2013 QCCA 1058, 2013 QCCA 1058

D.P. c. Do.G. 2013 QCCA 1058 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-023542-137 (500-14-039290-119) DATE: JUNE 13, 2013 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. DOMINIQUE BÉLANGER, J.A. D. P. APPELLANT – Plaintiff v. DO. G. RESPONDENT – Defendant and THE PUBLIC CURATOR OF QUEBEC IN THE PERSON OF DI… L… IMPLEADED PARTY – Impleaded party and R. P.

IMPLEADED PARTY – Reasonable person JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The Court is seized with a motion to dismiss the appeal of the interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Madam Justice Hélène Le Bel), rendered from the bench on March 27, 2013 (with written reasons issued on April 23, 2013). * * [ 2 ] In November 2011, the respondent applied for the institution of protective supervision of the appellant, pursuant to articles 877 and ff. C.C.P. In December 2012, the appellant, relying on articles 2, 20 and 54.1 C.C.P. , sought the

summary dismissal of the respondent's action. According to the appellant, the respondent, by seeking to have her declared incompetent, is simply trying to counter the divorce proceedings that she previously instituted against him.

She claims that he has a personal and pecuniary interest in the whole matter, that his is a clear case of conflict of interest, and that his proceedings should be dismissed and declared “ improper and abusive and to have been done in bad faith ”. [1] [ 3 ] On March 27, 2013, in a thorough and careful judgment recounting the details of a situation which she considered to be extremely preoccupying, Le Bel J. dismissed the appellant's motion to dismiss.

She concluded that the appellant is a vulnerable person and ordered a set of provisional measures designed to ensure her protection during the proceedings. [ 4 ] The appellant filed an inscription in appeal from this judgment on April 25, 2013, to which the respondent replied with a motion to dismiss pursuant to

article 501, subparagraphs 4.1 and 5. C.C.P. * * [ 5 ] At the hearing of the motion to dismiss the appeal, the Court raised the following question: Le Bel J.'s judgment being interlocutory, could the appellant file, as she did, an inscription in appeal or should she have sought leave to appeal in accordance with articles 29 and 511 C.C.P. ? [ 6 ] Appellant's counsel suggests that the answer to this question lies in

article 26, first paragraph, subparagraph 6 (d) , C.C.P. , which provides that “any judgment” rendered in matters of “protective supervision of persons of full age” is appealable as of right. She submits that the words “'any judgment” clearly indicate that the provision applies to all judgments in such matters, whether final or interlocutory. [ 7 ] Although the argument, prima facie , appears not to be unreasonable, it proceeds from a literal and decontextualized reading of the provision.

Such a reading is inconsistent with the organizing principle underlying articles 26 and 29 C.C.P. and is contrary to the overall economy of these provisions that seek to ensure the efficient progression of the suit and the resulting minimization of the

possibility of interlocutory appeals. [ 8 ] Articles 26, 29 and 511 C.C.P. provide that: 26.

Peuvent faire l'objet d'un appel, à moins d'une disposition contraire : 1. les jugements finals de la Cour supérieure et de la Cour du Québec, sauf dans les causes où la valeur de l'objet du litige en appel est inférieure à 50 000 $; 2. les jugements finals de la Cour du Québec dans les causes où cette cour exerce une compétence qui lui est attribuée exclusivement par une autre loi que le présent code; 3. les jugements finals rendus en matière d'outrage au tribunal pour lesquels il n'existe pas d'autres recours; 4. les jugements ou ordonnances rendus en matière d'adoption; 5. les jugements finals en matière de garde en établissement et d'évaluation psychiatrique; 6. les jugements ou ordonnances rendus dans les matières suivantes;

a) la modification du registre de l'état civil;

b) la tutelle au mineur ou à l'absent et le jugement déclaratif de décès;

c) le conseil de tutelle;

d) les régimes de protection du majeur et l'homologation du mandat donné par une personne en prévision de son inaptitude.

Peuvent aussi faire l'objet d'un appel, sur permission d'un juge de la Cour d'appel, lorsque la question en jeu en est une qui devrait être soumise à la Cour d'appel, ce qui est notamment le cas s'il est d'avis qu'une question de principe, une question nouvelle ou une question de droit faisant l'objet d'une jurisprudence contradictoire est en jeu : 1. les autres jugements ou ordonnances rendus en vertu des dispositions du Livre VI du présent code; 2. le jugement qui prononce sur la requête en annulation d'une saisie avant jugement; 3. les jugements ou ordonnances rendus en matière d'exécution; 4. les jugements rendus en application de l'article 846; 26.

