2017 NBCA 37, 2017 NBCA 37

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 86-16-CA BRUCE NORTHRUP APPELLANT BRUCE NORTHRUP APPELANT - and - - et - WINDSOR ENERGY INC. and KHALID AMIN RESPONDENTS WINDSOR ENERGY INC. et KHALID AMIN INTIMÉS Northrup v. Windsor Energy Inc. et al., 2017 NBCA37 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Quigg Northrup c.

Windsor Energy Inc. et autre, 2017NBCA 37 CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’sBench: November 3, 2016 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine: le 3 novembre 2016 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2016 NBBR 200 , 2016 NBQB 200 Décision frappée d’appel : 2016 NBBR 200 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: May 24, 2017 Appel entendu : le 24 mai 2017 Judgment rendered: September 7, 2017 Jugement rendu : le 7 septembre 2017

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Quigg Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Richard Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Frederick C. McElman, Q.C. Josie H. Marks For the respondents: D. Andrew Rouse, Q.C. Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Quigg Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Richard Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelant: Frederick C. McElman, c.r. Josie H. Marks Pour les intimés : D. Andrew Rouse, c.r. THE COURT Leave to amend the pleadings by removing admissions of fact is denied. The appeal is allowed.

The appellant is entitled to costs of $5,000 in the court below and $3,500 on appeal which includes the costs relating to the dismissal of the respondents’ motion. LA COUR L’autorisation de modifier les plaidoiries en retirant des aveux est refusée. L’appel est accueilli. L’appelant a droit à des dépens de 5 000 $ en première instance et de 3 500 $ en appel, lesquels comprennent les frais afférents au rejet de la motion des intimés. The judgment of the Court was delivered by QUIGG, J.A. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] The question on appeal is whether it is a violation of the Oil and Natural Gas Act , S.N.B. 1976, c. 0-2.1 (“ ONGA ”), and Geophysical Exploration Regulation , NB Regulation 86-191(“Reg 86-191”), to conduct geophysical exploration within municipal boundaries, through which there is a Provincial highway right-of-way, without obtaining the municipality’s consent in writing. Prior to the hearing, the respondents filed a motion requesting they be allowed to introduce new evidence, withdraw admissions and amend their statement of claim.

Redundantly, the appellant filed a motion requesting this Court dismiss the respondents’ motion to introduce new evidence and withdraw admissions.

II. Background [ 2 ] The essential facts in the motion below and this appeal are straightforward and undisputed. In October 2011, the first respondent, Windsor Energy (“Windsor”), conducted seismic testing along Highway 1, within what it believed at the time to be the boundary of the municipality of Sussex. Khalid Amin, the second respondent, is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Windsor Energy Inc.

On November 2, 2011, the appellant , Bruce Northrup, then Minister of Natural Resources, issued a press release stating that Windsor was in violation of the ONGA and Reg 86-191, having conducted the testing without the written consent of the municipality. The Minister also filed a complaint with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”). [ 3 ] On August 15, 2014, the respondents commenced an action against the appellant and the Province of New Brunswick (“Province”).

Thirteen claims were advanced, all but one of which were based on the assertion the statements made in the press release and to the RCMP were false. Three claims now remain, all against the former Minister: two misfeasance in public office, and one injurious falsehood.

The Province is no longer a defendant. [ 4 ] Because the substance of the three claims pertained to the accuracy of his statements, the appellant filed a Notice of Motion seeking a pre-trial determination of the following question of law: Is it a violation of the ONGA or Reg 86-191 to conduct geophysical exploration within municipal boundaries without first obtaining the municipality’s consent in writing? [ 5 ] The appellant (and the Province) also requested an order granting judgment on admissions of facts pursuant to Rule 23.01(1) (

c) of the Rules of Court . They contended that:

(1) Windsor had carried out the testing within the municipal boundaries of Sussex without its consent; and (2) if under the Regulation, Windsor was required to obtain the consent of the municipality, then Windsor breached Reg 86-191 and the ONGA . That alleged breach could be an answer to the claims of injury to reputation. [ 6 ] Therefore, central to the motion was the admission that Windsor or its agents conducted the testing within Sussex’s municipal boundaries without Sussex’s consent in writing. [ 7 ] The re spondents delineate the issues on their motion as follows: 1.

Whether the admissions are in substance not admissions of fact; 2. Whether they should be permitted to withdraw the admissions; 3. Whether amending a pleading is appropriate on the interlocutory appeal; 4. Whether it is appropriate to permit the respondents to file an amended appeal submission. [ 8 ] The respondents submit the admissions they made, if they are admissions, are in the nature of admissions of law. The relevant law would be the law applicable to the

interpretation of the boundaries of the Town of Sussex. [ 9 ] The respondents hired an independent surveyor and now question the territorial limits of the Town of Sussex. They say the boundaries may not be the same as they believed them to be at the time of the testing. They submit the original description of the boundary of Sussex relies on the expression “Trans-Canada Highway” while today, the highway is known as Route 1. [ 10 ] The respondents submit if the admissions are admissions of law, then, generally, the rule is they can be withdrawn at anytime.

In the alternative, assuming the admissions are admissions of fact, they argue that the jurisprudence indicates a favourable approach to the allowance of withdrawal of admissions. [ 11 ] The respondents further submit, the new evidence, which includes a survey prepared by Don-More Surveys & Engineering Ltd. and an affidavit from the surveyor, Mr. Toole, should be admitted, in order to determine whether the evidence discloses

a triable issue. The triable issue means the new evidence raises doubts about the accuracy of the statements that the testing took placewithin the municipal boundaries of Sussex. This Court would not be required to rule on whether the evidence is true.

The respondents saysince new evidence has come to light regarding the boundaries of Sussex, it would be appropriate to allow them to file a new factum totake the new information into consideration. [12] The appellant submits this appeal and the entirety of the litigation to date has proceeded upon the basis of therespondents’ admission – in the initial statement of claim and its many amendments – that they conducted seismic testing within themunicipal boundaries of Sussex. The appellant provided at least five examples where this admission was made.

The respondents did notserve a Notice of Refusal to Admit Facts after they had been served with a Notice of Request to Admit Facts on May 16, 2016. They are,therefore, deemed to have admitted the truth of these facts.

At the hearing of the appellant’s motion for judgment on admissions, thefactual record included: (1) the repeated admission in the Statement of Claim; (2) the admission pursuant to the non-response to theNotice of Request to Admit Facts; and (3) the content of the affidavit of Khalid Amin, sworn to on August 17, 2016. [13] In March 2017 (after the appeal had been perfected), the respondents filed a motion in the Court of Queen’sBench seeking to withdraw their admission that in October of 2011, Windsor had conducted testing within the municipal boundaries ofSussex.

The Court of Queen’s Bench declined to hear the matter since it was before this Court. [14] On May 4, 2017, the respondents filed their motion in this Court. On May 12, 2017, the appellant filed a Cross-Motion to primarily raise a preliminary objection to receipt of the new evidence and to strike the respondents’ motion. The appellantsubmits the respondents should not be permitted to enter the new evidence and their motion to withdraw admission should be dismissed. [15] The appellant argues the new evidence should not be admitted as the criteria as set out in Palmer v.

R., (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, have not been met (see also Doiron v. Wilcox, 2012 NBCA 70, 393 N.B.R. (2d) 183; Law Societyof New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2000] N.B.J. No. 540 (C.A.) (QL); and Gautreau et al. v. Saulnier et al., 2014 NBCA 22, [2014] N.B.J. No.87 (QL)). I agree. In my view, the respondents have not shown that the new evidence could not have been obtained and placed before themotion judge with reasonable diligence. Further, the new evidence fails to satisfy the remaining criteria. The new evidence contradictsthe evidence of the respondents themselves. Mr.

Amin provided sworn evidence to the court below that “Windsor conducted 2D seismictesting on Highway 1 within the municipal boundary of Sussex by approximately 200 meters”. Furthermore, the author of the newevidence has not been qualified as an expert and was not subject to cross-examination. [16] As a result, there are questions regarding the credibility and usefulness of the evidence. The opinion evidence,which contradicts not only the evidence of the appellant but also the sworn evidence of the respondents, is not suitable to be received bythis Court. Mr.

Amin has not explained why he previously deposed the testing occurred “200 meters” within the municipal boundary. Iwould have expected the Court to have been presented with evidence explaining when and why Mr. Toole was retained and what led therespondents to hire him. I also would have expected information explaining why the respondents’ previous understanding with respect tothe boundary was incorrect. [17] Therefore, the criteria to admit new evidence have not been met. [18] The appellant submits he would suffer serious prejudice if the withdrawal of admissions were allowed.

