2021 NBCA 19, 2021 NBCA 19

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 72-20-CA BRENDAN JOHN RUSSELL APPELLANT BRENDAN JOHN RUSSELL APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Russell v. R., 2021 NBCA 19 Russell c.

R., 2021 NBCA 19 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l’honorable juge Drapeau l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: July 3, 2020 (conviction) Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : le 3 juillet 2020 (déclaration de culpabilité) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: [2020] N.B.J.

No. 239 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : [2020] A.N.-B. n o 239 Appeal heard and judgment rendered: April 15, 2021 Appel entendu et jugement rendu : le 15 avril 2021 Reasons delivered: July 8, 2021 Motifs déposés : le 8 juillet 2021

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Drapeau Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Drapeau Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Thomas J. Burke, Q.C. For the respondent: Patrick McGuinty Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Thomas J. Burke, c.r. Pour l’intimée : Patrick McGuinty THE COURT After hearing counsel, the Court dismissed the appeal from the bench and revoked the appellant’s bail.

Simply put, reversal is not warranted on any of the bases put forward by the appellant, including verdict unreasonableness and misapplication of the rule in Browne v. Dunn , [1893] J.C.J. No. 5 (H.L. Eng.) (QL). Detailed reasons are provided in the accompanying text. LA COUR Après audition des avocats, la Cour a, séance tenante, rejeté l’appel et révoqué la mise en liberté sous caution de l’appelant. En termes simples, aucun des moyens mis de l’avant par l’appelant, y compris le caractère déraisonnable du verdict et l’application erronée de la règle établie dans Browne c. Dunn , [1893] J.C.J.

No. 5 (Ch. des lords) (QL), ne justifie l’infirmation de la décision. Des motifs détaillés sont donnés dans le texte qui suit. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DRAPEAU, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an appeal from conviction on a charge of theft of property with a value exceeding $5,000 ( s. 334 (

a) of the Criminal Code ). During the timeframe specified in the Information, the appellant was employed as a salesperson at MacLean Sports, a local family-owned retailer of power sports products, including snowmobiles. The prosecution’s theory at trial in Provincial Court was that the appellant stole cash deposits he received from snowmobile purchasers.

[ 2 ] Those purchasers testified for the prosecution, and the trial judge found they gave the appellant the cash deposits in question ($1,000 in one instance, $5,000 in the other). Moreover, the evidence from management at MacLean Sports, which the judge accepted, confirmed it did not receive the funds. Those findings, which are untainted by any palpable and overriding error, establish the deposits were stolen from MacLean Sports.

As a result, the only issue on appeal is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in concluding it was the appellant who stole the missing funds. [ 3 ] As will be seen, the case for the prosecution with respect to $3,000 of the deposits totalling $6,000 rested on direct evidence, and the case with respect to the other $3,000 depended on circumstantial evidence. A conviction for theft of the latter sum could be entered only if the appellant’s guilt in relation thereto was the sole reasonable inference to be drawn from the record.

The appellant testified in his own defence; he denied receiving the $1,000 cash deposit from one customer and asserted the other did not provide $5,000, but only $3,000, which the appellant delivered to a cashier for processing. The judge found the appellant’s exculpatory testimony was not credible and that, having regard to the totality of the evidence, the prosecution had established his guilt on the charge of theft of property with a value exceeding $5,000, as set out in the Information. [ 4 ] The appellant submits the judge’s adverse credibility findings result from a misapplication of the rule in Browne v.

Dunn , [1893] J.C.J. No. 5 (H.L. Eng.) (QL).

The appellant also contends the verdict cannot stand because: (1) the judge equated disbelief of his exculpatory testimony to circumstantial evidence of guilt; (2) the evidence is reasonably open to the inference that someone else stole the cash deposit ($3,000) he acknowledged receiving, and the verdict is unreasonable; and (3) the reasons for conviction fail to explain how the judge resolved significant “difficulties” with certain aspects of the testimony provided by the purchasers. [ 5 ] After considering the parties’ thorough written and oral submissions, we dismissed the appeal from the bench, with reasons to follow.

Concomitantly, we revoked the appellant’s bail. [ 6 ] My reasons for dismissing the appeal are set out in the text that follows. II. Evidential Record and Key Findings of Fact [ 7 ] The appellant’s last period of employment with MacLean Sports ran from October 2016 to January 14, 2019, at which time he quit and went to work for a local car dealership. It was the prosecution’s theory at trial that, during the last four months of this timeframe, cash deposits totalling $6,000 provided by two customers were entrusted to the appellant for remittance to MacLean Sports, and he stole them.

Brian MacLean, the founder and owner, testified no other cash deposit had gone missing and been unaccounted for in the store’s 45-year history. The appellant did not provide the customers with a cashier’s receipt for the cash he acknowledged receiving. In each case, he prepared a “deal sheet” that purported to specify the deposit actually paid.

On the judge’s findings of fact, one deal sheet correctly identified the deposit paid as $3,000 and thus contradicted a key feature of the appellant’s exculpatory testimony; the other understated by $2,000 the deposit paid and overstated by $3,000 the deposit on record with MacLean Sports. A. The policy pertaining to cash deposits [ 8 ] The accounting at MacLean Sports is computerized. Mr. MacLean described its software system as “state of the art”. Receipts for cash are generated by the store’s computer system and are issued by a cashier in the parts department.

The receipt identifies the transaction, the sum received, the customer and the cashier who received the payment. When a cash receipt is produced through the store computer, there is a verifiable record of the payment. When issued by a cashier, such a receipt cannot be changed by the salesperson. A deal sheet is prepared by the salesperson. When completed, a snowmobile deal sheet identifies, among other things, the particular transaction, the salesperson, the purchaser, the snowmobile in question, the total sale price, the deposit and the balance to be financed.

Unlike a cashier’s receipt, a deal sheet may show a deposit that does not match the deposit actually paid. The deal sheet form provides for both the purchaser’s and the manager’s signature. In the two instances detailed in the record, the purchaser signed the deal sheet, but the manager did not. [ 9 ] The evidence is inconsistent regarding the store’s policy for cash deposits on the purchase of snowmobiles. According to Jennifer MacLean, MacLean Sports’ general manager, salespeople were not authorized to take cash.

She explained cash payments were to be taken by the customer to a cashier in the parts department “so that the customer can be provided with an actual receipt”. Jamie Doiron, a salesman at MacLean Sports for 15 years, testified cash deposits were taken by either the salesperson

or the customer to a cashier for processing. According to Mr. Doiron, salespeople did not provide receipts for cash, as that was a cashier’s responsibility. If the cashiers were busy, the salespeople had to wait to get a receipt for any cash. Chad McGarity, a witness called by the defence, worked in sales at MacLean Sports, but quit well before the theft of the deposits took place. He explained that, while he worked at MacLean Sports, cash deposits were, on occasion, taken by the salesperson to a cashier.

The appellant testified it was his understanding that salespeople were authorized to take cash from customers and remit the funds to a cashier. When the cashiers were busy, the cash could be left on the counter for a cashier to process later. [ 10 ] The trial judge did not determine what was permitted under the store policy, if any, pertaining to cash deposits. Evidently, and correctly in my view, he considered any such determination was beside the central point.

On the judge ’s findings of fact, the appellant took the cash deposits in both instances ($1,000 and $5,000), a cashier did not produce a receipt and MacLean Sports did not receive the funds. As mentioned, in each case, the appellant provided the customer with a deal sheet that purported to indicate, among other things, the deposit actually paid. B. The first missing cash deposit ($1,000) [ 11 ] Jason Hill, 46, testified that, on October 4, 2018, he agreed to purchase a snowmobile from MacLean Sports. To that end, he provided the appellant with a deposit of $3,000. In direct examination, Mr.

Hill testified the whole deposit was in cash. On cross-examination, defence counsel confronted Mr. Hill with his previous statement that $2,000 out of the $3,000 deposit had been paid by way of charges on a debit and a credit card. In his response, Mr. Hill essentially acknowledged that may have been the case, adding, however, “the $1,000 cash must have disappeared then”. [ 12 ] On direct examination, Mr. Hill stated the appellant left his office with the $3,000 in cash. Mr. Hill assumed it was taken to a cashier for processing. When the appellant returned, he provided a deal sheet, which Mr.

Hill signed, confirming a deposit of $3,000, with the balance of the purchase price to be financed. The document was received in evidence as Exhibit #2. As will be seen, MacLean Sports’ computer records showed a deposit of only $2,000. However, Mr. Hill was not made aware of the discrepancy until later. [ 13 ] After taking delivery of the snowmobile, Mr. Hill experienced significant problems with its operation and, as a result of his complaints, MacLean Sports agreed to replace it. By this time, the appellant was no longer part of its sales force. Ms. MacLean testified the business’ computer records showed Mr.

