M.D. Applicant - v. –, 2023 NBKB 202

File: FDSJ-553-2020 2023 NBKB 202 IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK FAMILY DIVISION JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SAINT JOHN BETWEEN: M.D. Applicant - and – P.D. Respondent DECISION BEFORE: Madam Justice Danie Roy AT: Saint John, New Brunswick DATE OF HEARING: May 16 and 19 2023 DATE OF DECISION: November 16, 2023 APPEARANCES: Joshua D. Adams, on behalf of the Applicant P.D., per se Roy, J. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] M.D. and P.D were married on November 26, 1994, and separated on January 29, 2016.

The applicable legislation is the Divorce Act and the Martial Property Act. [ 2 ] They both continued to live in the marital home until February 2018 and shared expenses until they were required to leave having defaulted on the mortgage. The bank, which held a mortgage on the marital home, foreclosed on it. [ 3 ] The parties have reached an agreement with respect to child support up to July 1, 2023, and with respect to division of marital assets and debts, including the division of their respective pensions, with the exception of the division of three Registered Retirement Savings Plan.

The other issues to be decided are prospective child support, spousal support, and special or extraordinary expenses.

[ 4 ] The parties are the parents of four children and three of them are adults. The youngest, W., born […], is 17 years old, J., born […], is 19 years old, N., born […], is 23 years old and S., born […], is 25 years old. [ 5 ] The parenting arrangement is a split parenting arrangement. This has generally been the situation since the date of separation. P.D. has the majority of parenting time with the three older children, S., N. and J., and their primary residence is with her. M.D. has the majority of parenting time with the youngest child, W., who resides with him.

M.D. and P.D. do not seek a parenting order. [ 6 ] The parties also agree that their adult children attending a post-secondary institution are entitled to child support, being unable to withdraw from their parent’s charge. However, P.D. seeks continued support for the two oldest children whom, at the time of the trial, were set to graduate from a post-secondary program in June 2023. She seeks support on the basis of need and uncertainties of their future. [ 7 ] P.D. also seeks an order for special or extraordinary expenses for all four children retroactively since 2018.

She originally claimed over $70,000 in expenses be shared between herself and M.D. on a pro rata basis according to their incomes. Her revised claim is for $49,459. [ 8 ] P.D. is a pharmacist and has worked in that capacity since 1993, other than parental leaves when the children were born. [ 9 ] M.D. is a front store manager at a pharmacy. He started working at a pharmacy in 1989 in receiving. He worked his way through being front store manager in 2001. He went on six weeks' sick leave in 2006 and only returned to work in 2014.

When he re- entered the work force, he returned to work in receiving where he had started in 1989 . He again worked his way through the front store manager position in 2021. He requests a spousal support order on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. [ 10 ] The three Registered Retirement Savings Plan at issue were withdrawn by M.D. in 2016, 2017, and 2018 and P.D. seeks 50%. M.D. withdrew the following amounts: 2016 $2973.00 2017 $2154.00 2018 $1400.00 [ 11 ] The parties are not seeking that a divorce be granted at this time.

The solicitor for M.D. advised a request for divorce by way of affidavit evidence would be submitted following the decision. ISSUES [ 12 ] The issues before the Court are: a. Prospective child support; b. Special and extraordinary expenses, retroactively and prospectively; c. Spousal support, retroactively and prospectively; d. Division of three Registered Retirement Savings Plan.

LAW AND ANALYSIS Child support [ 13 ] P.D. seeks continued support for the two older children who, at the time of the trial, were to graduate from their post- secondary program in June 2023. She seeks continued support on the basis of need and the uncertainties with respect to their future.

M.D. does not agree and takes the position that they are no longer children of the marriage for the purposes of child support. [ 14 ] The Court has jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of the children of the marriage and shall do so in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines. [ 15 ] The Divorce Act defines a child of the marriage as a child of two spouses or former spouses, who: (

a) is under the age of majority and who has not withdrawn from their charge, or (

b) is at the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life. [ 16 ] The term "other cause" has been defined to include the pursuit of higher education ( MacLennan v. MacLennan , 2003 NSCA 9 , at paragraph 37 ). [ 17 ] A child at or over the age of majority is not automatically a child of the marriage for the purposes of support simply by virtue of being a full-time undergraduate university student. It must be shown that the child is unable to withdraw from parental charge.

It is the party claiming support who has the burden of establishing entitlement. Generally, the “material time” for the purposes of determining the child’s status is the time of trial. ( MacLennan v. MacLennan , 2003 NSCA 9 , at paragraphs 39 and 44 ) [ 18 ] Whether an adult child is unable to withdraw from parental charge because of the pursuit of reasonable education is a case specific inquiry. The party claiming support has the burden of establishing entitlement. ( M.S. v.

D.M.A. 2011 NBQB 79 , at paragraph 9 ) [ 19 ] The analysis of whether or not a child attending post-secondary education is unable to withdraw from parental charge involves a careful assessment of their overall circumstances, including their needs and the parents’ means.

The entitlement is a fact-driven exercise and no single factor is determinative. ( Mirzahi v Sana , [2022] AJ No 558 , 2022 ABQB 313 , at paragraphs 15 and 18 ) [ 20 ] In Mirzahi , at paragraph 16 , Justice Feth provides a helpful list of non-exhaustive factors when considering the overall circumstances and these are: (1) w hether the child is in fact enrolled in a course of studies and whether it is a full- time or part-time course of studies; (2) whether or not the child has applied for, or is eligible for, student loans or other financial assistance; (3) t he career plans of the child, i.e., whether the child has some reasonable and appropriate plan or is simply going to college because there is nothing better to do; (4) t he ability of the child to contribute to his own support through part-time employment;

(5) t he age of the child; (6) the child's past academic performance, whether the child is demonstrating success in the chosen course of studies; (7) w hat plans the parents made for the education of their children, particularly where those plans were made during cohabitation; and (8) at least in the case of a mature child who has reached the age of majority, whether or not the child has unilaterally terminated a relationship from the parent from whom support is sought. [ 21 ] As noted by Justice Morrison in T.T.B. v.