Thejurisprudence prescribes a stringent three-part test that must be met before a court will permit withdrawal of an admission. The same testapplies whether the admission was made in the pleadings or pursuant to a Notice of Request to Admit Facts. In A.C. Poirier & AssociatesInc. v. Cormier, 2006 NBQB 186, 298 N.B.R. (2d) 205, Glennie J. applied the following test: The law as it relates to withdrawing admissions was referred to in Lyons v. Lyons Estate, (NB KB), [1989] N.B.J. No.617, 1989 CarswellNB 147, 99 N.B.R. (2d) 220 in which Richard, C.J.Q.B., as he then was, writes at para. 12: 12.

In BAYDON CORP LTD. et al. v. DUPONT GLORE FORGAN CANADA LTD. et al. (1974), (ON SC), 4 O.R. (2d)290, Henry J. stated at page 296 as follows: From these authorities I understand the principle to be that before leave is given to withdraw an admission by amendment to pleadings,the Court ought to be satisfied of three things:

(

a) that the fact admitted is not true; (

b) that the admission was inadvertent or the solicitor was wrongly instructed; (

c) that the withdrawal of the admission will not result in an injustice to the action, it being understood that if the other parties can becompensated by costs there is no injustice. See also: Duivenvoorden v.

Belarus Tractor, Canada LLP, 2005 NBQB 388 , 2005 CarswellNB 630, 290 N.B.R. (2d) 192where the defendant in that case successfully satisfied the Court that the original admission by the defendant in its Statement of Defencewas not true and that the withdrawal of the admission would not result in an injustice to the plaintiff in that case. [para. 48] [19] This three-part test remains the law in Ontario today, although the first criterion is often formulated as arequirement that falsity of the admission be a “triable issue”. In the recent decision of Stickel v.

Lezzaik, 2015 ONSC 4659, [2015] O.J.No. 3873 (QL), the Ontario Superior Court says: Before the court will grant leave for an admission to be withdrawn, the person seeking the withdrawal must: (1) raise a triable issue; (2)provide a reasonable explanation for the admission and for its withdrawal; and (3) establish that the withdrawal will not result in non-compensable prejudice: Antipas v. Coroneos, [1988] O.J. No. 137 (H.C.J.); Szelazek Investments Ltd. v. Orzech, [1996] O.J. No. 336(C.A.); 147619 Canada Inc. v. Chartrand, [2006] O.J. No. 1877 (C.A.); 1679753 Ontario Ltd. v.

Muskoka Lakes (Township), 2010ONSC 1230 , [2010] O.J. No. 736 (S.C.J.), aff'd 2011 ONSC 1997 (Div. Ct.). All three elements must be established for leaveto be granted: BNP Paribas (Canada) v. Donald S. Bartlett Investments Ltd., 2012 ONSC 5604. [para. 29] [20] All three elements must be established for leave to be granted. New Brunswick jurisprudence confirms themoving party has the burden of proving the admission sought to be withdrawn is untrue. The quality of the evidence provided isinsufficient to discharge even the lesser burden of “triable issue”. The respondents have not discharged the burden in this case.

None ofthe three criteria were met. [21] The respondents seek to withdraw the admission that they conducted seismic testing within the boundaries ofSussex. However, the appeal record contains many facts which support the truth of this admission. If we accept the further evidenceprovided by the parties on the motion, it reinforces the fact that seismic testing occurred within the Town’s boundaries.

For example, therespondents sought permission from the Town to conduct the testing; the agent who undertook the testing confirmed it occurred withinthe Town’s boundaries; and the Province’s surveyor personally examined the location of the testing and confirmed it occurred within theboundaries of the Town. The only evidence provided by the respondents in support of the withdrawal of the admission is their surveyor’smaterials and report. [22] The surveyor’s report relies on data which is not attached or disclosed and was completed more than five yearsafter the testing occurred.

Therefore, in my view, the surveyor’s report as well as his affidavit are based upon undisclosed hearsay and asa result, “lac[k] the hallmarks of trustworthiness” (see Nova Scotia v. Johnson, 2005 NSCA 99, [2005] N.S.J. No. 261 (QL) at para. 89). [23] The report does not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the strong evidence put forward by the appellant. Theappellant’s evidence includes a sworn affidavit from the surveyor for the Department of Natural Resources (Mr.

Bastarache), who visitedthe site of the seismic testing seven days after the testing took place and produced his full survey on October 17, 2011, 23 days after theseismic testing occurred. In preparation of this survey, Mr. Bastarache used the original data from the agent who conducted the testing,which is disclosed and attached to his sworn affidavit. Mr. Bastarache’s evidence is also consistent with the understanding of therespondents’ own agents who were on the ground at the time of the testing, as well as the conduct of the respondents from October 2011to March 2017 inclusive.

Therefore, the respondents have not put forward sufficient evidence to meet the first of the three mandatorycriteria to obtain leave to withdraw the admission. [24] The second criterion which must be satisfied by the respondents is that the admission was “inadvertent”. Areview of the jurisprudence indicates that a bald assertion that an admission was made through inadvertence is insufficient. A reasonableexplanation, such as a misunderstanding between client and lawyer or a typographical error, must be provided.

When an admission hasbeen maintained throughout the proceedings, such as in this case, it is difficult to plead inadvertence. The jurisprudence on this pointtends to be based on situations where there have been disagreements between lawyers and clients or clients have retained new lawyers. Inmost of these situations courts have found admissions could not be withdrawn based on inadvertence. In the case before us therespondents have not discharged their burden of proving the admission was made inadvertently. No evidence of inadvertence has beenprovided by the respondents.

The only evidence proffered by the respondents in this regard is the bare assertions made by Mr. Amin in

his April 27, 2017 affidavit: Based on the information received by the Defendant, Northrup, and other officials at the DNR, I instructed my solicitors, by inadvertence, to admit in the Statement of Claim and the amendments thereto that Windsor had carried out seismic testing within the municipal boundary of Sussex on October 17, 2011. [para. 14] [ 25 ] This assertion falls short of the evidentiary standard required to prove inadvertence. The respondents’ Statement of Claim has been amended three times.

The respondents were served with the Notice of Request to Admit Facts in May 2016 and then with the motion below for judgment on admissions, each of which forced them to turn their minds to the specific issue of the seismic testing location. On each of these occasions, they not only maintained their admission, but filed further affidavit evidence reiterating the same. No attempt to withdraw the admission was made until the week prior to the appeal hearing. Furthermore, the admission is with respect to a fact that is within the sole control of the respondents.

It is not credible for sophisticated parties such as the respondents, who deal with this type of testing regularly, to suggest they had not mapped out where they would be undertaking the testing in 2011. Nor is it credible for the respondents to now say they had no method to determine where the seismic testing had occurred until consulting a surveyor in 2017, a surveyor who had no personal knowledge of the testing that occurred in 2011.

The data used to calculate the seismic testing points was in the respondents’ possession and it was their agent who stated the seismic testing had occurred within the bounds of the municipality. In Nesbitt v. Miramar , 2000 BCSC 187 , [2000] B.C.J. No. 279 (QL), the Court states: The judicial admission was not made without full information and documentation nor in haste or inadvertently. The defendant had 10 months, from the time of the commencement of the action on March 2, 1992, until it made the admission in its Amended Statement of Defence, to carefully consider the matter.

It can only be assumed that the defendant was aware of the consequences of making such an admission. The defendant also included the admission that the option had been exercised in its Notice to Admit to the plaintiff of August 30, 1993. While this document may not in itself bind the defendant, it does verify that counsel revisited this matter, further suggesting that the defendant was well aware of the admission it was making.

Lastly, no new information developed after the judicial admission was made that was not already available to the defendant and in this respect, the defendant had at the time more complete information and documentation than did the plaintiff. [para. 67] [ 26 ] There is no evidence to support the respondents’ assertion the oft-repeated admission, of having conducted seismic testing within the Town of Sussex, was inadvertent.

The respondents have not met the second of the three mandatory criteria to withdraw their admission. [ 27 ] The third and final criterion for the respondents to prove is that the withdrawal of admissions would not prejudice the appellant in a way that cannot be compensated by damages. The appellant submits he will be seriously prejudiced as the impact on his case would be one that cannot be compensated by damages.

The appellant says he will be subjected to the following prejudices if the withdrawal is allowed: Availability of Data: there is no evidence from the Respondents as to if the testing data still exists, and if so, its physical location, status or availability. Impact of Time: the seismic testing took place over five and half years ago. The lapse of time will undoubtedly impact the accuracy of memories and availability of evidence.

