r V. M., 2013 QCCA 1881

Leacock c. R. 2013 QCCA 1881 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-004985-113 - 500-10-005037-112 (500-01-025677-094) DATE: NOVEMBER 4, 2013 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. JACQUES R. FOURNIER, J.A. DOMINIQUE BÉLANGER, J.A. GAMON LEACOCK APPELANT - Accused v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT - Prosecutor JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Gamon Leacock appeals a conviction pronounced by the Quebec Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Judge Pierre E.

Labelle), on July 5, 2011, and asks for leave to appeal from a judgment on sentence rendered by the same judge on October 20, 2011. [ 2 ] The appellant was found guilty of assault, forcible confinement, sexual assault with a weapon, uttering threats, administrating a noxious substance and theft regarding events that took place on August 16, 2009, involving two victims: K. M., 18, and her boyfriend, V. M., 19. [ 3 ] K. M. who lives with her mother. On the night of August 16, 2009, she and her boyfriend were at home, after K. M. had returned from work, around midnight. The appellant, a friend of K.

M.'s mother, rang the doorbell and entered the apartment, saying he was hungry and wanted to order a pizza. [ 4 ] What followed thereafter was in dispute at trial. The complainants K. M. and V. M. testified for the Crown and the appellant testified in his own defence. [ 5 ] According to the complainants' testimony, while K. M. was looking for menus in the kitchen, the appellant, under the influence of drugs, went to the living room where he struck V. M. in his face and tied his hands with electrical cords. Afterwards, he instructed K.

M. to go in her mother's bedroom, to remove her clothing and to kneel on the bed. He sexually assaulted her with a knife at her back. The assault continued over about four hours and at one point the appellant assaulted K. M. using sex toys that belong to K. M.'s mother. He also obliged V. M. to have sexual relations with his girlfriend and forced both of them to smoke crack cocaine with him. After several hours, the appellant wanted to procure more drugs. He asked for money and as the complainants K. M. and V. M. had none, he stole K.

M.'s debit card from her wallet and demanded her personal identification number (PIN), which he received. He left the residence with the cellular phone of V. M. and withdrew $200 from K. M.'s bank account. Very early in the morning, the complainants, in shock, went to see K. M.'s mother who was at her boyfriend's residence. The police were called and K. M. and V. M. were taken to the hospital. Sex toys were found scattered all over the floor of the bedroom. [ 6 ] The appellant did not deny that he had sexual relations with the complainant K. M. during the night of August 16, 2009.

In his defence, he testified that the relations, which took place in the presence of and with the knowledge of the complainant’s boyfriend V. M., were consensual. He denied having committed any sexual assault in respect of either K. M. or V. M., and denied all acts of violence, the use of sex toys, forcible confinement, threats and use of a weapon. The appellant said that he, K. M. and V. M. all consumed crack- cocaine during the evening. He claimed that he did not steal K.

M.’s debit card, but rather that she allowed him to use it and freely provided him with her PIN. [ 7 ] The trial judge did not believe the better part of the appellant’s testimony, saying that it “flies in the face of common sense”. On this point, he wrote the following: [63] I believe the accused when he says that he was present in the apartment of the victim on the night in question.

I also believe him when he testified that he left the apartment with the bankcard of the victim and that he withdrew money from her bank account. [64] It is with the rest of his evidence that I have problems with. [65] According to him, both victims are not only habitual drug users, but they are habitual crack cocaine smokers. This did not

transpire from the whole of the evidence. Both victims denied having used drugs, except for K. M. who admitted that she now smokes cannabis from time to time. [66] The accused testified that he got to the apartment of the victim around 12:30 and that she had already been drinking. This affirmation does not fit with the rest of the evidence. K. M. had just come back from work and was just out of the shower. [67] More importantly, I just do not believe that K.

M. came on to him and had a consensual sexual relationship with him while her boyfriend looked on, more interested in smoking crack and that he started to get jealous only when the drugs ran out. This just flies in the face of common sense. [68] Adding his denials regarding the use of the sex toys, which were found all over the floor of the bedroom, and his denial that M.

V. had been tied with electrical cords on which human epithelial tissues were recovered, I reject the accused version on what transpired when he was inside the apartment. [69] In coming to this conclusion, I also take into consideration the fact that the memory of the events was a whole lot clearer for the accused when he testified regarding his presence in the apartment than for what had happened the rest of the night and the next morning. As a whole, I would say that the evidence given by the accused seemed made to measure to fit within the frame laid out by the evidence of the Crown.

