2013 FC 257, 2013 FC 257

[2014] 3 F.C.R. 620 IMM-1748-12 2013 FC 257 Gautam Chandidas, Rekha Chandidas, Karan Chandidas, Kunal Chandidas, Rhea Chandidas ( Applicants ) v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ( Respondent ) Indexed as: Chandidas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Federal Court, Kane J.—Toronto, October 2, 2012; Ottawa, March 8, 2013.

Citizenship and Immigration — Exclusion and Removal — Removal of Refugees — Judicial review of decision by immigration officer refusing applicants’ pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) — Fatwa issued against principal applicant, citizen of India, for closing factory because of striking Muslim employees — Applicants submitting no internal flight alternative (IFA), center in Mumbai not providing needed treatment for daughter with leukemia — Officer considering publicly available Response to Information Request (RIR) — Concluding applicants having IFA, available treatment for daughter in Mumbai — Whether officer breaching duty of procedural fairness by relying on RIR; whether officer failing to consider daughter’s best interests; whether IFA finding reasonable — Failure to disclose RIR not breach of procedural fairness — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 113 only restricting applicants’ ability to adduce such information, not ability of officer to use information that is not “new” — S. 113 may place applicant in “catch 22” situation when officer relying on new evidence, but applicant restricted in rebutting that new evidence — Here, RIR providing balanced, general information about fatawa — Officer engaging in partial analysis of best interests of daughter — Evidence herein indicating obstacles to treatment of cancer in India — Not reasonable for officer to conclude little evidence medical treatment not available in Mumbai — Second branch of IFA test not met — Evidence establishing barriers to treatment in India, daughter needing specialized care — Application allowed.

This was an application for judicial review of a decision by an immigration officer refusing the applicants’ pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) and finding that the applicants would not be subject to a risk of persecution, danger of torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to their country of nationality. The principal applicant, a citizen of India, owned a garment factory in New Delhi that employed Muslims. He refused the employees’ demand for time off for daily prayer. He subsequently closed his factory following a strike.

In retaliation, he was kidnapped and threatened and a fatwa was issued by a local mosque calling for his execution. Following the rejection of their refugee claim, the applicants applied for a PRRA. They submitted, inter alia , that they had no internal flight alternative (IFA). Due to their daughter’s treatment for leukemia, the applicants indicated that the only possible treatment center would be in Mumbai, where the principal applicant could be found by Muslims wanting to execute the fatwa. However, the applicants also submitted that this treatment center would not provide the treatment their daughter needed.

In assessing the forward-looking risk, the officer considered current country condition documents including an IRB Response to Information Request (RIR) which examined fatawa in general. The officer concluded that the applicants had a reasonable and viable IFA in Mumbai because there was little evidence to suggest that the authority who issued the fatwa had far-reaching influence that would endanger the principal applicant there. The officer also concluded that the applicants would adapt to new environments, and that their daughter would have access to treatment in Mumbai.

At issue was whether the officer breached the duty of procedural fairness by relying on the RIR, which was public information but had not been disclosed to the applicants; whether the officer failed to consider the daughter’s best interests; and whether the officer’s IFA finding was reasonable. Held , the application should be allowed. The failure to disclose the publicly available RIR was not a breach of procedural fairness.

Section 113 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act only restricts the applicants’ ability to adduce such information; it does not restrict the ability of the officer to use information that is not “new”. The information was publicly available and the applicants could have accessed it. In some circumstances,

section 113 may place an applicant in a “catch 22” situation when the officer relies on new evidence, but the applicant is restricted in rebutting that new evidence. In this case, the RIR was public information and provided balanced and general information about fatawa. Although the officer was not required to conduct a full analysis of the daughter’s best interests in the context of the PRRA, he did engage in a partial analysis of her best interests in determining that an IFA existed in Mumbai.

The evidence in the present case indicated that there were obstacles to treatment for children with cancer in India, including the lack of infrastructure and insufficient staff. The officer’s conclusion that there was little evidence that medical treatment would not be available in Mumbai was not reasonable. Due to the personal circumstances of the applicant’s family, the second branch of the IFA test was not met.

The two-pronged test for an IFA is that (1) the Board (or officer) must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the proposed IFA; and, (2) conditions in the proposed IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, upon consideration of all the circumstances, for the claimant to seek refuge there. The evidence established the barriers to treatment in India and highlighted that the daughter had been treated for relapsed leukemia which requires specialized treatment and follow-up care.

