2018 NBCA 42, 2018 NBCA 42

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK J.C.M. APPELLANT 28-17-CA J.C.M. APPELANT - and - - et - M.J.M. RESPONDENT M.J.M. INTIMÉE J.C.M. v. M.J.M., 2018 NBCA 42 J.C.M. c.

M.J.M., 2018 NBCA 42 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Baird CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Baird Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: March 2, 2017 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 2 mars 2017 History of case: Decision under appeal: N/A Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : s.o. Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: April 12, 2018 Judgment rendered: July 19, 2018 Appel entendu : le 12 avril 2018 Jugement rendu : le 19 juillet 2018 Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: J.C.M. on his own behalf For the respondent: Kimberly A. McCurdy Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : J.C.M., en son propre nom Pour l’intimée : Kimberly A.

McCurdy THE COURT The appeal is allowed in part and referred to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench. Disbursements are ordered in the amount of $1,353. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli en

partie et l’affaire est renvoyée à un juge de la Cour du Banc de la Reine. La Cour accorde des débours de 1 353 $. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A.

I. Intr oduction [ 1 ] This appeal gives the Court an opportunity to consider ss. 7 and 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175 (Guidelines) as amended, and, more specifically, to offer guidance as to how income is to be calculated for the purposes of assessing child support, including what financial information should be provided to the court when the above sections of the Guidelines are in play. II. Background [ 2 ] M.J.M. and J.C.M. cohabited for approximately ten years, and had a son, S., prior to their separation in 2012. In 2014, J.C.M. re-partnered and has a child of that relationship.

M.J.M. has not re-partnered and lives in her sister’s basement apartment. [ 3 ] Following the separation, M.J.M. filed a Notice of Application pursuant to the Family Services Act , S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2, ( Act ), in which she claimed custody of S., child support, and various other property and debt relief. Thus began a flurry of motions, approximately ten in total between October 2012 and the hearing of the Application in September 2016. An abundance of financial information was filed by both parents, resulting in several interim orders.

In 2014, an agreement was reached between the parties on the key issues of custody, access, and the division of their property and debt. [ 4 ] At the hearing, the dispute centered on the custody of S., access and visitation, and the quantum of child support, with particular emphasis given to s. 7 expenses. The parties resolved the issue of custody and a Consent Order issued in October 2015. The Consent Order also purported to resolve the issue of child support.

The order provided that J.C.M. would assume the custodial care of S. for approximately 44% of the time, thus triggering the need for an analysis pursuant to s. 9 (a), (b), and (

c) of the Guidelines . The application judge adjourned the hearing to November. When the hearing resumed, the judge acknowledged the parents had a shared custody arrangement; however, he advised he required further evidence, and properly required both parties to file updated affidavits, along with updated Financial Statements. He adjourned the matter to a date when the parents would have the opportunity to cross- examine each other with respect to that information. The hearing resumed in July 2016. [ 5 ] The application judge was asked to rule on the following issues:

i) Should income be imputed to M.J.M. on the basis she failed to establish through medical evidence she could only work part-time? ii) Under s. 9(

c) of the Guidelines , should the court consider the fact M.J.M. had no living expenses, per se , as part of its analysis of the respective standards of living pursuant to s. 9 (

c) of the Guidelines ? iii) Had J.C.M. overpaid his child care expenses, which were ordered to be paid at a rate of $80 monthly, given S. no longer required day care; further, should he be required to contribute towards child care expenses for the weeks S. was not in attendance? iv) Did hockey camps qualify as s. 7 expenses, and did M.J.M. violate previous court orders when she enrolled S. in more than three sporting activities without prior consultation with J.C.M.?

v) How was M.J.M.’s other income, such as RRSP income, child tax benefits, and GST rebates to be treated for the purpose of establishing the pro rata sharing of s. 7 expenses? III. The Application Judge’s Decision

[ 6 ] The application judge found the parents have a shared custody arrangement, and, s. 9 of the Guidelines was engaged. This finding is not appealed. He found M.J.M.’s income in 2015 was $46,642.00 (based on her Financial Statement), plus $3,200 in Child Tax Benefits and GST rebates. He determined J.C.M.’s 2015 income for child support purposes was $91,554.41, less union dues for a total income of $90,250.39. He found that J.C.M.’s common law spouse was on maternity leave until March 2015, and thereafter worked part-time.

No income was attributed to her for 2015; however, he found she earned $5,949.59 for the first five months in 2016, and with her employment insurance benefits and universal child care benefits, her income was estimated to be $14,625.81. [ 7 ] The application judge made the following order: • Pursuant to s. 9 of the Guidelines , J.C.M. was ordered to pay $600 monthly as s. 3 Guideline [Table] child support, payable on the first day of each month, effective forthwith, and payable through the Family Support Orders Service (FSOS), now Office of Support Enforcement (OSE); • J.C.M. was ordered to pay an additional flat rate of $80 monthly towards the “special expense of [S.’s] sports”; • J.C.M. agreed to pay a proportionate share of the net costs of any additional expenses required for S.’s medical and dental treatment not covered by group insurance, including orthotics and orthodontics; • The respective claims for retroactive adjustments to child support were dismissed; • There was no order for costs.

IV. The Grounds of Appeal [ 8 ] J.C.M. asserts:

i) The application judge erred in fact and in law, he misapprehended evidence, and he did not consider all of the evidence; ii) The application judge deprived J.C.M. of procedural fairness by denying him the right to complete a cross-examination of M.J.M.; iii) The application judge was biased as he made findings of fact not supported by the evidence; iv) The application judge incorrectly recited the chronological order of events by misquoting from his earlier decision and therefore, his ultimate findings were tainted;

v) Section 9 of the Guidelines was incorrectly interpreted and applied; vi) A proper analysis pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines was not conducted; vii) The proper analysis concerning retroactive adjustments and overpayments of child support was not conducted; vii) The court order was deficient in that it did not contain information required by the Guidelines .

[9] J.C.M. requests an Order that the application judge’s decision be set aside and a new hearing be held before adifferent judge, or, alternatively, this Court make the order that should have been made in the first instance pursuant to Rule 1.02.1 of theRules of Court. V. Standard of Review [10] The standard of review for cases of this nature is well known. Errors of law are assessed on the correctnessstandard, while other types of errors will be subjected to the palpable and overriding standard. As has been stated many times, this Courtdoes not re-try cases: Vaughan v.

Vaughan, 2014 NBCA 6, 415 N.B.R. (2d) 286, per Quigg J.A., at para. 7. In particular, with respect toappellate intervention in matters pertaining to support generally, this Court will not overturn support orders, unless the reasons disclosean error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong (L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Hickey v.Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, [1999] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL), at para. 11, applied in P.R.H. v. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA18, 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100, per Larlee J.A., at para. 8). In F.M. v.

T.H., 2016 NBCA 29, 449 N.B.R. (2d) 240, the Court concluded a trialjudge’s decision is owed deference unless he or she erred in principle, there was a misapprehension of the evidence that rose to thepalpable and overriding standard, or the award was clearly wrong. See F.M. v. T.H., 2016 NBCA 29, 449 N.B.R. (2d) 240. VI. Analysis [11] The key provisions of the Act and Guidelines are reproduced in Appendix “A”. A. Procedural Fairness [12] It is my opinion there was no breach of procedural fairness in this case.

As the trier of fact, an applicationjudge has the discretionary authority to control his or her own process. There were occasions during the hearing where the applicationjudge limited cross-examination and gave direction to both parties concerning procedural issues. This was clearly within his purview, andfrom the transcripts, it is clear the application judge’s purpose was to limit the examinations to matters he concluded were germane to theultimate questions at issue. [13] J.C.M. specifically draws our attention to October 14, 2015, the second day of the hearing.

On that day, theConsent Order with respect to child support was placed before the judge for his signature. The case was set over to November 23, 2015,at which time the judge provided reasons why he would not execute the Order. The judge found the parents had a shared custodyarrangement, and he decided the matter would continue to be heard on that basis; in other words, he advised the parties he wanted toreceive evidence in conformity with s. 9 of the Guidelines.

