R. v. P.S., 2015 NBCA 74

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 39-15-CA HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN APPELLANT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE APPELANTE - and - - et - P.S. RESPONDENT P.S. INTIMÉE R. v. P.S., 2015 NBCA 74 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green R. c.

P.S., 2015 NBCA 74 CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: March 31, 2015 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine: le 31 mars 2015 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o. Appeal heard: September 23, 2015 Appel entendu : le 23 septembre 2015 Judgment rendered: December 17, 2015 Jugement rendu : le 17 décembre 2015

Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Kathryn Gregory For the respondent: Martin A. Goguen Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelante : Kathryn Gregory Pour l’intimée : Martin A. Goguen THE COURT The application for leave to appeal is granted. Theappeal is allowed and the sentence is varied to anine-month custody and supervision order, (sixmonths’ closed custody and three months’supervision in the community), followed by 15months’ probation. LA COUR La demande en autorisation d’appel est accueillie.

LaCour accueille l’appel et remplace la sentence parune ordonnance de placement et de surveillanced’une durée de neuf mois (six mois de garde enmilieu fermé et trois mois de surveillance au sein dela collectivité), suivis d’une probation de quinzemois. The judgment of the Court was delivered by QUIGG J.A. I. Introduction [1] On May 18, 2012, 17-year-old P.S. caused a motor vehicle accident while her ability to drive was impairedand, in the process, caused the death of one person and bodily harm to two others.

In the aftermath of this incident, she was charged withsix counts alleging criminal conduct, but three of these were stayed after she pled guilty to one count of operating a motor vehicle whileimpaired causing an accident resulting in death (s. 255(3.1) of the Criminal Code) and two similar counts relating to the bodily harm thatalso resulted from the accident (s. 255(2.1)). P.S. was sentenced as a youth under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1 (YCJA).In addition, the sentencing took into account the Gladue and Ipeelee principles (R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R.688, [1999] S.C.J.

No. 19 (QL); R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433), as she is an aboriginal woman of both Mi’kmaq andMaliseet descent.

The following sentences were imposed: 1) A two-year custody and supervision order (six months’ closed custody, 18 months’ community supervision); 2) A six-month custody and supervision order (two months’ closed custody, four months’ community supervision), concurrent; and 3) A six-month custody and supervision order (two months’ closed custody, four months’ community supervision), concurrent. [2] The Crown seeks leave to appeal the sentence on grounds involving questions of law alone, and asks thisCourt to vary the sentence in order to give effect to s. 42(2)(

n) of the YCJA, such that the two-year sentence be apportioned as 16 monthsof custody and eight months of community supervision. P.S. cross-appeals, requesting the sentence on count one be varied to a six-month custody and supervision order, apportioned as four months of closed custody, and two months of community supervision,followed by an 18-month probation order.

[ 3 ] It bears mentioning that the following decision is of limited precedential value on account of amendments to the YCJA since the incident occurred. Section 38(2) (

f) of the YCJA came into force on October 23, 2012, and introduced principles of denunciation and deterrence as considerations for the purpose of youth sentencing. These were not statutory considerations at the time of the commission of the offences, and are not applicable in this case. II. Factual background [ 4 ] To set out the background against which this appeal is decided, I borrow liberally from the written submissions, as well as from the trial judge’s decision.

There does not appear to be any dispute with respect to the basic facts. [ 5 ] On the evening of May 18, 2012, P.S. and S.M. were visiting the home of a friend. They left the friend’s home at dusk, with S.M. driving. At 9:34 p.m., the Woodstock RCMP received a 911 call advising of a three-vehicle collision on Route 165 in Hay Settlement. Constable Peggy Delisle responded to the call. At the scene, she observed a Pontiac Grand Prix, which had sustained extensive front-end damage, and contained two female occupants, P.S and S.M., trapped inside. P.S. was the driver of that vehicle.

The emergency medical technicians who arrived at the scene informed Constable Delisle that both P.S. and S.M. were in critical condition. A second vehicle involved in the accident was identified as a Pontiac Grand Am driven by Adam Grant. Mr. Grant was not injured in the accident and was able to assist and speak with the police at the scene. The third vehicle involved in the accident, a Jeep Wrangler driven by Alicia Reid, was found over an embankment on the bank of the St. John River. It had collided head-on with the vehicle driven by P.S. prior to Mr. Grant’s collision with P.S. Both Ms.

Reid and her front seat passenger, Jeff Leighton, were seriously injured in the collision. [ 6 ] In his statement, Mr. Grant related that he had been driving north on Route 165 toward Woodstock when he noticed a woman on the side of the road waving her arms. He then collided with the tan Grand Prix, which he had not observed on the roadway as there were no lights. Ms. Reid and Mr. Leighton were transported to the Dr. Everett Chalmers hospital in Fredericton for treatment. They were subsequently able to advise police that prior to the accident, they had observed the vehicle driven by P.S. travelling in their lane.

Ms. Reid pulled to the left immediately prior to impact, in an attempt to avoid P.S. Unfortunately, P.S. maneuvered her vehicle into the same lane and the vehicles collided head-on. When the first witnesses arrived at the scene and went to offer assistance to the various victims, they discovered both P.S. and S.M. conscious and screaming. However, S.M. subsequently slipped in and out of consciousness. The emergency medical technicians attempted to resuscitate her, but she succumbed to her injuries before she could be removed from the vehicle. It took in excess of one hour to remove P.S. and S.M. from the vehicle.

P.S. was screaming and distressed throughout the procedure. Constable Delisle detected a strong odour of alcohol on P.S.’s breath as she attempted to comfort her during the extraction process. [ 7 ] Once extracted from the vehicle, P.S. was also transported to the Dr. Everett Chalmers Hospital, arriving at approximately 11:40 p.m. She had sustained extensive injuries and was in critical condition. She suffered fractures to her legs, neck, spine and ribs. In addition, she suffered a lacerated liver, a ruptured spleen and a collapsed lung.

Although she required surgery in Saint John, she was not sufficiently stable to be transported. Constable Delisle advised the hospital that a warrant would be sought for the blood they were taking. Following the issuance of the warrant, blood samples were obtained from the hospital and sent to the RCMP Forensics Laboratory in Halifax for analysis. [ 8 ] A toxicology report dated June 10, 2014, concluded that P.S.’s blood alcohol at the time of the incident would have been in the range of 158 to 182 mg percent.

At p. 2 of the report, it states: […] There is an interval of approximately 2.4 hours between the collision and blood collection, over which alcohol was being eliminated. Using the [blood alcohol concentration] result of 134 mg% and considering the same elimination rate and assumptions as above, in my opinion, the [blood alcohol concentration] would have been in the range of 158-182 mg% at 2130 hours. It should be noted that a serum sample was also analyzed for alcohol content; the result was 133 mg%, which corresponds to a [blood- alcohol concentration] in the range of 106-121 mg%.

This is approximately 7 percent lower than the hospital’s result of 143 mg%. (The converted hospital result is in turn 3-5% lower than the forensic lab’s analysis of the whole blood sample.) Extrapolating the converted serum result back to the time of the collision, the [blood alcohol concentration] would have been in the range of 130-169 mg% at 2130 hours. [ 9 ] In the report, there are also indications of the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in P.S.’s blood. P.S. acknowledged using marijuana on the evening of the accident.

Constable Delisle was present in the emergency room when nursing staff removed approximately 2.5 grams of marijuana contained in a plastic bag, from P.S.’s bra. Her purse, which had been

retrieved at the accident scene, also contained a small quantity of marijuana. [ 10 ] An autopsy performed on S.M. confirmed that she died from blunt force injuries to her chest and abdomen, as well as multiple fractures to the extremities of the right side of her body. Ms. Reid suffered injuries including a left heel fracture requiring surgery and the insertion of screws, as well as a crushed right elbow requiring surgical repair and the insertion of two plates and ten screws. Ms. Reid continues to experience limited function of the right arm due to this injury, and her arm remains crooked.

These injuries have greatly impacted upon her career as a nurse. She has a three and a half inch scar across her forehead as a result of significant facial lacerations she sustained in the collision. Mr. Leighton suffered fractures to his thumb, right femur, right foot, toes and left tibia. In addition, Mr. Leighton sustained a ruptured spleen and was in hospital for an extended period of time due to blood clots which developed as a result of the broken femur. [ 11 ] As outlined above, P.S. pled guilty to three of six counts alleging criminal conduct, while the others were stayed.