The finding that the applicants had provided little evidence that medical treatment would not be available in Mumbai was unreasonable The PRRA was remitted for consideration by a different officer.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 3(3)(f), 25, 72, 96, 97, 113. TREATIES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS CITED Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, [1992] Can. T.S. No. 3. CASES CITED applied: Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (FCA), [1994] 1 F.C. 589, (1993), 109D.L.R. (4th) 682 (C.A.). considered: Chandidas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 258; Asmelash v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2005 FC 1732; Varga v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 394, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 3; Pinter v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 296, 44 Imm. L.R. (3d) 118; Hamam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),2011 FC 1296, 3 Imm. L.R. (4th) 289. referred to: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Mancia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (FCA), [1998] 3 F.C. 461, 147 F.T.R. 307 (C.A.); Mandida v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 491; deGuzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 436, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 655; Ranganathan v.

Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), (FCA), [2001] 2 F.C. 164, (2000), 11 Imm. L.R. (3d) 142 (C.A.); Gunaratnam v.Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 122, 96 Imm. L.R. (3d) 306; Hernandez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011FC 1301; Holder v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 337, 7 Imm. L.R. (4th) 338. AUTHORS CITED U.S. Department of State. 2010 Human Rights Reports: India. Washington: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, online:<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160058.pdf>.

APPLICATION for judicial review of a decision by an immigration officer refusing the applicants’ pre-removal risk assessment andfinding that the applicants would not be subject to a risk of persecution, danger of torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusualtreatment or punishment if returned to their country of nationality. Application allowed. APPEARANCES Jeremiah Eastman for applicants. Kevin Doyle for respondent. SOLICITORS OF RECORD Eastman Law Office, Toronto, for applicants. Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.

The following are the reasons for judgment and judgment rendered in English by [1] Kane J.: This is an application for judicial review pursuant to

section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.2001, c. 27 (the Act), of the decision of a senior immigration officer (the officer), dated January 12, 2012, which refused the applicants’pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) and found that the applicants would not be subject to a risk of persecution, danger of torture, risk tolife or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to their country of nationality, India. Background [2] The Chandidas family seeks judicial review of their negative PRRA decision.

A brief description of the Chandidas’ time inCanada is provided to situate this application. [3] Gautam Chandidas, the principal applicant [or applicant], is a citizen of India who arrived in Canada on a visitor’s visa in August2007. His wife, two sons and daughter arrived in November 2007. [4] The applicants applied for refugee status in May 2008 based on the principal applicant’s fear of persecution due to his experiencein India. Mr. Chandidas, who is Hindu, owned a garment factory in New Delhi that employed many Muslims.

The Muslim employeesdemanded time off for daily prayers, which he refused due to production demands. Following a strike, he closed his factory. Inretaliation, he was kidnapped twice and threatened. A fatwa was issued by a local mosque calling for his execution. Mr. Chandidas fledand claims that he and his family cannot return to India. [5] The Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board [or IRB]) denied the applicant’s claim for refugee protection, finding that hisclaims lacked credibility, that a fatwa had not been issued and that the applicants had no subjective fear of persecution. Leave for judicial

review of the negative decision was denied on September 8, 2011. [ 6 ] In November 2011, the applicants applied for a PRRA, which reiterated the risks stated in the refugee protection claim. The principal applicant claimed that he and his family had no internal flight alternative. [ 7 ] On January 12, 2012, the PRRA officer refused the application. [ 8 ] In July 2010, prior to seeking the PRRA, the applicants had submitted an application for permanent residence from within Canada on humanitarian and compassionate (H&

C) grounds based on the best interests of their child (BIOC) and on their establishment in Canada. The H&C application was refused by the same officer who refused the PRRA application and on the same day, January 12, 2012. The application for judicial review of the H&C decision was heard at the same time as the current application and was granted. Separate reasons for judgment were issued and can be found at Chandidas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2013 FC 258 . [ 9 ] On March 13, 2012, this Court granted the applicants’ motion to stay their removal from Canada.

Decision under Review [ 10 ] The officer found that the applicants had an internal flight alternative (IFA) in Mumbai and as a result, that they would not be subject to a risk of persecution, danger of torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to India. The officer concluded that the applicants were not in need of protection under

section 96 or 97 of the Act . [ 11 ] In reaching this conclusion, the officer considered the principal applicant’s submission about the fatwa issued against him and which indicated that the family had no IFA. Due to their daughter Rhea’s treatment and follow-up care for relapsed acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL), the applicants indicated that the only possible treatment center would be in Mumbai, where the principal applicant could be found by Muslims wanting to execute the fatwa.

