Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v. B.M., 2011 ONCJ 660

WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file: This is a case under

Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 48(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—

(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The court may make an order, . . . (

c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85.—

(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(

c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. Milton Registry No. c200/10 DATE: 2011·VI·09 CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v. B.M. , 2011 ONCJ 660 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF THE REGION OF HALTON Applicant, — AND — B.M. and T.K.

Respondents Before Justice Roselyn Zisman Heard on 6 May 2011 Reasons for Judgment released on 9 June 2011 Diane Skrow ............................................................................................ for the applicant society Ryan Gibson ............................................................................. for the respondent mother, B.M. No appearance by or on behalf of the respondent father, T.K., service outstanding

JUSTICE R. ZISMAN Introduction [ 1 ] This is a temporary care and custody motion regarding W.N., born February […], 2001 (“the child”). She was apprehended from the care of her mother, Ms. B.M. (“the mother”) on April 28, 2011. Her father is Mr. T.K. (“the father”) who resides in Kenya, Africa. The mother advised the society that she has had no contact with the father since she moved to Canada and does not know his whereabouts.

Service on the father was previously dispensed with in prior proceedings and still an outstanding issue in this proceeding. [ 2 ] The society seeks an order that the child remain in the care and custody of the society with access at the discretion of the society. The mother seeks the return of the child to herself. Background [ 3 ] The society first became involved with the family on June 30, 2009 when the society received a police report which indicated that there had been an incident of domestic violence in the mother’s home. The mother and her boyfriend, Mr.

V.C., became involved in a verbal argument that escalated. According to the police report Mr. V.C. smashed the mother’s television, pushed the mother to the ground and put his hands around her neck, grabbed her hair and started to smash her face against the floor tiles. The mother was able to escape and ran for help. [ 4 ] According to the police reports, the mother made several statements that she was fearful of Mr. V.C., she considered him dangerous, that he had been in this situation before and she believed he would someday kill someone given his behaviour when he is mad. [ 5 ] Mr.

V.C. was arrested and charged with two counts of assault. At the time of this incident, Mr. V.C. was already on a bail recognizance for a domestic incident that involved his ex-wife. [ 6 ] The mother advised the society workers that the child was upstairs during the altercation and was not aware of the incident. The child was interviewed and it was confirmed that she was unaware of the altercation and did not express fear of Mr. V.C. The mother further stated that she had no intention of resuming her relationship with Mr.

V.C. [ 7 ] The society closed its file as it appeared the mother was protective of the child and had a good understanding of domestic violence and the risk it places on a child. [ 8 ] The society then became aware of the fact that the mother was attending Mr. V.C.’s criminal proceedings, was communicating with Mr. V.C.’s parents and his lawyer and that it was her intention to reunite with him. [ 9 ] The society again met with the mother in December 2010 and she denied any intention of reuniting with Mr. V.C. The society cautioned the mother not to permit contact between the child and Mr. V.C.

The society had learnt that in addition to the charges he faced with respect to the mother, Mr. V.C. had an extensive history of domestic violence against his former partners and convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, sexual assault and utter threats. The mother stated that she did not feel that Mr. V.C. was a risk to her child and refused to voluntarily agree that the child not have contact with Mr. V.C. [ 10 ] The society commenced a protection application.

On May 13, 2010 the mother and the society agreed to a temporary order that the child remain in the care of the mother, subject to the supervision of the society and on condition that the mother shall ensure that the child have no contact directly or indirectly with Mr. V.C. [ 11 ] On August 5, 2010 the mother and the society entered into terms of a final order. On consent there was a finding that the child was in need of protection pursuant to clause 37(2) (

g) the Child and Family Services Act. The child was to remain in the care and custody of the mother subject to the supervision of the society for 7 months, one of the conditions being that the mother ensures that the child has no contact directly or indirectly with Mr. V.C. [ 12 ] The mother consented to the following factual findings in the statement of agreed facts: The mother’s boyfriend has an extensive history of violent and abusive behaviour, some of which has led to criminal convictions. In February 2010 [Mr. V.C.] was convicted of Assault with respect to his conduct towards the mother.