P.H.D. 2014 NBQB 164 , at paragraph 27 , in determining the reasonableness of a student’s education plan, a degree of tolerance should be expected by the parent. [ 22 ] S. is 25 years old and is an adult. At the time of the hearing, he had been offered a job at the Saint John Refinery and it was expected he would complete his post-secondary degree in June 2023. Although the job offer is conditional about successfully finishing his program and testing, P.D. testified that she is confident he will succeed.

The evidence before me does not lead me to conclude S.’s plan is to continue post-secondary education. [ 23 ] I find that S. is no longer a child of the marriage for the purposes of child support as of July 1, 2023. [ 24 ] N. is 23 years old and an adult. At the time of the hearing, it was also expected he would complete his post-secondary degree in June 2023. While pursuing his studies, he has worked on a part-time basis for Alcool NB Liquor and, at the time of the trial, he was also doing an apprenticeship.

P.D. said his position is part-time and permanent. [ 25 ] P.D. submits that N. may go back to finish a university degree and believes this is what he wishes to do. However, th ere is uncertainty as to what N. will do next. At the time of the trial, there is no evidence that he is enrolled in a post-secondary program or that he has a definite educational plan. There is no evidence either as to his a bility to contribute to his own support on a go forward basis.

Recall that the evidence is that he has worked part-time while going to school. [ 26 ] The evidence does not convince me N. is a child of the marriage within the meaning of the Divorce Act and I find that N. is no longer a child of the marriage for the purposes of child support as of July 1, 2023. [ 27 ] J. is 19 years old and an adult. He is enrolled in a post-secondary program. P.D.’s evidence is that his goal is to make his way through a pharmacy program and he is working towards that goal.

P.D. also said J. needs to take summer courses to stay on track at a cost of about $1900, adding that he is working two jobs to make this happen. [ 28 ] I accept that J. is enrolled in post-secondary education and that he has a specific plan to go into a pharmacy program and that he is making the efforts to reach that goal. I conclude that J. remains a child of the marriage for the purposes of child support. [ 29 ] W. is 18 years old. At the time of the trial, he was registered to attend the University of New Brunswick in September 2023.

He is a child of the marriage for the purposes of child support. [ 30 ] Therefore, a child support order is required for both W. and J.

[ 31 ] Pursuant to paragraph 3(2) of the Guidelines , unless otherwise provided in the Guidelines , where a child to whom a child support order relates is the age of majority or over, the amount of child support order is: (

a) the amount determined by applying the Guidelines as if the child were under the age of majority; or (

b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child. [ 32 ] The onus of showing that the Guidelines amount is inappropriate under section 3(2) of the Guidelines is on the party so claiming ( See MacLennan v. MacLennan , 2003 NSCA 9 , at paragraph 48 .) There is no evidence that would lead me to conclude that I should depart from the Guidelines .

Financial Disclosure [ 33 ] P.D. is a pharmacist and she has worked as a pharmacist throughout the relationship. M.D. is a front store manager at a pharmacy. The parties income from 2018 until 2022 is as listed in the table below. P.D.’s stated income is excluding union dues and licensing fees. Also, in 2022, P.D.’s income is higher because she received retroactive pay after the renewal of their union contract.

Applicant Respondent 2018 $39, 580 $72, 061 2019 $38, 917 $94, 498 2020 $39, 172 $99, 747 2021 $49, 596 $92, 707 2022 $64, 842 $111 940 [ 34 ] For the year 2023, the parties agree their income for the purposes of child support is $64,842 for M.D. and $101,491 for P.D. [ 35 ] Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Guidelines , when there is a split parenting arrangement, that is if there are two or more children, and each spouse has the majority of parenting time with one or more of those children, the amount of a child support order is the difference between the amount that each would otherwise pay if a child support order were sought against each of the spouses. [ 36 ] M.D. and P.D. have a split parenting arrangement where M.D. has the majority of parenting time with W. and P.D. has the majority of parenting time with J.

Conclusion on child support [ 37 ] I order child support payable by P.D. in the amount of $315.00 commencing July 1, 2023, and continuing on the 1 st day of each month thereafter, based on the parties’ income being $64,842 for the Applicant and $101,491 for the Respondent. Special or extraordinary expenses [ 38 ] P.D. requests that special and extraordinary expenses be shared proportionally for all four children, including W. who has primarily resided with M.D. She says she has continued to pay for his expenses because she wanted him to have the same lifestyle as his

brothers who were living with her. She requests an order from 2018 onward, the date when they stopped sharing expenses. [ 39 ] Pursuant to the Guidelines , in a child support order, the Court may provide an amount to cover expenses as follows: Special or extraordinary expenses 7

(1) In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation: (

a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment of the spouse who has the majority of parenting time; (

b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child; (

c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses; (

d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs; (

e) expenses for post-secondary education; and (

f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities. Definition of "extraordinary expenses"

(1.1) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(

d) and (f), the term extraordinary expenses means (

a) expenses that exceed those that the spouse requesting an amount for the extraordinary expenses can reasonably cover, taking into account that spouse’s income and the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate; or (

b) where paragraph (

a) is not applicable, expenses that the court considers are extraordinary taking into account (

i) the amount of the expense in relation to the income of the spouse requesting the amount, including the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate, (ii) the nature and number of the educational programs and extracurricular activities, (iii) any special needs and talents of the child or children, (iv) the overall cost of the programs and activities, and (

v) any other similar factor that the court considers relevant. Sharing of expense

(2) The guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1) is that the expense is shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. Subsidies, tax deductions, etc.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the court must take into account any

subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit relating to the expense. Universal child care benefit

(4) In determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the court shall not take into account any universal child care benefit or any eligibility to claim that benefit. [ 40 ] As noted by the authors Payne and Payne in Child Support Guidelines in Canada , 2022,

section 7 of the Guidelines gives the Court the discretion to order payment of an amount over and above the regular table amount. The expenses must be proven to be "special" or "extraordinary" in some way. The authors provide the following helpful comments at pages 267 and 269: …Section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines gives the court the discretion to order payment of an amount over and above the regular table amount. However, in order to quality for a

section 7 order, the expenses must be proven to be “special” or “extraordinary” in some way. This is because the basic table amounts of child support are designed to cover all the “ordinary” costs of raising a child. Food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities are all ordinary, as are many educational, extracurricular, and recreational expenses.