She was sentenced on March 31, 2015. At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought the maximum penalty permitted under s. 44 of the Act , being a three-year custody and supervision order, apportioned as two years in closed custody, followed by one year of supervision in the community. Defence counsel requested a sentence of lengthy probation with strict conditions or, in the alternative, six months of deferred custody. Both the Crown and defence counsel agreed the situation met the threshold of a “violent offence” under s. 39(1) (

a) of the YCJA , for which the accused was liable to be sentenced to a period of incarceration. The sentencing judge settled on a two-year custody and supervision order (six months’ closed custody and 18 months’ community supervision). There was also an agreement to a ten-year driving prohibition (Transcript, February 27, 2015, p. 44). III. Grounds of appeal [ 12 ] The Crown appeals the sentence on the following ground: The trial judge erred by imposing a sentence contrary to law as set out in section 42(2) (

n) of the YCJA . […] More particularly the trial judge imposed a custody and supervisory sentence in which the supervisory portion is not one half the length of the custody portion as mandated by the Act . [ 13 ] P.S. cross-appeals on the same legal basis, and requests the sentence on count one be varied to a six-month custody and supervision order, followed by an 18-month probation order on the grounds that the judge’s intention was to impose a six- month custody and supervision order followed by an 18-month probation order.

P.S. argues this reasoning is made clear at para. 71 of the judge’s decision: In my view, 6 month[s] of closed custody followed by 18 months of supervision and a 10 year driving prohibition will accomplish the goals of providing meaningful consequences for P.S. and will ensure her path towards rehabilitation continues. IV. Analysis A. Objectives of the YCJA [ 14 ] A review of two texts, Youth Criminal Justice Law , by Nicholas Bala and Sanjeev Anand (2d ed, Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2009), and A Guide to the Youth Criminal Justice Act , by Lee Tustin and Robert E.

Lutes, Q.C. (2010 ed, Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009), reveals that the YCJA was introduced in the hope of decreasing the use of custodial sentences for young people. The Act encourages the use of non-custodial sentences for non-serious crimes, and strives for consistency in sentencing, and to provide guidance to courts in crafting youth sentences focused on rehabilitation rather than retribution. In Youth Criminal Justice Law , the authors state:

The YCJA, however, provides that a youth should not receive a greater punishment than an adult convicted of the same offence in similarcircumstances; in most cases, a concern with rehabilitation and the principle of limited youth accountability will result in a less serioussanction. The YCJA makes clear that youth court sentences are not to be used as a substitute for providing child welfare, mental health, orother treatment services; it also reflects that in order to improve the youth’s social situation, sentences cannot be more intrusive thanwarranted by the offence and the record of the youth.

While one must not imagine that all young offenders want to be or can berehabilitated, the rehabilitative ideal remains an important rationale for having a distinct youth justice system. [pp. 5-6] [15] At pp. 540-41, the authors opine: “While there are cases in which the seriousness of the offence or threat tocommunity safety requires a custodial sentence,

section 39 is intended to ensure that this most serious and intrusive response to youthoffending is used only in serious cases”. [16] In a discussion respecting s. 39 of the YCJA, the authors of A Guide to the Youth Criminal Justice Act state: This

section seeks to address one of the underlying principles of reducing the number of youths in custody in Canada by placinglimitations on courts when sentencing a youth to custody. The general rule is that a youth justice court must not impose a custodysentence unless the court has considered all alternatives to custody at the time of sentencing. Custody is to be used only if a young personhas been found guilty of a violent offence, fails to comply with previous sentences or has a history of offences, or in exceptional caseswhere a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the principle of the Act.

What needs to be clarified is whether the failure “tocomply with non-custodial sentences” refers to a breach of different court orders, or whether two breaches of the same court order canqualify. [p. 83] [17] In R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., 2005 SCC 78, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, the Supreme Court examined the objectives ofthe YCJA. The following year, Rosenberg J.A., of the Ontario Court of Appeal, applied the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. C.D. in R.v. R.E.W., (ON CA), [2006] O.J.

No. 265 (C.A.) (QL), noting as follows: However, Bastarache J. notes that this general concern for protection of the public is tempered by "some specific goals, includingrestricting the use of custody for young offenders" (para. 34). After examining the provisions of the YCJA that justify this view, heconcludes with an observation concerning s. 39(1)(

a) that could apply equally to s. 39(1)(d): Accepting that the Act is aimed at restricting the use of custody for young offenders, it follows that a narrow

interpretation of "violentoffence" is to be preferred, because the classification of an offender's conduct as a "violent offence" opens the gate to custody (para. 38). (iv) Intention of Parliament and legislative history With respect to the intention of Parliament, Bastarache J. noted in R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., supra, that there was an explosion in the useof custodial dispositions following enactment of the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, as rep. by Youth Criminal Justice Act,2002, S.C. 2002, c. 1 [YOA].

Successive amendments to the YOA failed to curb the use of custody because the Act "continued to givesignificant discretion to youth court judges and, therefore, had little effect on sentencing patterns" (para. 48). As he explained, s. 39departs from the discretionary approach and "instead provides for clear conditions that must be satisfied before a custodial dispositioncan even be considered as an option" (para. 48). The

section "was designed, in part, to send a clearer message to those involved in theyouth criminal justice system about restricting the use of custody for young offenders" (para. 48). Bastarche J. referred at para. 48 to thestatement by Minister of Justice Anne McLellan in introducing the YCJA for its second reading: The proposed youth criminal justice act is intended to reduce the unacceptably high level of youth incarceration that has occurred underthe Young Offenders Act. The

preamble to the new legislation states clearly that the youth justice system should reserve its most seriousinterventions for the most serious crimes and thereby reduce its over-reliance on incarceration. In contrast to the YOA, the new legislation provides that custody is to be reserved primarily for violent offenders and serious repeatoffenders. The new youth justice legislation recognizes that non-custodial sentences can often provide more meaningful consequencesand be more effective in rehabilitating young persons. [paras. 34-35]

[ 18 ] As mentioned above, P.S., through her counsel, agreed this situation meets the criteria for a “violent offence”. Therefore, the trial judge was able to apply s. 39 of the Act . B. Relevant provisions of the YCJA [ 19 ] As mentioned earlier, custody is only to be resorted to if the young person has been found guilty of a violent offence. [ 20 ] Section 39(1) of the YCJA states: 39.

(1) A youth justice court shall not commit a young person to custody under

section 42 (youth sentences) unless (

a) the young person has committed a violent offence; (

b) the young person has failed to comply with non-custodial sentences; (

c) the young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has a history that indicates a pattern of either extrajudicial sanctions or of findings of guilt or of both under this Act or the Young Offenders Act ,

chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985; or (

d) in exceptional cases where the young person has committed an indictable offence, the aggravating circumstances of the offence are such that the imposition of a non- custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles set out in

section 38. 39.

(1) Le tribunal pour adolescents n’impose une peine comportant le placement sous garde en application de l’article 42 (peines spécifiques) que si, selon le cas :

a) l’adolescent a commis une infraction avec violence;

b) il n’a pas respecté les peines ne comportant pas de placement sous garde qui lui ont déjà été imposées;

c) il a commis un acte criminel pour lequel un adulte est passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de plus de deux ans, après avoir fait l’objet de plusieurs sanctions extrajudiciaires ou déclarations de culpabilité – ou toute combinaison de celles-ci – dans le cadre de la présente loi ou de la

Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants ,

chapitre Y-1 des Lois révisées du Canada (1985);

d) il s’agit d’un cas exceptionnel où l’adolescent a commis un acte criminel et où les circonstances aggravantes de la perpétration de celui-ci sont telles que l’imposition d’une peine ne comportant pas de placement sous garde enfreindrait les principes et objectif énoncés à l’article 38. [ 21 ] There is no question that a custodial sentence was available in this case. Within the YCJA , a youth custody sentence is followed by a mandatory period of “supervision in the community” equaling one half of the custodial sentence, and one third of the total sentence (2:1). Section 42(2) (

n) provides:

(2) When a youth justice court finds a young person guilty of an offence and is imposing a youth sentence, the court shall, subject to this section, impose any one of the following sanctions or any number of them that are not inconsistent with each other and, if the offence is first degree murder or second degree murder within the meaning of

section 231 of the Criminal Code , the court shall impose a sanction set out in paragraph (

q) or subparagraph ( r )(ii) or (iii) and may impose any other of the sanctions set out in this subsection that the court considers appropriate: […] (

n) make a custody and supervision order with respect to the young person, ordering that a period be served in custody and that a second period — which is one half as long as the first — be served, subject to sections 97 (conditions to be included) and 98 (continuation of custody), under supervision in the community subject to conditions, the total of the periods not to exceed two years from the date of the coming into force of the order or, if the young person is found guilty of an offence for which the punishment provided by the Criminal code or any other Act of Parliament is imprisonment for life, three years from the date of coming into force of the order[.] 42.

