2015 NBCA 4, 2015 NBCA 4

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 14-14-CA / 15-14-CA KAREN JOHNSON APPELLANT KAREN JOHNSON APPELANTE - and - - et - STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY RESPONDENT STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY INTIMÉE Johnson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 2015 NBCA 4 Johnson c.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 2015 NBCA 4 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: January 15, 2014 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 15 janvier 2014 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : Inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: October 30, 2014 Appel entendu : le 30 octobre 2014 Judgment rendered: January 22, 2015 Jugement rendu : le 22 janvier 2015

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Larlee Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Larlee Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: George A. McAllister, Q.C. For the respondent: Peter M. Rogers, Q.C. Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : George A. McAllister, c.r. Pour l’intimée : Peter M. Rogers, c.r. THE COURT The first appeal is dismissed; the second is allowed with costs. LA COUR Le premier appel est rejeté; le deuxième est accueilli avec dépens.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by LARLEE, J.A. [ 1 ] Two appeals arising from the same factual background were heard together by consent of the parties. The appellant, Karen Johnson, owned a home insured by the respondent. On June 20, 2008, she lost her house to fire, for which she submitted a proof of loss on April 13, 2009, claiming the replacement cost of her home, the loss of her personal property, the loss of use, and the cost of demolition. The respondent denied the appellant’s claim primarily on the basis that the house had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days prior to the fire.

The respondent also alleged that the appellant failed to notify it of a material change to the risk. [ 2 ] On June 3 and 4, 2013, the parties proceeded to an examination for discovery in Fredericton. The appellant’s counsel provided the respondent’s counsel with several undertakings on the first day of discovery, though stated that the undertakings were conditional, depending on how respondent counsel responded to the appellant’s request for undertakings later in the discovery process. A dispute arose between opposing counsel on the second day of discovery regarding the appellant counsel’s line of questioning.

A standstill resulted whereby counsel for the respondent would not continue the discovery and left with his client, and counsel for the appellant would not deliver copies of the exhibits as marked at the discovery. Communications broke down between the parties, and each filed a motion seeking relief from the Court.

[3] The first appeal arises from a Notice of Motion filed by the respondent on November 19, 2013,seeking an order for the fulfillment of the appellant’s four undertakings and delivery of the sixteen exhibits marked at discovery. Themotion judge granted the motion and rendered an order accordingly, including costs payable to the respondent.

With leave, the appellantappeals from that decision and seeks a dismissal of the respondent’s motion with costs. [4] A discretionary order may be interfered with on appeal only if: the order is founded upon anerror of law, an error in the application of the governing principles, or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence;or if the order is unreasonable in the sense that nothing in the record can justify it: The Beaverbrook Canadian Foundation v. TheBeaverbrook Art Gallery, 2006 NBCA 75, 302 N.B.R. (2d) 161, at para. 4; Williamson et al. v.

Gillis et al., 2011 NBCA 53, 374 N.B.R.(2d) 311, at paras. 13-15. [5] With respect to this first appeal, the motion judge reviewed the record, determined that therespondent had fulfilled its undertakings to the appellant (confirmed by a three page letter), and saw no impediment to the appellantfulfilling her undertakings or producing exhibits marked at discovery. Nor can I. This discretionary order is owed deference. There is nomerit to the first appeal and I would dismiss it. [6] On November 27, 2013, the appellant brought a second motion that gives rise to the secondappeal.

In the motion, the appellant sought to strike out the respondent’s Statement of Defence, or alternatively, that David Magee, whowas testifying as an officer, director, or manager of the respondent at the examination for discovery in June, 2013, be directed to return tothe discovery at a date and time to be specified by the appellant, and answer a specific question that had been posed by the appellant. Theappellant also sought costs. The motion judge made an order instead that Mr.

Magee provide a detailed affidavit, and that if theappellant was not satisfied with that affidavit, the portion of the motion requesting a return to discovery was adjourned sine die so that afurther hearing could be requested. With leave, the appellant seeks a reversal of that decision and that her motion be granted with costs. [7] The applicable Rules are 32.06(1) and (2) (Scope of Examination), 33.11 (Improprieties onExamination) and 33.12 (Penalty for Refusal or Neglect): see Appendix A.