The Appellant could have collected this information years ago if the Respondents had not admitted from the beginning of this litigation that the testing occurred within the bounds of the Town of Sussex. [para. 79, Appellant’s Brief on Motion] [ 28 ] The appellant submits the unavailability of this evidence makes it such that the respondents have not met their onus of proving he would not be prejudiced by withdrawal of the admission. The appellant has proceeded in this litigation on the basis the

interpretation of s. 17(1) of Reg 86-191 of the Act is the issue to be determined. The respondents have always admitted to conducting seismic testing within the boundaries of the Town of Sussex, thereby falling under s. 17(1)( a ). The appellant has relied on this fact in preparation of pleadings and strategies for his defence. The key question in this litigation, from the time the claim was first filed in 2014, is whether the respondents were subject to both s. 17(1)(

a) and ( b ) . [ 29 ] In Hryniak v. Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, Karakatsanis J. discusses several relevant principles of general application, particularly in light of the proportionality principle now codified in Rule 1.02.1 of the New Brunswick Rules of Court :

There is growing support for alternative adjudication of disputes and a developing consensus that the traditional balance struck byextensive pre-trial processes and the conventional trial no longer reflects the modern reality and needs to be re-adjusted. A properbalance requires simplified and proportionate procedures for adjudication, and impacts the role of counsel and judges. This balance mustrecognize that a process can be fair and just, without the expense and delay of a trial, and that alternative models of adjudication are noless legitimate than the conventional trial. This requires a shift in culture.

The principal goal remains the same: a fair process that results in a just adjudication of disputes. A fairand just process must permit a judge to find the facts necessary to resolve the dispute and to apply the relevant legal principles to thefacts as found. However, that process is illusory unless it is also accessible -- proportionate, timely and affordable. The proportionalityprinciple means that the best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure. [paras. 27-28] The same principles have long been present in New Brunswick (see Lyons v.

Lyons Estate (1989), (NB KB), 99N.B.R. (2d) 220, [1989] N.B.J. No. 617 (Q.B.) (QL)). [30] In light of Hryniak and Lyons it is apparent the most exhaustive process is not always the most equitable. Theappellant has made best efforts to utilize pre-trial procedures to secure a just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of theproceeding, based on the claim put forward by the respondents. In A.C. Poirier & Associates Inc. the defendant brought an application toamend his Statement of Defence to, among other things, withdraw his admission that he was the owner of certain equipment.

The trusteesaid permitting the amendment would render all steps taken to that point a waste. In disallowing the amendments, Glennie J. agreed theplaintiff would be prejudiced: In my opinion, the Plaintiff will be prejudiced by allowing the Defendant to withdraw his admission in paragraph 4 of his Statement ofDefence that he was the owner of the Equipment mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim. If this amendment is allowed, thePlaintiff's action and the steps taken to date will have been wasted and the Plaintiff will be required to commence a new action.

As well,the corporate charter of FotoExpert Inc. has been forfeited. The corporation no longer exists. In this regard, the Defendant has not discharged the onus which requires him to satisfy the Court there will not be any prejudice if hisadmission of ownership was allowed to be withdrawn. See: Quinn v. Moncton Hospital, [1990] N.B.J. No. 1015 and Sampson &McNaughton Ltd. v. Nicholson et al. (1984), (ON SC), 46 O.R. (2d) 339. [paras. 50-51] [31] Substantial delays can lull a party into refraining from further investigation of a matter because they haverelied on admissions by opposing parties (see Nesbitt).

The respondents’ proposed amendments would completely change the substanceof the case before us and would result in an injustice which could not be compensated by costs. [32] For the reasons specified above I would dismiss the respondents’ motion to admit further evidence on appealand would not allow the admissions to be withdrawn. This renders the appellant’s Cross-Motion moot. Frankly, it was redundant in anyevent.

One need not file a motion to oppose a motion. [33] I will now turn to the appeal of the motion judge’s determination that written consent of the municipality wasnot required if the testing that occurred within municipal boundaries was also within a highway right-of-way, thus concluding therespondent had complied with the law when Windsor conducted its testing on October 17, 2011. III. Grounds of Appeal [34] The appellant says the motion judge erred in law by: a. failing to read the words of s. 17(1) of Reg 86-191 in their grammatical and ordinary sense;

b. implicitly substituting the phrase “on municipal land” for the phrase “within the bounds of a municipality” in s. 17(1)(

a) of Reg 86- 191; c. implicitly substituting the “New Brunswick Highway Corporation” for the “District Transportation Engineer” in s. 17(1)(

b) of Reg 86-191; d. implicitly considering the landowner consent of the New Brunswick Highway Corporation to be equivalent to the consent of the District Transportation Engineer (required by s. 17(1)(

b) of Reg 86-191); e. interpreting the word “or” between paragraphs (

a) and (

b) of s. 17(1) of Reg 86-191 as meaning that if (

b) applies (

a) does not apply – prioritizing (

b) over ( a ); f. going beyond the objective question of law which was before the Court and making a subjective finding of fact unrelated to legislative intent to interpret the ONGA and Reg 86-191; g. interpreting the statutory provisions before the Court in accordance with “the scheme of highway control under provincial legislation” rather than in accordance with the scheme and object of the ONGA and its regulations; h. relying upon other statutes and specifically the Highway Act and the Municipalities Act , and extrinsic documents; and i. finding that no consent in writing of the municipality was required (i.e. s. 17(1)(

a) of Reg 86-191 did not apply). [ 35 ] The appellant also contends the motion judge’s method of statutory

interpretation conflicts with the approach endorsed by this Court and the Supreme Court of Canada. IV. Standard of Review [ 36 ] The issue raised by this appeal is a question of statutory

interpretation. It therefore presents as a question of law (see Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2014 SCC 40 , [2014] 2 S.C.R. 135 , at para. 33 ; Heritage Capital Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co. , 2016 SCC 19 , [ 2016] 1 S.C.R. 306 , at para. 23 ). The standard of review is correctness and this Court may substitute its view for that of the motion judge if appellate intervention is warranted. V. Analysis [ 37 ] The motion judge was asked to interpret s. 17(1) of Reg 86-191 enacted pursuant to the ONGA . This provision states:

17(1) A geophysical permittee shall not work (

a) within the bounds of a municipality unless theconsent in writing of the municipal authority isobtained; or (

b) within any highway right of way unless theconsent in writing of the District TransportationEngineer is obtained. 17(1) Il est interdit au titulaire d’un permis detravaux géophysiques d’exécuter des travaux

a) dans les limites d’une municipalité, à moinsd’avoir obtenu le consentement écrit de l’autoritémunicipale; ou

b) à l’intérieur d’une emprise de route, à moinsd’avoir obtenu le consentement écrit del’ingénieur régional des transports. [38] The legal issue before the motion judge was whether the municipal consent requirement at s. 17(1)(

a) applieswhen a geophysical permittee is working within the bounds of a municipality and within a highway right-of-way. The motion judgedetermined it does not. She found that, if a geophysical permittee is working within a highway right-of-way that is also within thebounds of a municipality, s. 17(1)(

a) is not engaged and the consent of the municipality is not required. The appellant submits that this isan error of law. He asks this Court to reverse the motion judge’s finding and in light of admissions made by the respondents, to grant himjudgment dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 23.01(10(

c) and/or Rule 37.10 of the Rules of Court. [39] The appellant submits that, while the grounds of appeal are numerous they can be grouped as follows: 1) Improper Approach to Statutory

Interpretation; 2) Erroneous determination of a question of law; and 3) Erroneous determination of a question of fact not before the Court. A. Improper Approach to Statutory

Interpretation [40] The appellant says the motion judge erred in law by applying an incorrect approach to statutory

interpretation,in that she failed to read the words of s. 17(1) in their ordinary and grammatical sense (grounds 1(

a) to (e)) and in their entire context,harmoniously with the scheme and object of Reg 86-191 and the ONGA and the intention of the Legislature (grounds 1(

g) and (h)).

(1) Statutory

interpretation [41] In Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, the Supreme Court outlinesthe proper approach to statutory

interpretation: In Elmer Driedger’s definitive formulation, found at p. 87 of his Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983): Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammaticaland ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. Driedger’s modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred approach to statutory

interpretation across a widerange of interpretive settings: see, for example, Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, at p.578, per Estey J.; Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, at p.17; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21; R. v. Gladue, (SCC),[1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 25; R. v. Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, 2000 SCC 65, at para. 26; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001SCC 2, at para. 33, per McLachlin C.J.; Chieu v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3, atpara. 27. I note as well that, in the federal legislative context, this Court’s preferred approach is buttressed by s. 12 of the

InterpretationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which provides that every enactment “is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal

construction and

interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”. [para. 26] [42] This is further confirmed in Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47,[2015] 3 S.C.R. 300: When assessing the reasonableness of an administrative decision maker’s

interpretation, Driedger’s modern rule of statutoryinterpretation provides helpful guidance: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammaticaland ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. (E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87) [para. 18] [43] The jurisprudence sets out several principles to be considered when applying this approach to statutoryinterpretation. Firstly, one must not read in words that are not included in the text. In Wilson, the Supreme Court explains: Mr.

