r v. R., 2018 NBCA 38

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 24-15-CA JESSIE CORMIER APPELLANT JESSIE CORMIER APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Cormier v. R., 2018 NBCA 38 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Baird Cormier c.

R., 2018 NBCA 38 CORAM : l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Baird Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: February 20, 2015 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine: le 20 février 2015 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o. Appeal heard: April 20, 2017 and December 7 , 2017 Appel entendu : le 20 avril 2017 et le 7 décembre 2017

Judgment rendered: July 5, 2018 Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice Quigg Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Baird Jugement rendu : le 5 juillet 2018 Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Quigg Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Baird Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Michel DesNeiges For the respondent : Patrice B. Deschênes Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelant : Michel DesNeiges Pour l’intimée : Patrice B.

Deschênes THE COURT Leave to appeal is granted, the appeal is allowed and the sentences are varied to concurrent terms of imprisonment for three years and two years commencing February 20, 2015, the date the sentence was originally imposed for the offences under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , S.C. 1996, c. 19 . The ancillary orders issued in the Court of Queen’s Bench are unaffected.

LA COUR L’autorisation d’interjeter appel est accordée, l’appel est accueilli et les peines sont remplacées par des peines d’emprisonnement de trois ans et de deux ans à purger concurremment à partir du 20 février 2015, date à laquelle la peine a été infligée à l’origine pour les infractions visées au par. 5(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances , L.C. 1996, ch. 19 . Les ordonnances accessoires rendues par la Cour du Banc de la Reine demeurent inchangées. The following is the judgment delivered by QUIGG J.A. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] On October 25, 2014, at the conclusion of a trial, a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench convicted Jessie Cormier and Neisha Petitpas of possession of oxycodone and crack cocaine, both for the purposes of trafficking. These offences, set out in s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , S.C. 1996, c. 19, each carry a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life. On February 20, 2015, the trial judge sentenced both offenders to four-year terms of imprisonment on each count, but ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. He also issued ancillary orders.

[ 2 ] Mr. Cormier and Ms. Petitpas filed separate appeals against their convictions as well as applications for leave to appeal their sentences. Ms. Petitpas’ conviction appeal was successful on the grounds her choice of language at trial had been ignored. A new trial was ordered: 2017 NBCA 6 , [2017] N.B.J. No. 28 (QL). As for Mr. Cormier, he subsequently abandoned his appeal against conviction and proceeded only with his application for leave to appeal the sentence. [ 3 ] For the reasons set out below, I would allow Mr. Cormier’s application for leave to appeal.

In my respectful view, the sentences imposed in the Court of Queen’s Bench are the product of an error in principle because the judge considered the failure to express remorse as an aggravating factor. As a result, it is the responsibility of this Court to determine appropriate sentences for the two offences and, if necessary, vary the sentences accordingly. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the Court ordered the preparation of a presentence report.

This has enabled us to consider both the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, to apply the principles of sentencing and to determine the sentence we consider appropriate in the circumstances. Having done so, and for the reasons set out below, I conclude the following sentence of imprisonment is appropriate: (1) three years for the offence relating to crack cocaine; and (2) two years for the oxycodone offence. I would therefore vary the sentences accordingly. Because of the principle of totality, I would order both sentences to be served concurrently.

Finally, I would leave all ancillary orders untouched. II. Background [ 4 ] The facts of the case are not complicated. On March 5, 2013, the police executed a search warrant at the residence Mr. Cormier and Ms. Petitpas occupied. The search uncovered 24.7 grams of crack cocaine in a plastic bag, floating in a mop bucket near the front door, 50 Percocet ( oxycodone ) pills in a cup holder on the sofa where Ms. Petitpas was seated with the couple’s four-year-old son, and a bag of marijuana in another cup holder. A total of 14.8 grams of marijuana was found at the residence.

The street value of the crack cocaine was estimated to be between $2,600 and $7,000, while the oxycodone was estimated to be able to fetch between $125 and $250 in the same market. Considerable sums of money were found on Mr. Cormier’s person: $2,510 in one pocket and $2,120 in another. A further sum of $320 was found at the residence.

Empty pill bottles bearing no labels, small plastic bags described as “dime bags” and two kitchen scales were also located on the premises. [ 5 ] Possession of the marijuana formed the basis of a separate charge – one under s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act – to which Mr. Cormier pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 days in jail. [ 6 ] Mr. Cormier was not convicted as a first-time offender; however, his record did not reveal previous drug-related offences.

His five prior criminal convictions related to offences committed between 2008 and 2010: operating a motor vehicle while impaired ( s. 253(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code ), uttering threats ( s. 264.1(1) (a)), forcible confinement ( s. 279(2) (a)), breach of an undertaking ( s. 145(5.1) (a)) and theft ( s. 334 (b)(i)). For these offences, he received sentences that included fines, probation and jail – the longest term of imprisonment imposed being two months. [ 7 ] Following conviction, both counsel for Mr. Cormier and Ms. Petitpas requested the trial judge order presentence reports. When the matter resumed for sentencing, no presentence report had been prepared as Probation Services had been unable to establish contact. No further explanation was given.

It is worth noting on that occasion Mr. Cormier was represented by a different lawyer. [ 8 ] At the sentencing hearing, Crown counsel sought a sentence of incarceration of three to four years, while defence counsel argued for a sentence of imprisonment in the range of 18 to 24 months. After hearing submissions, the sentencing judge adjourned briefly to consider the sentence. When the judge returned, approximately half an hour later, he began passing sentence but was immediately reminded by Crown counsel of his obligation to ask the accused if he had anything to say.

The judge then complied with the provisions of s. 726 of the Criminal Code . [ 9 ] The sentencing judge began with a review of the charges and an overview of the facts. The judge noted Mr. Cormier was a 25-year-old man with a grade eight education, who had grown up in the Moncton and Shediac areas. The judge noted Mr. Cormier was a seasonal worker and the father of a young child who was six years of age at the time of sentencing. While Mr. Cormier did not have any record of prior drug offences, the judge noted he had prior convictions, as outlined above. It was also acknowledged Mr.

Cormier was addicted to oxycodone and suffered from depression. [ 10 ] The judge noted the absence of a presentence report. He then reviewed the submissions of counsel, acknowledged the ranges they each had put forth in argument and emphasized the crime of possession for the purpose of trafficking of a

Schedule I drug carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life. The sentencing judge then recited the principles and objectives of sentencing as set out in ss. 718 , 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and in s. 10 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act .

[ 11 ] Turning to a review of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the sentencing judge stated he found few mitigating factors, pointing only to the fact a six-year-old child would be affected by any sentence of incarceration imposed upon his parents. As for aggravating factors, the judge noted: the drugs involved were considered hard drugs; the quantities were considerable; the offences took place in the presence of a young child; and the offences were committed by an accused with a criminal record.

The judge expanded his list of aggravating factors by adding a failure to express remorse and a lack of respect for the justice system. [ 12 ] The sentencing judge identified general and specific deterrence and denunciation as the main considerations in passing sentence for offences of this type. He noted the Court of Appeal emphasized this point on multiple occasions. He then reviewed the cases offered by both the defence and prosecution in support of their respective positions.

He stated those put forth on behalf of the accused could be distinguished on their facts and that he preferred the cases Crown counsel advanced, which justified a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. [ 13 ] In the first of two cases the trial judge cited in support of his reasons, R. v. Vautour , 2014 NBQB 178, 420 N.B.R. (2d) 395 , an individual, found to be “operating at a much higher, sophisticated and commercial level than your average small time street dealer” (para. 2), had sold seven and 13.83 grams of crack cocaine to a police undercover operator on two separate occasions.

The offender was 32 years of age, employed part- time, separated, and was the father of two children who resided with their mother. As in the present case, a presentence report was ordered, but Probation Services had been unable to prepare one. Unlike the present case, Mr. Vautour had a record of previous convictions that included drug offences dating back to 2003, and had served lengthy terms of imprisonment. In imposing concurrent terms of four years’ imprisonment, the sentencing judge specifically found Mr.

Vautour had not “demonstrated any real prospects for rehabilitation” (para. 22). [ 14 ] The second case the judge relied upon to support terms of imprisonment of four years on each count was Smith v. R. , 2012 NBCA 99 , 396 N.B.R. (2d) 367. In that case, a Provincial Court judge imposed a sentence of five and a half years after convicting an accused of four counts of possession of controlled substances.

The substances in question were described as “174 grams of marihuana, 34 grams of cocaine, five 20-milligram pills and twenty-two 10-milligram pills of oxycodone as well as 79 pills containing methamphetamine” (para. 2). Mr. Smith had a significant history with illegal drugs. [ 15 ] In reviewing the Smith case, the sentencing judge stated the sentence of imprisonment had been confirmed on appeal. With respect, Smith does not stand for that proposition.

