2020 NBCA 77, 2020 NBCA 77

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 76-19-CA ELVIS BEN VICAIRE APPELLANT ELVIS BEN VICAIRE APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Vicaire v. R., 2020 NBCA 77 Vicaire c.

R., 2020 NBCA 77 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: March 28, 2006 (conviction) February 16, 2007 (sentence) Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : le 28 mars 2006 (déclaration de culpabilité) le 16 février 2007 (détermination de la peine) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2007 NBPC 22 Décision frappée d’appel : 2007 NBCP 22 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: [2019] N.B.J.

No. 207 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : [2019] A.N.-B. n o 207 Appeal heard: September 8, 2020 Appel entendu : le 8 septembre 2020 Judgment rendered: December 17, 2020 Jugement rendu : le 17 décembre 2020

Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Margaret Gallagher, Q.C. For the respondent: Patrick McGuinty Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Margaret Gallagher, c.r. Pour l’intimée : Patrick McGuinty THE COURT The appeal is dismissed. LA COUR L’appel est rejeté. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GREEN, J.A. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] The Parliament of Canada has recognized certain individuals pose such a significant threat to the lives, safety, or well-being of others that it may be appropriate, under strict circumstances, to designate these individuals as dangerous offenders and sentence them to incarceration for an indeterminate period. Given the obvious implications of such a decision on an offender’s personal liberty, great care must be taken by trial judges before determining this disposition is warranted. In the opinion of the trial judge in this matter, Elvis Ben Vicaire is such a person. [ 2 ] Mr.

Vicaire seeks to challenge his designation as a dangerous offender and the indeterminate sentence imposed upon him. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss his appeal. II. Background [ 3 ] Mr. Vicaire has led a troubled and violent life that brought him repeatedly within the ambit of the criminal justice system. The severity of his actions over the course of many years, coupled with the psychological factors at play, culminated in the Crown seeking to have Mr. Vicaire designated as a dangerous offender pursuant to s. 753 of the Criminal Code . I will delve into the details of Mr.

Vicaire’s personal and criminal history later in these reasons. At present, I will focus only on the portion of the narrative that constituted the predicate offence for the dangerous offender application. [ 4 ] On March 26, 2006, Mr. Vicaire asked his brother Darrell Vicaire for a cigarette. When a cigarette was not forthcoming, Mr. Vicaire threw his brother against a kitchen wall in their mother’s home, damaging the wall, then threw his brother to the floor and jumped on his chest (Darrell Vicaire later attended at hospital where he was treated for a separated shoulder).

As Darrell Vicaire fled the residence, Mr. Vicaire threw a hammer at him, threatened to kill Darrell Vicaire and their mother, “then proceeded to smash the glass patio doors in the residence as well as various pieces of furniture [and] other household items and broke holes in the walls.” All this over a cigarette.

[ 5 ] The police located Mr. Vicaire hiding in a crawl space under a nearby home. He surrendered into custody and was subsequently charged with assault causing bodily harm (s. 267(

b) of the Code ), uttering death threats (s. 264.1(1) (a)), and damage to property (s. 430(3)(a)). [ 6 ] Two days later, on the morning of March 28, just minutes after having entered guilty pleas on the charges arising from the incident described above, Mr. Vicaire was in a holding cell at the Miramichi Law Courts building. Although handcuffed, he smashed the glass window in his cell door. He began “flicking blood from the cuts [on his wrists] onto the walls of the cell.” He also threatened by his words and actions to do further harm to himself and to any officer who attempted to enter the cell.

Pepper spray was employed, “but it had little or no effect.” Mr. Vicaire armed himself with a shard of broken glass and refused repeated orders to drop the improvised weapon. Only after deploying a taser was it possible for officers to subdue him. Flowing from this incident were a charge of resisting a peace officer (s. 129(a)), and two charges of mischief (ss. 430(1)(

b) and (c)). [ 7 ] On August 2, 2006, the Crown filed a Notice of Application with the Provincial Court requesting, pursuant to s. 753(1)(a), an order designating Mr. Vicaire as a dangerous offender and imposing upon him an indeterminate sentence. The court subsequently ordered Mr. Vicaire remanded to the East Coast Forensic Hospital in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, for an assessment. [ 8 ] Over the course of three days in November 2006, a judge of the Provincial Court heard the Crown’s application.

He released his decision on February 16, 2007, concluding with the following disposition: I am therefore satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Vicaire is a dangerous offender and that the risk he poses cannot be managed under the long term offender provisions of the Criminal Code and accordingly I sentence him to an indeterminate sentence. [para. 60] [ 9 ] In June 2019, some 12 years after being designated as a dangerous offender and receiving a sentence for an indeterminate period of incarceration, Mr. Vicaire, on his own behalf, filed a Notice of Appeal.

This was followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal dated September 27, 2019, in which Mr. Vicaire, now represented by counsel, cited as his sole ground that the trial judge had erred in law “in failing to apply principles of sentencing relating to aboriginal offenders.” Apparently motivated by the argument with respect to Indigenous offenders, the Crown consented to Mr.

Vicaire being granted an extension of time to file his Notice. [ 10 ] A judge of this Court, sitting alone as motion judge, issued the following decision on August 6, 2019: Considering the unique circumstances of this case, and in light of the express consent of the Attorney General, the motion to extend time to file a Notice of Appeal is allowed. The Notice of Appeal shall be filed and served by September 27, 2019. [ 11 ] Although the Attorney General consented to the extension of time, she most certainly did not concede the appeal.

Crown counsel argued persuasively that the appeal should be dismissed, and, as indicated, I have reached the same conclusion. III. Issues & Analysis [ 12 ] In his second Amended Notice of Appeal, Mr. Vicaire raises four issues for the Court’s consideration, which he argues are sufficient to justify appellate intervention and a finding that he is not a dangerous offender. The grounds of appeal may be summarized by posing the following questions: 1.

Did the trial judge err in concluding the predicate offence of assault causing bodily harm constituted a “serious personal injury offence” as defined by s. 752 of the Code ? 2. Did the trial judge err in his assessment of the threat posed by Mr. Vicaire to the “life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons”, including his analysis of Mr. Vicaire’s behavioural pattern? 3. Did the trial judge err when he relied upon the psychiatric and other medical evidence presented?

4. Did the trial judge err when he failed to consider Mr. Vicaire’s Indigenous status in determining whether an indeterminate sentence was warranted, specifically by failing to order a Gladue report? A. Legislative Framework [ 13 ] The legislative framework with respect to an application for a finding that a particular offender should be designated as a dangerous offender is set out in s. 753(1) of the Code :

(1) On application made under this Part after an assessment report is filed under subsection 752.1(2), the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied (

a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (

a) of the definition of that expression in

section 752 and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well- being of other persons on the basis of evidence establishing (

i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour, (ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or (iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or (

b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (

b) of the definition of that expression in

section 752 and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses. 753

(1) Sur demande faite, en vertu de la présente partie, postérieurement au dépôt du rapport d’évaluation visé au paragraphe 752.1(2), le tribunal doit déclarer qu’un délinquant est un délinquant dangereux s’il est convaincu que, selon le cas :

a) l’infraction commise constitue des sévices graves à la personne, aux termes de l’alinéa a) de la définition de cette expression à l’article 752, et que le délinquant qui l’a commise constitue un danger pour la vie, la sécurité ou le bien-être physique ou mental de qui que ce soit, en vertu de preuves établissant, selon le cas : (

i) que, par la répétition de ses actes, notamment celui qui est à l’origine de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, le délinquant démontre qu’il est incapable de contrôler ses actes et permet de croire qu’il causera vraisemblablement la mort de quelque autre personne ou causera des sévices ou des dommages psychologiques graves à d’autres personnes, (ii) que, par la répétition continuelle de ses actes d’agression, notamment celui qui est à l’origine de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, le délinquant démontre une indifférence marquée quant aux conséquences raisonnablement prévisibles que ses actes peuvent avoir sur autrui, (iii) un comportement, chez ce délinquant, associé à la perpétration de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, d’une nature si brutale que l’on ne peut s’empêcher de conclure qu’il y a peu de chance pour qu’à l’avenir ce comportement soit inhibé par les normes ordinaires de restriction du comportement;

b) l’infraction commise constitue des sévices graves à la personne, aux termes de l’alinéa b) de la définition de cette expression à l’article 752, et que la conduite antérieure du délinquant dans le domaine sexuel, y compris lors de la perpétration de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, démontre son incapacité à contrôler ses impulsions sexuelles et laisse prévoir que vraisemblablement il causera à l’avenir de ce fait des sévices ou autres maux à d’autres personnes. B. Serious Personal Injury Offence