Rule 32.06 provides that persons examined for discoveryshall answer any proper question relating to an issue in the action to the best of their knowledge, information and belief, and goes on tospecify grounds on which questions are not to be objected to. Rule 33.11 sets out the circumstances under which a person beingexamined for discovery, or a party present or represented at a discovery, can adjourn the examination to seek directions from the Court asto its continuation, or seek an order terminating the examination or limiting its scope.

Rule 33.12 particularizes the Court’s powers in theevent a person refuses or neglects to attend or to remain in attendance for his or her examination, or refuses to be sworn, answer a properquestion, produce a document which he or she is bound to produce, comply with an order under Rule 33.11, or fulfill an undertaking. [8] In Seely v.

Corrier, 2009 NBCA 3, 340 N.B.R. (2d) 262, Drapeau, C.J.N.B. examined Rule32.06(1), by which a person being examined for discovery is required to answer any “proper question relating to an issue in the action”.He stated the following: In my respectful judgment, the disposition in this Court depends on the answer to questions of law, namely the propriety and relevance ofcertain questions posed at discovery pursuant to Rule 32. That being so, correctness is the controlling standard of review.

In any event,one cannot distil from the record at our disposal an explanation for the judge’s dismissal of the appellant’s motion. Where, as here, aCaesarian thumbs down is given without substantiating reasons, the Court can only confirm if it concludes the order made in firstinstance is the one “that ought to have been made” (see Rule 62.21(1)). [para. 22] [9] There is a body of New Brunswick jurisprudence that refers to discovery procedure, and it maybe helpful to review it. In Seven Seas Restaurant Ltd. v. Central and Eastern Trust Co. (1978), (NB KB), 26 N.B.R.(2d) 533, [1978] N.B.J.

No. 341 (Q.B.) (QL), Dickson, J. dealt with the validity of objections made to certain questions asked of thepresident of the plaintiff company who testified at a discovery. He found all of the questions pertinent and relevant to the issues; theyhad to be answered, along with supplementary questions relevantly pertaining to the same subject matter and which directly flowed fromthe answers given (para. 5).

As to the purposes of discovery generally, he expanded that they are: (1) to enable the examining party toknow the case he has to meet; (2) to enable him to procure admissions which will dispense with other formal proof of his case; and (3) toprocure admissions which will destroy the plaintiff’s case (para. 6). After confirming that the tendency of our courts in modern times isto widen all avenues of discovery, he states: Discovery of course must be relevant to the issues but it is now firmly recognized that that relevance should be construed with somelatitude.

It should not be overlooked that where evidence is elicited on discovery which is not properly admissible at trial, it is alwayswithin the competence of the trial judge to refuse to admit its introduction. [para. 6]

[10] In Violette et al. v. Wandlyn Inns Ltd. et al. (1995), (NB CA), 169 N.B.R.(2d) 374, [1995] N.B.J. No. 574 (C.A.) (QL), the respondents unilaterally adjourned an examination for discovery, and the appellantbrought a motion seeking a finding that the respondents were in contempt for their cancellation of the examination. Ryan, J.A., for theCourt, found the respondents did not have the right to unilaterally adjourn an examination for discovery under Rule 33.10 (para. 5).

In hisreasons he explains the scope and general purpose of discovery: One of the objectives of oral examination for discovery is to enable the opposite party to know what case he or she is called upon to meetand, in addition, to simplify the trial by procuring admissions: Graydon v. Graydon (1921), (ON SC), 51 O.L.R. 301(H.C.). The tendency of the courts is not to circumscribe the avenues of discovery but to widen them: Henderson v. Mercantile Trust Co.(1922), 52 O.L.R. 198.