Hill provided a deposit of only $2,000 in October 2018, none of which was in cash. The deposit discrepancy between Exhibit #2 and the store’s records came to light in the course of setting the financing arrangement for the substitute snowmobile. At that time, Mr. Hill was made aware the store records showed a deposit of only $2,000. He objected, insisting he made a $3,000 deposit as confirmed by Exhibit #2. MacLean Sports eventually accepted Mr.

Hill’s account and absorbed the loss of $1,000 by closing the transaction for the substitute snowmobile on the basis of a $3,000 deposit. [ 14 ] In his testimony, the appellant asserted Mr. Hill made a $2,000 deposit, thereby contradicting not only Mr. Hill’s evidence on the point but, as well, Exhibit #2, the deal sheet the appellant prepared. He offered the following explanation for the reference to a deposit of $3,000 in Exhibit #2. Mr. Hill initially wanted to put $2,000 down and finance the balance of the purchase price. Shortly before attending the store to execute the purchase documents, Mr.

Hill called to advise he wished to increase the down payment to $3,000. The appellant then prepared Exhibit #2. However, according to the appellant, Mr. Hill changed his mind, reverting to a $2,000 deposit. The appellant’s explanation for Exhibit #2, which, as noted, bears Mr. Hill’s signature and refers to a deposit of $3,000, is that he must have used the wrong deal sheet. This version of events was not put to Mr. Hill on cross-examination by defence counsel, which, I hasten to point out, is not counsel for the appellant in these proceedings. C.

The second missing cash deposit ($5,000) [ 15 ] In April 2018, Bradley Keilty, 53, agreed to purchase a new snowmobile from MacLean Sports. He provided a $2,000 cash deposit to the appellant, and agreed to pay the balance before the winter. The store’s computer system shows the appellant remitted the cash to Bobby Doiron, a store cashier. However, the appellant did not provide Mr. Keilty with a receipt for the $2,000 deposit or a deal sheet confirming its payment; Mr. Keilty and the appellant simply shook hands on the deal. Before leaving, Mr.

Keilty told the appellant he would try to make further payments over the summer and pay the balance “before the snow flew”. [ 16 ] When Mr. Keilty failed to make any further payments during the summer and fall, the appellant called him to press for action. Mr. Keilty returned to the store on December 19, 2018, at which time, according to his testimony, he handed $5,000 in cash to the appellant for processing. Mr. Keilty testified the appellant took the cash deposit to another location in the store and returned with Exhibit #1.

The appellant did not provide a cashier’s receipt for the $5,000, or for any other sum for that matter.

Mr. Keilty left after the appellant gave him Exhibit #1. This deal sheet was signed by Mr. Keilty. On cross-examination, defence counsel suggested the second deposit was for only $3,000, to which Mr. Keilty responded: “No, I gave $5,000 the second time”. When confronted with Exhibit #1, the deal sheet he signed that showed a total deposit of only $5,000, Mr. Keilty insisted he paid $7,000. When asked why he would sign a document “that was $2,000 short”, Mr. Keilty stated: “I don’t know. I guess I wasn’t paying much attention that day”. On re-direct, Mr.

Keilty confirmed the appellant did not review with him the contents of Exhibit #1; the appellant was busy with another customer and Mr. Keilty signed the document without close examination, just before leaving the premises. [ 17 ] On January 14, 2019, the appellant quit his job at MacLean Sports. When Mr. Keilty called MacLean Sports a few days later, he was informed the appellant no longer worked there and Jamie Doiron was responsible for his snowmobile transaction. Later that day, Mr. Keilty attended at the store, intending to make a further $5,000 payment on account.

At that time, he learned the store records showed a deposit of only $2,000. Mr. Keilty protested, insisting he paid $7,000. Mr. Doiron declined the offer of a further deposit, preferring to wait until the matter of the deposit previously paid was sorted out. Mr. Keilty returned home, found his “receipt” for $5,000 and faxed over Exhibit #1, the deal sheet prepared by the appellant in December 2018. Evidently, Mr. Keilty believed the $5,000 referenced in Exhibit #1 was not the total deposit paid, but the $5,000 in cash he gave the appellant on December 19, 2018. [ 18 ] When Mr.

Keilty phoned MacLean Sports on January 17, 2019, he was advised $5,000 seemed to be missing. He received a call from management a day or two later, at which time he insisted, once again, two cash deposits had been made: $2,000 in April 2018 and $5,000 in December 2018. Mr. MacLean reached out to the appellant to get his input regarding the missing $5,000. He left a message on the appellant’s cell phone, but his call was not returned. Mr. MacLean subsequently contacted the police to report the theft of Mr. Keilty’s $5,000 cash deposit. MacLean Sports eventually accepted Mr.

Keilty’s version of the facts and absorbed the loss of $5,000 when it closed the snowmobile transaction on the basis of a credit for cash deposits totalling $7,000. [ 19 ] The appellant testified Mr. Keilty made a deposit of $2,000 in April 2018, and that he returned before Christmas to make a further deposit. According to the appellant, Mr. Keilty gave him $3,000 in cash at that time. The appellant placed the money in an envelope with “Keilty” marked on the front, which he brought to the parts department for processing by a cashier.

Because there was a line-up (apparently at all payment stations), the appellant left the envelope with a cashier and asked the payment be added to the Keilty deal. The cashier, whose identity the appellant testified he could not remember, informed the appellant they were busy and he would get to it later. Mr. Keilty did not ask for a receipt. He provided Mr. Keilty with Exhibit #1, which shows a total deposit of $5,000.

Questioned as to how the cash deposit of $3,000 that he claimed he left on the counter could disappear, the appellant responded: “the only way that I could see it is after it goes to Parts it just doesn’t get processed in”. On cross-examination, the appellant added: “it was left on a counter that is […] obviously visible to the public and to the Parts department because it wasn’t instantly taken ... I know where I left it, and that’s, that’s all, that’s where my storyline ends”. The appellant stated he circled the part of Exhibit #1 showing a deposit of $5,000 to draw Mr.

Keilty’s attention to the total amount paid toward the purchase. Although the appellant testified he was not blaming the unidentified cashier or any other cashier for the disappearance of the $3,000 in cash, the defence invited the judge to view that possibility as reasonably open on the evidence. [ 20 ] Ms. MacLean testified the deposit indicated in Exhibit #1 ($5,000) was inaccurate because it overstated by $3,000 the sum received by MacLean Sports. It was her conclusion the figure of $5,000 in Exhibit #1 was “manipulated […] because there was never a $5,000 deposit” remitted to MacLean Sports.

As noted, it was Mr. Keilty’s evidence that the document understated his deposit by $2,000. Ms. MacLean explained that, unlike a deal sheet, a computer-generated receipt for cash could not be “fudged”. [ 21 ] Jamie Doiron testified that, on January 16, 2019, Mr. Keilty came in to put a further deposit of $5,000 toward the purchase of a snowmobile and asked to see what his balance was. Mr. Doiron pulled his account up on the computer system; it showed a deposit of only $2,000. When Mr. Keilty protested he had actually paid $7,000, Mr. Doiron asked for substantiating proof. Mr.

Keilty returned home and faxed Exhibit #1, obviously thinking it confirmed his stated conviction that he provided a $5,000 cash deposit on December 19, 2018. [ 22 ] Mr. MacLean testified he ultimately accepted Mr. Keilty’s deposit-related account and absorbed the $5,000 loss. He explained MacLean Sports did not know $5,000 was missing before Mr. Keilty produced Exhibit #1 since that sum “never came into the system”. Mr. MacLean also testified the appellant received advances on commissions during the second half of 2018 because he could not make ends meet on the commissions he earned. According to Mr.

MacLean, when the appellant quit in January 2019, he owed MacLean Sports $6,900 in unearned commissions. In his testimony, the appellant contested this allegation. Be that as it may, Mr. MacLean refuted speculation by defence counsel on cross-examination that a cashier might have stolen the $3,000 cash deposit the appellant claimed he handed over. Mr. MacLean explained the cashier would have known his or her misappropriation stood to be discovered very quickly.

In his view, it would be a “very, very dangerous game for somebody to take $3,000 like that” from a salesperson, knowing the snowmobile was going to be delivered within a few days. In this regard, I would note, parenthetically, that, if a cashier had stolen the $3,000 cash deposit, he or she would have known the theft might well be witnessed by a fellow cashier and any subsequent profession of innocence would be contradicted by both the remitting salesperson and the customer. [ 23 ] Ethan Roscoe, the appellant’s nephew, was called by the defence. He worked as a parts

representative at MacLean Sports during the last half of 2018. He testified cash would occasionally be left on the counter or a back shelfin the parts department by a salesperson, from where it would be taken to the accountant’s office at the end of the day. Mr. Roscoerecalled observing a parts representative receive a thick stack of bills from a salesperson, “which was laid […] to the left of his computerscreen for a large portion of the day, without it ever being placed somewhere safe”. Mr. Roscoe did not identify the salesperson inquestion as the appellant, nor did he testify the cash went missing.