[ 14 ] The first ground of appeal alleges the trial judge erred in concluding that the predicate offence of assault causing bodily harm constitutes a “serious personal injury offence.” The definition of that term, found in s. 752, reads as follows: serious personal injury offence means (

a) an indictable offence, other than high treason, treason, first degree murder or second degree murder, involving (

i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or (ii) conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage on another person, and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more, or (

b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in

section 271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault). sévices graves à la personne Selon le cas :

a) les infractions — la haute trahison, la trahison, le meurtre au premier degré ou au deuxième degré exceptés — punissables, par mise en accusation, d’un emprisonnement d’au moins dix ans et impliquant : (

i) soit l’emploi, ou une tentative d’emploi, de la violence contre une autre personne, (ii) soit une conduite dangereuse, ou susceptible de l’être, pour la vie ou la sécurité d’une autre personne ou une conduite ayant infligé, ou susceptible d’infliger, des dommages psychologiques graves à une autre personne;

b) les infractions ou tentatives de perpétration de l’une des infractions visées aux articles 271 (agression sexuelle), 272 (agression sexuelle armée, menaces à une tierce personne ou infliction de lésions corporelles) ou 273 (agression sexuelle grave). [ 15 ] With respect, it is beyond question that the offence of assault causing bodily harm meets the definition set out above.

Section 267, as it then read, provided:

267 Every one who, in committing an assault, (

a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weaponor an imitation thereof, or (

b) causes bodily harm to the complainant, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable toimprisonment for a term not exceeding tenyears or an offence punishable on

summaryconviction and liable to imprisonment for aterm not exceeding eighteen months. 267 Est coupable soit d’un acte criminel etpassible d’un emprisonnement maximal dedix ans, soit d’une infraction punissable surdéclaration de culpabilité par procéduresommaire et passible d’un emprisonnementmaximal de dix-huit mois quiconque, en selivrant à des voies de fait, selon le cas :

a) porte, utilise ou menace d’utiliser une armeou une imitation d’arme;

b) inflige des lésions corporelles au plaignant. [16] In support of his argument that the predicate offence of assault causing bodily harm does notconstitute a “serious personal injury offence” in his case, Mr. Vicaire relies upon the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Neve,1999 ABCA 206, [1999] A.J. No. 753 (QL), wherein that court discussed the need to consider the degree of violence required whenconducting a dangerous offender analysis: As these

definitions demonstrate, violence, in its everyday usage, contemplates an element of severity to the physical force thatconstitutes the violent act. Hence, interpreting s. 752(a)(

i) to require that the violence be objectively serious is consistent with thelegislative text. Certainly, in other contexts, violence has been found to require something more than a mere application of force. InPitters v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (Ontario) (1996), 95 O.A.C. 325 at 334, the Ontario Court of Justice (Divisional Court)considered the meaning to be given to the words “crime of violence” as they appear in the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act,R.S.O. 1990, c. C-24: A “crime of violence” is a crime of a violent kind.

In everyday usage, “violence” connotes the exercise of a physical force so as to inflictinjury or damage to persons or property. “Violent” includes intense, vehement, very strong or severe. It is characterized by the doing ofharm or injury. [para. 74] [Emphasis in original.] [17] In his written submission, Mr. Vicaire argues that, “The sentencing judge’s brief analysis on thisissue did not go far enough to properly consider whether Mr. Vicaire’s actions were sufficiently serious to allow consideration of theDangerous Offender Provisions” (emphasis in original). The problem with Mr.

Vicaire’s position is that it is not consistent with thedirection provided by the Supreme Court in R. v. Steele, 2014 SCC 61, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 138: Paragraph (

a) of the definition in s. 752 requires, first, that the offence be an indictable offence, second, that the maximum sentence forthe offence be imprisonment for 10 years or more and, third, that the offence involve (

i) the use or attempted use of violence againstanother person, or (ii) conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict severepsychological damage on another person. In subpara. (a)(i), the word “violence” is not qualified, which means that the criteria may besatisfied even if the violence in question is not in itself “serious” (see Goforth, at para. 21; Lebar, at para. 67; R. v. Smith, 2012 ONCA645 , at para. 2).

The degree of seriousness intended by Parliament exists if all three requirements of the definition are met.Thus, an offence that involves the use or attempted use of violence against another person is not an SPIO under para. (

a) of the definitionif it is not an indictable offence or if it is not punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for 10 years or more. Just as para. (

b) of thedefinition does not invite the court to assess the manner of commission of the enumerated offences, subpara. (a)(

i) does not invite it toassess the seriousness of the violence the offender used or attempted to use; any level of violence is sufficient. [para. 39]

[18] As stated in Steele, the relevant

section of the Code “does not invite [the court] to assess theseriousness of the violence the offender used or attempted to use; any level of violence is sufficient.” Furthermore, Mr. Vicaire’sargument on this point is not consistent with the jurisprudence of our Court. In R. v.

Dunn, 2011 NBCA 19, 369 N.B.R. (2d) 271,Richard J.A. (as he then was) had this to say in his opening paragraph on the subject of what constitutes a serious personal injury offence:“An unprovoked and vicious assault on an unsuspecting victim, resulting in significant injuries requiring hospitalization, is a seriouspersonal injury offence that courts have an obligation to denounce and deter.” I note Justice Richard made this observation within thecontext of the definition of “serious personal injury offence” set out in s. 752 (see Dunn, at para. 14). [19] Mr.

Vicaire further questions the validity of the trial judge’s finding that the predicate offencewas a serious personal injury offence on the basis that the trial judge made a palpable error in finding the injuries inflicted by Mr. Vicaireupon his brother included both a separated shoulder and a cracked chest plate. In this regard, Mr. Vicaire is correct. The record does notsupport the trial judge’s finding. The injuries did include a separated shoulder, but the chest plate was not cracked. The factual error maybe palpable, but it is not overriding.

This factual error notwithstanding, the trial judge quite properly found the evidence before himclearly established the predicate offence of assault causing bodily harm met the statutory definition of serious personal injury offence. Iwould dismiss the first ground of appeal. C. Threat Assessment and Behavioural Pattern Analysis [20] In R. v. Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 936, the Supreme Court outlined the fourcriteria the Crown must establish in applications for dangerous offender designations. Relying upon the analysis conducted by La ForestJ. in R. v. Lyons, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, [1987] S.C.J.

No. 62 (QL), the Court in Boutilier set out the followingconditions: 1. The offender has been convicted of, and has to be sentenced for, a serious personal injury offence. 2. This predicate offence is part of a broader pattern of violence. 3. There is a high likelihood of harmful recidivism. 4. The violent conduct is intractable. See Boutilier, at paragraphs 26 to 28. [21] La Forest J., writing for the majority in Lyons, explained the criteria in these terms: First, the legislation applies only to persons convicted of a “serious personal injury offence” as defined in s. 687.

These offences all relateto conduct tending to cause severe physical danger or severe psychological injury to other persons. Significantly, the maximum penaltyfor all these offences must be at least ten years’ imprisonment. Secondly, it must be established to the satisfaction of the court that theoffence for which the person has been convicted is not an isolated occurrence, but part of a pattern of behaviour which has involvedviolence, aggressive or brutal conduct, or a failure to control sexual impulses.