The objectives just mentioned are examples of the general purpose of discovery which includes particulars, disclosure of documents,inspection of documents, admitting of documents, physical examination, production of reports, inspection of property and interrogatories.The general purpose of discovery can be summarily described as follows: 1. to enable the examining party to know the case he or she has to meet; 2. to enable a party to obtain admissions which will dispense with other formal proof of your own case; 3. to obtain admissions which will permit you to destroy your opponent’s case; and 4. to facilitate settlement. [paras. 2-3] [11] Ryan, J.A. went on to approve of the reasoning of Stevenson, J. in Bank of Montreal v.

Peter J.Donovan Ltd. et al. (1983), (NB KB), 51 N.B.R. (2d) 208, [1983] N.B.J. No. 351 (Q.B.) (QL) . In that case anexamination was abruptly adjourned, upon the refusal of a witness to answer a question, and the questioning counsel withdrew alongwith his client. The plaintiff applied to strike the defence and counterclaim of the defendants with leave to apply for judgment forthwith.Stevenson, J. opined that it would be wrong to grant such a motion. He concluded that the discovery should be resumed, concluded, andthe action brought on for trial.

He emphasized “[a]ll counsel should cease their cold war tactics” (para. 18). Ryan, J.A. emphaticallyendorsed this approach: I approve the ruling in Bank of Montreal and Donovan; counsel should cease such tactics. Counsel do not have the right to unilaterallyadjourn an examination for discovery under Subrule 33.10. To hold otherwise would leave the procedure subject to potential abuse bylitigants who wish to delay the process. [para. 9] [12] In Juman v.

Doucette, 2008 SCC 8, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157, Binnie, J. comments that pre-trialdiscovery is “essential to prevent surprise or ‘litigation by ambush’, to encourage settlement once the facts are known, and to narrowissues even where settlement proves unachievable” (para. 24). [13] Recently in Rumble v. Sobeys Incorporated, 2014 NBCA 72, [2014] N.B.J. No. 322 (QL),Drapeau, C.J.N.B., citing Kay v. Kay (1999), (NB CA), 215 N.B.R. (2d) 291, [1999] N.B.J. No. 289 (C.A.) (QL),reiterated the importance of achieving the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.

Thepossibility of doing so is enhanced “where the risk of surprise is minimized, if not eliminated, by giving the parties an opportunity toknow beforehand precisely what they will face at trial” (para. 12). Surely, as is evident from the jurisprudence reviewed above,discovery is one of the most important tools in that arsenal to alleviate from surprise at trial. [14] The motion judge in this case ruled in the following manner on the appellant’s motion: I am going to order that Mr. Magee is to provide a detailed affidavit with regard to the items Mrs.

Johnson has contended were in thehome or around the home or in the porch to be delivered to Mr. Rogers within 45 days. And further that if Mr. McAllister is not satisfiedwith the affidavit that the portion of his motion with respect to returning for further discovery will be adjourned sine die so that he may,

after he receives that, request a further hearing which could probably be done by court call or telephone conference call so that you don’t have to come back up, Mr. Rogers. The motion judge gave no substantiating reasons for her decision. Thus, in accordance with Seely , we are able to interfere if the order made in first instance is not the one that ought to have been made. [ 15 ] The discovery was in its second day and a reading of the transcript reveals the detailed questioning by counsel for the appellant was leading to a deteriorating situation. When the discovery abruptly ended, counsel for Ms.

Johnson was posing questions to Mr. Magee regarding the contents of the house, questions he alleges are relevant to the vacancy issue. The following is the exchange in the discovery that immediately preceded counsel for State Farm leaving with Mr. Magee: Q. 582 Do you have evidence that the footwear, winter boots… MR. ROGERS Mr. McAllister, I’m afraid I must interrupt. This is a grotesque waste of time. Why don’t you just ask him if his answer is the same for the other items on the page? MR. McALLISTER: I’m… MR. ROGERS: But honestly, you know what? MR. MCALLISTER: Because I want to direct… MR.

ROGERS: Have some respect for your time and my time, the court reporter’s time, your client’s time, my client’s time. MR. MCALLISTER: I want to direct his mind to each and every one of these items. A. As I’ve indicated, the Point of Origin’s report says both bedrooms were void of furnishings. This list that you’re going through now is in those bedrooms. I just said their…our evidence is that there was no furnishings in those bedrooms. Counsel for Ms. Johnson was asking questions from page 2 of a 5 page document where Ms. Johnson had listed the contents of her home: MR.