Moreover, he had no personal knowledge of the Hill and Keiltytransactions and conceded he did not recall any large sums of cash going missing in the admittedly brief time he worked at MacLeanSports. [24] The trial judge framed the defence position with respect to testimonial inconsistencies aswhether “differences in testimony […] on unrelated, incidental, or collateral matters, of itself, render the witness’ testimony on morepertinent matters unreliable?” The judge correctly answered this question in the negative; in the result, he was satisfied there were nocritical inconsistencies within the testimony provided by each purchaser.

The judge was “satisfied on the evidence given that MacLeanSports were out $5,000.00 in the Keilty deal, and $1,000.00 on the Hill deal”. This conclusion was anchored to his acceptance of theevidence of the purchasers, both of which “testified in a forthright manner, and were not shaken in cross-examination” with respect to thecash amount they provided to the appellant. The judge disbelieved the appellant’s testimony that Mr. Hill changed his mind regardingthe amount of the deposit (from $3,000 to $2,000). In the judge’s view, this suggestion should have been put to Mr.

Hill on cross-examination, and the failure to do so led him “to the conclusion that it was a fabrication to avoid guilt”. [25] The judge acknowledged the case against the appellant on the charge of theft over $5,000 restedon circumstantial evidence, as “no one saw [him] pocket the money”, which I take as a reference to the $3,000 the appellant testified heleft on the counter in the parts department. He cautioned himself that, as a result, guilt for the offence charged (theft of property with avalue exceeding $5,000) must be the only reasonable inference arising from the record.

The trial judge stated he had great difficulty“accepting that one would take a large sum of money from a customer in cash, and then just leave it”, thus rejecting Mr. Roscoe’s andthe appellant’s evidence on the point. The judge added: “For the protection of both the customer, and the salesman, a receipt should beobtained, even if it stays in the salesman’s file. In short, I do not accept the [appellant’s] testimony regarding the Keilty transaction”.

Thejudge considered the defence position that someone else may have taken the $3,000 in cash allegedly left on the counter as “untenable”.He concluded the only reasonable inference was that the full missing cash deposit ($6,000) had been converted by the appellant to hisown use. In the result, the offence as charged was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. III. Analysis and Decision [26] As noted, the appellant seeks to overturn his conviction on the following interconnectedgrounds: (1) the judge’s adverse credibility findings result from a misapplication of the rule in Browne v.

Dunn; and (2) the verdict isunsustainable because: (

a) the judge impermissibly used his disbelief of the appellant’s exculpatory testimony with respect to the Hilltransaction as circumstantial evidence of guilt; (

b) the evidence is reasonably open to the inference that someone else stole the cashdeposit ($3,000) the appellant acknowledged receiving from Mr. Keilty, and the verdict is unreasonable; and (

c) the reasons forconviction fail to explain how the judge resolved “difficulties” with certain aspects of the testimony provided by Messrs. Hill and Keilty. A. Misuse of the disbelief of the appellant’s exculpatory evidence with respect to the Hill deposit ($1,000) and misapplication of therule in Browne v. Dunn [27] The appellant rightly asserts a trial judge’s mere disbelief of the accused’s testimony may not beused as circumstantial evidence of guilt. For that to happen, there must be independent evidence that the testimony was fabricated orconcocted to avoid guilt: R. v. O’Connor, (ON CA), [2002] O.J.

No. 4410 (C.A.) (QL), at para. 17, and Oland v. R.,2016 NBCA 58, [2016] N.B.J. No. 288 (QL), at para. 66, leave to appeal denied [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 188. The appellant contends,accurately in my view, the requisite independent evidence is nowhere to be found in the record. However, I reject the suggestion that thejudge used, as circumstantial evidence of guilt, his disbelief of the appellant’s testimony that Mr. Hill changed his mind regarding thedeposit ($2,000 instead of $3,000), and that he did not receive $1,000 in cash.

With respect, the trial judge did not make unauthorized useof his disbelief of this purportedly exculpatory testimony. [28] Exhibit #2, which the appellant prepared, corroborates Mr. Hill’s testimony that he provided a$3,000 deposit. The judge made a commonsensical point when he stated the appellant’s evidence that Mr. Hill changed his mind andreverted to a deposit of $2,000 was designed to avoid guilt. That evidence could have no other purpose. The judge’s statement of theobvious was quite properly made in connection with the assessment of the appellant’s credibility.

However, and critically, nothing in therecord, including the reasons for decision, supports the appellant’s contention that the judge went further and used his disbelief of theappellant’s evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt. Indeed, the judge stated that, even though he rejected the appellant’s exculpatorytestimony, he had to determine whether “on a consideration of the totality of the evidence, [he was] satisfied that the Crown has proven

all the essential elements of the offence, that is, that MacLean Sports were deprived of money which belonged to them, and that it was [the appellant] who took the money”. There is simply no merit to the contention that the trial judge deviated from what he acknowledged was his adjudicative duty. I now turn to the application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn . [ 29 ] In Shephard v. R. , 2019 NBCA 76 , 2019 N.B.J.

No. 313 (QL) , the Court adopted the broad description of the rule found in McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence , 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019): A party who intends to challenge the credibility of a witness, whether by calling contradictory evidence or simply as part of closing submissions to the fact finder, should generally provide the witness with an opportunity to address or explain the point upon which credibility is attacked. Simply put, the witness should be confronted in cross-examination with any material point on which his or her credibility is to be challenged.

A failure to do so may detract from the strength of the party’s case or entitle the party who called the witness to a remedy. [p. 21-109] [para. 76] The Court added “the trial judge has a broad discretion in assessing fairness and determining whether the rule is engaged and, if so, the appropriate remedy for any infringement” (para. 77). As will be seen, I conclude the judge’s remedy-related exercise of discretion is unimpeachable. [ 30 ] When pressed on the point at the hearing, counsel for the appellant conceded the rule in Browne v. Dunn applies to the defence.

However, this threshold issue being one of law, the concession does not settle the matter. Indeed, doubts have been raised concerning, at the very least, the extent of the rule’s applicability to the defence in criminal proceedings. In R. v. S.C.D.Y. , 2020 ABCA 134 , [2020] A.J. No. 393 (QL) , the Court questioned, admittedly in obiter , whether the rule applies with the same strictness to the accused as it does to the prosecution and civil litigants (para. 81). Doubts on point have also been raised by the High Court of Australia in MWJ v. The Queen , [2005] HCA 74, at paras. 18, 41.

I begin consideration of this issue by acknowledging the limited precedential value of Cormier v. R. , 2012 NBCA 76 , 393 N.B.R. (2d) 118 , which dealt with the sustainability of convictions for, among other offences, kidnapping and unlawful confinement. [ 31 ] In that case, the accused suggested in his direct examination the complainant, the key witness for the prosecution, had been untruthful in her testimony. The accused had not put to her on cross-examination his version of the truth. The judge allowed the prosecution to recall the complainant to give her an opportunity to respond to the accused’s suggestion.

On appeal, the Court held the recall order was not an improper exercise of judicial discretion. It disposed of the appellant’s submission to the contrary without dealing with the question of whether the rule properly applied against the accused at all. That said, the widely accepted view, which I endorse subject to the observations that follow, is that the rule applies to the defence. [ 32 ] The English Court of Appeal provides the first case that addresses the issue of the applicability of the rule to the defence. In R. v. Fenlon (1980), 71 Cr. App.

R. 307 (C.A.) , the Court opined there seems to be “no reason why there should be any different rule relating to defendants between themselves from that applying to the prosecution vis-a-vis the defendant or the defence vis-a-vis the prosecution” (p. 313). Fenlon was cited with approval by the Ontario Court of Appeal in its leading case on the rule, R. v. Quansah , 2015 ONCA 237 , [2015] O.J. No. 1774 (QL) , at para. 79 . That case was in turn mentioned approvingly in Crowley v. R. , 2015 NBCA 61 , [2015] N.B.J. No. 229 (QL) , and Oland .

In both Quansah and this Court’s decision in Shephard , the rule is described as applicable to a “party”, without any distinction between the prosecution and the defence. See, to like effect, R. v. Furlong , 2012 NLCA 29 , [2012] N.J. No. 181 (QL) , at para. 25 , R. v. Clark , 2015 ABCA 160 , [2015] A.J. No. 510 (QL) , R. v. Knox , 2017 SKCA 8 , [2017] S.J. No. 30 (QL) , at para. 50 , R. v P.W.M. , 2018 PECA 24 , [2018] P.E.I.J. No. 56 (QL) , R. v. Podolski , 2018 BCCA 96 , [2018] B.C.J. No. 847 (QL) , Chandroo v. R. , 2018 QCCA 1429 , [2018] Q.J. No. 8321 (QL) , R v. Willis , 2019 NSCA 64 , [2019] N.S.J.

