PAMELA PATRICIA BROWN, Petitioner, (Responding Party) - v. -, 2011 NBQB 322

2011 NBQB 322 Court File FDF-203-01 Registrar’s File 1301-46969 IN THE COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK FAMILY DIVISION JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FREDERICTON BETWEEN: PAMELA PATRICIA BROWN, Petitioner, (Responding Party) - and - LANCE ARTHUR BROWN, Respondent, (Moving Party) ORAL DECISION Date of Hearing: January 6 and 26, 2011 Date of Decision: March 4, 2011 Before: Madam Justice Anne D. Wooder Representation of parties at hearing:

Howard T. Myatt, Esq., Solicitor for the Petitioner (Responding Party) Amanda J. Evans, Esqe., Solicitor for the Respondent (Moving Party) I. INTRODUCTION: [ 1 .] Pamela Brown and Lance Brown were divorced on March 28, 2003 after having separated in October 2000. They had married in June 1980. The Order for Corollary Relief dated February 25, 2003 provided for the payment of spousal support by Mr. Brown in the amount of $1,200.00 monthly. At that time, Mr. Brown was a full time serving member of the regular Canadian Armed Forces. In early 2006, Mr. Brown voluntarily retired from his twenty-six year career.

Several months later, he secured a full time “Class B” contract with the Armed Forces Reserves in his former regiment and at a slightly lower rank (Warrant Officer as opposed to Master Warrant Officer). Although his income from the Reserves contract was less than it had been in the regular forces, the combined effect of his military pension and his employment income resulted in annual earnings that were greater than he had been receiving when the spousal support obligation was imposed. [ 2 .] In January 2010, Mr.

Brown was notified that his contract with the Reserves was being terminated due to budgetary restrictions. Although continued work was available, it was under a different contractual arrangement and the number of available days of work was reduced. His income has therefore decreased and, by this motion, Mr. Brown has asked that his spousal support obligation be decreased.

Although his motion sought termination of the spousal support, by the end of the hearing, his counsel had conceded that reduction rather than termination was the relief being requested and that the argument arising from what has come to be known as “double dipping” was effectively not being maintained. II. ISSUES: A). Has there been a material change in Mr. Brown’s circumstances? B). If there has been a material change in Mr. Brown’s circumstances, should the spousal support be reduced and if so, by how much? C). What is the appropriate costs order? III. EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND: [ 3 .] The reasons offered by Mr.

Brown for his decision to retire voluntarily were: - That in October 2004, the parties’ son, Joshua, had been killed in an accident, causing Mr. Brown emotional and psychological distress; - Mr. Brown’s work environment was a stressful operational unit; - He had done one tour in Bosnia and was likely facing another deployment or a posting; and - His common law wife, with whom he had lived since June 2005, had a career position and she and her two children were well settled in the area where the family was living. [ 4 .] There was no suggestion that Mr.

Brown’s decision to retire was made in bad faith or in a deliberate effort to avoid his spousal support obligations. [ 5 .] In the year of, and the years following, the parties’ divorce, Mr. Brown’s annual income was as follows: - 2003: $63,696.00 - 2004: $65,065.90 - 2005: $74,810.00

- 2006: $108, 476.00 (employment income, pension income, RRSP, retirement allowance) - 2007: $78,700.00 (employment income, pension income) - 2008: $88,451.30 (employment income, pension income, RRSP, and employment insurance benefits) - 2009: $82,227.00 (employment income and pension income) [ 6 .] In 2010, Mr. Brown had pension income of $25,344.00, income from employment of at least $16,500.00 and employment insurance income of $14,100.00 for a total of approximately $56,000.00. Mr. Brown estimates that his income for 2011, and forward, will be approximately $37,000.00.

Obviously, his pension income will not change. He says he is prepared at this time to work the sixty days per year permitted under the current Reserve constraints, and as demonstrated by Exhibit 3. That document, an email from HQ dated November 10, 2010, sets out the policy with respect to the allotment of work days. Days in excess of sixty are permitted upon a standard form request and with the appropriate command authority. According to Mr. Brown, that authority is not being given. However, he has not made any such requests for extra days. Mr.