MCALLISTER: I’m…I’m continuing and I’m going to continue this discovery in the sequence that I choose, okay? Now… MR. ROGERS: Okay. Well, we’re going to terminate if then, Mr. McAllister. I’m sorry, we’re not willing to engage in that. It’s an abuse of our time. [ 16 ] It is clear from Violette et al. v. Wandlyn Inns Ltd. et al. that under Rule 33.10 counsel do not have the right to unilaterally adjourn an examination. Perceived tedious questioning does not provide sufficient reason.

The witness is required to answer any proper question that has a semblance of relevance, and must do so to the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief (Rule 32.06(1)). As Drapeau, C.J.N.B. pointed out, “[o]ral discovery dwarfs all other available discovery devices in terms of importance and effectiveness”: Seely v. Corrier , at para. 27 . There is no evidence on the record to suggest Mr. Magee is under any impediment, or that he is a novitiate with respect to discovery proceedings and is suffering some kind of disadvantage because of the questioning. The fact that Mr.

Rogers and his client would have to return to Fredericton is of no moment. The motion judge gave no explanation as to why she ordered the filing of an affidavit by Mr. Magee to replace oral examination. She does not refer to any of the remedies enumerated in Rule 33.12(1)(a)-(e).

[ 17 ] That leaves the question of what order ought to have been made. I see no reason, following Violette et al. v. Wandlyn Inns Ltd. et al. , why oral examination for discovery should not be completed. [ 18 ] In Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 821 v. Vitalité Health Network (Zone 1B), 2015 NBCA 3 , Drapeau, C.J.N.B. states certain provinces, including New Brunswick, have codified the principle of proportionality (Rule 1.02.1), which allows the Court to consider the importance and complexity of the triable issue even if the litigation itself is not considered important or complex.

He explains the context: The principle of proportionality has long held an important place in the Canadian legal landscape. In Hryniak v. Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 , the Supreme Court of Canada confirms this principle must be taken into account in the exercise of any discretionary power under rules of procedure. At paragraph 31, the Supreme Court adopts the observations in Szeto v. Dwyer , 2010 NLCA 36 , [2010] N.J.

No. 187 (QL) to the effect that, at common law, the principle of proportionality ordains consideration of “the appropriateness of the procedure, its cost and impact on the litigation, and its timeliness, given the nature and complexity of the litigation” (para. 52). […] It bears emphasizing that Rule 1.02.1 does not alter the principles that govern the

interpretation of the provisions of the Rules of Court . In other words, it has no interpretive value (see the comments of LeBel J., on behalf of the majority, in Marcotte v. Longueuil (City), 2009 SCC 43 , [2009] 3 S.C.R. 65, at paras. 43 and 68-71 ). Under Rule 1.02.1, the court is duty bound to bring into play the principle of proportionality whenever it applies the rules. That said, the wording of Rule 1.02.1 gives it a very broad scope.

Like the Ontario rule, it authorizes the court to consider the importance and complexity of the issues even if the litigation itself might not be considered important or complex. Moreover, under Rule 1.02.1, the “issues” include, but are not limited to, financial issues. [paras. 55, 57-58] [ 19 ] Rule 62.21(1) authorizes the Court to make the decision or order that ought to have been made in first instance: see J.H. v.

T.H. , 2014 NBCA 52 , 422 N.B.R. (2d) 388 , at para. 11 , where the Court applied the principle of proportionality and decided the issue itself instead of remitting it to the Court of Queen's Bench. In J.H. v. T.H. , as in Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1773 v. Town of Shediac , 2005 NBCA 20 , 280 N.B.R. (2d) 324, the Court had at its disposition the means to decide the matter. [ 20 ] I am of the view that remitting this matter to the Court of Queen’s Bench, to have the order made that ought to have been, would be wasteful of the parties’ time and money.