No. 331 (QL) , and R. v. Dowd , 2020 MBCA 23 , [2020] M.J. No. 49 (QL) . [ 33 ] As noted, a trial judge has a broad discretion in determining whether the rule in Browne v. Dunn is engaged and, if so, the appropriate remedy for its breach. A trial judge may, in his or her discretion, conclude the breach should be treated as inconsequential. Objectionable conduct by prosecuting counsel in responding to the breach might fuel that accused-friendly result.

Where a different assessment of the breach’s consequences is contemplated, the judge should invite submissions regarding suitable remedies, chief among which would be a witness recall order or a consideration of the breach in assessing the credibility of the accused’s contradictory testimony. Where the prosecution establishes a breach of the rule and seeks a remedy, and the judge is satisfied one should be prescribed, it may be appropriate to give primary consideration to a witness recall order since it is much less likely to entail a miscarriage of justice than any other solution.

In the present case, the trial judge, who was no doubt alive to this option, concluded the defence breach of the rule stood to be considered in assessing the credibility of the appellant’s related exculpatory testimony. The appellant submits the trial judge erred in settling upon this response to his breach of the rule. I respectfully disagree. [ 34 ] R. v. Dexter , 2013 ONCA 744 , [2013] O.J. No. 5686 (QL) (per Weiler J.A., MacFarland and Watt JJ.A. concurring) is on point. In that case, the appellant was found guilty of several offences relating to a single car accident.

The sole issue was whether he was the driver or a passenger. The three other occupants of the motor vehicle testified for the prosecution and identified the appellant as the driver. The appellant testified he stopped driving before the accident and was passed out in the rear

passenger seat behind the driver when it occurred. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s evidence that he was not the driver at the time of the accident. One of the grounds for doing so, which formed the basis for a ground of appeal, was the judge’s conclusion the defence had breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn and his determination that the breach undermined the credibility of the appellant’s denial he was driving at the time of the accident.

On appeal, the Court agreed the defence had infringed the rule for the following reasons: The appellant submits that in the circumstances, the rule was not breached because counsel for the defence suggested to all three complainants on cross-examination that the appellant expressed an unwillingness to drive at the dam. He argues that while his version of events that he fell asleep in the backseat was not specifically put to them, it is clear from the witnesses’ evidence-in-chief that they would have denied the suggestion because they had testified that the appellant was the driver for the whole evening.

In my opinion, the rule was breached. The suggestion that the appellant was “unwilling to drive” after the men had been at the dam was not sufficient to put the three witnesses on notice that the appellant would seek to impeach their evidence by testifying that he did not drive. Although the appellant submits that it was clear from their evidence-in-chief that the witnesses would have denied the suggestion, not putting the question to Billingsley and Munro denied them the opportunity to explain how they knew that it was the appellant who was driving.

Rainford was the only witness that counsel for the defence did confront with the suggestion that someone else could have been driving. He provided the explanation that the appellant continued to drive because the car was “his baby” and he would not have allowed someone else to drive it. Earlier, Rainford testified in his examination-in-chief that after leaving the Burnt River dam, he passed out but awoke to hear the appellant screaming “cops” and then “[f]uck that.

They’re not catching me.” During cross-examination, Rainford confirmed that the appellant yelled when he noticed the police cruiser pursuing his vehicle. Rainford was not directly challenged on that aspect of his evidence, but his overall reliability and ability to recall what happened was, given the amount of alcohol he had consumed that night. When the appellant testified, his counsel asked him about his reaction to the flashing police lights and screaming during re-examination.

Defence counsel said, “I don’t want to put words in your mouth but, I’m not leading you, but as you were asleep your evidence would be that you weren’t woken up by any of these flashing lights or screaming[?]” The appellant answered, “That’s correct.” Had Rainford been confronted with the suggestion that the appellant was asleep so he could not have spoken the words Rainford attributed to him, Rainford might have explained that he recognized the appellant’s voice or offered some other explanation.

Because defence counsel failed to properly confront the three Crown witnesses with the appellant’s claim to be asleep in the back seat, they did not have the opportunity to explain fully why they knew he was driving. [paras. 24-29] [ 35 ] The Court also made remedy-focused observations that I unhesitatingly endorse: The effect that a court should give to a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn will depend on a number of factors.

In deciding how to address a breach, a trial judge may consider: • The seriousness of the breach; • The context in which the breach occurred; • The stage in the proceedings when an objection to the breach was raised; • The response by counsel, if any, to the objection; • Any request by counsel to re-open its case so that the witness whose evidence has been impugned can offer an explanation; • The availability of the witness to be recalled; and • In the case of a jury trial, whether a correcting instruction and explanation of the rule is sufficient or whether trial fairness has been so impaired that a motion for a mistrial should be entertained.

Thus, the extent of the rule’s application is within the discretion of the trial judge after taking into account the circumstances of the case: see R. v. Lyttle , 2004 SCC 5 , [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, at para. 65 ; R. v. Werkman , 2007 ABCA 130 , 404 A.R. 378, at para. 9 .

There are at least two permissive options to rectify the breach. One is for the trial judge to take into account the failure to cross-examinewhen assessing a witness’s credibility and deciding the weight to be given to that witness’s evidence: see Werkman, at paras. 9-11; R. v.Paris (2000), (ON CA), 138 O.A.C. 287, at para. 22. Another is to allow counsel to recall the witness whoseevidence has been impeached without notice. As Moldaver J.A. explained in R. v.

McNeill (2000), (ON CA), 48 O.R.(3d) 212 (C.A.), at paras. 47-49, where the concern lies in the witness’s inability to present his or her side of the story, if the witness isavailable and the trial judge is satisfied that recall is appropriate, the trial judge ought to offer the aggrieved party that opportunity. Themechanics of when and by whom the witness should be recalled should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.

If the aggrieved partywho is offered this option declines it, then the trier of fact would simply decide whether to believe all, part or none of the [later]witness’s evidence regardless of whether the evidence was uncontradicted. Deference is owed to a trial judge’s exercise of discretion in deciding how to deal with a breach of the rule unless error in principle isshown: see R. v.

Blom (2002), (ON CA), 61 OR (3d) 51 (C.A.), at para. 20. [paras. 20-22] [36] In Dexter, the prosecution did not immediately object when the accused testified he was nolonger driving at the time of the accident and was sleeping in the seat behind the driver. As in the present case, the prosecution waiteduntil closing submissions to raise the defence’s breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn. Justice Weiler addressed this aspect of the case incomprehensive fashion: The Crown did not object to the breach of the rule until closing submissions. By the time the issue was raised, the defence had closed itscase.

The trial judge did not give counsel an opportunity to recall the witnesses. The appellant submits that, in failing to raise the issueearlier, the Crown acted unfairly. Courts are reluctant to interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the conduct of a trial, particularly where, as here, thedefence has caused the problem by breaching a rule of fairness. This does not mean that the court is not concerned when the Crownwaits until closing submissions to make the argument that the rule has been breached. In R. v. M.

B., 2009 ONCA 524, 251 O.A.C. 81,the court commented at para. 72 that it was significant that the Crown had waited until final argument to make its Browne v.Dunn argument and rejected the submission that the rule had been breached. In R. v. Giroux (2006), (ON CA), 210O.A.C. 50, the court suggested at para. 49 that “it might have been preferable if the Crown had made a Browne v. Dunn objection to theaccused’s evidence at the time it was tendered.” I endorse these comments. The Crown is not an ordinary litigant. In Boucher v.

The Queen, (SCC), [1955] S.C.R. 16, Rand J. stated at pp. 23-24: It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what theCrown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legalproof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly.

The role ofprosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be nonecharged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness andthe justness of judicial proceedings. (Emphasis added.) The Crown exercises a public function involving much discretion and power. It must be allowed to perform the advocacy and truth-seeking function with which it has been entrusted: see R. v.

Cook, (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113, at paras. 19-21; R. v.Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 18. In Jolivet, Binnie J. stated at para. 21: Crown counsel is entitled to have a trial strategy and to modify it as the trial unfolds, provided that the modification does not result inunfairness to the accused.

In exercising its discretion the Crown must act fairly and dispassionately. [Emphasis in original.] Timely objection by the Crown is important because the accused should not be held responsible for defence counsel’s inadvertent oreven deliberate failure to observe the rule: see McNeill, at para. 53. The possible impact of a late objection is perhaps most obvious in cases involving a jury. When the defence has called evidence in a jurytrial, counsel for the prosecution is entitled to address the jury last: see s. 651(3) of the Criminal Code.

Thus, counsel for the defencegenerally has no opportunity to respond to the Crown’s submissions. In addition, a valid but late objection by the Crown adds acomplicating factor to the jury’s task and places an additional burden on the due administration of justice. The members of the jury, as

triers of fact, must be instructed on how to weigh the evidence in light of the rule’s non-observance. If those instructions are faulty andthe accused is convicted, additional uncertainty, expense and delay resulting from an appeal and the ordering of a new trial may be theresult. If timely objection is made by the Crown, and the objection is upheld, the impact of defence counsel’s breach of the rule on theaccuracy of the fact finding process and due administration of justice can be minimized.

