2014 QCCA 1680, 2014 QCCA 1680

R. c. Cloud 2014 QCCA 1680 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-005575-145 ; 500-10-005586-142; 500-10-005587-140; 500-10-005598-147; 500-10-005602-147; 500-10-005655-145 (500-01-098201-137; 500-01-101029-145; 500-01-101894-142; 500-01-101851-142; 500-01-101852-140; 500-01-101853-148; 500-01-098761-130; 500-01-104832-149) DATE: SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.A. N° : 500-10-005575-145 (500-01-098201-137) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – APPELLANT plaintiff v.

RICHARD JASON CLOUD APPLICANT – RESPONDENT accused and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC MISE EN CAUSE – Mise en cause and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MIS EN CAUSE – Mis en cause N° : 500-10-005586-142 (500-01-101029-145) SEQ ACC. 001 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – APPELLANT plaintiff v. DAVE O'FARRELL APPLICANT – RESPONDENT accused and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC MISE EN CAUSE – Mise en cause and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MIS EN CAUSE – Mis en cause N° : 500-10-00587-140 (500-01-101894-142) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – APPELLANT plaintiff

v. SHARON BARON APPLICANT – RESPONDENT accused et THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC MISE EN CAUSE – Mise en cause and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MIS EN CAUSE – Mis en cause N° : 500-10-005598-147 (500-01-101851-142; 500-01-101852-140; 500-01-101853-148) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – APPELLANT plaintiff v. BOON SEAR PHENGSAI APPLICANT – RESPONDENT accused and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC MISE EN CAUSE – Mise en cause et THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MIS EN CAUSE – Mis en cause N° : 500-10-005602-147 (500-01-098761-130) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – APPELLANT plaintiff v.

ISABELLE BENOIT APPLICANT – RESPONDENT accused and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC MISE EN CAUSE – Mise en cause and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MIS EN CAUSE – Mis en cause N° : 500-10-005655-145 (500-01-104832-149) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – APPELLANT plaintiff v. JIMMY MÉTHOT APPLICANT – RESPONDENT accused and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC MISE EN CAUSE – Mise en cause and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MIS EN CAUSE – Mis en cause JUDGMENT * * This judgment has been signed in French and English.

Both versions are official. [ 1 ] The applicants, by motion entitled Motion to Raise a New Constitutional Issue , seek permission to challenge on appeal the

[ 1 ] The applicants, by motion entitled Motion to Raise a New Constitutional Issue , seek permission to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the mandatory surcharge regime, an issue that was not debated at trial. [ 2 ] For the reasons of Doyon J. A., with which Hilton J. A., concurs, THE COURT: [ 3 ] DISMISSES the motion. [ 4 ] For her part and for other reasons, the Chief Justice would have granted the motion. [ 5 ] The motion for leave to appeal and to join in the hearing of the other appeals in the Jimmy Méthot file (500-10-005655-145) is not contested and is hereby GRANTED .

NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.A. Mtre Dionisios Galiatsatos Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales For respondent Mtre Yves Vaillancourt Chalifoux, Montpetit, Vaillancourt, Paradis & Ass.

For the applicant Richard Jason Cloud Mtre Stéphanie Delisle-Goudreau For the applicant Dave O'Farrell Mtre Yves Gratton Aide Juridique de Montréal For the applicant Sharon Baron Mtre Antoinette Stuart Conant Gemme For the applicant Boon Sear Phengsai Mtre Julie Vincent For the applicant Isabelle Benoit Mtre Steve Hanafi Steve Hanafi avocat For the applicant Jimmy Méthot Mtre Éric Dufour Direction Générale des affaires juridiques et législative Bernard, Roy (Justice-Québec) For the mise en cause The Attorney General of Quebec Mtre Gilles Villeneuve (absent) Service des poursuites pénales du Canada For the mise en cause The Attorney General of Canada Date of hearing: June 3, 2014 REASONS OF DOYON, J.A. [ 6 ] The applicants have pleaded guilty to various accusations requiring the payment of the mandatory victim surcharge (art. 737 Cr.