Unless otherwise provided, an appeal lies (1) from any final judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Québec, except in a case where the value of the object of the dispute in appeal is less than $50,000; (2) from any final judgment of the Court of Québec in a case where such court has exclusive jurisdiction under any Act other than this Code. (3) from any final judgment rendered in matters of contempt of court for which there is no other recourse; (4) from any judgment or order rendered in matters of adoption; 5) from any final judgment rendered in matters concerning confinement in an institution or psychiatric assessment; 6) from any judgment or order rendered in the following matters:

a) changes made to the register of civil status; (

b) tutorships to minors or absentees and declaratory judgments of death; (

c) tutorship councils;

d) protective supervision of persons of full age and the homologation of a mandate given by a person in anticipation of his incapacity.

An appeal also lies, with leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal, when the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal, particularly where, in the opinion of the judge, the matter at issue is a question of principle, a new issue or a question of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial precedents, (1) from any judgment or order rendered under the provisions of Book VI of this Code; (2) from any judgment ruling on a motion to quash a seizure before judgment; (3) from any judgment or order rendered in matters concerning execution; 4) from any judgment rendered under

article 846;

4.1. les jugements qui rejettent une demande en justice en raison de son caractère abusif; 5. les autres jugements finals de la Cour supérieure et de la Cour du Québec. (4.1) from any judgment that dismisses an action because of its improper nature; (5) from any other final judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Québec. 29. Est également sujet à appel, conformément à l'article 511, le jugement interlocutoire de la Cour supérieure ou celui de la Cour du Québec mais, s'il s'agit de sa compétence dans les matières relatives à la jeunesse, uniquement en matière d'adoption : 1. lorsqu'il décide en

partie du litige; 2. lorsqu'il ordonne que soit faite une chose à laquelle le jugement final ne pourra remédier; ou 3. lorsqu'il a pour effet de retarder inutilement l'instruction du procès. Toutefois, l'interlocutoire rendu au cours de l'instruction n'est pas sujet à appel immédiat et ne peut être mis en question que sur appel du jugement final, à moins qu'il ne rejette une objection à la preuve fondée sur l'article 308 de ce code ou sur l'

article 9 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (chapitre C-12 ) ou à moins qu'il ne maintienne une objection à la preuve. Est interlocutoire le jugement rendu en cours d'instance avant le jugement final. 29. An appeal also lies, in accordance with

article 511, from an interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Québec but, as regards youth matters, only in a matter of adoption: (1) when it in part decides the issue; (2) when it orders the doing of anything which cannot be remedied by the final judgment; or (3) when it unnecessarily delays the trial of the suit. However, an interlocutory judgment rendered during the trial cannot be appealed immediately and it cannot be put in question except on appeal from the final judgment, unless it disallows an objection to evidence based upon

article 308 of this Code or on

section 9 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms (chapter C-12 ), or unless it allows an objection to evidence. Any judgment is interlocutory which is rendered during the suit before the final judgment.

511. L'appel d'un jugement interlocutoire n'a lieu que sur permission accordée par un juge de la Cour d'appel, lorsqu'il estime qu'il s'agit d'un cas visé à l'article 29 et que les fins de la justice requièrent d'accorder la permission; il doit alors ordonner la continuation ou la suspension des procédures de première instance. Toutefois, l'appel du jugement interlocutoire rejetant une objection à la preuve fondée sur l'article 308 de ce code ou sur l'

article 9 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (chapitre C-12 ) n'est pas assujetti à une permission. De plus, cet appel ne suspend pas l'instance, mais le juge de première instance ne peut rendre son jugement final ni entendre la preuve visée par l'objection tant que l'appel du jugement interlocutoire n'est pas décidé. L'appel d'un jugement interlocutoire est soumis aux règles applicables à un jugement final; cependant, les parties ne sont pas tenues de produire un mémoire, sauf si un juge en décide autrement.