Recreational sports and other similar extracurricular activities such as dance lessons, community sports leagues, ski trips, etc., will not generally qualify as special or extraordinary expenses unless the child’s participation goes beyond that of an ordinary child. “Special,” as distinct from “extraordinary”, expenses are generally added more or less as a routine matter, provided that they are not unreasonably high, but controversy can arise with respect to the “ necessity” for a child to be engaged in extracurricular activities.

Section 7 of the Guidelines is not presumptive; it indicates that a court may on either spouse’s request provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the expenses enumerated, which expenses may be estimated taking into account the necessity of the expenses in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expenses in relation to means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to separation. The onus is on the parent seeking a contribution to plead and prove the expense.

Although expenses may be estimated, there must be some cogent evidence of a particular expense. … Although child are expenses, medical and dental insurance, health-related expenses, and post-secondary educational expenses need not be extraordinary under sections 7(1) (a), (b), (

c) and (

e) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines in order to warrant a judicial allocation, expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any educational programs that meet a child’s particular needs under section 7(1) (

d) of the Guidelines and expenses for extracurricular activities under section 7(1) (

f) of the Guidelines must be extraordinary in order to be allowable. All expenses, however, must meet the tests of necessity and reasonableness set out in section 7(1) of the Guidelines. The onus falls on the applicant who seeks special or extraordinary expenses under

section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines to prove that the expenses are necessary in relation to the child’s best interests and reasonable having regard to the parental financial circumstances. [ 41 ] The exp ense must fall into one of the categories found in

section 7 of the Guidelines and the list is exhaustive. Justice Daigle provides the following helpful

summary in J.A.R. and M.R.R. 2019 NBQB 303 at paragraph 68 : [ 68 ] Therefore, to summarize, the expense must fall into one of the categories of expenses found in

section 7. This list is exhaustive: See Sinha v. Sharma , 2018 NBQB 11 at para. 153 . The expense must be both “necessary” (in relation to the child’s best interests) and “reasonable” (in relation to the financial means of the parents (and, where appropriate, the child)as well as the family’s spending patterns prior to separation). In addition, if the expense is one listed under subsection (

d) or (f) -educational programs or extracurricular activities -- the party claiming the expense must prove that they are “extraordinary” (as that term is defined at ss. 7(1.1) of the Guidelines). [ 42 ] P.D. provided a detailed list of expenses and numerous receipts. However, most of the expenses claimed do not fall into one of the categories found in

section 7 of the Guidelines . [ 43 ] M.D. does not dispute the expenses were made. He concedes the guiding principle that the expenses are to be shared in proportion to the respective incomes of the parents, after deducting from the expenses the contribution, if any, from the children. He does not take issue with the retroactive claim to 2018. Still, the expenses do need to fall into one of the categories found in

section 7 of the Guidelines . That is because t he basic table amounts of child support are designed to cover all the ordinary costs of raising a child.

Health andDental Sports School Cell PhoneCarInsurance DriverExam/Permit2018 $991 $3220 $1133 $2380 2019 $2969 $2835 $307 $3105 $660 $3002020 $3837 $1835 $800 $3700 $660 $4182021 $1097 $4290 $1405 $5502022 $1026 $2087 $1470 $2129 $1202023 $655 $165 $813 TOTAL $10575 $14267 $3875 $13532 $1260 $1388 [44] The following expenses do not fall into one of the categories found in

section 7: allowance for the children, haircuts, towtruck, expenses related to graduation, tires, gas, mattress, and Christmas shopping. I decline to make an order in regards to thoseexpenses. [45] P.D. says she bought clothing and groceries for W., who resides primarily with M.D. She says she has continued to pay forthese expenses because she wanted W. to have the same lifestyle as his brothers who were living with her and these should therefore beshared. Food and clothing are ordinary costs of raising a child.

While P.D. may have purchased items for W., recall that the partiesresolved the issue of child support to July 1, 2023. I decline to make an order with respect to clothing and groceries expenses. [46] At the request of the Court, P.D. provided a revised list of expenses. Her revised claim is as follows: [47] With respect to car insurance,driver training, exams and permit, thesedo not fall into one of the categoriesfound in

section 7 of the Guidelines.The evidence does not lead me toconclude that these expenses are“special” or “extraordinary” in someway. I decline to provide for an amountto cover all or any portion of theseexpenses. [48] Also, cellphone expenses do not fall into one of the categories found in

section 7 of the Guidelines (BNM v PJM 2017 SKQB331 at paragraph 158.) I decline to provide for an amount to cover cellphone expenses. Health and Dental [49] M.D. concedes that the health and dental expenses in the amount of $10,575 fall into the categories found in

section 7 of theGuidelines. I order that they be shared by the parties pro-rata of their respective incomes. [50] P.D. also seeks contribution for the Blue Cross premiums and says that M.D.’s share is $1750. Her evidence is that thedifference between the family plan and the personal plan is equivalent to a 2.9% increase. Her calculations are based on information shereceived verbally from her employer and is an estimation. The 2.9% increase is the cost for the last two years and she applied the samepercentage for the previous years.

She then applied 40% of the 2.9% increase in costs to calculate M.D.’s share. [51] M.D. is not disputing it is a valid claim but submits there is a lack of evidence that the 2.9% increase is a proper and correctamount. However, as noted in M.R. v. J.R., 2018 NBCA 12 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 104,

section 7 of the Guidelines allows theCourt to order an amount to cover all or any portion of specific expenses, which expenses may be estimated. I am satisfied with theevidence and that the estimated amount of $1750, being M.D.’s share of the increase in costs for the Blue Cross premiums since 2018, tothe date of trial, is reasonable and appropriate. [52] M.D. shall pay to P.D. his share of the Blue Cross premiums commencing July 1, 2023. He shall also pay his share of theBlue Cross premiums to the date of trial which is $1750.