I also have to consider that the accused possesses a lengthy criminal record and is a habitual crack user. [ 8 ] The appellant relies on R. v. C.L.Y . [1] and R. v. Shalaby [2] and argues that the judge's reasoning and his analysis of the evidence were not made in accordance with the principles set forth in R. v. W.(D.) [3] . [ 9 ] He submits that even if the judge set aside his testimony at trial because he considered it to lack credibility, he was bound to consider it in light of the whole of the evidence. The appellant said the judge omitted to do so.

He submits that this amounted to an error of law in that the judge erred in the application of the second step of the test in R. v. W.(D.) . [ 10 ] The appellant was the sole witness called by the defence. After having decided that he did not believe the appellant’s testimony as to what transpired in the apartment, the judge wrote: [70] I know turn to the second step of the W. D. analysis. The testimony of Mr. Leacock was the only evidence offered in defence.

Since I do not believe his version of the facts of what took place in the apartment, I come to the conclusion that the defence in its entirety does not raise a reasonable doubt. [ 11 ] It is this passage of the judgment, and in particular the judge’s reference to the fact that “the defence in its entirety does not raise a reasonable doubt”, that the appellant cites as the source of the judge’s error. He argues that by measuring the appellant’s version of the facts against the evidence of the “defence”, rather than as against the whole of the evidence, the judge misapplied R. v.

W.(D.) . [ 12 ] It is true that the turn of phrase in paragraph [70], insofar as it is the possible source of confusion as to the judge’s line of reasoning, may have been ill-chosen.

Read on its own, paragraph [70] might well suggest the judge mistakenly thought that, since he had set aside the appellant's testimony, the defence did not raise a reasonable doubt and that he did not have to consider whether, in light of the whole of the evidence, he was convinced by that evidence of the appellant’s guilt. [ 13 ] According to the appellant, this amounts to an overriding error and requires that the guilty verdict be set aside and a new trial ordered.

Moreover, in the appellant’s view, the tenor of the judgment precludes the reader from understanding why certain aspects of the evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt. [ 14 ] We disagree with the appellant. As will be explained in the paragraphs that follow, the judge analyzed the arguments raised by the defence which, in effect, amounted to a complete denial of all of the evidence upon which the charges rested.

The judge did not convict the appellant simply because he disbelieved his testimony or preferred that of the complainants but arrived at the conclusion that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after having considered all of the evidence. [ 15 ] A review of the judgment as a whole [4] indicates that the judge first summarized all of the testimony he heard [5] , that he next analyzed the appellant’s testimony in light of the whole of the evidence [6] , including the cross-examinations of the two complainants [7] . All of the steps set forth in R. v.

W.(D). were properly addressed and, in particular, the judgment considered as a whole convinces the reader that the judge respected the presumption of innocence. [ 16 ] It bears recalling that in Dinardo [8] , Charron J. emphasized the importance for a trial judge to direct his or her mind to the decisive question of whether the “accused's evidence, considered in the context of the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt”: [23] The majority rightly stated that there is nothing sacrosanct about the formula set out in W. (D.) .

Indeed, as Chamberland J.A. himself acknowledged in his dissenting reasons, the assessment of credibility will not always lend itself to the adoption of the three distinct steps suggested in W. (D.) ; it will depend on the context (para. 112). What matters is that the substance of the W. (D.) instruction be respected. In a case that turns on credibility, such as this one, the trial judge must direct his or her mind to the decisive question of whether the accused’s evidence, considered in the context of the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Put differently, the trial judge must consider whether the evidence as a whole establishes the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view, the substantive concerns with the trial judge’s decision in this case can better be dealt with under the rubric of the sufficiency of his reasons for judgment. [ 17 ] Courts have repeatedly held that the steps in R. v. W.(D.) . need not to be recited as a strict formula [9] . What is essential is that the burden of proof and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt be properly applied [10] .