C. ). This surcharge is payable for every count on which they were found guilty. They now seek authorisation to raise, on appeal, a new constitutional argument pertaining to this legislative provision. The Context

[7] Since the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims Act[1] (the “Act”) entered into force on 24 October 2013, themandatory surcharge amounts to 30% of the imposed fine or, if no fine is imposed, to $100 per

summary conviction and to $200 perindictable offense. Since that date as well, the sentencing court no longer has discretionary power to exempt the offender from thesurcharge.

That being said, an offender unable to pay the surcharge can perform community service where such program exists, as is thecase in the province of Quebec. [8] The prosecution appeals the applicants’ sentences on the ground that the trial judges erred in applying the provisions pertainingto the mandatory surcharge. [9] Without delving into details, the prosecution submits that the judges below have, in a way, refused to give effect to the Acteither 1) by adding a minimum fine (in the range of $5 per count) to a prison term followed by a probation order, so as to substantiallyreduce the amount of the mandatory surcharge ( to $1.50), 2) by granting an excessive delay to pay it (5 years), or 3) by granting no delayfor payment, but reducing instead the prison term for each count to compensate for the prison term resulting from non payment, thusannihilating the Act’s effects. [10] In response to the prosecution’s appeals, the applicants request permission to raise a new argument on appeal, that is, theunconstitutionality of the Act, which allegedly violates sections 12 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

To that end,they seek authorisation to serve notice to the Attorneys General of Canada and Quebec, notably that required under

section 95 of theQuebec C.C.P. [11] The respondent and the third parties oppose the motion on the ground that such an argument should first have been invoked attrial, allowing for a sufficient evidentiary record with regards to the particular circumstances of the applicants as well as to the allegedviolations of the Charter and, if it arises, to circumstances relevant under

section 1 of the Charter. Without a full record, they argue, thedebate would be taking place in a factual vacuum incompatible with a thorough analysis of the issue. They add that the Court of Appealis not the appropriate forum to compile the record, which, moreover, is likely to extend beyond documentary evidence. They raise thepossibility that experts will be called upon to testify, for instance, on the objectives of the Act, or the applicants to testify on theirpersonal circumstances.

The General Rule [12] The applicants acknowledge that as a general rule, raising new arguments on appeal is forbidden absent exceptionalcircumstances. Such exceptions include, for instance, a change in the law subsequent to the trial judgement or a declaration ofunconstitutionality depriving the judgement of its juridical basis.[2] That being said, the evidentiary record must also be sufficient toallow a ruling on the new issue, and the failure to raise the issue at trial must not result from a strategic decision.

The Court may thus useits discretion to “[translation] accept or reject a new ground on appeal, keeping in mind that a party who was not afforded the opportunityto submit evidence at trial in order to respond to the new issue may suffer a prejudice.”[3] [13] As the Ontario Court of Appeal points out, appellate courts will generally dismiss a motion to raise a new issue when themissing evidence precludes a thorough examination of that issue, especially when a Charter right is at stake: [36] At the trial, the appellant had the onus of demonstrating any Charter breach on which he would rely.

He chose to try to establishonly a breach of s. 8. This court will only consider Charter arguments not raised at trial in limited circumstances. First and foremost, thiscourt will not consider new Charter issues unless the trial record admits of a full, fair and reliable assessment of that claim. The recordis silent on the factual questions underlying the appellant’s claim that he was not told that he was being detained in relation to thehomicide and that he was not told that he had a right to counsel in relation to that matter.

The appellant proceeds on the basis that thecourt should simply assume that these violations occurred because the initial efforts to advise the appellant of the reasons for his arrestand his right to counsel were foiled by the incompetent interpreter. This court cannot make any such assumption. The trial record doesnot address these issues. For that reason alone, it would be inappropriate for this court to deal with this issue: R. v. Jamieson (1998), (ON CA), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 347 at 349-50 (Ont.