School [53] M.D. concedes the expenses in the amount of $3875 related to school is an extraordinary expense for primary or secondaryschool education and fall into one of the categories found in

section 7 of the Guidelines. I order that it be shared by the parties pro-rataof their respective incomes. Sports

[54] P.D. requests that expenses of $14 267 related to sports be determined to be extraordinary expenses. [55] To determine whether an extracurricular activity qualifies as an extraordinary expense, the Court must examine the necessityof the expense in relation to the child’s best interests, the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouse and thoseof the child and to the family’s spending pattern before separation, and whether the expenses claimed is extraordinary (J.A.R. andM.R.R. 2019 NBQB 303, at para. 84.) [56] The fees incurred as a result of participation in community sports by the children generally do not qualify as extraordinaryexpenses (M.D. and C.M., 2023 NBKB 121, at paragraph 114). [57] In relation to extraordinary expenses, Justice O’Connell provides a useful

summary in the decision of Simone v Van Nuys,2021 ONCJ 652 at paragraphs 151 to 157 as follows: 151 An order for contribution to special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Guidelines is discretionary as to both entitlementand amount: Julien Payne and Marilyn Payne, Child Support Guidelines in Canada, 2009, Irwin Law (Toronto), p. 227, 231. 152 Where the expense is not within the means of the parties, the court may limit or deny recovery of that amount. Ebrahim v.Ebrahim, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2039 (SCJ); L.H.M.K. v. B.P.K. 2012 BCSC 435 , [2012] B.C.J. 593 (SCJ). 153 In Titova v. Titov 2012 ONCA 864 CanLII, the Court of Appeal for Ontario explained the following in awarding

section 7 expenses:In awarding s. 7 special and extraordinary expenses, the trial judge calculates each party's income for child support purposes, determineswhether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of s. 7 of the Guidelines, determines whether the claimedexpenses are necessary "in relation to the child's best interests" and are reasonable "in relation to the means of the spouses and those ofthe child and to the family's spending pattern prior to the separation." If the expenses fall under s. 7(1)(

d) or (

f) of the Guidelines, thetrial judge determines whether the expenses are "extraordinary". Finally, the court considers what amount, if any, the child shouldreasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then applies any tax deductions or credits. 154 The list of special and extraordinary expenses under clauses 7(1) (

a) to (

f) is exhaustive. If a claim does not fall within any of thelisted categories, then it must be dismissed. See Kilrea v. Kilrea (1998), 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 952, [1998] O.J. No. 3677, 75 O.T.C.269, 1998 CarswellOnt 3652 (Ont. Gen. Div.) 155 The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of thecategories under

section 7 and that the expenses are necessary and reasonable, having regard to the parental financial circumstances.See Park v. Thompson, , 77 O.R. (3d) 601, 197 O.A.C. 158, 252 D.L.R. (4th) 730, 13 R.F.L. (6th) 415, [2005] O.J.No. 1695, 2005 CarswellOnt 1632 (Ont. C.A.); Kase v. Bazinet, 2011 ONCJ 718, at paragraph 39. 156 Expenses for usual or ordinary extracurricular activities for a particular family are included in the table amount of support and arenot considered extraordinary expenses under clause 7(1)(

f) of the Guidelines. See Smith v. Smith (1997), 75 A.C.W.S. (3d) 703, [1997]O.J. No. 4833, 48 O.T.C. 316, 1997 CarswellOnt 4493 (Ont. Gen. Div.), paragraph [14] and [16]; D'Urzo v. D'Urzo (2002), (ON SC), 30 R.F.L. (5th) 277, [2002] O.J. No. 2415, [2002] O.T.C. 419, 2002 CarswellOnt 2104 (Ont. S.C.); Park v.Thompson, supra; Zimmerman v. Doe, , 159 A.C.W.S. (3d) 407, [2007] O.J. No. 2896, 2007 CarswellOnt 4721 (Ont.S.C.); Kase v.

Bazinet, 2011 ONCJ 718 (O.C.J.). 157 It is also clear from the case law that a custodial parent does not have carte blanche to enrol a child in any number of extra-curricular activities and then to look to the non-custodial parent to share all of the costs without consultation. See Forrester v.Forrester, , 73 A.C.W.S. (3d) 479, 11 O.F.L.R. 61, [1997] O.J. No. 3437, 1997 CarswellOnt 3212 (Ont. Fam. Ct.),paragraph [4];Zimmerman v. Doe, supra. [58] The expenses claimed by P.D. are mostly related to hockey and ball and include the costs of travel for hotels and meals whileattending tournaments.

It also includes the purchase of equipment, for example, boxing gloves, and weights. [59] The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses are necessary andreasonable, having regard to the parental financial circumstances. Expenses for usual or ordinary extracurricular activities for aparticular family are included in the table amount of support and are not considered extraordinary expenses. [60] M.D. submits that their financial situation was terrible and changes needed to occur when they separated. M.D. says it wassimply not an expense he could afford.

He also says P.D. was not informing him of the expenses. I note the evidence of P.D. that after awhile, because there was no response from M.D., she stopped communicating with him. [61] P.D. submits to keep the children involved in sports was in their best interests, particularly for J. who struggles with anxiety. Hockey is an outlet for him. I don’t doubt that being involved in extracurricular activities, such as hockey, is beneficial to the children. I

also recognize that the children were playing hockey prior to separation and participated in tournaments as well. [ 62 ] However, I am not convinced in light of the evidence that it is an extraordinary expense. I am not convinced that it falls outside of the usual or ordinary extracurricular activities. [ 63 ] In the circumstances, I decline to make an order for extracurricular activities pursuant to

section 7 of the Guidelines . Conclusion – Special and extraordinary expenses [ 64 ] With respect to special and extraordinary expenses, I order as follows based on parties' income:

a) M.D. shall pay 39% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 61% of the special and extraordinary expenses commencing July 1, 2023.

b) M.D. shall pay 39% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 61% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the period of January 1, 2023, to June 30, 2023, and the total amount is $820.

c) M.D. shall pay 35.7% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 62.3% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2022 and the total amount is $2496.

d) M.D. shall pay 35.7% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 64.3% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2021 and the total amount is $1097.

e) M.D. shall pay 32.1% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 67.9% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2020 and the total amount is $4637.

f) M.D. shall pay 32.4 % of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 67.6% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2019 and the total amount is $3276.

g) M.D. shall pay 35.5% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 64.5% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2018 and the total amount is $2124. [ 65 ] M.D. shall pay to P.D. his share of the Blue Cross premiums commencing July 1, 2023. He shall also pay his share of the Blue Cross premiums to the date of trial which is $1750.