Trial judges are not required to explain in minute detail the line of reasoning they followed to arrive at their verdict. [ 18 ] Moreover, the order in which trial judges set forth their conclusions in respect of the credibility of witnesses is generally of no

material consequence as long as the principle that proof must be made beyond a reasonable doubt is their paramount concern, as was explained recently by Karakatsanis J. [11] : [21] The paramount question in a criminal case is whether, on the whole of the evidence, the trier of fact is left with a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused: W.(D . ) , at p. 758. The order in which a trial judge makes credibility findings of witnesses is inconsequential as long as the principle of reasonable doubt remains the central consideration.

A verdict of guilt must not be based on a choice between the accused’s evidence and the Crown’s evidence: R. v. C.L.Y. , 2008 SCC 2 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 5, at paras. 6-8 . However, trial judges are not required to explain in detail the process they followed to reach a verdict: see R. v.

Boucher , 2005 SCC 72 , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 499, at para. 29 . [ 19 ] Contrary to appellant's submission, a reading of the judgment as a whole, shows that the judge did not consider the appellant's lack of credibility as the equivalent of proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 20 ] In his factum, appellant submits that the judge committed fundamental errors in his appraisal of the proof.

According to the appellant, even if the judge did not believe his version of the facts, he had to ask himself if this version raised a doubt given the contradictions raised by the different cross examinations and in the context of the evidence as a whole. [ 21 ] The appellant identifies seven specific aspects of the evidence which, he argues, go unexplained in the judgment and which should have raised a reasonable doubt in the judge’s mind : ➢ The threats: the appellant pointedly denied having uttered any threats whatsoever. The complainant K. M. testified that she did not recall receiving death threats. K.

M. did say that the appellant repeatedly said to V. M. not to try anything but that she did not recall whether V. M. received threats from the appellant. V. M. testified that the appellant threatened both him and K. M.. The appellant argues on appeal that these “contradictions” mean that his own testimony in which he denied uttering threats was more likely to be truthful and that it should have raised a doubt. ➢ The use of the knife: The appellant denies using a knife to threaten the complainants. K. M. said she saw the knife when the appellant used it to cut open the soda can to smoke crack, whereas V.

M. testified that the appellant was constantly threatening him with the knife and had the knife pointed at the back of K. M. while he was sexually assaulting her. According to the appellant, these “contradictions” should have raised a doubt in the judge’s mind. ➢ The forcible confinement of the complainant V. M.: because the laboratory analysis of the two electrical cords did not reveal any DNA evidence, the appellant’s denial that he tied V. M. up using the cords should have raised a reasonable doubt. ➢ The injuries to V. M.’s face and wrists: the appellant denies having hit V. M..

Given that no photographs were taken and that the medical personnel did not record the presence of injuries described by V. M., this should have raised a reasonable doubt. ➢ The clothing: the appellant submits that DNA analysis of the clothing was inconclusive which should have raised a reasonable doubt. ➢ The forcible confinement of K. M.: the appellant denies having forcibly confined the complainant K. M.. The appellant says that because she went to the kitchen while he was in the bedroom, K. M. could well have used the telephone or even escaped through the kitchen door. K.

M. testified that she did not even think of doing either of these two things. According to the appellant, this should have raised a reasonable doubt in the judge’s mind. ➢ The use of sex toys: the appellant denies using sex toys with K. M.. The mother of the complainant K. M. testified that, after the events, she had gathered up all the objects that were in the bedroom.

According to the appellant, the fact that this key incriminating evidence had been removed from the scene of the crime should have elicited a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge. [ 22 ] It is plain from the judgment when read as a whole that none of the denials of the appellant raised a doubt in the judge’s mind. [ 23 ] The evaluation of the credibility of the testimony provided made by the complainants is a matter best left to for the trial judge given his first-hand opportunity to hear the evidence.

The judge analyzed most of the points raised by the defence and none of them raised a reasonable doubt in his mind. Firstly, the judge considered the complainants’ credibility as follows: [73] There is also the testimony of both victims. They recounted the events of that night with objectivity, purpose and detachment. Their responses often arrived after a certain period of thinking. Their evidence as a whole was not shaken by cross-examination. [74] Defence counsel raised some issues in regards with the credibility of the witnesses, more specifically with K.

M. regarding the fact that she did not leave the apartment or called for help when she had a chance to do so. It must be remembered that during these briefs periods of time, her boyfriend was still in the immediate presence of the accused, who had demonstrated extreme violence towards the couple and was, armed a knife. [75] Also, there is the testimony of the mother of K. M. as to the mental state of both victims; they were in shock, a fact corroborated by the police officers that also saw them after the assault.

