r v. ANDREW THOMAS LABR, 2024 QCCS 204

R. c. Labrèche 2024 QCCS 204SUPERIOR COURT CANADAPROVINCE OF QUEBECDISTRICT OF MONTREAL N° : 500-01-232261-229 DATE : January 26, 2024____________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING : the Honourable ALEXANDRE BOUCHER, J.s.c.____________________________________________________________________ HIS MAJESTY THE KINGProsecutorv.ANDREW THOMAS LABRÈCHE-and-EMANUELL HUNTE-ROBERTSAccused -and-THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBECIntervener____________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT____________________________________________________________________ I [1] Mr.

Andrew Thomas Labrèche and Mr. Emanuell Hunte-Roberts were found guilty of first-degree murder by a jury following atrial. The background of this case was summarized previously in: R. v. Labrèche, 2023 QCCS 2465. For purposes of this judgment, itsuffices to recall that the victim, Mr. Frantz Louis, a prominent member of organized crime, was shot in broad daylight in a residentialneighbourhood while sitting in his parked car. A man walked down the street towards the victim and killed him with multiple gunshotsfired at close range. The shooter then fled in a car where a driver was waiting nearby.

The evidence revealed that Mr. Hunte-Roberts wasthe shooter and that Mr. Labrèche was the driver. The evidence also showed that both accused acted with intent and knowledge, plus thatthe crime was a planned and deliberate attack. [2] In normal circumstances sentencing for first-degree murder is not an issue for debate. The mandatory sentence for this crime isimprisonment for life without eligibility for parole for 25 years, pursuant to sections 235 and 745 (

a) of the Criminal Code. However,Mr. Hunte-Roberts and Mr. Labrèche challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory sentence on the ground that it infringes on theright against cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. II [3] The accused argued that the mandatory sentence for first-degree murder is incompatible with human dignity under the testdevised over the years by the Supreme Court of Canada since R. v. Smith, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 1045 and consideredrecently in such cases as R. v. Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3; R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2 and R. v.

Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23. Under this test, theCourt must determine whether the impugned mandatory sentence is grossly disproportionate, not merely excessive, to the sentence thatwould be just and appropriate for the actual offender before the Court or for another offender in a reasonable hypothetical or foreseeablecase. Moreover, the Court must also determine whether the sentence is intrinsically incompatible with human dignity by its very nature.In other words, the Court must apply a two-prong test.

The first prong deals with the severity of the sentence in terms of amount orduration and applies to mandatory minimum sentences. The second prong deals with the methods of punishment and applies to a narrowclass of punishments that are in themselves contrary to human dignity. When the sentence infringes on s. 12, the Crown has the onus todemonstrate that the infringement is justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter. However, it is exceedingly rarethat a cruel and unusual punishment will be justified under s. 1. [4] Here, Mr. Hunte-Roberts and Mr.

Labrèche relied on both prongs of the test. They argued that the mandatory sentence for first-degree murder is grossly disproportionate by its duration and incompatible with human dignity by its very nature. They focused theirarguments on the 25-year period to be served before parole eligibility. They emphasized that they are not entitled to a judicial review ofthis period after 15 years under the so-called “faint hope clause” because this measure was prospectively abolished by Parliament in2011.

The accused submitted that they or a hypothetical offender could remain in detention long after being rehabilitated under thepresent mandatory sentence for first-degree murder. Such a prolonged sentence would cause unacceptable torment. Mr. Labrèche alsoinsisted that he was found guilty as an accomplice and that the mandatory sentence would not properly account for his diminished degreeof responsibility.

[5] The accused also relied on s. 7 of the Charter and submitted that the punishment for first-degree murder is overbroad inviolation of fundamental justice. However, Since R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14, it has been established that the principle ofproportionality in relation to sentencing is protected by s. 12 of the Charter, not s. 7. It is not clear that s. 7 adds anything to the inquiryinto a sentence’s compliance with the Charter. III [6] This is all very interesting. The parties have submitted elaborate evidence and arguments.

However, at the risk of disappointingsome of the parties, this judgment is more about the principle of stare decisis than the substantive constitutional issue, for the simplereason that this issue has already been decided. [7] The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until 25 years for first-degree has been found to becompatible with s. 12 of the Charter by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Luxton, (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 711. ChiefJustice Lamer then wrote, at p. 724: “These sections provide for punishment of the most serious crime in our criminal law, that of firstdegree murder.