Spousal Support [ 66 ] The Court may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay, as the Court thinks reasonable, for the support of the other spouse pursuant to the Divorce Act . [ 67 ] The Act also provides that in making a spousal support order, the Court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and provides as follows at paragraphs 15.2 (4) and 15.2 (6) :

(4) In making a spousal support order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including: (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabitated; (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and aboveany obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [68] The objectives of the Divorce At reflect the diverse dynamics of the many unique marital relationships. There is no hard andfast rule. The Court must look at all the factors in the light of the objectives of support, and exercise discretion in a manner that equitablyalleviates the adverse consequences of the marriage breakdown. [69] In Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with entitlement tospousal support.

There are three bases for entitlement to spousal support; compensatory, contractual, and non-compensatory support. Asnoted in paragraph 34 of the decision, the Divorce Act and the provincial statutes are intended to deal with the economic consequences ofthe marriage breakdown for both parties. The following passages found in paragraphs 35, 36, 38 , 39 and 41 are relevant: 35 Moge, supra, sets out the method to be followed in determining a support dispute.

The starting point is the objectives which theDivorce Act stipulates the support order should serve: (1) recognition of economic advantage or disadvantage arising from the marriageor its breakdown; (2) apportionment of the financial burden of child care; (3) relief of economic hardship arising from the breakdown ofthe marriage, and (4) promotion of the economic self-sufficiency of the spouses: s. 15.2(6). No single objective is paramount; all must beborne in mind.

The objectives reflect the diverse dynamics of the many unique marital relationships. 36 Against the background of these objectives the court must consider the factors set out in s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act. Generally, thecourt must look at the "condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse". This balancing includes, but is not limited to,the length of cohabitation, the functions each spouse performed, and any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support. Dependingon the circumstances, some factors may loom larger than others.

In cases where the extent of the economic loss can be determined,compensatory factors may be paramount. On the other hand, "in cases where it is not possible to determine the extent of the economicloss of a disadvantaged spouse . . . the court will consider need and standard of living as the primary criteria together with the ability to pay of the other party": Ross v.Ross (1995), (NB CA), 168 N.B.R. (2d) 147 (C.A.), at p. 156, per Bastarache J.A. (as he then was). There is no hardand fast rule.

The judge must look at all the factors in the light of the stipulated objectives of support and exercise his or her discretion ina manner that equitably alleviates the adverse consequences of the marriage breakdown. (…) 38 The contractual or consensual basis for support finds its source in s. 89(1)(

b) of the Family Relations Act, which counsels courts to"hav[e] regard to . . . (

b) an express or implied agreement between the spouses that one has the responsibility to support and maintain theother", and s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act ("In making an order under subsection (1) . . ., the court shall take into consideration . . . (

c) anyorder, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse"). Consensual considerations may either create or negate anobligation to support, under appropriate circumstances. 39 The compensatory basis for support finds its source in a number of factors mentioned in the statutes. In the British Columbia FamilyRelations Act, these include s. 89(1)(

a) and (d). "[T]he role of each spouse in their family" embraces the contributions made by thespouses to the family for which compensation may be appropriate on the collapse of the marriage. Similarly, "the ability and capacity of... either or both spouses to support themselves" permits a court to examine whether spouses have foregone opportunities to develop theability to support themselves because of the marriage or have been rendered less able to support themselves by adverse effects of themarriage or the marriage breakdown.

"[C]ustodial obligations respecting a child" (Family Relations Act, s. 89(1)(c)) may relate tocompensation. While spousal support is distinct from child support, the need to care for children has an impact on factors relevant tospousal support.

Under the Divorce Act, compensation arguments can be grounded in the need to consider the "condition" of the spouse;the "means, needs and other circumstances" of the spouse, which may encompass lack of ability to support oneself due to foregoingcareer opportunities during the marriage; and "the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation", which may support thesame argument. In sum, these compensatory statutory provisions can be seen to embrace the independent, clean-break model of marriageand marriage breakdown. (…)

Section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act, which sets out the objectives of support orders, also speaks to these non-compensatory factors.The first two objectives -- to recognize the economic consequences of the marriage or its breakdown and to apportion between thespouses financial consequences of child care over and above child support payments -- are primarily related to compensation. But thethird and fourth objectives are difficult to confine to that goal.

"[E]conomic hardship . . . arising from the breakdown of the marriage" iscapable of encompassing not only health or career disadvantages arising from the marriage breakdown properly the subject ofcompensation (perhaps more directly covered in s. 15.2(6)(a): see Payne on Divorce, supra, at pp. 251-53), but the mere fact that aperson who formerly enjoyed intra-spousal entitlement to support now finds herself or himself without it. Looking only at compensation,one merely asks what loss the marriage or marriage breakup caused that would not have been suffered but for the marriage.

But evenwhere loss in this sense cannot be established, the breakup may cause economic hardship in a larger, non-compensatory sense. Such aninterpretation supports the independent inclusion of s. 15.2(6)(

c) as a separate consideration from s. 15.2(6)(a). Thus, Rogerson sees s.15.2(6)(c), "the principle of compensation for the economic disadvantages of the marriage breakdown as distinct from the disadvantagesof the marriage", as an explicit recognition of "non-compensatory" support ("Spousal Support After Moge", supra, at pp. 371-72(emphasis in original)). [70] In his decision of B.S.W. v. W.F.W., 2023 BCSC 1925, Justice Verhoeven provides a useful

summary of applicable principlesat paragraph 178: [178] In McGrail v. McGrail, 2016 BCSC 104, I stated: [96] All of the factors referred to in s. 15.2(4) and all four of the objectives under s. 15.2(6) must be taken into account. No singleobjective is paramount. The four objectives set out in s. 15.2(6) can be viewed as an attempt to achieve an equitable sharing of theeconomic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown: Moge v. Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 [Moge]. [97]

Section 161 of the FLA is substantially the same as s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act. [98] The relevant principles regarding spousal support were reviewed and summarized by Madam Justice Rowles, for theCourt, in Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507 at paras. 45 to 61.