There is also the state of the bedroom, with sex toys strewn about and finally the electrical cords that were seized; they were identified by V. M. and DNA analysis showed a human genetic footprint. [76] After hearing both of them testify and even with the small differences in their stories, I believe them, and their testimonies convince me. [ 24 ] It appears from the whole of the evidence that the appellant was constantly speaking with the complainant V. M., even while he was sexually assaulting K. M.. The appellant addressed his remarks to V. M.. The testimony of V.

M. is clear: the appellant uttered deaths threats directed at him and directed at K. M. In answer to questions at trial, V. M. stated:

Q. And why didn't you try to go to the bed… A. Because he kept on threatening me, saying: If you move I am going to kill your girlfriend. If my girlfriend move does anything he is going to kill her. Either way he kept on threatening her and threatening me. […] Q. Did you hear anything going on? Did you hear either K. or Mr. Leacock say anything? A. No, Mr Leacock was just threatening and calling me names, calling me a bitch, etc., as I said, and K. did not say anything because I don't know what, maybe she was in a state of shock too or what but she would not say anything. [ 25 ] The complainant K.

M. confirmed that the appellant said repeatedly: Vaun, don’t try anything . [ 26 ] The judge concluded the following on the basis of V. M.’s testimony: [30] He saw the accused sexually assault his girlfriend. She was kneeling on the bed and the accused was behind her. During the assault, the accused threatened V. M. continuously and ordered him to show his hands at all time. [31] After some time, the accused ordered V. M. to come into the bedroom and sit on the bed. Upon entering the room, he saw that his girlfriend was covered in spit and the accused had a knife in his hands and he was using it to threaten them.

During the course of the assault, the accused ordered V. M. to come behind his girlfriend and to have sexual relation with her. He even tried to put V. M.'s penis in. [ 27 ] The evidence made plain that the complainants were traumatized by the assault and were in a state of shock at the time. The judge heard this evidence and took into account whatever divergences may have existed as between their accounts. [ 28 ] V. M. also testified that the appellant had a knife, that he had been bound at the wrists with two electrical cords by the appellant and that the appellant had hit him in the face.

It was not unreasonable to hold that K. M. did not see the knife during the sexual assault given that she had her face up against the mattress and her back turned to the appellant. [ 29 ] Police Officer Leblanc testified as to the presence of objects on the floor of the bedroom and as to the presence of the electrical wires. This corroborated the testimony of the two complainants. [ 30 ] The judge warned himself as to the absence of DNA evidence on the clothing and on the electrical cords.

He was well aware of these facts and wrote: [71] Upon embarking on the third part of the analysis, I am fully aware that the evidence does not reveal any physical link between the accused and the apartment, even if the evidence revealed some elements of evidence that should or at least could have revealed the presence of DNA. On this issue, the black-t-shirt and the clothing that K. M. wore that night come to mind. No evidence was put before me to explain the negative results, not being an expert, I cannot give any other

interpretation to these results than nothing was found. [ 31 ] It is true that the police officers, including Officer Leblanc, did not give evidence that V. M. had marks on his face. It would seem that the question was not asked. This does not, however, amount to a contradiction but was, at most, an aspect of evidence from the complainant that was uncorroborated by a neutral witness. Three other witnesses did confirm the presence of the marks.

It fell to the judge to evaluate this evidence, which he did. [ 32 ] In paragraph 74 of his reasons, the judge explained why he concluded that there had been forcible confinement notwithstanding the fact that K. M. might have escaped through the kitchen door. [ 33 ] While the sex toys were not seized, police officers Daigneault and Leblanc asserted that they saw them in the mother’s bedroom, on the floor and on the bed, on the day of the events.

Moreover, the bedroom was in a state of disarray. [ 34 ] The appellant has not demonstrated that the judge committed a palpable and overriding error in his evaluation of the evidence, nor has he shown that the cross-examinations or the evidence as a whole should have raised a reasonable doubt. When the judgment is considered as a whole, the judge applied R. v. W.(D.) . correctly.

There was ample evidence in support of the verdict. [ 35 ] It bears recalling that the judge was not bound to take up all the elements of the evidence that contributed to his sense as to why the appellant’s testimony was not credible in his judgment [12] . Nor was he necessarily bound to reconcile all the details of the complainants’ respective accounts, even if this testimony did indicate small differences. His analysis of the evidence is sufficient to understand the reasons why he had no reasonable doubt as to the verdict.