It is more likely that the court will give greaterconsideration to a request by counsel to recall the witness whose evidence defence counsel is attempting to impeach. Raising a timely objection is consistent with the Crown’s duty arising from Boucher to “see that all available legal proof of the facts ispresented” as well as its truth-seeking function. If the Crown wishes to wait until closing submissions to object to a breach of the rule, itwould be wise to provide a reason for doing so.

The exercise of the Crown’s discretion must be rational, consistent with the Crown’s roleand with due regard for the administration of justice. [paras. 30-37] [37] Despite the concerns expressed in the foregoing excerpt from her reasons for decision, which Ishare, Justice Weiler rejected the appellant’s argument that the trial judge was obliged to pro-actively offer the defence an opportunity tore-open its case.

She did so for a number of reasons, the bulk of which are in play here: First, when defence counsel heard the Crown’s submissions that the rule had been breached, he did not suggest to the trial judge that thewitnesses be recalled and given an opportunity to explain. The appellant has not alleged that his trial counsel was incompetent. In theabsence of such a request, the trial judge was not obliged to recall the witnesses on his own initiative: see Paris, at para. 18; Giroux, atpara. 48. Second, as indicated, how a trial judge deals with a breach is dependent upon the circumstances of the case.

Unlike McNeill, this was nota jury trial where an instruction was needed to overcome any prejudice to the appellant resulting from counsel’s breach. A trial judge ispresumed to know the law: see R. v. Burns, (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656, at pp. 664-65. In addition, the trial judgeheard the explanation of Rainford when confronted with the suggestion that someone other than the appellant was driving. Third, the manner in which a trial judge chooses to deal with a breach of the rule involves an exercise of discretion that is entitled toconsiderable deference. The trial judge chose a permissible option open to him.

The appellant has not shown any error in principle in hisdecision to do so. […] It was open to the trial judge to consider the defence’s failure to properly confront the three witnesses with the appellant’s contrary storywhen weighing his credibility on the key disputed fact. [paras. 39-41, 44] [38] In the case at bar, as in Dexter, the appellant was represented by counsel at trial, defencecounsel did not apply for a witness recall order when the prosecution invoked the rule in Browne v. Dunn in its closing submission andincompetence of trial counsel was not raised as a ground of appeal.

I surmise defence counsel did not seek an order recalling Mr. Hill tothe witness stand because he feared his likely contradictory version of the facts surrounding the controversial $1,000 cash deposit woulddamage the appellant’s credibility, and buttress the prosecution’s case. Moreover, in this case, an application by prosecuting counsel fora recall order might arguably constitute an improper intrusion into defence strategy. Finally, a recall order issued by the judge on his owninitiative risked jeopardizing his status, both real and perceived, as an independent and impartial arbiter (see R. v.

Clark, at para. 15). Thecumulative effect of those circumstances compels the conclusion it was not incumbent on the judge to raise the possibility of recallingMr. Hill. [39] In choosing to take into account the defence breach of the rule in making credibilityassessments, the judge dealt with it in a legally permissible manner. His exercise of discretion in settling upon that remedy is entitled todeference.

I am satisfied the judge’s exercise of discretion was neither unreasonable nor the product of reversible error of law, principleor fact (see Cormier, at para. 35, for the applicable standard of review). [40] In the result, there is simply no principled basis to interfere with the trial judge’s findings offact, including his credibility findings. B. Guilt as the only reasonable inference and verdict unreasonableness

[41] In R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] S.C.J. No. 19 (QL), there is agreement in the several sets ofreasons with the following articulation of the test for reversal on the basis of verdict unreasonableness in a case such as the present one: When a verdict is reached by a judge sitting alone and explained in reasons for judgment, there are two bases on which a court of appealmay find the verdict unreasonable. First, a verdict is unreasonable if it is not one that a “properly instructed jury acting judicially, couldreasonably have rendered” (R. v.

Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36, quoting R. v. Yebes, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 185). In Biniaris, Arbour J. clarified that this standard, despite being expressed in terms of a verdictreached by a jury, also applies to the decisions of a judge sitting without a jury.

She explained, however, that review forunreasonableness on appeal is “somewhat easier when the judgment under attack is that of a single judge”, since judges give reasonswhereby the reviewing appellate court may be able to identify a flaw in the evaluation of the evidence, or in the analysis, that will serve to explainthe unreasonable conclusion reached, and justify the reversal. [para. 37] Arbour J.’s comments in Biniaris led to the adoption, in R. v.

Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 , [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, and R. v.Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40 , [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, of a narrowly expanded, second avenue of review for unreasonableness. A verdictreached by a judge may be unreasonable, even if supported by the evidence, if it is reached “illogically or irrationally” (Beaudry, atparas. 96-97, per Fish J. (dissenting in the result); Sinclair, at paras. 4 and 15-17, per Fish J. (dissenting in the result), and at para. 44, perLeBel J.).

This may occur if the trial judge draws an inference or makes a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainlycontradicted by the evidence relied on by the judge in support of that inference or finding, or shown to be incompatible with evidencethat has neither been contradicted by other evidence nor rejected by the trial judge (Sinclair, at paras. 4, 16 and 19-21; R. v. R.P., 2012SCC 22 , [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 9).

The Beaudry and Sinclair inquiry into illogical or irrational findings or inferences is not an invitation for reviewing judges to substitutetheir preferred findings of fact for those made by the trial judge (Beaudry, at para. 98). As MacPherson J.A. noted in the Court ofAppeal, the “fact that an appeal court judge would have had a doubt when the trial judge did not is insufficient to justify the conclusionthat the trial judgment was unreasonable” (para. 67, quoting R. v. A.G., 2000 SCC 17 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 29).

Nor isit an invitation to unjustifiably interfere with a trial judge’s credibility assessments. A court of appeal reviewing credibility assessmentsin order to determine whether the verdict is reasonable cannot interfere with those assessments unless they cannot be supported on anyreasonable view of the evidence (R.P., at para. 10; R. v. Burke, (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 474, at para. 7).

The inquiryinto the logic or rationality of a judge’s essential findings under Beaudry and Sinclair is narrowly targeted at “fundamental flaws in thereasoning process” which means that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law (Sinclair, at paras. 4, 26and 77). [paras. 28-30] [42] As for the correct approach on appeal from a finding that guilt is the only reasonable inferenceto draw from circumstantial evidence, the leading case is R. v.

Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000: […] Where the Crown’s case depends on circumstantial evidence, the question becomes whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, couldreasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence: Yebes, at p.186; R. v. Mars (2006), (ON CA), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4; R. v. Liu (1989), 1989 ABCA 95, 95 A.R. 201 (C.A.), at para. 13; R. v. S.L.R., 2003 ABCA 148 ; R. v. Cardinal (1990), 1990 ABCA 115 , 106A.R. 91 (C.A.); R. v. Kaysaywaysemat (1992), (SK CA), 97 Sask.

R. 66 (C.A.), at paras. 28 and 31. The governing principle was nicely summarized by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Dipnarine, at para. 22. The court noted that“[c]ircumstantial evidence does not have to totally exclude other conceivable inferences” and that a verdict is not unreasonable simplybecause “the alternatives do not raise a doubt” in the jury’s mind.

Most importantly, “[i]t is still fundamentally for the trier [of] fact todecide if any proposed alternative way of looking at the case is reasonable enough to raise a doubt.” [paras. 55-56] [43] Where the outcome turns on circumstantial evidence, an inference alternative to guilt may bedrawn from a lack of evidence or gaps in the evidence. There is no burden on the defence to prove facts capable of opening the door to afinding that guilt is not the only reasonable inference.

In determining whether such an inference is appropriate, the judge must besatisfied it arises from a plausible theory or a reasonably possible scenario that are rooted in common sense, logic and everydayexperience applied to the evidence or absence of evidence. Inferences alternative to guilt must be reasonable; they may not flow fromspeculation: Villaroman, at paras. 35-43.

[ 44 ] Mindful of those principles, and for the reasons that follow, I conclude there is no evidence- related basis for reversal. [ 45 ] Trial judges are not required to check their common sense at the courtroom door. Indeed, their oath of office commands they do right according to law and common sense is almost invariably an important contributor in fulfilling that fundamental adjudicative responsibility.

In the present case, the trial judge identified the correct legal principles, reviewed the critical evidence for the prosecution and the defence, made unimpeachable findings of fact (including credibility) and came to the commonsensical conclusion that the appellant’s guilt for the offence charged was the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence and the facts as he found them. Those findings of fact are pivotal, having regard to the appellant’s testimony and the theories available on the record at trial. [ 46 ] Context informs evidential characterization.