This Assault took place in the mother’s home and the child was in the home when the assault occurred. [Mr. V.C.] has been diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder. At this time the Society has no objective evidence from any experts involved with [Mr. V.C.] indicating that he does not pose a risk of harm to the mother and the child. The mother has re-established her relationship with [Mr. V.C.] and a Court Order is required to ensure that the child has no contact with [Mr. V.C.]. Section 37(2)(

g) of the Family and Child Services Act : There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm, demonstrated by serious anxiety, depression, withdrawal, self-destruction or aggressive behaviour, or delayed development resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of her parent or the person having charge of her. [ 13 ] In the Status Review Application returnable March 3, 2011, the society sought a termination of the supervision order on the basis that the mother had been co-operative, had attended and participated in individual counselling to address the issues of domestic

violence and informed the society that she was no longer involved in a romantic relationship with Mr. V.C. The society had met with the child monthly and she had not disclosed any contact with Mr. V.C. [ 14 ] Almost immediately thereafter, the society obtained information that the mother intended to resume her relationship with Mr. V.C. The society amended its application to seek an order that the child remain in the care and custody of her mother pursuant to

section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act , with a condition that the child have no access to Mr. V.C. whatsoever and the society be notified of any proposed change to custody and/or access whether by court order or voluntary agreement. The supervision order was to be terminated. [ 15 ] On April 14, 2011, the mother and the society consented to an order as requested by the society. The mother executed a statement of agreed facts that simply indicated as follows: • The mother has attended and participated in individual counselling to address the history of domestic violence.

The mother has indicated that she intends to continue her relationship with Mr. V.C. • The child has not disclosed having contact with Mr. C. during the period of the supervision order. [ 16 ] The court made a further order that a copy of the order be provided to Mr. V.C. and to his probation officer. Mr. V.C.’s probation order stipulated that he was to abide by any family court order regarding access to the child. Events Leading to Apprehension [ 17 ] The child was apprehended on April 29, 2011.

The society commenced a new Protection Application returnable May 3, 2011 on the basis that the child would be placed at an unacceptable risk of emotional harm, pursuant to s. 37(2)(

g) of the Child and Family Service Act, due to the mother’s failure to protect the child by breaching the court orders that restricted any access between the child and Mr. V.C. [ 18 ] On May 3, 2011 on a temporary without prejudice basis, the child was placed in the temporary care and custody of the society. The temporary care and custody hearing was adjourned to May16, 2011 at which time judgement was reserved until today. [ 19 ] The affidavit of Ms. Karina Cal, in support of the motion, disclosed that the society received information from an unidentified source that: a. [Mr.

V.C.] is residing full-time with the mother and the child and has never lived with his parents, as per the terms of his probation order; b. [Mr. V.C.] had access with his biological children at the mother’s home to celebrate Easter and the child was present and played with his biological children; c. The all the, as a group, visited [Mr. V.C.’s] parents’ home in Oakville, and then subsequently returned to the other’s home; d. [Mr. V.C.] drove the mother, the child, and his biological children in his vehicle and the child sat in the back middle seat; e.

The Family responsibility Office found that the mother is residing with [Mr. V.C.] and that he runs two businesses out of her home. One of the businesses is “Paint Guys”, which is owned by [Mr. V.C.]; and f. [Mr. V.C.] disclosed to others that the mother drank alcohol in excess, and he had to hide the bottles. [ 20 ] As a result of this information, Ms. Cal interviewed the child at her school. The child disclosed the following: a. She lived with her mother alone in Oakville; b. They moved to their new home last April 2010 and she started her new school in fall 2010; c.

Her father resided in Africa, and she spoke to him often on the telephone using a calling card; d. Her mother had her father’s telephone number at home; e. She went to a friend’s house for Easter; f. Although initially, she denied knowing who [Mr. V.C.] was, she then acknowledged he was her mother’s friend; g. With respect to the Easter weekend, the child confirmed that she saw [Mr. V.C.] at his parent’s home located in downtown Oakville; h. She confirmed that she was in the vehicle with [Mr. V.C.] along with his biological children and her mother; i.