L'appel d'un tel jugement est entendu à la date déterminée par le juge dans le cas où la permission est requise et par le greffier, dans les autres cas. 511. An appeal lies from an interlocutory judgment only on leave granted by a judge of the Court of Appeal if he is of opinion that the case is one that is contemplated in

article 29 and that the pursuit of justice requires that leave be granted; the judge must then order the continuation or suspension of the proceedings in first instance. However, an appeal from an interlocutory judgment dismissing an objection to evidence based on

article 308 of this Code or on

section 9 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms (chapter C-12 ) is not subject to a leave. Furthermore, the appeal does not suspend the proceedings but the judge of first instance cannot render final judgment or hear the evidence contemplated by the objection until appeal from the interlocutory judgment is decided. Appeal from an interlocutory judgment is subject to the rules applicable to a final judgment; however, the parties are not required to file a factum, unless a judge decides otherwise.

The appeal is heard on the date determined by the judge in cases where leave is required and on the date determined by the clerk in other cases. [ 9 ] The respective domains of articles 26 and 29 C.C.P. are those of final and interlocutory judgments (the definition of which appears in the third paragraph of art. 29), there being no overlap between them, except as far as seizures before judgment are concerned, on which topic we shall return to later. [ 10 ] Louise Mailhot and Lysanne Pariseau-Legault thus write that : Le plaideur qui veut appeler d'une décision doit commencer par classer le jugement entrepris dans l'une ou l'autre des deux catégories fondamentales prévues par le Code de procédure civile : jugement final ou jugement interlocutoire.

On peut appeler d'un jugement final aux conditions de l'article 26, avec ou sans permission, selon le cas. De même, l'appel d'un jugement interlocutoire se fait avec ou sans permission, selon le régime de l'article 29. Il faut prendre garde de ne pas confondre jugement final et jugement au fond, ni croire que tout jugement rendu sur une demande incidente se qualifie obligatoirement d'interlocutoire. Selon l'article 29, « est interlocutoire le jugement rendu en cours d'instance avant le jugement final ». On pourrait donc en conclure que tout jugement qui ne statue pas sur le fond de l'affaire est interlocutoire.

Cependant, un jugement sur une demande incidente au procès sera un jugement final s'il ne laisse plus subsister d'instance entre les parties et s'il est impossible de recommencer le procès devant le même tribunal ou devant un autre. L'appel d'un tel jugement sera régi par l'article 26, parce qu'il s'agira d'un jugement « final » au sens de cet article, même s'il a été rendu avant un jugement au fond. Ces questions feront l'objet d'un développement particulier plus loin. [2] [ 11 ] Indeed,

article 26 C.C.P. starts with the words “Unless otherwise provided”, which indicates that if another provision dictates the manner in which the right to appeal is to be exercised, then this other provision shall prevail. We could stop here and conclude that, since

article 29 deals specifically with all manners of interlocutory judgments, then

article 26 is necessarily restricted to final judgments. [ 12 ] This is confirmed by the fact that, after its introductory paragraph,

article 26 goes on to list all judgments that are appealable as of right, using the phrase “final judgments” in most cases, which makes it clear that only those are appealable as of right. There are two notable exceptions to the use of that phrase, in matters falling under subparagraphs 4 and 6 to which we shall revert shortly. [ 13 ] An appeal also lies – but this time upon leave – from the judgments listed in the second paragraph of

article 26. Two of the subparagraphs thereof refer to judgments that are final by nature, such as the judgment rendered under

article 846 C.C.P. (subpara. 4) and the judgment dismissing an action because of its improper nature ( subpara. 4.1). Subparagraph 5 of this same paragraph, by referring to “ any other final judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Quebec” reinforces the idea that all judgments mentioned in earlier subparagraphs are also final judgments or considered to be such.

That would certainly cover the judgments referred to in the first subparagraph ( i.e. judgments generally rendered under the provisions of Book VI of the Code of Civil Procedure ). [ 14 ] As for judgments rendered in matters concerning execution (subpara. 3), they are regarded as final judgments for the purpose of the exercise of the right of appeal, although they might actually be better described, in familiar terms, as “post-final”. What is certain is

that they are not “interlocutory” within the meaning given to that word in

article 29. [ 15 ] Thus, with one exception, judgments referred to in the second paragraph of

article 26 are final judgments. The exception pertains to judgments ruling on a motion to quash a seizure before judgment (subpara. 2). This appears to be an anomaly, however, which cannot, in and of itself, affect the general scheme of

article 26. [ 16 ] Returning now to subparagraphs 4 and 6 of the first paragraph of