The Sentence [ 36 ] The appellant contends that a sentence of three years consecutive to the seven year sentence he is currently serving in respect of other crimes would have been sufficient. The judge sentenced him instead to a further seven-year prison term. [ 37 ] The judge was of the view that the appropriate sentence should fall within a range from six and one-half years to nine years. The cases of R. v. Charlemagne [13] , R. v. Assing [14] et R. v.

Cadorette [15] to which the judge referred demonstrate that the sentence was appropriate. [ 38 ] The table annexed to this judgment indicates a wide range of sentences, between three and one-half years and 18 years, for sexual assault with a weapon. In some cases where sentences are less harsh, one observes the presence of mitigating factors, including the age of the offender, a manifestation of remorse, etc. [ 39 ] The judge was of the view that no mitigating factor applied in the circumstances, but he did identify aggravating factors, including the presence of two victims, an abuse of trust of the victim K.

M., the use of a knife, the protracted duration of the sexual

assault, the degrading nature of the acts committed, the objects used in the course of the assault, the fact that the offender forced V. M. to witness the sexual assault of his girlfriend and the state of intoxication of the offender. The judge took account of the total lack of compassion the appellant showed for his victims and his absence of remorse, the consequences of the assault on the victims, in particular for the complainant K.

M. for whom the consequences have been most serious, as well as the criminal record of the appellant that showed a history of violent crime and a distinct possibility of re-offending.

The judge recognized the need to isolate the appellant from society and accorded less importance to the possibility of rehabilitation in the circumstances. [ 40 ] The appellant submits that the judge committed two errors. [ 41 ] First, the judge is said to have failed to take account of the fact that the sentence, when added to the seven years that the appellant is serving for other crimes, amounts to a total of 14 years of imprisonment, which is inappropriate in the circumstances. [ 42 ] The judge made no such error. He was well aware that in imposing the sentence, paragraph 718.2 (

c) of the Criminal Code required him to consider the totality of the sentence that the appellant would have to serve. As he wrote in his judgment, he took account of this obligation: In imposing a sentence,

Section 718.2 (

c) of the Criminal Code requires that Court considers the totality of the sentence to be served so that it is no unduly harsh or that it becomes unjust and has an effect of quashing all hopes of rehabilitation for the offender. It cannot be contested that the sexual assaults on V. M. end K. M. are different events and constitute a different transaction and the series of robberies that netted a total sentence of seven (7) years for the offender.

Thus the sentence in the present file should not only reflect the fact that he is currently serving a long sentence but also take into consideration all relevant factors enumerated above. [ 43 ] Secondly, the appellant submits that the judge erred in his implementation of the principle of harmonization of sentences in that he imposed four years of imprisonment on the count of sexual assault in respect of V. M. (count 4) while imposing seven years from the same count concerning K. M. (count 11).

According to the appellant, the difference in the sentences between the two is not justified. [ 44 ] Again, the appellant has failed to demonstrate a reviewable error by the judge. The evidence shows that the duration of the sexual assault experienced by K. M., as well as the severity of the assault inflicted on her, most certainly justify the disparity between the two sentences, even before one considers the consequences of K. M.’s state of health. It is sufficient to say that K.

M. was assaulted by the appellant over a very long period and with a significant degree of violence and degradation, including the use of foreign objects. [ 45 ] The appellant is mistaken in the manner in which he invokes the principle of harmonization. The proper application of that principle does not preclude a disparity between two sentences where two victims are subject to sexual assaults of differing degrees, even when they occur as part of a single criminal transaction, where the disparity is justified in the circumstances.

This was the case here. [ 46 ] As a general rule, there are no uniform sentences for a given crime. This is particularly true in the case of sexual assaults like the ones in this case that were characterized by different degrees of violence and brutality, of denigrating language, of length, and which give rise to different consequences for the victims. [ 47 ] In conclusion, leave to appeal from the sentence is granted but the appeal will be dismissed. The appellant has shown no error that would allow the Court to disturb the exercise of discretion by the judge in imposing sentence.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COURT : [ 48 ] DISMISSES the appeal from the judgment on the verdict; [ 49 ] GRANTS the motion for leave to appeal on the sentence; [ 50 ] DISMISSES the appeal on the sentence. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. JACQUES R. FOURNIER, J.A. DOMINIQUE BÉLANGER, J.A. Mtre Rita Magloé Francis For the appellant Mtre Geneviève Langlois Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions of Quebec For the respondent Date of hearing: October 7, 2013 TABLEAU DES PEINES AGRESSION SEXUELLE ARMÉE (art. 272C.cr.)

