2015 QCCA 746, 2015 QCCA 746

Plomp c. Joshi 2015 QCCA 746 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-024868-143 (500-17-077343-138) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: April 30, 2015 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE ALLAN R. HILTON , J.A. marie st-pierre , J.A. mark schrager , J.A. PETITIONER ELIZABETH PLOMP In person RESPONDENTS COUNSEL DR. ARVIND JOSHI DR. JANE MCCUSKER ELISABETH DAMPOLIAS SONIA DESCHENES CARLO DE STEFANO DENISE BEAUREGARD ZAHOOR CHUGHTAI Mtre MAGALI COURNOYER-PROULX (Lavery De Billy) IMPLEADED PARTY COUNSEL

CENTRE HOSPITALIER DE ST MARY Mtre magali cournoyer-proulx (Lavery De Billy) DESCRIPTION : Motion in revocation of judgment (Articles 482, 483 (2), 519 and 520 C.C.P.) Clerk: Robert Osadchuck Courtroom: Antonio-Lamer HEARING Continuation of the hearing held on April 27, 2015. By the Court: judgment – see page 3. Robert Osadchuck Clerk BY THE COURT JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Elizabeth Plomp seeks to revoke the judgment of this Court (Duval Hesler, C.J.

Claude Gagnon and Marcotte, JJ.A.) rendered on January 26, 2015 [1] that dismissed her motion dated December 1, 2014 for leave to appeal a judgment of the Superior Court (Mayer, J.). [2] The impugned judgment dismissed her motion soliciting his recusal from continuing to hear the respondents' application to have Mrs. Plomp declared a vexatious litigant in the Superior Court. [ 2 ] Amongst the grounds Mrs. Plomp invoked to obtain the judge's recusation are the following, as Mayer, J. described them in his written judgment: [1] A few days before the hearing scheduled to determine whether Mrs.

Elizabeth Plomp should be declared a vexatious litigant, she telecopied a Motion for recusation, in which she raised deep concerns related to her fears that I am partial. She concludes that I should recuse myself. [2] Her Motion in recusation is lengthy and her concerns are numerous. They can be summarized in the following categories, namely that I: • made a number of decisions against her interests during the case management period, including, refusing her requests to: (

i) postpone the hearing;

(ii) permit her to question Mtre. Mélanie Sauriol and Mtre. Cournoyer-Proulx on their affidavits; (iii) obtain further documents from them by subpoena; and, (iv) hear her motion in revocation of Madam Justice Guylène Beaugé's judgment before the motion to have her declared a quarrelsome litigant. Rather, I have kept this revocation motion hidden (under key) in my office; • have shown a lack of interest in the file. In particular, I have shown no curiosity to know the facts or to examine the proof of this case; • cited Mtre.

Magalie Cournoyer-Proulx's book on labour law in two earlier judgements; • favoured the attorneys of Centre Hospitalier de St. Mary ("St. Mary's Hospital") since I accept their arguments without question. In fact, I have asked the attorneys what they believed should be done to proceed in this matter; • refused to take cognisance of and to enforce her collective agreement; and • made some ill timed humour that she believes made fun of her. [3] In furtherance of her fears and concerns, Mrs.

Plomp states that she filed a complaint against me with the Canadian Judicial Council. [3] [ 3 ] The motion with which the Court was seized and dismissed on January 26 is governed by the rules relating to the appeal of interlocutory judgments. [4] Accordingly, Mrs. Plomp was bound by the parameters of paragraph 2) of the first paragraph of

article 29 and

article 511 C.C.P. in order that leave be granted. As our former colleague André Rochon has written, « [l]e jugement qui accueille, rejette ou prend sous réserve une requête en récusation ordonne toujours que soit faite une chose à laquelle le jugement final ne pourra remédier. » [5] [ 4 ] Her principal grievances with respect to the judgment that she seeks to revoke are twofold. [ 5 ] First, she considers that the judgment was not a reasoned one in that it did not address any of the many grounds for which she sought leave to appeal.