article 26, one cannot but observe that judgments referred therein are not characterized as “final”. The French version of subparagraph 4 speaks of “ jugements ou ordonnances rendus en matière d'adoption ” and that of paragraph 6 speaks of “ les jugements ou ordonnances rendus dans les matières suivantes ”. The English version of both subparagraphs use the phrase “any judgment”. According to the appellant, as we have seen earlier, this would include both final and interlocutory judgments rendered in these matters. Considering the general framework of

article 26, as a whole, however, we are of the view that this conclusion is incorrect. It is even more implausible when one considers the introductory paragraph of

article 29 C.C.P. [ 17 ] This paragraph, which we reproduce again for convenience, reads as follows : 29. Est également sujet à appel, conformément à l'article 511, le jugement interlocutoire de la Cour supérieure ou celui de la Cour du Québec mais, s'il s'agit de sa compétence dans les matières relatives à la jeunesse, uniquement en matière d'adoption : […] 29. An appeal also lies, in accordance with

article 511, from an interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Québec but, as regards youth matters, only in a matter of adoption: […] [ 18 ] If the appellant is right in arguing that the absence of the word “final” in

article 26 means that an interlocutory judgment may in that case be appealed as of right, then one may wonder why

article 29 needs to provide specifically for interlocutory judgments in matters of adoption. Indeed, subparagraph 4 of the first paragraph of

article 26 permits an appeal as of right “from any judgment or order rendered in matters of adoption”. From the appellant's perspective, it would follow that, in the absence the word “final”, both interlocutory and final judgments in matters of adoption are appealable as of right under this provision. Obviously, this cannot be reconciled with the fact that

article 29 specifically allows the appeal of interlocutory judgments in matters of adoption, but only on permission being granted. The absence of the word “final” in subparagraph 4 of the first paragraph of

article 26 is clearly meaningless. [ 19 ] Similarly, the fact that the word “final” does not appear in subparagraph 6 of the same paragraph cannot detract from the conclusion that only final judgments are actually contemplated by

article 26. In other words, whether the word “final” appears or not,

article 26, first paragraph, subparagraph 4 and 6, deals with appeals of final judgments only, as if it read in the following manner : 26. Peuvent faire l'objet d'un appel, à moins d'une disposition contraire : […] 4. les jugements ou ordonnances finaux rendus en matière d'adoption; […] 6. les jugements ou ordonnances finaux rendus dans les matières suivantes;

a) la modification du registre de l'état civil;

b) la tutelle au mineur ou à l'absent et le jugement déclaratif de décès;

c) le conseil de tutelle;

d) les régimes de protection du majeur et l'homologation du mandat donné par une personne en prévision de son inaptitude. 26. Unless otherwise provided, an appeal lies […] (4) from any final judgment or order rendered in matters of adoption; […] 6) from any final judgment or order rendered in the following matters:

a) changes made to the register of civil status; (

b) tutorships to minors or absentees and declaratory judgments of death; (

c) tutorship councils;

d) protective supervision of persons of full age and the homologation of a mandate given by a person in anticipation of his incapacity. [ 20 ] The appellant argues that considering the subject-matter of subparagraph 6, which deals with the fundamental rights of a person (including liberty and privacy), and considering that every person is presumed competent unless proven otherwise, an appeal as of right is logical as it would protect the rights of the individual against any attempt to deprive him or her of the full exercise of his or her rights under

article 1 C.C.Q. [ 21 ] This argument may appear attractive on its face, but must be rejected. It may indeed be turned around completely: the situation

of a vulnerable person who needs protection (whether a minor or a person of full age) cannot be imperilled by an ill-founded, unnecessary or dilatory appeal. The requirement that all interlocutory judgments in these matters be appealed only with leave, as in any other matter, offers a reasonable and well-balanced compromise between the respect for personal autonomy and the need for protection. [ 22 ] As a footnote, we might add that this solution is also compatible with the manner in which judgments in matters concerning confinement in an institution or psychiatric assessment are handled.