Références Infractions Faits saillants Facteurs aggravants Facteurs atténuants Peines R. c. Cadorette 2011 QCCA 1792 Cité par le juge de première instance . 1X Agression sexuelle causant des lésions corporelles − Le délinquant et la victime se rencontrent lors d'une fête. − L'accusé loue une chambre d'hôtel. − La victime est sous l'effet de l'alcool, elle n'a pas de souvenir de l'événement. − Elle se réveille le matin, sans son pantalon ni sous-vêtements.

Elle a mal aux lèvres inférieures du vagin. − Ecchymoses sur la cuisse et le genou. − Abus de confiance à l'égard de la victime, qui est vulnérable en raison de la consommation abusive d'alcool. − Brutalité − Comportement de l'accusé à la suite de la commission de l'infraction : tente d'incriminer quelqu'un d'autre. − Pénétrations vaginale et anale sans protection. − Jeune âge de l'accusé (23 ans) − Absence d'antécédents judiciaires. − Emploi stable. Peine globale 3 ans et demi R. c.

Choquette J.E. 2001-1627 1X Agression sexuelle causant des lésions corporelles 1X Séquestration 1X Menaces de mort − La victime connaît le délinquant. − Le délinquant entre dans la maison de la victime dans la nuit, alors que les deux jeunes filles de la victime s'y trouvent − Menaces de mort, étranglement. − Agression sexuelle (Vibrateur dans l'anus et le vagin, fellation) − Agression dure 1h30. − Intrusion de nuit dans une résidence sans y être invité − Position de force − Certaines formes de préméditation − Acte de violence physique − Violence verbale, propos dénigrants − Proximité de deux enfants mineurs − Séquelles physiques et psychologiques chez la victime − Jeune âge de l'accusé (24 ans) − Absence d'antécédent judiciaire − Emploi stable − Milieu familial adéquat − Soutien familial Peine globale 3 ans et demi − Agression sexuelle causant des lésions corporelles : 28 mois − Séquestration : 12 mois − Menaces de mort:10 mois

R . v.

D.T.K. 2002 BCCA 190 1X Introduction par effraction 1X Agression sexuelle armée 1X Séquestration − Le délinquant est un jeune autochtone − Le délinquant est entré par la porte arrière de la maison de la victime − Il est arrivé dans la chambre où la victime dormait − Agression sexuelle (pénétration digitale) − Utilisation d'une arme pour menacer − Délinquant s'est endormi et est retrouvé le lendemain par les policiers − Victime prise par surprise − Introduction par effraction dans la maison de la victime − Âge du délinquant (20 ans) − Le délinquant a vécu dans un milieu autochtone très difficile. − Sa jeunesse a été très chaotique. − Mauvaise relation avec ses parents. − Aucun emploi stable, excepté celui qu'il exerce depuis l'événement − Possibilité réelle de réhabilitation Peine globale 4 ans (La Cour d'appel substitue une peine de 4 ans à la peine de 6 ans qu'avait octroyée le Tribunal de première instance, vu la situation particulière du jeune délinquant autochtone).

R. v. A.A.B. [ 1997] A.J. No. 1148 1X Agression sexuelle armée − Le délinquant est un ami de la famille de la victime. − Victime âgée de 16 ans. − La victime laisse entrer le délinquant dans la maison, alors que ses tuteurs sont absents. − Agression sexuelle avec un couteau. − Aucune blessure physique. − Planification − Infraction commise au domicile de la victime. − Présence d'enfants dans la maison où l'infraction a été commise. − Abus de confiance − Aucun Peine globale 4 ans et demi (moins 2 ans de détention) La Cour d'appel confirme la peine en soulignant qu'il s'agit d'une sentence au bas de l'échelle. R. v.