With respect to the $3,000 the appellant acknowledged receiving from Mr. Keilty and swore he remitted to a cashier, no one witnessed him do otherwise and pocket the funds. There was, therefore, no direct evidence he failed to remit the funds to a cashier, as the prosecution alleged. Proof of that failure depended on circumstantial evidence, and the appellant submitted it was reasonably possible the funds had been stolen by someone else.

However, that possibility was neither argued nor arguable in connection with the other $3,000 because the appellant did not claim he received those funds and remitted them to a cashier. He simply denied receiving the funds, which excludes theft by someone else. [ 47 ] Specifically, the appellant testified Mr. Hill did not give him $1,000 in cash. It was Mr. Hill’s sworn testimony that he did. Viewed contextually, Mr. Hill’s testimony constituted direct evidence of theft of the $1,000 by the appellant. The trial judge found Mr.

Hill gave the $1,000 in cash to the appellant as a deposit on the purchase of a snowmobile. He also found MacLean Sports did not receive that sum from the appellant. On those findings of fact, which are based on direct evidence, there was no room for reasonable doubt and the trial judge rightly found the appellant guilty of theft of the $1,000. [ 48 ] Mr. Keilty testified he gave $5,000 in cash to the appellant in December 2018. The appellant testified Mr. Keilty gave him only $3,000 in cash. Viewed contextually, Mr.

Keilty’s testimony constituted direct evidence of theft by the appellant of the $2,000 difference. The trial judge found as a fact Mr. Keilty gave the appellant $5,000 in cash in December 2018, and that MacLean Sports did not receive any part of that sum from the appellant.

On those findings of fact, which are based on direct evidence, there was no room for reasonable doubt and the trial judge rightly found the appellant guilty of theft of the $2,000 difference. [ 49 ] Given my conclusion that the judge’s findings of fact (including his credibility findings) must stand, only the case for theft of the $3,000 in cash, which the appellant testified he received and remitted to an unidentified cashier, rests on circumstantial evidence.

If the trial judge committed reversible error in finding the appellant’s guilt with respect to that sum was the sole reasonable inference to draw from the record, only a conviction for the included offence of theft of property of a value under $5,000 would be sustainable. [ 50 ] Mr. MacLean testified that, in the 45 years of MacLean Sports’ existence no cash deposit had ever gone missing and been unaccounted for, except the two at issue in these proceedings.

On the facts as found by the trial judge, two significant cash deposits entrusted to the appellant went missing over a relatively short period in late 2018, and the appellant stole the first ($1,000) and $2,000 out of the second. The trial judge effectively concluded the appellant’s guilt for theft of the remaining $3,000 was the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole. That conclusion was inevitable once the judge found the defence suggestion that someone else stole the $3,000 was “untenable”. I am satisfied the judge could reasonably make that finding.

Indeed, any other finding would offend common sense. C. Failure to resolve testimonial “difficulties” [ 51 ] The “difficulties” to which this ground of appeal refers are: (1) the inconsistency between Mr. Hill’s direct examination, where he stated the entirety of his $3,000 deposit was in cash, and his acknowledgement on cross-examination that only $1,000 may have been in cash; and (2) the inconsistency between Mr.

Keilty’s testimony that he provided two deposits totalling $7,000 and Exhibit #1, which indicates only $5,000 was paid on account. [ 52 ] The record shows the trial judge was alive to those “difficulties”. Needless to say, the inconsistency between Mr. Hill’s evidence on direct and on cross was relevant to the issue of his overall credibility. However, once the judge found Mr. Hill’s evidence he gave the appellant the missing $1,000 was credible, the matter of whether the other $2,000 was paid in cash or by debit and credit cards petered out in significance.

As for the evidential inconsistency relating to the deposit in the Keilty transaction, the trial judge evidently resolved it by accepting Mr. Keilty’s testimony, which meant that Exhibit #1 understated the deposit paid ($7,000) by $2,000.

[ 53 ] In my respectful view, the trial judge’s reasons for decision adequately deal with all contentious material issues, and easily pass muster (see R. v. G.F. , 2021 SCC 20 , [2021] S.C.J. No. 20 (QL), Karakatsanis J., for the majority, at paras. 68-82). V. Conclusion [ 54 ] It is for the reasons set out in the preceding text that I concluded the case for intervention by the Court had not been made and I joined my panel colleagues in dismissing the appeal from the bench. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE DRAPEAU 1.

Introduction [1] Il s’agit d’un appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité pour vol de biens d’une valeur dépassant 5 000 $ ( al. 334a) du Code criminel ). À l’époque mentionnée dans la dénonciation, l’appelant occupait le poste de commis vendeur chez MacLean Sports, entreprise familiale de la région qui exploite un commerce de détail de motoneiges et autres produits de sports motorisés.

Selon la thèse de la poursuite au procès devant la Cour provinciale, l’appelant avait volé des dépôts en espèces qu’il avait reçus d’acheteurs de motoneiges. [2] Ces acheteurs ont témoigné à charge, et le juge du procès a conclu qu’ils avaient remis à l’appelant les dépôts en espèces en question (1 000 $ dans un cas, 5 000 $ dans l’autre cas). De plus, la preuve de la direction de MacLean Sports, que le juge a retenue, a confirmé que l’entreprise n’avait pas touché les fonds. Ces conclusions, viciées par aucune erreur manifeste et dominante, démontrent que les dépôts ont bien été volés de MacLean Sports.

En conséquence, la seule question qui se pose en appel est celle de savoir si le juge du procès a commis une erreur justifiant infirmation en concluant que c’était l’appelant qui avait volé les fonds disparus. [3] Comme nous le verrons, la preuve de la poursuite à l’égard d’une moitié, soit 3 000 $, des dépôts totaux de 6 000 $ était directe, tandis que sa preuve à l’égard de l’autre moitié de 3 000 $ était circonstancielle.

L’appelant ne pouvait être déclaré coupable du vol de cette seconde moitié des fonds que si sa culpabilité à cet égard était la seule inférence qu’on pût tirer raisonnablement à partir du dossier. L’appelant a témoigné pour son compte; il a nié avoir reçu le dépôt de 1 000 $ en espèces d’un client et a affirmé que l’autre client ne lui avait pas remis 5 000 $, mais seulement 3 000 $, et qu’il avait remis cet argent à un caissier pour qu’il s’en occupe.

Le juge a conclu que le témoignage disculpatoire de l’appelant n’était pas crédible et que, eu égard à l’ensemble de la preuve présentée, la poursuite avait démontré qu’il était coupable relativement à l’accusation de vol de biens d’une valeur dépassant 5 000 $ énoncée dans la dénonciation. [4] L’appelant soutient que les conclusions défavorables du juge sur la question de sa crédibilité découlent d’une application erronée de la règle établie dans Browne c. Dunn , [1893] J.C.J. No. 5 (Ch. des lords) (QL).

Par ailleurs, l’appelant prétend que le verdict ne peut être maintenu parce que : 1) le juge a assimilé l’incrédibilité de son témoignage disculpatoire à une preuve circonstancielle de sa culpabilité; 2) il est raisonnablement possible d’inférer de la preuve produite que quelqu’un d’autre a volé le dépôt en espèces (3 000 $) qu’il a reconnu avoir reçu, et le verdict est déraisonnable; 3) on ne comprend pas, à partir des motifs de la déclaration de culpabilité, comment le juge est arrivé à résoudre des [TRADUCTION] « problèmes » importants liés à certains aspects des témoignages des acheteurs. [5] Après examen des observations approfondies – écrites et orales – des parties, nous avons rejeté l’appel séance tenante et indiqué que les motifs suivraient.

En même temps, nous avons révoqué la mise en liberté sous caution de l’appelant.

[6] Mes motifs du rejet de l’appel sont énoncés ci-après. II. Dossier de la preuve et conclusions de fait [7] La dernière période d’emploi de l’appelant auprès de MacLean Sports a commencé en octobre 2016 pour se terminer le 14 janvier 2019, date à laquelle il a démissionné et est allé travailler au service d’un marchand d’autos de la région. Au procès, la poursuite avait pour thèse que, durant les quatre derniers mois de cette période, deux clients avaient confié des dépôts en espèces d’une valeur totale de 6 000 $ à l’appelant pour remise à MacLean Sports, et qu’il les avait volés.

Le propriétaire fondateur, Brian MacLean, a témoigné qu’aucun autre dépôt en espèces n’avait disparu sans explication durant les 45 années d’exploitation du commerce. L’appelant n’a pas remis de reçus de caisse aux clients pour l’argent qu’il reconnaît avoir reçu. Dans chaque cas, il a rempli un « bordereau d’opération » censé spécifier le dépôt effectivement payé.

Les conclusions de fait du juge indiquent que, dans un des bordereaux, le dépôt payé de 3 000 $ avait été correctement inscrit, ce qui contredisait un élément clé du témoignage disculpatoire de l’appelant, tandis que, dans l’autre bordereau, le dépôt payé était minoré de 2 000 $ et le dépôt enregistré auprès de MacLean Sports était majoré de 3 000 $. A. La politique relative aux dépôts en espèces [8] La comptabilité chez MacLean Sports est informatisée. Selon M. MacLean, le logiciel utilisé est [TRADUCTION] « à la fine pointe de la technologie ».