In fact, the judgment dismissing her motion says only this: [1] Petitioner's motion for leave to appeal is dismissed, not because of the issue of delays, but because her appeal of the first instance judge's decision not to recuse himself would, in the unanimous opinion of this Court, be doomed to fail. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [2] DISMISSES the motion for leave to appeal, with costs.

There being no appeal pending before this Court, Petitioner's other requests are moot. [ 6 ] Second, she contends that the Court erred by not adjudicating her other request seeking the suspension of a safeguard order issued by Beaugé, J. in the following terms on November 26, 2013: [6]

a) INTERDIT à Elizabeth Plomp de déposer, directement ou indirectement, toute procédure de quelque nature que ce soit devant la Cour supérieure ou la Cour du Québec, sans avoir obtenu au préalable l'autorisation écrite du juge en chef de la Cour supérieure ou de la Cour du Québec, selon le cas;

b) INTERDIT à Elizabeth Plomp de déposer, directement ou indirectement, toute demande en justice, requête, plainte ou autre procédure de quelque nature que ce soit devant tout tribunal ou organisme administratif relevant du pouvoir de surveillance et de contrôle de la Cour supérieure, sans avoir obtenu au préalable l'autorisation du président du Tribunal ou du directeur de l'organisme administratif concerné, selon le cas;

c) INTERDIT à Elizabeth Plomp de déposer, directement ou indirectement, toute plainte disciplinaire contre des avocats, à moins que celle-ci n'ait été autorisée par le Syndic du Barreau du Québec;

d) ORDONNE à tout officier de tout greffe de refuser le dépôt de toute demande en justice, requête, plainte, demande ou autre procédure d'Elizabeth Plomp, à moins que telles procédure ou plainte n'aient fait l'objet de l'autorisation mentionnée ci-dessus; [ 7 ] The Court is of the view that Mrs. Plomp's motion in revocation is unfounded and therefore it will be dismissed with costs. Here is why. [ 8 ] Articles 482 and 483 C.C.P . provide as follows:

482. A party condemned by default to appear or to plead may, if he was prevented from filing his defence by surprise, by fraud or by any other reason considered sufficient, request that the judgment be revoked and that the action be dismissed. The motion, addressed to the court which rendered the judgment, must contain not only the grounds for revocation of judgment, but also the grounds of defence to the action. 1965 (1st sess.), c. 80, a. 482. 483. Likewise, where there is no other useful recourse against a judgment, the court which rendered it may revoke it at the request of one of the parties, in the following cases:

(1) When the procedure prescribed has not been followed and the resulting nullity has not been covered;

(2) When the judgment has decided beyond the conclusions, or when it has failed to rule on one of the essential grounds of the suit;

(3) When, in the case of a minor or person of full age under tutorship or curatorship, no valid defence has been produced;

(4) When judgment has been rendered upon an unauthorized consent or tender subsequently disavowed;

(5) When judgment has been rendered upon documents whose falsity has only been discovered afterwards, or following fraud of the adverse party;

(6) When, since the judgment, decisive documents have been discovered whose production had been prevented by a circumstance of irresistible force or because of the act of the adverse party;

(7) When, since the judgment, new evidence has been discovered and it appears that: (

a) if it had been brought forward in time, the decision would probably have been different; (

b) it was known neither to the party nor to his attorney or agent and (

c) it could not, with all reasonable diligence, have been discovered in time. 1965 (1st sess.), c. 80, a. 483; 1989, c. 54, s. 134. 482. La

partie condamnée par défaut de comparaître ou de plaider peut, si elle a été empêchée de produire sa défense, par surprise, par fraude ou par quelque autre cause jugée suffisante, demander que le jugement soit rétracté, et la poursuite rejetée. La requête, adressée au tribunal où le jugement a été rendu, doit contenir non seulement les motifs qui justifient la rétractation, mais aussi les moyens de défense à l'action. 1965 (1 re sess.), c. 80, a. 482. 483.

De même, le jugement contre lequel n'est ouvert aucun autre recours utile peut être rétracté par le tribunal qui l'a rendu, à la demande d'une partie, dans les cas suivants: 1. Lorsque la procédure prescrite n'a pas été suivie et que la nullité qui en résulte n'a pas été couverte; 2. Lorsqu'il a été prononcé au-delà des conclusions, ou qu'il a été omis de statuer sur un des chefs de la demande; 3. Lorsque, s'agissant d'un mineur ou d'un majeur en tutelle ou en curatelle, aucune défense valable n'a été produite; 4.