(2) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, dans le cas où il déclare un adolescent coupable d’une infraction et lui impose une peine spécifique, le tribunal lui impose l’une des sanctions ci-après en la combinant éventuellement avec une ou plusieurs autres compatibles entre elles; dans le cas où l’infraction est le meurtre au premier ou le meurtre au deuxième degré au sens de l’

article 231 du Code criminel , le tribunal lui impose la sanction visée a l’alinéa q ) ou aux sous-alinéas r )(ii) ou (iii) et, le cas échéant, toute autre sanction prévue au présent

article qu’il estime indiquée : […]

n) l’imposition, par une ordonnance de placement et de surveillance, d’une peine maximale de deux ans à compter de sa mise à exécution ou, dans le cas où l’adolescent est déclaré coupable d’une infraction passible de l’emprisonnement à vie prévue par le Code criminel ou par toute autre loi fédérale, d’une peine maximale de trois ans à compter de sa mise à exécution, dont une période est purgée sous garde, laquelle est suivie d’une autre – dont dont la durée est la moitié de la première – à purger, sous réserve des articles 97 (conditions obligatoires) et 98 (maintien sous garde), sous surveillance au sein de la collectivité[.] Furthermore, mandatory conditions are imposed upon the young person while they serve the supervisory portion of their sentence in the community: 97.

(1) Every youth sentence imposed under paragraph 42(2) (

n) shall contain the following conditions, namely, that the young person, while serving the portion of the youth sentence under supervision in the community, (

a) keep the peace and be of good behaviour; (

b) report to the provincial director and then be under the supervision of the provincial director; (

c) inform the provincial director immediately on being arrested or questioned by the police; (

d) report to the police, or any named individual, as instructed by the provincial director; 97.

(1) Toute ordonnance rendue en application de l’ alinéa 42(2)

n) comprend les conditions suivantes, qui s’appliquent à l’adolescent dès qu’il commence à purger sa période de surveillance au sein de la collectivité :

a) l’obligation de ne pas troubler l’ordre public et de bien se conduire;

b) l’obligation de se rapporter à son directeur provincial et ensuite de demeurer sous la surveillance de celui-ci;

c) l’obligation d’informer immédiatement son directeur provincial s’il est arrêté ou interrogé par la police;

d) l’obligation de se présenter à la police ou à la personne nommément désignée, selon ce qu’indique le directeur provincial;

e) l’obligation de communiquer à son

(

e) advise the provincial director of the young person’s address of residence and report immediately to the provincial director any change (

i) in that address, (ii) in the young person’s normal occupation, including employment, vocational or educational training and volunteer work, (iii) in the young person’s family or financial situation, and (iv) that may reasonably be expected to affect the young person’s ability to comply with the conditions of the sentence; and (

f) not own, possess or have the control of any weapon, ammunition, prohibited ammunition, prohibited device or explosive substance, except as authorized in writing by the provincial director for the purposes of the young person participating in a program specified in the authorization. Other conditions

(2) The provincial director may set additional conditions that support and address the needs of the young person, promote the reintegration of the young person into the community and offer adequate protection to the public from the risk that the young person might otherwise present.

The provincial director shall, in setting the conditions, take into account the needs of the young person, the most effective programs for the young person in order to maximize his or her chances for reintegration into the community, the nature of the offence and the ability of the young person to comply with the conditions. directeur provincial son adresse résidentielle et d’informer immédiatement celui-ci de tout changement : (

i) d’adresse résidentielle, (ii) d’occupation habituelle, tel qu’un changement d’emploi ou de travail bénévole ou un changement de formation, (iii) dans sa situation familiale ou financière, (iv) dont il est raisonnable de s’attendre qu’il soit susceptible de modifier sa capacité de respecter les conditions de l’ordonnance;

f) l’interdiction d’être en possession d’une arme, d’un dispositif prohibé, de munitions, de munitions prohibées ou de substances explosives, ou d’en avoir le contrôle ou la propriété, sauf en conformité avec l’autorisation écrite du directeur provincial en vue de la participation de l’adolescent au programme qui y est précisé. Conditions

(2) Le directeur provincial peut, par ordre, fixer des conditions additionnelles qui répondent aux besoins de l’adolescent, favorisent sa réinsertion sociale et protègent suffisamment le public contre les risques que présenterait par ailleurs l’adolescent. Pour les fixer, il prend en compte les besoins de l’adolescent, les programmes les mieux adaptés à ceux-ci et qui sont susceptibles d’augmenter le plus possible ses chances de réinsertion sociale, la nature de l’infraction et la capacité de l’adolescent de respecter les conditions. [ 22 ] The community supervision period is unique to the YCJA .

While it incorporates characteristics similar to both probation orders and conditional sentence orders, it is identical to neither. The conditions associated with supervision in the community are very similar to those imposed in probation orders. However, a breach of these conditions will not result in a new charge for the breach comparable to s. 733 of the Criminal Code . C. Custody and supervision in the community [ 23 ] Under the YCJA , every period of custody is followed by a period of supervision and support in the community as part of the young person's sentence.

This includes custody and supervision orders, intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision orders, and youth sentences for murder. Judges must clearly state in open court the portion of the sentence to be served in custody and the portion to be served in the community.

[ 24 ] The YCJA contains a list of mandatory conditions that apply to all young persons under supervision in the community. Additional conditions can be imposed by the provincial director to support the young person and address his or her individual needs, as well as to manage risk. [ 25 ] If a young person breaches a condition while under supervision in the community, a review is held, which may result in a change in conditions or in the young person being returned to custody. If the provincial director has ordered the young person to be returned to custody under s. 102(1)( b ) , the court will conduct a review.

If the court is satisfied that the young person has breached a condition and the breach was serious, it may order the young person to serve the remainder of the community portion in custody. If the breach was not serious, the court may vary the conditions or impose new or additional conditions. [ 26 ] Before the commencement of the community supervision portion, the court can require the young person to remain in custody if it is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the young person will commit an offence causing death or serious harm if released into the community before the end of the sentence. D.

Probation [ 27 ] A judge may choose to impose a probation order which would take effect following the mandatory community supervision period under s. 56(5)( b ): 56(5) An order made under paragraph 42(2) (

k) or (

l) comes into force (

b) if a young person receives a sentence that includes a period of continuous custody and supervision, at the end of the period of supervision. 56(5) L’ordonnance visée aux alinéas 42(2)

k) ou

l) devient exécutoire, selon le cas, à compter de :

b) la date d’expiration de la surveillance lorsque l’adolescent s’est vu imposer une peine comportant le placement sous garde de façon continue et la surveillance. [ 28 ] In R. c.

A.H.A. , 2005 QCCA 780 , [2005] J.Q. no 12623 (QL) , the court clarifies the situation regarding the applicability of probation in a custody and supervision order: [TRANSLATION] Section 42(4) of the YCJA provides that, when making a custody and supervision order, the judge shall state the number of days or months to be served by the youth in custody and the number of days or months to be served under supervision at the end of the custody period (the period of supervision being one half as long as the period of custody, pursuant to s. 42(2) (

n) of the YCJA ). This is what the trial judge ordered, but the wording used may lead to confusion. Therefore, it is open to the Court to intervene and clarify the situation. The appellant is also right in arguing, based on s. 56(5) of the YCJA , that the probation order only comes into force at the end of the period of supervision; this, in fact, prevents a situation where the conditions of the probation order are incompatible with those applicable during the period of supervision pursuant to s. 97 of the YCJA .

It will therefore be necessary to vary the sentence in order to specify that the probation order will come into force on the expiry date of the period of supervision, rather than at the beginning of the sentence, and for a period of 4 months rather than 16, in keeping with the trial judge’s objective. [paras. 6 and 7] E. Application to this case [ 29 ] In the case before us, the youth court judge wrote comprehensive reasons for sentence. She reviewed P.S.’s personal circumstances, including her supportive mother, and the birth of her son the year following the accident.