Thirdly, it must be established that the pattern of conduct isvery likely to continue and to result in the kind of suffering against which the

section seeks to protect, namely, conduct endangering thelife, safety or physical well-being of others or, in the case of sexual offences, conduct causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons.Also explicit in one form or another in each subparagraph of s. 687 is the requirement that the court must be satisfied that the pattern ofconduct is substantially or pathologically intractable.

Finally, the court has the discretion not to designate the offender as dangerous or toimpose an indeterminate sentence, even in circumstances where all of these criteria are met. [para. 43] [22] I have already discussed, and disposed of, Mr. Vicaire’s arguments with respect to the first ofthese four criteria. I now turn my attention to the remainder. [23] Relying on the Neve decision, Mr.

Vicaire asserts that “only serious criminal offences which arerelevant to pattern in the Dangerous Offender context are to be considered at this stage” and that “this eliminates consideration ofoffences unrelated in nature to the predicate offence (even if involving violence), and anti-social behaviour and character evidence.” TheCrown argues that, with respect to the “seriousness” of other offences on the offender’s criminal record, the Steele decision of theSupreme Court suggests otherwise. I agree.

While Neve has been cited extensively by Canadian courts since its release in 1999, certain ofits findings have clearly been displaced by Steele.

[ 24 ] In R. v. Shea , 2017 NSCA 43 , [2017] N.S.J. No. 192 (QL) , this very issue was considered by Bryson J.A. Although Justice Bryson was writing in dissent, the majority agreed with his legal analysis, which states: Neve says the pattern offences must be objectively “serious” because the predicate offence is also objectively serious. We know from Steele that the second proposition is wrong. It must follow that so is the first. The predicate offence must be a serious personal injury offence, but it need not be “objectively serious” and it must follow that neither need be the pattern behaviour.

Otherwise, pattern behaviour would be subject to a higher standard than the predicate offence, which triggers the dangerous offender process. Put otherwise, the pattern offences need not be “objectively serious” because the predicate offence need not be. Steele says so. “Seriousness” is captured by the statutory language and does not require embellishment.

There is no need to “read in” language that the legislation does not contain. [para. 53] [ 25 ] In the present case, the Crown argues that the offences considered by the trial judge “were, in fact, objectively serious and highly relevant.” Again, I agree. [ 26 ] The trial judge relied upon a “Chronology by Offence Date of Criminal Behaviour of Elvis Vicaire Leading to Conviction by offence” to assist him in his analysis. Given the importance of this evidence to the outcome of the Crown’s application, I have attached the chronology to these reasons as Appendix “A”.

For certain of these offences, a synopsis is provided, outlining the “circumstances of the offence.” The propensity for violence, often with little or no provocation, is disturbing. The litany of offences includes a sexual assault committed when Mr. Vicaire was only age 13 (his victim was a seven-year-old child), the use of weapons, and assaults against members of his own family as well as peace officers. In his decision at paragraph 15, the trial judge provided a useful

summary of Mr. Vicaire’s criminal history. It reflects a clear pattern of repetitive violent behaviour: […] As a youth he had 18 convictions including convictions for eight property related offences, a sexual assault with a weapon in 1991 and five additional offences against persons either by way of threat or assaultive behaviour. As an adult he was convicted on two counts of threatening people, four indictable and one

summary assaults, two charges of obstructing or resisting peace officers, eight charges of assaults on peace officers, one charge of assault causing bodily harm, four breaches of court orders, two charges of dangerous driving, ten property related offences and an offence of unlawfully being in a dwelling house. In addition on November 9 th , 2004 he was convicted on one count of felony theft and two misdemeanours with respect to an auto accident. [ 27 ] The Crown’s written submission includes a compelling passage addressing Mr.

Vicaire’s “broader pattern of violence”, of which the predicate offence clearly formed a part: It suffices to say that the evidence before the trial judge, including the chronology of criminal conduct, establishes a nearly constant stream of persistent aggressive and violent assaults on civilian victims or police officers, perpetrated in a state of uncontrollable rage, triggered by insignificant or trifling events, that resulted in injuries for several victims, some of which required hospitalization. [ 28 ] I agree with this characterization of the situation. [ 29 ] Mr.

Vicaire takes issue with the sufficiency of the trial judge’s analysis with respect to establishing the requisite pattern required under s. 753 . In response, “the Crown acknowledges more robust reasons may have been beneficial.” That said, the trial judge’s reasons need not be perfect, and I am satisfied the judge’s reasons more than allow for meaningful appellate review. The trial judge concluded the Crown’s application met the requirements of both ss. 753(1)(a)(

i) and (ii), and I would not interfere with his findings. D. Reliance on Psychiatric and other Medical Evidence [ 30 ] The trial judge quoted extensively from psychiatric and medical evidence in his decision. Of particular relevance is the report of forensic psychiatrist Dr. Scott Theriault. Below are some of Dr. Theriault’s findings: The risk assessment instruments used in this case place Mr. Vicaire at an extremely elevated risk of violent re-offense compared to the general violent offender population. Mr. Vicaire has a well-established pattern of not only multiple violent offenses but of at least one

sexual offense and numerous non-violent and property offenses. Given his risk scores on the instruments utilized, Mr. Vicaire, if placed in a situation where he has an opportunity to reoffend (and given his history, even in an institutional setting), it is highly likely that he will re-offend in a relatively short period of time. […] [H]is features of psychopathy are such that even in the absence of substance abuse disorder, or with the treatment of the mental disorder, his risk for violent recidivism would remain elevated. Mr.

Vicaire does have, by history, a diagnosis of a significant mental disorder, namely schizoaffective disorder […] Mr. Vicaire would benefit from treatment of his illness, although it should not be anticipated that treatment of his psychiatric illness would lead to reduction in his risk. […] Finally, there is a need to comment on the treatability of psychopathy. It remains a controversial issue in the field whether psychopathy is a treatable condition or not. Several investigators/researchers are actively pursuing treatment programs for psychopathy, including researches within the Correctional Service of Canada.

The following quotation is taken from the

chapter on treatment of psychopathy in the Handbook of Psychopathy, published in 2006 by the Guildford Press: “We believe there is no evidence that any treatments yet applied to psychopaths have been shown to be effective in reducing violence or crime. In fact, some treatments that are effective for other offenders are actually harmful for psychopaths in that they appear to promote recidivism.

We believe that the reason for these finding is that psychopaths are fundamentally different from other offenders and that there is nothing “wrong” with them in the manner of a deficit or impairment that therapy can “fix”. [ 31 ] Under the heading “Risk Assessment” in his report, Dr. Theriault states, “The following instruments were utilized and scored in determining Mr. Vicaire’s risk for violent recidivism.” He then goes on to identify three specific tools: 1.

Psychopathy Checklist Revised, Second Edition, which he describes as “a commonly utilized instrument in the field of forensic psychiatry” that was “designed to measure the extent of psychopathic traits;” 2. HCR-20, described as “a structured guide used in the assessment of risk for violence” that acts to “assist assessors in delineating those factors, both static and dynamic […] which have a known association with the risk for violent recidivism;” and 3.

Violence Risk Assessment Guide, “an actuarial instrument that utilizes static information (i.e. information that does not change) from an individual’s history to generate a numerical value representing the probability of violent re-offence in the future.” [ 32 ] Mr. Vicaire challenges the trial judge’s reliance on Dr. Theriault’s report because Dr. Theriault used the assessment tools referenced above, and the validity of those tools has been questioned when used with Indigenous offenders. In support of his position, Mr. Vicaire relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ewert v.

Canada , 2018 SCC 30 , [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165 . Specifically, in his written submission Mr. Vicaire states, “Those are three of the very tools that the Supreme Court has described in [ Ewert ] as of ‘questionable validity’ with respect to Indigenous inmates because they fail to account for cultural differences, and have been shown to be inaccurate.” With respect, that is not what the court said in Ewert . [ 33 ] The Ewert decision was rendered within the context of the statutory obligations imposed on the Correctional Service of Canada by the Corrections and Conditional Release Act , S.C. 1992, c. 20 .