They had to take a car seat out of the vehicle to fit all of them; j. Although, she initially denied that the police had ever attended at her home, she subsequently recalled the incident that had occurred two years prior, which involved her mother and [Mr. V.C.]; k. She had witnessed part of the incident of domestic violence between [Mr. V.C.] and her mother, but she did not provide details; l. Sometimes she was scared of [Mr. V.C.], but was unable to explain why; and

m. She denied her mother used alcohol in excess. [ 21 ] Ms. Cal was advised by the principal of the child’s school that there were no custody/access orders on file indicating that the child’s contact with any adult is restricted. On reviewing the child’s school registration, Ms. Cal noted that the child was registered in the school on June 30, 2010, and that the mother had recorded Mr. V.C. as one of the emergency contacts for the child and on the form it states that the relationship of Mr. V.C. to the student is “uncle”. [ 22 ] The telephone number provided for Mr.

V.C. in the emergency contact information is the same home telephone number provided by the mother for herself. It is also the same telephone number listed for Mr. V.C.’s business, Paint Guys, on the internet. [ 23 ] In the interview with the mother, on the day following the apprehension, she adamantly denied that the child had any contact with Mr. V.C. since the court order. When asked to clarify what court order, the mother indicated the court order of April 14, 2011. The mother denied that Mr. V.C. resided in her home and reported that he attended at her home after the child left for school.

She reported that he may have had some brief contact when the child returned from school but then stated that he had no contact. She denied being fearful of Mr. V.C. and maintained that despite his history, people change. [ 24 ] In response to the society motion, the mother deposed as follows: (

a) Although during their relationship, Mr. V.C. assaulted her and was charged criminally, she resumed a relationship with him as he claimed that he no longer had problems with drugs or alcohol and that he had been misdiagnosed and improperly medicated which had exacerbated the situation. As a result of his criminal convictions, he had to take

part in counselling and there would never be any problems again. (

b) They continued their relationship despite the difficulties imposed by the child protection and criminal proceedings. But as the terms made their relationship very difficult and they were “in the process of breaking up though there had been no final defining moment.” (

c) On the Friday of the Easter weekend, she was informed that there was a shift available for her that evening from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. and as it paid double time she accepted the work. But as she was unable to find a babysitter, she contacted Mr. V.C.’s family who had previously cared for the child on occasion. They were aware that Mr. V.C. was not to have contact with her daughter and she trusted them. She left the child at 5:00 p.m. and picked her up early afternoon the next day. They then spend the rest of the Easter weekend with friends. (

d) The mother denied any contact with Mr. V.C. or any knowledge that he had contact with the child. (

e) As a result of the society’s renewed contact, she became aware that Mr. V.C. had, in fact, had contact with the child while she was left with his family over the Easter weekend. (

f) This was a “defining moment” for her and she immediately and permanently broke up with Mr. V.C. as she realized he was irresponsible and could not be trusted to look out her or her daughter’s best interests. (

g) With respect to the society’s concerns regarding the registration of Mr. V.C.’s business at her residence and him being her secondary emergency contact for the child’s school, these were both holdovers from the time their relationship was going well and had been in place for some time. (

h) The mother denied the other allegations against her and was concerned that almost all of the allegations stemmed from an anonymous source that she believed to be Mr. V.C.’s former spouse and mother of his children. She believed that the allegations were made in an effort to hurt Mr. V.C. As she had never had any involvement with her daughter, the information she received would have been from her own children who were of tender years. [ 25 ] In reviewing the mother’s affidavit, I noted that the mother never clarifies when she never actually resumed her relationship with Mr.

V.C. [ 26 ] In reply to the mother’s affidavit, Ms. Amy Bramwell, the child protection supervisor in this case, deposed that the mother’s supposition that the source of the society’s information was Mr. V.C.’s ex-wife was inaccurate. The society had also received information that the child, Mr. V.C. and the mother had attended the movie “Hop” together. Applicable Law [ 27 ] Temporary care and custody hearings are determined pursuant to subsections 51(2) , (3) , (3.1) , and (3.2) of the Child and family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

C-11 (hereinafter referred to as “C.F.S.A.”) the relevant portions which state as follows: Custody during adjournment

(2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child, (

a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part; (

b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; (

c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or (

d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the society, but not be placed in, (

i) a place of secure custody as defined in

Part IV (Youth Justice), or

(ii) a place of open temporary detention as defined in that Part that has not been designated as a place of safety. Criteria

(3) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (

c) or (

d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believethat there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a)or (b). Placement with relative, etc.