Wilson submits that the officer's belief must be based not only on the ASD result, but also on confirmatory evidence showing thatthe driver’s ability to drive is affected by alcohol. I would reject this

interpretation. It is not supported by the text of the provision, and itrequires the court to read in words that are simply not there. This Court has cautioned against judicial rewriting of legislation under theguise of interpreting it: ... the contextual approach allows the courts to depart from the common grammatical meaning of words where this is required by aparticular context, but it does not generally mandate the courts to read words into a statutory provision. It is only when words are“reasonably capable of bearing” a particular meaning that they may be interpreted contextually... .

The Crown is asking this Court to readwords into s. 34(2) which are simply not there. In my view, to do so would be tantamount to amending s. 34(2), which is a legislative andnot a judicial function. [First emphasis in original; second emphasis added.] (R. v. McIntosh, (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, at p. 701; cited with approval in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada(Attorney General), 2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, at para. 174. See also R. v. Hinchey, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R.1128, at paras. 8-9 and 36; Canada (Information Commissioner) v.

Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2S.C.R. 306, at para. 40.) [para. 27] [44] Secondly, when interpreting statutes in New Brunswick, both the English and French version of the text areequally authoritative. In the event of ambiguity between them, the preferred

interpretation is that which gives effect to the sharedmeaning of both versions. As explained by Drapeau, J.A. (as he then was) in Saint John Port Authority et al. v. Kenmont ManagementInc., 2002 NBCA 11, 248 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (dissenting in part): Of course, both the English and the French versions are equally authentic in construing s. 2 (see s. 14 of the Official Languages of NewBrunswick Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. O-1) and this Court must, if at all possible, give effect to their common or shared meaning.

It is settledlaw that where the two versions of a bilingual statute are reconcilable, one must be interpreted by the other and, if one is ambiguous andthe other plain and unequivocal, the latter will generally be preferred unless a contrary legislative intention is otherwise apparent. See R.Sullivan, Statutory

Interpretation (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1996) at 90-96. In my view, both versions of s. 2 are easily reconcilable.The French version is unambiguous; it equates “specialty” to “formal contract”. The contract under seal was “[o]ne of the classic formalcontracts at common law” [Emphasis added]. See S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Rochester, New York:Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 1990) at 31. [para. 37] [45] Thirdly, when the statutory provision being interpreted is a regulatory provision, the scheme and purpose ofthe enabling legislation is of critical importance. In Wood v. Schaeffer, 2013 SCC 71, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1053, the Court explains:

Answering the question posed by this appeal requires interpreting s. 7(1) of the regulation. The words of the provision must be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the regulation, its objective, and the intention of the legislature. Critically, the provisions of the regulation must be read in light of the purpose of the enabling legislation -- the Act. That purpose “transcends and governs” the regulation ( Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2005 SCC 26 , [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, at para. 38 ). An

interpretation of s. 7(1) that leads to conflict with another provision of the regulation, or that runs contrary to the purpose of the legislative scheme, must be avoided. [para. 33]

(2) Section 17 is not restricted to municipally owned land [ 46 ] The motion judge determined that s. 17(1)(

a) is not engaged by the simple fact that a permittee is working within the bounds of a municipality; rather, it applies only if the permittee is working within the bounds of the municipality and on land owned by the municipality. It is apparent that interpreting “within the bounds of a municipality” to mean land “owned” by the municipality is inconsistent with the grammatical and ordinary words of the text, particularly when read in the context of the ONGA and Reg 86-191 as a whole. The plain meaning of the phrase “within the bounds of a municipality” at s. 17(1)(

a) refers to all land within a municipality’s territorial limits, and is not limited to land owned by the municipality. In the French version of Reg 86-191, the phrase, “dans les limites d’une municipalité” cannot be interpreted as meaning lands owned by the municipality. The ordinary meaning of the word “limite” denotes a territorial boundary. In my view s. 17(1)(

a) means exactly what it says: a permittee requires the consent in writing of the municipality before it undertakes any work within the territorial limits of the municipality. This applies regardless of who owns the land. To restrict the wording to land owned by the municipality would require reading in words that are simply not there. [ 47 ] The fact that s. 17(1)(

a) is not restricted to municipally owned land is further supported by the context of the statutory scheme as a whole and, in particular, by the purpose and wording of the ONGA . The Act regulates the exploration for oil and gas in the province. It declares Crown ownership over all oil and natural gas reserves and imposes a blanket prohibition upon exploration for oil and natural gas unless an enterprise possesses a proper licence or permit.

The Act then establishes a regulatory scheme by which the executive branch of government is empowered to issue licences and permits for geophysical exploration; to impose terms and conditions upon licensees and permittees; and to enact regulations. All licensees are required to comply with the ONGA and Reg 86-191. Any breach of the Regulation is an offence under the ONGA . The purpose of the ONGA is to establish a regulatory scheme, under the control of the Minister, for the exploration for oil and gas in New Brunswick.

The ONGA prohibits geophysical exploration without permission from the Minister by way of an appropriate licence or permit and permission from any landowner upon whose land work will be conducted (s. 12, s. 9(1)(

a) ONGA ). [ 48 ] The delegated authority under s. 59 of the ONGA includes making regulations regarding the terms and conditions of geophysical permits and the method, manner and location in which, and where, geophysical exploration is carried out. The motion judge did not refer to the ONGA in order to interpret s. 17(1) of the Regulation. The judge instead focused upon the Municipalities Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22, its Regulation and the Highway Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-5 .

In my view, had she considered the ONGA it would have been apparent the purpose of s. 17(1) is not to secure a municipality’s consent as a landowner. The consent of landowners is addressed at s. 9 of the ONGA . Section 17(1) goes beyond s. 9 of the ONGA by requiring the consent of the municipality for all work done within its territorial boundaries, regardless of who owns the land. [ 49 ] Geophysical exploration includes a wide range of activities, including seismic operations, test drilling, and blasting with dynamite.

The invasive nature of these activities could have an important impact on municipalities, for example with respect to the structural integrity of water and sewer systems. From a purposive perspective it is apparent why municipal consent would be required in addition to the landowner’s consent already required by the ONGA . The intent of s. 17(1)(

a) is to recognize that a municipality has an interest in whether geophysical testing within its boundaries occurs and, therefore, requires municipal consent. [ 50 ] The motion judge should have considered the scheme and object of the enabling legislation rather than rely upon extrinsic documents produced after the enactment of the ONGA and Reg 86-191. Extrinsic documents produced after legislation is enacted, even if issued by a Crown corporation, or government entity, are generally irrelevant to statutory

interpretation. Statutory

interpretation is a legal matter for determination by the judicial, not executive, branch of government (see Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2012 SCC 71 , [2012] 3 S.C.R. 660 , at paras. 98-99 ). [ 51 ] The consent of the New Brunswick Highway Corporation as referred to by the motion judge does not provide insight into the legislative intent at the time of the enactment of the ONGA or Reg 86-191. It is not a legislated form under the ONGA or its Regulations.

Similarly, emails from employees of the Department of Natural Resources, presented by the respondents at the motion should not have been given weight in interpreting the meaning of s. 17(1). They are not evidence of legislative intent and offer no value in a statutory

interpretation analysis. Therefore, in my view, the motion judge erred in reading s. 17(1)(

a) restrictively so as to only apply to work undertaken on municipally owned land, rather than to any work undertaken within the bounds of the municipality.

[ 52 ] Section 17(1)(

a) was enacted pursuant to the Lieutenant Governor in Council’s delegated authority to regulate “the method, manner and location in which and where geophysical exploration is to be carried out” ( ONGA s. 59(1)( i )). The proper

interpretation requires the respondents to obtain the written consent of the municipality before undertaking seismic testing within town limits, regardless of the ownership of the land upon which their work was being performed. (3) Section 17(1)(

a) is not subordinate to s. 17(1)( b ) [ 53 ] In addition to restricting s. 17(1)(

a) to municipally owned land, the motion judge determined s.17(1)(

a) is subordinate to s. 17(1)( b ). That is, if a permittee is working on land located within the bounds of the municipality and within a highway right-of-way, s. 17(1)(

a) has no application; only s. 17(1)(

b) applies. In my view this

interpretation does not correspond to the grammatical and ordinary sense of the wording of the provision or to the broader legislative context and purpose of Reg 86-191 and the ONGA . Subsection 17(1) mandates that consent is required in different circumstances. If a permittee is within the bounds of the municipality, municipal consent is required. If the permittee is within a highway right-of-way, consent of the District Transportation Engineer is required.

