2017 FCA 42, 2017 FCA 42

[2018] 2 F.C.R. 328 A-431-16 2017 FCA 42 Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada ( Applicants ) v. Ade Olumide ( Respondent ) Indexed as: Canada v. Olumide Federal Court of Appeal, Stratas J.A.—Ottawa, March 2 and 6, 2017.

Practice –– Applications – Vexatious proceedings — Application for order declaring respondent vexatious litigant under Federal Courts Act , s. 40 , related relief — Matter arising in different proceeding involving same parties, others — Respondent not filing any material on application; not attending court hearing — In past, respondent bringing other matters before Court — Very few applications, motion brought in Court under Act, s. 40; not much said about

interpretation thereof — Main issues herein: proper

interpretation of Act, s. 40; proceedings that must be taken to declare person vexatious litigant; whether present application should be allowed — Act, s. 40 important tool to be used in appropriate circumstances in timely way — Where litigant’s behaviour likely to recur in multiple proceedings, where purposes of s. 40 implicated, Act, s. 40 remedies becoming live — Declaration that litigant vexatious not barring litigant’s access to courts but only regulating it — Vexatiousness concept drawing meaning mainly from purposes of Act, s. 40 — Other courts previously declaring applicant vexatious litigant — In present circumstances, findings of other courts could be considered, could be given much weight — Respondent not offering any evidence in response to vexatious behaviour in other courts in past, in Federal Court of Appeal — Granting of present application strongly supported by purposes of Act, s. 40 — Application granted.

This was an application for an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant under

section 40 of the Federal Courts Act and related relief. This matter arose in a different proceeding involving the same parties and others in which the applicants brought a motion for relief under

section 40. In response to the motion, however, the respondent discontinued the proceeding but the Court later held that the motion for relief was not discontinued and could be converted to a stand-alone application for relief under

section 40. The respondent did not file any material on the application and did not attend the court hearing. The application was heard and determined by a single justice designated by the Chief Justice. There have been very few applications and motions brought in this Court under

section 40 of the Act and, in those applications and motions, not much was said about the

interpretation and application thereof. This resulted in creating some uncertainty. The main issues herein were the proper

interpretation of

section 40 of the Act, the proceedings that must be taken to declare a person a vexatious litigant, and whether the application should be allowed. Held , the application should be granted.

Section 40 is an important tool to be used in appropriate circumstances in a timely way. It reflects the fact that the Federal Courts are community property that exist to serve everyone, but those who misuse unrestricted access in a damaging way must be restrained.

Section 40 exists alongside other express, implied or necessarily incidental powers the Federal Courts have to regulate litigants and their proceedings. Where a litigant’s misbehaviour is likely to recur in multiple proceedings or actually recurs in later proceedings and where the purposes of

section 40 are implicated by the nature or quality of the litigant’s conduct,

section 40 remedies become live. While

section 40 has been characterized as being a drastic, last-resort option, a declaration that a litigant is vexatious does not bar the litigant’s access to the courts but rather regulates it. As to the meaning of “vexatious” , vexatiousness is a concept that draws its meaning mainly from the purposes of

section 40 of the Act. Where regulation of the litigant’s continued access to the courts under

section 40 is supported by the purposes of that section, relief should be granted. In this case, both the Federal Court and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had previously declared the applicant to be a vexatious litigant. In these circumstances, the findings of these Courts could be considered and given much weight. Furthermore, the record showed vexatious behaviour on the part of the respondent in other courts that mirrored his behaviour in the Federal Court of Appeal. The respondent did not offer any evidence in response. The granting of this application was strongly supported by the purposes of

section 40. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED Federal Courts Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, ss. 16, 40 . Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106, r. 369.

Interpretation Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21, s. 12. CASES CITED CONSIDERED: Olumide v. Canada , 2016 FCA 287 ; Canada v. Olympia Interiors Ltd. , 2001 FCT 859 , 209 F.T.R. 182, affd 2004 FCA 195 , 323 N.R.

191; Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FC 1106; Campbell v. Canada, 2005 FCA 49, [2005] 2 C.T.C. 31; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mishra,[2000] F.C.J. No. 1734 (QL) (C.A.), 101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 72. REFERRED TO: Coote v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (Lawpro), 2014 FCA 98, 459 N.R. 174; Coote v. Lawyers’ Professional IndemnityCompany, 2013 FCA 143; Rock-St Laurent v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 192, 434 N.R. 144; Rizzo & Rizzo ShoesLtd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193; Bell ExpressVu LimitedPartnership v.

Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, (1998), 157 D.L.R. (4th) 385; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77;Canada v. Long Plain First Nation, 2015 FCA 177, 388 D.L.R. (4th) 209; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Dinardo,2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788; R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869;Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129; Olumide v.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right ofOntario, 2017 ONSC 1201 ; Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. APPLICATION for an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant under

section 40 of the Federal Courts Act and related relief.Application granted. APPEARANCES Daniel Caron for applicants. SOLICITORS OF RECORD Deputy Attorney General of Canada for applicants. The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by [1] Stratas J.A.: The applicants apply for an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant under

section 40 of the FederalCourts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 and related relief. A. Procedural history [2] This matter originally arose in a different proceeding involving these parties and others (file A-201-16 [2016 FCA 287]). In thatproceeding, the applicants brought a motion for relief under

section 40. Relief under

section 40 can be brought by way of motion: Cootev. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (Lawpro), 2014 FCA 98, 459 N.R. 174, at paragraph 12. [3] However, in response to the motion, the respondent discontinued the proceeding. Soon afterward, this Court held that the motionfor relief under

section 40 was not discontinued and could be converted to a stand-alone application for relief under

section 40, with themotion material converted to application material: Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FCA 287. This was done. This application (file A-431-16)has proceeded on an expedited basis in accordance with a court-ordered schedule. On the authority of Coote v. Lawyers’ ProfessionalIndemnity Company, 2013 FCA 143, other matters involving the respondent have been stayed pending this Court’s determination of theapplication. [4] The respondent has chosen not to file any material on the application. B.

The composition of the Court for this application [5] This application is being heard and determined by a single justice designated by the Chief Justice. A single justice can determinean application under

section 40. In the case of final determinations of applications for leave to appeal, applications for judicial review,appeals and references, the Court must be comprised of no less than three justices. This includes motions that result in finaldeterminations. See Federal Courts Act,

section 16; Rock-St Laurent v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 192, 434 N.R.144. [6] In the past, I have heard other matters involving the respondent. In one such matter (file 16-A-38), the respondent alleged that Iwas biased and should recuse myself.

My order disposing of that matter contained certain recitals dealing with the respondent’sallegation of bias: AND WHEREAS in some of the materials filed with the Court, [the respondent] has made statements suggesting that Justice Stratas ispredisposed against his position; AND WHEREAS, in response, Justice Stratas considered whether he should recuse himself and determined that he should not for thefollowing reasons: The Chief Justice appointed me to deal with the latest motions in various proceedings brought by [the respondent] before the Court. Ihad no input into that decision.

Having been appointed, I cannot recuse myself absent good legal cause. The law is clear that good legal cause exists if I were biased in fact against [the respondent] or his case or were otherwise unable todecide the present matter fairly. Further, good legal cause exists if the legal test for apparent bias is made out. That test is whether areasonable, fully-informed person, thinking the matter through, would conclude that it is more likely than not that I, whether consciouslyor unconsciously, would not decide the present appeal fairly: Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v.

National Energy Board et al., (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at page 394. On the issue of actual bias or unfairness, I confirm that I have approached and will continue to approach the present matter and anyfuture matters involving [the respondent] with an open mind, reading his submissions and materials with an open mind. I assure [the

respondent] that I have never had any ill-will or other negative sentiment against him or any of his proceedings and that remains the casetoday. On the issue of apparent bias, I find that the test is not made out. The reasonable, fully-informed person, thinking the matter through,would conclude that I am capable of deciding matters involving [the respondent] fairly and with an open mind.

AND WHEREAS [the respondent] has made adverse statements and complaints about this Court and the judges in it and if that werealone a sufficient basis for recusal, all his proceedings would remain in limbo, unable to be determined; the common law doctrine ofnecessity applies in this instance; [7] In this application, I do not have an allegation of bias before me. However, I wish to repeat and rely on the recitals I made in myprevious order, quoted above. I have approached this application with the open-mindedness, independence and impartiality a judge musthave. C.

The hearing of the application [8] As is its usual practice, this Court issued an order setting the time, place and duration of the hearing. It arranged for delivery ofthis order to the respondent. [9] At the time set for the hearing, the respondent was not present. The registrar opened the Court. The Court began by saying that itsparamount concern at that moment was procedural fairness to the respondent. Just in case the respondent was late or lost in the building,the Court adjourned the hearing for a half hour.

It asked the usher to search and call for the respondent on all floors in the building wherethere are courtrooms. [10] During the adjournment, the respondent appeared in the courtroom set for the hearing and sat in the audience area. Just beforethe Court reopened, the respondent left. The registrar and usher advised the Court that the respondent knew that the application wasgoing to be heard and that within moments the hearing was going to begin in this courtroom.