Smith was a conviction appeal. [ 16 ] After having referred to the above cases, the sentencing judge again listed what he considered to be aggravating factors: • Possession of drugs in a residence where a young child resided; • Hard drugs; • Negative effect on society; • No expression of remorse; • No cooperation with the probation officer for the preparation of a presentence report. [ 17 ] Having repeated these factors, the judge later, on two occasions, repeated his observation of the presence of a young child, noting the child was exposed to this type of activity and, at one point, acknowledging the child would miss his parents. [ 18 ] The sentencing judge again emphasized the need to specifically deter the accused, isolate them from society, and make them aware of the harm they had done to society and to the victims.

The judge described the crime as one that was planned. In the end, the judge imposed sentences of four years of imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and he made a number of ancillary orders, including the forfeiture of the money seized from Mr. Cormier. None of these ancillary orders are in issue. As mentioned earlier, the trial judge did not have a presentence report at his disposal. We requested that one be prepared. We received the presentence report prior to the second hearing. III. Grounds of Appeal

[19] The appellant commenced this appeal as a self-represented party who was appealing both conviction andsentence. Prior to the appeal hearing, he was able to retain counsel and withdrew his appeal against conviction. The remainingapplication for leave to appeal raises grounds alleging errors in principle and a demonstrably unfit sentence. IV. Standard of Review [20] In R. v. R.K.J. (1998), (NB CA), 207 N.B.R. (2d) 24, [1998] N.B.J.

No. 483 (QL),Drapeau, J.A., as he then was, sets out the analytical framework that should be applied to the determination of applications for leave toappeal sentence: It is the undoubted duty of this court to review the fitness of any sentence imposed. That it must do so bearing in mind the privilegedposition occupied by the trial judge is settled law. All agree that the sentencing process is hardly an exact science. It is a subjectiveprocess which features a large measure of discretion.

The intrinsically discretionary nature of the sentence decision explains, at least inpart, the Supreme Court’s insistence on a deferential approach to all sentence reviews. See R. v. Shropshire (M.T.), (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227; 188 N.R. 284; 65 B.C.A.C. 37; 106 W.A.C. 37; 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193; 129 D.L.R. (4th) 657; 43 C.R. (4th)269, R. v. C.A.M., (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81; 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327,and R. v. MacDonnell (F.E.), (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 305; 210 N.R. 318; 158 N.S.R. (2d) 1; 466 A.P.R. 1.

Nevertheless, deference has its limits, and this court is duty bound to vary a sentence in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, if thesentencing court commits an error of law or an error in principle, or if the sentence imposed is clearly unreasonable, there is no longerroom for deference and this court is required to impose the sentence which it considers fit. See R. v. F.S.A. (1996), (NB CA), 182 N.B.R. (2d) 20; 463 A.P.R. 20 (C.A.), and R. v. Melanson (E.R.) (1998), (NB CA), 199 N.B.R. (2d)338; 510 A.P.R. 338 (C.A.).

In this context, an error in law most commonly occurs as a result of a misapprehension of the evidence or a misapplication of judicialprecedents. As for an error in principle, it typically involves one or more of the following: the application of wrong sentencing principles,a failure to consider relevant factors or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations.

As well, there will be cases where the failureto give proper weight to each relevant circumstance will amount to an error in principle. (Our court will necessarily be slow to find anerror of this nature for, if it was otherwise, professions of deference would soon ring hollow.) Finally, a sentence will be clearlyunreasonable where it is either inordinately long or inordinately short.

It will reach this level only if it is a substantial and markeddeparture from the sentence customarily imposed for similarly situated offenders committing similar crimes. [paras. 11-13] [21] Once it is determined that leave will be granted, this Court has repeated on many occasions that considerabledeference is owed to the sentencing judge. In Steeves v.

R., 2010 NBCA 57, 360 N.B.R. (2d) 88, Drapeau C.J.N.B. frames the applicablestandard of review as follows: In sum, a court of appeal is not at liberty to substitute its view of fitness for that of the sentencing judge unless the sentence imposed isthe product of either an error of law or an error in principle, or unless it is clearly unreasonable (see R. v. Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, [1995] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL), at paras. 46-48; R. v. Solowan, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 309, [2008] S.C.J. No. 55 (QL),2008 SCC 62, at para. 16; R. v. L.M. [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, [2008] S.C.J.

No. 31 (QL), 2008 SCC 31, at paras. 14-15; and R. v. C.A.C.(2009), 349 [N.B.R.] (2d) 265, [2009] N.B.J. No. 342 (QL), 2009 NBCA 68 (Bell, J.A. for the Court, at para. 4)). If the sentence at issueis the result of reversible error, the court of appeal bears the burden of prescribing the punishment that it considers fit in thecircumstances. [para. 25] V. Analysis A. Error in principle [22] In the case before us, the sentencing judge found Mr. Cormier’s failure to express remorse was an aggravating

factor. In Nash v. R. , 2009 NBCA 7 , 340 N.B.R. (2d) 320, Robertson J.A. stated: […] I would allow the appeal. In my respectful view, the trial judge erred. She erred in principle by holding that the failure to express remorse, following a conviction for second degree murder, is an “aggravating factor” that supports a decision to extend the period of parole ineligibility . In fairness to the trial judge, the jurisprudence of this Court pertaining to remorse is ambiguous.

It fails to draw a clear distinction between cases where the offender is found guilty of second degree murder and those where the offender has pled guilty. For purposes of deciding this appeal, it is important to recognize that an offender’s continuing right to silence based on a plea of not guilty does not evaporate once the jury returns a verdict of guilty.

That is why the failure to express remorse cannot be considered an aggravating factor, save in exceptional circumstances . [para. 2] [Emphasis added.] [ 23 ] Applying the above, I conclude the sentencing judge erred in principle when he considered the absence of an expression of remorse an aggravating factor. In my respectful view, he also erred in principle when he considered the failure to cooperate with a probation officer for a presentence report as an aggravating circumstance.

There simply was no basis for him to conclude there had been no cooperation. [ 24 ] In my view, the error in principle certainly had an impact on the sentence the judge imposed. The judge particularly emphasized this factor at least twice. It was not a mere secondary factor in the judge’s assessment of a fit punishment, as was the case in Gavin v. R. , 2009 QCCA 1 , [2009] Q.J. No. 2 (QL) , and as explained in R. v.

Lacasse , 2015 SCC 64 , [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 . [ 25 ] Since the sentence imposed in the Court of Queen’s Bench is the product of errors in principle, and since at least one of those errors had an impact on the sentence imposed, this Court is entitled to intervene and may vary the sentence, if need be. [ 26 ] Considering the errors in principle, I would grant leave to appeal and turn the analysis to what constitutes a fit sentence in the circumstances. B.

Should the Court of Appeal set a range of sentences for trafficking in hard drugs in New Brunswick? [ 27 ] At the conclusion of the appeal hearing, counsel were requested to provide further submissions concerning the appropriate sentencing range for the possession of “hard drugs”, such as crack cocaine, for the purpose of trafficking.

Counsel were asked to answer the following questions: 1) what should be, in New Brunswick, the appropriate range of sentences for cases involving the trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking of hard drugs; and 2) identify ranges that have been set by appellate courts in other provinces. A further date was set to hear oral submissions on these points. Neither counsel disappointed. Each of them provided the Court with an extremely well written submission evidencing extensive research.

I borrow liberally from these submissions. [ 28 ] The establishment of any sentencing range will facilitate an informed application of the principle of parity codified in s. 718.2 (

b) of the Criminal Code .

Section 718.2 (

b) requires a sentence be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [ 29 ] The table attached as Appendix A to these reasons illustrates the wide range of sentences that are imposed or confirmed by appellate courts in Canada for offences relating to the trafficking of

Schedule I drugs and, in particular, crack cocaine. While it may be impossible to extrapolate from that table a definitive range for any particular case, it nevertheless demonstrates the serious nature of the crimes and the general need to denounce and deter by imposing sentences of imprisonment. [ 30 ] Despite the detailed work and able arguments of counsel, I would decline, at this time , to set a definitive range for sentencing offenders who traffic in or are in possession of

Schedule I drugs. I so decline because I agree with counsel for Mr. Cormier that, in order for any range to be set, there would need to be a fairly clear line of demarcation between the types of dealers who engage in these crimes. There is, for example, a significant difference between a youthful offender who might share or even sell to friends at a party and a distributor who has a network of dealers to widely distribute the drugs. Yet, both are guilty of the same offence. Before any type of definitive range can be set, the various levels of drug traffickers would need to be identified and properly defined. We simply don’t have a proper evidentiary record for this in the present case.