Brown testified that although he is prepared to work several days a month, he wishes to stay home and care for his two year old son and essentially retire from the paid work force. He testified in cross- examination that his common law wife is employed with Department of National Defence and that her annual income is approximately $80,000.00. The combined household income, therefore, is in excess of $115,000.00 annually. [ 7 .] Paragraphs six to eighteen of Mrs. Brown’s affidavit sworn in response to the motion outline her educational/work history. By way of

summary, when the parties met, Mrs. Brown was in her first year of a Bachelor of Education degree at the University of New Brunswick. She successfully completed that year in the spring of 1979. Her continued attendance at university was interrupted by her engagement to Mr. Brown in 1979 and their marriage in 1980. The parties lived for six years following their marriage in Petawawa, Ontario, where both of their children were born. They then lived in Germany for six years before moving to Oromocto in 1992. While in Petawawa, Mrs. Brown took children into her home to supplement the family’s income.

In Germany, she worked at unspecified part time jobs within the school system until she secured a full time position as assistant to the purchasing agent at Cannex. Mrs. Brown’s efforts to pursue upgrading on computers were interrupted by Mr. Brown’s posting to Oromocto. Due to what she described as “serious financial difficulties” as a result of Mr. Brown’s “financial mismanagement”, Mrs. Brown again sought work outside the home. She found part-time work at Home Hardware and at an arcade in a local mall. In 1995, she obtained work as a waitress at Mingler’s Pub. By then, Mrs. Brown was 49 years old. [ 8 .] Mr.

Brown’s position is that it was entirely Mrs. Brown’s decision not to pursue any further education or upgrading or to seek work that did not involve day shift hours or extended weekly hours. [ 9 .] In Oral Reasons for Decision given by Athey, J. following the contested spousal support hearing, the learned justice found as follows: “Returning to the matter before me, during eleven of the twenty years that the parties cohabited, Mrs. Brown assumed the vast majority of childcare and household management responsibilities while Mr. Brown was able to pursue his career unimpeded by those responsibilities.

She also supplemented the household income by babysitting and doing clerical work during the postings at Petawawa and Lahr, Germany. After Mr. Brown was posted to CFB Gagetown she remained out of the work force for approximately three years. As a result of the role she adopted during marriage, she was unable to advance any career or acquire any seniority in the workforce. For the past seven years, she has been employed as a waitress and currently earns less than $15,000.00 per year.

She has few assets and is presently not able to access her share of the pension and retirement allowance…… Clearly, there was a compensatory aspect to the award of spousal support that was ultimately made. [ 10 .] Mrs. Brown’s circumstances have not improved since Justice Athey’s decision. Paragraphs 20 to 29 of her affidavit set out the details. Mrs. Brown was obliged to stop working as a waitress due to rotator cuff problems that saw her qualify for short term disability payments in April 2010. She attempted to return to her work at the Pub but was physically unable to do what was required. Mrs.

Brown qualified for employment insurance benefits in April 2010 that will last for a year. She has continued to look for work and is presently employed part time as a salesperson in a lottery booth in a local mall. Her employment income reduces her employment insurance income dollar for dollar. To date, she has not earned more from employment than she receives from employment insurance.

[11.] In the year of, and the years following, the parties’ divorce, Mrs. Brown’s income (exclusive of spousal support) was asfollows: 2003 $13,549.00 2004 $13,362.00 2005 $15,497.00 2006 $21,685.00 2007 $21,638.00 2008 $13,034.00 2009 $17,855.00 [12.] Mr. Brown’s position is twofold. He says there is insufficient evidence of a medical condition that makes Mrs. Brown’scontinued work as a waitress impossible. He also says that she could find work that is more remunerative than working in the lotterybooth and he asks that Mrs. Brown have income attributed to her. In short, he expects her to work full time.

He does not wish to do sohimself. IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS: A). Has there been a material change in Mr. Brown’s circumstances? [13.]

Section 17.(1) of the Divorce Act is the statutory authority for courts to vary spousal support orders. [14.] Before varying an order, the court must be satisfied that there has been a change in the condition, means, needs or othercircumstances of either party. See

section 17.(4.1) of the Act. Any change must be a material one, one that was not known at the timethe original order or most recent variation order was made, and one that, if known, would have resulted in a different order. See: Willickv Willick (SCC), 1994 CarswellSask 48 (S.C.C.). [15.] Mr. Brown says that his circumstances have changed because of his reduced employment with the Reserves, and not hisvoluntary retirement from the regular forces. He sought no variation following his retirement, even though he was unemployed for aperiod of some three months.

