Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2020 SKPC 12

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2020 SKPC 12 Date: February 21, 2020 Information: 90204614 Location: La Loche _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Tristan Janvier Appearing: Andrew Clements For the Crown Ian Mokuruk For the Accused SE NTENCING DECISION M.E. BALD WIN, J I. Factual Background [ 1 ] Mr. Janvier pled guilty to committing manslaughter on October 27, 2018, by unlawfully causing the death of Lucas Lemaigre, contrary to

section 236 of the Criminal Code . He pled guilty after a preliminary hearing and prior to a trial of the matter. [ 2 ] I heard sentencing submissions on December 6, 2019. Counsel entered an Agreed Statement of Facts into evidence, which is marked as Exhibit A and is summarized below.

[ 3 ] At approximately 6:30 a.m. on October 27, 2018, La Loche RCMP were dispatched to 1013 Lemaigre Street in La Loche in response to a possible shooting and injured male. RCMP found Lucas Lemaigre laying on his back on the porch outside of the front door of the residence. At that point, he had no signs of life and was observed to have a gunshot wound to his neck. [ 4 ] Shortly after Mr. Lemaigre was found, the RCMP were alerted that Mr. Janvier had attended 737B Fredrick Crescent in La Loche with a firearm and stated that he had just shot someone. [ 5 ] Police attended the residence and arrested Mr.

Janvier who was, at the time, intoxicated and on a conditional sentence order [CSO]. [ 6 ] Mr. Janvier told the police that he originally intended on committing suicide with the gun he retrieved from his room but ran into the victim on the road. According to Mr. Janvier, he asked the victim where his quad was and shot the gun in what was supposed to be a warning shot. [ 7 ] The cause of death was a gunshot wound to Mr. Lemaigre’s back. The bullet perforated the left lung and exited through the left lower neck. The firearm used was an SKS rifle, with a 7.62 mm ammunition round. II.

Position of the Crown [ 8 ] The Crown seeks 10 years jail less remand credit. Mr. Janvier has been in custody since October 27, 2018, 483 days at 1.5 credit, which amounts to 725 days or approximately 24 months. Although Mr. Janvier was on a CSO that, according to Mr. Mokuruk, was terminated on December 17, 2018, I have no confirmation from either the Crown or defence as to how many days, if any; Mr. Janvier was serving his CSO in custody during his remand time. By my calculations, he should have served his CSO to January 3, 2019, only 17 days after it was terminated.

The 17 days would have very little consequence on the sentence being suggested by either counsel and I am therefore not taking it into consideration. The Crown also seeks a DNA order and a weapons prohibition for life under s. 109. III. Position of Defence [ 9 ] Defence seeks a sentence of six to seven years less remand time or the equivalent of between 48 and 60 months or between four and five years going forward. IV. Relevant Sentencing Principles [ 10 ] The purpose and principles of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code .

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to foster respect for the law and to maintain a just, peaceful and safe society.

The Court attempts to achieve this by imposing just penalties that have one or more of the following objectives: a. denouncing unlawful conduct; b. deterring the offender and other persons from committing offences; c. separating offenders from society, where necessary; d. assisting in rehabilitating offenders; e. providing reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and f. promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community. [ 11 ]

Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender or moral blameworthiness.

[12]

Section 718.2 directs the court to consider other factors when determining the fit sentence including: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offenceor the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, … (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done tovictims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginaloffenders. [13] In R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206 at para 43: The language in ss. 718-718.2 of the Code is sufficiently general to ensure that sentencing judges enjoy a broad discretion to craft asentence that is tailored to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender.

The determination of a fit sentence is, subjectto some specific statutory rules, an individualized process that requires the judge to weigh the objectives of sentencing in a manner thatbest reflects the circumstances of the case. No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge todetermine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case. The relative importance of anymitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. V.

Analysis [14] Dealing with denunciation and deterrence first, a review of the case law filed by both defence and Crown suggest a consistenttheme that the primary principles of sentencing for this court to consider are those of denunciation and deterrence. The basis of this isthe inherent dangerousness of this type of offence involving a firearm. [15] Denunciation was explained by Chief Justice Lamer in R v M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 500 at para 81as: Retribution, as well, should be conceptually distinguished from its legitimate sibling, denunciation.