This is a crime that carries with it the most serious level of moral blameworthiness, namely subjective foresight of death.The penalty is severe and deservedly so”. The Supreme Court also dismissed a challenge based on s. 7 of the Charter in R. v. Arkell, (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR. 695. The mandatory sentence for first-degree murder was also approved by the Court of appeal ofQuebec in Meunier v. R., 2014 QCCA 1681 and R. v.

Lefebvre, . [8] Under the principle of vertical stare decisis, this Court is bound to follow these precedents set by higher judicial authorities.Stare decisis is a fundamental element of the rule of law. It ensures certainty and correctness in the law. The rule also contributes to theefficiency and economy of the law, by preventing the same issues from being debated repeatedly: R. v. Comeau, 2018 SCC 15, para 26;R. v.

Lapointe, 2021 QCCA 360, paras. 30-36; see also Shannon Hale, “The Bedford trilogy and the shifting foundations of vertical staredecisis: emancipation from judicial restraint?”, (2020) 29 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 97. [9] Moreover, constitutional challenges against the sentence for first-degree were recently dismissed by the Superior Court ofQuebec in Fortier-Grenier v. R., 2021 QCCS 1930 and B.C. v. R., 2021 QCCS 4198. Therefore, the rules of horizontal stare decisis andjudicial comity also apply in this matter. See R. v.

Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19. [10] The jurisprudence has focused primarily on constructive first-degree murder premised on underlying unlawful conduct. There isno doubt that the same conclusions apply to planned and deliberate murder, which is arguably the form of murder with the highestdegree of moral blameworthiness. [11] Scholars have commented on the mandatory sentence for first-degree murder and called for a reconsideration of the currentstate of the law. See: Don Stuart, “Bissonnette: Striking Down Consecutive Life Sentences” (2022) 7:80 Criminal Reports 235; LisaDufraimont, “R. v.

Bissonnette and the challenge of doing justice in multiple murder cases” (2022) 7:80 Criminal Reports 238; IsabelGrant, Crystal Choi & Debra Parkes, "The Meaning of Life: A Study of the Use of Parole Ineligibility for Murder Sentencing" (2020)52:1 Ottawa L Rev; Isabel Grant, "Rethinking the Sentencing Regime for Murder" (2001) 39:2/3 Osgoode Hall LJ 655; Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 7th ed., Toronto: Carswell, 2018, at p. 573; Allan Manson, The Easy Acceptance of Long-Term Confinement in Canada (1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 265.

The writings of learned authors can contribute to the evolution of the law. Itremains that academic criticism is not a sufficient reason to disregard stare decisis: R. v. McGregor, 2023 SCC 4, para. 22. [12] It is true that stare decisis is not absolute. There are “extraordinary exceptions” to this rule. A lower court may reconsidersettled rulings of higher courts in two situations: (1) where a new legal issue is raised; and (2) where there is a change in thecircumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” (R. v.

Comeau, 2018 SCC 15, paras. 26-29; Carter v.Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, para. 44; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, para. 42). [13] Moreover, a court may depart from precedents issued by courts of coordinate jurisdiction within a province in three situations:(1) where the rationale of the earlier decision has been undermined by subsequent appellate decisions; (2) where some binding authorityin case law or some relevant statute was not considered; (3) or where the earlier decision was not fully considered (R. v.

Sullivan, 2022SCC 19, para. 75). [14] Here, there is no sufficient reason not to apply stare decisis to the precedents that have rejected the arguments that the 25-yearperiod of parole ineligibility for first-degree murder amounted to cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter. [15] It has been argued that the abolition of the judicial review of parole ineligibility after 15 years opened the door to areconsideration of R. v.

Luxton, (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 711, because the availability of the so-called “faint hope clause”was noted therein as a factor in upholding the mandatory sentence as constitutionally valid. However, the recent judgment in R. v.Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 closed the door on this kind of argument. The Supreme Court in Bissonnette affirmed its previous judgment inLuxton. Chief Justice Wagner, writing for a unanimous Court, said at paras. 85-86: [85] To ensure respect for human dignity, Parliament must leave a door open for rehabilitation, even in cases where this objective is ofminimal importance.

Offenders who are by chance able to rehabilitate themselves must have access to a sentence review mechanismafter having served a period of incarceration that is sufficiently long to denounce the gravity of their offence.

This last point is important,as Parliament has latitude to establish sentences whose severity expresses society’s condemnation of the offence committed, and whilesuch sentences may in some circumstances have the effect of dooming offenders to die behind bars, they are not necessarily contrary to s.12 of the Charter. [86] As an illustration, in Luxton, this Court rejected the argument that the mandatory sentence for first-degree murder infringes s. 12 ofthe Charter. The Court considered it proper for Parliament to treat this crime — the most serious of all — with an appropriate degree ofseverity.

