Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2012 SKPC 112

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2012 SKPC 112 Date: July 13, 2012 Information: 24401489 Location: Fort Qu'Appelle _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Llewellyn Floyd Swaine Appearing: Adam Breker For the Crown Barry Nychuk For the Accused DECISION ON VOIR DIRE B. J. TOMKINS , J [ 1 ] On July 10, 2011, Llewellyn Floyd Swaine was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while his ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug, contrary to sections 253(1) (

a) and 255(1) of the Criminal Code and also with having care or control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration thereof in his blood exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood, contrary to sections 253(1)(

b) and 255(1) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] Since counsel for the accused had provided notice of his intention to raise certain Charter issues, the Crown called its first and only witness on the voir dire and Mr. Swaine was sworn and testified on the voir dire as well. The evidence of these two witnesses comprises the case on the voir dire and is the evidence on which my decision will be based. CIRCUMSTANCES OF ARREST AND DETENTION - Constable Oman's Evidence

[ 3 ] The Crown's witness was Constable Mark Oman, who had been an RCMP Officer for about 15 months at the time of this incident. When he went on shift at about 5:00 p.m. on July 10, 2011, he overheard on the police radio that other RCMP members were actively looking for a green Dodge Intrepid being operated by a suspected impaired driver. In the course of his patrol at about 5:20 p.m., he observed a green Intrepid parked in the lot in front of the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Fort Qu'Appelle. [ 4 ] Constable Oman drove onto the parking lot and saw a man sitting alone in the driver's seat.

The window beside the man was open and Constable Oman observed the keys in the ignition, although the vehicle was not running. He said "Hello" to the man and the man responded similarly. Immediately, Constable Oman noticed a "very strong" odour of alcohol on the man's breath. In addition, he saw that the man's eyes were glassy and his speech was slurred. The man, who identified himself as Llewellyn Swaine, told Constable Oman that he had consumed a few beer earlier in the day, drove to Standing Buffalo First Nation and then returned to town with his nephew to pick up some supper. [ 5 ] Constable Oman asked Mr.

Swaine to step out of his vehicle and come to the police vehicle. His purpose, he said, was to give him an opportunity to assess "his degree of impairment". He observed Mr. Swaine's gait was steady and his manual manipulation was "quite good". [ 6 ] Constable Oman said Mr. Swaine was showing signs of impairment by alcohol and that he believed Mr. Swaine was impaired to some degree. Outside the police vehicle, Constable Oman advised Mr. Swaine that it was clear he had been drinking and that he had been in control of a motor vehicle.

He told him he would have to come to the police vehicle where an Approved Screening Device ("ASD") test would be administered. [ 7 ] The police vehicle Constable Oman was driving was not equipped with an ASD and so there was a brief delay while they waited for one to be delivered. The ASD test was administered at 5:31 p.m. and Mr. Swaine registered a fail reading. [ 8 ] At this point, at 5:33 p.m., Constable Oman advised Mr. Swaine that he was under arrest for care or control of a vehicle while impaired. Mr. Swaine said he understood. [ 9 ] Next, at the same time, Constable Oman advised Mr.

Swaine of his right to counsel. He read this from a card as follows: You have the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. You may call any lawyer you wish. Legal Aid duty counsel is available to provide you with immediate legal advice free of charge and can explain the Legal Aid plan to you. I can provide you with a number you can call free of charge. Do you understand? Mr. Swaine said that he did. [ 10 ] Next, Constable Oman gave Mr. Swaine what is commonly referred to as the police warning, advising of his right to remain silent. Mr.

Swaine also said he understood this. [ 11 ] Finally, at 5:35 p.m., Constable Oman made a demand for Mr. Swaine to accompany him to the detachment to provide samples of his breath for analysis. Mr. Swaine said he understood the demand and, when asked if he would provide samples, replied "Yes, probably." [ 12 ] Constable Oman described the process for telephone calls to counsel at the Fort Qu'Appelle RCMP Detachment. He said there is a telephone room in which an accused person is placed and the RCMP member then dials a different telephone from outside the room and advises the accused person when it is ringing.