C. Sentencing principles particular to trafficking hard drugs in general and crack cocaine in particular [ 31 ] While I would not, for the reasons stated above, take up the challenge of identifying and setting a definitive range of sentences for cases involving trafficking in or possession of hard drugs for the purpose of trafficking, I would nevertheless take advantage of the extensive research counsel has provided in order to identify certain principles that might provide guidance to sentencing courts. [ 32 ] The first of these principles is that those who traffic in or who possess

Schedule I substances – the so-called hard drugs – for the purpose of trafficking, will only rarely and exceptionally escape a sentence of imprisonment. This is so because of the emphasis courts must give to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for these types of crimes on account of the devastating effects these substances have on society in general and on those who fall victim to their nefarious and highly addictive properties in particular. [ 33 ] The second principle is that, among the hard drugs, crack cocaine requires particular consideration.

Crack cocaine is described as being a derivative of cocaine powder: Simon Armstrong et al., Sentencing Drug Offenders , (Toronto: Thompson Reuters, 2004) (loose-leaf updated 2017, release 33) ch 3 (see 3-3). [ 34 ] In Sentencing Drug Offenders , crack cocaine is described as follows: Crack cocaine is a form of freebase cocaine produced by mixing powder cocaine with an alkaline solution, such as baking soda, and heating it into lumps. The name “crack” comes from the cracking or popping sound it makes when it is heated or cooked.

Crack cocaine is less pure than traditional freebase cocaine because the adulterants present in powder cocaine are not removed. However, both forms are more concentrated, and thus more dangerous, than powder cocaine. [ 35 ] In R. v. Trinh , 2000 ABCA 231 , [2000] A.J. No. 964 (QL) , an expert witness testified as to the impact of consuming crack cocaine: […] crack cocaine is an extremely addictive substance. The user builds up a tolerance, and requires more and more of the drug to get and keep a given level of euphoria. The expert had dealt with users whose habit cost them as much as $600 per day.

The habit’s cost leads many users to crime and prostitution. He said that the vast majority of street level crack cocaine users are prostitutes who consume it after earning some money. [para. 5] [ 36 ] In the cases counsel for both parties provided us, many involved individuals who were found guilty of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. This jurisprudence generally recognizes that crack cocaine is more dangerous and harmful than traditional powder cocaine.

The connotation used by courts to describe crack cocaine and the effects of its consumption suggests it should be an important consideration when crafting an appropriate sentence. There is a general consensus among courts that crack cocaine is a highly addictive drug causing harm to society and that the main objective of sentencing in possession or trafficking cases should be deterrence.

Some courts of appeal consider crack cocaine to be an aggravating factor in sentencing, and, in some cases, courts have determined trafficking in crack cocaine indicates an added degree of commercialization and premeditation, not directly associated with powder cocaine, because of the additional steps required to convert powdered cocaine into crack. Some courts have characterized the sale of crack cocaine as an “immensely profitable crime of premeditation” ( see R. v. Wong , 2004 ABCA 260 , [2004] A.J.

No. 861 (QL) , at para. 14 ). [ 37 ] The Court of Appeal of Alberta has made strong remarks regarding the possession of crack cocaine. In each of Trinh , R. v. Ma , 2003 ABCA 220 , [2003] A.J. No. 901 (QL) , and in Wong the court emphasized the need to discourage trafficking crack cocaine or possession for the purpose of trafficking. The addictive nature of the drug and aggravated harm to users appear to have motivated that Court to place a greater emphasis on the principle of deterrence over all other objectives.

[ 38 ] Similar conclusions were echoed by the Court of Appeal of Manitoba in R. v. Kosanouvong , 2002 MBCA 144 , [2002] M.J. No. 428 (QL) , where the court described trafficking crack cocaine “as a commercial venture involving a hard, addictive drug”.

It concluded the prior case law submitted for its consideration expressed “denunciation and deterrence” as important principles when sentencing for this type of offence. [ 39 ] The Ontario Court of Appeal has placed additional emphasis on deterrence and denunciation when sentencing an offender for trafficking crack cocaine or its possession for the purpose of trafficking. The Court of Appeal suggests the involvement of this substance constitutes an aggravating factor: R. v. Woghiren , [2004] O.J. No. 5030 (C.A.) (QL) . [ 40 ] In R. c. Dorvilus , [1990] J.Q.

No. 1243 (QL) , the court emphasized that courts should be unyielding toward crack cocaine, due to its high addiction rate and low cost, which are attractive features to the youth. Moreover, in R. c. Moreira , 2011 QCCA 1828 , [2011] J.Q. No. 14006 (QL) , the Court of Appeal reiterated that crack cocaine traffickers should expect higher sentences than those trafficking in powder cocaine (see para. 33). [ 41 ] The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal expressed a strong statement against trafficking crack cocaine in R. v. Carvery , [1991] N.S.J. No. 501 (C.A.) (QL) .

The court stated evidence had been led “reinforcing crack cocaine’s reputation as a cruelly addictive narcotic”, and held that “[t]rafficking in crack cocaine is a crime so corrosive to the social fabric that sentences must reflect deterrence above all other considerations, even when the offender […] has no previous record”. [ 42 ] The third principle is that, while I would decline at this time to fix a definitive range in New Brunswick for the punishment for trafficking (or possession for the purpose of trafficking) in hard drugs (or in crack cocaine in particular), until our Court does so, certain ranges can nevertheless be extrapolated from the jurisprudence through ascertaining broadly comparable cases.

In doing so, a sentencing judge can certainly consider ranges established in other provinces and tailor these to the particular circumstances of this province. Obviously, sentencing judges in New Brunswick must also consider sentences imposed in this province. [ 43 ] Sentencing ranges are the subject of the following comments by Wagner J., as he then was, in Lacasse : […] Where sentencing ranges are concerned, although they are used mainly to ensure the parity of sentences, they reflect all the principles and objectives of sentencing.

Sentencing ranges are nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives.

However, they should not be considered “averages”, let alone straitjackets, but should instead be seen as historical portraits for the use of sentencing judges, who must still exercise their discretion in each case: Even when an appellate court has established a range, it may be that a fact pattern will arise, which is sufficiently dissimilar to past decisions that the “range”, as it were, must be expanded. The fundamental point is that a “range” is not a straitjacket to the exercise of discretion of a sentencing judge. ( R. v. Keepness , 2010 SKCA 69 , 359 Sask.

R. 34 , at para. 24 ) There will always be situations that call for a sentence outside a particular range: although ensuring parity in sentencing is in itself a desirable objective, the fact that each crime is committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile cannot be disregarded. The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation. It involves a variety of factors that are difficult to define with precision.

This is why it may happen that a sentence that, on its face, falls outside a particular range, and that may never have been imposed in the past for a similar crime, is not demonstrably unfit. Once again, everything depends on the gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the specific circumstances of each case. LeBel J. commented as follows on this subject: A judge can order a sentence outside that range as long as it is in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing. Thus, a sentence falling outside the regular range of appropriate sentences is not necessarily unfit.

Regard must be had to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, and to the needs of the community in which the offence occurred.

(Nasogaluak, at para. 44) [paras. 57-58] [44] Keeping in mind that “sentencing ranges are primarily guidelines, and not hard and fast rules” (para. 60 inLacasse, referring to para. 44 in R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206), it is proper to review sentencing ranges establishedin other provinces for crimes involving

Schedule I drugs in general and crack cocaine in particular. From my review of the jurisprudenceof other provinces, there is a broad spectrum of ranges established across the country. [45] The Court of Appeal of Alberta has extensive experience with sentencing for hard drugs. The sentencing rangeidentified by the court in R. v. Chin, 2009 ABCA 226, [2009] A.J. No. 711 (QL), appears to be consistently applied to crack cocaineoffences. As stated in Chin, trafficking hard drugs will typically result in sentences from three years to four and one half years ofimprisonment (see para. 14).

Thus, the principle that denunciation and deterrence warrant three years imprisonment is regularly appliedin Alberta with respect to trafficking crack cocaine or possession for the purpose of trafficking. For example, in R. v. To, 2004 ABCA197, [2004] A.J. No. 633 (QL), a sentence of three and one half years imprisonment was appropriate for having possession for thepurpose of trafficking 18.2 grams of crack cocaine. In R. v. Bedi, 2015 ABCA 361, [2015] A.J. No. 1254 (QL), imprisonment for 40months was deemed appropriate, where the offence involved 100 grams of crack cocaine.