The judge sent a directive to the parties, dated January 27, 2016, giving theminstructions as to what would occur when the hearing resumed. [14] He instructed that there was no need for them to file additional financial statements, and limited both of them tothree pages, in the event there were questions concerning the filing of financial information. He advised them that at the hearing, hewould continue the viva voce evidence of the wife, if her testimony had not been completed, and he would then proceed to hear from thehusband, with respect to his “circumstances”.

He then stated he did not require additional documentation concerning the s. 7 expenses.He restricted argument to the ss. 7 and 9 issues outstanding, and limited each party to a three page letter, if they disagreed with hisapproach. [15] The judge advised J.C.M. he should take note of the decision Contino v.

Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63,[2005] 3 S.C.R. 217, and he should be prepared to present his case with respect to child support on the basis of a shared custodyarrangement. [16] Given the issue of custody was resolved, the application judge signaled to these parties he wished to limit theexaminations to the remaining issue of child support. The issue raised by the appellant is not trivial; however, we would only interfere ifthe judge’s decision to limit cross-examination affected the result.

In this case, after reading the transcripts, I am not convinced it did.J.C.M. correctly argues the Rules provide for cross-examination: Rule 55.01(1). Although the judge stated he would give J.C.M. theopportunity to cross-examine M.J.M., he limited the cross-examination and he limited J.C.M.’s direct evidence. J.C.M. asserts: “By notallowing me to cross examine or challenge this direct testimony of the Respondent, or offer my own direct testimony, the judge’sconclusions and findings of fact were tainted.

He formed a negative assessment of me and of my financial situation based onunsubstantiated claims and allegations from both the Respondent and her counsel”.

[17] As noted, the remaining issue at trial was child support. Prior conduct and other unrelated issues between theseparties would have little, if any, relevance to what the judge had to decide. Prior misconduct of a parent is generally a factor to beconsidered in the context of deciding custody; however, that issue had been resolved. So long as the directions to limit either the direct orthe cross-examinations of the parties did not affect the ability of the judge to exercise his judicial function in an impartial and judiciousmanner, I would not interfere with his discretionary decision to proceed as he did.

This was a high conflict situation, which had beenbefore the same judge on many occasions. The narrow issue that remained was one of child support, as noted. I am not able to discern anerror on the part of the application judge on this point, and I would dismiss this ground of appeal; however, as will be seen further inthese reasons, I conclude there were errors in how the amount of child support was determined. B. Incorrect Chronological Order of Events [18] J.C.M. asserts the application judge erroneously recited the chain of events which preceded the hearing in2016.

He specifically raises the issue of shared custody as an example. The judge states at paragraphs 12, 54 and 55 of his reasons, thatJ.C.M. had not invoked the shared custody provisions set out in s. 9 of the Guidelines until the Consent Order was rejected. This wasindeed incorrect. It is clear J.C.M. had previously argued there was a shared custody arrangement which would have required aconsideration of s. 9. [19] Although I agree there may have been a misapprehension of the evidence in this regard, it can be correctedthrough a retroactive order. C.

Apprehension of Bias [20] The issue of bias was considered in Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen et al., 2015 NBCA 26, 435 N.B.R. (2d)259. Larlee and Quigg JJ.A. write: […] In Brooks v. The Law Society of New Brunswick et al., this Court describes what constitutes bias on the part of a judge who is askedto adjudicate. It is a serious allegation. There is a subjective and an objective component to the bias test when broad allegations aremade: R. v. S. (R.D.) [ (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, [1997] S.C.J. No. 84 (QL)].

With respect to the subjectivecomponent, the judge considers whether she or he can adjudicate impartially. If she or he cannot do so, that puts an end to the exercise.The objective component of the test is “reasonable apprehension of bias”, the test usually applied.

As this Court stated in Dugas v.Gaudet et al., 2014 NBCA 7, 416 N.B.R. (2d) 389, to sustain an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias, one must meet thefollowing criteria: “[t]he grounds giving rise to the apprehension of bias must be sufficiently serious to rebut the presumption that thejudge will abide by his or her oath of office and ‘[judge] a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances’(see United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), at p. 421, excerpt quoted with approval in R. v. S.(R.D.))” (para. 5). [para. 16] See also Lambert v.

Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 N.B.R. (2d) 346, at paras. 15-16; and Brooks v. The Law Society of NewBrunswick et al., 2015 NBCA 18, 433 N.B.R. (2d) 371, at paras. 6-8. [21] On this ground, J.C.M. alleges the application judge showed bias against him by only accepting evidence andargument which favored M.J.M., and by placing undue weight on her testimony. His argument is also tied to the belief he was undulyrestricted in his cross-examination, as previously discussed.

He asserts many of the facts contained in M.J.M.’s viva voce testimony, aswell as in her affidavits and financial statements, were false. [22] J.C.M. argues the motions he filed were necessary because of M.J.M.’s failure to grant him access andvisitation as previously ordered. He submits the application judge penalized him by ordering costs against him. He claims therefore thejudge was biased.

The test to meet is whether a reasonable and well-informed person, having reviewed the situation in depth andrealistically, and practically, would think it more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decidefairly (see C.M.H. v. J.R.H., 2012 NBCA 71, 393 N.B.R. (2d) 154; and Bossé et al. v. Lavigne, 2015 NBCA 54, 440 N.B.R. (2d) 118, atpara. 7).

[ 23 ] J.C.M. included in his submission several paragraphs from the reasons to support this contention. They are extensive, and will be referred to by number. They appear as paras. 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25, 36, 50, 59, and 68 in the reasons. Having reviewed the evidence, and the reasons, I do not agree the application judge’s statements rose to the level of bias alleged and I conclude this ground should be dismissed. An application judge is entitled to make findings based on his or her assessment and

interpretation of the evidence, and I see no error that would warrant this Court’s intervention. D. Did the Application Judge Misquote from his Earlier Decision? [ 24 ] The parents agreed to participate in a Parenting Capacity Assessment with Psychological Component (PCA). The report was filed with the court in 2015. In it, the assessor observed S. expressed the desire to have a shared custody arrangement with his parents.

J.C.M. alleges the application judge erred when he wrote the following in his earlier reasons dated July 13, 2013, and August 2013: “Respondent was to retain the custody arrangements that were in place”. In the final decision, the judge added the words: “as recommended in a parent capacity assessment”. Clearly, this was an error, as the report did not contain this statement.

J.C.M. submits the application judge had a mistaken belief concerning custodial care when he misquoted from the report in his final decision. [ 25 ] I agree J.C.M. has correctly observed an error in the judge’s choice of words; however, in my opinion, the error was not overriding. In the end, the judge recognized these parents have shared custody of their son. Reasons do not have to be perfect. In Blanchard v. Légère , 2009 NBCA 2 , 339 N.B.R. (2d) 357 , Larlee J.A. says: “it should be noted that in giving reasons, a judge is not held to a standard of perfection” (para. 17). See Doiron v.

R. , 2013 NBCA 31 , 405 N.B.R. (2d) 22 , per Richard J.A., at para. 27; Jennings v. R. , 2014 NBCA 60 , 433 N.B.R. (2d) 1 , per Richard J.A. (dissenting), at para. 13; The New Brunswick Police Commission v. Smiley , 2017 NBCA 58 , [2017] N.B.J. No. 294 (QL) , per Green J.A., at paras. 21, 22, 26 & 27; and T.M.D. v. J.P.G. , 2018 NBCA 15 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 44 (QL) , at para. 29 . E.

The Application Judge did not Consider all the Evidence [ 26 ] During the hearing, the judge advised the parents he would not be examining all the receipts for the purpose of calculating the expenses that would qualify for reimbursement pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines . He defaulted to the amount of $80 monthly as J.C.M.’s contribution towards extracurricular expenses. On September 1, 2016, he stated: So I am not going to be examining every receipt: I’m not going through every document for the purpose of this hearing. [ 27 ] In my opinion, this was an error in principle. In J.H. v.