It was only after he was notified that the available hours of work with the Reserves were being cut backthat he filed this motion. The argument could compellingly be made that the retirement was still the catalyst, however, the point isirrelevant. Our Court of Appeal in Lemoine v. Lemoine (NB CA), 1997 CarswellNB 21 has made it clear that a payormay decide to stop working and, so long as there is no evidence of bad faith with a view to frustrating the right of a former spouse tosupport, the payor’s motivation cannot be considered.

As Bastarache, J. said, at paragraph 10 “a supporting spouse cannot be required tocontinue working”. [16.] As a result of Mr. Brown’s retirement from the regular forces and the reduction in the number of days of available workwith the Reserves, his income has declined. At the time of the Order for Corollary Relief, Mr. Brown’s annual income was $63,696.00.This year, he says it will be no more than $37,344.00. That is comprised of his pension income of $25,344.00 and the maximum incomefrom the Reserves, assuming the sixty days available are worked. Counsel for Mrs. Brown made the argument that Mr.

Brown has theoption of requesting more than the 60 days permitted. Exhibit 3 confirms that reality. However, the decision in Lemoine is an effectiverebuttal to that argument. [17.] In my view, the changes in Mr. Brown’s circumstances satisfy the requirement in

section 17.(4.1) of the Act, asinterpreted by the binding jurisprudence in this province. B). If there has been a material change in Mr. Brown’s circumstances, should the spousal support be reduced and if so, byhow much?

[18.] The question is therefore whether the variation sought should be granted. Initially, Mr. Brown argued against the“double recovery” discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Boston v. Boston 2001 CarswellOnt 2431. He presented evidence withrespect to the portion of his pension income that was attributable to his post-separation years of service. That argument was notmaintained, the accompanying explanation being that Mrs. Brown has demonstrated a continuing need.

Certainly, and in any event,cases post Boston have been clear that the prohibition against double recovery is not an absolute one. [19.] In this particular respect, I note that Mr. Brown’s share of his pension funds generates annual income of $25,344.30($2,112.02 monthly). According to Exhibit 12, which is correspondence from Paul G. Conrad of Actuarial Experts Consulting Limited,$17,130.08 of this amount is attributable to the period of the marriage and $9,579.60 represents Mr. Brown’s share of the dividedpension (the balance being attributable to wage increases received after the separation). Mrs.

Brown’s share of the pension fundsgenerates annual income of approximately $4,080.00 ($340.00 monthly). The terms of the pension plan guarantee Mr. Brown continuedpayments with no corresponding reduction in “capital”. Mrs. Brown must attempt to generate income from a capital account that issubject to depletion. Although the division of pension funds in these situations may be equal, the resulting payments are certainly not. [20.]

Section 17.(7) of the Divorce Act sets out the objectives of an order varying a spousal support order. They echo theobjectives of an order of first instance: 17.

(7) A variation order varying a spousal support order should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the former spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (

b) apportion between the former spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and aboveany obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the former spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each former spouse within a reasonable period of time. [21.] As already noted, Athey, J. found that Mrs. Brown had been economically disadvantaged as a result of the marriage andits breakdown. The nature of such a conclusion does not lend itself to a quantification of “damages” nor, as a consequence, adetermination that the disadvantage can or will be compensated for at any future point. In Lemoine, the court quoted with approval fromits’ decision in Ross v.

Ross at paragraph 18: 18 In the present instance, Guerette J. accepted that the higher earning spouse had a basic obligation to make continuing provisionfor his former spouse, because she was probably unable to become self-sufficient and had lost access to her former source of incomesecurity. In these circumstances, the following observations of Baker J. in Patrick v. Patrick (1994), (BC SC), 92B.C.L.R. (2d) 50 at p.54 (S.C.) are applicable, as stated by this Court in Ross v. Ross (1995), (NB CA), 16 R.F.L.(4th) 1 at p.6: ...

In my view, however, where an order for spousal support has been made with the primary objective of compensating the receivingspouse for economic disadvantage accruing during several years of marriage and expected to continue after divorce, a court should notreadily reduce or terminate spousal support.