The accused person then picks up the telephone in the telephone room and continues the call. The door to the telephone room is closed throughout and the accused person is therefore afforded privacy during the call. There is nothing of significance in the telephone room except the telephone; there is no telephone book, no list of lawyers and nothing else that would assist an accused person in identifying a lawyer. One cannot dial out on the telephone but can only participate in calls dialled by an officer outside the telephone room. [ 13 ] Constable Oman said that when he and Mr.

Swaine arrived at the detachment, he asked Mr. Swaine if he still wished to speak to a lawyer and Mr. Swaine said he did. A call was put through in the manner described above at 5:44 p.m. Mr. Swaine was on the telephone with Legal Aid for about ten minutes. When Mr. Swaine came out of the telephone room, he was clearly upset with the lawyer he had spoken to and expressed his dissatisfaction to Constable Oman. [ 14 ] Shortly thereafter, at 5:58 p.m., Constable Oman said he offered Mr. Swaine a telephone book and asked if there was another lawyer he preferred to call. Mr.

Swaine responded, "Let's just get it done." Constable Oman sat with Mr. Swaine until the first test was administered. That sample was taken at 6:03 p.m. and a reading of .19 was obtained. [ 15 ] Mr. Swaine then returned to the hallway outside the breathalyzer room while the machine was prepared for the second test. Constable Oman sat with him and they engaged in general conversation. Mr. Swaine was looking through the lawyer listings in the telephone book but at some point stood up and said "Fuck it" and turned toward the breathalyzer room.

The technician advised that he was not yet ready for the second test. [ 16 ] Mr. Swaine resumed looking at the directory and Constable Oman had noticed that Mr. Swaine had come to a lawyer's name in the telephone book. At 6:30 p.m., he placed Mr. Swaine back in the telephone room and put him in contact with that office. He spoke to someone for about two minutes and then came out of the phone room and said he would provide the second sample. [ 17 ] The second sample was taken at 6:47 p.m. and the reading was also .19. CIRCUMSTANCES OF ARREST AND DETENTION - Mr. Swaine's Evidence

[ 18 ] Mr. Swaine's evidence as to what occurred at the Kentucky Fried Chicken parking lot and until he and Constable Oman arrived at the RCMP Detachment was not materially different than Constable Oman's and I do not find it necessary to repeat it. He did, however, add certain information which is relevant to my decision. [ 19 ] Mr. Swaine said that as he sat in his vehicle with the window open, he saw a police vehicle pull up behind him. He heard the officer "run" his licence plate number.

Shortly thereafter, the police officer came to his window and asked for his identification. [ 20 ] While Constable Oman did not testify to these actions, I am aware that running plates and asking for licence and registration are common police actions, taken in virtually every case when a vehicle is approached. I accept Mr. Swaine's evidence in this respect. [ 21 ] Mr. Swaine's evidence as to what occurred at the detachment differs from Constable Oman's in significant respects. He said that when they arrived at the detachment, he was asked if he wished to speak to a lawyer and he said he did.

He said he was placed in the telephone room and shortly afterward a call came through. Mr. Swaine said he assumed it was duty counsel. He said he did not recall that he specifically asked to speak to Legal Aid duty counsel; he thought it was just "the normal procedure" - that if you get arrested and you indicated you wished to speak to a lawyer, you are allowed a call to duty counsel. [ 22 ] He said he did not recall being asked if he wished to speak to a particular lawyer. He recalled that he may have asked to speak to duty counsel but only because he understood that to be his only option.

While he admits it is possible Constable Oman offered him the option to contact counsel of his choice, he does not recall this occurring. [ 23 ] Mr. Swaine confirmed that the conversation did not go well with duty counsel. He found the person difficult to talk to, frustrated and frustrating. [ 24 ] Mr. Swaine said he told Constable Oman that he was upset about the conversation and after that, he gave the first sample. He said it was only after he provided the first sample that he was provided a telephone directory.

He looked through it and nothing caught his attention so he admitted he stood up, said "Fuck it" and moved toward the breathalyzer room. [ 25 ] When he was advised that he would have to wait a bit, he went back to the telephone book, located the name of a lawyer he wished to call and a call was placed to that lawyer. He had a brief conversation and was satisfied with the advice he received. After this conversation, Mr. Swaine gave his second sample. THE ISSUES [ 26 ] Counsel for Mr. Swaine has raised, in effect, six issues as follows: A. Was the initial detention of Mr.