T.H ., 2014 NBCA 52 , 422 N.B.R.(2d) 388 , Larlee J.A. wrote: […]While a motion judge may, for valid reasons, not place much weight on certain evidence that is properly before him, he cannot refuse to even look at the evidence, especially when counsel is drawing his attention to it. [para. 8] [ 28 ] At para. 42 of the reasons, the application judge stated: “[J.C.M.] has not indicated how much of his disposable income may be considered as expenses dedicated to [S.’s] care”. [ 29 ] The above statement is clearly wrong, as J.C.M. had provided the court with two budgets which were attached to his affidavit of July 16, 2016, and to his financial statement filed on August 16, 2016.

I conclude the judge erred when he made the above statement, and this error may well have affected the ultimate result. I would, therefore, allow the ground of appeal with respect to the calculation of expenses that qualify for reimbursement pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines .

F. Did the Judge Correctly Interpret and Apply s. 9 of the Guidelines? [30] In my opinion, this ground of appeal has merit.

Section 9 is a vexing

section for both lawyers and courts alike.In 2005, the Supreme Court attempted to answer some of the questions concerning its applicability. In Contino, Bastarache J. set out aframework for the analysis when there is a finding the parents have a shared custody arrangement (para. 43). [31] In doing so, Bastarache J. stated the following: These objectives create a palpable tension in the Guidelines (Rogerson, at pp. 59 and 93). At para. 40 in Francis v. Baker [ (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250, [1999] S.C.J.

No. 52], I wrote that the proper construction of a provision “requires that the objectives ofpredictability, consistency and efficiency on the one hand, be balanced with those of fairness, flexibility and recognition of the actual‘condition[s], means, needs and other circumstances of the children’ on the other”. Like s. 4 in that case, s. 9 must here be interpretedwith these objectives in mind.

Parliament, in adopting s. 9, deliberately chose to emphasize the objectives of fairness, flexibility andrecognition of the actual conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought,even if to the detriment of predictability, consistency and efficiency to some degree. The legislator recognized in s. 9 that there is a widerange of situations of shared custody depicting the reality of different families. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in the same vein,observed that there is a myriad of fact patterns which come under the application of s. 9: Green v.

Green, [2000 BCCA 310, [2001]B.C.J. No. 1001], at para. 34. […] The specific language of s. 9 warrants emphasis on flexibility and fairness. The discretion bestowed on courts to determine the childsupport amount in shared custody arrangement calls for the acknowledgment of the overall situation of the parents (conditions andmeans) and the needs of the children. The weight of each factor under s. 9 will vary according to the particular facts of each case. […] […]

Section 9(

c) vests the court a broad discretion for conducting an analysis of the resources and needs of both the parents and the children.As mentioned earlier, this suggests that the Table amounts used in the simple set-off are not presumptively applicable and that theassumptions they hold must be verified against the facts, since all three factors must be applied. Here again, it will be important to keepin mind the objectives of the Guidelines mentioned earlier, requiring a fair standard of support for the child and fair contributions fromboth parents.

The court will be especially concerned here with the standard of living of the child in each household and the ability of eachparent to [absorb] the costs required to maintain the appropriate standard of living in the circumstances. [paras. 33, 39, 68] [32] In F.M. v. T.H., this Court wrote: Professor Rollie Thompson, in “Case Comment: Contino v. Leonelli-Contino” (2004), 42 R.F.L. (5th) 326, outlines the process a trialjudge should follow for the s. 9 analysis once there is a finding the parents have a shared parenting arrangement.

In his view a trial judgeis required to: i. determine the straight set-off amount; ii. review the child expense budgets; iii. consider the ability of each parent to bear the increased costs of shared custody and the standard of living for the children in eachhousehold; and iv. distinguish between initial orders or agreements, and variations. [para. 26]

[ 33 ]

Section 9 requires a court to consider the financial information provided by each party and to conduct a comparison of the standard of living in each household. J.C.M. argues the application judge should have required information concerning the family members with whom M.J.M. resides, in order to complete the analysis.

Schedule II to the Guidelines defines household to mean: “[…] any person who shares living expenses with the spouse or from whom the spouse otherwise receives an economic benefit as a result of living with that person, if the court considers it reasonable for that person to be considered part of the household […]”. [ 34 ] M.J.M. resides with her sister and receives an economic benefit as a result. She does not pay rent, nor is she responsible for the utilities. Her living expenses are subsidized by her family members.

J.C.M. submits the application judge should have received financial information from the sister and her husband in order to conduct the comparative household standard of living analysis. I disagree. There was no evidence these individuals were contributing directly towards the expenses incurred by M.J.M. for her benefit, or on behalf of S., nor was there any evidence the benefits were related to her employment. I agree the indirect contribution is evident; however, it is readily considered through a careful examination of the respective budgets of the parents.

As M.J.M. does not pay rent, nor does she have some of the other living expenses normally listed in a financial statement, the lack of these expenses would more properly be factored into the analysis pursuant to s. 9 (

c) of the Guidelines . [ 35 ] In M.W.M. v. H.L.M ., 2010 NBCA 86 , 366 N.B.R. (2d) 142 , this Court was asked to determine whether a motion judge erred when he imputed income to the appellant in an amount equal to that paid by a third party to cover the cost of his mortgage and a line of credit at a time when he was disabled. Concluding in the affirmative, Quigg J.A. observed the distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary benefits. In arriving at her conclusion, she relied on Nielsen v. Nielsen , 2007 BCCA 604 , [2007] B.C.J.

No. 2599 (QL) , where the court concluded income could not be imputed to the payor father on the basis he was living rent-free, because his housing was unrelated to his employment and it was not a payment for a service provided by him (para. 43). M.W.M. v. H.L.M. has been relied on in the following cases: T.M.D. v. J.P.G. , at para. 4 ; L.D.M. v. J.K.D. , 2017 NBCA 47 , [2017] N.B.J. No. 259 (QL) , at para. 10 ; M.K.R. v. J.A.R. , 2015 NBCA 73 , 443 N.B.R. (2d) 313 , at para. 11 . [ 36 ] Any benefit M.J.M. receives with respect to her living expenses is more properly considered under s. 9 (

c) as was discussed in Contino . The Supreme Court is clear the respective standards of living are a valid consideration when calculating child support in a shared custody situation. The application judge found the standard of living did not matter (Transcript, September 1, 2016, pp. 232-243). This was an error in principle, in my view. [ 37 ] Other concerns in the judge’s analysis cannot be ignored. In calculating the respective incomes, the application judge included RRSP income received by J.C. M., but excluded RRSP income from the calculation of M.J.M.’s income, without explanation. J.C.

M. asserts the judge should have provided reasons as to why he would include RRSP income for one, and not for the other spouse. He claims it was both “unfair and prejudicial” to do so. I agree. [ 38 ] J.C.M. argues he successfully demonstrated his parenting time with S. increased by 60% following the changes to the access and visitation arrangements, and therefore his expenses with respect to the care of S. increased; however, the application judge found “The differential has neither increased [or] decreased [J.C.M.’s] expenses to maintain S. appreciably” (para. 56).

From the budgets submitted, J.C.M. asserted the expenses associated with his care of S. increased significantly. In my view, to not consider these increased costs was an error. In the same vein, M.J.M.’s expenses related to the care of S. would have decreased; however, there was no analysis in this regard. See Woodford v. MacDonald , 2014 NSCA 31 , [2014] N.S.J. No. 146 (QL) , where the court offered useful guidance as to how a s. 9 analysis should be conducted ( paras. 26, 30, 32). See also G.F. v. J.A.C.F ., 2016 NBCA 21 , 449 N.B.R. (2d) 34 , at para. 12 ; Cherewyk v. Cherewyk , 2018 MBCA 13 , [2018] M.J.