The evidence on an application to vary a so-called "compensatory support" order mustestablish not only that there has been a significant change in the means and needs of the parties since trial but also that the factors whichresulted in economic disadvantage during the marriage and after its breakdown no longer exist and that the lost advantage has beenrecovered. [22.] There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that there does not continue to be a compensatory aspect to the spousalsupport. In addition, Mrs.

Brown’s need was acknowledged. [23.] Although there are no longer any children of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act, the parties’ surviving child didnot live independently of Mrs. Brown following the parties’ separation. That child, a daughter Rhanda, is presently 29 years old. Shewas almost 19 when her parents separated. For two periods of time totaling two and a half years, she and her (then infant) son lived withMrs. Brown, initially from prior to the separation until July 2001 and then again from the Summer of 2004 until June of 2006.

[ 24 .] Like Mr. Brown, Mrs. Brown has had to deal with the loss of Joshua. [ 25 .] With respect to the issue of continuing economic hardship, Mr. Brown’s evidence and financial statement show no proof of same.

In the years following the parties’ separation and divorce, his income increased; he and his present partner own a home with equity in excess of half of the home’s value to which they have made significant renovations; he has savings and RRSPs; he and his family take holidays; he owns three motor vehicles including one motor cycle; his financial circumstances are sufficiently comfortable that he took voluntary retirement from the military. If there was economic hardship, it has been overcome. [ 26 .] According to Mr. Brown’s financial statement sworn on January 4, 2011, he has a monthly deficit of $608.00.

He testified that he pays 50% of the household expenses notwithstanding that he earns less than one third of the income of his spouse, and notwithstanding that her two teenage children live with them. Mr. Brown’s expenses include: - RESP contributions of $150.00 monthly or $1,800.00 annually; - Babysitting/daycare of $75.00 monthly or $900.00 annually; - Children’s extracurricular activities of $50.00 monthly or $600.00 annually; - Gifts of $60.00 monthly or $720.00 annually; - Vacation of $80.00 monthly or $960.00 annually; - Entertainment and recreation of $100.00 monthly or $1,200.00 annually.

These expenses add up to $6,180.00 annually, or $515.00 monthly. All but the daycare expense could be characterized as discretionary. I note that Mr. Brown’s expenses include $600.00 per month in spousal support, and not the $1,200.00 ordered. In any event, a portion of the monthly deficit could be addressed by a reduction by Mr. Brown in discretionary spending and a more proportionate sharing with his present partner of the household expenses. [ 27 .] Mr. Brown is in a net equity position of almost $100,000.00.

He and his wife own their home which he values at $160,000.00, and against which there is a $49,000.00 mortgage and a $44,000.00 secured line of credit. He has an unsecured line of credit in the order of $18,000.00 and very modest credit card debt of several hundred dollars. Mr. Brown has RRSPs worth approx $30,000.00 (I note parenthetically that these were partially liquidated after the hearing and are now worth less) and he has a balance in his bank account of $1,369.00. [ 28 .] Mrs. Brown’s financial situation is very different.

She owns a townhouse which she values at $120,000.00 against which there is a mortgage of $117,500.00. She has other consumer debt of $3,400.00 and debts owed to family of $1,150.00. Her single unencumbered asset, apart from a thirteen year old vehicle, is the approximately $130,000.00 in pension funds that she has invested. She was forced to cash in registered retirement savings funds when Mr. Brown decreased the amount of support he was paying in February 2010. According to her financial statement, she has no money in bank accounts.

Her monthly expenses are shown on her financial statement to be $2,747.62, with no amounts identified for vacation. This is approximately $1,000.00 less monthly than Mr. Brown spends as his one-half share of his household expenses. [ 29 .] In October 2003, Mrs. Brown received $130,190.02 as her share of Mr. Brown’s pension funds, which she invested. As of June 30, 2010, the balance in her investment account was $126,377.79. She draws $340.00 monthly from that account. There was no evidence with respect to how the account is invested or managed, or how the decision was made to withdraw $340.00 monthly. Mr.

Brown criticized what he called the lack of an explanation, however, he did not ask to cross-examine Mrs. Brown. She is using her share of the pension funds to generate some income. Obviously, this account is her sole retirement fund. [ 30 .] There is a disparity in the parties’ respective means and in their lifestyles. Obviously, Mr. Brown’s lifestyle is supported by a working partner and her $80,000.00 in annual income. For the seven past years, Mr. Brown has enjoyed income levels that reached as high as $108,000.00 in 2006. Mrs.

