2015 NBCA 26, 2015 NBCA 26

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 4-14-CA MARY ELLEN ROSE APPELLANT MARY ELLEN ROSE APPELANTE - and - -et- HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK (The Province of New Brunswick including the Departments of Justice, Office of the Attorney General and Finance), PREMIER DAVID ALWARD, ATTORNEY GENERAL MARIE-CLAUDE BLAIS, THE HONOURABLE BLAINE HIGGS, DOUG HOLT and MARTHA BOWES RESPONDENTS SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE DU CHEF DE LA PROVINCE DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK (la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick, y compris le Ministère de la Justice, le Cabinet du Procureur général et le Ministère des Finances), le PREMIER MINISTRE DAVID ALWARD, la PROCUREURE GÉNÉRALE MARIE-CLAUDE BLAIS, BLAINE HIGGS, DOUG HOLT et MARTHA BOWES INTIMÉS - and - -et- DANNY SOUCY, MINISTER OF POST SECONDARY EDUCATION, TRAINING AND LABOUR RESPONDENT DANNY SOUCY, MINISTRE DE L’ÉDUCATION POSTSECONDAIRE, DE LA FORMATION ET DU TRAVAIL INTIMÉ - et - -et- KIM DALEY, CURRENT DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES RESPONDENT KIM DALEY, SOUS-MINISTRE ACTUELLE DU MINISTÈRE DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES INTIMÉE - and - -et- THE NEW BRUNSWICK HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION RESPONDENT COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE INTIMÉE

- and - - et - THE HONOURABLE PATRICK A.A. RYAN, Q.C. RESPONDENT - and - L’HONORABLE PATRICK A.A. RYAN, c.r. INTIMÉ - et - THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST COMMISSIONER, THE HONOURABLE LANDRY OR SUCH OTHER PERSON WHO HAS BEEN RECENTLY APPOINTED RESPONDENT LE COMMISSAIRE AUX CONFLITS D’INTÉRÊTS, L’HONORABLE LANDRY, OU TOUTE AUTRE PERSONNE RÉCEMMENT NOMMÉE À CE POSTE INTIMÉ Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen et al., 2015 NBCA 26 Rose c.

Sa Majesté la Reine et autres, 2015 NBCA 26 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Bell The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Bell l’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: December 20, 2013 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 20 décembre 2013 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : Inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: January 29, 2015 and March 12, 2015 Appel entendu : les 29 janvier 2015 et 12 mars 2015 Judgment rendered: April 23, 2015 Jugement rendu : le 23 avril 2015 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Larlee Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Larlee

Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg Souscrit aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg The Honourable Justice Bell did not participate in the judgment L’honorable juge Bell n’a pas pris part au jugement Counsel at hearing: Mary Ellen Rose appeared in person For the respondents Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of New Brunswick (The Province of New Brunswick including the Departments of Justice, Office of the Attorney General and Finance), Premier David Alward, Attorney General Marie- Claude Blais, The Honourable Blaine Higgs, Doug Holt, Martha Bowes, Danny Soucy, Minister of Post Secondary Education, Training and Labour and Kim Daley, current Deputy Minister of the Department of Human Resources: Keith P.

Mullin Daniel A. Standing For the respondent The New Brunswick Human Rights Commission: Trisha E.M. Gallant-LeBlanc For the respondents The Honourable Patrick A.A. Ryan, Q.C. and the Conflict of Interest Commissioner, The Honourable Landry or such other person who has been recently appointed: R. Gary Faloon, Q.C.

Avocats à l’audience : Mary Ellen Rose, en son nom Pour les intimés Sa Majesté la Reine du chef de la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick (la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick, y compris le Ministère de la Justice, le Cabinet du Procureur général et le Ministère des Finances), le Premier ministre David Alward, la Procureure générale Marie-Claude Blais, Blaine Higgs, Doug Holt, Martha Bowes, Danny Soucy, Ministre de l’Éducation postsecondaire, de la Formation et du Travail et Kim Daley, sous-ministre actuelle des Ressources humaines : Keith P. Mullin Daniel A.