As pointed out by the appellant, the list could have continued: if a permittee is within a watershed, consent of the Department of Environment is required. [ 54 ] There is nothing in the wording to suggest if the circumstances of both s. 17(1)(

a) and (

b) exist, that is work within the bounds of both a municipality and a highway right-of-way, only (

b) applies. The motion judge concluded this because the subsections were divided by the word “or” which she determined required the subsections to be read disjunctively. Even if “or” is attributed a disjunctive meaning, it could not prioritize s. 17(1)(

b) over s. 17(1)( a ). In Gauthier v. Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission (N.B.) , 2003 NBCA 25 , 259 N.B.R. (2d) 176, this Court confirms, despite being disjunctive, “or” is frequently inclusive, depending on the context ( see also R. v. Mullins , 2005 NBCA 111 , 294 N.B.R. (2d) 265 ; Agnew v. Smith , 2001 NBCA 83 , 240 N.B.R. (2d) 63 ). In other words, even if these two subsections are read in isolation (disjunctively), it does not mean they cannot both apply to the same situation. If work occurs within the bounds of a municipality, municipal consent is required. This requirement arises under s. 17(1)(

a) regardless of whether the work is also within a highway right-of-way. Similarly, if work is occurring within a highway right-of-way, the consent of the District Transportation Engineer is required regardless of whether the work is also within a municipality.

The fact that “or” is disjunctive does not preclude it from being inclusive: independent, disjunctive assessments can conclude that the consent of both apply, resulting in simultaneous application to the same situation. [ 55 ] Furthermore, even if “or” was given a disjunctive and exclusive meaning, it would not result in the conclusion reached by the motion judge. A disjunctive and exclusive meaning would allow a permittee to choose between two alternatives, a conclusion rejected by the motion judge. The

interpretation adopted by the motion judge is, if both subsections are engaged, only the consent at s. 17(1)(

b) is required. This is not a disjunctive and exclusive

interpretation of “or”. It rewrites the provision to state that s. 17(1)(

a) applies unless you are also within s. 17(1)( b ), which would result in only (

b) being applicable. This requires reading words into the text that are not there. [ 56 ] In the decision, the motion judge explains prioritizing s. 17(1)(

b) over (

a) because “[t]he purpose of

section 17 is to provide a mechanism for consent with regard to seismic testing” and “consent is either required from one or the other; that is from the province or the municipality”; a review of the Regulation and the ONGA in their entirety suggests that this is not correct. These subsections impose requirements upon geophysical permittees before commencing blasting or other seismic tests. A geophysical permittee, by definition, has obtained “consent from the province” through the issuance of its permit by the Minister. Thus, s. 17(1)(

b) cannot be targeting provincial consent as found by the motion judge. Rather, the purpose of s. 17(1) is to require consent from entities that, in addition to the Province and the Minister who always have an interest, may have an interest in proposed geophysical exploration given the location of the proposed work.

If the work is occurring within a highway right-of-way, the consent of the District Transportation Engineer is required in addition to the consent of others prescribed under the ONGA and Reg 86-191, because the District Transportation Engineer has an interest in activities conducted on highway rights-of-way.

If the work is occurring within the bounds of the municipality, municipal consent is required in addition to any other consent required because the municipality has an interest in the work. [ 57 ] When the Regulation is read in its entire context, including that of its enabling legislation, it is clear the purpose of the ONGA is to require consent from the full range of parties who may be impacted by the work. This purpose leads to an inclusive

interpretation. If a geophysical permittee is working within a municipality and within a highway right-of-way, the interests of both the municipality and the District Transportation Engineer are engaged such that the consent of both are required. B. Erroneous Determination of a Question of law

[ 58 ] The appellant submits the motion judge erred in finding that the respondents did not require the consent of the municipality in writing, to conduct seismic testing within the bounds of the municipality of Sussex (ground 1(i)). [ 59 ] The appellant sought determination of the following question of law in his motion to the Court of Queen’s Bench: Is it a violation of the ONGA or REG 86-191 to conduct geophysical exploration within municipal boundaries without first obtaining municipality’s consent in writing? The motion judge responded negatively. Before us the appellant submits this is an error of law. I agree. The words of s. 17(1)(

a) read in their entire grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme and object of Reg 86-191 and the ONGA , clearly confirm the written consent of the municipality is required before conducting geophysical exploration within municipal bounds. C. Erroneous Finding of Fact on Question Not Before the Court

(1) Erroneous finding of fact on question not before the court [ 60 ] The appellant also says the motion judge erred in making the disputed factual determination that Windsor did not violate the ONGA or Reg 86-191 when this issue was not before the court and the evidence explicitly contradicted the motion judge’s determination (ground 1(f)). [ 61 ] The appellant submits that the motion judge not only answered the question of law negatively, she proceeded to make a positive finding of fact on a matter not before the court.

In the decision, the judge states: Finally, the answer to the question, whether or not the plaintiffs in this factual situation were in violation of the ONGA or its Regulation 86-191 with regard to conducting geophysical exploration within the municipal boundary of Sussex, is in the negative. [para. 27] It appears the judge based this finding on: 1) her determination that s. 17(1)(

a) of Reg 86-191 did not apply; and 2) an implicit finding of fact that the requirements of s. 17(1)(

b) of Reg 86-191 and all other provisions of the ONGA and Reg 86-191 were met. [ 62 ] The second point was not before the motion judge and it was not permissible for her to make a disputed finding of fact on a motion pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court . This finding of fact, that the requirements of s. 17(1)(

b) were met, appears to be contradicted by the evidence offered by the respondents. The judge determined the respondents required the consent of the District Transportation Engineer to conduct seismic testing within a highway right-of-way in the municipality of Sussex and that this consent had been obtained. Yet, the facts before the Court indicate the consent provided by the District Transportation Engineer explicitly excluded the work performed along Highway 1 within the municipal boundaries of Sussex. The consent of the District Transportation Engineer that the respondents’ filed with the court states: Please accept this letter as written consent pursuant to section 17(1) (

b) of Regulation 86-191 under the Oil and Natural Gas Act authorizing Windsor Energy Inc. (“Windsor”) to conduct geophysical exploration along highways and Public (not maintained) roads as attached hereto as

schedule “A” with the exception of the identified Highway 1 and designated highways and Public (not maintained) roads within the boundaries of a municipality at this time . [Emphasis in original.] [ 63 ] In my view, it was an error in law for the motion judge to make a factual determination that the respondents had obtained the District Transportation Engineer’s consent as required by s. 17(1)(

b) and, implicitly, that all other provisions of the ONGA and all Regulations had been met, when those matters had not been put before her.

(2) Rule 23.01(1)(c): judgment on admissions of fact [ 64 ] In the court below, the appellant sought determination of the legal question of whether conducting geophysical exploration within municipal boundaries without written consent from the municipality is a violation of the ONGA or Reg 86-191. If it had been determined to be so, the appellant sought judgment in his favour based upon the respondents’ admissions that Windsor had conducted geophysical exploration within the municipal boundaries of Sussex without the municipality’s consent. [ 65 ] Rule 62.21(1) instructs: 62.21 Powers of Court of Appeal To Draw Inferences and Make Decisions

(1) The Court of Appeal may draw inferences of fact, render any decision and make any order which ought to have been made, and may make such further or other order as the case may require. 62.21 Attributions de la Cour d’appel Pouvoir d’inférer et de décider

(1) La Cour d’appel peut faire des inférences à partir des faits et rendre toute décision ou ordonnance qui aurait dû être rendue. Elle peut également rendre toute autre ordonnance appropriée à la cause. [ 66 ] Therefore, if this Court determines the question of law should have been answered positively, we could grant judgment under Rule 23.01(1) (

c) and/or Rule 37.10 (a). [ 67 ] In the case before us, two important admissions of fact have been made: Windsor or its agents conducted approximately eight seismic tests within the municipal boundaries of Sussex; and, at the time of the seismic tests, Windsor had not obtained the consent in writing of the Town of Sussex. The first admission is made at paragraph eight of the second Further Amended Statement of Claim. The second admission is established by the respondents’ failure to respond to a Request to Admit Facts under Rule 51 of the Rules of Court . Rules 51.03 and 51.04(1) state:

51.03 Effect of Refusal or Failure

(1) The party on whom a Request to Admit Facts is served shall be deemed to admit the truth of such facts unless, within 10 days thereafter, he serves a Notice of Refusal to Admit Facts (Form 51B).