The 25-year parole ineligibility period reflects society’s condemnation of the commission of such a crime and does not outrageour standards of decency (Luxton, at pp. 724-25). Because of the 25-year mandatory ineligibility period, an elderly offender who isconvicted of first-degree murder will thus have little or no hope of getting out of prison. As was decided in Luxton, that sentence is

nonetheless compatible with s. 12 of the Charte r , since it is within the purview of Parliament to sanction the most heinous crime with a sentence that sufficiently denounces the gravity of the offence, but that does not exceed constitutional limits by depriving every offender of any possibility of parole from the outset. [ 16 ] Acknowledging the opinions critical of the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years, the Chief Justice added further, at para. 90, “ It must be borne in mind that this 25-year period, although constitutional, is far from lenient ”. [ 17 ] It is true that these comments were in obiter dicta – they were incidental remarks.

They were not part of the ratio decidendi – the narrow rationale of the decision – because, in Bissonnette , the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the 25-year parole ineligibility period for first-degree murder but rather on the imposition of consecutive 25-year periods in cases involving multiple first-degree murders. Strictly speaking, the stare decisis principle applies to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter .

But, leaving aside the sometimes-blurred distinction between the concepts of ratio decidendi and obiter , considered incidental comments on the law by the Supreme Court provide persuasive guidance for lower courts: R. v. Henry , 2005 SCC 76 , paras. 52-57 . It remains that “ a statement of a legal principle that is accepted by a majority of the Court constitutes the opinion of the Court with respect to that legal principle ” : R. v. Ibanescu , 2013 SCC 31 , para. 1 .

There is no doubt that the Supreme Court in Bissonnette , while striking down consecutive 25-year parole ineligibility periods, sanctioned and solidified the rest of the murder sentencing regime, see: Lisa Kerr , “Dignity Cannot Be Totally Denied:

(2022) The Limits of Bissonnette”, 81 Criminal Reports 330. Above all, as mentioned, the Court affirmed Luxton where the ratio decidendi was precisely that the mandatory sentence for first-degree murder is not contrary to s. 12 of the Charter . [ 18 ] This is sufficient to dismiss the accused’s claim that the sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years violates

section 12 of the Charter . Whether one agrees or not, this sentence is well-established in our criminal justice system and has been approved by authoritative precedents. It is recognized that first-degree murder must be severely punished because it is always a very serious crime committed by offenders who bear a high degree of moral blameworthiness. Under the stare decisis principle, this Court is bound to apply this jurisprudence. [ 19 ] It would not be appropriate for this Court to analyse the constitutional issue further.

The Court must impose the sentence provided for by the law. [ 20 ] Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out before concluding that a life imprisonment sentence without eligibility for parole until they have served twenty-five years is a fit and proportionate punishment for both accused in the circumstances of this case. The Court is mindful that the accused are two young men in their early twenties. The sentence should aim to rehabilitate them as far as possible. However, the objective of rehabilitation is subordinate to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence because of the gravity of the crime.

First-degree murder is the worst crime of all. It involves intentionally ending the life of a human being, after thinking and planning to do so. Here, the circumstances of the crime are particularly serious. According to the evidence on sentencing, the accused committed together a contract killing related to organized crime. The attack was well-organized, violent, and coldly executed. The fact that he was an accomplice is not a significant mitigating factor for Mr. Labrèche in the circumstances of this case. Moreover, the murder was committed with a firearm in a public place, which makes it even more dangerous.

Montreal citizens deserve to live in a safe and peaceful environment. IV [ 21 ] FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED REASONS, the applications by the accused challenging the constitutional validity of the mandatory sentence for first-degree murder are DISMISSED . ALEXANDRE BOUCHER , j.S.C. Mtre. Claude Berlinguette-Auger Mtre. Philippe Vallières-Roland Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales Counsel for prosecutor Mtre. Alexandre Duval Mtre. Renaude Morin Bernard, Roy (Justice-Québec) Counsel for the Attorney General of Quebec Mtre. Mathew Shadley Mtre.

Philipe Knerr Shadley Knerr Counsel for Andrew Thomas Labrèche, accused Mtre. Martin Latour Mtre. Maude Pagé-Arpin Latour Dorval Avocats Counsel for Emanuell Hunte-Roberts, accused Hearing dates : December 4 and 5, 2023.