Swaine arbitrary, unlawful and in violation of

section 9 of the Charter ? B. Were Mr. Swaine's rights under

section 10(

b) of the Charter violated? C. If Mr. Swaine's Charter rights were violated, what is the appropriate remedy? D. Is it fatal to the Crown's case that Constable Oman could not identify the manufacturer or model number of the approved screening device? E. Is the discrepancy between the date of the alleged offence and the date on the Certificate of Analyses fatal to the Crown's case? F. Was the taking of a breath sample into the ASD unnecessary and if so, did it constitute an unlawful seizure of the breath sample? The first three of these, being Charter arguments, are properly before me on the voir dire .

The latter three are matters for decision within the trial proper and do not fall necessarily within this decision. [ 27 ] In this regard, I note that both the Crown and defence indicated their intention to apply to have the admissible voir dire evidence applied to the trial of this matter and both indicated that they did not intend to call further evidence in that trial.

However, the application to apply the evidence has not yet been made and the matter is adjourned pending decision on the voir dire . [ 28 ] Further, while written argument was provided, the defence did not provide argument in regard to the last of these issues. In

respect of that issue, Mr. Nychuk specifically reserved for argument at trial. A. Was the initial detention of Mr. Swaine arbitrary, unlawful and in violation of

section 9 of the Charter ? [ 29 ]

Section 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads, " 9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned." [ 30 ] The defence argued that Mr. Swaine's rights under this

section were infringed. He says he was detained from the moment Constable Oman approached his vehicle and began questioning him and that Constable Oman did not have reasonable grounds for an investigative detention. He says there was no other lawful basis for the detention. If he is correct, the detention was contrary to

section 9 of the Charter . [ 31 ] In response, the Crown asserts that detention did not begin until Constable Oman formed the opinion that Mr. Swaine had been consuming alcohol and was possibly impaired. Detention in such circumstances is clearly lawful, he said. Even if the detention commenced at the time the defence has submitted, the Crown says it is lawful pursuant to provincial legislation and as a matter of common sense and public interest. [ 32 ] I am satisfied that Mr. Swaine was detained as soon as Constable Oman commenced interacting with him. By this time, through his open window Mr.

Swaine had heard Constable Oman run his plates and, almost immediately after approaching the vehicle, the officer requested his identification. Mr. Swaine was obligated to comply with that request and certainly believed this was so. [ 33 ] Further, Constable Oman testified that when he approached the vehicle he said "Hello", he concluded immediately upon Mr. Swaine's greeting in response that Mr. Swaine's breath had a strong smell of alcohol.

At that point, especially given that Constable Oman sought the driver of a green Intrepid on suspicion of impaired driving, an investigative detention had certainly commenced. [ 34 ] It would be apparent to Mr. Swaine that Constable Oman was not engaged in providing general assistance or maintaining order; he must have known that Constable Oman - by requesting his licence and registration and by the nature of the questions asked, particularly regarding alcohol consumption - was investigating him as an individual. [ 35 ] The issue, according to the defence, is whether Constable Oman had grounds to place Mr.

Swaine under investigative detention given the information available to him. In particular, he noted that all Constable Oman knew was that an anonymous civilian had made a complaint of a possibly impaired man operating a green Intrepid vehicle. He did not know the year of the vehicle or its licence plate number, the time the complaint was received, the time the driving was observed or where the driving was observed. Nor did he have a description of the driver. [ 36 ] I am satisfied that Constable Oman had objectively reasonable grounds for placing Mr. Swaine under detention.

I agree that the information in Constable Oman's possession was not extensive but it was not inadequate in these circumstances. [ 37 ] Constable Oman said that when he came on duty at 5:00 p.m., he learned that the RCMP members were "actively" looking for a suspected impaired driver operating a green Chrysler Intrepid. The fact that the officers were actively looking indicates that the complaint had been received reasonably recently; the officers would not be actively pursuing a dated complaint. [ 38 ] The fact that Constable Oman observed Mr.