No. 34 (QL) . [ 39 ] Finally, with respect to the sources of income, s. 15(1) states: “Subject to subsection (2), a spouse’s annual income is determined by the court in accordance with sections 16-20”. This requires a court to include all sources of income for the purpose of calculating the child support amount. M.J.M. provided proof of her GST benefits but she testified she did not know how much she was receiving in child tax benefits. Her child tax benefit would have changed as a result of the shared custody arrangement.

At that point in the proceedings, the judge should have required M.J.M. to produce the information. The judge had an obligation to properly calculate M.J.M.s income prior to establishing the basic set-off amount under s. 9 (a). [ 40 ] Given the deficiencies in the analysis as noted, I conclude this part of the application judge’s decision must be referred back to the Court of Queen’s Bench for an appropriate s. 9 analysis. I have narrowed the time frame to October 2015, when the shared custody order was presented to the judge for his approval.

This will require both parties to provide the following information: 1. Copies of their T1 General Income Tax Returns for 2015, 2016 and 2017, along with their Notices of Assessment or Reassessment;

2. Proof of income from all sources, including RRSP income, child tax benefits, GST rebates, bonuses and refunds during the same time frame; 3. Copies of the Financial Statements which were filed with the court during the above time frame; 4. J.C.M. to provide proof of household income including the income from his spouse during the same time frame. G. The

Section 7 Analysis [ 41 ] The application judge set M.J. M.’s child related expenses at $8,167.44 per annum, and J.C. M.’s were set at $7,740.00. He then ordered a “flat” payment of $80 per month representing J.C. M.’s share towards additional expenses. [ 42 ] From the record, the following concern emerges. Although the judge started with a straight set-off amount, he was not able to calculate the correct amount for the pro rata sharing of the s. 7 expenses. All sources of M.J.M.’s income were not included for this purpose.

There was no accounting for any subsidies or tax credits she would be eligible to receive, and the figures applied for the child’s portion of the health and dental insurance premiums were not accurate. The pro rata sharing of s. 7 expenses requires a discrete analysis. [ 43 ] The analysis concerning the s. 7 expenses was deficient for the following reasons: • Contributions toward child care expenses are to be calculated net of any tax benefits received by the claimant. It appears the child care expenses were prorated without taking into consideration the tax credits M.J.M. received or would receive.

This would include the recreational tax credit and any other benefits or third party payments she received on S.’s behalf in connection with the s. 7 expenses.

J.C.M.’s contributions should be retroactively calculated to January 2014, the calendar year when those payments would be globally assessed for this purpose; • The judge failed to consider J.C.M.’s assertion he should not have to pay for child care expenses for S. for the weeks he had S. in his care, including during the summer vacation period, nor should he be required to pay for the weeks S. was enrolled in a summer camp but did not attend, or when he was enrolled in two summer camps the same week.

This should have been addressed in the application judge’s decision and again, it should be retroactively reviewed to January 2014; • M.J.M. did not require child care for S. after August 2015, yet J.C.M. contributed to the expense through an automatic garnishment of $80 monthly to the Family Support Orders Service (FSOS), as was court ordered.

In my view, there should have been a retroactive adjustment to September 1, 2015, when child care for S. was no longer being paid; • M.J.M. claimed several expenses associated with extra-curricular activities for S. over and above the three activities previously ordered by the judge. J.C.M. asserts he overpaid for these activities and there should have been a retroactive adjustment. I agree. M.J.M. acknowledged that judo, soccer, swimming and ball hockey did not qualify (Affidavit sworn June 20, 2013).

In the judge’s order dated March 2013, regular hockey was determined not to qualify for reimbursement; however, elite hockey did (Appeal Book, para. 73). S. has not played elite hockey since 2013. I would order a retroactive assessment of these expenses to January 2014; • Only those health and dental insurance premiums paid by a parent on behalf of a child qualify as a prorated expense pursuant to s. 7; however, J.C.M. did not request reimbursement for the health and dental premiums he pays for S.

Any medical expenses, including orthodontic expenses that have been paid by one parent, net of tax credits, are divisible in pro rata shares following the eligible medical expense deduction showing on the T1 General Income Tax Return. This issue was raised by J.C.M. as one which caused some confusion, particularly as it related to S.’s orthodontic expenses. In the event there was a tax credit to either parent as a result of medical expense deductions taken, this issue should be reviewed, once again to January 1, 2014;

• As noted, s. 7 expenses are calculated and prorated net of all tax benefits, subsidies, and third party payments, including the recreational tax credit. Before us, M.J.M.’s counsel agreed M.J.M. had received the recreational tax credit. This amount should have been disclosed and considered by the application judge prior to prorating the cost of recreational activities. H. Retroactive Support [ 44 ] The application judge dismissed the claims for a retroactive review of child support. In my opinion, this was an error.

Section 14 of the Guidelines enumerates the circumstances constituting a change that would give rise to a variation order in respect of child support. As noted, there were several interim court orders. These orders would have been subject to variation on a retroactive basis if it was found they were based on erroneous information, or if the circumstances of the parties or S. had changed. [ 45 ]

Section 15 of the Guidelines specifies that a spouse’s annual income is determined in accordance with ss. 16 - 20 . Both spouses can agree in writing to the annual income of a spouse, and a court may assess child support on that basis if the court considers the amount reasonable, having regard to the income disclosure requirements set out in s. 21. Subject to ss. 17-20, a spouse’s annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total Income” in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency, and is adjusted in accordance with

Schedule III. [ 46 ] Child support is subject to annual review. As incomes change, so should the amount payable under the Guidelines . Although the Guidelines do not specifically require spouses to exchange copies of their filed income tax returns and Notices of Assessment on an annual basis, unless court ordered, or agreed, it is highly desirable to ensure the child support is paid in compliance with the objectives of the Guidelines (see s. 1 ). [ 47 ] The judge relied on the previous year’s income information when he calculated child support, thus opening the door for a retroactive review.

Both spouses were in receipt of ascertainable income. I add, in the event it is not possible to calculate a payor’s income in any given year, a judge has the authority to impute income using the criteria set out in s. 19 of the Guidelines , thus preserving the right to retroactively adjust for changes in the future if necessary. In F.M. v. T.H. , this Court reiterated “[t]he authority to vary a child support order either retroactively or prospectively is set out in s. 118 of the Family Services Act ” (para. 38). [ 48 ] In P.M.B. v.

M.L.B. , 2010 NBCA 5 , 353 N.B.R. (2d) 323 , Robertson J.A. contemplated how s. 14 of the Guidelines applies to variation orders made pursuant to s. 118 of the Act .

He writes: […] With respect to child support orders, s. 118(2) provides that if the court is satisfied that a “change of circumstances”, as provided for in the regulations respecting orders for child support, has occurred since the making of the last child support order, the court may discharge, vary or suspend any term of the order, prospectively or retroactively, and relieve the [payor] from the payment of part or all of the arrears and any interest due thereon. I note that the word “material” is omitted from the phrase “change in circumstances” found in s. 118(2).

However, the omission must be deemed of no moment as the word “material” must be read in as a matter of necessity. Otherwise, any change in circumstances, no matter how trivial or inconsequential, would be sufficient to trigger the right to variation. With respect to the reference to the change of circumstances as being those provided for in the regulations respecting child support orders, s. 4(7) of the Child Support Guidelines Regulation , N.B.

Reg. 98-27, states that the reference in s. 14 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines to s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act shall be read as a reference to s. 118(2) of the Family Services Act . Hence, the definition of change of circumstances found in s. 14 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines is also applicable to child support orders issued or enforceable under the Family Services Act .

As a general proposition, it is safe to conclude that under both the federal and provincial legislation, the right to a retroactive variation with respect to reducing or eliminating arrears of either spousal or child support, is dependent on the applicant [payor] establishing a material change in circumstances during the period of retroactivity.[…] [paras. 17-18] See also A.C. v. R.R. , 2006 NBCA 58 , 300 N.B.R. (2d) 1 , per Richard J.A., at para. 9. [ 49 ] The issue of retroactive claims was discussed by the Supreme Court in D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; L.J.W. v. T.A.R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v.