The Court acknowledged there were “credible concerns” the tools used were “of questionable validity with respect to Indigenous inmates”, but it did not make that an explicit finding: Given this context, it is crucial that the CSC heed the directive set out in s. 4(

g) of the CCRA , the effect of which is that the CSC’s practices must not perpetuate systemic discrimination against Indigenous persons. In the context of the case at bar, this required, at the

very least, that the CSC take seriously the credible concerns that have been repeatedly raised according to which information derived from the impugned tools is of questionable validity with respect to Indigenous inmates because the tools fail to account for cultural differences. By disregarding the possibility that these tools are systematically disadvantaging Indigenous offenders and by failing to take any action to ensure that they generate accurate information, the CSC fell short of what it is required to do under s. 24(1) of the CCRA .

Although this Court is not now in a position to define with precision what the CSC must do to meet the standard set out in s. 24(1) in these circumstances, what is required, at a minimum, is that if the CSC wishes to continue to use the impugned tools, it must conduct research into whether and to what extent they are subject to cross-cultural variance when applied to Indigenous offenders. Any further action the standard requires will depend on the outcome of that research.

Depending on the extent of any cross-cultural variance that is discovered, the CSC may have to cease using the impugned tools in respect of Indigenous inmates, as it has in fact done with other actuarial tools in the past. Alternatively, the CSC may need to qualify or modify the use of the tools in some way to ensure that Indigenous inmates are not prejudiced by their use. [paras. 66-67] [ 34 ] There was no evidence before the trial judge in Mr. Vicaire’s case that any of the diagnostic tools relied upon by Dr. Theriault were faulty or questionable.

Nothing was placed into evidence before the trial judge that the testing may be culturally biased or suspect to the detriment of Mr. Vicaire. Further, as the Crown has pointed out, if new research such as that suggested by the Supreme Court in Ewert now exists to support Mr. Vicaire’s position, there was no request to bring such material before this Court by way of a motion to introduce fresh evidence. [ 35 ] I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.

There was ample psychiatric and other medical evidence before the trial judge to support his findings, and I am satisfied he subjected that evidence to a proper evaluation and weighing. E. Lack of a Gladue Report [ 36 ] Upon finding that a dangerous offender designation was warranted, the trial judge proceeded to the next stage in the process: I turn now to a determination before declaring Mr.

Vicaire a dangerous offender and imposing an indeterminate term of incarceration, whether the sentencing sanctions available pursuant [to] the long-term offender provisions are sufficient to reduce the threat of harm to others to an acceptable level, to justify a determinate sentence. [para. 39] [ 37 ] Subsection 753.1(1) of the Code sets out the process for an application for an order that an offender is a long-term offender:

753.1

(1) The court may, on application made under this Part following the filing of an assessment report under subsection 752.1(2), find an offender to be a long-term offender if it is satisfied that (

a) it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more for the offence for which the offender has been convicted; (

b) there is a substantial risk that the offender will reoffend; and (

c) there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community. 753.1

(1) Sur demande faite, en vertu de la présente partie, postérieurement au dépôt du rapport d’évaluation visé au paragraphe 752.1(2), le tribunal peut déclarer que le délinquant est un délinquant à contrôler, s’il est convaincu que les conditions suivantes sont réunies :

a) il y a lieu d’imposer au délinquant une peine minimale d’emprisonnement de deux ans pour l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable;

b) celui-ci présente un risque élevé de récidive;

c) il existe une possibilité réelle que ce risque puisse être maîtrisé au sein de la collectivité. [ 38 ] One of the key provisions of that subsection is a requirement that the court be satisfied, “there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.” As will be seen, the trial judge considered but was unable to reach that conclusion. [ 39 ] The trial judge continued: For the reasons set out above I am satisfied that there is a substantial risk [that] Mr. Vicaire will re-offend. […] Considering Mr.

Vicaire’s long history of antisocial and criminal conduct, his propensity to act in a violent manner with little or no provocation, his continuing mental health issues which make him a poor candidate for rehabilitation, his total lack of remorse, his lengthy criminal record, the severity of the attack of the victim and the serious injuries he suffered, I am satisfied that a term of imprisonment in excess of two years in a federal [institution] would be appropriate. The final issue to be resolved is whether or not the risk that Mr.

Vicaire poses to the community can be managed in the community. [paras. 40, 42, 43] [ 40 ] I now turn to the substance of Mr. Vicaire’s final ground of appeal.

Section 718.2 of the Code imposes a positive obligation upon judges to consider “the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders” when crafting an appropriate sentence:

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shallalso take into consideration the followingprinciples: […] (

e) all available sanctions, other thanimprisonment, that are reasonable in thecircumstances and consistent with the harmdone to victims or to the community shouldbe considered for all offenders, withparticular attention to the circumstances ofAboriginal offenders. 718.2 Le tribunal détermine la peine àinfliger compte tenu également des principessuivants : […]

e) l’examen, plus particulièrement en ce quiconcerne les délinquants autochtones, detoutes les sanctions substitutives qui sontraisonnables dans les circonstances et quitiennent compte du tort causé aux victimes ouà la collectivité. [41] The Supreme Court considered and interpreted this provision in R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19 (QL), and expanded upon in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433. ThisCourt recently had occasion to discuss the obligation in Jackson v. R., 2019 NBCA 37, [2019] N.B.J. No. 114 (QL): In R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19 (QL), the Supreme Court provides direction on theproper

interpretation and implications of this section: [...] the aim of s. 718.2(

e) is to reduce the tragic overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in prisons. It seeks to ameliorate the presentsituation and to deal with the particular offence and offender and community. The fact that a court is called upon to take intoconsideration the unique circumstances surrounding these different parties is not unfair to non-Aboriginal people. Rather, thefundamental purpose of s. 718.2(

e) is to treat Aboriginal offenders fairly by taking into account their difference. [...] [...] At the same time, it must in every case be recalled that the direction to consider these unique circumstances flows from thestaggering injustice currently experienced by Aboriginal peoples with the criminal justice system. The provision reflects the reality thatmany Aboriginal people are alienated from this system which frequently does not reflect their needs or their understanding of anappropriate sentence. [paras. 87-88] The Supreme Court expanded upon its decision in Gladue with R. v.

Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, in which we gain adeeper understanding of how trial judges should approach the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender. Specifically, courts are directed totake notice of “the systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society” (para. 60). Ipeelee instructs us tolink those historic factors with today’s often stark realities for Aboriginal people in Canada: “lower educational attainment, lowerincomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration” (para. 60).

Ipeelee references the practice which has developed in Canadian courts to facilitate the consideration of these factors within the contextof applying s. 718.2(

e) to the sentencing process: [...] In current practice, it appears that case-specific information is often brought before the court by way of a Gladue report, which is aform of pre-sentence report tailored to the specific circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. Bringing such information to the attention ofthe judge in a comprehensive and timely manner is helpful to all parties at a sentencing hearing for an Aboriginal offender, as it isindispensable to a judge in fulfilling his duties under s. 718.2(

e) of the Criminal Code. [para. 60] Finally, the Ipeelee decision clearly sets out the basis upon which appellate intervention is warranted in sentence appeals involving anAboriginal offender: The sentencing judge has a statutory duty, imposed by s. 718.2(

e) of the Criminal Code, to consider the unique circumstances ofAboriginal offenders. Failure to apply Gladue in any case involving an Aboriginal offender runs afoul of this statutory obligation. As

these reasons have explained, such a failure would also result in a sentence that was not fit and was not consistent with the fundamental principle of proportionality. Therefore, application of the Gladue principles is required in every case involving an Aboriginal offender, including breach of an LTSO, and a failure to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention. [para. 87] IV.

Standard of Review If a trial judge fails to consider Gladue when sentencing an Aboriginal offender, or fails to give adequate weight to an offender’s Aboriginal status when crafting his or her sentence, it amounts to an error of law. Once such an error is established, the trial judge is no longer entitled to deference, and the appellate court must respond accordingly. [paras. 19-23] [ 42 ] Mr. Vicaire is unquestionably an Indigenous person. In his decision, the trial judge explicitly identifies Mr. Vicaire as “a member of the Eel Ground First Nation” and as being of Mi’kmaq descent.