She described many of the details found in the pre-sentence report with respect to P.S.’s education and her efforts to obtain her G.E.D. The judge chronicled P.S.’s difficult childhood, which continued into her adolescent years. P.S. grew up in a home where she was frequently exposed to drugs and alcohol, and for a period of time resided with one of her older half-siblings. The judge recounted that P.S. had been a victim of sexual abuse, and related her previous unsuccessful attempts at drug rehabilitation. It appears the turning point in P.S.’s life was her pregnancy and the subsequent birth of her son in 2013.

The judge reviewed P.S.’s housing situation and her participation in counselling.

[30] The judge undertook a thorough review of the impact upon the victims of this serious crime. The judge wasmindful of P.S.’s Mi’kmaq and Maliseet heritage, and addressed the principles set out in R. v. Gladue, outlining the factors to beconsidered when sentencing offenders of aboriginal descent. [31] The judge assessed the positions of both Crown and defence counsel and the agreements arrived at between theparties. She proceeded to set out the principles of sentencing from the YCJA (s. 38), and noted that s. 38(2)(

f) of the Act came into forceon October 23, 2012, after the commission of the offences before her. The judge wrote that it was acknowledged by the parties and theCourt that those subsections dealing with denunciation and deterrence were not applicable to the current matter. The judge took intoconsideration s. 39 of the Act, which precludes the court from considering a custodial sentence in the case of a young offender, unless theoffender has committed a violent offence.

She pointed out that, in this case, the parties agreed the circumstances of this case didconstitute a violent offence within the meaning of s. 39. [32] As required, the judge considered s. 39(3) of the Act, which provides that alternatives to custody be consideredprior to imposing a custodial sentence. The judge highlighted her obligation under s. 39(9) to provide reasons if she determined a non-custodial sentence was inadequate in the circumstances, and a custodial sentence was required.

She then proceeded to explain why, in herestimation, a non-custodial sentence was not appropriate. [33] The judge reviewed jurisprudence which had been referred to her by the parties, in particular: R. v. I.R.N, 2010MBQB 137, [2010] M.J. No. 190 (QL); R. v. L.E.S., 2007 SKPC 138, [2007] S.J. No. 757 (QL); R. c. M.A., 2012 NBCP 4 ,2012 NBPC 4, 383 N.B.R. (2d) 157. She then carefully considered the relevant provisions of the YCJA. [34] The judge delineated what she considered to be the aggravating and mitigating circumstances at paras. 56 and57 of her decision.

She then reached her conclusion: The present matter involves the sentencing of a young offender and therefore we are concerned with the sentencing provisions as set outin the Youth Criminal Justice Act as opposed to

section 718.2 of the Criminal Code. While the Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue andmany of the subsequent cases which have interpreted the decision pertain to adult offenders and therefore discuss

section 718 of theCriminal Code, the principles remain applicable in the context of aboriginal young offenders. In the present matter, both the sentencing principles set out in the Youth Criminal Justice Act as well as the guidance provided by theSupreme Court of Canada in Gladue militate against a custodial sentence.

Section 39(9) of the Act requires me to set out the reasons whya custodial sentence is necessary, which further highlights the overall approach to the Act which clearly discourages custodial sentences.Despite these strong indicators to avoid a custodial sentence, I remain of the view that in the circumstances of this case only a partiallycustodial sentence is appropriate. It is necessary that I explain this conclusion.

Section 38(1) of the Act states that the purpose of sentencing a young offender is that "hold a young person accountable through theimposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences for the young person and that promote his or her rehabilitation andreintegration into society". The portion of the principle which is most pertinent to the situation of P.S. is "meaningful consequences". Forlack of a more eloquent description, prior to the arrival of her son, P.S. simply "didn't get it". P.S. is now very concerned as to thesentence and the impact on her son.

Prior to his arrival, I am not convinced that P.S. had any appreciation for the devastatingconsequences of her actions nor a sense of responsibility for same. In order for there to be truly "meaningful consequences", there mustbe a consequence that has an impact on P.S. A supervisory or open custody sentence for P.S. will change little, if anything, in her currentdaily routine. P.S. will remain at home with her child and be able to leave her home for appropriate medical or other appointments.

P.S.has never been remanded as a result of these charges, nor has her freedom or activities been in any way restricted during the pre-trialperiod. Under the circumstances, that simply does not meet the requirement for a "meaningful consequence" in the context of the chargesof which P.S. has pled guilty. I am also concerned on the potential impact on P.S.'s future in the event there are not meaningful consequences imposed at this juncture.P.S. is taking the appropriate steps towards her rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

She has stopped consuming drugs andalcohol, she is pursuing her G.E.D. and she is seeking the assistance of mental health professionals. However, there is a certain realitythat this is all occurring with the backdrop of first a looming trial and then a sentencing hearing. It would only compound this tragedywere P.S. to retreat to her earlier behaviours and give up on her education in the event a light sentence was imposed.

Once the darkshadow of this sentencing is removed the Court does not want P.S. to feel comfortable reverting to her previous behaviours as she didfollowing her initial recovery in the summer of 2012. In my view, to ensure P.S. continues upon a path of rehabilitation and reintegrationalso requires the imposition of a partially custodial sentence.

Finally, when we respect an individual we allow them to make their own choices and live with the consequences, be it positive or negative. P.S. has every opportunity to become a valuable member of her community. In order to respect P.S. as a person, it is incumbent upon the Court to hold her accountable for her actions and in so doing impose meaningful consequences. In my view, in this case this cannot be achieved without the weight and reality of a period of time in jail.

Given the requirements of section 39(9) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act in addition to the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in Gladue , I do not do this lightly. In my view, 6 month[s] of closed custody followed by 18 months of supervision and a 10 year driving prohibition will accomplish the goals of providing meaningful consequences for P.S. and will ensure her path towards rehabilitation continues. [paras. 66-71] Accordingly, the judge sentenced P.S.: P.S., please stand. Your actions on the night of May 18, 2012 cost the life of [S.M.] and caused serious injuries to Alisha Reid and Jeff Leighton.

While you were only 17 at the time of this accident, you chose to drive a motor vehicle while you were impaired by alcohol and you must be held accountable for those actions and the devastating consequences on the victims and their families. Therefore, I sentence you as follows: (

a) With respect to Count 1 causing the death of [S.M.] while operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol in contravention of section 255(3.1) of the Criminal Code of Canada , I sentence you to a period of custody and supervision for 2 years, being 6 months closed custody followed by 18 months of supervision; (

b) With respect to Count 3 involving the bodily injury to Alisha Reid in contravention of section 255(2.1) of the Criminal Code of Canada , I sentence you to a period of custody and supervision of 6 months, being 2 months closed custody followed by 4 months of supervision to be served concurrently; (

c) With respect to Count 5 involving bodily injury to Jeff Leighton in contravention of section 255(2.1) of the Criminal Code of Canada , I sentence you to a period of custody and supervision of 6 months, being 2 months closed custody and 4 months of supervision to be served concurrently; (

d) Pursuant to

section 259 of the Criminal Code of Canada , you will be subject to a 10 year driving prohibition from the date you are released from custody; and (

e) Pursuant to

section 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada , you shall furnish DNA samples as requested. [para. 72] [ 35 ] Unfortunately, at the end of what is, in my view, a comprehensive, articulate, and logical decision, this was not an available sentence under s. 42(2) (

n) of the YCJA . F. Available sentencing options [ 36 ] In LSPJA—1510 , 2015 QCCA 361 , [2015] J.Q. No. 1394 (QL), the Québec Court of Appeal was reviewing the case of a youth who was 17 at the time of the accident. He was convicted of dangerous driving causing death, and appealed a sentence of 18 months (12 months in custody, and six months of supervision in the community), followed by a two-year probation order, and a two- year prohibition from driving beginning at the end of the custody portion of his sentence.

Section 42(14) of the YCJA clearly states that the total length of the sanction imposed for the same infraction cannot exceed two years, except in cases where an adult could be sentenced to life in prison, in which case the maximum youth penalty cannot exceed three years ( s. 42(2) ( n )). In this case, the sentence was 42 months in duration. The Québec Court of Appeal determined the judge erred in law, and undertook a comprehensive audit of cases involving sentences imposed upon adolescents for driving infractions.