Standing Pour l’intimée Commission des droits de la personne : Trisha E.M. Gallant-LeBlanc Pour les intimés l’honorable Patrick A.A. Ryan, c.r., et le commissaire aux conflits d’intérêts, l’honorable Landry, ou toute autre personne récemment nommée à ce poste : R. Gary Faloon, c.r. THE COURT The appeal is dismissed and three sets of costs of $2,500 are awarded: one to the Human Rights Commission, one to the Commissioners and one to the Province of New Brunswick.

LA COUR L’appel est rejeté avec trois masses de dépens de 2 500 $ chacune, une à la Commission des droits de la personne, une aux commissaires et une à la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick. The judgment of the Court was delivered by LARLEE and QUIGG, JJ.A.

I. Introduction [ 1 ] The present appeal concerns preliminary motions stemming from an application for judicial review of two decisions of the Human Rights Commission of New Brunswick (the “Commission”). On April 20, 2012, the appellant filed a complaint with the Commission alleging discrimination, based on marital status and perceived mental disability, in her applications for employment with the Government of New Brunswick.

The complaint asserted various individuals within the government had been harassing her, “as a result of taking in information from biased and unqualified persons outside the screening committees of the various competitions”, and spreading false allegations that contributed to her lack of success in securing positions she believed she had won based on merit. [ 2 ] The Commission released decisions with respect to the complaint on April 24, 2013, and June 26, 2013.

The first decision of the Commission denied a time-limit extension request from the appellant, effectively preventing her from including employment competitions from 2006, 2008 and 2009 in her complaint. The second decision dismissed the remainder of the complaint (that fell within the prescribed time limit) for being without merit. [ 3 ] On April 15, 2013, the appellant also requested an investigation by the Conflict of Interest Commissioner. The Honourable Patrick A.A.

Ryan, Q.C., Commissioner at the time of the complaint, disposed of the request on August 26, 2013, on the basis there were no grounds to sustain the investigation. [ 4 ] On July 23, 2013, the appellant filed an application for judicial review pursuant to Rule 69 of the Rules of Court . In addition to seeking judicial review, the appellant sought 23 different orders in her Notice of Application. [ 5 ] Subsequent to the application being filed, four preliminary motions were filed: three by the various respondents, and one by the appellant.

The Commission, the former and current Conflict of Interest Commissioner (the current Commissioner being Commissioner Alfred Landry, Q.C. ) (the “Commissioners”) , requested the application for judicial review against them be dismissed and their names be deleted as respondents: the Commission for lack of standing, and the Commissioners pursuant to the Members’ Conflict of Interest Act , S.N.B. 1999, c. M-7.01 and legislative privilege. The remaining respondents named in the application requested the appellant’s affidavit, filed in support of the Notice of Application, be struck.

The appellant’s motion requested leave to obtain viva voce evidence, disclosure of various files and the names of and information concerning successful candidates for the employment positions in question. [ 6 ] The judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench originally scheduled to hear the motions recused himself at the appellant’s request due to potential conflict. At the outset of the hearing before another judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, the appellant requested that the judge recuse herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

That motion was dismissed, as was a request from the appellant that the motions hearing be adjourned until the resolution of her complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council against the judge. [ 7 ] The judge heard the motions of the Commission and the Commissioners. The remaining two motions were to be scheduled following the decision on the first two. The motion of the Commission was granted, as was the motion of the Commissioners; these parties were therefore removed as respondents to the Notice of Application for judicial review and the Notice of Application was dismissed as against them.

The appellant appeals the judge’s decisions on the motions she heard, and asks that the parties remain as respondents. II. Analysis [ 8 ] At the outset of the second day of hearing, when we called upon the respondents to give their argument, the appellant informed us she had filed complaints against us with the Canadian Judicial Council. As we had not been notified by the Council of these complaints, we informed the appellant we would deal with them when the time came. As this Court stated in Brooks v.

The Law Society of New Brunswick et al ., 2015 NBCA 18 : … It is the duty of all judges to “exercise their judicial functions independently and free of extraneous influence”: Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges,

Chapter 2 – Principle 1. To borrow from the commentary in that chapter, a “judge’s duty is to apply the law as he or she understands it without fear or favour and without regard to whether the decision is popular or not” (p. 4). A

judge who does not exercise his or her judgment fearless of threats of a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council is not properlydemonstrating what has been described as “the foundation of judicial impartiality”: judicial independence. For these reasons, Ms.Brooks’ threats have fallen on totally deaf ears. [para. 4] Therefore, any complaints respecting us have no bearing on this decision. [9] The appellant then followed with an oral motion for the panel to recuse itself.