C.A.).[4] [Emphasis added] [14] In a subsequent decision, the same Court of Appeal added the following: [43] Appellate courts are generally reluctant to entertain Charter arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. This reluctancestems from concerns about prejudice to the other side arising from an inability to adduce necessary responding evidence at trial, the lackof a sufficient record to make necessary findings of fact, and society’s overarching interest in the finality of litigation: R. v. Warsing(1998), (SCC), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 259 at 271-72 (S.C.C.); R. v.

Brown (1993), (SCC), 83 C.C.C. (3d)129 at 133-34 (S.C.C.); and R. v. R.R. (1994), (ON CA), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 198-99 (Ont. C.A.).[5] [15] In R. v. Chambers, it recently stated: [45] The appellant did not raise these issues at trial, instead advancing them for the first time on this appeal hearing. It is well-established that appeal courts generally will not entertain arguments not made at trial. This general rule applies to constitutionalarguments raised for the first time on appeal, regardless of the constitutional remedy sought: see for example R. v. Roach, 2009 ONCA156, [2009] O.J. No. 662, at para. 6.

The appellant's failure to mount his Charter ss. 7 and 12 arguments at trial deprives this court of thereasoned analysis of the trial court on these issues.[6] [16] This Court concluded in R. c. Rudnicki[7] that except when the

interpretation of the relevant rule of law has been modified sincethe trial, the majority and the dissent in R. v. Brown[8] both yield the same result when the accused has failed to raise an argument attrial and to bring forward relevant evidence, except if a new

interpretation of the Law has occurred since the trial. Writing for themajority, Hilton J.A. said:

[Translation] 81 The Supreme Court majority ruled that the Alberta Court of Appeal erred in refusing to hear the new issue. It ordered a new trial to allow Brown to present evidence in order to determine whether, in the light of the Hébert case, he had renounced his right to silence or whether he knew the police lead the interrogations. The Hébert case had clarified

section 7 of the Charter , such that it was legitimate to raise a new issue on appeal which, given the prevailing case law at the time, was not raised at trial. 82 That is not so in the case at bar. The transcript of the Court of Quebec submissions reveals that the appellant’s counsel, Mr. Latour, renounced a constitutional challenge. He chose to question the application of the Regulation and the Directive instead. In doing so, he made a strategic choice. 83 In the Brown case, dissenting Justice l'Heureux-Dubé would have refused that the new issue be brought on appeal. She devises a three-part test which is quite useful in the case under review: In

summary, the following three prerequisites must be satisfied in order to permit the raising of a new issue, including a Charter challenge, for the first time on appeal. First, there must be a sufficient evidentiary record to resolve the issue. Second, it must not be an instance in which the accused for tactical reasons failed to raise the issue at trial.

Third, the court must be satisfied that no miscarriage of justice will result from the refusal to raise such new issue on appeal. 84 In Brown, Justice l'Heureux-Dubé would have dismissed the appeal for the following reasons: In the present case, none of these conditions are satisfied. There has been no change to the substantive offence. The issue was not raised at trial, with the consequence that the record necessary for appellate review of the issue is unavailable. As I will discuss in more detail below, because of the manner in which the trial was conducted, there has been no denial of justice to the appellant.

In my view, the Court of Appeal properly concluded that no appeal on this new issue should be entertained. 85 Applying the principles in the majority or the dissenting opinion obviously leads to the same result. 86 In my opinion, the Court should not deal with the constitutional issue that Rudnicki raised on appeal. He could have raised it at trial but chose not to. In principle, an appellate tribunal should not entertain a question of law of that nature when it was not analysed at trial, especially when the State was unable to submit evidence pertaining to

section 1 of the Canadian Charter . This goes to the very nature of an appellate tribunal. [ 17 ] In sum, courts frequently use the criteria developed by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in R. v. Brown . [ 18 ] Furthermore, the Court of Appeal must ensure that refusing to hear the new issue on appeal will not entail a denial of justice. [ 19 ] In response to these concerns, the applicants submit the following arguments: [Translation]