The Court then noted: [TRANSLATION] In light of the jurisprudence, from Québec as well as from the other Canadian provinces, in cases similar to that of X, it seems that the sentences imposed on youths for dangerous driving causing death offences are in the following range:

* a 24-month probation period with a 48-month driving prohibition and a requirement to do volunteer work; * a 6-month deferred custody order with an 18-month probation period and a 60-month driving prohibition. [para. 28] In the end, the Court varied the sentence: [TRANSLATION] ORDERS that X be remanded in closed custody for a period of six (6) months, less the 45 days spent in custody from February 26, 2014, to April 11, 2014, this period consisting in a four (4) month period of custody followed by a two (2) month period of supervision.

During this two (2) month period, X must understand that if he does not comply with these conditions or if he commits another offence, he can be brought back before the Court, which shall examine the possibility that he serve the remainder of his period of supervision in custody; Following these two periods, ORDERS X to serve a period of probation of 18 months, which shall be subject to the normal conditions of keeping the peace and being of good behaviour.

Further, he shall be prohibited from communicating in any way whatsoever with the victim’s parents, Céline Rabouin and Charles Ouellet, except by way of a letter of apology to the victim’s family, if he so desires and if he has not already done so. This letter shall be drafted under the supervision of agency A within three (3) months of this order and forwarded to the victim’s family, subject to their consent. He shall also find employment and do everything possible to keep it, and he shall be prohibited from consuming any type of drug, except in accordance with a medical prescription. [paras 45-46] [ 37 ] R. v.

C.D. S. , 2009 ABPC 395 , [2009] A.J. No. 1486 (QL) , involved a sentencing hearing for C.D.S., a young person who pleaded guilty to several offences, including dangerous driving causing death, breaking and entering a dwelling-house, and theft over $5,000. On several occasions between February 2008 and June 2008, C.D.S. stole motor vehicles, often with the assistance of his brother. During that same time period, C.D.S. was also actively involved in breaking and entering three dwelling-houses, and, on all three occasions, the residents were at home sleeping.

While in the company of four others, C.D.S. also stole a Honda Civic. While driving the Honda Civic at a high rate of speed, C.D.S. attempted to jump the car into the air and lost control of the vehicle. As a result, the vehicle struck a tree and one of the passengers was ejected from the vehicle; the passenger later died from his injuries. At the time the offences were committed, C.D.S. was bound by a six-month conditional discharge for a prior finding of guilt for break and enter with intent. Defence counsel took the position that an order for deferred custody was appropriate.

The Crown submitted that 15 months' open custody and supervision, followed by nine months' probation, was fitting. [ 38 ] The Provincial Court judge sentenced C.D.S. to a global maximum sentence of 20 months’ custody and supervision, the custody being secure custody, followed by 12 months’ probation, a 10-year driving prohibition, and a DNA sample order. [ 39 ] While C.D.S. pleaded guilty to the offences and spent time in pre-sentence detention, the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating factors.

All the offences were extremely serious, and C.D.S. repeatedly breached court orders, stole vehicles, and invaded homes. He was at high risk to reoffend and the financial losses suffered by many of the victims were significant and often unrecoverable. C.D.S. remained a significant danger to the public and required confinement in a highly structured environment. [ 40 ] In R. v. K.M.D. , 2007 SKCA 125 , [2007] S.J. No. 609 (QL) , the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reviewed a sentence imposed upon a 14-year-old male aboriginal offender of 180 days in closed custody to be followed by 90 days of community supervision.

The sentence followed convictions for dangerous driving, refusal to comply with a breath demand, and automobile theft. The offences triggered a review and conversion of a deferred custody sentence imposed six days previously. The effective total sentence was 14 months in closed custody, eight months of community supervision, and 12 months of probation. The appeal was allowed, the sentence set aside, and a sentence of two months’ closed custody, six months’ open custody, followed by four months of community supervision was substituted (8:4), all consecutive to the earlier converted deferred custody sentence.

The Court determined that while the sentencing judge did not err in imposing closed custody, a 14-month term was unreasonably long. [ 41 ] In the case at bar, the judge imposed an illegal sentence by failing to equate the period of community supervision to one half of the custodial sentence (i.e. six months, three months). Had the judge intended a six-month period of closed custody, the period of supervision would automatically have been set at three months. [ 42 ] In her decision, the judge indicated that her intention was to impose a sentence of two years (24 months): “I

sentence you to a period of custody and supervision for two years, being six months closed custody followed by 18 months of supervision” (para. 72). [ 43 ] If her intention was for the 24-month period not to include a probation period, the sentence would have to have been structured to include 16 months of closed custody, followed by eight months of community supervision. [ 44 ] If the judge contemplated a probation period as part of the 24-month sentence, including a six-month custodial sentence, the sentence would include an automatic three-month community supervision period, and the remainder would issue as a 15 - month probation order. [ 45 ] The Crown claims the judge imposed an illegal sentence and that it should be varied such that the two-year sentence be apportioned as 16 months of custody and eight months of supervision in the community.

The respondent agrees the judge imposed an illegal sentence, but submits the correct

interpretation of the judge’s reasoning should include a six - month custody and supervision order (which would consist of four months’ closed custody, followed by two months of community supervision). The respondent contends this could reasonably be followed by an 18-month probation order, even though probation was not considered by the judge at the sentencing hearing. V. Disposition [ 46 ] Having concluded that the sentence is obviously the result of an error in law, it follows that both the appeal and cross-appeal must be allowed and the sentence varied to one considered fit in the circumstances.

Having regard to s. 687 of the Code , and based upon the jurisprudence I have reviewed respecting the sentencing of offenders under the YCJA , I would vary the sentence to a nine - month custody and supervision order, apportioned as six months in custody, and three months of supervision in the community, followed by a 15 - month probation order on the following conditions: (1) keep the peace and be of good behaviour; (2) strictly follow the directions of her probation officers; (3) report to Probation Services when ordered to do so; and (4) not use any illicit or non-prescribed drugs or alcohol.

The DNA sample order and the 10 - year driving prohibition remain in effect. ___________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A. We concur: __________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.A. ___________________​​_______ Bradley V. Green, J.A . Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE QUIGG I. Introduction

[1] Le 18 mai 2012, P.S., âgée de dix-sept ans à l’époque, a causé un accident de la route tandisque sa capacité de conduire était affaiblie et, du coup, a causé la mort d’une personne et occasionné des lésions corporelles à deux autres.À la suite de cet accident, elle a été accusée de six chefs lui reprochant un comportement criminel.

Trois chefs ont cependant fait l’objetd’une suspension après que P.S. s’est reconnue coupable à l’égard d’un chef de conduite d’un véhicule à moteur lorsque sa capacité deconduire était affaiblie causant ainsi un accident ayant occasionné la mort d’une autre personne (par. 255(3.1) du Code criminel) etqu’elle a plaidé coupable à l’égard de deux chefs d’accusation semblables se rapportant à des lésions corporelles découlant également decet accident (par. 255(2.1)). P.S. a été condamnée sous le régime de la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents, L.C.2002, ch. 1. La détermination de la peine a tenu compte également des principes formulés dans les arrêts Gladue et Ipeelee (R. c. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 688, [1999] A.C.S. no 19 (QL); R. c. Ipeelee, 2012 CSC 13,[2012] 1 R.C.S. 433), du fait que P.S. est une Autochtone d’ascendance à la fois micmaque et malécite.

Ont été prononcées au procès : 1) une ordonnance de placement et de surveillance d’une durée de deux ans (six mois de garde en milieu fermé, dix-huit mois desurveillance au sein de la collectivité); 2) une ordonnance de placement et de surveillance d’une durée de six mois (deux mois de garde en milieu fermé, quatre mois desurveillance au sein de la collectivité), peine à purger concurremment; 3) une ordonnance de placement et de surveillance d’une durée de six mois (deux mois de garde en milieu fermé, quatre mois desurveillance au sein de la collectivité), peine à purger concurremment. [2] Le ministère public demande l’autorisation d’appeler de la peine en invoquant des questions dedroit seulement.