Brown’s maximum income during that same time period was $21,685.00, exclusive of spousal support. [ 31 .] The argument put forth by Mr. Brown is that Mrs. Brown should be working at something more remunerative than selling lottery tickets and that she has had ample time to become self-sufficient. He says that her evidence of ill health is not supported by any evidence other than her own. [ 32 .] Mrs. Brown was 46 years of age when the parties separated and 49 when they divorced. She is now 57 years old. In

1979 she completed her one and only year at university. She has taken no upgrading of any kind, nor returned to university. Postseparation she continued the same work she had had for the five years prior. [33.] In her analysis of the objectives of a spousal support order, Athey, J. said, in part, when making the original order that: “I find that Mrs. Brown has made reasonable efforts to contribute to her needs by applying for a position as a teacher’sassistant and looking for employment in the newspaper.

Her reluctance to embark on university studies at age 49 considering her limitedmeans, coupled with no guarantee of employment thereafter, is in my opinion understandable and does not indicate that she is content tobe reliant upon Mr. Brown to support her. She is in need of support from Mr. Brown and he is capable with his income of $62,460.00and non taxable fringe benefits of $1,800.00 of contributing to her needs. At the breakdown of their marriage both parties may have suffered economic disadvantages, but Mrs. Brown’s were fargreater than Mr. Brown’s. I do not accept that Mr.

Brown’s assignment in bankruptcy conferred a significant economic advantage onMrs. Brown since it was he who managed his income during cohabitation and he testified he mismanaged money and spent itfrivolously. There is no evidence to suggest any mismanagement or frivolousness on Mrs. Brown’s part. The disparity between the incomes of the parties confirms the economic hardship suffered by Mrs. Brown as a result ofthe breakdown of the marriage. Notwithstanding her efforts she is unable to achieve self-sufficiency at this time or in the foreseeablefuture.” [34.] The Supreme Court of Canada in Moge v.

Moge (SCC), 1992 CarswellMan 143 confirmed that all four ofthe objectives defined in the Act must be taken into account when an order for spousal support is made or sought to be varied. No singleobjective is paramount. The fact that one of the objectives has been attained does not necessarily dispose of the matter. [35.] Moge also recognized the social reality in which many women live and work. In addition to child rearing and householdmanagement, women have assumed other work outside the home.

Far from providing some of those women with financial independence, [S]uch employment continues to play a secondary role and sacrifices continue to be made for the sake of domestic relations. Thesesacrifices often impair the ability of the partner who makes them (usually the wife) to maximize her earning potential because she maytend to forego educational and career advancement opportunities.

These same sacrifices may also enhance the earning potential of theother spouse (usually the husband) who, because his wife is tending to such matters, is free to pursue economic goals. (See paragraph71). [36.] L'Heureux-Dubé determined that: 1. "[T]he doctrine of equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown ... recognizes that work withinthe home has undeniable value and transforms the notion of equality from the rhetorical status to which it was relegated under adeemed self-sufficiency model, to a substantive imperative". (See paragraph 74). 2.

"The ultimate goal is to alleviate the disadvantaged spouse's economic losses as completely as possible, taking into account all thecircumstances of the parties, including the advantages conferred on the other spouse during the marriage". (See paragraph 77). 3. "The longer the relationship endures, the closer the economic union, the greater will be the presumptive claim to equal standardsof living upon its dissolution". (See paragraph 85). 4. Following Story v. Story "There may be cases where self-sufficiency is never possible due to the age of the spouse at marriage breakdown.

It is often, in myopinion, totally unrealistic to expect that a 45-or 50-year-old spouse who has not been in the job market for many, many years to beretrained and to compete for employment in a job market where younger women have difficulty becoming employed." (See paragraph37). [37.] The objectives of a variation order are identical to those of an order of first instance. The jurisprudence is clear thatcourts should look to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (the “SSAG”) when determining the quantum of support when originalorders are made.

See: C.(J.D.E.) v C.(S.M.) 2006 NBCA 46 , 2006 CarswellNB 242 (N.B.C.A.). There seems no reason todisregard those Guidelines when a variation is sought due to a change in the income of a payor, particularly when the Act says that thecourt must take the change of circumstances into consideration when making the variation order. Here the change in circumstances isthe decline in Mr. Brown’s income.