Retribution requires that a judicialsentence properly reflect the moral blameworthiness of that particular offender. The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentenceshould also communicate society’s condemnation of that particular offender’s conduct.

In short, a sentence with a denunciatory elementrepresents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code ofvalues as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. [16] Justice Charron explained deterrence as a sentencing principle in R v P.(B.W.), 2006 SCC 27 , [2006] 1 SCR 941 atpara 2: Deterrence, as a principle of sentencing, refers to the imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and othersfrom engaging in criminal conduct. [17] Mr. Janvier was assessed as being medium risk to re-offend.

He has, through his lawyer and through the probation officerthat wrote the pre-sentence report [PSR] voiced his willingness and desire to change and to become a positive member of society.

Hisassessment as medium risk for re-offending does contribute to the need for some specific deterrence but general deterrence remains animportant objective in order to also deter those who would compromise the lives and safety of others by committing similar acts. [18] In this case, an appropriate sentence must denounce criminal conduct that endangers the lives and safety of others, particularlywhen that conduct is committed with a firearm. The dominant principles in this case are denunciation and general and specificdeterrence. I do not disregard Mr. Mokuruk’s comments about rehabilitation, considering Mr.

Janvier’s young age at the time of theoffence, rehabilitation, although an important principle, is a less dominant principle than those of denunciation and deterrence.

[19] The principle of parity of sentences is set out in s. 718.2, which provides that a sentence should be similar to sentencesimposed on similar offenders for similar offences.

The rationale for parity, set out in R v Mann, 2010 ONCA 342: [16] The principle of parity has developed to preserve and ensure fairness by avoiding disproportionate sentences among convictedpersons where, essentially, the same facts and circumstances indicate equivalent or like sentences. [20] Of course, parity is only one of a number of principles that I must take into consideration in imposing an appropriate sentence, and it cannot on its own dictate the result in all cases involving similar offenders committingsimilar offences.

Sentencing must be an individualized process that takes the personal circumstances of the offender into consideration. Counsel have provided cases that set out similar offences committed by similar offenders and I have considered them. [21] Parliament did not impose a statutory minimum sentence for manslaughter offences but did impose a statutory minimumwhere a firearm was used. The range for manslaughter sentences is wide and varied and, as submitted by the Crown, the appropriaterange is set out in R v Hathway, 2008 SKQB 480, 327 Sask R 129 [Hathway] as four to 12 years jail for manslaughter.

In Hathway,Justice Allbright wrote at para 34: [34] My perception is that as of recent years, the sentencing emphasis generally for the offence of manslaughter has given rise toincreased sentences with a correspondingly increased emphasis on general deterrence. Perhaps it could be said that the harbinger to thistrend in Saskatchewan can be found in the remarks of Cameron J.A. in R. v.

Zimmer (1991), (SK CA), 63 C.C.C. (3d)61 (Sask CA). … [36] In considering the relevant decisions of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and various decisions of the Saskatchewan Court ofQueen’s Bench which have not been subject to appeal, I have concluded that the appropriate range of sentencing for the offence ofmanslaughter in the Province of Saskatchewan is between four and 12 years.

There are isolated instances of sentences less than fouryears, and sentences greater than 12 years, however they are indeed exceptional, and in my view a sentence falling outside of the rangeof four years to 12 years ought to occur only in the most unusual, exceptional or extenuating of circumstances. [22] The Court of Appeal in R v Keepness, 2010 SKCA 69, 359 Sask R 34 [Keepness] remarks on Justice Allbright’s comments in Hathway at para 29: I agree with this general review of the law, except for one refinement.

The judge in Hathway describes sentences that fall outside therange as being “exceptional” or occurring “only in the must unusual, exceptional or extenuating circumstances.” As had been indicated,a review of the case law bears out the statement there is a usual range for manslaughter — at least for manslaughters involving brutalityand alcohol or drugs — from four to 12 years, but it overstates the matter to conclude that departures from a range occur in the mostunusual or exceptional circumstances only.

This language may lead a judge to conclude incorrectly that the lower and upper limits of therange are more fixed than they are, or that they are to be departed from in only the rarest of cases. No matter how one tries to delimit thetype of case for which the range for manslaughter is being set, the description will remain nebulous and the circumstances variable.