In Trinh, the Court of Appeal expressed a needto impose harsher sentences where individuals traffic crack cocaine from an established crack house before maintaining a four yearsentence against the accused while indicating it would have preferred five years. [46] In British Columbia, the Court of Appeal departed from the usual range of between nine months and threeyears in R. v. Gibbon, 2006 BCCA 219, [2006] B.C.J. No. 983 (QL), because the evidence indicated the accused ran a highlysophisticated drug house despite the authorities having only recovered three grams of crack cocaine.

Taking into account the accused’sprior convictions, the court upheld a sentence of four years imprisonment. [47] In Saskatchewan, the Court of Appeal has fully endorsed and repeated its direction that trafficking hard drugsin the province will warrant a sentence between 18 months to four years (see R. v. Bear, 2016 SKCA 140, [2016] S.J. No. 587 (QL), atpara. 25; and R. v. Patryluk, 2002 SKCA 33, [2002] S.J.

No. 130 (QL)). [48] The Manitoba Court of Appeal explicitly stated in Kosanouvong its range for trafficking crack cocaine isbetween long conditional sentences to penitentiary terms; however, a conditional sentence is no longer a possibility followingamendments to s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code. The recent decision of R. v. Gilchrist, 2004 MBCA 21, [2004] M.J.

No. 47 (QL), suggestsa range of three to five years for street-level cocaine trafficking as being appropriate even for first-time offenders. [49] The Ontario Court of Appeal does not appear to have yet established a definite sentencing range for crackcocaine offences. Sentences appear to range between 18 months to four years depending on the amount of drugs recovered and theoffender’s prior record. For example, in R. v. Goulet, (ON CA), [1995] O.J. No. 340 (C.A.) (QL), and in R. v.Mohamed, 2009 ONCA 424, [2009] O.J.

No. 2039 (QL), where the amount of crack cocaine recovered was 54.5 grams and 76.63 gramsrespectively, the sentences imposed were three years and four years of imprisonment. In R. v. Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619, [2015] O.J. No.5109 (QL), 89.4 grams of crack cocaine recovered from the accused resulted in two years imprisonment; while in R. v. Alexander, 2017ONCA 181, [2017] O.J.

No. 1026 (QL), the Court of Appeal upheld an 18 month sentence for an accused found in possession of 8.3grams of crack cocaine who also had a prior record involving drug offences. [50] In Quebec, the Court of Appeal in Dorvilus identified a range of sentences for trafficking or possession of crackcocaine for the purpose of trafficking, between six months and 54 months of imprisonment. As seen in Loyer c. R., 2008 QCCA 1108,[2008] J.Q. No. 5080 (QL), the Court of Appeal upheld a 30-month sentence for simple possession within a correctional facility. [51] In Nova Scotia, in R. v. Dawe, 2002 NSCA 147, [2002] N.S.J.

No. 504 (QL) the court noted that “[p]ossessionof cocaine for the purposes of trafficking typically results in sentences of two years or more” (para. 6). This view was reaffirmed in R. v.Steeves, 2007 NSCA 130, [2007] N.S.J. No. 532 (QL), and R. v. Conway, 2009 NSCA 95, [2009] N.S.J. No. 433 (QL). [52] As for sentencing decisions in New Brunswick, the table in Appendix A illustrates that sentences ofimprisonment between two years less a day given in 2009 and six years, eight months have been imposed in cases involving traffickingin or possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The length of sentence varies depending on the amount of crack cocaine

involved and level of involvement of the individual convicted. D. The appropriate sentence for Mr. Cormier [53] My analysis to determine the appropriate sentence for Mr. Cormier begins with an acknowledgement of thefundamental principles of sentencing set out in s. 718.1, which states that “[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of theoffence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. [54] The gravity of the offence is magnified because, as described above, one of the crimes involved crack cocaine.Its full extent is determined by also considering, to the extent possible, the level of Mr.

Cormier’s involvement in the drug trade. This is afact-based analysis. In R. v. Oates, (NL CA), [1992] N.J. No. 165 (NL C.A.) (QL), the Newfoundland and LabradorCourt of Appeal established a list of relevant factors to help identify the level of one’s participation in the distribution of drugs. They areas follows: 1. Types of drugs involved; 2. Quantities in question; 3. The degree of sophistication of the enterprise; 4. Potential for profit; 5. Length of time the enterprise existed prior to arrest; and 6.

Accused’s role or level of involvement in the enterprise. [55] Applying these factors to the present case, we are able to somewhat determine the degree of Mr. Cormier’sinvolvement. [56] When the police executed the search warrant, they discovered three different types of drugs were located in theresidence: crack cocaine, Percocet/oxycodone and marijuana. The quantities were not insignificant: 24.7 grams of crack cocaine, 50-5mg Percocet/oxycodone pills, and 14.8 grams of marijuana. On the evidence found, Mr. Cormier’s operation does not appear to havebeen very sophisticated.

All that was found were two scales, plastic “dime bags” and two pill bottles without prescription stickers. Thisevidence does, however, demonstrate an ongoing trafficking operation for profit. This conclusion is bolstered by the discovery ofsignificant sums of money on Mr. Cormier’s person and by opinion evidence of the street value of the drugs. While there was noevidence of the length of time Mr. Cormier was involved in the illegal drug trade, one can conclude from his conviction that he waslikely in charge of the operation. [57] In sum, Mr.

Cormier was in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking for profit. One of these drugswas crack cocaine, described above as a “cruelly addictive drug” that is “so corrosive to [our] social fabric”. This highly addictive drughas the potential to destroy many lives, not only of those who consume it, but also of their families and of those who may fall victim ofcrimes committed by users who seek to feed their addiction. The quantity he possessed was not insignificant and he possessed it so hecould sell it and make a profit. The seriousness of the offence cannot be understated.

He bears full responsibility for his crimes. [58] The sentencing analysis continues by considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as theparity and totality principles in order to craft a sentence that will meet the applicable sentencing objectives, which are, in this case,principally deterrence and denunciation. This is not to say, however, that rehabilitation cannot also be one of the objectives of sentencinga drug dealer.

In some cases, it may well be an appropriate consideration, although it takes a back seat to the other two objectives. [59] I begin this part of the analysis by agreeing with the sentencing judge that the following constitute aggravatingfactors: the drugs involved were considered hard drugs; the quantities were considerable; the offences took place in the presence of ayoung child; and the offences were committed by an accused with a criminal record. While there were no entries of prior drug offenceson Mr.

Cormier’s record, he did admit in the presentence report that he had previously been engaged in the traffic of drugs. Possession ofthree types of drugs for the purpose of trafficking is also an aggravating factor because it demonstrates a higher degree of commerciality.

[60] As for mitigating factors, there are only a very few. Mr. Cormier’s young age is certainly a consideration.Clearly, Mr. Cormier did not have the advantage of being raised in a law-abiding and productive environment. Rather, the presentencereport indicates he was raised in a “criminal environment” where his parents were dealing drugs on a daily basis. Mr. Cormier beganusing drugs at the age of 12 and formed an opiate addiction in 2011. He has a grade eight education and very limited work experiencebecause he and his family trafficked drugs for most of his adult life. Mr.

Cormier’s only work experience was working for a pavingcompany for two summers and snow removal one winter. He has no source of income. [61] As for the objectives sought to be achieved in the present case, it is clear from the jurisprudence that primaryconsideration must be given to denunciation and deterrence, both specific and general.

The sentence must be proportional to theseriousness of the offence, which, in this case, is significant because of the nature of one of the illegal substances – crack cocaine.Without question, a sentence of incarceration is indicated. [62] I do not disagree with Crown counsel that a sentence of incarceration between three and four years would beappropriate in this case. Such a sentence would send a strong message of denunciation to the public at large and would hopefully deterthose who might reflect on the likely consequences of their actions should they be tempted to engage in the trade of crack cocaine.

Asentence of three to four years would be consistent with the sentencing ranges established in other provinces and some of NewBrunswick’s previous sentencing decisions, as demonstrated above and in the attached Appendix. Under different circumstances andwith a differently situated offender, a lower sentence might be appropriate, but that is not the situation here. Mr.

Cormier was a youngman with a criminal past operating a for-profit drug trade in a substance that ruins lives. [63] But for one factor, I would leave undisturbed the sentence of four years imposed by the sentencing judgedespite his error in principle. That factor is derived from the presentence report, the benefit of which the trial judge did not have. Thereport indicates Mr. Cormier has successfully completed an intake primer program at the federal institution where he is incarcerated andbegun a second program, this one a four-month program he attends on a daily basis.