(3.1) Before making a temporary order for care and custody under clause (2) (d), the court shall consider whether it is in the child’s bestinterests to make an order under clause (2) (

c) to place the child in the care and custody of a person who is a relative of the child or amember of the child’s extended family or community. 3.2) A temporary order for care and custody of a child under clause (2) (

b) or (

c) may impose, (

a) reasonable terms and conditions relating to the child care and supervision; (

b) reasonable terms and conditions on the child’s parent, the person who will have care and custody of the child under the order, thechild and any other person, other than a foster parent, who is putting forward a plan or who would participate in a plan for care andcustody of or access to the child ; and (

c) reasonable terms and conditions on the society that will supervise the placement, but shall not require the society to provide financialassistance or to purchase any goods or services . 2006, c. 5, s. 8 (3). [28] The onus is on the society on a temporary care and custody hearing to establish, on credible and trustworthy evidence,that there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if the child is returned to the mother, that it ismore probable than not that she will suffer harm.

Further, the onus is on the society to establish that the child cannot be adequatelyprotected by terms of conditions of an interim supervision order. See Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa-Carlton v. T. and T., , 97 A.C.W.S. (3d) 939, [2000] O.J. No. 2273, 2000 Cars​well​Ont 2156 (Ont. Fam. Ct.). Analysis [29] Counsel for the society submitted that the mother cannot be trusted to protect her daughter from contact with Mr. V.C.and there are no terms and conditions that could adequately protect the child. It is submitted that there is credible and trustworthyevidence that the mother has allowed such contact.

Counsel for the society relied on the affidavit of Ms. Cal wherein she outlinesinformation she received from an unidentified source. On behalf of the mother, it is submitted that she believes the source to be Mr.V.C.’s former spouse who would have a motive to lie about him. Counsel for the society submitted that the source of the informationwas not Mr. V.C.’s former spouse but that the society was not in a position to reveal the “unidentified source” as that person fearedretaliation from Mr.

V.C. [30] Family Law Rules, subrule 14(18) requires that an affidavit is support of a motion shall as much as possible contain onlyinformation within the personal knowledge of the person signing the affidavit. But subrule 14(19) provides that if it is necessary to relyon information from someone else, such information can only be relied upon if the source of the information is identified and the personsigning the affidavit believes the information to be true. [31] In view of Mr.

V.C.’s violent criminal history, it may be understandable that the source of the society’s information has avalid concern about his/her safety if their identity is revealed; however, it prevents mother and her counsel from assessing the strength ofthe society’s case and hampers the mother’s ability to fully answer the allegations against her. The court cannot assess if the informationis “trustworthy and credible” without knowing the identity of this anonymous source.

The court needs to know the relationship of thesource to the parties, if the source has a motive to lie and if the information is first hand or second hand. If the only basis of the society’sposition was the information from the anonymous source, I would have no choice but to dismiss the society’s motion. [32] However, the allegation that the mother permitted the child to have contact with Mr. V.C. is specifically confirmed by thechild. I do not accept the submission from mother’s counsel, that the information from the child is not credible or trustworthy.

The childis 10 years old and she has no motive to lie about having contact with Mr. V.C. She provided a detailed account of the contact betweenherself, the mother and Mr. V.C. over the Easter week-end. [33] The mother does not dispute that she listed Mr. V.C. as an emergency contact at the child’s school as of June 30, 2010 butstated that this was a “holdover from a time when our relationship was going well and has been in place for some time”.

Thisexplanation is concerning, as the society has been involved with the mother since June 30, 2009 when the society received a police reportthere had been an incident of domestic violence in the mother’s home which resulted in the mother’s boyfriend, Mr. V.C., being chargedwith two counts of assault. On September 28, 2009 Mr. V.C. was convicted of assaulting the mother and convicted of other offencesrelating to domestic violence against his former spouse. On February 23, 2010 he was sentenced to incarceration for 2 months and 26days and probation for 3 years.