Hiemstra , 2006 SCC 37 , [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231 , where Bastarache J., at para. 104, concludes that because child support is the right of the child, there will be a variety of factors to be considered when making a retroactive award. In this case, the recipient spouse is not seeking a retroactive variation in her favour. It is J.C.M., the payor, who seeks to retroactively vary interim court

orders on the basis the application judge should have done so at the time of the final hearing. It is my view the retroactive adjustment pursuant to s. 9 of the Guidelines should start in October 2015, when the Consent Order with respect to the custody of S. was presented to the judge. With respect to the retroactive adjustment for s. 7 expenses, these should be reviewed retroactively to January 1, 2014, as noted. I. The Order [ 50 ] The order dated May 4, 2017, does not comply with the provisions of the Guidelines for the following reasons:

i) Paragraph 1 requires J.C.M. to pay child support in the amount of $600 monthly; however, it does not advise how the application judge arrived at the calculation; ii) The “flat” rate of $80 monthly as J.C.M.’s contribution towards the “special expense” of S.’s “sports” does not comply with s. 7 of the Guidelines . [ 51 ] The Guidelines specify the information that must be included in an order for child support.

Section 13 requires the inclusion of: (

a) The name and birth date of each child to whom the order relates; (

b) The income of any spouse whose income is used to determine the amount of the child support order; (

c) The amount determined under para. 3(1)(

a) for the number of children to whom the order relates; (

d) The amount determined under para. 3(2)(

b) for a child over the age of majority; (

e) The particulars of any expense described in s. 7(1), the child to whom the expense relates, the amount of the expense or, where that amount cannot be determined, the proportion to be paid in relation to the expense; and (

f) The date on which the lump sum or first payment is payable and the day of the month or other time period on which all subsequent payments are to be made. [ 52 ] The order in this case does not specify the income of the parties, nor does it state it was made in consideration of the criteria set out in s. 9 as discussed. The additional amount for S.’s sports does not reflect the pro rata sharing of eligible s. 7 expenses. Without a proper analysis, the flat rate approach does not meet the objectives of the Guidelines , in my opinion. One cannot discern what expenses qualify.

The application judge performed a straight set-off calculation using income information not included in the order, and he arbitrarily added an amount for sports without considering other expenses that would qualify for reimbursement pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines . Sections 9 (

b) and (

c) of the Guideline s required him to perform a more in-depth analysis. As noted, s. 13 required him to provide detailed information. I would allow this ground of appeal. The calculations with respect to ss. 7-9 of the Guidelines are referred to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench on the terms noted. VII. Costs [ 53 ] Before us, J.C.M. requested costs; however, they were not requested in his Notice of Appeal. The power to order costs is discretionary: The Minister of Transportation and the Province of New Brunswick v. Carter’s Country Store

(1996) Ltd. , 2017 NBCA 23 , at para. 29 ; L.T.G. v. C.J.G. , 2011 NBCA 12 , 369 N.B.R. (2d) 202 , at para. 14 , per Bell J.A. This Court has never favoured an unreasoned award of costs to unrepresented litigants: Tibbetts v. Newman , 2005 NBCA 37 , 283 N.B.R. (2d) 63 , at para. 14 , per Ryan J.A. [ 54 ] J.C.M. requested we order M.J.M. to pay the disbursement for one half of the cost of the transcript ordered for the appeal. As he has been partially successful, I would order reimbursement for one half of this disbursement which totals $1,353.00.

Family Services Act

Loi sur les services à la famille VIII. Disposition [ 55 ] For the reasons given, I would allow the appeal in part. I would refer the issue of the monthly amount of child support pursuant to s. 9 of the Guidelines to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, to be calculated retroactively to October 2015. [ 56 ] I would also refer the issue of the retroactive payments towards expenses that qualify for reimbursement pursuant to s. 7 of the Guideline s, as well as the issue of the determination of the respective incomes of the parties, for this purpose, to January 1, 2014, to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench.

APPENDIX “A” APPENDICES « A » 115(6) In determining the amount, if any, of support in relation to need, for a dependant who is neither a child nor a child at or over the age of majority, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the parties, including, (

a) the assets and means of the dependant and of the respondent and any benefit or loss of benefit under a pension plan or annuity; (

b) the capacity of the dependant to provide for his or her own support; (

c) the capacity of the respondent to provide support; (

d) the age and the physical and mental health of the dependant and of the respondent; (

e) whether any physical or mental disability or other cause exists that impairs the ability of the dependant to support himself; (

f) the length of time the dependant and respondent cohabited; 115(6) Avant de fixer, eu égard au besoin, le montant de la prestation de soutien pour une personne à charge qui n’est pas un enfant ou qui n’est pas un enfant majeur, si prestation il y a, la cour doit prendre en considération tous les éléments de la situation des parties, y compris

a) les biens et les moyens de la personne à charge et du défendeur ainsi que les prestations ou pertes de prestations au

titre d’une pension ou d’une rente;

b) la capacité de la personne à charge de pourvoir elle-même à son soutien;

c) la capacité du défendeur de verser des prestations de soutien;

d) l’âge et l’état de santé physique et mentale de la personne à charge et du défendeur;

e) la présence d’un handicap physique ou mental ou d’une autre cause réduisant la faculté de la personne à charge de pourvoir elle-même à son soutien;

f) la durée de cohabitation de la personne à charge et du défendeur;

(

g) the needs of the dependant, having regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties cohabited; (

h) the measures available for the dependant to become financially independent and the length of time and cost involved to enable the dependant to take such measures; (

i) the legal obligation of the respondent to provide support for any other person; (

j) the desirability of the dependant or respondent remaining at home to care for a child; (

k) any contribution by the dependant to the realization of the career potential of the respondent; (

l) Repealed: 1997, c.59, s.3 (

m) Repealed: 1997, c.59, s.3 (

n) Repealed: 1997, c.59, s.3 (

o) where the dependant is a spouse, the effect on his or her earning capacity of the responsibilities assumed during cohabitation; (

p) where the dependant is a spouse, whether the dependant spouse has undertaken the care of another dependant who is of the age of nineteen years or over and unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of the dependant spouse; (

q) where the dependant is a spouse, whether the dependant spouse has undertaken to assist in the continuation of a program of education for another dependant who is of the age of nineteen years or over and unable for that reason to withdraw from the charge of the dependant spouse;

g) les besoins de la personne à charge, compte tenu du niveau de vie auquel elle était habituée à l’époque où les parties cohabitaient;

h) les mesures que peut prendre la personne à charge pour acquérir son indépendance financière ainsi que le temps dont elle aura besoin pour prendre ces mesures et le coût correspondant;

i) l’obligation légale du défendeur de pourvoir au soutien de toute autre personne;

j) l’opportunité pour la personne à charge ou le défendeur de demeurer à la maison pour se charger d’un enfant;

k) la part que la personne à charge a prise à la réalisation du potentiel professionnel du défendeur;

l) Abrogé : 1997, ch. 59, art. 3

m) Abrogé : 1997, ch. 59, art. 3

n) Abrogé : 1997, ch. 59, art. 3

o) lorsque la personne à charge est un conjoint, l’effet des responsabilités assumées durant la cohabitation sur sa capacité de gain;

p) lorsque la personne à charge est un conjoint, le fait pour elle d’avoir entrepris de se charger d’une autre personne à charge âgée de dix-neuf ans et plus qui ne peut se passer de son appui pour cause de maladie, de handicap ou pour toute autre raison;

q) lorsque la personne à charge est un conjoint, le fait pour elle d’avoir entrepris d’aider une autre personne à charge âgée de dix-neuf ans et plus à poursuivre ses études si celle-ci, pour cette raison, ne peut se passer de son appui;