(2) The court, in exercising its discretion as to costs, shall take into account a refusal or failure to admit any fact which is subsequently proved at trial. 51.04 Effect of Admission

(1) A fact admitted or deemed to be admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. 51.03 Effet d’une demande laissée sans réponse

(1) La

partie à qui une demande d’aveux est signifiée est réputée admettre la véracité des allégations qui y sont contenues, à moins qu’elle ne signifie, dans les 10 jours qui suivent, un avis de refus de faire des aveux allégués (formule 51B).

(2) Lorsqu’elle exerce son pouvoir relatif aux dépens, la cour doit prendre en considération tout refus ou défaut d’admettre un fait dont la véracité est par la suite établie au procès. 51.04 Effet de l’aveu

(1) Un fait admis ou réputé admis en application de la présente règle est établi définitivement à moins que la cour ne permette la rétractation ou la rectification de l’aveu. [ 68 ] The effect of a formal admission of fact, whether through the pleadings or by failing to serve a Notice of Refusal to Admit Facts, is binding on the party who has made the admission.

It can only be withdrawn with leave of the court, which leave is exercised only in very limited circumstances. [ 69 ] Despite their admission that seismic tests were conducted within the boundaries of the Town of Sussex without the municipality’s approval in writing, the respondents pleaded the appellant made a false statement when he said these actions violated the ONGA and Reg 86-191. When interpreted properly, the Act and the Regulations confirm the respondents’ pleading is incorrect in law. The appellant was correct to characterize Windsor’s actions as contrary to provincial legislation.

As a result, there is no basis upon which the respondents’ tort claims can succeed. An essential element that must be proven in order for the respondents to succeed with their injurious falsehood claim is the existence of a false statement. In this case, the false statement pleaded is the appellant’s statement in the press release that Windsor violated the ONGA and Reg 86-191 by conducting seismic testing within municipal boundaries without the municipality’s consent. A proper

interpretation of s. 17(1)(

a) of Reg 86-191, combined with the admissions of fact made by the respondents, confirm this statement was true. Therefore, the injurious falsehood claim cannot succeed. [ 70 ] In Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse , 2003 SCC 69 , [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 , the Supreme Court confirms misfeasance in public office is an intentional tort requiring proof of deliberate unlawful conduct; the defendant must have deliberately acted unlawfully in the exercise of his or her public functions (para. 32).

In this case, the alleged unlawful act is the appellant falsely stated in the press release and to the RCMP, that Windsor violated the ONGA and R eg 86-191. Yet the respondents’ admissions of fact, combined with existing jurisprudence, confirm this statement was true. The Minister was commenting truthfully in the press upon matters of public interest and the complaint to the RCMP was not a deliberate unlawful act. Therefore, the injurious falsehood claim and the misfeasance in public office claim cannot succeed and the appellant is entitled to judgment in his favour in this regard. VI.

Conclusion [ 71 ] Initially, the respondents admitted they conducted geophysical exploration within the boundaries of the municipality of Sussex without the written consent of the municipality. Their initial complaint was that the appellant characterized this conduct as a violation of the ONGA and Reg 86-191. However, an application of the proper principles of statutory

interpretation to s. 17(1)(

a) confirms that conducting seismic testing within the bounds of the municipality without its consent is a violation of the ONGA

and Reg 86-191. Accordingly, the appellant’s characterization of the respondents’ conduct as being unlawful was accurate and cannot form the basis of a tort claim. Judgment should, therefore, be granted in the appellant’s favour, dismissing the action. VII. Disposition [ 72 ] I would dismiss the motion by the respondents and allow the appeal. I would direct judgment be issued dismissing the action. The appellant is entitled to costs of $5,000 in the court below, and $3,500 on appeal, which includes the costs relating to the dismissal of the respondents’ motion.

Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE QUIGG I. Introduction [1] La question à trancher en appel consiste à déterminer si la réalisation de travaux de prospection géophysique dans les limites d’une municipalité traversée par l’emprise d’une route provinciale, sans avoir obtenu au préalable le consentement écrit de la municipalité, enfreint la

Loi sur le pétrole et le gaz naturel , L.N.-B. 1976, ch. O-2.1 (« la Loi »), et le Règlement sur la prospection géophysique , Règlement du N.-B. 86-191 (le « règl. 86-191 »). Avant l’audience, les intimés ont déposé une motion dans laquelle ils demandaient l’autorisation d’introduire de nouveaux éléments de preuve, de retirer certains aveux et de modifier leur exposé de la demande. De manière superflue, l’appelant a déposé une motion demandant à notre Cour de rejeter la motion dans laquelle les intimés demandaient l’autorisation d’introduire de nouveaux éléments de preuve et de retirer certains aveux. II.

Contexte [2] Les faits essentiels de la motion tranchée en première instance et du présent appel sont simples et non contestés. En octobre 2011, l’intimée, Windsor Energy (« Windsor »), a réalisé des essais sismiques le long de la route 1, à l’intérieur de ce qu’elle croyait alors être les limites de la municipalité de Sussex. Khalid Amin, l’intimé, est le président-directeur général de Windsor Energy Inc.

Le 2 novembre 2011, l’ appelant , Bruce Northrup, qui était alors ministre des Ressources naturelles, a publié un communiqué de presse indiquant que l’intimée avait enfreint la Loi et le règl. 86-191 en réalisant des essais sismiques sans le consentement écrit de la municipalité. Le Ministre a également déposé une plainte auprès de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (« la GRC »). [3] Le 15 août 2014, les intimés ont intenté une action contre l’appelant et la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick (la « Province »).

Treize revendications ont été formulées, et elles étaient toutes fondées, à l’exception d’une seule, sur l’assertion selon laquelle les déclarations faites dans le communiqué de presse et à la GRC étaient fausses. Il ne reste maintenant que trois revendications qui visent toutes l’ancien ministre : deux de malfaisance dans une charge publique et une de dénigrement.

La Province n’est plus défenderesse. [4] Étant donné que l’exactitude de ses déclarations était au cœur des trois revendications, l’appelant a introduit un avis de motion dans lequel il demandait à la Cour de trancher avant le procès la question de droit suivante : [TRADUCTION] L a réalisation de travaux de prospection géophysique dans les limites d’une municipalité sans avoir obtenu au préalable le consentement par écrit de cette dernière constitue-t-elle une violation de la

Loi sur le pétrole et le gaz naturel et du règl. 86-191?

[5] L’appelant (et la Province) demandaient également à la Cour d’ordonner que jugement soit rendu fondé sur des faits avoués conformément à la règle 23.01(1)

c) des Règles de procédure . Ils faisaient valoir : (1) que Windsor avait effectué des essais sismiques à l’intérieur des limites municipales de Sussex sans son consentement et (2) que si le règlement imposait à Windsor l’obligation d’obtenir le consentement de la municipalité, il en découlait que Windsor avait enfreint le règl. 86-191 et la Loi .

La présumée violation pouvait constituer une réponse aux allégations d’atteinte à la réputation. [6] Par conséquent, l’aveu que Windsor ou ses mandataires avaient effectué des essais sismiques dans les limites municipales de Sussex sans le consentement de la municipalité était au cœur de la motion. [7] Les intimés formulent comme suit les questions que soulève leur motion : 1. Peut-on dire qu’en substance, les aveux ne sont pas des aveux de fait? 2. Les intimés devraient-ils être autorisés à retirer leurs aveux? 3. La modification d’une plaidoirie est-elle appropriée dans le cadre de l’appel interlocutoire? 4.

Est-il approprié d’autoriser les intimés à déposer un mémoire d’appel modifié? [8] Les intimés soutiennent que les aveux qu’ils ont faits, si tant est que ce soit des aveux, sont par nature des aveux sur des questions de droit. Le droit pertinent serait celui qui régit l’interprétation des limites de la ville de Sussex. [9] L es intimés ont engagé un arpenteur indépendant et contestent maintenant les limites territoriales de la ville de Sussex. Ils affirment que ces limites ne sont peut-être pas celles qu’ils pensaient au moment où les essais ont été effectués.