Therefore, in accordance with Rules 1.02.1 and 62.21(1), I am prepared to make the determination that should have been made in the first instance. The parties will resume discovery within sixty days from the date of the publication of this decision and complete it. [ 21 ] For these reasons, I would dismiss the first appeal, and allow the second. Since I am of the opinion that the appellant has been more successful on the appeals than the respondent, I would order the respondent to pay costs of $1,500. ____________________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.A. WE CONCUR:

___________________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A. ___________________________________ BRADLEY V. GREEN, J.A. APPENDIX A /

ANNEXE A 1.02.1 Proportionality In applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to what is at stake in the proceeding and the importance and complexity of the issues. […] 32.06 Scope of Examination 1.02.1 Proportionnalité Lorsqu’elle applique les présentes règles, la cour rend des ordonnances et donne des directives qui sont proportionnées aux enjeux de l’instance ainsi qu’à l’importance et à la complexité des questions en litige. […] 32.06 Portée de l’interrogatoire

(1) Unless ordered otherwise, a person being examined for discovery shall answer to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, any proper question relating to an issue in the action, including any matter made discoverable by paragraph (2) to (4) and a question shall not be objected to on the ground that (

a) the information sought is evidence, (

b) the question is cross-examination if it relates to an issue in the action and is not directed solely to the credibility of the witness, or (

c) the question is cross-examination on the affidavit of documents of the party being examined.

(2) A party being examined for discovery shall answer, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, any question concerning the names and addresses of potential witnesses. 33.11 Improprieties on Examination

(1) An examination may be adjourned by the person being examined or by any party present or represented on the examination for the purpose of applying to the court for directions as to its continuation, or for an order terminating the examination or limiting its scope where (

a) the right to examine is being abused by an excess of improper questions or obstructed by an excess of improper interruptions or objections,

(1) Sauf ordonnance contraire, la personne interrogée au préalable doit répondre selon ce qu’elle sait, ce qu’elle a appris ou ce qu’elle croit à toute question légitime qui se rapporte à un des objets du litige et notamment à tout renseignement qui peut être, aux termes des paragraphes (2) et (4), l’objet d’une communication. Les motifs suivants ne doivent pas constituer des objections valables :

a) le renseignement recherché est un élément de preuve,

b) la question relève du contre-interrogatoire si elle se rapporte à une question en litige et ne vise pas seulement la crédibilité du témoin ou

c) la question constitue un contre- interrogatoire sur l’affidavit des documents établi par la

partie interrogée.

(2) Toute

partie interrogée au préalable doit répondre selon ce qu’elle sait, ce qu’elle a appris ou ce qu’elle croit à toute question relative aux nom et adresse de témoins éventuels. 33.11 Conduite irrégulière à l’interrogatoire

(1) Tout interrogatoire peut être ajourné à la demande de l’interrogé ou d’une

partie présente ou représentée à l’interrogatoire, afin de demander à la cour des directives quant à la poursuite de l’interrogatoire ou une ordonnance y mettant fin ou en restreignant le champ, lorsque l’une des situations suivantes se produit :

a) un usage abusif est fait du droit d’interroger par un nombre excessif de questions injustifiées, ou l’exercice de ce droit est gêné par des interruptions ou des objections injustifiées,

b) l’interrogatoire est exécuté de mauvaise foi ou de façon déraisonnable de sorte à ennuyer, à gêner ou à accabler l’interrogé,

(

b) the examination is being conducted in bad faith, or in an unreasonable manner so as to annoy, embarrass or oppress the person being examined, (

c) the examination is excessive in length having regard to the nature of the proceeding, (

d) many of the answers to the questions are evasive, unresponsive or unduly prolix, or (

e) there has been a neglect or improper refusal to produce a relevant document in the possession, custody or control of the person being examined, which is not privileged, and which he was required to produce by these rules or by the Notice of Examination or the Summons to Witness served upon him, as may be.

(2) On a motion under paragraph (1), the court may order the person whose improper conduct necessitated the motion or the person who improperly brought the motion, as may be, to personally pay forthwith the costs of the motion, any costs unnecessarily incurred and the costs of any continuation of the examination.