Les reçus d’argent sont générés par le système informatique du magasin et sont remis par un caissier du service des pièces. Le reçu indique l’opération, la somme reçue, le client et le caissier qui a reçu le paiement. Le reçu d’argent produit au moyen de l’ordinateur du magasin donne un enregistrement vérifiable du paiement. Lorsque émis par le caissier, un tel reçu ne peut être changé par le commis vendeur. Un bordereau d’opération est rempli par le commis vendeur.

Une fois rempli, le bordereau d’opération pour la vente d’une motoneige indique, entre autres, l’opération particulière, le commis vendeur, l’acheteur, la motoneige visée, le prix total de la vente, le dépôt et le solde à emprunter. Contrairement au reçu de caisse, le bordereau d’opération peut indiquer un dépôt qui ne correspond pas à la somme effectivement payée. Le formulaire de bordereau d’opération prévoit les signatures à la fois de l’acheteur et du gérant.

Dans les deux cas à l’égard desquels des détails ont été versés au dossier, l’acheteur a signé ce bordereau, mais non le gérant. [9] La preuve produite est incohérente concernant la politique du magasin relative aux dépôts en espèces lors d’achats de motoneiges. Selon la directrice générale de MacLean Sports, Jennifer MacLean, les commis vendeurs n’étaient pas autorisés à percevoir de l’argent. Elle a expliqué que les paiements en espèces devaient être apportés par le client à un caissier du service des pièces [TRADUCTION] « afin que le client puisse recevoir un reçu véritable ».

Jamie Doiron, commis vendeur chez MacLean Sports depuis 15 ans, a indiqué dans son témoignage que les dépôts en espèces étaient apportés, soit par le commis vendeur, soit par le client, au caissier pour qu’il s’en occupe. Selon lui, les commis vendeurs ne remettaient pas de reçus pour les paiements d’argent, cela relevant d’un caissier. Si les caissiers étaient occupés, les commis vendeurs devaient attendre leur tour pour obtenir un reçu pour tout paiement d’argent. Chad McGarity, témoin à décharge, a travaillé comme commis vendeur chez MacLean Sports, mais a démissionné bien avant le vol des dépôts.

Il a raconté que, lorsqu’il travaillait chez MacLean Sports, il arrivait parfois que des dépôts en espèces soient apportés par le commis vendeur à un caissier. L’appelant a témoigné qu’il avait compris que les commis vendeurs étaient autorisés à recevoir de l’argent des clients et à le transmettre à un caissier. Lorsque les caissiers étaient occupés, l’argent pouvait être laissé sur le comptoir en attendant qu’un caissier s’en occupe. [10] Le juge du procès ne s’est pas prononcé sur ce que la politique du magasin, s’il en était, permettait de faire à l’égard des dépôts en espèces.

Manifestement, et avec raison, à mon avis, il a estimé que cela n’avait rien à voir avec la question centrale. Selon les conclusions de fait du juge, l’appelant a pris les dépôts en espèces dans les deux cas (1 000 $ et 5 000 $), aucun caissier n’a produit de reçu et MacLean Sports n’a pas touché les fonds. Comme je l’ai mentionné, dans chaque cas, l’appelant a remis au client un bordereau d’opération censé indiquer, entre autres, le dépôt effectivement payé. B.

Le premier des dépôts en espèces manquants (1 000 $) [11] Jason Hill, 46 ans, a témoigné que, le 4 octobre 2018, il avait décidé de s’acheter une motoneige chez MacLean Sports. À cette fin, il a remis à l’appelant un dépôt de 3 000 $. Au cours de l’interrogatoire principal, il a témoigné que le dépôt entier était en espèces. Au cours du contre-interrogatoire, l’avocat de la défense a rappelé à M. Hill sa déclaration antérieure selon laquelle 2 000 des 3 000 dollars du dépôt avaient été payés au moyen de cartes de débit et de crédit. Dans sa réponse, M.

Hill a reconnu essentiellement qu’il en était peut-être ainsi, ajoutant, cependant : [TRADUCTION] « Les 1 000 $ en espèces ont donc dû disparaître. »

[12] Lors de son interrogatoire principal, M. Hill a témoigné que l’appelant était sorti de son bureau avec les 3 000 $ en main. M. Hill a présumé qu’il les avait apportés à un caissier pour qu’il s’en occupe. À son retour, l’appelant a produit un bordereau d’opération, que M. Hill a signé, confirmant le dépôt de 3 000 $, le solde étant à régler au moyen d’un emprunt. Le document a été reçu en preuve comme pièce n o 2. Comme nous le verrons plus loin, la base de données de MacLean Sports fait état d’un dépôt de 2 000 $ seulement. Toutefois, M.

Hill n’a pris connaissance de l’écart que plus tard. [13] Après que la motoneige lui eut été livrée, M. Hill a connu d’importants problèmes de fonctionnement et, à la suite de ses plaintes, MacLean Sports a accepté de la remplacer. L’appelant ne faisait plus

partie à ce moment-là de son personnel de vente. Selon le témoignage de M me MacLean, la base de données de l’entreprise indiquait que, en octobre 2018, M. Hill avait remis un dépôt de 2 000 $ seulement, lequel n’était pas du tout en espèces. L’écart du montant du dépôt entre la pièce n o 2 et les données du magasin n’est apparu qu’au cours des démarches pour le financement de l’acquisition de la motoneige de rechange. C’est alors que M. Hill a appris que, selon les données du magasin, le dépôt n’avait été que de 2 000 $.

Il a protesté, assurant qu’il avait fait un dépôt de 3 000 $ comme le confirme la pièce n o 2. En fin de compte, MacLean Sports a accepté la version de M. Hill et a assumé la perte des 1 000 $ en fixant à 3 000 $ la valeur du dépôt au moment de clore l’opération visant la motoneige de rechange. [14] Dans son témoignage, l’appelant a affirmé que M. Hill avait fait un dépôt de 2 000 $, contredisant ainsi non seulement le témoignage de M. Hill à cet égard, mais aussi la pièce n o 2, savoir le bordereau d’opération rempli par l’appelant.

Voici l’explication qu’il a donnée au sujet du montant de 3 000 $ qui apparaît dans la pièce n o 2. Au départ, M. Hill voulait faire un versement comptant de 2 000 $ et emprunter le reste. Or, peu avant de se présenter au magasin pour signer les documents d’achat, M. Hill a appelé pour dire qu’il souhaitait augmenter le versement comptant à 3 000 $. L’appelant a alors préparé la pièce n o 2. Cependant, selon l’appelant, M. Hill a changé d’idée, revenant à un dépôt de 2 000 $. L’explication qu’il donne pour la pièce n o 2, laquelle, rappelons-le, porte la signature de M.

Hill et indique le montant de 3 000 $, c’est qu’il a dû utiliser le mauvais bordereau d’opération. M. Hill n’a pas été interrogé à propos de cette version des faits au cours de son contre-interrogatoire par l’avocat de la défense, qui, je m’empresse de préciser, n’est pas celui qui représente l’appelant en appel. C. Le second des dépôts en espèces manquants (5 000 $) [15] En avril 2018, Bradley Keilty, 53 ans, a décidé de s’acheter une motoneige neuve chez MacLean Sports. Il a remis un dépôt en espèces de 2 000 $ à l’appelant, s’engageant à payer le solde avant l’hiver.

Selon la base de données du magasin, l’appelant a remis l’argent à un caissier du magasin, Bobby Doiron. Cependant, l’appelant n’a pas remis à M. Keilty un reçu pour le dépôt de 2 000 $ ni un bordereau d’opération confirmant le paiement du dépôt; M. Keilty et l’appelant se sont simplement serrés la main en signe d’accord. Avant de partir, M. Keilty a dit à l’appelant qu’il essaierait de faire d’autres versements au cours de l’été et qu’il paierait le solde [TRADUCTION] « avant la tombée de la neige ». [16] M.

Keilty ayant omis de faire d’autres versements au cours de l’été et de l’automne, l’appelant l’a appelé pour le presser d’agir. M. Keilty est retourné au magasin le 19 décembre 2018 et, selon son témoignage, il a alors remis 5 000 $ en espèces à l’appelant pour qu’il s’en occupe. M. Keilty a témoigné que l’appelant avait apporté le dépôt en espèces à un autre endroit du magasin et qu’il était revenu avec la pièce n o 1. L’appelant n’a pas remis de reçu de caisse pour les 5 000 $, ni d’ailleurs pour aucun autre montant. M. Keilty est reparti après que l’appelant lui eut remis la pièce n o 1.