However, the applicants also submitted that this treatment center would not provide the treatment Rhea needed, putting the child’s health and, possibly, life at risk. [ 12 ] The officer rejected some documents submitted by the applicants on the basis that they did not constitute “new evidence” pursuant to paragraph 113 (

a) of the Act , since they pre-dated the applicants’ refugee claim. These documents included news reports on fatawa [1] and police dysfunction and impunity in India. [ 13 ] However, the officer accepted other documents as new evidence, while noting that they should be excluded under paragraph 113 (

a) of the Act . These documents related to the possibility of an IFA, which the Board had not examined. The officer accepted a letter from Dr. Truong at SickKids Hospital in Toronto [Hospital for Sick Children], describing the treatment needed, and an Executive

Summary of the India Pediatric Oncology Initiative Meeting supported by the Jiv Daya Foundation, which described the barriers to treatment of childhood cancer in India. The officer also accepted a copy of a recent unsigned letter from the principal applicant’s estate manager in India, which described the active status of the fatwa against him. [ 14 ] The officer indicated that he attributed significant weight to the findings of the Board, according to which the applicants did not face a risk of persecution.

The officer noted that the principal applicant reiterated the same risks: that he fears Muslims in India because of the fatwa issued against him and he fears being executed, and that there is a lack of state protection due to the sheer number of Muslims in India. The officer attributed little weight to the letter provided by the principal applicant as new evidence of the active status of the fatwa. [ 15 ] However, the officer did not make an explicit finding that a fatwa had not been issued. [ 16 ] In assessing the forward-looking risk, the officer considered current country condition documents.

These included a 2010 United States Department of State report [ 2010 Human Rights Reports: India . Washington: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor] describing India’s democratic political system, as well as a 2007 Immigration and Refugee Board Response to Information Request (RIR) which examined fatawa in general. [ 17 ] The officer concluded that the applicants had a reasonable and viable IFA in Mumbai because there was little evidence to suggest that the authority who issued the fatwa had far-reaching influence that would endanger the principal applicant there.

The officer also concluded that the applicants would adapt to new environments, and that Rhea would have access to treatment for ALL in Mumbai. The Issues [ 18 ] Three issues arise in this application: whether the officer breached the duty of procedural fairness by relying on the RIR, which was public information but had not been disclosed to the applicants; whether the officer failed to consider Rhea’s best interests, as required by paragraph 3(3) (

f) of the Act (which provides that the Act is to be applied and construed in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory); and, whether the officer’s IFA finding was reasonable. [ 19 ] It is well settled that questions of mixed law and fact are assessed on a reasonableness standard, and questions of law and procedural fairness are assessed on a correctness standard: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paragraph 51 . [ 20 ] While all three issues are canvassed below, I find that the determinative issue is the IFA finding.

The IFA finding was not reasonable given the needs of the child, Rhea, for adequate treatment for ALL. It should be noted that the application for judicial review of the negative H&C decision was granted in Chandidas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2013 FC 258 [cited above], where the officer’s assessment of the BIOC was found to be inadequate. The evidence with respect to the seriousness of ALL and the barriers to the availability of treatment in India was part of the record before the officer in both applications. The barriers to treatment make the IFA in Mumbai unreasonable.

Did the officer breach the duty of procedural fairness by relying on the RIR, which was public information but had not been disclosed to

the applicants? [21] The applicants submit that the officer breached the duty of fairness by failing to disclose extrinsic evidence, i.e. the 2007 RIR onfatawa, which the officer relied upon in determining that the fatwa would not be operative beyond the area of the principal applicant’sformer factory, and not in Mumbai, and in failing to provide the applicants an opportunity to respond. [22] The applicants argue that the document was not available to them due to paragraph 113(

a) of the Act, which prevents PRRAapplicants from relying upon evidence that pre-dates the rejection of their refugee claim (in this case, May 11, 2011). The applicantscontend that this provision prevents them from making submissions to rebut the evidence relied upon by the officer because the evidenceexisted prior to the determination of the refugee claim—it was not “new” evidence. [23] The respondent submits that there was no breach of procedural fairness since the officer was not required to notify the applicantsthat he would be relying upon public sources regarding general country conditions: Mancia v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship andImmigration), (FCA), [1998] 3 F.C. 461 (C.A.), at paragraph 27. [24] Paragraph 113(