We were bothindividually of the opinion, after hearing the appellant’s oral submission and reviewing a lengthy document containing the allegations ofbias against us, not to recuse ourselves. We were of the view we could adjudicate fairly and abide by our oaths of office to judge thelegal matters of the case. We were also of the view that an informed person, looking at the matter realistically and practically and havingthought the matter through, would apprehend we were impartial: R. v. S. (R.D.), (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, [1997]S.C.J. No. 84 (QL), at paras.109-115; Lambert v.

Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 N.B.R. (2d) 346, at para. 4; Brooks v. The LawSociety of New Brunswick et al., at paras. 4-8. [10] Having said this, the extraordinary aspect of this appeal was the appeal hearing, on essentiallytwo preliminary motions, took the better part of two days when normally an appeal of this nature would take half of a day. The appellantwould not take direction from the Court, and she was disrespectful and insulting to all counsel for the respondents.

She sees collusion atevery turn and tries to link not only the Court but also individuals with similar family names and legal affiliations to a conspiracy againsther. By her own admission she is a non-practicing lawyer, but it was evident she had no appellate advocacy experience: essentially shewanted a hearing de novo of all the allegations made below and could not focus on the pertinent grounds of appeal.

The patience of Jobwould have been strained because of the distraction of so many extraneous and irrelevant matters. [11] Robertson J.A. succinctly explains the difficulty courts face with such cases in Murray v. NewBrunswick Police Commission (2012), 389 N.B.R. (2d) 372, [2012] N.B.J. No. 211 (C.A.) (QL): Unfortunately, what courts are facing today is a cluster of cases in which the self-represented litigant is generally unwilling and, at times,hostile to the prospect of taking instruction from the court, particularly as to what can be argued.

This is the litigant who is under themistaken impression they have an unfettered right to pursue their self-interests without regard to the rights of the opposing party underthe rules of evidence and the Rules of Court. These are the cases in which the simple case becomes unnecessarily complex and courtproceedings become marathon sessions. These are the cases in which the self-represented litigant operates on the mistaken assumptionthat if he or she is unsuccessful on any ruling it is because of bias on the part of the decision-maker.

These are the litigants who, ifconfronted with the law, will plead ignorance and seek the court’s indulgence. Otherwise, they continue to believe they have masteredthe intricacies of statutory

interpretation, the application of legal principles, doctrines and rules -- without the benefit of legal training.Often, these are the cases where the opposing party has had to retain and pay legal counsel to defend unmeritorious interlocutoryproceedings in circumstances where everyone knows the self-represented litigant lacks the financial resources to pay any costs award, beit large or small.

These are cases where the self-represented litigant will expect, if not demand, that he or she be given greater andpersistent access to court staff, whose primary function is to serve the public at large by accepting documents that comply with legalrequirements and not to act as quasi-judicial advisors. Fortunately, most cases and most self-represented litigants do not fall within thesedescriptions. The law reports support this observation: e.g., Druet v. Girouard, 2012 NBCA 40, [2012] N.B.J. No. 136 (QL).

Regrettably,it only takes a few to grind down the pace at which justice is delivered in this Province and to stretch the patience of all judges who, as amatter of fact, are truly committed to ensuring that all litigants are provided with meaningful “access to justice”. On the other hand, theextent to which Rule 76.1 will be viewed as a viable means for controlling vexatious proceedings is a matter beyond the scope of thesereasons. [para. 10] See also Brooks v.