He has voiced a desire to complete a GED programand to enroll in an electrician course. The presentence report also indicates Mr. Cormier is having daily contact with his young child andhis desire to be a better father. In the presentence report, he does express remorse, stating: “I know I’ve ruined many families whoseparents were buying drugs instead of taking care of their children’s needs. I have a lot of regret and it is constantly on my mind. I wantto begin a new

chapter in my life and be a better father to my child, something that I never had growing up”. The factor is, of course, thepossibility of rehabilitation. [64] This is the case of a young man whose childhood was defined by his parents’ criminality and who has untilnow taken the same path. While his involvement in the drug trade was not insignificant, it had not reached the upper echelons. Hisincarceration in a federal institution appears to have allowed him to better himself and to reflect on the evils of that which he is convictedof having done.

His youth, desire to better himself and his dedication to his son leave a glimmer of hope that rehabilitation is possible.Since deterrence and denunciation can be achieved, as the Crown contends, with a sentence of three to four years, I would settle on thelower term because the hope of rehabilitation remains alive. As the Supreme Court stated in R. v. McDonnell, (SCC),[1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, [1997] S.C.J. No. 42 (QL), “the final sentence will be the least that is appropriate in the circumstances” (see para.83). [65] Based on all of the above, I would sentence Mr.

Cormier to a term of three years’ imprisonment for having hadin his possession 24.7 grams of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Because his possession to the same end of the oxycodonewas a comparatively smaller amount that would have yielded only a very modest sum on the street market, and because that substance,though dangerous when illegally trafficked, is not quite as destructive as the crack cocaine, he should not be sentenced to the same termfor the possession of this substance.

I would therefore sentence him to a term of two years’ imprisonment for his possession of theoxycodone for the purpose of trafficking in it but, considering the totality principle, I would order the sentences to be servedconcurrently. VI. Disposition [66] For these reasons, I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and vary the sentence to three years’incarceration for trafficking crack cocaine and two years concurrent for trafficking oxycodone commencing on the date the sentence wasinitially imposed, subtracting the time Mr.

Cormier was released from custody pending the determination of the conviction appeal heeventually abandoned. All ancillary orders imposed by the sentencing judge are unaffected.

APPENDIX “A” Case Age and Gender of the Accused Sentence Imposed Brief Facts Street Value (approx.) Details of Previous Record BRITISH COLUMBIA R. v. Aitken , 2004 BCCA 411 , [2004] B.C.J. No. 1551 (QL) 37 years Male 15 months Arrested for possession of: 33 rocks of crack cocaine; 6 packages with 2 rocks each; 27 spit balls of powder cocaine; and 18 flaps of heroin. $1,290 Substantial: 16 drug offences; various theft and possession of stolen property; many breaches of orders, failure to attend court and similar offences. R. v. Schoenhals , 2008 BCCA 380 , [2008] B.C.J.

No. 1882 (QL) 66 years Male 20 months Arrested for possession of: 17.25 grams of crack cocaine; 1.5 grams powered cocaine and 0.2 grams of crack cocaine. Accused was an addict and had a 30- year history of cocaine use, and was unemployable due to brain injury with severe medical issues. There were 2 arrests: the second offence committed while he was on bail. He was found with another 2 oz of cocaine. $2,210 Considered a mid- level trafficker; record for cocaine possession, production, assaulting a police officer and failing to comply with an undertaking. R. v. Gibbon , 2006 BCCA 219 , [2006] B.C.J.

No. 983 (QL) 37 years Female 4 years Arrested for possession of: 3 grams crack cocaine for purpose of trafficking; the trial judged imposed a sentence that was beyond the range [defence recommended six months and Crown recommended 16 months]. She was charged with possession, possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime. Accused dropped out of school in grade eight, was married, but lost her husband in truck accident, had 3 children (one of the marriage). Accused had not worked since husband’s death and lived on widow’s pension and became addicted to drugs.

Lengthy criminal record: two counts of theft and failure to appear; 29 convictions for theft, fraud, possession of stolen property, drug possession, and failure to comply with various court orders. She played a main role in the operation and was found to have been involved in a sophisticated drug operation. Accused also had a youth record (14 years old): convicted of theft, break and enter, robbery and breach of probation.

ALBERTA R. v. Wong , 2004 ABCA 260 , [2004] A.J. No. 861 (QL) 18 years Male 30 months Charged with two counts of drug possession for the purpose of trafficking: 68.6 grams powder cocaine, 24.9 grams crack cocaine and 266 (186 + 80) ecstasy pills. Also seized from the residence: CAD$10,000, USD$225, a digital scale, heating equipment, glassware, cornstarch, packaging material, 9 mm hand gun and ammunition, a 24” machete, and an asp baton. The majority found the sentence unfit and emphasized a “three- year starting point for cocaine trafficking involving a commercial operation”. $15,000 No prior record.

Court found the fact the accused possessed a variety of drugs suggested his activities were sophisticated and organized. R. v. Rahime , 2001 ABCA 203 , [2001] A.J. No. 988 (QL) 20 years Male 18 months conditional Pled guilty to: two counts of trafficking in cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The accused sold a total of 3 grams of cocaine to an undercover officer, and at the time of arrest had 10 grams of cocaine. The Court found “a conditional sentence is available or possible notwithstanding a three year starting point.

On the other hand, there will be cases in which the sentencing judge decides that the sentence must be at or above the starting point”. Conditions imposed included home confinement on weekends for 16 weeks, curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., maintenance of employment and drug testing on demand. No prior record, but was addicted to cocaine.

R. v. Trinh , 2000 ABCA 231 , [2000] A.J. No. 964 (QL) Male - age unknown 4 years Found in possession of CAD$1000 and cocaine for purpose of trafficking. The Court noted “starting points enunciated for heroin do not apply to cocaine or crack”. Accused was a key worker in a semi- fortified crack house. “It was a more or less permanent establishment dedicated to cocaine sales, and even some modest processing of the cocaine to make it into crack and so easier to consume. A whole house was dedicated to these ends, and modified to suit them”.

Previous record for various offences involving narcotics; convictions for simple possession; had over five previous convictions and a one year sentence imposed. R. v. Ma , 2003 ABCA 220 , [2003] A.J. No. 901 (QL) 20 years Male 3 years He was found in possession of: 238.2 grams or 8.5 oz of cocaine and CAD$985. He was convicted for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking [crack cocaine].

Five factors determined why a 2- year sentence was inappropriate. $23,823 No prior criminal record, but he was known to be the associate of a major commercial trafficker and worked delivering drugs to street-level traffickers. R. v. To , 2004 ABCA 197 , [2004] A.J. No. 633 (QL) 34 years Male 3.5 years Charged with six counts of trafficking in cocaine. When arrested had in his possession: three cellphones, CAD$3,780, 5.1 grams of powder cocaine and 18.2 grams of rock cocaine. A ccused is/was married with two children (at the time). No significant record. R. v. Chin , 2009 ABCA 226 , [2009] A.J.

No. 711 (QL) 22 years Male 5 years and lifetime firearm ban He had in his possession: a loaded semi-automatic pistol, $3,800 in cash, a bulletproof vest, 15 grams of crack cocaine, four cell phones and 13 rounds of ammunition. His appeal was allowed in part. Court of Appeal concluded 10-year prohibition was appropriate and reiterated the starting point was three to four and a half years. Minor criminal record.

R. v. Melnyk , 2014 ABCA 344 , [2014] A.J. No. 1150 (QL) 22 years Male 12 months Possession of 22 spitballs of crack cocaine totalling 5 grams. He was sentenced to 90-day intermittent imprisonment. The Crown appealed and the Court of Appeal concluded 18 to 20 months was proper. Given he had completed his 90-day sentence he was sentenced to a further 9 months. $340 No prior record. R. v. Bedi , 2015 ABCA 361 , [2015] A.J.

No. 1254 (QL) 22 years Male 8 years Found in possession of: 99.8 grams of crack cocaine and 300 grams of heroin; the accused was medicated for anxiety, depression and ADHD at the time of the offences. Adult conviction for possession of cocaine and several youth convictions for which he received fines and probation. SASKATCHEWAN R. v. Patryluk , 2002 SKCA 33 , [2002] S.J. No. 130 (QL) 21 years Male 11 months Found in possession of 2 lbs of cannabis marijuana and 3 oz of cocaine. He had bought marijuana for $1,300 and cocaine for $3,300, intending to resell to make a profit of $7,000.

The appeal was allowed and sentence reduced from an 18 month conditional sentence to 11 months imprisonment. The accused was given credit for time served and electronic monitoring as well as 150 hours of community service. $21,000 Twice convicted of impaired driving and was placed on probation.

R. v. Bear , 2016 SKCA 140 , [2016] S.J. No. 587 (QL) Female - age unknown 4.5 years Found in possession of 55 grams of methamphetamine, 26 grams of crack cocaine, 133 hydromorphone pills and $2,850 cash. While on conditional release the accused was again found in possession of 2.5 grams of cocaine, 14.3 grams of crack cocaine, 4 hydromorphone pills and 12 diazepam pills (along with 1000 syringes and 50-60 Ziploc bags). Accused is First Nations. At trial accused was sentenced to 3.5 years concurrent; Court of Appeal allowed Crown’s appeal and substituted sentence with global sentence of 4.5 years.