When the Court reopened, counsel for theapplicants, an officer of the Court, confirmed this. [11] Satisfied that the requirements of procedural fairness were met, the Court invited the applicants to make submissions. Theapplicants offered only a few minutes of submissions. They also presented a supplementary book of authorities consisting of orders anddirections that have been issued since they filed their motion material and an updated list of the proceedings the respondent has broughtin the Federal Courts.

As this material consists merely of information about proceedings in this Court—information of which the Courtcan take judicial notice—and otherwise uncontroversial information, the Court permitted its filing. D.

Section 40 of the Federal Courts Act, its proper

interpretation, and proceedings to declare a person a vexatious litigant [12] There have been very few applications and motions brought in this Court under

section 40 of the Federal Courts Act. And inthose applications and motions, this Court has not said much about the

interpretation and application of

section 40. [13] In my view, this has created some uncertainty. This uncertainty has had the likely effect of inhibiting parties from seeking reliefunder

section 40 and delaying until success seems assured. This is unfortunate.

Section 40 is an important tool to be used in appropriatecircumstances in a timely way. [14]

Section 40 provides as follows: Vexatious proceedings 40

(1) If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatiousproceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person inthat court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court. [15] Like all statutory provisions,

section 40 must be interpreted in accordance with its text, context and purpose: Rizzo & Rizzo ShoesLtd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193; Bell ExpressVu LimitedPartnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559. Further, we must give

section 40 “such fair, large and liberal construction andinterpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”:

Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21,

section 12. [16]

Section 40 is similar to the vexatious litigant provisions that are found in the statutes governing courts in other jurisdictions.Thus, much of their case law assists. An excellent

summary of some of it appears in Canada v. Olympia Interiors Ltd., 2001 FCT 859,209 F.T.R. 182, affd 2004 FCA 195, 323 N.R. 191. The Federal Court’s discussion in Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FC 1106 is also useful. [17]

Section 40 reflects the fact that the Federal Courts are community property that exists to serve everyone, not a private resourcethat can be commandeered in damaging ways to advance the interests of one. [18] As community property, courts allow unrestricted access by default: anyone with standing can start a proceeding. But those whomisuse unrestricted access in a damaging way must be restrained. In this way, courts are no different from other community propertieslike public parks, libraries, community halls and museums. [19] The Federal Courts have finite resources that cannot be squandered.

Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a momentunavailable to a deserving litigant. The unrestricted access to courts by those whose access should be restricted affects the access ofothers who need and deserve it. Inaction on the former damages the latter. [20] This isn’t just a zero-sum game where a single vexatious litigant injures a single innocent litigant. A single vexatious litigantgobbles up scarce judicial and registry resources, injuring tens or more innocent litigants. The injury shows itself in many ways: to name

a few, a reduced ability on the part of the registry to assist well-intentioned but needy self-represented litigants, a reduced ability of thecourt to manage proceedings needing management, and delays for all litigants in getting hearings, directions, orders, judgments andreasons. [21] On occasion, innocent parties, some of whom have few resources, find themselves on the receiving end of unmeritoriousproceedings brought by a vexatious litigant. They may be hurt most of all.

True, the proceedings most likely will be struck on a motion,but probably only after the vexatious litigant brings multiple motions within the motion and even other motions too. In the meantime, theinnocent party might be dragged before other courts in new proceedings, with even more motions, and motions within motions, andmaybe even more. [22]

Section 40 is aimed at litigants who bring one or more proceedings that, whether intended or not, further improper purposes,such as inflicting damage or wreaking retribution upon the parties or the Court.

Section 40 is also aimed at ungovernable litigants: thosewho flout procedural rules, ignore orders and directions of the Court, and relitigate previously-decided proceedings and motions. [23]