Reis 2011 BCSC 319 1X Agression sexuelle armée 1X Séquestration − Le délinquant ne connaissait pas la victime − Agression a lieu chez le délinquant dans le cadre d'une vente de stupéfiants. − Événement unique − Pénétration vaginale et anale, fellation, utilisation d'un godemiché. − Menace et intimidation à l'aide d'un bâton de base-ball et d'une épée. − Utilisation d'un câble de télévision pour ligoter les mains de la victime − Consommation de crack par la victime durant l'agression sexuelle à la demande du délinquant. − Agression de longue durée. − Plusieurs actes sexuels. − Utilisation de deux armes dans le but d'intimider. − Impact psychologique dévastateur et permanent sur la victime. − Comportement menaçant et agressif. − Victime vulnérable en raison de sa dépendance à la drogue. − Soutien considérable de la part de la famille et des amis du délinquant. − Absence d'antécédent judiciaire (mitigé compte tenu des activités criminelles non détectées du délinquant).

Peine globale 5 ans

R. v.

Sazmand 2010 BCSC 1905 1X Agression sexuelle armée − Le délinquant ne connaît pas la victime. − Agression spontanée commise à l'occasion d'un vol au domicile de la victime. − Agression commise sous la menace d'un couteau placé à proximité. − Pénétration digitale, pénétration, fellation, utilisation d'un godemiché. − Plaidoyer de culpabilité. − La nature même de l'infraction; le délinquant est entré dans le domicile de la victime alors qu'elle dormait. − Le délinquant portait un bas afin de camoufler son visage. − Agression prolongée (45 minutes) − Impact dévastateur et permanent sur la victime. − Jeune âge de l'accusé (19 ans) − Historique familial difficile − Admission de culpabilité dès l'arrestation et plaidoyer de culpabilité − Remords exprimés par l'accusé à la fin de l'agression et lors de son procès. − Aucun antécédent judiciaire.

Peine globale 5 ans (Moins 16 mois de détention préventive) R. v.

J.E.T. 2005 B.C.J. 206 1X Agression sexuelle armée − Le délinquant a 18 ans. − Le délinquant connaît la victime depuis qu'il est jeune. − Durant la nuit, le délinquant entre dans la maison de la victime alors qu'elle est endormie. − Menace à l'aide d'un bâton de base-ball − Agression sexuelle (Cunnilingus, fellation, pénétration) − Le délinquant a pris les téléphones de la maison et a débranché les fils. − Délinquant consomme de la marijuana pendant l'agression. − Circonstances extrêmement graves − Planification − Entrée dans une maison d'habitation − Séquestration − Menaces − Intimidation − Agression sexuelle violente sur une victime vulnérable − Abus de confiance − Séquelles psychologiques. − Âge du délinquant − Plaidoyer de culpabilité − Accord pour se soumettre à un test du V.I.H.

Peine globale 6 ans (une peine applicable aux adultes a été imposée au délinquant)

Gamon Leacock No : 200-01- 025677-094 1X Voies de fait. 2X Administration d'une substance délétère. 2X Séquestration 2X Agression sexuelle armée 2X Menace de mort 2X Vol qualifié − Le délinquant est un ami de la famille d'une des victimes. − Il se présente au domicile d'une des victimes. − Le délinquant frappe et ligote une première victime. − Il agresse sexuellement l'autre victime. (Pénétration et utilisation d'objets sexuels) − Il ordonne à la première victime de regarder l'agression sexuelle et de pénétrer l'autre victime. − Le délinquant porte un couteau. − Durant l'agression, le délinquant consomme du crack et ordonne aux victimes d'en inhaler. − L'agression dure 4 heures. − Vol d'une carte bancaire − Présence de 2 victimes − Abus de confiance − Utilisation d'un couteau − Période de temps pendant laquelle s'est déroulée l'agression sexuelle. − Utilisation d'objets pendant l'agression sexuelle. − Actes dégradants − Le délinquant a forcé une victime à regarder l'agression sexuelle subie par sa conjointe. − Le délinquant était dans un état d'intoxication sévère dû à la consommation de crack. − Absence de compassion/ sympathie. − Les conséquences chez les victimes.

Fin de leur relation. − Plusieurs antécédents judiciaires (surtout des vols qualifiés et menaces) − Aucun Peine globale 7 ans

R. v. Assing (ON SC),[2008] O.J. No.4527 Cité par le juge depremière instance. 1X Agressionsexuelle armée 1X Séquestration 1x Vol − Le délinquant neconnaît pas la victime. − Événement unique − Le délinquant porte uncouteau au visage de lavictime et la contraint à lesuivre dans un édificeavoisinant. − Le délinquant volel'argent, le cellulaire et deschèques à la victime. − Le délinquant frappe lavictime sur le visage, lecorps et la tête.