This case was heard in late 2006 and decided in early 2007, eight years after Gladue , yet no Gladue report was ordered. Mr. Vicaire’s Indigenous ancestry received only a passing reference in his Pre-Sentence Report. This omission serves to highlight, once again, a chronic problem in this province. It is worth repeating the observations made in Jackson : In the present case, counsel for Mr. Jackson argues the “standard required” for a Gladue report was not met. This statement illuminates what I consider a weakness in the approach to preparing Gladue reports in New Brunswick: there is no apparent standard.

Unlike some Canadian jurisdictions, we appear to have no administrative protocol designed to provide trial courts with consistently fulsome pre- sentence reports which reflect the positive obligations imposed by Gladue and Ipeelee . In my opinion, it would be beneficial to all interested parties if such a protocol existed. [para. 24] [ 43 ] I have no hesitation in stating the failure to order and then consider a Gladue report in the circumstances of this case constitutes an error of law. The more pertinent question, however, is whether the error requires overturning the decision of the trial judge.

In my view, it does not. I will elaborate. [ 44 ] In Gladue , the Supreme Court made clear that “the more violent and serious the offence the more likely it is as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and non-aboriginals will be close to each other or the same” (para. 79). See also Penny v. R. , 2010 NBCA 49 , 362 N.B.R. (2d) 255 , per Quigg J.A., at para. 53. [ 45 ] The Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Radcliffe , 2017 ONCA 176 , [ 2017] O.J. No. 1060 (QL) , dealt with a case that bears marked similarities to that of Mr. Vicaire. Mr.

Radcliffe, an Indigenous offender, was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to incarceration for an indeterminate period. Six years later, he appealed, alleging the trial judge had erred “in failing to order a Gladue report or to consider the influence of Gladue factors and s. 718(2) (

e) of the Criminal Code in determining whether there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of [Mr. Radcliffe]’s risk of re-offence in the community.” For our purposes in this analysis, the decision of Watt J.A. in Radcliffe is very much on point, and I adopt his reasoning as my own, in particular the following: At the outset, we acknowledge that the trial judge did not refer to either Gladue or to s. 718.2 (

e) in reaching his conclusion on sentence.

Section 718.2 (

e) requires that, as a matter of substantive decision-making, an offender’s Aboriginal status and related circumstances must be considered when determining an appropriate sentence. Despite this error, we are satisfied that express consideration of Gladue factors and s. 718.2 (

e) would have made no difference in the result. It is well settled that Gladue factors and s. 718.2 (

e) of the Criminal Code have limited relevance in dangerous offender proceedings. They have no say in whether an offender meets the statutory requirements for designation as a dangerous offender. Their influence has to do with the subsidiary question of whether there is a reasonable possibility of eventually controlling the offender’s re-offence risk in the community, thus on the divide between dangerous and long-term offenders.

With the paramount sentencing objective of protection of the public, the judicial discretion to determine an appropriate sentence is significantly circumscribed. […] In this case, the trial judge had to determine whether there was a realistic possibility of eventually controlling the risk that the appellant would re-offend in the community. It was not a close contest. An offender with an incurable anti-social personality disorder, several

equally-incurable paraphilias and a significantly elevated likelihood of violent recidivism. One who had a richly documented history oftreatment avoidance. It is inconceivable in these circumstances that Gladue considerations, especially without evidence of theavailability, much less the nature of ameliorative programs, could have converted an unmanageable risk into a manageable one. [paras.62, 63 and 65] [46] In spite of the clear error of law committed in not ordering and considering a Gladue report andnot taking into account Mr.

Vicaire’s Indigenous status, which is freely conceded by the Crown, in my opinion the trial judge’s decisionshould stand. As stated in Radcliffe, “there must be evidence before the sentencing judge that the dangerous offender can be safelyreleased into the community.” There was no evidence to substantiate such a finding. The author of Mr.

Vicaire’s Pre-Sentence Reportstated, “From a correctional perspective, and considering the matters for which he again appears before the Court, it is uncertain whetherthere are any community resources available at this time which would effectively treat his problems of aggression, substance abuse andhis paranoid delusional convictions that society is ‘out to get him’”. [47] An error on the part of the presiding judge in hearing a dangerous offender application will notnecessarily require setting aside the decision and ordering a new hearing, as the Supreme Court made clear in R. v.

Johnson, 2003 SCC46, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 357: It is a reasonable assumption, in our view, that Parliament would not have intended that any error of law in the course of a dangerousoffender application would necessitate a new hearing. As Prowse J.A. correctly concluded in the companion case, R. v. Mitchell (2002),161 C.C.C. (3d) 508, 2002 BCCA 48, at para. 63: ... it would defy common sense to presume that Parliament intended to preclude the court of appeal from dismissing an appeal where asentencing judge makes a trivial or immaterial error in the course of dangerous or long-term offender proceedings.

While the court ofappeal is given the power to order a new hearing, it is not bound to do so simply because the appellant is able to point to an error on thepart of the sentencing judge. Rather, the court must assess the nature and effect of the error to determine whether it justifies thesubstitution of a different sentence, a new hearing or a dismissal of the appeal.

But if a court of appeal has the power to dismiss an appeal against a declaration that an offender is dangerous on the basis that the errorof law has resulted in no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, that power may be exercised in only the rarest of circumstances. InR. v. Bevan, (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599, at p. 617, the Court concluded that the curative proviso contained in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) is to be applied in only those circumstances in which there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been anydifferent had the error of law not been made.

The same high standard applies in the context of s. 759(3)(b). Where the error of law consists of the sentencing judge’s failure to consider the availability of the long-term offender provisions, it is inonly the rarest of circumstances, if any, that there will be no reasonable possibility that the sentencing judge would have imposed adifferent sentence but for the error. The criteria set out in the long-term offender provisions are substantially different from the criteriaset out in the dangerous offender provisions.

Therefore, the evidence and arguments that are relevant under the long-term offenderapplication are not precisely the same as the evidence and arguments that are relevant under the dangerous offender application.

Absent athorough inquiry into the suitability of the long-term offender provisions at the sentencing hearing, it will be difficult, if not impossible,for an appellate court to be satisfied that the sentencing options available pursuant to the long-term offender provisions would have beenincapable of reducing the threat of harm to an acceptable level. [paras. 49-50] [48] The findings of the trial judge at this stage of his analysis are telling: This out of control, aggressive, defiant behaviour eventually led to serious intervention by social workers, psychologists and psychiatristsfrom the time Elvis was a very young child.

These interventions have had little impact on his behaviour, and he subsequently ended upin prison. His experience within the federal prison system was chaotic and did little to prevent him from aggressive, intimidating,assaultive and violent behaviour both inside the institution and upon each release. […] Because of his conduct in the various institutions his security classification was generally set at maximum.

Upon his incarceration in theMoncton Detention Centre in May of 1999 in an assessment of a parole officer […] he was described as an individual who cannoteffectively manage his anger and that he presents a maximum risk of recidivism.

[…] In an assessment dated June of 1999 […] prepared at Dorchester Penitentiary, Mr. Vicaire is described as “a young man who has demonstrated a propensity to behave aggressively and violently and all attempts at helping him seems to have been futile. In October 1999 a parole officer addressing the issue of whether or not Mr. Vicaire should be paroled wrote […] “Mr. Vicaire’s lack of progress toward addressing his criminogenic factors coupled with his apparent lack of motivation to change lead the court to believe his risk is not assumable in the community at this time.” […] Mr.

Vicaire’s documented propensity to acts of violence, his continuing mental health issues, his complete resistance and lack of co- operation with efforts at rehabilitation continue to present. In January 2003 a parole officer expressed the opinion that Mr. Vicaire would be no more receptive to intervention in the community than he was in prison as follows: […] “It would not be anticipated that Mr. Vicaire would be any more receptive, remorseful or responsible in the community than he has been while incarcerated.” […] “Mr.