Section 40 exists alongside other express, implied or necessarily incidental powers the Federal Courts have to regulate litigantsand their proceedings. These are found in the Federal Courts Act and the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106. Other powers emanatefrom the Federal Courts’ plenary jurisdiction to regulate their proceedings: Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian LibertyNet, (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, (1998), 157 D.L.R. (4th) 385. All of these powers are specific to particularproceedings before the Courts. [24] This sheds light on the role of

section 40. Where a litigant’s misbehaviour is specific to a particular proceeding and isolated in itsharm and unlikely to be repeated, the usual powers to regulate litigants and their proceedings will suffice. But where a litigant’smisbehaviour is likely to recur in multiple proceedings or actually recurs in later proceedings and where the purposes of

section 40 areimplicated by the nature or quality of the litigant’s conduct,

section 40 remedies become live. [25] A litigant’s misbehaviour in just a single proceeding can result in

section 40 remedies. The express text of

section 40 makes thisclear: it provides that where a party “has conducted a [single] proceeding in a vexatious manner”, the Court “may order that no furtherproceedings be instituted by the person in that court”: Campbell v. Canada, 2005 FCA 49, [2005] 2 C.T.C. 31, at paragraph 19. [26] On occasion, some courts, including this Court, have characterized

section 40 as being a drastic, last-resort option. It has beencalled a “most extraordinary” power that “must be exercised sparingly and with the greatest of care” because an individual is “entitled toaccess the courts”: Olympia Interiors (F.C.A.), above, at paragraph 6. [27] But in characterizing

section 40, care must be taken not to exaggerate it. A declaration that a litigant is vexatious does not bar thelitigant’s access to the courts. Rather, it only regulates the litigant’s access to the courts: the litigant need only get leave before starting orcontinuing a proceeding. [28] In 2000, our Court put this well: …. An order under subsection 40(1) does not put an end to a legal claim or the right to pursue a legal claim.

Subsection 40(1) appliesonly to litigants who have used unrestricted access to the courts in a manner that is vexatious (as that term is understood in law), and theonly legal effect of any order under subsection 40(1) is to ensure that the claims of such litigants are pursued in an orderly fashion, undera greater degree of Court supervision than applies to other litigants. (Canada (Attorney General) v. Mishra, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1734 (QL) (C.A.), 101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 72 [at paragraph 16].) [29] Seen in this way,

section 40 is not so drastic. A litigant can still access the courts by bringing a proceeding but only if the Courtgrants leave. Faced with a request for leave, the Court must act judicially and promptly, considering the legal standards, the evidencefiled in support of the granting of leave, and the purposes of

section 40. The Court could well grant leave to a vexatious litigant who hasa bona fide reason to assert a claim that is not frivolous and vexatious within the meaning of the case law on pleadings. [30] What is “vexatious” for the purposes of

section 40? [31] Vexatiousness is a concept that draws its meaning mainly from the purposes of

section 40. Where regulation of the litigant’scontinued access to the courts under

section 40 is supported by the purposes of

section 40, relief should be granted. Put another way,where continued unrestricted access of a litigant to the courts undermines the purposes of

section 40, relief should be granted. In myview, all of this Court’s cases on

section 40 are consistent with this principle. [32] In defining “vexatious”, it is best not to be precise. Vexatiousness comes in all shapes and sizes. Sometimes it is the number ofmeritless proceedings and motions or the reassertion of proceedings and motions that have already been determined. Sometimes it is thelitigant’s purpose, often revealed by the parties sued, the nature of the allegations against them and the language used.

Sometimes it isthe manner in which proceedings and motions are prosecuted, such as multiple, needless filings, prolix, incomprehensible or intemperateaffidavits and submissions, and the harassment or victimization of opposing parties. [33] Many vexatious litigants pursue unacceptable purposes and litigate to cause harm. But some are different: some have goodintentions and mean no harm. Nevertheless, they too can be declared vexatious if they litigate in a way that implicates

section 40’spurposes: see, e.g., Olympia Interiors (F.C. and F.C.A.), above. [34] Some cases identify certain “hallmarks” of vexatious litigants or certain badges of vexatiousness: see, for example, Olumide v.Canada, 2016 FC 1106 [cited above], at paragraphs 9 and 10, where the Federal Court granted relief under

section 40 against therespondent; and see paragraph 32 above. As long as the purposes of

section 40 are kept front of mind and the hallmarks or badges aretaken only as non-binding indicia of vexatiousness, they can be quite useful. [35] A word or two needs to be said about proving vexatiousness. Often the record offered in support of

section 40 applications is

laborious to assemble and voluminous to present. It needn’t always be so. [36] Again, the issue is whether the litigant should be subject to an additional level of regulation, not whether the litigant’s access tocourt should be forever barred. This invites focused, well-chosen evidence, not an encyclopedia of every last detail about the litigant’slitigation history.

In some cases, the requirement of vexatiousness can be proven by an affidavit that provides only the most relevantinformation, court decisions that describe the litigant’s intentions and conduct, and selected pleadings and documents that demonstratevexatiousness. [37] Some prosecuting these applications forget that other courts’ findings of vexatiousness under similarly-worded provisions can beimported into later applications against the same litigant and can be given much weight: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77.