a) Considering the new issue on appeal will not cause a real prejudice to the [respondent-appellant] or to the Attorney General because the submission of new evidence [seems], at first glance, […] [rather] unlikely or of limited scope. (See Boisclair c. R ., Montreal, 500-10-0048310119, para. 8) The evidence on record allows a thorough analysis of the new issue, as per allegations 3 to 17 of this motion;

b) While the constitutional issue was not raised at trial, the applicants did not omit it for strategic reasons. They still proposed Justice Healy’s restrictive

interpretation at trial, an

interpretation likely to limit the scope of the legislative amendments;

c) For that matter, the amendments to the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims Act were declared unconstitutional and inoperative on January 6, 2014 by the Honourable E. M. Schnall, O.C.J. in R. v. Flaro , 2014 ONCJ 2 , [2014] O.J. No. 94, as per the judgment submitted under the annex no. 12;

d) In this respect, the Honourable Justice Schnall states the following at paragraphs 20, 21 and 34 of his reasons: 20 The imposition of a fine, as a punitive measure, imposed without the ability to scrutinize each case on its own merits is unconstitutional, where it results in a sentence which is grossly disproportionate to the offence and the offender's circumstances. It is contrary to

section 12 of the Charter . 21 It would outrage the sentiments of an informed public if it were to realize the arbitrary nature of this mandatory provision which fails to consider the individual circumstances of the offender. An offender with substantial income is dealt with in the same way as an impecunious offender, with no consideration of ability to pay.

In the cases I referred to above, this results in a sentence which is not only beyond excessive; the mandatory provisions impose a crushing debt on an individual who has no reasonable expectation of ever being able to pay: this constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In those cases it forces a person to have to choose between buying food and paying the VFS. […] 34 Any provision that fails to take into account a defendant's mental health status and ability to pay, fails to satisfy the factors enumerated above and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as being grossly disproportionate .

e) Given the declaration of unconstitutionality of those same provisions, it would be unjust to deny the applicants the permission to raise this new issue on appeal, especially since it is a pure question of law. The Applicants’ Choice [ 20 ] We know that the trial judges rendered their decisions without the applicants challenging the constitutionality of the Act . In the case of Mr. Cloud, one may even suggest that the trial judge tried to get the applicants to raise the issue, albeit unsuccessfully. In the other cases under study, the trial judges simply referred to the judgement in Cloud .

In sum, the applicants chose not to mount a constitutional challenge. This choice bears consequences. [ 21 ] They now submit that their personal and financial situation was not conducive to raise such a resource-intensive argument at trial. I have difficulty accepting this argument. Their situation has certainly not improved since; so that it is hard to sustain that they are now well-placed to do so while they were not at trial. [ 22 ] The applicants made a choice which, to a certain extent, worked in their favour, as the trial judgements considerably curtailed the effects of the mandatory surcharge.

This curtailing is now the main argument of the prosecution, but that was eminently foreseeable. In short, the applicants’ choice at trial paid off and I doubt it advisable to allow them to reorient their pleading now that the prosecution has filed an appeal. The Need to Submit Evidence [ 23 ] It seems to me beyond question that should the Court authorize the sought addition, a new body of evidence would have to be submitted.

The respondent and third parties would otherwise suffer a prejudice. [ 24 ] As the respondent and the Attorneys General argue in their joint submission outline: [Translation] Had he been party at trial, the Attorney General could have first interrogated each applicant on their assets – their capacity to pay a surcharge – or on the possibility, for them, to perform community service (s. 786 Cr. C. ). The Honourable Judge Braun, J. Q., briefly considered the matter regarding the applicant Phengsai, but concluded that he lacked any knowledge of his financial information.