Swaine in his vehicle no more than twenty minutes later added to his grounds. Had he located the vehicle some hours later, for example, I would likely reach a different conclusion. [ 39 ] The fact that Constable Oman did not know the source of the complaint or its details is not fatal. Even the officer receiving the complaint directly is not required, as might be the case in respect of a warrant, for example, to assess the credibility of the source and the reliability of the information provided. He is entitled, for investigative purposes, to rely on complaints as they are received.

Complaints are investigated for the very purpose of verification; they cannot be verified in advance. [ 40 ] Taken together, these circumstances provided Constable Oman grounds to place Mr. Swaine under investigative detention. That detention, therefore, did not infringe his

section 9 Charter rights. [ 41 ] In closing, I will deal briefly with the Crown's argument that the detention was also justified under The Traffic Safety Act as related to traffic enforcement. I do not accept this argument. I am satisfied that Constable Oman's actions were taken in pursuance of the criminal complaint and solely on that basis; he did not approach Mr. Swaine's vehicle for any of the purposes set out in

section 209.1 of The Traffic Safety Act . Nor did his evidence, directly or by implication, so suggest. B. Were Mr. Swaine's rights under

section 10(

b) of the Charter violated ? [ 42 ]

Section 10(

b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads as follows: Every one has the right on arrest or detention (

b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right[.] [ 43 ] Case law has established that the authority who arrests a person is required, under this provision, to do the following things:

• Inform the detained person of his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay; • Inform the detained person that duty counsel is available free of charge; • Provide the detained person a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel of his choice. [ 44 ] Mr. Justice Foley, in R. v. MacLaren [1] summarized nicely the implications of these obligations when he wrote: The trial judge concluded that the fact that Mr. MacLaren spoke to a Legal Aid lawyer and did not ask to speak to a specific lawyer was, in the circumstances as described by the constables, exhaustive of his s. 10(

b) rights as he "was given a reasonable opportunity to exercise his right". In my opinion, the trial judge erred in law in failing to appreciate that the right constitutionally guaranteed is not merely of speaking to a Legal Aid lawyer or even to a specific lawyer but the words "to retain and instruct counsel" are a legal phrase which incorporates several specific rights including the right to select and retain counsel, receive legal advice in privacy and confidentiality.

The trial judge failed to examine the evidence to consider or determine whether a reasonable opportunity to select or choose counsel was accorded to the accused. To "speak with a lawyer" may be the vehicle chosen to communicate with counsel but this is not the extent of the right which is constitutionally guaranteed. The fundamental right to retain and instruct counsel and receive that counsel's advice under conditions of privilege includes the right to choose which counsel one will contract with to be advised ( reference omitted ).

These rights give rise to corresponding duties on the custodians of persons in detention to arrange matters so as to provide a reasonable and realistic opportunity for the exercise of the right. [ 45 ] The defence says, in effect, that Constable Oman deprived Mr. Swaine of his right to "select or choose counsel" by not providing him a reasonable opportunity to do so. [ 46 ] Mr. Swaine said he did not know the name of any specific lawyer but, in any event, did not recall that Constable Oman asked him if he wished to contact a specific lawyer.

He was not initially provided a list of lawyers or a telephone directory from which to identify a lawyer to call. [ 47 ] He did speak to Legal Aid duty counsel but did not recall whether the officers recommended Legal Aid to him or whether he asked to speak to Legal Aid duty counsel. He said that, as events unfolded, he thought this was just normal procedure. That is, he thought if you get arrested, you are allowed to call the duty counsel.

As I understand his evidence, he thought that he had a right to counsel and if he chose to exercise it, he exercised it by consulting Legal Aid duty counsel. [ 48 ] After he spoke to duty counsel, he believes he told Constable Oman he was upset by the call but said that they then went and he blew for the first time. He said he did receive a phone book and an opportunity to consider lawyers listed there but that this did not happen until after he had given his first sample. He agreed with Constable Oman that after this, he did identify a lawyer he wanted to call and that he was allowed to do so.

Following consultation with that lawyer, Mr. Swaine gave his second sample. [ 49 ] Constable Oman's evidence as to the provision of counsel contradicts Mr. Swaine's in certain respects. [ 50 ] Constable Oman said it is his regular practice, once he arrives at the detachment with an accused person, to ask if they wish to consult a lawyer. He said he asked if they have a lawyer and if they don't or if they haven't sufficient money to retain a lawyer, he tells them that there is Legal Aid duty counsel as an option.