The wheel needn’t be reinvented. [38] Even where other courts have declared the respondent to be a vexatious litigant, the applicant must file evidence of therespondent’s vexatious behaviour in this Court bearing in mind the comments in paragraph 36, above. As a legal matter, the applicantbears the legal burden of proving vexatiousness on the balance of probabilities.

But as a practical matter, due to the weight that canattach to other courts’ findings, a respondent might have to offer highly credible evidence in order to resist the application. [39] Finally, a few words about the reasons for judgment in vexatious litigant applications. In matters such as this, sometimes reasonsfor judgment describe litigants, their conduct, and their attitudes in lurid ways that might amuse the more sophomoric among us.Happily, I have never seen that approach taken in the Federal Courts. There, the reasons have been restrained and appropriate, clinical intone and minimalist in approach.

This is as it should be. Courts should treat all litigants—even vexatious ones—with dignity and respect.To the court, the litigant may deserve to be declared a vexatious litigant. But to others, the litigant may be an employee or volunteer, afriend or acquaintance, an aunt or uncle, a parent or child—and a good one too. No one deserves to be tarred and feathered and paradedthrough the town square, least of all by courts. [40] Often little need be said in support of a finding of vexatiousness: see the

summary of law on adequacy of reasons in Canada v.Long Plain First Nation, 2015 FCA 177, 388 D.L.R. (4th) 209, at paragraph 143, citing R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3; R.v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788; R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1S.C.R. 869; Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129. In assessing adequacy, appellatecourts review the reasons offered against the record and the submissions made: R.E.M., at paragraphs 35 and 55.

If the record containsdetail, the reasons need only summarize or say a few things. Frequently in cases such as these, less is more. E. This case [41] Through her delegated authority, the Attorney General of Canada has consented to this application, as is required by subsection40(2) of the Federal Courts Act. [42] On the merits of the application, the starting point is that both the Federal Court and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice havedeclared the applicant to be a vexatious litigant: Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FC 1106 [cited above]; order of the Ontario Superior Court ofJustice, dated October 17, 2016.

In these circumstances, the findings of these Courts can be considered and can be given much weight:C.U.P.E., above. Further, the record shows vexatious behaviour on the part of the respondent in other courts that mirrors his behaviour inthis Court: see, most recently, the

summary of conduct in Olumide v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 2017 ONSC 1201. In response, the respondent has not offered any evidence. [43] The granting of this application is strongly supported by the purposes of

section 40. In roughly three years, the respondent hasbrought at least 47 matters in various courts. In this Court, he has brought 18, most of which have been dismissed summarily. As forthose not dismissed, the pleadings, motions and affidavits contain many scandalous and irrelevant allegations and it is not possible to seeany merit in them. The respondent flouts directions and orders of this Court. F. Postscript [44] In the Federal Courts system, the applicants in this case are often respondents to proceedings. In some of them, they face litigantswho exhibit vexatiousness.

Too often though, the applicants do not start vexatious litigant applications for months, if not years, evenmany years. In the meantime, much damage to many is done. [45] To reiterate,

section 40 aims in part to further access to justice by those seeking the resources of the Court in a proper way. Allparticipants in litigation—courts, parties, rule-makers and governments—must have a pro-access attitude and act upon it: Hryniak v.Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. And as community property, courts deserve to be protected for the benefit of all. [46] Uncertainty in the jurisprudence might have excused the applicants’ delays in the past. Now the uncertainty is gone. [47] None of these observations are directed at counsel for the applicants who, once the motion for relief under

section 40 wasbrought, prosecuted this matter efficiently and professionally. G. Disposition [48] The application is granted. The respondent shall be declared a vexatious litigant. He shall not institute new proceedings, whetheracting for himself or having his interests represented by another individual in this Court, except by leave of this Court. All proceedingsinstituted by the respondent in this Court and currently before this Court shall be stayed. The stay shall not be lifted and the proceedingsshall not continue unless leave is granted by this Court.

The Registry shall neither accept nor file any document of any kind from therespondent unless it is a fully-compliant motion record filed under rule 369 [of the Federal Courts Rules] seeking leave to instituteand/or continue proceedings in this Court. The Registry shall file a copy of the Court’s judgment and these reasons in all affected filesand shall send a copy of same to the parties in those files.

[ 49 ] The applicants request $2 240 in costs for this motion. This is more than reasonable. A judgment shall issue in accordance with the preceding paragraph, with costs to the applicants in the amount of $2 240.