Ils font valoir que la description initiale de la limite territoriale de Sussex fait référence au terme [TRADUCTION] « Transcanadienne » alors qu’aujourd’hui, cette route porte le nom de route 1. [10] L es intimés allèguent que si les aveux sont des aveux sur des questions de droit, il est alors possible, de façon générale, de les retirer en tout temps.

Subsidiairement, à supposer que les aveux soient des aveux de fait, ils soutiennent que la jurisprudence tend à voir d’un bon œil la rétractation de tels aveux. [11] Les intimés font également valoir que les nouveaux éléments de preuve, qui comprennent un arpentage effectué par la Don-More Surveys & Engineering Ltd. et un affidavit de l’arpenteur, M. Toole, devraient être admis en preuve dans le but de déterminer si la preuve indique qu’il y a matière à procès.

Cela signifie que les nouveaux éléments de preuve soulèvent des doutes au sujet de l’exactitude des déclarations selon lesquelles les essais ont été effectués à l’intérieur des limites municipales de Sussex. Notre Cour ne serait pas tenue de déterminer si ces éléments de preuve sont véridiques.

Les intimés affirment qu’étant donné qu’il existe de nouveaux éléments de preuve au sujet des limites municipales de Sussex, il conviendrait de les autoriser à déposer un nouveau mémoire afin de prendre en considération cette nouvelle information. [12] L’appelant soutient que le présent appel et la totalité des poursuites engagées jusqu’à ce jour étaient fondés sur l’aveu par les intimés – dans l’exposé de la demande initial et ses nombreuses modifications – qu’ils avaient effectué des essais sismiques à l’intérieur des limites municipales de Sussex. L’appelant a présenté au moins cinq exemples d’un tel aveu.

Les intimés n’ont pas signifié d’avis de refus de faire des aveux après avoir reçu signification d’un avis de demande d’aveux le 16 mai 2016. Ils sont donc réputés avoir admis la véracité de ces faits.

Lors de l’audition de la motion de l’appelant pour jugement fondé sur un aveu, le dossier factuel comprenait : (1) l’aveu répété dans l’exposé de la demande, (2) l’aveu consécutif à l’absence de réponse à l’avis de demande d’aveux et (3) la teneur de l’affidavit de Khalid Amin, souscrit le 17 août 2016. [13] En mars 2017 (une fois l’appel mis en état), les intimés ont déposé devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine une motion dans laquelle ils demandaient l’autorisation de retirer leur aveu selon lequel Windsor avait effectué des essais en octobre 2011 dans les limites municipales de Sussex.

La Cour du Banc de la Reine a refusé d’entendre l’affaire au motif que notre Cour en avait été saisie. [14] Le 4 mai 2017, les intimés ont déposé leur motion devant notre Cour. Le 12 mai 2017, l’appelant a déposé une motion incidente essentiellement dans le but de soulever une objection préliminaire à la réception des nouveaux éléments de preuve et de radier la motion des intimés. L’appelant soutient que les intimés ne devraient pas être autorisés à présenter les

nouveaux éléments de preuve et que leur motion visant à obtenir le retrait de leurs aveux devrait être rejetée. [15] L’appelant soutient que les nouveaux éléments de preuve ne devraient pas être admis étantdonné que les critères énoncés dans l’arrêt Palmer c. La Reine, (SCC), [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759, n’ont pas été remplis (voir également Doiron c. Wilcox, 2012 NBCA 70, 393 R.N.-B. (2e) 183; Law Society of New Brunswick c. Ryan, [2000] A.N.-B. no 540 (C.A.) (QL); et Gautreau et autre c. Saulnier et autre, 2014 NBCA 22, [2014] A.N.-B. no 87 (QL)). Je suis d’accord.

À mon avis, lesintimés n’ont pas démontré que les nouveaux éléments de preuve ne pouvaient pas être obtenus et présentés à la juge saisie de la motionavec une diligence raisonnable. De plus, les nouveaux éléments de preuve ne satisfont pas aux critères restants. Ils contredisent la preuveque les intimés ont eux-mêmes introduite. Dans le témoignage sous serment qu’il a présenté au tribunal d’instance inférieure, M. Amin adéclaré que [TRADUCTION] « Windsor a effectué des essais sismiques 2D sur la route 1 à 200 mètres environ à l’intérieur des limitesmunicipales de Sussex ».

Par ailleurs, l’auteur des nouveaux éléments de preuve n’a pas été reconnu comme témoin expert et n’a pas étésoumis à un contre-interrogatoire. [16] De ce fait, sa crédibilité et l’utilité de la preuve qu’il a présentée soulèvent des questions. Lapreuve sous forme d’opinion, qui contredit non seulement la preuve produite par l’appelant mais également le témoignage sous sermentdes intimés, ne réunit pas les conditions requises pour être reçue par notre Cour. M. Amin n’a pas expliqué pour quelle raison il avaitdéclaré que les essais s’étaient déroulés à « 200 mètres » à l’intérieur des limites municipales.

Je me serais attendu à ce qu’une preuvesoit déposée devant la Cour pour lui expliquer à quelle date et pourquoi M. Toole avait été engagé par les intimés et ce qui les avaitpoussés à retenir ses services. Je me serais aussi attendu à obtenir de l’information expliquant pourquoi la perception que les intimésavaient de l’endroit où se trouvait la limite était inexacte. [17] Il en découle que les critères permettant de recevoir de nouveaux éléments de preuve n’ont pasété remplis. [18] L’appelant affirme qu’il subirait un grave préjudice si le retrait des aveux était autorisé.

Lajurisprudence prescrit un critère strict en trois volets qui doit être rempli pour qu’un tribunal permette le retrait d’un aveu. Le mêmecritère s’applique que les aveux aient été faits dans les plaidoiries ou par suite d’un avis de demande d’aveux. Dans l’affaire A.C. Poirier & Associates Inc. c. Cormier, 2006 NBQB 186 , 2006 NBBR 186, 298 R.N.-B. (2e) no 205, le juge Glennie a appliqué le critèresuivant : [TRADUCTION] Le droit régissant le retrait d’aveux a été examiné dans l’affaire Lyons c.

Lyons, (NB KB), [1989] A.N.-B. no 617, 1989 CarswellNB 147, 99 R.N.-B. (2e) 220, dans laquelle le juge Richard, juge en chef de la Cour du Banc de la Reine (tel était alorsson titre), a écrit ce qui suit au par. 12 : [TRADUCTION] 12. Dans l’affaire Baydon Corp. Ltd. et al. c.

Dupont Glore Forgan Canada Ltd. et al. (1974), (ON SC), 4 O.R. (2d)290, le juge Henry a déclaré ce qui suit à la page 296 : [TRADUCTION]D’après ces précédents, je crois comprendre que le principe veut qu’avant d’accorder l’autorisation de retirer un aveu par voie demodification des plaidoiries, la Cour devrait être convaincue de trois choses :

a) le fait admis n’est pas véridique;

b) l’aveu a été fait par inadvertance ou l’avocat a été mal instruit;

c) le retrait de l’aveu ne donnera pas lieu à une injustice dans le cadre de l’action, étant entendu que si les autres parties peuvent êtredédommagées par voie de dépens, il n’y a pas d’injustice. Voir également Duivenvoorden c. Belarus Tractor, Canada LLP, 2005 NBQB 388 , 2005 CarswellNB 630, 290 R.N.-B. (2e)192, une affaire dans laquelle la défenderesse a réussi à persuader la Cour que l’aveu qu’elle avait initialement fait dans son exposé de ladéfense n’était pas véridique et que le retrait de cet aveu ne porterait pas préjudice au demandeur en cause. [par. 48]

[19] Ce critère en trois volets est encore aujourd’hui l’état du droit en Ontario, même si laformulation du premier volet exige souvent que la fausseté de l’aveu soit une [TRADUCTION] « question justiciable ». Dans l’arrêtStickel c. Lezzaik, 2015 ONSC 4659, [2015] O.J.

No. 3873 (QL), une décision récente, la Cour supérieure de l’Ontario déclare ce quisuit : [TRADUCTION]Pour que le tribunal autorise le retrait d’un aveu, la personne qui sollicite le retrait doit au préalable : (1) soulever une questionjusticiable, (2) fournir une explication raisonnable justifiant l’aveu et son retrait et (3) démontrer que le retrait ne causera pas depréjudice non indemnisable : Antipas c. Coroneos, [1988] O.J. No. 137 (H.C.J.); Szelazek Investments Ltd. c. Orzech, [1996] O.J. No.336 (C.A.); 147619 Canada Inc. c. Chartrand, [2006] O.J. No. 1877 (C.A.); 1679753 Ontario Ltd. c.