Correct application of the principles of sentencing should mean there are fewer sentences falling outside the range for manslaughter thanwithin it, but the exercise of their discretion, judges may depart, without introducing disparity, where the circumstances of the case arebeyond those customarily found at the lower or upper ends of the range. [23] Both Crown and defence have provided a number of cases to assist in determining the appropriate sentence for Mr. Janvier,bearing in mind the range and principals set out in both Hathway and Keepness. [24] The cases relied upon by the Crown are: (

a) R v Ross, 2006 SKCA (SentDig) 16, a case from 2006 where the 54-year-old accused and the victim were long time acquaintances. On the night in question, the accused was drinking heavily when the victim arrived at the residence, pounding on the door. The victimnoticed the accused’s unlocked car in the driveway and got in. The accused picked up his 22 rifle, took a shot, and struck the car. Thevictim became angry and returned to the house, threatening the accused. The accused reloaded the rifle, shot, and struck the victim inthe nose. The victim was killed instantly.

The accused was extremely intoxicated at the time. The accused had a record containing noviolence but two convictions for pointing a firearm and one for possessing a restricted weapon. He was sentenced to 10 years. Thesummary does not provide much detail, however, the sentence was a joint submission accepted by the court. The accused was notIndigenous and thus Gladue factors (R v Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688 [Gladue]) were not a consideration of thecourt. The facts however are comparable to the case at hand.

(

b) In Hathway, where the accused received a sentence of 11½ years for a charge of manslaughter. In Hathway, the accused had anextensive criminal record, was not Indigenous and that case involved a brutal and sustained attack on an 84-year-old victim who suffered10 stab wounds. The facts differ substantially from this case; however, the analysis on the range of sentence for manslaughter isapplicable. (

c) R v Fiddler, 2018 SKQB 197, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 10 years for manslaughter. Mr. Fiddler shot the victim,unprovoked, while in a severely drunken state. There had been no fight, argument or violence prior to the shooting. Fiddler involved anact that was very high on the LaBerge scale (R v Laberge, 1995 ABCA 196) of foreseeability of consequences, as it is here. In Fiddler,however the guilty plea present in Mr. Janvier’s case was absent. While each case turns on its own facts, the Court’s imposition of a 10year sentence in Fiddler, absent a guilty plea, is relevant to the case at bar. (

d) R v Bellegarde, 2019 SKPC 22, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of nine years for the beating death of Mr. Bellegarde’sspouse. The Court considered Mr. Bellegarde’s substantial Gladue factors, his guilty plea and remorse as mitigating and the domesticnature of the offence and the fact that he had prior convictions for assault against her as aggravating. The facts of this case differ. Mr.Bellegarde perpetrated what seemed to be a brutal beating on the victim causing her death and had a record for violence against the samevictim. (

e) R v Whitehead, 2016 SKCA 165, the accused pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to nine years jail that was reduced toeight years on appeal. The case involved a drunken revenge beating of the victim. Mr. Whitehead’s lack of any criminal record andsignificant Gladue factors and prospects for rehabilitation, coupled with the trial judge’s error in principle by overemphasizing parity ledto the reduction of the sentence on appeal, making Whitehead somewhat distinguishable. (

f) Finally, the Crown provided an unreported case, R. v. Mitsuing, where Mr. Mitsuing shot Jordon Sandfly in the head. BothMitsuing and Sandfly were intoxicated by alcohol and/or drugs and began to argue. The accused took a sawed off 22 caliber rifle andshot Sandfly in the head and fled to Lloydminster. Mitsuing received a jail sentence of eight years. It was a joint submission by Crownand defence due to Vetrovec issues (Vetrovec v R, (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 811) with witnesses under the influence and theCrown’s concerns about identifying which of the three occupants of the vehicle had the gun.

The accused was remorseful but I have noinformation about his prior criminal record if one existed. The facts here are similar in nature, Mr. Mitsuing would have had Gladuefactors but his criminal history if any is unknown and the plea bargain as a result of issues with the Crown’s case is acknowledged. [25] The cases relied upon by defence are as follows: (

a) R v Walker, 2011 SKQB 273, 380 Sask R 227 where the Court sentenced Mr. Walker to eight years jail after a jury found him guiltyof manslaughter. Mr. Hayward, the victim, who was 24 years old at the time of his death, was known to be a user and seller of drugs,was dating Mr. Walker’s teenage daughter. Mr. Walker was angry, entered Mr. Hayward’s residence and shot Mr. Hayward five timesat close range, including once in the back, in his own home while other young people were present. Mr. Walker had no criminal recordand appeared to be remorseful.