Vicaire has not responded to interventions to address his risk factors, program involvement, medication or psychological/psychiatric interventions. It is not anticipated that he will be any more compliant in a community setting…” In 2004 he continues to resist treatment. […] A parole officer at the Atlantic Institution writes: “His resistance towards treatment is exacerbated by his co-morbidity of his anti-social personality disorder.” Right up until his last release from a federal institution he continues to resist any meaningful interventions.

Based on the history of intervention and his resistance to treatment, either inside or outside the institutions, and given that the attempts at intervention span a period of time now approaching 20 years it is unlikely that future efforts will meet with any success. In addition Dr. Theriault in his medical report, referred to above, suggests that there is no successful treatment for psychopathy. I have therefore concluded that Mr.

Vicaire continues to pose a serious risk to the community, that he continues to resist and oppose any meaningful interventions in regards to his social and mental health situation, that he continues to demonstrate a lack of conscience and shows no remorse for his conduct, that he has alienated his family and the members of his community by his conduct and as such has absolutely no community support, that he is aggressive and manipulative and continues to be a very serious risk to re-offend in a violent manner, that his pattern of conduct is “substantially or pathologically intractable” and that at the present time there is no realistic probability of controlling the risk he represents in the community.

I am therefore satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Vicaire is a dangerous offender and that the risk he poses cannot be managed under the long term offender provisions of the Criminal Code and accordingly I sentence him to an indeterminate sentence. [paras. 45, 47, 49, 50, 52-60] [ 49 ] In my opinion, a fulsome Gladue report would not have changed the outcome of Mr. Vicaire’s designation and sentence.

As directed to consider by the Supreme Court in Johnson , I am satisfied “ the error of law has resulted in no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice .” Consequently, while I obviously do not condone the clear omission in this case to order and consider a Gladue report and to take into account Mr. Vicaire’s circumstances as an Indigenous offender, I would not overturn the trial judge’s decision on this ground.

IV. Conclusion and Disposition [ 50 ] I am not persuaded the decision of the trial judge was the product of reversible error. For the reasons set out above, I would dismiss the appeal. Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par LE JUGE GREEN I. Introduction [1] Le Parlement du Canada reconnaît que certaines personnes présentent un danger d’une importance telle pour la vie, la sécurité ou le bien-être d’autrui qu’il peut convenir, en des circonstances strictement définies, de les déclarer délinquants dangereux et de les condamner à une incarcération de durée indéterminée.

Étant donné les conséquences manifestes d’une décision en ce sens sur la liberté de la personne, le juge du procès doit se montrer très prudent avant de conclure que cette déclaration est justifiée. De l’avis du juge du procès dans la présente affaire, Elvis Ben Vicaire est un délinquant dangereux. [2] M. Vicaire entreprend de contester la déclaration de délinquant dangereux et la peine de durée indéterminée prononcées contre lui. Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter son appel. II. Contexte [3] M.

Vicaire a mené une existence tumultueuse et violente qui, à maintes reprises, l’a mené sur le terrain de la justice pénale. La gravité des actes qu’il a commis au fil de nombreuses années ainsi que les facteurs psychologiques en jeu ont conduit le ministère public à demander qu’il soit déclaré délinquant dangereux au

titre de l’ art. 753 du Code criminel . J’examinerai en détail, plus loin dans les présents motifs, le passé de M. Vicaire et ses antécédents criminels. Pour le moment, je m’arrête à l’épisode au cours duquel a été perpétrée l’infraction sous-jacente, sur laquelle s’appuyait la demande de déclaration de délinquant dangereux. [4] Le 26 mars 2006, M. Vicaire a demandé une cigarette à son frère, Darrell Vicaire. La cigarette attendue ne venant pas, M.

Vicaire a projeté son frère contre le mur de la cuisine de leur mère, qu’il a endommagé, puis il a envoyé son frère au sol et lui a sauté sur le torse (Darrell Vicaire s’est ensuite présenté à l’hôpital avec une dislocation de l’épaule). Tandis que son frère s’enfuyait, M. Vicaire lui a lancé un marteau, a menacé de le tuer, de même que leur mère, puis il a [TRADUCTION] « entrepris de fracasser les vitres des portes-fenêtres coulissantes de la demeure, de même que divers meubles et articles ménagers, et [a] enfoncé les murs par endroits ». Le tout pour une cigarette. [5] La police a trouvé M.

Vicaire terré dans le vide sanitaire d’une maison avoisinante. Il s’est livré à la police et, par la suite, il a été accusé de voies de fait ayant causé des lésions corporelles ( al. 267b) du Code criminel ), de menaces de mort ( al. 264.1(1) a)) et de détérioration de biens ( al. 430(3) a)). [6] Deux jours plus tard, le 28 mars au matin, M. Vicaire se trouvait détenu dans une cellule du Palais de justice de Miramichi, à peine quelques minutes après avoir plaidé coupable face aux accusations issues de ces événements. Quoique menotté, il a pu briser la fenêtre de la porte de sa cellule.

Puis, coupé aux poignets, M. Vicaire s’est mis à [TRADUCTION] « asperg[er] de sang les murs de la cellule ». Il a également menacé, en paroles et par gestes, de se faire du mal à nouveau et de s’en prendre à tout agent qui tenterait de pénétrer dans la cellule. Le vaporisateur de poivre employé [TRADUCTION] « n’a à peu près rien donné ». M. Vicaire s’est armé d’un tesson de verre et, malgré des sommations répétées, a refusé de jeter l’arme improvisée. Les agents n’ont pu le maîtriser qu’après avoir fait usage d’un pistolet électrique. Une accusation imputant à M.

Vicaire d’avoir résisté à un agent de la paix (al. 129a)) et deux accusations de méfait (al. 430(1)

b) et c)) ont ensuite été portées.

[7] Le 2 août 2006, le ministère public a déposé auprès de la Cour provinciale un avis de requête par lequel il sollicitait, sur le fondement de l’al. 753(1)

a) du Code , une ordonnance déclarant M. Vicaire délinquant dangereux et lui infligeant une peine de durée indéterminée. La Cour a ensuite ordonné le renvoi de M. Vicaire pour évaluation à l’East Coast Forensic Hospital, situé à Dartmouth, en Nouvelle-Écosse. [8] En novembre 2006, un juge de la Cour provinciale a consacré trois jours à l’audition de la requête du ministère public. Le 16 février 2007, il a rendu une décision dont le dispositif est le suivant : [TRADUCTION] Je suis donc convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable que M.

Vicaire est un délinquant dangereux et que le risque qu’il constitue ne peut pas être pris en charge sous le régime des dispositions du Code criminel applicables aux délinquants à contrôler. En conséquence, je condamne M. Vicaire à une peine de détention de durée indéterminée. [par. 60] [9] En juin 2019, soit quelque douze ans après avoir été déclaré délinquant dangereux et condamné à une peine d’incarcération de durée indéterminée, M. Vicaire a déposé, pour son propre compte, un avis d’appel. L’avis a été suivi d’un avis d’appel modifié daté du 27 septembre 2019, dans lequel M.

Vicaire, représenté par une avocate, faisait valoir pour unique moyen que le juge du procès avait commis une erreur de droit [TRADUCTION] « en n’appliquant pas les principes de détermination de la peine relatifs aux délinquants autochtones ». Apparemment sensible à l’argument avancé à l’égard des délinquants autochtones, le ministère public avait consenti à ce qu’une prolongation du délai de dépôt de l’avis soit accordée à M. Vicaire. [10] Une juge de notre Cour, siégeant seule à

titre de juge saisie de la motion, a rendu la décision suivante le 6 août 2019 : Compte tenu des circonstances particulières dans cette affaire et du fait que la procureure générale a expressément accordé son consentement, la requête en prorogation du délai d’interjeter appel est accueillie. L’avis d’appel doit être déposé et signifié au plus tard le 27 septembre 2019. [11] Quoique la procureure générale ait consenti à la prolongation du délai, elle n’a absolument pas concédé le bien-fondé de l’appel.