Il sollicite de notre Cour une modification de la sentence qui donnerait effet à l’al. 42(2)

n) de la Loi et répartirait lesdeux années en seize mois de garde et huit mois de surveillance au sein de la collectivité. Par un appel reconventionnel, P.S. demandeque la peine prononcée au premier chef soit modifiée et passe à un placement et à une surveillance d’une durée de six mois (quatre moisde garde en milieu fermé et deux mois de surveillance au sein de la collectivité), suivis d’une probation de dix-huit mois. [3] Il convient de noter que la décision qui suit a une valeur jurisprudentielle limitée en raison demodifications apportées à la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents après l’accident. Son alinéa 38(2)f), entré envigueur le 23 octobre 2012, introduit les principes de dénonciation et de dissuasion parmi les considérations devant intervenir lors del’assujettissement d’un adolescent à une peine. La Loi n’imposait pas ces considérations à l’époque où les actes criminels ont été commiset elles ne sont pas applicables en l’espèce. II. Contexte factuel [4] Je puiserai largement dans les mémoires des parties et dans les motifs de la juge du procèspour définir le contexte dans lequel notre Cour doit rendre sa décision.

Les faits essentiels ne semblent pas contestés. [5] Le soir du 18 mai 2012, P.S. et S.M. rendaient visite à un ami. Elles ont quitté son domicile àla tombée de la nuit et S.M. a pris le volant. À 21 h 34, le poste de Woodstock de la GRC a reçu un appel du service 911 l’informantd’une collision entre trois véhicules sur la route 165, à Hay Settlement. La gendarme Peggy Delisle a répondu à l’appel. À son arrivée,elle a vu une Pontiac Grand Prix dont le devant était gravement endommagé et constaté que les deux occupantes de la voiture, P.S etS.M., s’y trouvaient emprisonnées. P.S. en était la conductrice.

Les techniciens en soins médicaux d’urgence qui sont arrivés sur leslieux de l’accident ont informé la gendarme Delisle que P.S. et S.M. étaient toutes deux dans un état critique. Le deuxième véhiculeaccidenté, une Pontiac Grand Am, était conduit par Adam Grant. M. Grant n’avait pas été blessé dans l’accident et il a pu apporter uneaide et parler à la police sur les lieux. Le troisième véhicule engagé dans l’accident, une Jeep Wrangler conduite par Alicia Reid, s’étaitarrêté sur le versant d’un remblai, au bord de la rivière Saint-Jean.

Il était entré en collision frontale avec le véhicule conduit par P.S., avant que la voiture de M. Grant heurte ce véhicule. Mme Reid et son passager avant, Jeff Leighton, ont été tous deux grièvement blessésdans la collision. [6] M. Grant a déclaré qu’il roulait vers le nord sur la route 165, en direction de Woodstock,lorsqu’il avait aperçu une femme qui agitait les bras en bordure de la route. Il était ensuite entré en collision avec la Grand Prix marron, qu’il n’avait pas vue sur la chaussée parce que ses phares n’étaient pas allumés. Mme Reid et M.

Leighton ont été transportés à l’Hôpital Dr Everett Chalmers, à Fredericton, pour y être traités. Ils ont ensuite été capables d’informer la police que, avant l’accident, ils avaient vu le véhicule conduit par P.S., qui roulait sur leur voie. Immédiatement avant l’impact, Mme Reid avait braqué à gauche pour tenterd’éviter P.S. Malheureusement, celle-ci s’était engagée sur la même voie et les véhicules s’étaient heurtés de plein fouet. P.S. et S.M.étaient l’une et l’autre conscientes et criaient lorsque les premiers témoins sont arrivés sur les lieux et sont allés à leur secours.

Ensuite,toutefois, S.M. a perdu connaissance de façon intermittente. Les techniciens en soins médicaux d’urgence ont tenté de la ranimer, mais

elle a succombé à ses blessures avant qu’on puisse la dégager du véhicule. Il a fallu plus d’une heure pour qu’on puisse en sortir P.S. et S.M. Tout ce temps-là, P.S., bouleversée, criait. En tentant de la réconforter pendant l’extraction, la gendarme Delisle a remarqué une forte odeur d’alcool dans son haleine. [7] Une fois dégagée du véhicule, P.S. a été transportée elle aussi à l’Hôpital D r Everett Chalmers, où elle est arrivée vers 23 h 40. Elle avait subi de nombreuses blessures et était dans un état critique. Elle avait subi des fractures aux jambes, au cou, à la colonne vertébrale et aux côtes.

En outre, elle avait subi des lacérations au foie, l’éclatement de la rate et l’affaissement d’un poumon. Elle avait besoin d’être opérée à Saint John, mais son état n’était pas assez stable pour qu’on puisse la transporter. La gendarme Delisle a avisé l’hôpital qu’un mandat serait demandé pour obtenir le sang qu’il prélevait.

Après la délivrance du mandat, des échantillons de sang ont été obtenus de l’hôpital et envoyés au laboratoire judiciaire de la GRC, à Halifax, en vue d’une analyse. [8] Un rapport de toxicologie daté du 10 juin 2014 a conclu que l’alcoolémie de P.S., au moment de l’accident, avait été de l’ordre de 158 à 182 mg par 100 ml. À la page 2, le rapport indique ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] Entre le moment de la collision et le prélèvement du sang, il y a eu un intervalle d’environ 2,4 heures, pendant lequel de l’alcool était éliminé.

Si on prend la mesure [d’alcoolémie] de 134 mg par 100 ml, et si on tient compte du taux d’élimination et des hypothèses ci- dessus, à mon avis, [l’alcoolémie] aurait été de l’ordre de 158 à 182 mg par 100 ml à 21 h 30. Il faut remarquer qu’on a aussi analysé la teneur en alcool d’un échantillon de sérum; le résultat était de 133 mg par 100 ml, ce qui correspond à une [alcoolémie] de l’ordre de 106 à 121 mg par 100 ml.

C’est environ 7 p. cent de moins que le résultat de l’hôpital, qui était de 143 mg par 100 ml. (La mesure de l’hôpital après conversion est elle-même de 3 % à 5 % plus basse que l’analyse de l’échantillon de sang total faite par le laboratoire judiciaire.) Si on extrapole au moment de la collision la mesure convertie du sérum, [l’alcoolémie] aurait été de l’ordre de 130 à 169 mg par 100 ml à 21 h 30. [9] Le rapport mentionne en outre la présence de tétrahydrocannabinol (THC) dans le sang de P.S. Celle-ci a reconnu qu’elle avait consommé de la marihuana le soir de l’accident.

La gendarme Delisle était présente dans la salle d’urgence lorsque le personnel infirmier a retiré du soutien-gorge de la prévenue un sac de plastique contenant environ 2,5 grammes de marihuana. Son sac à main, retrouvé sur les lieux de l’accident, contenait aussi une petite quantité de marihuana. [10] Une autopsie pratiquée sur S.M. a établi qu’elle était décédée par suite de traumatismes contondants à la poitrine et à l’abdomen, ainsi que de multiples fractures aux extrémités du côté droit du corps.

M me Reid a subi des blessures, dont une fracture du talon gauche qui a nécessité une chirurgie et l’insertion de vis, ainsi que l’émiettement des os du coude droit qui a nécessité des réparations chirurgicales et l’insertion de deux plaques et de dix vis. En raison de cette blessure, M me Reid continue de se sentir limitée dans le fonctionnement de son bras droit, et son bras ne s’est pas redressé. Ses blessures ont pesé lourdement sur sa carrière d’infirmière. Du fait des graves lacérations qu’elle a subies au visage dans la collision, elle a une cicatrice de 3,5 pouces au front. M.

Leighton a subi des fractures au pouce, au fémur droit, au pied et aux orteils droits et au tibia gauche. Il a également subi l’éclatement de la rate et a été hospitalisé pendant une longue période en raison de caillots de sang qui se sont formés par suite de la fracture du fémur. [11] Comme nous l’avons vu, P.S. a plaidé coupable à l’égard de trois des six chefs l’accusant de comportement criminel, les autres chefs ayant fait l’objet d’une suspension. Sa condamnation a été prononcée le 31 mars 2015.

Lors de l’audience de détermination de la peine, le ministère public a demandé la peine maximale qu’admet l’art. 44 de la Loi , soit un placement et une surveillance de trois ans, peine qui devait consister en une garde de deux ans en milieu fermé suivie d’une surveillance d’un an au sein de la collectivité. L’avocat de la défense sollicitait de la Cour une longue probation assortie de conditions rigoureuses ou, subsidiairement, une ordonnance différée de placement sous garde d’une durée de six mois.