Again, the facts of this case are similar involving the shooting of the victim, without provocation andwithout a prior argument or fight. It is also distinguishable on the basis that Mr. Walker had no prior criminal record. Mr. Walker is notIndigenous and so Gladue factors were not a consideration for the court. (

b) R v Strongquill, 2016 SKQB 397, a case where the Court sentenced the accused to eight years jail. Mr. Strongquill pled guilty tomanslaughter. After an evening of drinking, Mr. Strongquill and some friends surrounded two men, the victim and another but both ranaway. Mr. Strongquill found one of the men, the victim, Mr. Moise, who was 16 years old, and stabbed him once with a hunting knifeand left him on the steps to die. Mr. Strongquill was 22 years old at the time and had no criminal record. Mr. Strongquill wasremorseful, had substantial Gladue factors and was assessed at a low risk to re-offend.

Crown and defence provided a joint submissionto the court for eight years jail and the Court imposed the joint submission. [26] The cases referred to by both Crown and defence are helpful in determining an appropriate sentence, however, the facts of theoffence are a central consideration in determining the appropriate sentence in any case.

In particular, the nature of the offence and theaccused person’s role in the offence are very important in any assessment of his moral culpability. [27] Manslaughter can include a wide range of conduct from near accident to near murder (R v Zimmer (1991), (SK CA), 63 CCC (3d) 61 (Sask CA), the Laberge analysis provides a helpful framework for assessing fault and the seriousness ofmanslaughter according to the foreseeability of the consequences. This analysis has been applied in numerous Saskatchewan cases,including Hathway.

[28] When considering the mental element or the mens rea, one of the significant considerations is fault which bears on thequestion of moral blame. However, fault is to be assessed while also considering all of the other factors that influence moralblameworthiness, including an individual’s background.

The Laberge continuum ranges from the minimum degree of objective fault –the “objective foresight by the accused of the risk of bodily harm which is neither trivial nor transitory” to the offender having actualknowledge short of the requisite intention for murder – the unlawful act would likely subject the victim to the risk of life threateninginjury or, knowing the probable life threatening consequences of the act, did the offender proceed recklessly in the face of the risk at thehigher end of the spectrum (Laberge at para 12). [29] When considering moral culpability I must look at the underlying actions of the accused.

Here, Mr. Janvier shot the victim, seemingly unprovoked, while in a severely drunken state. There had been no fight or violence prior tothe shooting. In fact, the victim was walking away from Mr. Janvier. While an unintentional killing while committing a minor offencewill attract a lighter sentence, where circumstances indicate an awareness of risk just short of murder, it will obviously attract a sentenceat the higher end of the range. Here, the act involved, shooting the victim,

an act very high on the Laberge scale of foreseeability ofconsequences.

An act such as shooting is inherently life threatening and is relevant. Because of the inherent risk of using a high caliberfirearm, it will attract a sentence at the higher end of the range. [30] When evaluating fault, I must also consider the other factors that bear on moral culpability. Thus, my assessment of Mr.Janvier’ s degree of fault as residing at the higher end of the range does not end my inquiry into the issue of moral blame. I must go onto consider Mr. Janvier’s personal circumstances and how they bear on his culpability. Mr.

Janvier is an Indigenous offender, and I mustapply the principles of Gladue and Ipeelee (R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, 280 CCC (3d) 265 [Ipeelee]) and address how his backgroundfactors shed light on the question of moral blame (R v Chanalquay, 2015 SKCA 141, 472 Sask R 110) which I will do later in thisdecision. [31] Although there appears to be a low degree of deliberation and planning, unlike some of the cases provided by the Crown, itwas a deliberate act provoked by what appears to have been a dispute over an ATV and the risk of death was high, given the use of a highcalibre firearm. [32] The circumstances of the offenders and the offences in these cases differ dramatically.

What is common is that these casesconsistently seek to weigh and assess the moral blameworthiness of the offender involved. As mentioned, on the scale of moralblameworthiness, Mr. Janvier’ s actions were more serious than a prank gone wrong but not as serious as the actions of the offenders wesee in some of the cases mentioned. He was acting out of some kind of retribution for the theft of his ATV. There did not appear to bemuch planning on his part.