The applicant Cloud mentioned he was expecting some money from a New Brunswick Band Council, but the file is incomplete as to his actual financial ability to pay a surcharge. As for the other applicants’ appellate files, they are silent on the issue. Yet the applicants’ ability to pay the surcharges required by the Act and the possibility to perform community service can be important factors in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the Act. Moreover, the Attorney General could have demonstrated the concrete effect of the surcharge on each applicant.

He could have proven the existence of viable alternative measures as well. Given the applicants’ choice, none of the preceding could be achieved. Yet, as the Court is well aware, judicial deference requires that a court only rule on a constitutional issue when necessary, if the facts of a case demand it. [References omitted.] [ 25 ] I agree with these remarks. The trial record is undoubtedly insufficient to support the sections 12 and 7 violations the applicants seek to raise in respect of their inability to pay the surcharge or to perform community service in lieu.

Yet without evidence of a violation in their case, a constitutional argument cannot be raised. [9] [ 26 ] It is true, as the applicants submit, that the “reasonable hypothetical circumstances” they seek to invoke in support of their argument, within the meaning of R. v. Goltz , [10] do not really require new evidence. Granted. The question, however, is much more complex. [ 27 ] As the respondent and the third parties have noted, their strategy would have greatly differed had the constitutional issue been raised at trial.

Similarly, the applicants themselves would have wanted to flesh out their evidence and to counter the respondent and third parties’ arguments. This evidence, some of which testimonial, would now be heard on appeal. The credibility of witnesses would be at stake and the Court would not have the benefit of a trial judgement on that aspect of the debate.

Consequently, even if the Court allowed the submission of new evidence, it would be at a disadvantage compared with its usual position where an argument is first presented at trial. [ 28 ] Besides, should the Court conclude that the Act violates sections 7 and 12 of the Charter , it must allow the third parties to submit evidence regarding

section 1 of the Charter . I again share the respondent and the third parties’ opinion when they state: [Translation] On the substantive issue, the Attorney General could have presented evidence in support of the constitutional validity of the Act. For instance, he could have submitted Hansard evidence held during its enactment. He could also have submitted some of the documents presented in House of Commons or Senate Committee Proceedings. Statistical data pertaining to the surcharge could have been submitted and explained.

The Attorney General could have called witnesses on the existence and administration of various organisations financed with the surcharge proceeds. Experts could have established the relation between the financing of theses organisations and the impact of curtailing the surcharge. Other experts, for instance a criminologist or a psychologist, could have enlightened the court as to the impact of the surcharge on the offenders. The Attorney General would have also submitted the various measures under review which lead the Parliament to settle on the imposition of the surcharge.

Lastly, should the applicants demonstrate a violation, the third party should be able to submit any evidence to justify the impairment of a constitutional right. In sum, the Attorney General would have fully discharged his role to defend the Act, using all the available evidence to support its claim. [ 29 ] Such evidence is likely to be extensive, and, more importantly, it will not have been subjected to the analysis of a trial judge. It would have to be examined for the first time in appeal on both the credibility and the reliability of witnesses, in addition to any objections

on which the Court would have to adjudicate. [ 30 ] I further note that in most Supreme Court cases involving a Charter ​ -based constitutional challenge, evidence was submitted a trial. Such was the case, for example, in R. v. Oakes , [11] R. v. Smith , [12] R. v. Goltz , [13] R. v. Ferguson , [14] and R. v. Morrisey . [15] [ 31 ] R. v. Keegstra [16] is the exception. In that case sections 2(

b) and 11(

d) were raised at trial, but the representations were limited to

section 2(

b) because the Attorney General had not been served notice with regards to

section 11(d). The appeal nevertheless dealt with that section. Importantly, the constitutional challenge of the attacked legislative provision pertained to the presumption of innocence, as it imposed a burden of proof on the accused. The case law, however, had already canvassed the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, which could explain why the Court proceeded to the

section 11(

d) analysis. Furthermore, the Keegstra decision preceded Brown . The Declaration of Unconstitutionality in R. v. Flaro [ 32 ] With respect, it is difficult to endorse the applicants’ position that given the declaration of unconstitutionality in R. v. Flaro [17] , “[translation] it would be unjust to deny the applicants the opportunity to raise this new question on appeal”. In that Ontario provincial court decision, the trial judge raised the constitutional issue on his own initiative, without notice to the Attorney General and without any intervention on the part of the latter.