In such matters, which also involve fundamental personal rights, only final judgments are appealable as of right, according to

article 26, first paragraph, subparagraph 5, interlocutory judgments being subject to

article 29 (and art. 511) C.C.P. [3] [ 23 ] It must also be said that appeals from interlocutory judgments are not looked upon favourably in the general scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure , since they are obstacles to or deviations from the ordinary course of the action and delay its progress. This is why appeals from such judgments are to be pre-authorized and only when the restrictive conditions set out in both articles 29 and 511 are fulfilled. [4] [ 24 ] There is no reason to make an exception to this rule for interlocutory judgments rendered in matters of protective supervision, or all other matters covered by subparagraph 6 of the first paragraph of

article 26 C.C.P. As far as subparagraph 6

d) is concerned, final judgments would include all judgments instituting protective supervision on the merits and judgments on the merits reviewing such orders pursuant to articles 277 and 278 C.C.Q. [ 25 ] Finally, it is also to be noted that, in the few cases where the Court had to deal with appeals from interlocutory judgments in matters covered by subparagraph 6 (

d) of the first paragraph of

article 26 C.C.P. , it did so pursuant to articles 29 and 511 C.C.P. , albeit without discussion. For instance, see: A. v. Québec (Curateur public ), 2013 QCCA 82 (Fournier J.A.); S.M. v. Québec (Curateur public) , 2008 QCCA 1691 (Chamberland J.A.), Québec (Curateur public) v.

M.B. , [2003] J.Q. no 4539 (LexisNexis) (Gendreau J.A.) . [ 26 ] The present appeal should therefore be dismissed, since leave was neither sought nor granted. * * [ 27 ] As far as Le Bel J.'s order to suspend the divorce proceedings is concerned, leave to appeal, which was not sought, was also required. [5] * * [ 28 ] At the hearing, in order to secure her rights, the appellant made a verbal motion for leave to appeal pursuant to

article 523 C.C.P. [6] The Court heard the motion (together with the motion to dismiss) and shall now adjudicate it. [ 29 ] Needless to say, the respondent contested the verbal motion for leave, for the reasons explained in his own motion to dismiss: in his opinion, the appeal is purely dilatory and cannot succeed. [ 30 ] We agree that leave cannot be granted. [ 31 ] Firstly, the appellant's motion to dismiss the respondent's action was made pursuant to

article 54.1 C.C.P. For the reasons explained in Cormier c. Teine Energy Ltd ., [7] interlocutory judgments dismissing such motions are not appealable as they do not fulfill the conditions set out in

article 29 C.C.P. : they do not decide the issues, they do not order the doing of anything which cannot be remedied by the final judgment and they do not unnecessarily delay the trial of the suit. There are a few limited exceptions to that rule, [8] none of which applies here. [ 32 ] Is the whole situation nevertheless so unique, as the appellant seems to suggest, that it would justify a departure from these rules (assuming that such a departure were possible, which is unlikely)? And, secondly, should the Court subsidiarily grant leave only with respect to the provisional measures Le Bel J. ordered (which appear to be appealable pursuant to

article 29 C.C.P. )?

After reviewing all the documents filed by the parties, including the meticulous judgment of Le Bel J., and considering the great deference which must be shown to the Superior Court’s assessment of facts and discretionary powers in such matters, the Court is of the view that the grounds of appeal set out in the appellant's inscription (and now in her verbal motion for leave to appeal), are on both counts devoid of any reasonable chance of success. [ 33 ] Leave to appeal shall therefore be refused. [ 34 ] Instead of challenging LeBel J.'s judgment, the appellant and her lawyer (as well as her family) should ensure that the action before the Superior Court proceeds as quickly and efficiently as possible, this being an important and urgent matter that must be resolved with utmost diligence from all parties.

Special attention shall be required from the Public Curator, who is provisionally in charge of the appellant's property and who is also in charge of “ faire le nécessaire pour mettre le dossier en état et obtenir un jugement du Tribunal sur la requête en ouverture d'un régime de protection ”. [9] [ 35 ] It is to be noted that the inscription in appeal as well as the motion to dismiss the appeal were served on the Public Curator, who chose not to appear in the file.

This will not preclude the Court from ordering him to act as diligently as possible in the present file. [ 36 ] The present judgment shall therefore be sent by the Clerk of the Court to the Public Curator. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 37 ] GRANTS the motion to dismiss the appeal, without costs; [ 38 ] DECLARES that the inscription in appeal is null and void; [ 39 ] DISMISSES the appeal, without costs;

[ 40 ] DISMISSES the verbal motion to appeal pursuant to

article 523 C.C.P. , without costs. [ 41 ] ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to send the present judgment to the Public Curator and ORDERS the Public Curator to pursue the matter with utmost diligence. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. DOMINIQUE BÉLANGER, J.A. Mtre Lillian Kliger For the appellant Mtre Mazaltov Ohana For the respondent Date of hearing: May 31, 2013