However, the inherent danger that goes with walking around with a loaded firearm and then firing it in thedirection of someone distinguish the underlying unlawful act here from the kind of minor offence with serious consequences that wasspoken of in R v Creighton, (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 3. VI. Personal Circumstances of the Accused and Gladue [33] Mr. Janvier is 24 years old and was born to Laurie Janvier who is a teacher’s aide at the La Loche Dene High School. Mr.Janvier has never had anything to do with his father and has one younger sister. Mr.

Janvier was raised by his grandparents, George andRosalie Janvier who were his main supports. After losing his grandparents, he attempted suicide many times. [34] When Mr. Janvier was 10 years old, his grandparents passed away within a year of each other and this left him feeling lost. He returned to reside with his mother for a short time before moving in with his Aunt Ruby Jolibois for a couple of years. At age 14, Mr.Janvier moved back to his mother’s home and it was around this time that he became involved with negative peers and crime. [35] Mr.

Janvier has been with Dawn Sylvestre since 2015 and has two children with her. Since he has been taken into custody, hischildren have been residing with extended family. [36] Next, I must consider Mr. Janvier’s Gladue factors. Ipeelee and Gladue make it clear that I am to be diligent in following thedirection set out in s. 718.2(e), I have a statutory duty to consider the unique circumstances of Mr. Janvier as an Aboriginal offender.

AsJudge Robinson in R v Ballantyne, 2012 SKPC 168, 408 Sask R 58 said, I must take judicial notice of the systemic and backgroundfactors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society, including colonialism, displacement and the residential school experience. These factors have clearly affected Mr. Janvier.

[ 37 ] Mr. Janvier is of Metis ancestry but refers to himself as Dene. Mr. Janvier reports a positive childhood and was taught the traditional way of living by his grandparents. He says he was bullied in school which made him feel depressed and angry. He stated that he felt impacted as a result of being Indigenous. Growing up in La Loche, Mr. Janvier witnessed poverty, housing shortages, and came from a broken home, never having had a relationship with his father. Mr. Janvier indicated that he started to use alcohol at age 11 and drank more steadily after his cousin committed suicide when he was 15 years old.

He used alcohol to cope. Like many Indigenous people, Mr. Janvier has suffered the systemic issues that continue to plague First Nations communities because of racism and colonization. Despite Mr. Janvier’s report of a positive childhood and not being affected by residential schools and other factors, the Court can take judicial notice of the systemic barriers and the realities of colonialism, displacement and residential schools faced by Indigenous persons in Canada ( Ipeelee at para 59 ). [ 38 ] In terms of positive community supports, Mr.

Janvier has a number of supportive family members, including his mother, his girlfriend, Dawn and his friend, Diana. [ 39 ] Defence agrees that a lengthy sentence must be imposed here but that some reduction would be appropriate after consideration of Mr. Janvier’s Gladue factors. I am satisfied that Mr. Janvier’s background and the systemic issues in First Nations communities reduce his moral culpability and should result in a reduction of the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate. [ 40 ] I do not find that the circumstances of this case or those personal circumstances of Mr.

Janvier bring this sentencing outside of the range set in both Hathway and Keepness as a range of between four and 12 years. VII. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors [ 41 ] A review of the facts shows that there are a number of aggravating factors and they are as follows: (

a) Mr. Janvier was on a CSO, serving a jail sentence in the community, at the time of this offence. He was on the CSO for three counts of assault with a weapon, a breach of undertaking and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose; (

b) Mr. Janvier was on a condition not to possess firearms or other weapons. Not only was a firearm used in the commission of this offence, but also Mr. Janvier retrieved the firearm from his bedroom while on a condition not to possess firearms; (

c) Mr. Janvier shot the victim in the back and left him on the road, bleeding, without notifying anyone; and (

d) Mr. Janvier has a criminal record, which contains convictions for offences of violence and weapons offences and does not come before the courts as a first time offender. [ 42 ] The following are mitigating factors in addition to the Gladue factors which I have already discussed. (

a) Mr. Janvier has pled guilty to manslaughter and was, from the beginning, prepared to accept responsibility. The preliminary hearing was only conducted to determine Mr. Janvier’s level of intoxication at the time and a limited number of witnesses were required to testify. By entering a guilty plea, even at this stage of the proceedings, Mr. Janvier has spared the witnesses from testifying at a trial and of course spared the victim’s family from having to endure a lengthy court process. (

b) He is a very youthful offender; (

c) He is remorseful. [ 43 ] I also consider Mr. Janvier’ s young age and relatively short record and the fact he has never served any time incarcerated prior to this. His prospects for rehabilitation, as set out in the PSR, are good.