Il attacheses mains derrière sondos. − Agression sexuellecomplète (2 pénétrationsvaginales) − La victime a denombreuses ecchymoses,contusions et enflures surle visage et le corps − Plaidoyer deculpabilité − Attaque violente d'unétranger sur une victimevulnérable, initialementdans un endroit public. − Couteau porté près duvisage et menaces del'utiliser. − Enlèvement etisolement où la victime aété ligotée. − Agression sexuelle àdeux reprises. − Violence physique etintimidation. − Séquelles physiques etpsychologiques − Relations sexuellesnon protégées. − Actes brutaux,humiliants et dégradants. − Abandonne lavictime alors qu'elle estattachée et blessée. − Absenced'antécédentsjudiciaires. − Le délinquantreçoit le soutien desa famille. − Volonté dudélinquant à suivreune thérapie Peine globale 9 ans (Moins 5 ans etdemi de détentionprovisoire) − Agressionsexuelle armée : 9ans − Enlèvement : 2ans − Vol :2 ans.

R. v. Broekaert 2003 MBCA 10 1X Agressionsexuelle armée. − Le délinquant neconnaissait pas la victime. − Événement unique. − Le délinquant a agrippéla victime à la sortie d'unbar. − Agression sexuelle avecl'utilisation d'un tournevis. − Le délinquant était sousl'effet de l'alcool. − Menaces de mort. − Plaidoyers deculpabilité − Blessures physiquesimportantes. − Scénario troublant − Menaces de mort − Agression sexuellelongue, dégradante etsauvage. − Blessures graves et denature sexuelle. − Séquelles physiques etpsychologiquesimportantes − Peud'antécédentsjudiciaires. − Admission deculpabilité.

Peine globale 11 ans et demi

R. c.

Charlemagne [2000] J.Q. no 5639 Cité par le juge de première instance. 1X Agression sexuelle armée 1X Enlèvement / 98Séquestration 1X Vol qualifié 1X Menace de mort − Le délinquant ne connaît pas la victime − Événement unique − Enlèvement − Le délinquant porte un couteau à la gorge de la victime afin de la contraindre à avoir des rapports sexuels avec lui. − Agression sexuelle complète (fellation, cunnilingus, tentative de pénétration anale, pénétration vaginale sans protection) − Menace de mort. − Vol de la carte d'identité de la victime, de sa bague et d'argent. − Plaidoyer de culpabilité − Préméditation et planification − Enlèvement − Couteau placé sur la gorge − Actes dégradants − Domination et humiliation − Langage dégradant et violent. − Menaces de mort − Climat de terreur et d'horreur − Relations non protégées − Séquelles psychologiques très importantes. − Conséquences médicales. − Haut risque de récidive et de dangerosité − Rapports présentenciel et sexologique particulièrement défavorables. − Jeune âge du délinquant (28 ans) − Absence d'antécédents judiciaires Peine globale 12 ans − Agression sexuelle armée : 11 ans − Enlèvement : 5 ans − Menaces de mort : 1 an − Consécutif à vol qualifié : 1 an R. c.

D.R.M. 2002 BCSC 775 1x Invasion à domicile 1X Agression sexuelle armée − Effraction dans la maison de la victime, alors que les autres résidents sont endormis. − Sous l'effet d'alcool et de cocaïne. − Le délinquant coupe les lignes de téléphone − Entre dans la chambre et ordonne au fiancé de la victime de se ligoter lui-même avec une corde électrique. − Menaces de mort envers le couple avec le couteau − Agression sexuelle sur la victime alors que son financé est dans une autre pièce (fellation et pénétration) − Séquelles psychologiques intense, fin du mariage. − Circonstances brutales − Séquelles psychologiques sévères − Récidiviste : infraction dans la même circonstance commise 8 ans auparavant. − Plusieurs antécédents criminels (drogue, agression sexuelle armée, séquestration) − Préméditation − Utilisation d'un couteau − Aucun Peine globale 18 ans Délinquant déclaré délinquant à contrôler (753.1

(3) C.c.r. ).