No age indicated but accused has two children: a son and a daughter who also struggles with drug abuse. First Nations and long history of drug abuse and extensive criminal record of drug related offences. From 1981 to 2005, there were 32 criminal convictions, six of which were simple possession of controlled substances and five for trafficking or possessing controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking. MANITOBA R. v. Kosanouvong , 2002 MBCA 144 , [2002] M.J.

No 428 (QL) 41 years Male 2 years to be followed by 18 months supervised probation Sold 1 rock crack cocaine to an undercover officer for $40; at time of arrest, the accused had 5 rocks of crack cocaine. The accused was married with four children and had been living in a refugee camp in Thailand before becoming a Canadian citizen in 1981. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and sentence was extended “from 18 months to two years less a day to be served in the community, concurrent on both counts. This was to be followed by the 18 months’ supervised probation, as originally ordered” (para. 12).

Minimal unrelated criminal record; described as low risk to re-offend as he was working in the community and raising a family. R. v. Gilchrist , 2004 MBCA 21 , [2004] M.J. No. 47 (QL) 20 years Male 4 years Found in possession of 351 rocks of cocaine (10 plastic bags with 35 rocks of crack cocaine) and $7,640 cash. When the accused was 17 years old, his family broke down and he was left with little family support. No criminal record. ONTARIO

R. v. Giroux, (ON CA),[2006] O.J. No.1375 (C.A.)(QL) Male, ageunknown 12 monthsplus 90days plus$10,000fine Convicted of 1 count oftrafficking in cocaine,and possession ofproperty obtainedthrough the commissionof a criminal offence,selling imported spirits,smuggling spirits intoCanada, and sellingimported liquor. Theappellant was a plumberby trade. He wasapprehended by anundercover officer withwhom he had madearrangements to “set updeals for a fee” andwhere the officer agreedto pay $500 per kg ofcocaine (which nevermaterialized). No prior criminalrecord.

However “itwas clear from theevidence that hewas immersed inthe drug andsmuggling cultureand that he wasmotivated by greedwhen he committedthe offence”. R. v. Goulet, (ON CA),[1995] O.J. No.340 (C.A.) (QL) 21 yearsMale 3 years Found in possession of54.5 grams of crackcocaine. He was theback-seat passenger of avehicle pulled over bythe Police. $10,000 Accused was anunemployed drugaddict with priorconvictions forbreaking andentering andattempted breakingand entering.Record: 1989 -Break & Enter -Probation 12months; 1991 -Attempt Break &Enter - Probation 12months.

R. v. Nguyen , [2005] O.J. No. 6032 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) 37 years Male 3 years less 8 months pre-trial custody = 2 years, 4 months Found in possession of 2oz crack cocaine. He is a Canadian citizen, and migrated to Canada from Vietnam in 1987. At the time, he was married with one son, and helped his spouse raise her children ages 20, 18 and 9 (at the time).

Record: 1993, sentenced to 5.5 years for two counts of trafficking in narcotics; 1998, he was recommitted as a statutory release violator; January 2003, he was convicted of failing to comply with recognizance and given 30 days in jail; August 2003, upon conviction for over 80, impaired driving, failed to attend court and obstructed a peace officer, he was sentenced to 45 days to be served intermittently plus probation for 18 months and a driving prohibition for two years; November 2003, for the offences of failure to comply with recognizance and failure to attend court, he was sentenced to 18 days on each count and 6 days pretrial custody (para. 5).

R. v. Woolcock , [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.) (QL) 53 years Male 15 months Found in possession of 6.3 grams of crack cocaine, CAD$926 and USD$60 Two prior convictions for drug related offences in 1998, for which he was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment. R. v. Burke , [2004] O.J. No. 3076 (C.A.) (QL) Male - age unknown 3 years Found in possession of 25.13 grams of crack cocaine Had prior convictions. R. v. Mohamed , 2009 ONCA 424 , [2009] O.J.

No. 2039 (QL) 26 years Male 20 months after credit of 28 months & 3 years’ probation Found in possession of 76.63 grams crack cocaine - the Court found the quantity suggested he was a mid- level dealer Lengthy record going back to 1999 including offences of violence and weapons offences. R. v. Crevier , 2015 ONCA 619 , [2015] O.J.

No. 5109 (QL) 26 years Female 6 years 89.4 grams of powder and crack cocaine and a firearm; CAD$1308.43 plus CAD$4,920 in her apartment and a small amount of marijuana in her underclothes. $10,000 Had a lengthy criminal record, including for drug offences, and was subject to a weapons prohibition at the time of the subject offence. R. v. Alexander , 2017 ONCA 181 , [2017] O.J. No. 1026 (QL) Male - age unknown 18 months 8.3 grams of crack cocaine and various amounts of currency One prior conviction in 2004 for a drug related offence. QUEBEC

R. c. Dorvilus [1990] J.Q. No. 1243 (QL) 34 years Male 2 years Accused was arrested while attempting to sell, on two occasions, 1 gram crack cocaine to an undercover officer Loyer c. R. , 2008 QCCA 1108 , [2008] J.Q. No. 5080 (QL) Male - age unknown 30 months Found in possession of 28 grams of crack cocaine while in prison serving a 15-month sentence for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking Unknown, but at the time of commission of this offence the accused was incarcerated, serving a 15-month sentence for similar offence. R. c. Moreira , 2011 QCCA 1828 , [2011] J.Q.

No. 14006 (QL) 25 years Male 90 days 26.25 grams of cocaine, and 26 rocks of crack cocaine were seized from the accused's apartment No criminal record. NOVA SCOTIA R. v. Dawe , 2002 NSCA 147 , [2002] N.S.J. No. 504 (QL) Female age unknown 15 months Found in possession of 4 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 200 grams of hashish and 235 grams of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and $1,240 cash. In addition, a large quantity of prescription drugs and plastic bags were found. Not clear from the facts. R. v. Carvery , [1991] N.S.J.

No. 501 (C.A.) (QL) Male - age unknown 5 years Accused made four one- ounce purchases of cocaine and three of smaller amounts, totalling six and one- half ounces in all, at a price of $1,600 per ounce, from a cocaine distribution ring operating in the Halifax area in late 1989 and early 1990. No criminal record. R. v. Conway , 2009 NSCA 95 , [2009] N.S.J. No. 433 (QL) 65 years Male 30 months Found in possession of 103.1 grams of crack cocaine; 264.12 grams of cannabis marijuana; and CAD$2,938. Accused was found operating a Dial-a-Dope operation out of his truck.

Accused was married and a father. $12,960 No prior record. NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR

R. v. Mitchell , 2017 NLCA 26 , [2017] N.J. No. 139 (QL) 19 years Female 7 months It does not appear that at the time of the initial arrest any drugs were found on the appellant, but it is understood from the scanty facts on appeal that the appellant was addicted to oxycodone and trafficked in pills in order to support her habit. The Crown’s submission conceded the decision related to trafficking in oxycodone and was unrelated to the appeal, but was proffered for the NLCA’s position on starting points. First time offender. R. v. Kane , 2012 NLCA 53 , [2012] N.J.

No. 268 (QL) 29 years Male 2 years Was arrested for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana and cocaine and was among several charged in connection with a c onspiracy that involved the distribution of drugs in Newfoundland following their importation, storage and sale, and the collection of funds for transfer to other conspirators in Quebec. The head of the conspiracy in Quebec received a five-year sentence. The Newfoundland head received a 7-year sentence. Kane’s immediate superior received a 5-year sentence, and Kane’s subordinate received a 2.5 year sentence.

Transactions involved 50 lbs of marijuana and 2 kg of cocaine. The lower court noted that although the accused was not the head of the conspiracy, he wasn’t at the low level. No criminal record. NEW BRUNSWICK R. v. Blizzard , 2005 NBQB 408 , [2005] 290 N.B.R. (2d) 294 44 years Male 6 years and 8 months Cocaine, crack cocaine. Expanding the use and demand for crack in Saint John. Lengthy criminal record. Considered an organizer. R. v. Frenette , 2009 NBQB 81 , [2009] N.B.J.

No. 190 59 years Male 2 years less a day Trafficking of cocaine and 2 counts of trafficking crack. 64 grams cocaine $5,000; 3 sales of 1 gram crack cocaine $80 each. No criminal record.