(

r) where the dependant is a spouse, any housekeeping, child care or other domestic service performed by the spouse for the family, in the same way as if the spouse were devoting the time spent in performing that service in remunerative employment and were contributing the earnings therefrom to the support of the family; (

s) any other legal right of the dependant to support other than out of public assistance programs; and (

t) the conduct of the parties, where such conduct unreasonably precipitates, prolongs or aggravates the need for support or unreasonably affects the ability to pay support. 118(2) Where an order for child support or an order for the support of a child at or over the age of majority has been made and the court is satisfied that a change of circumstances as provided for in the regulations respecting orders for child support has occurred since the making of the order under subsection 115(1) or since the making of the last order under this section, if any, in respect of the support of a child or a child at or over the age of majority, the court may, upon the application of any person named in the order or referred to in subsection 115(3) and subject to paragraph 113(2)(b), subsections 115(1.1) to (1.6) and the regulations respecting orders for child support, as the case may be, (

a) discharge, vary or suspend any term of the order, prospectively or retroactively, (

b) relieve the respondent from the payment of part or all of the arrears or any interest due thereon, and (

c) make any order for child support or any order for the support of a child at or over the age of majority that the court could make on an application under

section 115 for the support of a dependant who is a child or a child at or over the age of majority.

r) lorsque la personne à charge est un conjoint, tous les soins consacrés au ménage, à un enfant ou tout autre service domestique fourni par le conjoint pour la famille tout comme si le conjoint consacrait à un emploi rémunérateur le temps passé à fournir ce service et affectait au soutien de la famille les gains dérivés de cet emploi;

s) tout autre droit de soutien que la loi reconnaît à la personne à charge, à l’exclusion du soutien obtenu en vertu de programmes publics d’assistance, et

t) la conduite des parties, si cette conduite précipite, prolonge ou accentue de façon déraisonnable le besoin de soutien ou si elle réduit de façon déraisonnable la faculté de payer les prestations de soutien. 118(2) Lorsqu’une ordonnance de soutien pour enfant ou pour enfant majeur a été rendue et que la cour est convaincue qu’un changement de situation prévu aux règlements concernant les ordonnances de soutien pour enfant s’est produit depuis qu’elle a rendu l’ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe 115(1) ou la dernière ordonnance en vertu du présent article, le cas échéant, relativement au soutien de l’enfant ou de l’enfant majeur, la cour peut, à la demande de toute personne nommée dans l’ordonnance ou visée par le paragraphe 115(3) et sous réserve de l’alinéa 113(2)b), des paragraphes 115(1.1) à (1.6) et des règlements concernant les ordonnances de soutien pour enfant, selon le cas,

a) révoquer, modifier ou suspendre toute condition énoncée dans l’ordonnance, pour l’avenir ou à

titre rétroactif,

b) dégager le défendeur du paiement de tout ou

partie des arriérés ou des intérêts moratoires y afférents, et

c) rendre toute ordonnance de soutien pour enfant ou pour enfant majeur que la cour pourrait rendre lorsqu’elle est saisie d’une demande en application de l’article 115 pour le soutien d’une personne à charge qui est un enfant ou qui est un enfant majeur.

Federal Child Support Guidelines Special or extraordinary expenses 7(1) In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation: (

a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the custodial parent’s employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment; (

b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child; (

c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses; (

d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs; (

e) expenses for post-secondary education; and Lignes directrices fédérales sur les pensions alimentaires pour enfants Dépenses spéciales ou extraordinaires 7(1) Le tribunal peut, sur demande de l’un des époux, prévoir dans l’ordonnance alimentaire une somme, qui peut être estimative, pour couvrir tout ou

partie des frais ci-après, compte tenu de leur nécessité par rapport à l’intérêt de l’enfant et de leur caractère raisonnable par rapport aux ressources des époux et de l’enfant et aux habitudes de dépenses de la famille avant la séparation :

a) les frais de garde de l’enfant engagés pour permettre au parent en ayant la garde d’occuper un emploi, ou de poursuivre des études ou de recevoir de la formation en vue d’un emploi, ou engagés en raison d’une maladie ou d’une invalidité du parent;

b) la portion des primes d’assurance médicale et dentaire attribuable à l’enfant;

c) les frais relatifs aux soins de santé dépassant d’au moins 100 $ par année la somme que la compagnie d’assurance rembourse, notamment les traitements orthodontiques, les consultations professionnelles d’un psychologue, travailleur social, psychiatre ou toute autre personne, la physiothérapie, l’ergothérapie, l’orthophonie, les médicaments délivrés sur ordonnance, les prothèses auditives, les lunettes et les lentilles cornéennes;

d) les frais extraordinaires relatifs aux études primaires ou secondaires ou à tout autre programme éducatif qui répond aux besoins particuliers de l’enfant;

e) les frais relatifs aux études postsecondaires;

f) les frais extraordinaires relatifs aux activités parascolaires. Garde partagée

(

f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities. Shared custody 9 Where a spouse exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody of, a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by taking into account (

a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses; (

b) the increased costs of shared custody arrangements; and (

c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought. 9 Si un époux exerce son droit d’accès auprès d’un enfant, ou en a la garde physique, pendant au moins 40 % du temps au cours d’une année, le montant de l’ordonnance alimentaire est déterminé compte tenu :

a) des montants figurant dans les tables applicables à l’égard de chaque époux;

b) des coûts plus élevés associés à la garde partagée;

c) des ressources, des besoins et, d’une façon générale, de la situation de chaque époux et de tout enfant pour lequel une pension alimentaire est demandée. Circumstances for variation Changements de situation

14 For the purposes of subsection 17(4) of the Act , any one of the following constitutes a change of circumstances that gives rise to the making of a variation order in respect of a child support order: (

a) in the case where the amount of child support includes a determination made in accordance with the applicable table, any change in circumstances that would result in a different child support order or any provision thereof; (

b) in the case where the amount of child support does not include a determination made in accordance with a table, any change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either spouse or of any child who is entitled to support; and (

c) in the case of an order made before May 1, 1997, the coming into force of

section 15.1 of the Act , enacted by

section 2 of

chapter 1 of the Statutes of Canada, (1997). 14 Pour l’application du paragraphe 17(4) de la Loi, l’un ou l’autre des changements ci- après constitue un changement de situation au

titre duquel une ordonnance alimentaire modificative peut être rendue :

a) dans le cas d’une ordonnance alimentaire dont tout ou

partie du montant a été déterminé selon la table applicable, tout changement qui amènerait une modification de l’ordonnance ou de telle de ses dispositions;

b) dans le cas d’une ordonnance alimentaire dont le montant n’a pas été déterminé selon une table, tout changement dans les ressources, les besoins ou, d’une façon générale, dans la situation de l’un ou l’autre des époux ou de tout enfant ayant droit à une pension alimentaire;

c) dans le cas d’une ordonnance rendue avant le 1 er mai 1997, l’entrée en vigueur de l’article 15.1 de la Loi, édicté par l’article 2 du

chapitre 1 des Lois du Canada (1997). Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD I.

Introduction [1] Le présent appel permet à la Cour d’examiner les art. 7 et 9 des Lignes directrices fédérales sur les pensions alimentaires pour enfants , DORS/97-175 (les Lignes directrices ), dans leur version modifiée, et, plus précisément, de donner des directives sur la façon de calculer le revenu en vue de la détermination des aliments à être versés au profit de l’enfant, y compris sur les renseignements financiers qu’il y a lieu de fournir au tribunal lorsque les articles 7 et 9 des Lignes directrices sont en cause. II.