The Law Society of New Brunswick et al. [12] The appellant relied on 143 grounds of appeal in her Supplementary Notice of Appeal; by herown admission she embellished the grounds because according to her, she presumed, without knowing, that if she made a request to theChief Justice of the Province of New Brunswick to increase the length of her appellant’s submission under Rule 62.14(4), the requestwould be denied. [13] The following is an example of two grounds that are demonstrative of unwarranted,unsubstantiated, and outlandish allegations for which there are absolutely no supporting facts:

(127) The learned trial judge erred in fact in stating on page 5 that she believed that the Applicant accepts her assertion of the fact thatshe has no prior knowledge of this matter as the trial judge reasonably ought to have been aware as a result of the records of theadministrative decision- makers and other documentation before the court that in light of the pervasive nature of the applicant’s matterthroughout New Brunswick and the trial judge’s ties and close association with the progressive conservative association, the law society

of New Brunswick and Michael Murphy in addition to many other concerns such as relationships with Attorney General Marie Claude Blais and Brian Gallant who also practised in Moncton that the applicant did not find it believable At All that the presiding judge set to hear the motion did not Have Prior Knowledge of this and was deliberately arranged to hear the motions by the Chief Justice [of the Court of Queen’s Bench] in order to get rid of the problem (being the Applicant) that threatened the careers of judges, government officials and others if the truth came out about their wrongdoing involving their treatment of this Applicant in the hiring process and open competition with the Province of New Brunswick;

(128) The learned trial judge erred in fact in stating on page 5 of her decision dated December 5, 2013 that the Applicant maintains that despite her best intentions it would be impossible for the trial judge to be unbiased as the Applicant does not believe the trial judge had any good intentions at all but an agenda from the outset to dismiss the applicant’s motions and ultimately her judicial review application( similar to the action of the staff and officials of the New Brunswick human rights commission and the actions of Former Conflict of Interest Commissioner Ryan in respect to the matters before them) and that she was deliberately picked as a result of her bias by the Chief Justice [of the Court of Queen’s Bench] who had already appointed one judge to hear the matter who was a colleague of another judge involved in the wrongdoing ( who the Chief Justice [of the Court of Queen’s Bench] clearly should have known had a conflict of interest and that there was certainly a reasonable apprehension of bias Before the Chief Justice [of the Court of Queen’s Bench] appointed him and which judge recused himself at the applicant’s request); [ 14 ] Having examined all the grounds of appeal, we summarize the issues to be determined on the appeal as follows.

The appellant argues the motion judge erred:

(1) In not recusing herself; having an apprehension of bias in not adjourning the hearing of the motions until a complaint the appellant made against the motion judge to the Canadian Judicial Council was resolved; and in splitting the motions into two hearings.

(2) In law by finding the decision of Former Commissioner Ryan could not be reviewed, violating the Constitutional guarantee of judicial review of any exercise of power under statute; decisions of the Conflict of Interest Commissioner are reviewable for jurisdictional error (including violating the procedural duty of fairness and bias), unreasonableness and deliberate wrongdoing despite the presence of a privative clause.

(3) In law and/or by proceeding deliberately despite the law by removing the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission and the former and current Conflict of Interest Commissioner as parties to the judicial review proceeding when their conduct and the resulting concerns respecting bias, fraud, breach of the procedural duty of fairness, collusion with the respondents and jurisdictional concerns as well as other concerns are of central importance in hearing the judicial review proceeding fully and fairly on its merits.

(4) In failing to take measures to ensure any false evidence before the court was corrected and any obstruction of justice was properly revealed and dealt with before she made any decisions or heard any motions of the respondents to remove themselves as parties and/or to dismiss the proceeding as against them.

(5) By proceeding deliberately to cover up the wrongdoing of the respondents and obstructing justice by making the decisions she made to assist the respondents. [ 15 ] The applicable standard of review, briefly stated, is that of correctness on questions of law ( Housen v. Nikolaisen , 2002 SCC 33 , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 8 ); deference on questions of fact, such that there must be palpable and overriding error to permit appellate interference ( Housen , at para. 10 ); and the same standard of deference to questions of mixed fact and law ( Housen , at para. 37 ). Richard J.A. iterates this test in Lemay v.

Peters , 2014 NBCA 59 , [2014] N.B.J. No. 244 (QL): As with every case on appeal, the trial decision must be assessed through the lens of the standard of review that governs each question raised. It has been stated time and again that the role of the appellate court is not to retry the case or to substitute its own findings for those of the trial judge.