Muskoka Lakes (Township), 2010ONSC 1230 , [2010] O.J. No. 736 (C. sup. Ont.), conf. 2011 ONSC 1997 (C. div. Ont.). Il faut satisfaire aux trois volets pourobtenir l’autorisation demandée : BNP Paribas (Canada) c. Bartlett, 2012 ONSC 5604. [par. 29] [20] Il faut satisfaire aux trois volets pour obtenir l’autorisation demandée. La jurisprudence duNouveau-Brunswick confirme qu’il incombe à l’auteur de la motion de prouver la fausseté de l’aveu dont le retrait est demandé. Laqualité de la preuve présentée en l’espèce est insuffisante, même pour s’acquitter du fardeau moins contraignant de la « questionjusticiable ».

En l’espèce, les intimés ne se sont pas acquittés du fardeau. Aucun des trois volets n’a été satisfait. [21] Les intimés veulent obtenir le retrait de l’aveu selon lequel ils ont procédé à des essaissismiques à l’intérieur des limites municipales de Sussex. Cependant, le dossier d’appel renferme de nombreux faits qui étayent lavéracité de cet aveu. Si nous acceptons les éléments de preuve supplémentaires que les parties ont présentés dans le cadre de la motion,cela a pour effet de renforcer le fait que des essais sismiques ont été réalisés dans les limites municipales. À

titre d’exemple, les intimésont demandé à la ville de Sussex de les autoriser à mener des essais, le mandataire qui a procédé aux essais a confirmé qu’ils s’étaientdéroulés à l’intérieur des limites de la ville et l’arpenteur de la Province a personnellement examiné l’endroit des essais et confirméqu’ils avaient été effectués à l’intérieur des limites municipales.

La seule preuve que les intimés ont produite à l’appui de leur demandede retrait se compose de la documentation et du rapport de leur arpenteur. [22] Le rapport de l’arpenteur se fonde sur des données qui ne sont ni annexées ni divulguées et quiremontent à plus de cinq ans avant la réalisation des essais. Par conséquent, selon moi, le rapport de l’arpenteur ainsi que son affidavitreposent sur du ouï-dire non divulgué, de sorte qu’ils [TRADUCTION] « n’offrent pas les garanties de fiabilité » (voir Johnson (Re),2005 NSCA 99, [2005] N.S.J.

No. 261 (QL), au par. 89). [23] Le rapport ne renferme pas une preuve permettant de réfuter la preuve solide produite parl’appelant. La preuve de ce dernier comprend un affidavit souscrit par l’arpenteur du ministère des Ressources naturelles(M. Bastarache), qui a visité les lieux des essais sismiques sept jours après la réalisation de ces essais et a produit son arpentage completle 17 octobre 2011, soit 23 jours après les essais. Pour préparer cet arpentage, M. Bastarache a utilisé les données originales obtenues dumandataire qui avait effectué les essais, données qui sont présentées et annexées à son affidavit.

La preuve produite par M. Bastarachecadre également avec la compréhension des propres mandataires des intimés qui se trouvaient sur les lieux au moment des essais et avecla conduite des intimés d’octobre 2011 à mars 2017 inclusivement. Par conséquent, les intimés n’ont pas présenté une preuve suffisantepour satisfaire au premier des trois critères qui sont obligatoires pour obtenir l’autorisation de retirer l’aveu. [24] Le second critère que doivent remplir les intimés prévoit que l’aveu doit avoir été fait[TRADUCTION] « par inadvertance ».

L’examen de la jurisprudence indique qu’une simple affirmation qu’un aveu a été fait parinadvertance est insuffisante. Il faut fournir une explication raisonnable comme un malentendu entre le client et l’avocat ou une erreurtypographique. Lorsqu’un aveu a été maintenu pendant toute la durée des procédures comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, il est difficile deplaider l’inadvertance. La jurisprudence en la matière a tendance à porter sur des situations dans lesquelles il y a eu des désaccords entreavocats et clients ou dans lesquelles les clients ont changé d’avocat.

Dans la plupart de ces situations, les tribunaux ont déterminé que lesaveux ne pouvaient être retirés en plaidant l’inadvertance. Dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, les intimés ne se sont pas acquittés du fardeaude prouver que l’aveu avait été fait par inadvertance. Les intimés n’ont présenté aucune preuve d’inadvertance. La seule preuve produitepar les intimés à cet égard se limite aux simples affirmations que M.

Amin a faites dans son affidavit du 27 avril 2017 : [TRADUCTION]Sur la base de l’information reçue par le défendeur, Northrup, et d’autres fonctionnaires du ministère des Ressources naturelles, j’aidonné à mes avocats, par inadvertance, l’instruction d’admettre, dans l’exposé de la demande et ses modifications, que Windsor avaiteffectué des essais sismiques à l’intérieur des limites municipales de Sussex le 17 octobre 2011. [par. 14]

[25] Cette assertion ne satisfait pas à la norme de preuve exigée pour établir l’inadvertance. L’exposé de la demande des intimés a été modifié à trois reprises. Les intimés ont reçu signification de l’avis de demande d’aveux en mai 2016, puis de la motion pour jugement fondé sur un aveu , ce qui, dans les deux cas, les a forcés à se concentrer sur la question précise de l’emplacement des essais sismiques. Chaque fois, ils ont maintenu leur aveu et ont en outre déposé une preuve par affidavit supplémentaire dans laquelle ils l’ont réitéré.

Ce n’est que lors de la semaine précédant l’audition de l’appel qu’ils ont tenté de retirer l’aveu. De plus, l’aveu vise un fait qui est sous le contrôle exclusif des intimés. Pour des parties averties comme les intimés, qui effectuent régulièrement ce type d’essais, il n’est pas crédible de laisser entendre qu’elles n’avaient pas délimité l’endroit où elles allaient procéder aux essais en 2011.

Les intimés ne sont pas non plus crédibles lorsqu’ils affirment maintenant qu’ils n’avaient aucun moyen de déterminer l’endroit où les essais sismiques avaient été menés avant de consulter un arpenteur en 2017, lequel n’avait aucune connaissance personnelle des essais qui avaient été réalisés en 2011. Les données qui ont servi au calcul des points de sondage sismique étaient en possession des intimés et c’est leur représentant qui a déclaré que les essais sismiques s’étaient déroulés à l’intérieur des limites municipales. Dans l’arrêt Nesbitt c. Miramar , 2000 BCSC 187 , [2000] B.C.J.

No. 279 (QL), la Cour déclare ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] L’aveu judiciaire n’a pas été fait sans disposer d’une information complète ni à la hâte ou par inadvertance. La défenderesse a eu dix mois, entre la date d’introduction de l’action le 2 mars 1992 et la date à laquelle elle a fait l’aveu dans son exposé de la défense modifié, pour examiner soigneusement l’affaire. On ne peut que supposer que la défenderesse connaissait les conséquences d’un tel aveu. La défenderesse a également inclus l’aveu que l’option avait été exercée dans son avis de demande d’aveu au demandeur daté du 30 août 1993.

Bien que ce document, en soi, ne lie peut-être pas la défenderesse, il atteste bel et bien que l’avocat a réexaminé la question, ce qui porte encore plus à croire que la défenderesse était parfaitement au courant de l’aveu qu’elle faisait.

Enfin, aucune information nouvelle à laquelle la défenderesse n’avait pas déjà accès n’est apparue après que l’aveu judiciaire eut été fait et à cet égard, la défenderesse disposait à l’époque d’une information et d’une documentation plus complètes que le demandeur. [par. 67] [26] Il n’existe aucune preuve à l’appui de l’assertion des intimés selon laquelle c’est par inadvertance qu’ils avaient reconnu à de multiples reprises avoir effectué des essais sismiques dans les limites municipales de la ville de Sussex.

Les intimés n’ont pas satisfait au deuxième des trois critères qui sont obligatoires pour retirer leur aveu. [27] Le troisième et dernier critère impose aux intimés l’obligation de prouver que le retrait de l’aveu ne causera pas à l’appelant un préjudice qui n’est pas indemnisable au moyen de dommages-intérêts. L’appelant soutient qu’il sera gravement lésé étant donné que cela aura en l’espèce une incidence qui ne peut être indemnisée au moyen de dommages-intérêts.

L’appelant affirme qu’il subira les préjudices suivants si le retrait est autorisé : [TRADUCTION] Disponibilité des données : Les intimés n’ont produit aucun élément de preuve indiquant si les données des essais existent toujours et, si c’est le cas, à quel endroit elles se trouvent et quel est leur statut ou leur disponibilité. Incidence du facteur temps : Les essais sismiques se sont déroulés il y a plus de cinq a

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