L’avocat du ministère public a soutenu éloquemment qu’il fallait rejeter l’appel et, comme je l’ai indiqué, je suis arrivé à la même conclusion. III. Questions en litige et analyse [12] Dans son second avis d’appel modifié, M. Vicaire soumet à l’examen de notre Cour quatre moyens. Il soutient qu’ils justifient d’intervenir en appel et de conclure qu’il n’est pas un délinquant dangereux. Il est permis de résumer ces moyens en posant les quatre questions suivantes : 1.

Le juge du procès a-t-il commis une erreur lorsqu’il a conclu que l’infraction sous-jacente de voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles était constitutive de « sévices graves à la personne » au sens de l’ art. 752 du Code criminel ? 2. Le juge du procès a-t-il commis une erreur dans son évaluation du danger que présentait M. Vicaire pour « la vie, la sécurité ou le bien-être physique ou mental de qui que ce soit », notamment dans son analyse du comportement général de M. Vicaire? 3.

Le juge du procès a-t-il commis une erreur en se fondant sur la preuve médicale, et notamment sur la preuve psychiatrique, présentée? 4. Le juge du procès a-t-il commis une erreur du fait qu’il n’a pas tenu compte du statut d’Autochtone de M. Vicaire pour déterminer si une peine de durée indéterminée était justifiée, et plus précisément du fait qu’il n’a pas ordonné la production d’un rapport fondé sur l’arrêt Gladue ? A. Cadre législatif

[13] Une demande priant le tribunal de conclure qu’un délinquant doit être déclaré dangereux s’inscrit dans le cadre législatif établi au par. 753(1) du Code criminel :

(1) On application made under this Part after an assessment report is filed under subsection 752.1(2), the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied (

a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (

a) of the definition of that expression in

section 752 and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of evidence establishing (

i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour, (ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or (iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or (

b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (

b) of the definition of that expression in

section 752 and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses. 753

(1) Sur demande faite, en vertu de la présente partie, postérieurement au dépôt du rapport d’évaluation visé au paragraphe 752.1(2), le tribunal doit déclarer qu’un délinquant est un délinquant dangereux s’il est convaincu que, selon le cas :

a) l’infraction commise constitue des sévices graves à la personne, aux termes de l’alinéa a) de la définition de cette expression à l’article 752, et que le délinquant qui l’a commise constitue un danger pour la vie, la sécurité ou le bien-être physique ou mental de qui que ce soit, en vertu de preuves établissant, selon le cas : (

i) que, par la répétition de ses actes, notamment celui qui est à l’origine de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, le délinquant démontre qu’il est incapable de contrôler ses actes et permet de croire qu’il causera vraisemblablement la mort de quelque autre personne ou causera des sévices ou des dommages psychologiques graves à d’autres personnes, (ii) que, par la répétition continuelle de ses actes d’agression, notamment celui qui est à l’origine de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, le délinquant démontre une indifférence marquée quant aux conséquences raisonnablement prévisibles que ses actes peuvent avoir sur autrui, (iii) un comportement, chez ce délinquant, associé à la perpétration de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, d’une nature si brutale que l’on ne peut s’empêcher de conclure qu’il y a peu de chance pour qu’à l’avenir ce comportement soit inhibé par les normes ordinaires de restriction du comportement;

b) l’infraction commise constitue des sévices graves à la personne, aux termes de l’alinéa b) de la définition de cette expression à l’article 752, et que la conduite antérieure du délinquant dans le domaine sexuel, y compris lors de la perpétration de l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, démontre son incapacité à contrôler ses impulsions sexuelles et laisse prévoir que vraisemblablement il causera à l’avenir de ce fait des sévices ou autres maux à d’autres personnes.

B. Sévices graves à la personne [14] Dans son premier moyen d’appel, l’appelant avance que le juge du procès a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a conclu que l’infraction sous-jacente de voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles était constitutive de « sévices graves à la personne ».

La définition donnée de ce terme à l’ art. 752 est la suivante : serious personal injury offence means (

a) an indictable offence, other than high treason, treason, first degree murder or second degree murder, involving (

i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or (ii) conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage on another person, and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more, or (

b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in

section 271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault). sévices graves à la personne Selon le cas :

a) les infractions — la haute trahison, la trahison, le meurtre au premier degré ou au deuxième degré exceptés — punissables, par mise en accusation, d’un emprisonnement d’au moins dix ans et impliquant : (

i) soit l’emploi, ou une tentative d’emploi, de la violence contre une autre personne, (ii) soit une conduite dangereuse, ou susceptible de l’être, pour la vie ou la sécurité d’une autre personne ou une conduite ayant infligé, ou susceptible d’infliger, des dommages psychologiques graves à une autre personne;

b) les infractions ou tentatives de perpétration de l’une des infractions visées aux articles 271 (agression sexuelle), 272 (agression sexuelle armée, menaces à une tierce personne ou infliction de lésions corporelles) ou 273 (agression sexuelle grave). [15] Je ferai respectueusement observer qu’il est incontestable que l’infraction de voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles répond à la définition précitée. L’

article 267 était alors libellé ainsi :

267 Every one who, in committing an assault, (

a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weaponor an imitation thereof, or (

b) causes bodily harm to the complainant, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable toimprisonment for a term not exceeding tenyears or an offence punishable on

summaryconviction and liable to imprisonment for aterm not exceeding eighteen months. 267 Est coupable soit d’un acte criminel etpassible d’un emprisonnement maximal dedix ans, soit d’une infraction punissable surdéclaration de culpabilité par procéduresommaire et passible d’un emprisonnementmaximal de dix-huit mois quiconque, en selivrant à des voies de fait, selon le cas :

a) porte, utilise ou menace d’utiliser une armeou une imitation d’arme;

b) inflige des lésions corporelles au plaignant. [16] À l’appui de l’argument voulant que l’infraction sous-jacente de voies de fait causant deslésions corporelles n’ait pas été constitutive de « sévices graves à la personne » dans son cas, M. Vicaire invoque la décision rendue parla Cour d’appel de l’Alberta dans R. c. Neve, 1999 ABCA 206, [1999] A.J. No. 753 (QL).

La Cour y a traité de la nécessité, lors del’analyse menée pour déterminer si un délinquant est dangereux, de prendre en considération le degré de violence requis : [TRADUCTION]Comme le montrent ces définitions, le mot « violence », dans l’usage courant, associe un élément de gravité à la force physique dontl’acte violent est constitué. Interpréter le ss-al. 752a)(

i) de sorte qu’il requière que la violence soit objectivement grave s’accorde doncavec le texte législatif. Sans aucun doute, il a été jugé en d’autres contextes que la violence requiert plus qu’une simple application deforce. Dans Pitters c. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (Ont.) (1996), 95 O.A.C. 325, p. 334, la Cour de justice de l’Ontario (Courdivisionnaire) s’est penchée sur le sens à donner aux mots « acte de violence criminel » employés dans la

Loi sur l’indemnisation desvictimes d’actes criminels, L.R.O. 1990, ch. C. 24 : [TRADUCTION]Un « acte de violence criminel » est un acte criminel de type violent. Dans l’usage courant, « violence » évoque l’emploi d’une forcephysique de manière à causer des blessures à des personnes ou des dommages à des biens. « Violent » signifie également intense,virulent, puissant ou aigu. Une action violente est caractérisée par le fait de causer un préjudice ou une blessure. [par. 74] [En italique dans l’original.] [17] Dans son mémoire, M.

Vicaire avance que [TRADUCTION] « [l]a brève analyse menée sur cepoint par le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine n’est pas allée assez loin pour que la Cour ait examiné convenablement si lesactions de M. Vicaire étaient suffisamment graves pour qu’il soit permis d’aborder les dispositions relatives aux délinquants dangereux »(soulignement dans l’original). La thèse de M. Vicaire a ceci de problématique : elle ne s’accorde pas avec la directive formulée par laCour suprême dans R. c.