a) of the Act relates specifically to PRRA applications and provides: Considerationof application113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows: (

a) an applicant whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after therejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in thecircumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection; [Emphasis added.] [25] In Asmelash v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1732, the Court considered how the duty ofprocedural fairness applies with respect to the disclosure of public documents. Justice Blais, as he then was, noted [at paragraphs 14–15]: In Mancia v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1997) (FC), 125 F.T.R. 297, [1997] F.C.J. No.120, Justice MacKay, at paragraph 13, confirmed that there is no obligation on the part of the officer to disclose information that isavailable from a public source prior to the date of any submission by the applicant: I note that in Nadarajah, Rothstein J. considered the documentary evidence there in question to be from sources available to the publicand he referred to the decision of Mr. Justice Rouleau in Quintanilla v.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, unreported, Courtfile IMM-1390-95, January 22, 1996 (F.C.T.D.), [1996] F.C.J. No. 84. In the latter case, where documentary evidence of countryconditions considered in a PDRCC assessment is material that is publicly available, Rouleau J. held there was no obligation to inform theapplicant, in advance of a decision, of specific documents concerning country conditions that are being considered.

That same principlewas applied in Nadarajah by Rothstein J., and in my view it is applicable here, at least with reference to documents published andavailable from public sources prior to the date of any submission by the applicant. In Chen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2003) 2002 FCT 266 , F.T.R. 297, [2002] 4 F.C. 193, JusticeHansen, at paragraphs 33-36, takes the analysis regarding extrinsic versus non-extrinsic evidence one step further by concluding that thedistinction between the two is no longer determinative of whether the duty of fairness requires disclosure.

She adopts the position thatwhen dealing with matters of procedural fairness, the overriding concern with respect to the disclosure of evidence is whether thedocument, opinion, or report is one of which the individual is aware or deemed to be aware: The broad principle I take from Mancia is as follows. Extrinsic evidence must be disclosed to an applicant. Fairness, however, will notrequire the disclosure of non-extrinsic evidence, such as general country conditions reports, unless it was made available after theapplicant filed her submissions and it satisfies the other criteria articulated in that case.

In my view, both of these “rules” share a single underlying rationale. Fairness requires that documents, reports, or opinions of which theapplicant is not aware, nor deemed to be aware, must be disclosed. The underlying rationale for the rule established in Mancia, in my opinion, survives Haghighi and Bhagwandass. The principle of thosecases, generally stated, is that the duty of fairness requires disclosure of a document, report or opinion, if it is required to provide theindividual with a meaningful opportunity to fully and fairly present her case to the decision maker.

Therefore, while it is clear that the distinction between extrinsic and non-extrinsic evidence is no longer determinative of whether theduty of fairness requires disclosure, the rationale behind the rule in Mancia remains.

I arrive at this conclusion because even in recentjurisprudence, applying the post-Baker framework for defining the duty of fairness, the overriding concern with respect to disclosure iswhether the document, opinion, or report is one of which the individual is aware or deemed to be aware. [Emphasis added.] [26] The applicants’ concern relates to the fact that they could not adduce any evidence (old or new) to rebut the information includedin the RIR because they were not aware that the officer was relying on this information to begin with.

The applicants note that if theyhad been aware of the officer’s reliance on the RIR and if they had evidence to rebut this that pre-dated the IRB decision (for example,that reflected the same time period as noted in the RIR), they would have been precluded from raising this due to

section 113 of the Act,and that this is unfair. [27] In this case, the applicants claimed that a fatwa was issued and the onus was on them to establish that risk, which theyendeavored to do in their submissions to the Board and in their submissions to the officer with the new letter from the estate manager. Itshould not be surprising that the officer would inform himself about fatawa in general. [28] In my view, the failure to disclose the publicly available RIR is not a breach of procedural fairness.

Section 113 of the Act onlyrestricts the applicants’ ability to adduce such information; it does not restrict the ability of the officer to use information that is not“new”. The information was publicly available and the applicants could have accessed it. The applicants were deemed to be aware of it.Moreover, they had presented other new evidence regarding the fatwa, to which the officer attributed little weight.

[29] In some circumstances,

section 113 of the Act may place an applicant in a “catch 22” situation when the officer relies on newevidence (of which the applicant is not aware), but the applicant is restricted in rebutting that new evidence. In this case, the RIR waspublic information and provided balanced and general information about fatawa. The officer cited excerpts including the following:“Even though a fatwa may not be recognized by the government, the group that issued it takes it seriously.