R. v. Lennon , 2013 NBCA 19 , 403 N.B.R. (2d) 207 22 years Male 30 months Trafficking .65 grams cocaine. $80.00 One prior drug related conviction. R. v. Vautour , 2014 NBQB 178 , 420 N.B.R. (2d) 395 32 years Male 4 years Trafficking in crack cocaine. He negotiated, supervised and participated in the sale of crack cocaine to undercover officer with delivery and receipt of payment affected through agents or their parties. Not average small time street dealer. 7 grams of crack worth $600; 13.83 grams of crack $1,300. Previous record of possession of controlled substances.

Operating at a highly sophisticated commercial level. Caught in a “dial-a-dope” operation. Dow v. R. , 2014 NBCA 15 , 418 N.B.R. (2d) 222 25 years Male 3 years Pled guilty on four counts of trafficking 32 oz. of cocaine. No prior convictions relating to drugs. Court said – but for his young age, early guilty plea, no prior drug related offence and level of involvement – sentence might have been much harsher, was a “go- between” in sales of drugs to undercover officer. $26,000+/– No prior convictions. R. v. Frenette , 2017 NBQB 21 , [2017] N.B.J.

No. 7 (QL) Male - age unknown 4 years cocaine; 1.5 years Hydrom - orphone; 1.5 years consecu-tive. 1.25 g. of cocaine; 107 hydromorphone pills; diazepam. Criminal record relating to robbery, possession of restricted weapon, possession of cannabis. Not a street vendor. Middle range. Version française du jugement rendu par LA JUGE QUIGG I. Introduction [1] Le 25 octobre 2014, à l’issue d’un procès, un juge de la Cour du Banc de la Reine a déclaré Jessie Cormier et Neisha Petitpas coupables de possession d’oxycodone et de crack en vue d’en faire le trafic.

La peine maximale à laquelle s’exposent les auteurs de ces infractions, qui sont prévues au par. 5(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances , L.C. 1996, ch. 19, est l’emprisonnement à perpétuité. Le 20 février 2015, le juge du procès a condamné chacun des deux contrevenants à des peines d’emprisonnement de quatre ans pour chaque chef, mais il a ordonné que les peines soient purgées concurremment. Il a aussi prononcé des ordonnances accessoires.

[2] M. Cormier et M me Petitpas ont déposé des appels distincts à l’encontre de leurs déclarations de culpabilité ainsi que des demandes d’autorisation d’interjeter appel de leurs peines. L’appel interjeté par M me Petitpas à l’encontre de sa déclaration de culpabilité a été accueilli au motif que le procès ne s’était pas déroulé dans la langue de son choix. La Cour a ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès : 2017 NBCA 6 , [2017] A.N.-B. n o 28 (QL). Pour sa part, M.

Cormier s’est par la suite désisté de son appel de la déclaration de culpabilité et a donné suite uniquement à sa demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel de sa peine. [3] Pour les motifs énoncés ci-dessous, je suis d’avis d’accueillir la demande d’autorisation d’appel de M. Cormier. À mon humble avis, les peines infligées à la Cour du Banc de la Reine découlent d’une erreur de principe du fait que le juge a considéré l’absence d’expression de remords comme une circonstance aggravante.

Par conséquent, il incombe à notre Cour de déterminer des peines appropriées pour les deux infractions et, au besoin, de modifier les peines en conséquence. Afin de s’acquitter de cette tâche, notre Cour a ordonné la préparation d’un rapport présentenciel, ce qui nous a permis de considérer à la fois les circonstances de l’infraction et la situation du contrevenant, d’appliquer les principes de la détermination de la peine et de fixer la peine que nous estimons appropriée dans les circonstances de l’espèce.

Au terme de ces étapes, et pour les motifs énoncés ci-dessous, je conclus que la peine d’emprisonnement suivante est appropriée : 1) trois ans pour l’infraction se rapportant au crack; 2) deux ans pour l’infraction se rapportant à l’oxycodone. Je modifierais donc les peines en conséquence. En raison du principe de la totalité, j’ordonnerais que les deux peines soient purgées concurremment. Enfin, je ne modifierais pas les ordonnances accessoires. II. Contexte [4] Les faits de la présente affaire ne sont pas complexes.

Le 5 mars 2013, la police a exécuté un mandat de perquisition en se présentant à la résidence occupée par M. Cormier et M me Petitpas. Elle a alors découvert 24,7 g de crack dans un sac en plastique, flottant dans un seau de lavage près de la porte avant, 50 comprimés de Percocet (oxycodone) dans un porte-gobelet sur le sofa où M me Petitpas était assise avec le fils de quatre ans du couple, et un sac de marijuana dans un autre porte-gobelet. Au total, 14,8 g de marijuana ont été découverts à la résidence.

La valeur estimative de revente du crack se situait entre 2 600 $ et 7 000 $, et on a estimé qu’on aurait pu obtenir de 125 $ à 250 $ pour l’oxycodone sur le même marché. On a trouvé des sommes considérables sur la personne de M. Cormier : 2 510 $ dans une poche et 2 120 $ dans une autre. Une autre somme de 320 $ a été découverte dans la résidence.

Des bouteilles de pilules vides ne comportant aucune étiquette, de petits sacs en plastique décrits comme des [TRADUCTION] « petits sachets » et deux balances de cuisine ont aussi été trouvés sur les lieux. [5] La possession de marijuana a fait l’objet d’un chef d’accusation distinct – pour l’infraction prévue au par. 4(1) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances – dont M. Cormier s’est reconnu coupable et pour lequel il a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 30 jours. [6] M.

Cormier n’a pas été condamné comme délinquant primaire; cependant, aucune infraction en matière de drogue n’était consignée dans son casier judiciaire. Ses cinq déclarations de culpabilité antérieures se rapportaient à des infractions commises entre 2008 et 2010 : conduite d’un véhicule à moteur avec capacités affaiblies ( al. 253(1)

a) du Code criminel ), profération de menaces ( al. 264.1(1) a)), séquestration ( al. 279(2) a)), manquement à un engagement ( al. 145(5.1) a)) et vol (ss- al. 334b) (i)). Pour ces infractions, il a été condamné à diverses peines qui incluaient des amendes, des périodes de probation et des peines d’emprisonnement (la plus longue peine d’emprisonnement qui lui a été infligée était de deux mois). [7] Après les déclarations de culpabilité, l’avocat de M. Cormier et celui de M me Petitpas ont demandé au juge du procès d’ordonner la préparation de rapports présentenciels.

Lorsque l’affaire a repris pour la détermination de la peine, aucun rapport présentenciel n’avait été préparé, puisque les Services de probation n’avaient pas été en mesure de joindre M. Cormier et M me Petitpas. Aucune autre explication n’a été donnée. Il vaut la peine de mentionner que, à cette occasion, M.

Cormier était représenté par un différent avocat. [8] À l’audience de détermination de la peine, l’avocat du ministère public sollicitait une peine d’emprisonnement de trois à quatre ans, alors que l’avocat de la défense faisait valoir qu’il y avait lieu d’infliger une peine dans la fourchette de 18 à 24 mois. Après avoir entendu les observations, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a suspendu brièvement la séance pour déterminer la peine.

Lorsqu’il est revenu, environ une demi-heure plus tard, le juge a commencé à prononcer la peine, mais l’avocat du ministère public lui a immédiatement rappelé son obligation de donner à l’accusé la possibilité de lui présenter ses observations. Le juge s’est ensuite conformé à l’ art. 726 du Code criminel . [9] Le juge chargé de déterminer la peine a commencé par passer en revue les accusations et faire un survol des faits. Il a souligné que M. Cormier était âgé de 25 ans et avait une scolarité de huitième année, et qu’il avait grandi dans les régions de Moncton et

de Shediac. Le juge a fait remarquer que M. Cormier était travailleur saisonnier et père d’un jeune enfant de six ans au moment du prononcé de la peine. Il a aussi mentionné que, bien que M. Cormier n’ait pas d’antécédents judiciaires pour infractions en matière de drogue, il avait déjà été déclaré coupable des infractions mentionnées précédemment. Il a été reconnu que M. Cormier souffrait d’une accoutumance à l’oxycodone et de dépression. [10] Le juge a souligné l’absence de rapport présentenciel.

Il a ensuite passé en revue les observations des avocats, reconnu les fourchettes que chacun d’eux avait proposées dans leurs observations et mis l’accent sur le fait que l’infraction criminelle de possession d’une drogue inscrite à l’annexe I en vue d’en faire le trafic est passible d’une peine maximale d’emprisonnement à perpétuité.

Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a ensuite cité les principes et les objectifs de la détermination de la peine énoncés aux art. 718 , 718.1 et 718.2 du Code criminel et à l’ art. 10 de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances . [11] Faisant ensuite un examen des circonstances atténuantes et aggravantes, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a déclaré avoir trouvé peu de facteurs atténuants, soulignant seulement le fait qu’un enfant de six ans serait touché par toute peine d’emprisonnement infligée à ses parents.