I am not inclined to conclude that given the Flaro decision, this Court’s refusal to grant the motion would create an injustice. [18] [ 33 ] When they pleaded guilty, the applicants knew that the Act had come into force and that absent a declaration of unconstitutionality, a mandatory surcharge would be imposed. In these circumstances, it is not unfair to bar them from invoking at this stage the invalidity of an Act , the consequences of which were well know to them. Conclusion [ 34 ] In

summary: 1) the applicants failed to raise the unconstitutionality of the Act at trial; 2) it would be unfair to allow them raising the additional argument without allowing the respondent and the third parties to submit comprehensive evidence pertaining to the violation of rights as well as to the application of

section 1 of the Charter ; 3) I am convinced that the applicants themselves would submit further evidence concerning the violation of their individual rights; 4) the Court would have to authorise the collection of this evidence, then analyse it the way a first instance tribunal would, hence foregoing the benefit of a trial judgement and depriving the parties of the possibility to appeal to this Court; 5) the applicants’ argument to the effect that it would be unfair to dismiss their motion is not convincing. [ 35 ] For these reasons, I would dismiss the motion for permission to raise a new constitutional question.

FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.A. MOTIFS DE LA JUGE EN CHEF [ 36 ] Je partage l'opinion de mes collègues quant à l’interdiction générale de présenter un nouveau moyen en appel. Je ferais cependant droit à la requête vu les circonstances exceptionnelles qui prévalent aux présents dossiers. Je crois utile de rappeler quelques principes avant d’aborder l’analyse des critères applicables. [ 37 ] Tout d’abord, l’octroi de la permission de présenter un nouveau moyen en appel relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la Cour. Les propos de la Cour d’appel de Colombie-Britannique dans affaire R. v.

Vidulich , que reprend la Cour suprême dans R. c. Brown , illustrent la marge de manoeuvre dont disposent les cours d’appel [19] : La décision d'accorder ou non l'autorisation est laissée à la discrétion de la cour. L'exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire sera guidé par l'évaluation des intérêts de la justice qui ont des répercussions sur toutes les parties. [traduction de la Cour suprême] [ 38 ] Certes, la retenue est de mise en appel. Vu l’importance de promouvoir la finalité des jugements de première instance [20] , il incombe aux parties de soulever les moyens pertinents en temps utile.

Mais l’arrêt Vidulich , précité, explique qu’il serait malvenu de forcer une cour d’appel à décider en vertu d’une loi inconstitutionnelle, simplement parce que cet aspect n’a pas été soulevé en première instance [21] : Of course, no court can be required to apply a legislative provision on the basis of an

interpretation that it believes to be incorrect, or to

apply a legislative provision which it is satisfied is unconstitutional. [ 39 ] Je traite maintenant de la requête pour soulever une nouvelle question constitutionnelle d’invalidité de la législation pertinente, d’adoption récente, dans les présents dossiers. Il ne s’agit pas de supputer les chances de succès de ce nouvel argument, mais bien uniquement de décider s’il devrait pouvoir être soulevé à ce stade. [ 40 ] La dissidence de l’arrêt Brown exprime désormais l’état du droit quant aux critères et conditions applicables. Règle générale, il est interdit de présenter un nouveau moyen en appel.

Seules des circonstances particulières justifient de déroger à cette pratique. Une déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité subséquente au jugement de première instance constitue à mon avis une telle exception [22] . En l’espèce, le jugement dans R. v. Tinker [23] , où on a attaqué dès le procès la validité de la suramende compensatoire, l’a déclaré inconstitutionnelle le 23 avril 2014, soit après les jugements a quo .