The court may fix those costs or make such other order as may be just. 33.12 Penalty for Refusal or Neglect Where a person refuses or neglects to attend or to remain in attendance for his examination or refuses to be sworn, or to answer a proper question, or to produce a document which he is bound to produce, or to comply with an order under Rule 33.11, or to fulfill an undertaking, the court may (

a) where an objection is held to be improper, order him to re-attend at his own expense and answer that question and any proper questions arising from his answer, (

b) order him to produce any document, to re- attend at his own expense and to answer any

c) la durée de l’interrogatoire est excessive compte tenu de la nature de l’instance,

d) plusieurs réponses sont évasives, vagues ou indûment prolixes ou

e) l’interrogé a négligé ou refusé sans raison valable de produire des documents pertinents et non privilégiés se trouvant en sa possession, sous sa garde ou sous son contrôle, documents qu’il était tenu de produire conformément aux présentes règles ou aux termes de l’avis d’interrogatoire ou de l’assignation à témoin, selon le cas, qui lui a été signifié.

(2) Sur une motion présentée en application du paragraphe (1), la cour peut ordonner à celui dont la conduite irrégulière a rendu nécessaire la motion ou dont la motion n’était pas justifiée, selon le cas, de payer immédiatement et personnellement les dépens afférents à la motion, ceux qui ont été encourus inutilement et ceux qui ont été occasionnés par la poursuite de l’interrogatoire.

Elle peut aussi fixer le montant de ces dépens ou rendre toute autre ordonnance qu’elle estime juste. 33.12 Sanction Lorsqu’une personne refuse ou néglige de comparaître ou de demeurer présente à son interrogatoire ou refuse de prêter serment, de répondre à une question légitime, de produire un document qu’elle est tenue de produire, de se conformer à une ordonnance rendue en application de la règle 33.11 ou de s’acquitter d’un engagement, la cour peut

a) lui ordonner, si elle a formulé une objection jugée injustifiée, de comparaître à nouveau, à ses propres frais, pour répondre à la question et à toute autre question légitime découlant de sa réponse,

b) lui ordonner de produire un document, de comparaître à nouveau à ses propres frais et de répondre à toute question légitime relative audit document,

c) rejeter la demande ou radier l’exposé de la

proper questions arising from such document, (

c) if he is a party, or an officer, director or manager of a corporate party, dismiss the claim or strike out the Statement of Defence, as may be, (

d) strike out his evidence, or part thereof, including any affidavit made by him, (

e) by Warrant (Form 33C) to any sheriff or other peace officer in New Brunswick, cause the person being examined to be apprehended anywhere in New Brunswick and brought before the court. Upon being apprehended, he may be detained in custody or released on such terms as the court may order, and he may be ordered to pay all costs arising out of his refusal or neglect, and (

f) make such other order as may be just. […] 62.21 Powers of Court of Appeal To Draw Inferences and Make Decisions

(1) The Court of Appeal may draw inferences of fact, render any decision and make any order which ought to have been made, and may make such further or other order as the case may require. défense, selon le cas, si ladite personne est une

partie ou un dirigeant, un administrateur ou un gérant d’une corporation

partie à l’action,

d) radier la totalité ou une

partie de sa déposition, y compris tout affidavit qu’elle a établi,

e) lancer un mandat (formule 33C) à l’adresse de tout shérif ou autre agent de la paix au Nouveau-Brunswick d’arrêter la personne interrogée n’importe où au Nouveau- Brunswick et de l’amener devant la cour. Après son arrestation, elle peut être détenue ou libérée aux conditions ordonnées par la cour et se voir condamnée, par ordonnance, aux dépens découlant de son refus ou de son omission et

f) rendre toute autre ordonnance qu’elle estime juste. […] 62.21 Attributions de la Cour d’appel Pouvoir d’inférer et de décider

(1) La Cour d’appel peut faire des inférences à partir des faits et rendre toute décision ou ordonnance qui aurait dû être rendue. Elle peut également rendre toute autre ordonnance appropriée à la cause.