Steele, 2014 CSC 61, [2014] 3 R.C.S. 138 : L’alinéa a) de la définition énoncée à l’art. 752 exige premièrement que l’infraction soit une infraction punissable par mise en accusation,deuxièmement que son auteur soit passible d’un emprisonnement d’au moins 10 ans et, troisièmement, qu’elle comporte (

i) l’emploi, ouune tentative d’emploi, de la violence contre une autre personne ou (ii) une conduite dangereuse, ou susceptible de l’être, pour la vie oula sécurité d’une autre personne ou une conduite ayant infligé, ou susceptible d’infliger, des dommages psychologiques graves à uneautre personne. Au sous-alinéa a)(i), le sens du terme « violence » n’est pas circonscrit, si bien que la condition peut être remplie mêmelorsque la violence en cause n’est pas « grave » en soi (voir Goforth, par. 21; Lebar, par. 67; R. c. Smith, 2012 ONCA 645 ,par. 2).

Le degré de gravité voulu par le législateur est atteint lorsque les trois éléments de la définition sont réunis. Ainsi, l’infraction quicomporte l’emploi ou une tentative d’emploi de la violence contre une autre personne ne constitue pas des « sévices graves à la

personne » au sens de l’al.

a) de la définition lorsqu’elle n’est pas punissable par mise en accusation ou que son auteur n’est pas passibled’un emprisonnement d’au moins 10 ans. Au même

titre que l’al.

b) de la définition n’invite pas le tribunal à apprécier le mode deperpétration des infractions énumérées, le sous-al. a)(

i) ne l’invite pas à considérer la gravité de la violence que le délinquant a employéeou tenté d’employer; toute violence, quelle qu’elle soit, suffit. [par. 39] [18] Comme la Cour l’a indiqué dans Steele, la disposition pertinente du Code criminel « [n’]invitepas [le tribunal] à considérer la gravité de la violence que le délinquant a employée ou tenté d’employer; toute violence, quelle qu’ellesoit, suffit ». L’argument de M. Vicaire sur ce point ne s’accorde pas non plus avec la jurisprudence de notre Cour. Dans l’arrêt R. c.

Dunn, 2011 NBCA 19, 369 R.N.-B. (2e) 271, le juge d’appel Richard (tel était alors son titre) a écrit ce qui suit, dans le paragraphed’ouverture de ses motifs, sur ce qui constitue des sévices graves à la personne : « Une agression brutale et non provoquée à l’endroitd’une victime sans méfiance, dont les blessures ont été suffisamment importantes pour nécessiter une hospitalisation, est une infractionconstituant des sévices graves à la personne à l’égard de laquelle les tribunaux ont une obligation de dénonciation et de dissuasion. »

Jenote que le juge Richard a formulé cette observation dans le contexte de la définition de « sévices graves à la personne » donnée àl’art. 752 (Dunn, par. 14). [19] M. Vicaire conteste en outre la validité de la conclusion que l’infraction sous-jacente étaitconstitutive de sévices graves à la personne en avançant que le juge du procès a commis une erreur manifeste lorsqu’il a conclu que lesblessures que M. Vicaire avait infligées à son frère comportaient à la fois une dislocation de l’épaule et une fêlure du sternum. M. Vicairea raison sur ce point. Le dossier n’étaye pas la conclusion du juge du procès.

Les blessures consistaient notamment en une dislocation del’épaule, mais le sternum ne présentait pas de fêlure. Si l’erreur est manifeste, elle n’est toutefois pas dominante. Cette erreur de fait miseà part, le juge du procès a conclu avec justesse que la preuve dont il disposait établissait nettement que l’infraction sous-jacente de voiesde fait causant des lésions corporelles répondait à la définition d’origine législative des sévices graves à la personne. Je suis d’avis derejeter le premier moyen d’appel. C. Évaluation du danger et analyse du comportement général [20] Dans R. c.

Boutilier, 2017 CSC 64, [2017] 2 R.C.S. 936, la Cour suprême a exposé à grandstraits les quatre critères auxquels le ministère public doit satisfaire s’il demande qu’un délinquant soit déclaré dangereux. Sur le fondement de l’analyse donnée par le juge La Forest dans R. c. Lyons, (SCC), [1987] 2 R.C.S. 309, [1987] A.C.S. no 62(QL), la Cour a énoncé, dans Boutilier, les conditions suivantes : 1. Le délinquant a été reconnu coupable et doit recevoir une peine pour sévices graves à la personne. 2. Cette infraction sous-jacente fait

partie d’un comportement général violent. 3. La probabilité d’une récidive préjudiciable est élevée. 4. Le comportement violent est irréductible. Voir Boutilier, aux par. 26 à 28. [21] Le juge La Forest, auteur des motifs de la majorité dans Lyons, a expliqué les critères ainsi : En premier lieu, ces dispositions s’appliquent uniquement aux personnes reconnues coupables de « sévices graves à la personne » ausens de l’art. 687. Chacune de ces infractions se rapporte à une conduite ayant pour effet d’exposer d’autres personnes à un grand dangerphysique ou de leur occasionner un préjudice psychologique grave.

Il est révélateur à ce propos que lesdites infractions entraînent unepeine maximale obligatoire d’au moins dix ans d’emprisonnement. En deuxième lieu, on doit convaincre la cour que l’infraction dont lapersonne a été reconnue coupable n’est pas un acte isolé, mais qu’elle fait

partie d’un comportement général caractérisé par la violence,par l’agressivité ou la brutalité, ou par l’incapacité à contrôler les impulsions sexuelles. En troisième lieu, on doit établir qu’il est fortprobable que ce type de comportement se poursuivra et causera le genre de souffrances contre lesquelles la disposition en cause chercheà offrir une protection, c’est-à-dire les actes constituant une conduite qui met en danger la vie, la sécurité ou le bien-être physiqued’autrui ou, dans le cas des infractions sexuelles, une conduite qui cause des sévices ou d’autres maux à autrui.

De plus, chaque alinéa del’art. 687 contient sous une forme ou une autre une exigence explicite que la cour soit convaincue qu’il s’agit d’un type de comportementqui est essentiellement ou pathologiquement irréductible. En dernier lieu, la cour a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de ne pas désigner ledélinquant comme dangereux ou de ne pas lui imposer une peine d’une durée indéterminée, et ce, même dans des circonstances où tousles critères susmentionnés ont été remplis. [par. 43]

[22] Je me suis penché et me suis prononcé ci-dessus sur les arguments de M. Vicaire relatifs au premier de ces quatre critères. J’aborde maintenant les critères restants. [23] Sur le fondement de l’arrêt Neve , M.

Vicaire avance que [TRADUCTION] « seules les infractions criminelles graves, pertinentes du point de vue de la répétition d’actes dans un contexte de délinquance dangereuse, doivent être prises en compte à ce stade » et que, [TRADUCTION] « de ce fait, il ne faut pas prendre en compte des infractions qui ne sont pas de la nature de l’infraction sous-jacente (même si elles ont comporté l’emploi de violence), des conduites antisociales et une preuve de moralité ».

Pour ce qui concerne la « gravité » que d’autres infractions portées au casier judiciaire du délinquant présentent, le ministère public répond que l’arrêt Steele , de la Cour suprême, indique le contraire. J’en conviens. Bien que l’arrêt Neve ait été abondamment cité par les tribunaux canadiens depuis qu’il a été rendu, en 1999, il est clair que l’arrêt Steele a écarté certaines des conclusions qui y sont exprimées. [24] Dans R. c. Shea , 2017 NSCA 43 , [2017] N.S.J. No. 192 (QL) , le juge d’appel Bryson s’est penché précisément sur cette question.

Bien qu’il ait exprimé une opinion dissidente, les juges majoritaires ont souscrit à son analyse juridique, formulée ainsi : [TRADUCTION] L’arrêt Neve affirme que les infractions répétées doivent être objectivement « graves », parce qu’est objectivement grave, aussi, l’infraction sous-jacente. Nous savons depuis Steele que le second énoncé est faux. Il doit s’ensuivre que le premier est tout aussi faux. L’infraction sous-jacente doit consister en des sévices graves à la personne, mais elle n’a pas à être [TRADUCTION] « objectivement grave » et il doit s’ensuivre que les actes répétés n’ont pas à l’être no

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