His evidence was equivocal on the question of whether he routinely offers duty counsel once the person says they don't have a lawyer or whether he offers them a telephone directory at that juncture. He said he offered a telephone directory to Mr. Swaine before he spoke to Legal Aid duty counsel. This offer is not in his notes, he admitted, but he said it was not necessary to note it because he always does it. [ 51 ] Constable Oman testified that he offered a telephone book again at 5:58 p.m. shortly after Mr.

Swaine completed his call with duty counsel and it was apparent he was not satisfied with the lawyer or the advice he received or both. He said that when he gave him the phone book, he told Mr. Swaine that if he was upset with the lawyer he spoke to, he could call any lawyer he wished. In response, Mr. Swaine said, "Let's just get it done." [ 52 ] There is no material discrepancy between the evidence of Constable Oman and Mr. Swaine about what transpired after Mr. Swaine took the first test. That is, Mr.

Swaine identified a lawyer from the directory and consulted that lawyer by telephone before giving his second sample. [ 53 ] I am satisfied that events unfolded much as Constable Oman testified in his general description of his practice. During examination-in-chief, he said: . . . what I do with everyone is once they're in, I ask them again if they still wish to contact counsel and if so, whom, if they already have a lawyer.

If they so choose Legal Aid, then we just go with Legal Aid unless they name a lawyer of other -- of another name. [ 54 ] In cross-examination, Constable Oman said: I always asked when I do this, I ask specifically if they have a lawyer and if so -- and if they don't know a lawyer a lot of the times they say, "I don't have a lawyer" or "I don't have any money," then I say, "Well, there's Legal Aid as an option; we'll call Legal Aid" and then he said "yes".

And later: There's always a conversation upon entering the detachment, if they have a legal -- legal representation already and if not, then you offer them Legal Aid and -- and instruct to them that it's available free of charge. Most of the time they argue -- or the issue with them is -- is lack of funds or money or the fact that they -- they have never had to retain counsel before. And so we're instructed that if they don't want any other lawyer or they don't -- you know, they don't want to proceed in any other way, that Legal Aid is there; you offer it to them and ask them -- it's his choice.

And later in cross-examination: The conversation is always the same with me. I ask them and I give them the option.

It's not documented in my notes, but it's my normal procedure and the conversation must have led to the fact that he did not already have legal representation or -- or the funds. [ 55 ] Thus, on at least three occasions, Constable Oman testified that, in effect, he asks the detained person if he has a lawyer and if they don't or if they can't afford one, he next offers them Legal Aid duty counsel. [ 56 ] Constable Oman followed the evidence quoted last above by saying "I'm not sure of the conversation and so he optioned to call Legal Aid because I always offer a phone book." This evidence that Constable Oman "always offers a phone book" came, as is noted, well into his cross-examination and after numerous questions relating to and descriptions of the events respecting counsel after Mr.

Swaine arrived at the detachment. [ 57 ] It may be that this is, in fact, Constable Oman's usual practice but I am not satisfied that he followed that practice in this case. I am not satisfied that Constable Oman offered Mr. Swaine a telephone directory and an opportunity to peruse it before the call was placed to Legal Aid duty counsel. While Constable Oman said this is his usual practice, he did not have notes or recollection of Mr.

Swaine's response to the offer and this is troubling, given his notes and recollections respecting other events related to consultation with counsel and given his earlier evidence, quoted above, as to his usual practice. [ 58 ] That evidence showed a practice of obtaining consent to contact with Legal Aid duty counsel after a detained person indicated that they did not have current legal counsel or funds to pay for counsel. This was consistent in all the quoted portions of Constable Oman's evidence and I accept that this is what occurred with Mr.

Swaine. [ 59 ] I noted with interest that, when referring to the provision of a telephone directory later in the evening, Constable Oman said, "At 5:58 he was offered another phone book or offered a phone book to call a -- a lawyer of his choosing . . .". The fact that he corrected himself from "another phone book" - which would suggest that one had been provided previously - to simply "a phone book" is telling. [ 60 ] I believe Constable Oman asked whether Mr. Swaine had a lawyer he wished to call and Mr. Swaine responded to the effect that he did not have counsel.