These days, an overabundance of authority stands for the following propositions, which have now become trite law: (1) findings of law are to be assessed on a standard of correctness; (2) a finding of fact is entitled to deference and will only be reversed if the result of a palpable and overriding error; and, (3) findings of mixed fact and law, that is the application of a legal standard to a set of facts in order to arrive at an ultimate conclusion, are also entitled to deference and are reviewable on the same standard as findings of fact unless a legal error can be extricated. [para. 31] A. Bias

[ 16 ] We begin with the ground alleging bias against the motion judge. In Brooks v. The Law Society of New Brunswick et al . , this Court describes what constitutes bias on the part of a judge who is asked to adjudicate. It is a serious allegation. There is a subjective and an objective component to the bias test when broad allegations are made: R. v. S. (R.D.) . With respect to the subjective component, the judge considers whether she or he can adjudicate impartially. If she or he cannot do so, that puts an end to the exercise.

The objective component of the test is “reasonable apprehension of bias”, the test usually applied. As this Court stated in Dugas v. Gaudet et al., 2014 NBCA 7 , 416 N.B.R. (2d) 389, to sustain an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias, one must meet the following criteria: “[t]he grounds giving rise to the apprehension of bias must be sufficiently serious to rebut the presumption that the judge will abide by his or her oath of office and ‘[judge] a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances’ (see United States v.

Morgan , 313 U.S. 409 (1941), at p. 421, excerpt quoted with approval in R. v. S.(R.D. ))” (para. 5). [ 17 ] In an oral decision, the motion judge gave her reasons for not recusing herself. In so doing, she cited and applied the correct jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada and this Court, and considered and weighed the appropriate factors. In our view, she made no reversible error in her application of the law relating to bias. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence on the record to support the allegation of bias. B.

Discretionary orders [ 18 ] With respect to the orders on procedure, the appellant argues the judge erred in not adjourning the proceedings pending resolution of the appellant’s complaint against her to the Canadian Judicial Council, and for hearing the first two motions together, to be followed by the remaining two. These are discretionary orders with which, in these circumstances, we would not interfere. In The Beaverbrook Art Gallery v.

Beaverbrook Canadian Foundation , 2013 NBCA 17 , 403 N.B.R. (2d) 161, Drapeau C.J.N.B. restates: [...] The impugned Order is quintessentially the product of an exercise of judicial discretion. Like any other discretionary judicial decision, it may be interfered with on appeal only if it is founded upon an error of law, an error in the application of the governing principles or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence (see British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v.

Okanagan Indian Band , [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, 2003 SCC 71 at par. 43 ) or if it is unreasonable, in the sense that nothing in the record can justify it (see The Honourable R.P. Kerans, Standards of Review Employed by Appellate Courts (Edmonton: Juriliber Limited, 1994), at pp. 36-37 and Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council , [1977] A.C. 1014 (H.L.) Lord Diplock at p. 1064). [para. 8] See also Pèse Pêche Inc. v. R ., 2013 NBCA 37 , 405 N.B.R. (2d) 212. Since we cannot identify any such error, the appeal against these discretionary orders must fail. C.

Conflict of Interest Commissioners [ 19 ] A reminder of the chronology of events at this stage may be useful to understand the procedure the Office of the Commissioner of Conflict of Interest followed: • April 15, 2013: the Commissioner received the complaint of the appellant • April 22-July 2, 2013: the Office received 8 emails from the appellant comprising 48 pages • June 10, 2013: the Commissioner sent 10 letters to the MLAs named in the complaint • June 20, 2013: Ms.

Rose heard a media report that Commissioner Ryan would be replaced by The Honourable Alfred Landry, Q.C. • June 26, 2013: the Human Rights Commission dismissed the appellant’s complaint • June 28, 2013: the appellant sent an email to the Commissioner’s office asking if any responses have been received from the MLAs • July 3, 2013: Commission Ryan advises the appellant he has informed the 10 MLAs of the complaint against them • July 23, 2013: the appellant filed her Notice of Application for judicial review of the Human Rights Commission’s decisions and included Commissioners Ryan and Landry as parties

• August 7, 2013: Commissioner sends copies of MLA’s replies to appellant, and suspends the investigation • August 21, 2013: Order in Council appointing Commissioner Alfred Landry, Q.C. as Conflict of Interest Commissioner effectiveSeptember 1, 2013 • August 26, 2013: Commissioner Ryan files 9 page report ceasing the investigation pursuant to s. 37(4) of the Members’ Conflict ofInterest Act because he found there were no grounds to sustain it. [20] The appellant in this case has made outrageous and scandalous allegations of fraud, bias,deliberate wrongdoing and bad faith against the Commissioners that are completely unsupported by the evidence.