His probation terms included that he was “to abide by directions of Halton Children’s Aid Societyregarding access and visitation with the children of Ms. B.M. unless and until there is a valid Family Court Order in place with the samesubject.” [34] On May 13, 2010 Justice Wolder ordered that the child be placed in the temporary care of the mother subject to thesupervision of the society and on condition that, “the mother shall ensure that the child does not have any contact, directly or indirectly,with Mr. V.C.”. But one month later, the mother listed Mr. V.C. as an emergency contact at the child’s school.

I do not accept the

mother’ evidence that this was a “holdover” as I draw the reasonable inference that Mr. V.C. was spending significant time residing withthe mother as otherwise it is not sensible that the mother would have left the school his contact telephone number that was the samenumber as hers. I reject the submission of mother’s counsel that just because the mother listed Mr. V.C. as an emergency contact thatdoes not lead to the inference that she intended him to have contact with the child.

The only common sense reason for leaving anemergency contact is that if the mother is unavailable, that person is someone the parent believes can be entrusted to care for the child incase the child is ill or has an accident or for any other reason the school must immediately contact someone about the safety or wellbeing of the child. I therefore draw the inference that the mother had a close enough relationship with Mr. V.C. that she trusted him tocare for and be responsible for her child if she was not available.

Therefore, the mother was prepared to breach the terms of the courtorders in the child protection and criminal proceedings. [35] I reject the mother’s explanation that the listing of Mr. V.C.’s address and telephone number for his business, being heraddress and telephone number, are also historic. I accept the evidence in Ms. Cal, that as of the date of her affidavit of May 2, 2011 thatwas the information she obtained from the internet. The mother attached to her affidavit, a copy of Mr.

V.C.’s telephone bill, in thename of his business, Paint Guys, as of May 13, 2011, and deposed that the telephone number had now been changed. The bill doesindicate that his business address is no longer her address but there is no confirmation of a telephone number. The mother does notdisclose how she obtained this recent bill as she deposed she has not seen or spoken with Mr.

V.C. for the last two weeks nor does itexplain why he would have been using her address and telephone number for his business if he has not been residing with her since June2009. [36] Based on the evidence of the child, the documentary evidence obtained by the society and the mother’s own evidence, Iam satisfied that the society has established that mother has had an ongoing relationship with Mr. V.C. and that it is highly likely she haspermitted contact between the child and Mr.

V.C., unbeknownst to the society, in breach of court orders that have been in place sinceMay 13, 2010. [37] I also find that the society has established that the mother, within nine days of consenting to an order that Mr. V.C. haveno contact with the child, breached the order and spent time with him and the child over the Easter week-end. [38] However, the society must also establish that it has real possibility that if the child is returned to her mother she willsuffer harm.

It is not every breach of a court order that will meet this requirement. [39] I have considered that the mother now deposes that her relationship with Mr. V.C. is permanently over and she has nointention of resuming that relationship. She deposes that she will do absolutely anything to have her daughter returned to her care [40] I must evaluate whether or not the mother can now be trusted. Even if she cannot be trusted to ensure that Mr.

V.C. hasno contact with her child, I must consider whether or not there conditions that can be imposed in a temporary supervision order toadequately protect the child. [41] I find that based on the mother’s past conduct that she has had difficulty severing her ties with Mr. V.C. I have carefullyreviewed her affidavit and there is no acknowledgment or understanding that contact with Mr. V.C. has placed or will in the future placeher daughter at risk of harm. Despite her daughter advising the society that she had contact with Mr.

V.C. and that her mother waspresent and aware of the contact, the mother takes no responsibility for placing her daughter at risk and blames Mr. V.C. and his family. [42] Despite the information that the child advised Ms. Cal that she was “scared” of Mr. V.C. and had witnessed part of theincident of domestic violence between Mr. V.C. and her mother, there was no acknowledgment or understanding by the mother of therisk of harm that her relationship with Mr. V.C. had posed to her child.