Pour ce qui est des circonstances aggravantes, le juge a souligné ce qui suit : les drogues en question étaient considérées comme des drogues dures; les quantités étaient considérables; les infractions avaient eu lieu en la présence d’un jeune enfant; et les infractions avaient été commises par un accusé ayant des antécédents judiciaires.

Le juge a ajouté à la liste des circonstances aggravantes l’absence d’expression de remords et le manque de respect à l’égard du système judiciaire. [12] Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a indiqué que les principaux objectifs dont il faut tenir compte en fixant la peine pour les infractions de ce genre sont l’effet dissuasif, ou la dissuasion, et la réprobation de la société, ou la dénonciation. Il a fait remarquer que la Cour d’appel avait souligné ce point à plusieurs occasions.

Il a ensuite passé en revue les décisions jurisprudentielles avancées tant par la défense que par le poursuivant à l’appui de leurs positions respectives. Il a déclaré que les faits des décisions qui avaient été invoquées pour le compte de l’accusé pouvaient être distingués de ceux de la présente affaire et qu’il préférait les décisions avancées par l’avocat du ministère public qui justifiaient une longue peine d’emprisonnement. [13] Dans la première des deux décisions invoquées par le juge du procès à l’appui de ses motifs, soit R. c.

Vautour , 2014 NBBR 178, 420 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 395 , une personne, qui, avait-t-on conclu, [TRADUCTION] « opérait à un niveau commercial plus élevé et sophistiqué que le trafiquant de drogue à la petite semaine ordinaire » (par. 2), avait vendu 7 g puis 13,83 g de crack à un agent banalisé à deux occasions distinctes. Le contrevenant, âgé de 32 ans, occupait un emploi à temps partiel, était séparé et père de deux enfants qui demeuraient avec leur mère. Comme en l’espèce, la Cour avait ordonné la préparation d’un rapport présentenciel, mais les Services de probation n’avaient pas été en mesure d’en préparer un.

Contrairement à la présente affaire, le casier judiciaire de M. Vautour comportait des déclarations de culpabilité antérieures dont certaines pour des infractions se rapportant à la drogue qui remontaient à 2003, et il avait purgé plusieurs longues peines d’emprisonnement. En lui infligeant des peines d’emprisonnement de quatre ans à purger concurremment, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a expressément conclu que M.

Vautour n’avait [TRADUCTION] « démontré aucune véritable possibilité de réadaptation » (par. 22). [14] La deuxième décision invoquée par le juge à l’appui de l’infliction de peines d’emprisonnement de quatre ans pour chaque chef est Smith c. R . , 2012 NBCA 99 , 396 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 367. Dans cette affaire, un juge de la Cour provinciale avait condamné l’accusé à une peine de cinq ans et demi après l’avoir déclaré coupable relativement à quatre chefs d’accusation de possession de substances désignées.

Les substances en question avaient été décrites ainsi : [TRADUCTION] « 174 g de marihuana, 34 g de cocaïne, cinq comprimés de 20 mg d’oxycodone et 22 comprimés de 10 mg d’oxycodone, ainsi que 79 pilules renfermant de la méthamphétamine » (par. 2). M. Smith avait des antécédents importants en matière de drogues illicites. [15] En examinant l’affaire Smith , le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a déclaré que la peine d’emprisonnement avait été confirmée en appel. Avec égards, ce n’est pas ce qu’affirme l’arrêt Smith .

L’arrêt Smith était un appel interjeté à l’encontre d’une déclaration de culpabilité. [16] Après avoir renvoyé aux décisions susmentionnées, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a de nouveau énuméré les circonstances qui, selon lui, étaient des circonstances aggravantes : • Possession de drogues dans une résidence où habitait un jeune enfant; • Drogues dures; • Effet néfaste sur la société; • Absence d’expression de remords;

• Aucune coopération avec l’agent de probation en vue de la préparation d’un rapport présentenciel. [17] Après avoir de nouveau énoncé ces circonstances, le juge a plus tard et à deux occasions, répété son observation concernant laprésence d’un jeune enfant en faisant remarquer que l’enfant avait été exposé à ce genre d’activité, et en reconnaissant, à un momentdonné, que ses parents manqueraient à l’enfant. [18] Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a encore une fois souligné la nécessité de dissuader expressément les accusés,de les isoler de la société et de les rendre conscients du préjudice qu’ils ont causé à la société et aux victimes.

Le juge a décrit le crimecomme un crime qui avait été préparé. Au bout du compte, il a infligé des peines de quatre ans d’emprisonnement relativement à chaquechef d’accusation, à être purgées concurremment, et il a rendu un certain nombre d’ordonnances accessoires, y compris la confiscationde l’argent saisi de M. Cormier. Aucune de ces ordonnances accessoires n’est contestée. Comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, lejuge du procès n’avait pas de rapport présentenciel à sa disposition. Nous avons demandé qu’un tel rapport soit établi et nous l’avonsreçu avant la deuxième audience. III.

Moyens d’appel [19] L’appelant a introduit son appel à

titre de

partie se représentant elle-même et il interjetait appel tant de sa déclaration deculpabilité que de sa peine. Avant l’audition de l’appel, il a pu retenir les services d’un avocat et il s’est désisté de son appel de ladéclaration de culpabilité. Dans la demande d’autorisation d’appel qu’il reste à trancher, l’appelant soulève comme moyens d’appel deserreurs de principe et une peine manifestement non indiquée. IV. Norme de contrôle [20] Dans R. c.

R.K.J. (1998), (NB CA), 207 R.N.-B. (2e) 24, [1998] A.N.-B. no 483 (QL), le juge d’appelDrapeau, tel était alors son titre, énonce le cadre analytique qui devrait être appliqué lorsqu’il s’agit de trancher des demandesd’autorisation d’interjeter appel d’une peine : [TRADUCTION]Il ne fait aucun doute que notre cour a le devoir d’examiner la justesse de toute peine infligée. Il est bien établi en droit qu’elle doit lefaire en tenant compte de la position privilégiée qu’occupait la juge du procès. Tous s’entendent pour reconnaître que la détermination dela peine est loin d’être une science exacte.

C’est un processus subjectif caractérisé par un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire. La natureintrinsèquement discrétionnaire de la détermination de la peine explique, en

partie du moins, pourquoi la Cour suprême du Canadainsiste pour que l’on fasse preuve de retenue en révisant une peine quelle qu’elle soit. Voir R. c. Shropshire (M.T.), (SCC), [1995] 4 R.C.S. 227; 188 N.R. 284; 65 B.C.A.C. 37; 106 W.A.C. 37; 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193; 129 D.L.R. (4th) 657; 43 C.R. (4th)269, R. c. C.A.M., (SCC), [1996] 1 R.C.S. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81; 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 etR. c. MacDonnell (F.E.), (SCC), [1997] 1 R.C.S. 305; 210 N.R. 318; 158 N.S.R. (2d) 1; 466 A.P.R. 1.

La retenue a néanmoins ses limites et notre cour a le devoir de modifier une peine lorsque les circonstances l’exigent. D’ailleurs, si letribunal qui prononce la peine commet une erreur de droit ou une erreur de principe, ou si la peine infligée est nettement déraisonnable,il n’y a pas lieu de faire preuve de retenue et notre cour a l’obligation d’infliger la peine qu’elle estime convenable. Voir R. c. F.S.A. (1996), (NB CA), 182 R.N.-B. (2e) 20; 463 A.P.R. 20 (C.A.) et R. c. Melanson (E.R.) (1998), (NB CA), 199 R.N.-B. (2e) 338; 510 A.P.R. 338 (C.A.).

Dans ce contexte, les erreurs de droit surviennent le plus souvent parce que le juge a mal interprété la preuve ou mal appliqué lesprécédents. En ce qui concerne les erreurs de principe, elles consistent le plus souvent dans l’une ou l’autre des erreurs suivantes :l’application des mauvais principes de détermination de la peine, l’omission de tenir compte de facteurs pertinents ou la prise en comptede considérations non pertinentes.

De plus, il arrive que l’omission de reconnaître l’importance voulue à chaque circonstance pertinenteéquivaille à une erreur de principe. (Notre cour hésitera nécessairement à reconnaître l’existence d’une erreur de cette nature, parce que[,]autrement, les professions de retenue seraient indubitablement vides de sens.) Finalement, une peine est nettement déraisonnable si elleest excessivement longue ou excessivement courte.

Cela ne se produit que si elle constitue un écart important et marqué par rapport à lapeine habituellement infligée à des délinquants qui se trouvent dans la même situation et qui commettent des crimes semblables. [par. 11

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