In such a case, a fatwa issuedagainst an individual can be just as dangerous as if it were government action against the individual.” Moreover, the applicants did seekto introduce evidence about the risk to them of the fatwa. [30] In these circumstances, there was no breach of procedural fairness as a result of the officer’s reliance on the publicly availableRIR. Did the officer fail to consider the best interests of Rhea, as required by paragraph 3(3)(

f) of the Act, which provides that the Act is to beapplied and construed in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory? [31] The applicants submit that because Canada is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[November 20, 1989, [1992] Can. T.S.

No. 3] (UNCRC), the Act must be interpreted in accordance with the Convention and therefore aBIOC analysis should have been conducted by the officer for the PRRA. [32] The respondent submits that the UNCRC does not require that the interests of affected children be considered under everyprovision of the Act: Mandida v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 491; de Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenshipand Immigration), 2005 FCA 436, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 655. The Act provides an effective opportunity to consider the BIOC pursuant tosection 25, in H&C applications.

Although the same officer may conduct the PRRA and the H&C assessment, these are separatedecision-making processes with different considerations and tests. [33] The two decision-making processes are indeed separate. [34] In Varga v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 394, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 3, the Federal Court of Appealheld that the best interests of the child need not be considered in every decision if there is another opportunity for such considerations [atparagraph 13]: Neither the Charter nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child … requires that the interests of affected children be considered underevery provision of IRPA: de Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 436 , [2006] 3 F.C.R.655 (F.C.A.), at paragraph 105.

If a statutory scheme provides an effective opportunity for considering the interests of any affectedchildren, including those born Canada, such as is provided by subsection 25(1), they do not also have to be considered before the makingof every decision which may adversely affect them. Hence, it was an error for the applications Judge to read into the statutory provisionsdefining the scope of the PRRA officer’s task a duty also to consider the interests of the adult respondents’ Canadian-born children. [35] In Pinter v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 296, 44 Imm.

L.R. (3d) 118, Chief Justice Lutfy notedthe difference between the assessment of risk factors in an application for humanitarian and compassionate consideration and one forprotection from removal [at paragraphs 3–4]: In an application for humanitarian and compassionate consideration under

section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act(IRPA), the applicant's burden is to satisfy the decision-maker that there would be unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardshipto obtain a permanent resident visa from outside Canada. In a pre-removal risk assessment under sections 97, 112 and 113 of the IRPA, protection may be afforded to a person who, upon removalfrom Canada to their country of nationality, would be subject to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment. [36] While recent amendments to

section 25 of the Act have clarified that the risk factors considered in sections 96 and 97 should notbe considered in H&C applications, but that other hardships may be considered, that amendment is not at issue in this case. The casesreferred to above continue to describe the distinction between the two processes. [37] Similarly in Hamam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1296, 3 Imm. L.R. (4th) 289, Justice Mandamin noted[at paragraph 41]: The jurisprudence sets out that the risk in an H&C application is that of hardship which is different from the risk to be considered in aPRRA application.

As Justice [de] Montigny stated in Ramirez, “[i]t is beyond dispute that the concept of ‘hardship’ in an H&Capplication and the ‘risk’ contemplated in a PRRA are not equivalent and must be assessed according to a different standard.” [38] The two assessments are different, and the better opportunity to consider the BIOC is in the context of an H&C application. Inthis case, the applicants made an H&C application, which was refused by the same officer who refused the PRRA. The officer foundthat Rhea’s best interests would be met by returning to India because treatment was available for her there.

Judicial review was grantedfor the H&C decision upon finding that the officer failed to conduct an appropriate BIOC analysis and for other reasons (see file No.IMM-1750-12 [2013 FC 258]). [39] Although the officer was not required to conduct a full BIOC analysis in the context of the PRRA, he did engage in a partialanalysis of the BIOC in determining that an IFA existed in Mumbai. [40] Dr. Truong’s letter indicated that “cancer outcomes and overall survival is well known to be higher in developed countries suchas Canada where there is a network of excellent pre-hospital care (ie.

EMS, ambulance), provision of supportive care (antibiotics andblood products), and excellent inpatient hospital services (diagnostic imaging and access to essential medications)”. [41] Dr. Truong also indicated: The treatment of relapsed leukemia is physically and psychologically demanding on a young child. The chemotherapy is much more

intensive and requires multiple clinic visits and long periods of hospitalization. The regime is so intense that rarely, a few children willdie while on therapy. Rhea has had a few instances during the treatment where she has had some life threatening episodes and had to beadmitted to the intensive care unit. The provision of timely and high quality care offered here has allowed her to recover from thoseepisodes without any complications.