[ 38 .] As noted previously, Mr. Brown’s position is that income should be “imputed” to Mrs. Brown for the purpose of making the SSAG calculations. He proposes that Mrs. Brown could be, or should be, generating annual income (both pension and employment) of $16,500.00. The reality is that Mrs. Brown presently has income of $11, 400.00. [ 39 .] Our Court of Appeal in Scott v. Scott 2004 CarswellNB 587 has made it clear that a party can give evidence as to the state of his/her health. Expert medical evidence is not required. Mrs.

Brown was not cross-examined on her affidavit, in which she deposed to the fact that she left a job that she had held for approximately 15 years due to shoulder problems that prevented her from continuing to do that type of work. She did not simply decide that she no longer wished to work. She applied for employment insurance benefits and she looked for other work. She is now 57 years of age, and with a skill set that ill equips her for the technological world.

In my view, she has not overcome the disadvantages of her marriage or its’ breakdown nor has she achieved economic self-sufficiency. [ 40 .] The SSAG calculations submitted by counsel for Mr. Brown use the imputed income amount for Mrs. Brown and $37,300.00 as the income amount for Mr. Brown. The latter is accurate, the former is not. The ranges generated from the application of those income numbers is a low of $518.00, a mid of $604.00, and a high of $691.00. They would obviously be higher if a lower income number was used for Mrs. Brown. [ 41 .] Mrs. Brown’s need is acknowledged.

Her financial statement indicates that each month she experiences a shortfall of $1,791.00. That does not take into account any spousal support. She encroached on her capital in 2010 when the spousal support was reduced and she continues to draw from her share of the pension fund. [ 42 .] Mr. Brown’s present income is approximately 1.7 times less than his income when spousal support was originally set. However, in my view, he has a continued ability to pay spousal support, albeit a reduced one. [ 43 .] Taking all of the above into consideration, spousal support will be fixed at $750.00 per month.

This was a twenty year marriage. There is nothing to suggest that a review as requested by counsel for Mr. Brown should be ordered. See Leskun v. Leskun 2006 CarswellBC 1492 (S.C.C.) . [ 44 .] There was an issue with respect to the arrears of support as a consequence of Mr. Brown’s underpayment beginning in February 2010 of the original amount ordered. The parties agreed upon the support arrears for 2010 and those have been paid. The reduced support will be effective as of January 2011. Future payments will be due and owing on the first day of each month beginning on April 1, 2011.

If there has been an overpayment for the months of January to March, inclusive, and if the parties are unable to agree on how that is to be repaid by Mrs. Brown then either party may apply to the court for further directions. C). What is the appropriate costs order? [ 45 .] Each of the parties was represented by counsel and each will have the associated expense. The position of Mr. Brown was modified as the matter progressed, to the point where he acknowledged Mrs. Brown’s need. He abandoned his position that support should terminate and asked that it be reduced, suggesting that a review might be appropriate.

In his Pre-Motion Brief, Mr. Brown proposed that he would pay $300.00 to $350.00 per month; in submission that amount increased to $600.00. By virtue of this order, support will reduce by $450.00 monthly. Although success was divided, Mrs. Brown has arguably been the more successful of the parties. The issue was a significant one for both of the parties, but an acutely precarious one for Mrs. Brown. [ 46 .] In light of the above, there will be an order that Mr. Brown pay all inclusive costs of $1,500.00. V.

ORDER: [ 47 .] The motion is granted in part and the Order for Corollary Relief dated February 25, 2003 is varied to provide that, effective as of January 2011, the respondent shall pay spousal support to the petitioner in the varied amount of $750.00. Payments shall be made on the first day of each month beginning on April 1, 2011 and continuing monthly thereafter until further order of the court.

All payments shall be made to the Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick, Family Division, Judicial District of Fredericton by way of either the appropriate payment order or federal garnishee. [ 48 .] Costs in the all inclusive amount of $1,500.00 are payable by the Respondent forthwith.

[ 49 .] The court retains jurisdiction to determine how any overpayment of spousal support that might have been made for the months of January to March, inclusive, should be repaid. DATED at Fredericton, New Brunswick this 16 h day of November, 2011, effective the 4 th day of March, 2011. ____________________________________ Anne D. Wooder, J.C.Q.B.