VIII. Victim Impact [ 44 ]

Section 722 of the Criminal Code requires that a sentencing judge consider any statement of a victim that describes the physical or emotional harm or property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the commission of an offence. I was presented with several victim impact statements. I have read them all. It is clear from the statements that Mr. Lemaigre has left behind a family in anguish over his passing. [ 45 ] Several of Mr. Lemaigre’s siblings provided victim impact statements each of them set out what a great person Mr. Lemaigre was, how they miss him and how they are grieving. Mr.

Lemaigre’s stepfather provided a statement setting out how he was a good father and uncle and the impact of the loss has affected their grieving family. Mr. Lemaigre’s mother also provided a statement. Like all of the statements, it was heartbreaking. Ms. Lemaigre talks about how wonderful her son was and how their lives have not been the same since. [ 46 ] There are no words that could adequately summarize the loss and sadness that these various statements communicate. The statements describe a kind and loving person. Mr.

Lemaigre left behind two children, parents, stepparents, siblings, and numerous other family members and friends who all struggle significantly with the loss. His children are left without his guidance and love. His family describe their time as being filled with pain and depression. [ 47 ] Clearly, the impact on Mr. Lemaigre’s family is devastating. IX. Conclusion [ 48 ] As I stated earlier, the sentencing range for manslaughter cases is four to 12 years. The Court of Appeal has also identified a starting point of seven years for cases at the higher end of the Laberge continuum. [ 49 ] Mr.

Janvier’s conduct approaches the higher end of the Laberge continuum. However, I acknowledge that the Laberge analysis categorizes comparative degrees of seriousness of the offence and that many other factors are relevant in determining the question of moral culpability. [ 50 ] Mr. Janvier has significant aggravating factors that include prior convictions for violence and weapons and the fact that this offence was committed with a firearm. [ 51 ] Mr. Janvier’s moral culpability is mitigated by his Gladue factors, his level of remorse, his prospects for rehabilitation and his guilty plea. [ 52 ] Accordingly, Mr.

Janvier’s sentence is to be a term of incarceration that reflects the extreme gravity of his actions because of their obvious and inherent dangerousness resulting in devastating consequences. A penitentiary term is required to address this kind of dangerous behavior. But for Mr. Janvier’s guilty plea, relative youth, limited record, potential to become a contributing member of society and Gladue factors, I would have imposed a term of incarceration in the range of 10-12 years. However, because of the factors I have mentioned and Mr. Janvier’s prospects of rehabilitation, I find that a fit sentence is nine years.

This is a sentence that in my view adequately addresses deterrence and denunciation by condemning the gravity of Mr. Janvier’s crime and appropriately reflects his degree of moral responsibility for the tragedies he caused. [ 53 ] It is not a sentence that makes amends or compensates in any way for the loss of life or for the lifetime of grief caused by his actions. It is simply a sentence that reflects our society’s denunciation of Mr. Janvier’s conduct in all of the circumstances.

[ 54 ] Having arrived at the determination that a nine year sentence is just and appropriate, I have also considered the deduction of pre-sentence custody. Mr. Janvier has been in custody since October 27, 2018 or 483 days. At 1.5 credit, that is 725 days. I give credit of two years for this. The sentence then is nine years less two years credit for pre-sentence custody for a total of seven years to serve. [ 55 ] There is a mandatory s. 109 firearms prohibition. I make that order for life.

In addition, this is a primary designated compulsory offence and therefore, under s. 487.051 I make a DNA order. [ 56 ] There will also be a forfeiture order for the ammunition and firearm as required by s. 491. [ 57 ] I will also grant the order requested by the Crown under s. 743.21 for the individuals named in the list provided by the Crown. ___________________ M.E. Baldwin, J