J’estime que cette circonstance permet de considérer ce nouveau moyen en appel. [ 41 ] Une fois que le requérant convainc la Cour qu’il se trouve dans une situation exceptionnelle, encore faut-il que soient remplies les trois conditions suivantes [24] : Premièrement, la preuve doit être suffisante pour trancher la question. Deuxièmement, il ne doit pas s'agir d'un cas où l'accusé n'a pas, pour des motifs de stratégie, soulevé la question au procès.

Troisièmement, la cour doit être convaincue qu'il ne résultera aucun déni de justice si l'examen de la nouvelle question n'est pas permis en appel. [ 42 ] Avec égards pour l’opinion contraire, j’estime ces conditions remplies dans les cas à l’étude. [ 43 ] La preuve aux dossiers est suffisante : les éléments colligés au procès se transposent aisément pour procéder à l’analyse de la constitutionnalité de la suramende compensatoire, maintenant rendue obligatoire sans possibilité de révision par le juge d’instance. Dans R. c. Broyles [25] , la Cour suprême considère un nouveau moyen d’appel.

L’arrêt de principe Brown entérine cette décision au motif que la preuve y était suffisante [26] : Comme cette question avait déjà été débattue antérieurement, quoique sous une forme légèrement différente, la Cour disposait d'un dossier complet, incluant les conclusions de fait nécessaires. [ 44 ] À l’instar de l’affaire Broyles , les éléments de preuve aux dossiers suffisent à l’analyse de la proportionnalité de la peine en vertu des articles 7 et 12 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés . Cette question a été débattue sous un angle différent mais compatible avec le nouveau moyen.

Par exemple, le tribunal d’instance a longuement abordé l’indigence du requérant Cloud en vertu des principes de proportionnalité et d’individualisation des peines [27] . Quant aux autres jugements qui font l’objet de la présente demande d’autorisation, ils réfèrent aux motifs dans Cloud [28] .

J’estime donc la preuve suffisante pour déterminer si la suramende enfreint les articles 7 et 12 de la Charte , preuve qui pourra être étayée et complétée par l’examen de situations hypothétiques [29] . [ 45 ] Il convient de rappeler, du reste, que cette requête s’inscrit dans le cadre de plusieurs appels par le ministère public des peines ici prononcées, parce que les effets de la suramende compensatoire ont été considérablement réduits en première instance. [ 46 ] L’absence de preuve requise pour l’analyse de l’article premier de la Charte n’est pas fatale.

Les éléments dont le ministère public et le Procureur général déplorent l’absence (débats parlementaires, preuve statistique, étude criminologique) sont souvent présentés en appel pour la première fois. Il n’est pas idéal qu’un tribunal d’appel doive se passer de l’éclairage du jugement d’instance et considérer la preuve pour la première fois, j’en conviens. La situation n’est cependant pas sans précédent. Lorsque les parties ont soulevé la constitutionnalité d’une disposition en première instance, il arrive que la Cour suprême entende une preuve nouvelle concernant l’

article 1 de la Charte [30] . Cette dernière rappelle d’ailleurs que l’article 687(1) C. Cr. confère aux tribunaux d’appel le pouvoir d’admettre une preuve nouvelle en matière de pourvoi de sentence [31] . Ce n’est donc pas un obstacle insurmontable. [ 47 ] D’autre part, je ne crois pas que l’on puisse qualifier de choix stratégique l’omission de plaider l’inconstitutionnalité de la suramende obligatoire en première instance. Si le juge a tendu la perche au requérant Cloud, ce dernier n’a pas explicitement renoncé à son droit de plaider que la suramende viole ses droits fondamentaux.