Lorsqu'il a été statué sur la foi d'un consentement ou à la suite d'offres non autorisés et subséquemment désavoués; 5. Lorsque le jugement a été rendu sur des pièces dont la fausseté n'a été découverte que depuis, ou à la suite du dol de la

partie adverse; 6. Lorsque, depuis le jugement, il a été découvert des pièces décisives dont la production avait été empêchée par une circonstance de force majeure ou le fait de la

partie adverse; 7. Lorsque, depuis le jugement, il a été découvert une preuve, et qu'il appert:

a) que si elle avait été apportée à temps, la décision eût probablement été différente;

b) qu'elle n'était connue ni de la partie, ni de son procureur ou agent et

c) qu'elle ne pouvait pas, avec toute la diligence raisonnable, être découverte en temps utile. 1965 (1 re sess.), c. 80, a. 483; 1979, c. 37, a. 15; 1989, c. 54, a. 134. [ 9 ] None of the multiple grounds Mrs. Plomp invokes in support of her motion give rise to revocation pursuant to the criteria set out in these two provisions. [ 10 ] Instead, they attack the conclusion of the judgment dismissing her motion because the proposed appeal "would be doomed to fail".

In her view, the three judges on the panel were obliged to provide reasons explaining their conclusion, thus requiring them to consider and analyze each of the grounds of appeal she asserted. Her argument before the Court on the present motion was aimed at convincing us, in effect, that the panel that dismissed her motion ought instead to have granted it. [ 11 ] The brevity of the disposition under review must be considered in the light of the requirements for obtaining leave from an interlocutory judgment of the kind Mayer, J. rendered.

Under any scenario, an applicant must establish that the proposed appeal is one in respect of which "the pursuit of justice requires that leave be granted / les fins de la justice requièrent d'accorder la permission. » [7]

[ 12 ] Manifestly, a conclusion that an appeal "is doomed to fail" responds to the primary consideration an authorizing judge or panel must consider. The interests of justice do not and cannot require that an appeal with no chance of success be authorized. As such, it is unnecessary to delve into the proposed grounds of appeal and analyze them in detail, unlike what often happens when an appeal is being considered on the merits.

That being said, nothing prevents an authorizing judge or panel to explain in detail why a motion for leave is dismissed, but nothing requires them to do so either. [ 13 ] Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada only issues orders granting or dismissing leave applications, but never provides reasons for its orders. [ 14 ] To the extent Mrs. Plomp has any recourse against this Court's judgment dismissing her leave application, it is to apply for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada pursuant to

section 40 of the Supreme Court Act [8] based on the criteria therein mentioned. Although it may be thought impossible that the Supreme Court grant such leave, in fact it does so on some occasions. [9] [ 15 ] Insofar as the Court declined to adjudicate Mrs. Plomp's request to suspend the provisional execution of the judgment of Beaugé, J. rendered on November 26, 2013 that is set out in paragraph [5] above, it could only have done so if there had been a validly constituted appeal of that judgment, which there was not. In any event, she was well beyond the maximum time limit of six months under

article 523 C.C.P. for the presentation of a request for leave to appeal the safeguard order, let alone obtain its suspension. [ 16 ] The foregoing is in all likelihood what the Court was referencing when it disposed of that aspect of her motion for leave by noting that "There being no appeal pending before this Court, Petitioner's other requests are moot." As there had been no appeal authorized of the judgment of Beaugé, J. granting the safeguard order, the Court had no jurisdiction to suspend its execution. [ 17 ] Mrs.

Plomp was undoubtedly unaware of the need to obtain leave to appeal the safeguard order in order to have its execution suspended. Such a state of affairs, however, does not confer jurisdiction on the Court to issue an order it is otherwise without jurisdiction to issue in the absence of a validly constituted appeal. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 18 ] DISMISSES the petitioner's motion in revocation of judgment, with costs. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. marie st-pierre, J.A. mark schrager, J.A.