La poursuite et la défense convenaient que la situation satisfaisait au critère préliminaire de perpétration d’une « infraction avec violence », aux termes de l’al. 39(1)

a) de la Loi , laquelle infraction était passible d’incarcération. La juge chargée de la détermination de la peine a arrêté son choix sur une ordonnance de placement et de surveillance d’une durée de deux ans (six mois de garde en milieu fermé et dix-huit mois de surveillance au sein de la collectivité). Il a été convenu également qu’une interdiction de conduire de dix ans serait imposée à P.S. (transcription, 27 février 2015, p. 44). III. Moyens d’appel [12] Le ministère public appelle de la sentence pour le moyen suivant :

[TRADUCTION] La juge du procès a commis une erreur en prononçant une peine contraire à l’al. 42(2)

n) de la Loi le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents. […] Plus précisément, la juge du procès a prononcé une peine de placement et de surveillance comportant une période de surveillance dont la durée n’était pas la moitié de celle de la période de garde, comme le prescrit la Loi . [13] L’appel reconventionnel formé par P.S. repose sur les mêmes moyens de droit.

P.S. prie la Cour de modifier la peine prononcée à l’égard du premier chef en ordonnant un placement et une surveillance d’une durée de six mois, suivis d’une probation de dix-huit mois, parce que l’intention de la juge était d’ordonner un placement et une surveillance de six mois suivis d’une probation de dix-huit mois.

Elle soutient que le par. 71 de la décision indique clairement que le raisonnement de la juge allait en ce sens : [TRADUCTION] Selon moi, une peine de six mois de garde en milieu fermé, suivis de 18 mois sous surveillance et d’une interdiction de conduire pendant 10 ans, atteindra l’objectif d’imposer une sanction juste assortie de perspectives positives à P.S. et assurera la poursuite de sa marche vers la réadaptation. IV. Analyse A. Objectifs de la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents [14] Il apparaît, à la lecture de deux ouvrages ( Youth Criminal Justice Law , de Nicholas Bala et Sanjeev Anand (2 e éd., Toronto, Irwin Law Inc., 2009), et A Guide to the Youth Criminal Justice Act , de Lee Tustin et Robert E. Lutes, c.r. (éd. 2010, Markham, LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009)), que la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents a été adoptée dans l’espoir de réduire le recours au placement sous garde des jeunes. La Loi incite au recours à des peines ne comportant pas de placement sous garde s’il ne s’agit pas de crime grave, vise la cohérence dans la détermination des peines et s’efforce d’orienter les tribunaux dans l’élaboration de peines spécifiques axées sur la réadaptation plutôt que sur le châtiment. Les auteurs de Youth Criminal Justice Law écrivent ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] La

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents prévoit toutefois que l’adolescent ne devrait pas être puni avec plus de rigueur que l’adulte coupable de la même infraction, commise dans des circonstances semblables; le plus souvent, le souci d’une réadaptation et le principe de responsabilité limitée des adolescents se traduisent par une sanction moins lourde. La Loi indique clairement que les peines prononcées par les tribunaux pour adolescents ne doivent pas se substituer à des services de protection de la jeunesse, des services de santé mentale ou d’autres services de traitement.

Elle évoque aussi que, pour que la situation sociale de l’adolescent s’améliore, les peines ne peuvent être plus contraignantes que ne le justifient son dossier et l’infraction.

S’il ne faut pas penser que la réadaptation soit toujours voulue par le jeune contrevenant, ou possible, l’idéal de réadaptation demeure une raison importante de l’établissement d’un système de justice distinct pour la jeunesse. [p. 5 et 6] [15] Aux pages 540 et 541, les auteurs expriment cet avis : [TRADUCTION] « Il existe des cas dans lesquels la gravité de l’infraction ou le risque pour la sécurité de la collectivité exige un placement sous garde, mais l’article 39 vise à garantir que cette mesure éminemment sévère et contraignante ne répondra à la criminalité juvénile que dans les cas graves. » [16] Dans une analyse de l’art. 39 de la Loi , les auteurs de A Guide to the Youth Criminal Justice Act écrivent ce qui suit :

[TRADUCTION]Cet article, par des restrictions imposées au tribunal qui envisage la condamnation d’un adolescent à un placement sous garde, cherche àmettre en œuvre un des principes fondamentaux, qui veut la réduction du nombre d’adolescents sous garde au Canada. La règle généraleveut que le tribunal pour adolescents n’impose le placement sous garde qu’en dernier recours, après avoir examiné toutes les mesures derechange lors de la détermination de la peine.

Il ne doit recourir au placement sous garde que si l’adolescent a été déclaré coupable d’uneinfraction avec violence, s’il n’a pas respecté des peines antérieures, s’il a commis plusieurs infractions, ou s’il s’agit d’un casexceptionnel dans lequel une peine ne comportant pas de placement sous garde enfreindrait le principe de la Loi.

Le point sur lequel deséclaircissements sont nécessaires est celui-ci : le critère du défaut de respecter les « peines ne comportant pas de placement sous gardequi […] ont déjà été imposées [à l’adolescent] » se rapporte-t-il à la violation d’ordonnances différentes, ou peut-il se rapporter à deuxcas de violation de la même ordonnance? [p. 83] [17] Dans R. c. C.D.; R. c. C.D.K., 2005 CSC 78, [2005] 3 R.C.S. 668, la Cour suprême s’estpenchée sur les objectifs de la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents. L’année suivante, cet arrêt était appliqué par lejuge Rosenberg, de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans R. c. R.E.W., (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 265 (C.A.) (QL). Il aindiqué ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]Le juge Bastarache a cependant signalé que, malgré que la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents vise généralement laprotection du public, elle a, en contrepartie, « des objectifs précis, dont celui de restreindre le recours au placement sous garde dans le casdes jeunes contrevenants » (par. 34).

Dans la conclusion de son examen des dispositions de la Loi justifiant ce point de vue, il a formuléune observation, au sujet de l’al. 39(1)a), qui pourrait tout aussi bien s’appliquer à l’al. 39(1)d) : Si l’on accepte que la Loi vise à restreindre le recours au placement sous garde, on doit alors privilégier l’interprétation stricte de« infraction avec violence », car si l’on qualifie d’« infraction avec violence » la conduite du contrevenant, on ouvre la porte auplacement sous garde (par. 38). (iv) Intention du législateur et historique législatif Au

chapitre de l’intention du législateur, le juge Bastarache a d’abord indiqué, dans R. c. C.D.; R. c. C.D.K., précité, que le recours auplacement sous garde avait explosé à la suite de l’adoption de la

Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants, L.R.C. 1985, ch. Y-1, remplacée par laLoi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents, L.C. 2002, ch. 1. Les modifications successives apportées à la

Loi sur lesjeunes contrevenants n’ont pas réduit le recours au placement sous garde, parce qu’elles « continuaient d’accorder aux juges du tribunalpour adolescents un pouvoir discrétionnaire considérable et avaient donc peu d’incidence sur les peines imposées » (par. 48). Comme ill’a expliqué, l’art. 39 écarte l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire et « établit plutôt des conditions claires qui doivent être remplies avantmême qu’une telle décision puisse être rendue » (par. 48). L’article a été conçu « en

partie pour communiquer encore plus clairement auxintervenants du système de justice pénale pour les adolescents le message qu’il faut restreindre le recours au placement sous garde dansle cas des jeunes contrevenants » (par. 48). Le juge Bastarache a cité, au par. 48 de ses motifs, les propos que la ministre de la Justice,Anne McLellan, a formulés au moment où la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents a été déposée en deuxièmelecture : Le projet de

loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents a pour objet de réduire le nombre inacceptable de jeunes incarcérésen vertu de la

Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants. Le préambule du projet de loi prescrit clairement que le système de justice pénale pourles adolescents devrait limiter la prise des mesures les plus sévères aux crimes les plus graves et diminuer le recours à l’incarcération desadolescents non violents. Contrairement à la

Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants, le projet de loi réserverait la garde surtout aux délinquants violents et auxrécidivistes dangereux. Le nouveau projet de

loi sur le système de justice pour les adolescents reconnaît que les peines en milieu ouvertpeuvent souvent être assorties de conséquences davantage significatives et être plus efficaces pour la réadaptation des adolescents.[par. 34 et 35] [18] Nous avons vu que P.S., par l’entremise de son avocat, a convenu que la situation satisfaisait aucritère de perpétration d’une « infraction avec violence ». La juge du procès pouvait donc appliquer l’art. 39 de la Loi. B. Dispositions pertinentes de la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents

[19] Comme je l’ai indiqué, on ne doit recourir au placement sous garde que si l’adolescent est coupable d’avoir commis une infraction avec violence. [20] Texte du par. 39(1) de la Loi : 39.