Ce bordereau d’opération porte la signature de M. Keilty. En contre-interrogatoire, l’avocat de la défense a avancé l’hypothèse que le second dépôt n’était que de 3 000 $, à quoi M. Keilty a répondu : [TRADUCTION] « Non, j’ai donné 5 000 $ la seconde fois. » Confronté à la pièce n o 1, savoir le bordereau d’opération qu’il a signé et qui indiquait un dépôt total de 5 000 $ seulement, M. Keilty a assuré qu’il avait payé 7 000 $. Lorsqu’on lui a demandé pourquoi il signerait un document [TRADUCTION] « minoré de 2 000 $ », il a répondu : [TRADUCTION] « Je ne sais pas.

Il faut croire que j’avais l’esprit ailleurs ce jour-là. » En réinterrogatoire, M. Keilty a confirmé que l’appelant n’avait pas parcouru avec lui le contenu de la pièce n o 1; l’appelant s’occupait d’un autre client et M. Keilty a signé le document sans l’examiner à fond, juste avant de quitter les lieux. [17] Le 14 janvier 2019, l’appelant a quitté son emploi chez MacLean Sports. Lorsque M. Keilty a appelé MacLean Sports quelques jours plus tard, il a appris que l’appelant n’y travaillait plus et que l’opération pour sa motoneige relevait désormais de Jamie Doiron. Plus tard le même jour, M.

Keilty s’est présenté au magasin avec l’intention de verser 5 000 $ de plus à son compte. C’est alors qu’il a appris que, selon les données du magasin, il n’avait versé en dépôt que 2 000 $. M. Keilty a protesté, assurant qu’il avait payé 7 000 $. M. Doiron n’a pas voulu accepter le dépôt additionnel, préférant attendre que la question du dépôt antérieur soit résolue. M. Keilty est retourné chez lui, a trouvé son « reçu » pour 5 000 $ et a télécopié la pièce n o 1, savoir le bordereau d’opération établi par l’appelant en décembre 2018. Il est clair qu’aux yeux de M.

Keilty, les 5 000 $ de la pièce n o 1 ne correspondaient pas à la totalité du dépôt versé, mais aux 5 000 $ qu’il avait remis en espèces à l’appelant le 19 décembre 2018. [18] Lorsque M. Keilty a téléphoné à MacLean Sports le 17 janvier 2019, il a appris que 5 000 $

semblaient avoir disparu. Au cours d’un appel qu’il a reçu de la direction du magasin un jour ou deux plus tard, il a de nouveau assuré que deux dépôts en espèces avaient été faits : un de 2 000 $ en avril 2018 et un autre de 5 000 $ en décembre 2018. M. MacLean a tenté de contacter l’appelant pour obtenir son point de vue sur la disparition des 5 000 $. Il a laissé un message sur le téléphone cellulaire de l’appelant, mais on ne l’a pas rappelé. M. MacLean a ensuite contacté la police pour signaler le vol du dépôt en espèces de 5 000 $ de M. Keilty.

MacLean Sports a fini par accepter la version des faits mise de l’avant par M. Keilty et a assumé la perte des 5 000 $ au moment de clore l’opération à l’égard de la motoneige en lui créditant 7 000 $ pour la totalité des dépôts en espèces. [19] L’appelant a témoigné que M. Keilty avait fait un dépôt de 2 000 $ en avril 2018, et qu’il était retourné avant Noël pour faire un dépôt additionnel. Selon l’appelant, M. Keilty lui a remis 3 000 $ en espèces à ce moment-là.

L’appelant a placé l’argent dans une enveloppe, a inscrit « Keilty » au recto de l’enveloppe et l’a apportée au service des pièces pour qu’un caissier s’en occupe. Comme il y avait une file d’attente (apparemment à toutes les caisses), l’appelant a confié l’enveloppe à un caissier et lui a demandé d’imputer le paiement au compte de M. Keilty. Le caissier, dont l’appelant, dans son témoignage, ne pouvait se rappeler le nom, l’a informé qu’ils étaient occupés et qu’il y verrait plus tard. M. Keilty n’a pas demandé de reçu. Il a remis à M. Keilty la pièce n o 1 faisant foi d’un dépôt total de 5 000 $.

Interrogé pour savoir comment le dépôt en espèces de 3 000 $ qu’il aurait laissé sur le comptoir a pu disparaître, l’appelant a répondu : [TRADUCTION] « [T]out ce que je peux voir, c’est qu’une fois l’argent remis au service des pièces, on ne s’est simplement pas occupé d’y donner suite. » En contre-interrogatoire, l’appelant a ajouté : [TRADUCTION] « [I]l a été laissé sur un comptoir qui […] est manifestement à la vue du public et du service des pièces, parce qu’on ne l’a pas pris tout de suite[…] Je sais où je l’ai laissé, et c’est… c’est tout, un point c’est tout. » L’appelant a déclaré qu’il avait encerclé la

partie de la pièce n o 1 qui précisait le montant de 5 000 $ pour le dépôt, afin d’attirer l’attention de M. Keilty sur le montant total du versement. Même si l’appelant a témoigné qu’il ne rejetait pas la faute sur le caissier non identifié ni aucun autre caissier pour la disparition des 3 000 $ en espèces, la défense a invité le juge à considérer cette conclusion comme plausible au vu de la preuve. [20] M me MacLean a affirmé dans son témoignage que le montant du dépôt indiqué dans la pièce n o 1 (5 000 $) était inexact, car il dépassait de 3 000 $ la somme perçue par MacLean Sports.

Elle a conclu que le chiffre de 5 000 $ de la pièce n o 1 était [TRADUCTION] « le fruit d’une manipulation […], car il n’y a jamais eu de dépôt de 5 000 $ » remis à MacLean Sports. Comme il est mentionné plus haut, M. Keilty a affirmé dans son témoignage que le montant de son dépôt indiqué dans le document était minoré de 2 000 $. M me MacLean a expliqué que, contrairement à un bordereau d’opération, un reçu de caisse généré par ordinateur ne pouvait pas être [TRADUCTION] « truqué ». [21] Jamie Doiron a témoigné que, le 16 janvier 2019, M.

Keilty était venu pour ajouter un dépôt de 5 000 $ envers l’achat d’une motoneige et qu’il avait demandé de voir son solde. M. Doiron a ouvert son compte dans la base de données; on y voyait un dépôt de 2 000 $ seulement. Lorsque M. Keilty a protesté, assurant qu’il avait payé en fait 7 000 $, M. Doiron a demandé une pièce justificative. M. Keilty est retourné chez lui et a télécopié la pièce n o 1, pensant manifestement qu’elle confirmait son affirmation voulant qu’il ait remis un dépôt en espèces de 5 000 $ le 19 décembre 2018. [22] M. MacLean a témoigné qu’il avait fini par accepter la version de M.

Keilty relativement au dépôt et avait assumé la perte de 5 000 $. Il a expliqué que, jusqu’à ce que M. Keilty produise la pièce n o 1, MacLean Sports ignorait qu’il manquait 5 000 $, puisque cette somme [TRADUCTION] « n’avait jamais été entrée dans la base de données ». M. MacLean a aussi témoigné que l’appelant avait obtenu des avances sur ses commissions durant le second semestre de 2018 parce que ses commissions gagnées ne lui permettaient pas de joindre les deux bouts. Selon M. MacLean, lorsque l’appelant a démissionné en janvier 2019, il devait 6 900 $ en commissions non gagnées à MacLean Sports.

Dans son témoignage, l’appelant a nié cette allégation. Quoi qu’il en soit, M. MacLean a réfuté en contre-interrogatoire la conjecture mise de l’avant par l’avocat de la défense voulant qu’un caissier eût pu voler le dépôt en espèces de 3 000 $ que l’appelant a prétendu qu’il avait transmis. M. MacLean a expliqué que le caissier aurait su qu’on aurait sûrement découvert son détournement de fonds très rapidement. À son avis, ce serait, pour un caissier, un [TRADUCTION] « jeu extrêmement dangereux […] que de s’emparer de 3 000 $ comme ça » sachant que la motoneige serait livrée dans quelques jours.

À ce propos, je ferai remarquer, en passant, que le caissier qui aurait volé le dépôt en espèces de 3 000 $ aurait su que le vol était susceptible d’être vu par un collègue et que toute profession d’innocence subséquente serait démentie par aussi bien le commis vendeur que le client. [23] La défense a appelé Ethan Roscoe, neveu de l’appelant, à témoigner. Il travaillait dans le service des pièces chez MacLean Sports pendant le second semestre de 2018.

Il a témoigné qu’il arrivait que des espèces fussent laissées par un commis vendeur sur le comptoir ou sur une tablette arrière du service des pièces, pour être apportées au bureau du comptable à la fin de la journée. M. Roscoe se souvenait d’avoir vu un employé du service des pièces recevoir une épaisse liasse de billets d’un commis vendeur, [TRADUCTION] « laquelle est restée […] à la gauche de l’écran d’ordinateur pendant une bonne part

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