Madam Justice Rowles at para. 47 states that the Supreme Court ofCanada has identified three grounds for entitlement to spousal support: (1) compensatory support, which primarily relates to the first twoobjectives of the Divorce Act; (2) non-compensatory support, which primarily relates to the third and fourth objectives; and (3)contractual support, citing Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 at paras. 15, 41-42. [99] With respect to orders for retroactive spousal support, in D.B.S. v.

S.R.G, 2006 SCC 37 , [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231 [D.B.S.]theSupreme Court of Canada states that in determining whether to make a retroactive award of child support, the court should strive for aholistic view of the matter and decide each case on the basis of its particular factual matrix: page 275-276. [100] In Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 , [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269 [Kerr] the Supreme Court stated that while D.B.S. was concernedwith child as opposed to spousal support, similar considerations are also relevant to deciding the suitability of a "retroactive" award ofspousal support.

Specifically, these factors are the needs of the recipient, the conduct of the payor, the reason for the delay in seekingsupport and any hardship the retroactive award may occasion on the payor spouse. However, in spousal support cases, these factors mustbe considered and weighed in light of the different legal principles and objectives that underpin spousal as compared with childsupport; Kerr, para. 207.

Nonetheless, the same flexibility and regard for a holistic view of the matter on its merits is appropriate in thecase of retroactive spousal support: Kerr, para. 212. [71] The Spousal Advisory Guidelines, while not binding, are helpful in arriving at a sensible range of support. The Guidelines donot deal with entitlement and deal only with amount and duration after entitlement has been found. Entitlement is a threshold issue to bedetermined before the Guidelines apply. [72] I need to first determine if there is entitlement to support.

If there is entitlement, I then need to determine the amount andduration of support. [73] M.D. seeks support on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. He does not seek support on a contractual basis. In theSpousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide, 2016, the authors' Professors Carol Rogerson and Rollie Thompson,provide a

summary of the principles of entitlement with respect to compensatory claims and non-compensatory claims as follows: Compensatory claims are based either on the recipient’s economic loss or disadvantage as a result of the roles adopted during themarriage or on the recipient’s conferral of an economic benefit on the payor without adequate compensation.

Common markers of compensatory claims include: being home with the children full-time or part-time, being a "secondary earner",having primary care of the children after separation, moving for the payor’s career, supporting the payor’s education or training; andworking primarily in a family business. Non-compensatory claims involved claims based on need. “Need” can mean an inability to meet basic needs, but it has also generallybeen interpreted to cover a significant decline in standard of living from the marital standard.

Non-compensatory support reflects theeconomic interdependency that develops as a result of a shared life, including significant elements of reliance and expectation, summed

up in the phrase "merger over time". Common markers of non-compensatory claims include: the length of the relationship, the drop in standard of living for the claimant after separation, and economic hardship experiences by the claimant. [ 74 ] The authors also note that it is an error to find no compensatory entitlement simply because the claimant worked throughout the marriage. There may still have been a career loss.

Compensatory entitlement can be based on the economic advantage of an uninterrupted career enjoyed by one spouse as a result of the other spouse’s assumption of a disproportionate share of child care responsibilities. [ 75 ] M.D. and P.D. were married for more than 20 years. They had significant financial struggles.

They did not enjoy a lavish lifestyle but they managed to take vacations to Prince Edward Island and Maine and the children were involved in some activities and they played hockey. [ 76 ] P.D. is a pharmacist and has worked in that capacity since 1993, other than parental leaves when the children were born. Her income has always been significantly higher than M.D.’s. [ 77 ] M.D.’s employment background is as follows. He started working at a pharmacy in 1989. His first job was in receiving and he worked his way to being front store manager in 2001, a position he left in 2006.

At that time, he had worked in a pharmacy since 1989 and for almost 18 years. He testified his qualifications are mostly experience gained throughout the years. [ 78 ] In 2006 he went on a sick leave for a period of 6 weeks. At that time, the children’s ages were 8, 6, 2, and 1. He wanted to remain on a leave for a longer period but his employer did not agree and he resigned. He found his job stressful; he had high blood pressure and he testified he was trying to do a good job and be a father to four young children. Then, as time passed, he became depressed and did not want to return to work.

He did return to work in February 2014. [ 79 ] The evidence of P.D. and M.D. varies with respect to the functions they each performed while M.D. was unemployed. It is necessary to make a credibility assessment. As Justice Ferguson noted in L.R. v. A.R. , 2015 NBQB 213 , at paragraph 73 : 73. In assessing credibility, the general rule should be that in order for testimony or evidence to become or assist in producing a finding of fact or facts, it must bear the marks of plausibility, harmony with other testimony or evidence and inherent likelihood thus according with reason and common sense.

These are the touchstones from which the cogency of the testimony or evidence is derived. [ 80 ] M.D.’s evidence is that when he was not working, he took over “more or less a lot of the roles” such as getting the children ready for the day, driving them to and from school and to sporting activities. He says he was cooking supper every night and trying to get the laundry done before P.D. would arrive home from work. He said they both shared the bedtime routines. [ 81 ] P.D.’s evidence is that M.D.’s decision to stop working was not a family decision. She says she remained the primary care giver.

She became on duty when she arrived home from work and continued to be responsible for making the various appointments. She says she dealt with the finances, looked after registering the children for activities and she booked the doctors and dentist appointments. She says she took the children to school and she volunteered at school. The children were calling her at work and she says she was running the household from work. Still, she concedes that M.D. took the children to activities and that he did work around the house.