He was then offered Legal Aid duty counsel as an alternative and Mr. Swaine accepted that offer. I do not accept Constable Oman's evidence that, before being offered or before accepting referral to Legal Aid duty counsel, Mr. Swaine was provided a phone book and an opportunity to select counsel from the lawyers listed there. [ 61 ] However, I do accept Constable Oman's evidence that Mr. Swaine was offered a directory and an opportunity to contact alternative counsel after he spoke to Legal Aid duty counsel and before he gave his first sample. [ 62 ] This evidence was documented by Constable Oman, as was Mr.

Swaine's response. His notes show that at 5:58 p.m. he offered Mr. Swaine a telephone book. In response to this offer, Mr. Swaine said "Let's just get it done." [ 63 ] While Mr. Swaine does not recall an offer of a directory at that time, I am not confident in his evidence. By his own admission, he was upset and emotional about the fact of his arrest and the potential that his employment would be compromised if his readings were over .08. He was frustrated by his conversation with duty counsel. He said he was very angry and wasn't listening carefully to Constable Oman. He simply wanted to get on with the tests.

He admitted he was uncertain about a number of aspects of events at the detachment. [ 64 ] I accept, therefore, Constable Oman's clear and recorded recollection that a telephone book and an opportunity to contact counsel was provided at 5:58 p.m. and declined by Mr. Swaine. I also accept that he and Constable Oman continued to wait together until the first sample was taken at 6:03 p.m. Thus, the offer of a directory was made five minutes before the first sample was given. [ 65 ] In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that Mr. Swaine's

section 10(

b) rights were infringed. While the practice at the Fort Qu'Appelle Detachment in placing the arrested person in a room without resources or access to an outside phone line is clearly not ideal, it does not in and of itself amount to a violation of an arrested person's

section 10(

b) rights. The officers at that detachment must be diligent to ensure that the right is afforded notwithstanding the physical layout of the telephone room. [ 66 ] In this case, Mr. Swaine was not initially provided appropriate access to counsel. He ought to have been provided a telephone directory and advice that he could select and contact any lawyer from the directory. This information and opportunity should have been provided before contact was made with Legal Aid duty counsel and in such manner that it would be clear that Legal Aid duty counsel was no more than an option and that the availability of duty counsel did not limit or affect the person's right to contact private counsel.

[ 67 ] However, Mr. Swaine was provided an opportunity to contact counsel of his choice and this occurred before he provided samples of his breath. In effect, the shortcoming in Constable Oman's implementation of the right to counsel was rectified when he was provided the option to consult counsel of his choice in addition to the contact he had with duty counsel. [ 68 ] I am not convinced that the fact that he chose, at that time, to decline the offer changes the fact that the option was offered.

I do not see, in the result, a difference between this case and that of an accused person who is properly afforded their right to counsel and declines it. [ 69 ] I have not been provided any authority that parallels the facts in this case.

Cases submitted by the defence involve: • a man who was provided only access to duty counsel after advising he did not have a lawyer; • a man who was provided only access to duty counsel after he was unable to contact his lawyer of choice; • a man who was given the choice of contacting this own lawyer or duty counsel and who, having no lawyer, thought his only option was to speak to duty counsel; and • a man who asked to speak to a lawyer once he reached the detachment but who was simply handed a phone and told duty counsel was on the line. [ 70 ] In each of these cases, the accused person was provided duty counsel only and without being provided the option to contact counsel of choice.

That is not the case for Mr. Swaine. [ 71 ] For these reasons, I am satisfied that Mr. Swaine's

section 10(

b) Charter right was not violated. [ 72 ] Since I have not found a breach of Mr. Swaine’s Charter right under either

section 9 or

section 10(b) , it is not necessary for me to consider whether, pursuant to Grant , the evidence should be admitted or excluded. There being no breach, the Certificate of Analyses will be admitted. CONCLUSION [ 73 ] I am satisfied that Mr. Swaine was not arbitrarily detained and that his right to counsel was not violated. DATED at Regina, Saskatchewan, this 13th day of July, A.D. 2012. __________________________________________ B. J. Tomkins, J