(1) A youth justice court shall not commit a young person to custody under

section 42 (youth sentences) unless (

a) the young person has committed a violent offence; (

b) the young person has failed to comply with non-custodial sentences; (

c) the young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has a history that indicates a pattern of either extrajudicial sanctions or of findings of guilt or of both under this Act or the Young Offenders Act ,

chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985; or (

d) in exceptional cases where the young person has committed an indictable offence, the aggravating circumstances of the offence are such that the imposition of a non- custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles set out in

section 38. 39.

(1) Le tribunal pour adolescents n’impose une peine comportant le placement sous garde en application de l’article 42 (peines spécifiques) que si, selon le cas :

a) l’adolescent a commis une infraction avec violence;

b) il n’a pas respecté les peines ne comportant pas de placement sous garde qui lui ont déjà été imposées;

c) il a commis un acte criminel pour lequel un adulte est passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de plus de deux ans, après avoir fait l’objet de plusieurs sanctions extrajudiciaires ou déclarations de culpabilité – ou toute combinaison de celles-ci – dans le cadre de la présente loi ou de la

Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants ,

chapitre Y-1 des Lois révisées du Canada (1985);

d) il s’agit d’un cas exceptionnel où l’adolescent a commis un acte criminel et où les circonstances aggravantes de la perpétration de celui-ci sont telles que l’imposition d’une peine ne comportant pas de placement sous garde enfreindrait les principes et objectif énoncés à l’article 38. [21] Il ne fait aucun doute qu’une peine comportant un placement sous garde pouvait être prononcée en l’espèce. Sous le régime de la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents , le placement sous garde d’un adolescent est suivi d’une période obligatoire de « surveillance au sein de la collectivité » d’une durée correspondant à la moitié de celle du placement sous garde, et au tiers de celle de la peine totale (2:1). Texte de l’al. 42(2) n ) :

(2) When a youth justice court finds a young person guilty of an offence and is imposing a youth sentence, the court shall, subject to this section, impose any one of the following sanctions or any number of them that are not inconsistent with each other and, if the offence is first degree murder or second degree murder within the meaning of

section 231 of the Criminal Code , the court shall impose a sanction set out in paragraph (

q) or subparagraph ( r )(ii) or (iii) and may impose any other of the sanctions set out in this subsection that the court considers appropriate: […] (

n) make a custody and supervision order with respect to the young person, ordering that a period be served in custody and that a second period — which is one half as long as the first — be served, subject to sections 97 (conditions to be included) and 98 (continuation of custody), under supervision in the community subject to conditions, the total of the periods not to exceed two years from the date of the coming into force of the order or, if the young person is found guilty of an offence for which the punishment provided by the Criminal code or any other Act of Parliament is imprisonment for life, three years from the date of coming into force of the order[.] 42.

(2) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, dans le cas où il déclare un adolescent coupable d’une infraction et lui impose une peine spécifique, le tribunal lui impose l’une des sanctions ci-après en la combinant éventuellement avec une ou plusieurs autres compatibles entre elles; dans le cas où l’infraction est le meurtre au premier ou le meurtre au deuxième degré au sens de l’

article 231 du Code criminel , le tribunal lui impose la sanction visée a l’alinéa q ) ou aux sous-alinéas r )(ii) ou (iii) et, le cas échéant, toute autre sanction prévue au présent

article qu’il estime indiquée : […]

n) l’imposition, par une ordonnance de placement et de surveillance, d’une peine maximale de deux ans à compter de sa mise à exécution ou, dans le cas où l’adolescent est déclaré coupable d’une infraction passible de l’emprisonnement à vie prévue par le Code criminel ou par toute autre loi fédérale, d’une peine maximale de trois ans à compter de sa mise à exécution, dont une période est purgée sous garde, laquelle est suivie d’une autre – dont dont la durée est la moitié de la première – à purger, sous réserve des articles 97 (conditions obligatoires) et 98 (maintien sous garde), sous surveillance au sein de la collectivité[.] En outre, l’adolescent est astreint à des conditions obligatoires pendant qu’il purge, au sein de la collectivité, la période de surveillance que comporte la peine : 97.

(1) Every youth sentence imposed under paragraph 42(2)(

n) shall contain the following conditions, namely, that the young person, while serving the portion of the youth sentence under supervision in the community, (

a) keep the peace and be of good behaviour; (

b) report to the provincial director and then be under the supervision of the provincial director; (

c) inform the provincial director immediately on being arrested or questioned by the police; (

d) report to the police, or any named individual, as instructed by the provincial director; 97.

(1) Toute ordonnance rendue en application de l’alinéa 42(2)

n) comprend les conditions suivantes, qui s’appliquent à l’adolescent dès qu’il commence à purger sa période de surveillance au sein de la collectivité :

a) l’obligation de ne pas troubler l’ordre public et de bien se conduire;

b) l’obligation de se rapporter à son directeur provincial et ensuite de demeurer sous la surveillance de celui-ci;

c) l’obligation d’informer immédiatement son directeur provincial s’il est arrêté ou interrogé par la police;

d) l’obligation de se présenter à la police ou à la personne nommément désignée, selon ce qu’indique le directeur provincial;

e) l’obligation de communiquer à son directeur provincial son adresse résidentielle et d’informer immédiatement celui-ci de tout changement :

(

e) advise the provincial director of the young person’s address of residence and report immediately to the provincial director any change (

i) in that address, (ii) in the young person’s normal occupation, including employment, vocational or educational training and volunteer work, (iii) in the young person’s family or financial situation, and (iv) that may reasonably be expected to affect the young person’s ability to comply with the conditions of the sentence; and (

f) not own, possess or have the control of any weapon, ammunition, prohibited ammunition, prohibited device or explosive substance, except as authorized in writing by the provincial director for the purposes of the young person participating in a program specified in the authorization. Other conditions

(2) The provincial director may set additional conditions that support and address the needs of the young person, promote the reintegration of the young person into the community and offer adequate protection to the public from the risk that the young person might otherwise present. The provincial director shall, in setting the conditions, take into account the needs of the young person, the most effective programs for the young person in order to maximize his or her chances for reintegration into the community, the nature of the offence and the ability of the young person to comply with the conditions. (

i) d’adresse résidentielle, (ii) d’occupation habituelle, tel qu’un changement d’emploi ou de travail bénévole ou un changement de formation, (iii) dans sa situation familiale ou financière, (iv) dont il est raisonnable de s’attendre qu’il soit susceptible de modifier sa capacité de respecter les conditions de l’ordonnance;

f) l’interdiction d’être en possession d’une arme, d’un dispositif prohibé, de munitions, de munitions prohibées ou de substances explosives, ou d’en avoir le contrôle ou la propriété, sauf en conformité avec l’autorisation écrite du directeur provincial en vue de la participation de l’adolescent au programme qui y est précisé. Conditions

(2) Le directeur provincial peut, par ordre, fixer des conditions additionnelles qui répondent aux besoins de l’adolescent, favorisent sa réinsertion sociale et protègent suffisamment le public contre les risques que présenterait par ailleurs l’adolescent. Pour les fixer, il prend en compte les besoins de l’adolescent, les programmes les mieux adaptés à ceux-ci et qui sont susceptibles d’augmenter le plus possible ses chances de réinsertion sociale, la nature de l’infraction et la capacité de l’adolescent de respecter les conditions. [22] La période de surveillance au sein de la collectivité est propre à la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents . Encore que cette surveillance présente des caractéristiques semblables à celles de la probation et du sursis, elle n’est identique ni à l’une ni à l’autre. Les conditions afférentes à la surveillance au sein de la collectivité s’apparentent de très près à celles qu’imposent les ordonnances de probation. Cependant, une violation de ces conditions ne conduira pas à une accusation de violation comme le veut l’ art. 733 du Code criminel . C. Placement sous garde et surveillance au sein de la collectivité [23] Sous le régime de la

Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents , toute période de placement sous garde est suivie d’une période de surveillance et de soutien, au sein de la collectivité, qui fait

partie de la peine infligée à l’adolescent. Il en est ainsi lorsque la cour pronon

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