She said he kept an immaculate lawn. [ 82 ] It is undisputed that as the parties struggled to survive financially on one salary, P.D. worked two jobs for a period of time. Sometimes, she worked 12 days without a day off. She would take on extra shifts and, because she would leave the vehicle with M.D., she was relying on a co-worker to drive her to work which meant she needed to leave earlier in the morning and arrived home late. [ 83 ] While I don’t doubt that P.D. remained involved with the children, when M.D. was unemployed, I find her evidence that she remained the primary caregiver simply not plausible.

Her work

schedule simply did not allow for that. It is not realistic and lacks credibility. I prefer the evidence of M.D. that during the period he was off work, he took “more or less a lot of the roles”.

[ 84 ] P.D. says that M.D. did not like his job and that he asked for a medical note. She says she encouraged him to go back to school. She says he did not want to work weekends or nights, he did not know what type of job he would like and he felt overqualified. She suggests that M.D. should have used his unemployed years to retrain. However, recall that when M.D. left his employment in 2006, the children’s ages were 8, 6, 2 and 1. His evidence is that he was trying to do a good job and be a father to four young children at the same.

He said it was easier when he was home. [ 85 ] M.D.’s career was interrupted while he was unemployed. While he is doing the same job today that he was doing when he stopped working in 2006, this was not so when he re-entered the workforce in 2014. He then returned to work in receiving where he had started in 1989. He had to, again, work his way to the front store manager position which he has now held since 2021. This took him another five years. Also, his evidence is that his period of unemployment has impacted his career advancement.

He adds that the current district manager has been in that position for about six or seven years. [ 86 ] M.D. and P.D. separated on January 29, 2016, but remained in the same house until February 2018. They continued to share expenses until that time. As their financial situation was precarious, the bank foreclosed on the marital home in February 2018. [ 87 ] When they left the marital home, M.D.’s circumstances were such that he was able to immediately secure a two-bedroom apartment which is where he still resides today. [ 88 ] His income today is significantly more than his 2018 income.

In the year 2022, his annual income was $64,842 and, in 2018, his income was $39,580. Also, he concedes he has a budget with a surplus each month. In his Financial Statement dated November 29, 2020, he reports a monthly surplus of $280.62. His Financial Statement dated March 15, 2021, shows that he reported a monthly surplus of $117. [ 89 ] P.D. declared bankruptcy in 2018. She had a drop of income that year and reported $72,061. For the year 2022, she shows an increase in income because of retroactive pay.

Her evidence is that for the year 2023, her annual income is $101,491. [ 90 ] When she left the marital home, it took her a few months to get organized but she moved into a friend’s cottage which has four bedrooms. She does not pay rent. She acknowledges she had a long weekend getaway in Ottawa but says it was paid for by her sister. She also says the vehicle she drives belongs to her father. In her Financial Statement dated January 21, 2021, she reports a monthly deficit of $1110.12.

Her evidence is that she continues to run a deficit each month. [ 91 ] I have considered the totality of the evidence and the circumstances and, in my view, M.D. is entitled to support on a compensatory basis. The evidence has not convinced me that he is entitled to support on a non-compensatory basis. [ 92 ] Having determined that M.D. is entitled to support, I now need to determine the amount and duration of support. [ 93 ] M.D. asks that an order for support commence in February 2018, which coincides when the bank foreclosed on the marital home.

M.D. filed his Application in December 2020, almost two years after they started living in separate households and completely severed the sharing of expenses. He provided no evidence to explain why he did not file his application sooner. I don’t have evidence that P.D.’s conduct was blameworthy with respect to disclosure or otherwise. I also note the parties have reached an agreement with respect to child support up to July 1, 2023.

I am cognizant that P.D. continues to report a monthly deficit and that a retroactive award will have an impact and may be difficult for her to absorb. [ 94 ] In light of the circumstances, and taking a holistic view of the matter, I decline to make an order for spousal support commencing in February 2018.

The Notice of Application was filed on December 9, 2020, and I order spousal support to commence on January 1, 2021. [ 95 ] The DivorceMate software provides the following ranges for spousal support per month using the “with child support” formula for an indefinite (unspecified) duration: Low Mid High 2021 104 324 554

2022 143 417 684 2023 0 283 609 [ 96 ] I find it is reasonable in the circumstances to make an award in the low-range. I also find it reasonable and appropriate to order time limited support and I do not believe a review period is appropriate. [ 97 ] In the decision of M.R. and J.R. , 2018 NBCA 12 , Justice Baird provided helpful comments on time limited spousal support as follows: [65] It is generally accepted that a fixed term is inappropriate where the payee’s ability to attain economic self-sufficiency is uncertain and where the court has found strong compensatory reasons exist.

In the case at bar, this was a medium-term marriage where the wife was financially dependent on her husband for her support. The trial judge found entitlement based on both compensatory and non- compensatory factors. By the time of trial, M.R. had found part-time employment, but there were no significant assets left from the marriage, as there were in S.C. [66] Larlee J.A. concludes the following in S.C .: "I favour the approach taken in the most recent cases to review the self-sufficiency of the payee after three years" (para.15). I agree. The parameters for such a review were discussed in Arsenault v.

Arsenault , 2002 NBCA 101 , 254 N.B.R. (2d) 190 ; and, Bourque v. Bourque , 2004 NBCA 60 , 274 N.B.R. (2d) 72 . See Leskun , where the Supreme Court framed the analysis for variations as contrasted with reviews pursuant to s. 17 of the Divorce Act . [67] Time limited spousal support should only be ordered when a trial judge is satisfied, from a clear evidentiary foundation, the goals and objectives of s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act will have been met within the time frame specified in the order. Reasons need to demonstrate the SSAG were considered, applied, or, if not applied, the reasons why. See MacLean v.

MacLean , 2004 NBCA 75 , 274 N.B.R. (2d) 90 ; S.C ., at paras. 14-15; Smith , at paras. 34-36. [ 98 ] I am tasked with crafting a spousal support order that distributes the financial consequences of the marriage and its breakdown as equitably as possible between M.D. and P.D. [ 99 ] The objectives of a spousal order are found in paragraph 15.2 (6) of the Divorce Act . In my view, a time-limited spousal order allows for the objectives to be met. I find that four years is reasonable and appropriate. [ 100 ] M.D. has lived in the same apartment since February 2018, when the parties started living separate and apart.