Contexte [2] M.J.M. et J.C.M. ont vécu ensemble environ dix ans et ont eu un fils, S., avant leur séparation en 2012. En 2014, J.C.M. était de nouveau en couple et il est le père d’un enfant issu de cette relation. M.J.M. n’a pas établi une nouvelle relation et elle vit dans l’appartement du sous-sol de sa sœur. [3] Après la séparation, M.J.M. a déposé un avis de requête en vertu de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2 (la Loi ), dans lequel elle réclamait la garde de S., des aliments pour l’enfant, et diverses autres mesures réparatoires visant les biens et les dettes. Ce fut le début de toute une série de motions, dix environ entre octobre 2012 et l’audition de la

requête en septembre 2016. De nombreux renseignements financiers ont été déposés par les deux parents, ce qui a donné lieu à plusieurs ordonnances provisoires. En 2014, les parties ont conclu une entente sur les questions essentielles, soit la garde, le droit d’accès et la répartition de leurs biens et de leurs dettes. [4] À l’audience, le débat a porté principalement sur la garde de S., les droits d’accès et de visite et le montant des aliments au profit de l’enfant, et une attention particulière a été portée aux dépenses prévues à l’art. 7.

Les parties ont réglé la question de la garde et une ordonnance par consentement a été rendue en octobre 2015. L’ordonnance par consentement devait également régler la question des aliments pour enfant. L’ordonnance prévoyait que J.C.M. assumerait la garde de S. environ 44 pour cent du temps, déclenchant ainsi la nécessité d’effectuer l’analyse que commandent les al. 9a), b), et

c) des Lignes directrices . Le juge saisi de la requête a reporté l’audience au mois de novembre. Lorsque l’audience a repris, le juge a reconnu que les parents avaient un arrangement de garde partagée; toutefois, il a indiqué qu’il lui fallait d’autres éléments de preuve et il a valablement demandé aux parties de déposer des affidavits mis à jour ainsi que des états financiers mis à jour. Il a reporté l’affaire à une date à laquelle chaque parent aurait l’occasion de contre-interroger l’autre parent au sujet de ces renseignements. L’audience a repris en juillet 2016. [5] Le juge saisi de la requête a été prié de trancher les questions suivantes :

i) Y a-t-il lieu d’attribuer un montant de revenu à M.J.M. pour le motif qu’elle a omis d’établir au moyen d’une preuve médicale qu’elle pouvait seulement travailler à temps partiel? ii) Pour ce qui concerne l’al. 9c) des Lignes directrices , la Cour doit-elle tenir compte du fait que M.J.M. n’avait pas de dépenses courantes proprement dites lors de son analyse des niveaux de vie respectifs des parties effectuée en application de l’al. 9c) des Lignes directrices ? iii) J.C.M. avait-il payé des frais de garde d’enfant en trop, que le tribunal lui avait ordonné de payer à raison de 80 $ par mois, étant donné que S. n’avait plus besoin de fréquenter une garderie; de plus, devait-on lui ordonner de contribuer aux frais de garde d’enfant les semaines où S. ne fréquentait pas la garderie? iv) Les frais des camps de hockey tombaient-ils sous le coup des dépenses prévues à l’art. 7 et M.J.M. avait-elle contrevenu à une des ordonnances judiciaires antérieures lorsqu’elle avait inscrit S. à plus de trois activités sportives sans avoir préalablement consulté J.C.M.?

v) Comment devait-on traiter les autres revenus de M.J.M., soit le revenu tiré de REER, la prestation fiscale canadienne pour enfants et le remboursement de TPS/TVH, afin d’établir le partage au prorata des dépenses prévues à l’art. 7? III. Décision du juge saisi de la requête [6] Le juge saisi de la requête a conclu que les parents avaient un arrangement de garde partagée et que l’art. 9 des Lignes directrices s’appliquait. Cette conclusion n’a pas été portée en appel.

Le juge a conclu que le revenu de M.J.M. en 2015 se chiffrait à 46 642 $ (selon son état financier), auquel s’ajoutaient la prestation fiscale canadienne pour enfants de 3 200 $ et des remboursements de TPS/TVH. Il a jugé que le salaire de J.C.M. en 2015 aux fins du calcul des aliments pour enfant était de 91 554,41 $ moins les cotisations syndicales, ce qui ramenait son revenu à 90 250,39 $. Il a conclu que la conjointe de fait de J.C.M. avait pris un congé de maternité jusqu’en mars 2015 et qu’elle avait travaillé à temps partiel par la suite.

Aucun revenu ne lui a été attribué en 2015; toutefois, il a jugé qu’elle avait gagné 5 949,59 $ pendant les cinq premiers mois de 2016, et en ajoutant les prestations d’assurance-emploi et la prestation universelle pour la garde d’enfants, il a évalué son revenu à 14 625,81 $. [7] Le juge saisi de la requête a rendu l’ordonnance suivante : • Conformément à l’art. 9 des Lignes directrices , il a ordonné à J.C.M. de verser des aliments pour enfant de 600 $ par mois au

titre de l’art. 3 des Lignes directrices , aliments payables le premier jour de chaque mois, à compter de la date de l’ordonnance, et ce, par l’entremise du Service des ordonnances de soutien familial (SOSF), maintenant le Bureau de l’exécution des ordonnances de soutien (BEOS);

• Il a ordonné à J.C.M. de payer une somme additionnelle de 80 $ par mois destinée [TRADUCTION] « aux sports de [S.], une dépense spéciale »; • J.C.M. a accepté de payer une part proportionnelle du coût net de toutes les dépenses additionnelles engagées pour les traitements médicaux et dentaires de S. qui ne sont pas couverts par l’assurance collective, y compris l’orthétique et l’orthodontie; • Les demandes respectives visant un rajustement rétroactif des aliments pour enfant ont été rejetées; • La Cour n’a accordé aucuns dépens. IV. Moyens d’appel [8] J.C.M. affirme ce qui suit :

i) Le juge saisi de la requête a commis une erreur de fait et de droit, il a mal interprété la preuve et il n’a pas tenu compte de l’ensemble de la preuve; ii) Le juge saisi de la requête a privé J.C.M. de l’équité procédurale en lui refusant le droit de contre-interroger M.J.M.; iii) Le juge saisi de la requête a fait preuve de partialité puisqu’il a tiré des conclusions de fait qui n’étaient pas étayées par la preuve; iv) Le juge saisi de la requête a mal indiqué l’ordre chronologique des événements en citant mal sa décision antérieure et, par conséquent, ses conclusions finales étaient viciées;

v) Le juge a mal interprété et appliqué l’article 9 des Lignes directrices ; vi) Le juge n’a pas effectué une analyse convenable pour l’application de l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices ; vii) Le juge n’a pas effectué l’analyse qui s’impose en ce qui concerne le rajustement rétroactif et le paiement en trop des aliments pour enfant; viii) L’ordonnance judiciaire était défectueuse parce qu’elle ne renfermait pas les renseignements prescrits par les Lignes directrices . [9] J.C.M. demande que soit rendue une ordonnance portant que la décision du juge saisi de la requête est annulée et qu’une nouvelle audience soit tenue devant un autre juge, ou, subsidiairement, que notre Cour rende l’ordonnance qui aurait dû être rendue en première instance en vertu de la règle 1.02.1 des Règles de procédure .

V. Norme de contrôle [10] La norme de contrôle qui s’applique aux affaires de cette nature est bien connue. Les erreurs de droit sont examinées selon la norme de la décision correcte tandis que les autres types d’erreurs sont susceptibles de contrôle selon la norme de l’erreur manifeste et dominante. Comme il a été souligné à plusieurs reprises, notre Cour ne juge pas l’affaire à nouveau : Vaughan c. Vaughan , 2014 NBCA 6 , 415 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 286 , la juge d’appel Quigg, au par. 7. Plus particulièrement, en ce qui concerne

l’intervention de la Cour d’appel dans des affaires portant généralement sur les aliments, notre Cour n’infirmera une ordonnancealimentaire que si les motifs révèlent une erreur de principe ou une erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve, ou encore, si ladécision est manifestement erronée (la juge L’Heureux-Dubé dans Hickey c. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 518, [1999] A.C.S. no 9 (QL), au par. 11, appliqué dans P.R.H. c. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 R.N.-B. (2e) 100, la juge d’appel Larlee, au par. 8). Dans l’affaire F.M. c.