The appellantpresented no evidence Commissioner Ryan failed to comply with a duty of procedural fairness; she simply makes the bald allegation.The principal oral argument the appellant made to us against Commissioner Landry was that he must be biased because he retained thesame legal counsel as Commissioner Ryan. [21] Any alleged error dealing with the removal by the motion judge of the Commissioners as partiesto the proceedings, or reviewing their conduct, can be dealt with summarily.

The conduct of the Commissioners is not reviewable unlessthere is a lack of good faith (s. 34(1) of the Members’ Conflict of Interest Act). The Conflict of Interest Commissioner is an officer of theNew Brunswick Legislature and has the immunity of legislative privilege (s. 35 of the Act). The motion judge found the appellantadduced no evidence of bad faith conduct, just bald allegations.

The Commissioners also sought the removal of certain paragraphs of theappellant’s affidavit which offended the common law rules of evidence, the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence of this Court. [22] In our view, there is no reversible error in the carefully considered reasons of the motion judgewith respect to the status of the Commissioners. Nor did she make any error in striking portions of the appellant’s September 11, 2013,affidavit. The pertinent paragraphs were inadmissible.

She made no error in dismissing the application against Commissioner Landry,because the evidence reveals he played no role in the matter and the Notice of Application contains no allegations pertaining to him.With respect to former Commissioner Ryan, the motion judge could find no evidence of bad faith in his dealings with the appellant eitherin processing her complaint or authoring his report at the conclusion of the investigation.

The motion judge correctly concluded theCommissioner has immunity under ss. 34 and 35 of the Act as well as the benefit of immunity pursuant to the privilege of the LegislativeAssembly: New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), (SCC), [1993] 1S.C.R. 319, [1993] S.C.J. No. 2 (QL), at pages 384-385; Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, 2005 SCC 30, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667, atpara. 29; Tafler v. British Columbia (Commissioner of Conflict of Interest), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1332 (C.A.) (QL), at paras.14-15, 17; andMarch v. Hodder et al., 2007 NLTD 93, [2007] N.J.

No. 163 (QL), at para. 22. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant insisted s. 34is a “privative clause”. Her argument on that point was confusing and incorrect in law. She is wrong. [23] The grounds of appeal with respect to the Commissioners are devoid of all merit and aredismissed. D.

Human Rights Commission [24] The Human Rights Commission only has standing to participate in judicial review of itsdecisions in very particular circumstances: (1) if the Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 171 gives it standing; (2) if the Human RightsCommission is granted intervenor status pursuant to Rule 15.02 of the Rules of Court; (3) if the Human Rights Commission is grantedstatus as amicus curiae pursuant to Rule 15.03; or (4) if the Human Rights Commission itself, upon application, seeks to be added as aparty pursuant to Rule 5.04(2): Smith v.

Province of New Brunswick (Department of Public Safety) and New Brunswick Human RightsCommission, 2012 NBCA 41, 397 N.B.R. (2d) 1. [25] If the appellant’s argument is she needs the Human Rights Commission to be a party in order to(1) have disclosure of the documents in its possession, and (2) to compel the Human Rights Commission to come and answer to itsrecord, the answer is the full record has been disclosed to the appellant, and there is no obligation on the decision maker to explain itsconclusion. [26] In the application, the appellant sought to add the Human Rights Commission as a party whenno Rule of Court permits it.

We are in total agreement with the motion judge when she concludes: In the absence of a request and subsequent order for standing by the Commission pursuant to Rules 15.02 or

15.03, in the absence of a right to participate as a party set out in its enabling statute and considering the guidelines provided by the Court of Appeal in Smith , I am of the view that the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission does not have standing as a party in the present application for judicial review and the application against them is therefore dismissed. [para. 46] [ 27 ] Since the motion judge made no reversible error in her application of the law with respect to the Human Rights Commission’s standing, the grounds relating to the Commission have no merit. III.

Disposition [ 28 ] For these reasons we dismiss the appeal and award three sets of costs of $2,500: one to the Human Rights Commission, one to the Commissioners and one to the Province of New Brunswick. ____________________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.A. ____________________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A.