Il faut distinguer la situation présente des faits dans l’affaire Brown , où l’appelant avait expressément renoncé à présenter un argument constitutionnel [32] . La majorité de la Cour suprême avait d’ailleurs accepté de se pencher sur le nouveau moyen d’appel, en dépit du choix stratégique en première instance. Cette considération est donc secondaire. [ 48 ] Finalement, empêcher les requérants d’invoquer leurs droits fondamentaux afin de contrer l’appel du ministère public est contraire à l’intérêt de la justice.

Cela est d’autant plus vrai à la lumière du second principe énoncé plus haut, voulant que la Cour ne puisse être forcée d’appliquer la suramende compensatoire si sa constitutionnalité est mise en doute. [ 49 ] Dans le présent cas, j’estime que l’intérêt de la justice est un facteur prépondérant qui justifie cet aménagement. [ 50 ] Sans aucunement aborder le fond du litige, force est de constater que la jurisprudence actuelle fluctue.

Les décisions portées en appel par le ministère public ici le démontrent amplement, puisqu’elles ont considérablement réduit la suramende même en l’absence d’un moyen d’inconstitutionnalité. [ 51 ] Comme déjà mentionné, dans l’affaire Tinker , la Cour provinciale de l’Ontario a déclaré inconstitutionnelle la suramende obligatoire.

Il convient cependant de préciser que l’accusé Tinker avait, selon les règles, avisé le procureur général de son moyen d’inconstitutionnalité en première instance. [ 52 ] En outre, je reconnais volontiers que l’affaire Tinker ne saurait équivaloir à un changement jurisprudentiel significatif émanant de la Cour suprême, comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire Brown . Dans Brown , en effet, l’arrêt R. c.

Hébert [33] , prononcé entretemps, avait radicalement changé la donne entre le jugement de première instance et l’appel. [ 53 ] Tinker représente néanmoins un premier jalon de droit positif sur la question que les requérants souhaitent soulever en appel, le

pourvoi en Cour supérieure n’ayant pas encore eu lieu. [ 54 ] Un survol de la jurisprudence révèle le traitement pour le moins disparate de la suramende compensatoire [34] à l’heure actuelle, les sentences en cause en fournissant un exemple. Cette jurisprudence évolue rapidement et au moins un jugement ( Tinker ) a déclaré la suramende compensatoire inconstitutionnelle. La situation diffère donc de celle qui prévalait dans l’affaire Rudnicki c.

R. , où la Cour avait refusé d’entendre un nouveau moyen constitutionnel en appel puisque « rien n'a changé dans le droit à ce sujet depuis le jugement dont appel » [35] . [ 55 ] Dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d’entendre un nouveau moyen en appel, la Cour doit donc se demander si le refus de considérer ce moyen entraînerait un déni de justice [36] : Les tribunaux devraient permettre que l'on débatte une nouvelle question en appel seulement dans les cas évidents où, après avoir soupesé les intérêts des deux parties, il serait par ailleurs injuste envers l'accusé de ne pas permettre de traiter cette nouvelle question. [ 56 ] Je répondrais ici par l’affirmative.

Les requérants devraient pouvoir bénéficier de la déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité ultérieure au jugement d’instance et rendue avant l’audition de l’appel. Si la suramende obligatoire viole un droit fondamental des accusés, il devrait leur être permis de faire valoir cet argument avant d'épuiser leur droit d'appel. [ 57 ] De plus, la justification à l’encontre de nouveaux moyens d’appel reposant sur la finalité des jugements ne s’applique pas en l’espèce.

En effet, les requérants se défendent dans le cadre de plusieurs appels par le ministère public à l’encontre d’amendes symboliques imposées en première instance. Ils ont plaidé coupable et la peine découle d’une suggestion commune.

Il ne s’agit donc pas de requérants qui, insatisfaits du déroulement en première instance, cherchent à refaire le procès en appel. [ 58 ] Pour ces motifs, je permettrais aux requérants de présenter un nouveau moyen constitutionnel en appel et je les autoriserais à donner maintenant au procureur général du Canada et à la procureure générale du Québec tout avis requis, notamment en vertu de l’article 95 C .p.c. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, J.C.Q.