In the mother’s materials, there is no proposal for anycounselling for the child to deal with the possible short term and long term effects of exposure to domestic violence. This is even moreconcerning as the mother herself has attended counselling for domestic violence and yet does not seem to have gained any insight. [43] The mother submitted that the society’s concerns are historical and pre-date the recent order of April 14, 2011 thatterminated the society’s supervision order and that the only “new incident” is the Easter week-end. It is precisely the historicalinformation about Mr.

V.C. that is concerning namely, his proclivity to resort to violence with all of his partners, his previous history ordrug and alcohol abuse and his psychiatric diagnosis of an antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. The factthat the mother appears to minimize these concerns places the child at risk. [44] Research has shown that domestic violence places children at risk of harm on a number of levels. First, the domesticviolence perpetrator may also be directly, physically or sexually abusive to the child.

Second, witnessing violence perpetrated againsttheir mother may have an abusive and detrimental impact on a child's development. Children can develop in appropriate maturity andsense of responsibility that can inhibit their ability to develop it at an appropriate level. Third, a perpetrator may abuse a child as part ofthe violence against their partner. Fourth, children can feel guilty, blame themselves and feel depressed. Fifth, children can developfears, insecurity and low self esteem as a result of witnessing domestic violence.

Finally, children can suffer emotional confusion thatcan result in bedwetting, nightmares, sleeping or eating disturbances, self-harm and weight loss. See Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v.Sheila Ann C., — 2005 ONCJ 274, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 869, [2005] W.D.F.L. 3688, [2005] O.J. No. 2154, 2005 Cars​well​Ont 2424 (Ont.C.J.), at paragraphs [79]-[144] for a thorough review of the literature regarding domestic violence); affirmed on appeal at Children’s AidSociety of Toronto v. Sheila Ann C., , 143 A.C.W.S. 3d 510, [2005] O.J.

No. 4718, 2005 Cars​well​Ont 5932 (Ont.S.C.); further affirmed on appeal at Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C. (Sheila Ann), 2007 ONCA 474, 158 A.C.W.S. (3d) 610,[2007] W.D.F.L. 2844, [2007] O.J. No. 2609, 2007 Cars​well​Ont 4267 (Ont. C.A.); permission to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canadadenied at Sheila Ann C. v. Children's Aid Society of Toronto, [2007] 3 S.C.R. xiv, , [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 462, 2007Cars​well​Ont 7859. [45] The only term of a temporary supervision order that would protect the child from harm is a term that the child has nocontact directly or indirectly with Mr. V.C.

It is precisely the breach of that condition in the

section 57.1 order that the mother consentedto on April 14, 2011 that resulted in the apprehension of the child. I am not prepared to risk harm to the child by now trusting andbelieving the mother that this time she truly will abide by these terms when she has proven that she is either unwilling or unable to do so

in the past. Conclusion [ 46 ] I therefore find the society has met the its onus that there are reasonable and probably grounds to believe that the child will be at risk of harm if returned to the care of her mother and that there are no terms of supervision that can adequately protect the child against this harm. [ 47 ] I have no doubt that the mother deeply loves and cares for her child.

I hope and expect that over the next several months, the mother with the assistance of the society and/or thorough her own counselling will begin the process of understanding the effects of domestic violence on her child whether or not the child is physically harmed or even when the child is not in the same room when that violence occurs and assist in helping her to understand why she was drawn to and unable to sever her relationship with a violent partner.

Without such an understanding, I am concerned that the mother will continue to have relationships with partners that put her child at risk. [ 48 ] Although there is currently no plan by a family member before the court, the society is assessing the maternal aunt’s home as a potential kin placement. [ 49 ] Therefore, there will be a order as follows: (

a) The child, W.K., born February […], 2001 shall be placed in the temporary care and custody of the Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region. (

b) The respondent, Ms. B.M., shall have access at a minimum of two times a week. The location, date and duration of the access to be agreed upon by the parties and taking into consideration the child’s school

schedule and the respondent’s work schedule. Such access to be supervised at the discretion of the society and can be supervised by a third party acceptable to the society. Released: 9 June 2011 Signed: Justice Roselyn Zisman