I recognized his career has been impacted by being unemployed for approximately seven years. This, no doubt, has had some impact on career advancement. However, he has managed to reinstate his previous position, in 2021, as a front store manager. His income has significantly increased since 2018, with his annual income now being $64,842.

In my view, a support order of four years promotes his self- sufficiency, recognizes the economic disadvantages and helps relieve the economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the marriage and also apportions between the spouses the financial consequences arising from the care of the children. [ 101 ] The DivorceMate software suggested low-range amount, given the parties income for the year 2023 is zero, and in my view this is appropriate. Conclusion-Spousal Support [ 102 ] I therefore order spousal support as follows:

a) For the year 2021, P.D. shall pay support to M.D. of $1248 ($104 monthly * 12)

b) For the year 2022, P.D. shall pay support to M.D. of $1716 ($143 monthly * 12)

c) Commencing January 1, 2023, and continuing on the 1 st day of each month thereafter, the amount of spousal support is nil (0). The spousal support order terminates on December 31, 2024.

Division of Marital Property [ 103 ] The parties have resolved all of the issues as it relates to division of marital property and debts, including the division of pension benefits, except for three Registered Retirement Savings Plans. [ 104 ] P.D. says that M.D. withdrew from RRSP’s after the separation and claims 50% of the following amounts: 2016-$2973.00 2017 $2154.00 2018 $1400.00 [ 105 ] M.D. admits he withdrew money from RRSP’s towards the end of their marriage to pay for credit card bills that were used by both he and P.D.

There is no evidence to contradict his evidence in this regard. [ 106 ] The period between 2016 and 2018 was the period when the parties were separated but still living in the same household and sharing expenses, although, there is little evidence before the Court with respect to the sharing of expenses during that period of time. Evidently, the parties struggled financially as the bank foreclosed in February 2018. [ 107 ] In the circumstances, I decline to make an order with respect to the division of the three RRSPs.

COSTS [ 108 ] Rule 59 of the Rules of Court of New Brunswick provides the framework for awarding costs. The costs of a proceeding are in the discretion of the Court. The general rule with respect to costs is that the successful party is entitled to costs. [ 109 ] Rule 59.02 provides that in fixing costs, the Court may consider: (

a) the amount claimed and the amount recovered, (

b) the apportionment of liability, (

c) the complexity of the proceedings, (

d) the importance of the issues, (

e) the conduct of any party which tended to shorten or unnecessarily lengthen the duration of the proceeding, (

f) the manner in which the proceedings was conducted, (

g) any step in the proceeding which was improper, vexatious, prolix or unnecessary, (

h) any step in the proceeding which was taken through over-caution, negligence or mistake, (

i) the neglect or refusal of any party to make an admission which should have been made, (

j) whether or not two or more defendants or respondents should be allowed more than one set of costs, where they have defended the proceeding by different solicitors, or where, although they defended by the same solicitor, they separated unnecessarily in their defence, (

k) whether two or more plaintiffs, represented by the same solicitor, initiate separate actions unnecessarily, and (

l) any other matter relevant to the question of costs.

[ 110 ] M.D. argues that had P.D. retained a lawyer after he filed his Application, the matter might have been resolved. He also says that in assessing costs, the Court needs to consider that a significant portion of the record relates to the

section 7 of the Guidelines claim put forward by P.D. [ 111 ] A party to a proceeding may act in person and P.D. has chosen to do so. She has put forward a significant claim for expenses and submitted a voluminous record of receipts. Still, she did, at trial, acknowledge that many of the expenses did not fall under

section 7 of the Guidelines and provided a revised

summary of expenses claimed. Furthermore, the parties did resolve many of the issues prior to the start of the trial and both parties should be commended for that. [ 112 ] The result is a mixed one. Both parties were requesting child support. M.D. was successful on his claim for spousal support. P.D. was successful in recovering a portion of the expenses claimed. In the circumstances, I decline to make an award of costs. DISPOSITION [ 113 ] I make the following order:

a) An annual income of $64,842 for the Applicant father and $101,491 for the Respondent mother shall be used for the purposes of calculating child support and special and extraordinary expenses commencing July 1, 2023.

b) Pursuant to

section 15.1 of the Divorce Act and

section 8 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , P.D. shall pay child support of $315.00 commencing July 1, 2023, and continuing on the 1 st day of each month thereafter.

c) M.D. shall pay 39% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 61% of the special and extraordinary expenses commencing July 1, 2023.

d) M.D. shall pay 39% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 61% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the period of January 1, 2023, to June 30, 2023, and the total amount is $820.

e) M.D. shall pay 35.7% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 62.3% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2022 and the total amount is $2496.

f) M.D. shall pay 35.7% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 64.3% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2021 and the total amount is $1097.

g) M.D. shall pay 32.1% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 67.9% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2020 and the total amount is $4637.

h) M.D. shall pay 32.4 % of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 67.6% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2019 and the total amount is $3276.

i) M.D. shall pay 35.5% of the special and extraordinary expenses and P.D. shall pay 64.5% of the special and extraordinary expenses for the year 2018 and the total amount is $2124.

j) M.D. shall pay to P.D. his share of the Blue Cross premiums commencing July 1, 2023. He shall also pay his share of the Blue Cross premiums to the date of trial which is $1750.

k) For the year 2021, P.D. shall pay spousal support to M.D. of $1248.

l) For the year 2022, P.D. shall pay spousal support to M.D. of $1716.

m) Commencing January 1, 2023, and continuing on the 1 st day of each month thereafter, the amount of spousal support is nil (0). The spousal support order terminates on December 31, 2024.

n) I make no order with respect to the claim for the division of the RRPS’s.

o) I make no order as to costs. DATED at Saint John, New Brunswick, this 16 th day of November 2023.

__________________________________ Danie Roy Justice of the Court of King’s Bench New Brunswick, Family Division