The successful treatment of children with cancer requires high quality medical care, the availability of specialists in oncology and othermedical specialties, and a multidisciplinary team of personnel that includes nurses, pharmacists, dieticians and social workers to name afew.

It requires access to diagnostic imaging services such as CT and MRI scanners and access to essential chemotherapeutic drugs, suchas those that Rhea is currently receiving. [Emphasis in original.] [42] The Jiv Daya Report (India Pediatric Oncology Initiative Meeting) included information that described the obstacles to treatmentfor children with cancer in India. The report indicated that the overall cure rate in India varied between 10 and 25 percent, compared to70 percent in the United States.

The report also indicated that there were over 40 000 new cases of childhood cancer each year in Indiaand 70 percent have advanced disease at diagnosis.

There are only 55 practicing paediatric oncologists in all of India. [43] The report indicated that the barriers to treatment identified included the lack of infrastructure, insufficient staff, lack of training,economic restraints and other challenges related to the delivery of care, and that the common issue expressed was the constant influx ofpatients, inadequate beds to see them all and insufficient staff to treat them. [44] The evidence highlights that the treatment for relapsed ALL is specialized.

The officer’s conclusion that there was little evidencethat medical treatment would not be available in Mumbai is not reasonable. Was the officer’s IFA finding reasonable? [45] The test for an IFA is well established and there is a high onus on the applicant to demonstrate that a proposed IFA isunreasonable: Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (FCA), [2001] 2 F.C. 164 (C.A.).The two-pronged test for an IFA has been cited in many cases and was established in Thirunavukkarasu v.

Canada (Minister ofEmployment and Immigration), (FCA), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.), which continues to apply. [46] The test is: (1) the Board (or in this case, the officer) must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no seriouspossibility of the claimant being persecuted in the proposed IFA; and, (2) conditions in the proposed IFA must be such that it would notbe unreasonable, upon consideration of all the circumstances, including consideration of a claimant’s personal circumstances, for theclaimant to seek refuge there. [47] In the present case, the officer found that Mumbai offered a reasonable IFA because no one beyond the immediate area of theprincipal applicant’s former factory would feel compelled to follow the fatwa, the applicant and his family would adapt to Mumbai, andRhea would have access to treatment there. [48] For the reasons noted above, the finding that the applicants had provided little evidence that medical treatment would not beavailable in Mumbai is unreasonable.

The evidence establishes the barriers to treatment in India and highlights that Rhea has been treatedfor relapsed ALL which requires specialized treatment and follow-up care. [49] Due to the personal circumstances of the applicant’s family, particularly the needs of Rhea for access to prompt and high qualitytreatment and follow-up for ALL, the second branch of the IFA test has not been met.

Proposed Certified Question [50] The applicants proposed the following question for certification: Do the principles of fairness dictate that a PRRA officer must, before arriving at his or her final determination on a PRRA application,when relying on evidence referred to in subsection 113(

a) of IRPA, which evidence the PRRA applicant could not rely upon in his or herPRRA application by operation of subsection 113(

a) of IRPA, disclose that said evidence to the PRRA applicant and afford him or her anopportunity to rebut that evidence? [51] The respondent has replied that the proposed question does not meet the test for certification as it is not a serious question ofgeneral importance that will be dispositive of the appeal. The question pertains to the disclosure of a particular country conditiondocument, and therefore would not be a question of general importance: Gunaratnam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC122, 96 Imm. L.R. (3d) 306.

Moreover, the law is well settled that PRRA officers need not disclose public documents relied upon aboutcountry conditions and which were available and accessible at the time the submissions were made: Mancia, above; Hernandez v.Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1301; Holder v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 337, 7 Imm. L.R.(4th) 438. [52] As noted above, the applicants were deemed to have been aware of the publicly accessible RIR and hence disclosure was notrequired. The applicants had also sought to adduce some new evidence about the fatwa, to which the officer attributed low weight.

Thequestion proposed for certification does not aptly capture the hypothetical situation faced by the applicants. In addition, its determinationwould not be dispositive. [53] No question is certified. JUDGMENT THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: 1. The application for judicial review is allowed and the PRRA should be remitted for consideration by a different officer;

2. No question is certified; and, 3. No costs are awarded. [1] According to the PRRA officer’s reasons, ‘fatwa’ is pluralized as ‘fatawa’.