T.H., 2016 NBCA 29, 449 R.N.-B. (2e) 240, la Cour a indiqué que la décision du juge de première instanceappelle à la déférence, à moins que le juge ait commis une erreur de principe, qu’une erreur apparaisse, dans l’interprétation de la preuve,qui satisfait à la norme de l’erreur manifeste et dominante, ou que la décision soit manifestement erronée. VI. Analyse [11] Les dispositions clés de la

Loi sur les services à la famille, L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2, et desLignes directrices sont reproduites à l’appendice A. A. Équité procédurale [12] À mon avis, il n’y a pas eu manquement à l’équité procédurale en l’espèce. En tant que juge desfaits, le juge saisi de la requête a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de fixer sa propre procédure. À certaines occasions pendant l’audience, lejuge saisi de la requête a limité le contre-interrogatoire et a donné des directives aux deux parties au sujet de questions d’ordreprocédural.

Cela était clairement dans les limites de son pouvoir et, à la lumière des transcriptions, il est clair que le juge du procès avaitpour but de limiter les interrogatoires à ce qu’il estimait pertinent relativement aux questions essentielles en litige. [13] J.C.M. attire expressément notre attention sur le 14 octobre 2015, soit le deuxième jour del’audience. Ce jour-là, l’ordonnance par consentement concernant les aliments pour enfant a été présentée au juge pour signature.L’affaire a été reportée au 23 novembre 2015, date à laquelle le juge a exposé les motifs pour lesquels il ne voulait pas signerl’ordonnance.

Le juge a conclu que les parents avaient un arrangement de garde partagée et que l’affaire continuerait d’être entendue surce fondement; autrement dit, il a indiqué aux parties qu’il voulait recevoir des éléments de preuve en conformité avec l’art. 9 des Lignesdirectrices.

Le juge a envoyé une directive aux parties, datée du 27 janvier 2016, dans laquelle il leur indiquait ce qui allait se passerlorsque l’audience reprendrait. [14] Il leur a donné pour instruction qu’il n’était pas nécessaire que l’une ou l’autre des partiesdépose des états financiers additionnels et il les a limitées à trois pages chacune dans le cas où il y aurait des questions au sujet du dépôtdes renseignements financiers.

Il les a informées qu’à l’audience, il continuerait d’entendre le témoignage de vive voix de l’épouse, sielle n’avait pas terminé son témoignage, et qu’il entendrait ensuite le témoignage du mari au sujet de sa « situation ». Il a ensuite préciséqu’il n’avait pas besoin de documents additionnels au sujet des dépenses prévues à l’art. 7. Il a restreint le débat aux questions relativesaux art. 7 et 9 encore en litige et a limité chacune des parties à une lettre de trois pages, pour le cas où elles ne souscriraient pas à sadémarche. [15] Le juge a indiqué à J.C.M. qu’il devrait examiner l’arrêt Contino c.

Leonelli-Contino, 2005 CSC63, [2005] 3 R.C.S. 217, et qu’il devrait être prêt à présenter sa cause relativement aux aliments pour enfant sur le fondement d’unarrangement de garde partagée. [16] Puisque la question de la garde avait été réglée, le juge saisi de la requête a signalé aux partiesqu’il voulait limiter les interrogatoires à la question des aliments pour enfant encore en litige. La question soulevée par l’appelant n’estpas négligeable; toutefois, nous ne sommes disposés à intervenir que si la décision du juge de limiter le contre-interrogatoire a influé surle résultat.

En l’espèce, après avoir lu les transcriptions, je ne suis pas convaincue que ce soit le cas. J.C.M. fait valoir à juste

titre que lesRègles prévoient un contre-interrogatoire : règle 55.01(1). Bien que le juge ait indiqué qu’il permettrait à J.C.M. de contre-interrogerM.J.M., il a limité le contre-interrogatoire et il a limité le témoignage direct de J.C.M. J.C.M. affirme ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]« Puisque le juge ne m’a pas permis de contre-interroger l’intimée ou de contester son témoignage direct, ou d’offrir mon propretémoignage direct, ses conclusions, et notamment, ses conclusions de fait, étaient viciées.

Il a tiré des conclusions défavorables à monsujet et au sujet de ma situation financière sur le fondement de prétentions et d’allégations non étayées formulées à la fois par l’intiméeet son avocate. » [17] Comme il a été mentionné, la seule question à trancher au procès était celle des aliments pourenfant. La conduite antérieure et les autres questions distinctes entre ces parties seraient peu pertinentes ou aucunement pertinentes pource qui concerne les décisions que le juge devait prendre.

La conduite antérieure d’un parent est généralement un facteur à considérerdans le contexte de la décision relative à la garde; cette question, toutefois, avait déjà été réglée. Dans la mesure où les directives visant à

limiter soit l’interrogatoire direct ou le contre-interrogatoire des parties n’ont pas nui à la capacité du juge d’exercer sa fonction judiciairede façon impartiale et judicieuse, je n’interviendrais pas dans sa décision discrétionnaire de procéder comme il l’a fait. Il s’agissait d’unesituation de conflit intense et les parties avaient comparu devant le même juge à plusieurs occasions. La question précise à trancher étaitcelle des aliments pour enfant, comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment.

Je ne puis discerner une erreur de la part du juge saisi de la requêteà cet égard et je rejetterais ce moyen d’appel; toutefois, comme nous le verrons plus loin dans les présents motifs, je conclus que deserreurs ont été commises en ce qui concerne le calcul du montant des aliments pour enfant. B. Ordre chronologique des événements erroné [18] J.C.M. affirme que le juge saisi de la requête a mal indiqué l’ordre chronologique desévénements qui ont précédé l’audience en 2016. Il souligne notamment la question de la garde partagée comme un exemple.

Le jugeindique, aux par. 12, 54 et 55 de ses motifs, que J.C.M. n’avait pas invoqué l’art. 9 des Lignes directrices applicable à la garde partagéeavant que l’ordonnance par consentement soit rejetée. En fait, cette déclaration était incorrecte. Il est évident que J.C.M. avait déjà faitvaloir qu’il y avait un arrangement de garde partagée qui aurait exigé l’examen de l’art. 9. [19] Bien que je convienne qu’il peut y avoir eu une interprétation erronée de la preuve à cet égard,il est possible d’y remédier au moyen d’une ordonnance rétroactive. C.

Crainte de partialité [20] La question de la partialité a été examinée dans l’arrêt Rose c. Sa Majesté la Reine et autres, 2015 NBCA 26, 435 R.N.-B. (2e) 259. Les juges d’appel Larlee et Quigg ont écrit ce qui suit : […] Dans Brooks c. Barreau du Nouveau-Brunswick et autres, notre Cour décrit ce qui constitue la partialité de la part d’un juge qui doitse prononcer sur une affaire. Il s’agit d’une allégation grave. Le critère applicable à la partialité dans les cas où des allégations généralessont faites comporte à la fois un élément subjectif et un élément objectif : R. c.

S. (R.D.) [ (SCC), [1997] 3 R.C.S. 484, [1997] A.C.S. no 84 (QL)]. Pour ce qui est de l’élément subjectif, le juge considère s’il lui est possible d’instruire l’affaire de façonimpartiale. S’il lui est impossible de le faire, il ne doit pas aller plus loin. L’élément objectif du critère est celui de la « crainteraisonnable de partialité », le critère habituellement appliqué. Comme notre Cour l’a déclaré dans Dugas c.

Gaudet et al., 2014 NBCA 7, 416 R.N.-B. (2e) 389, pour soutenir une allégation de crainte raisonnable de partialité, il incombe de remplir les critères suivants : « Lesmotifs qui sous-tendent la crainte de partialité doivent être d’une gravité telle qu’ils réfutent la forte présomption que le ou la jugerespectera son serment d’office et “[tranchera] le litige équitablement à la lumière de ses circonstances propres” (voir United States c.Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), à la p. 421, passage cité avec approbation dans l’arrêt R. c. S.(R.D.)) » (par. 5). [par. 16] Voir également Lambert c.

Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 R.N.-B. (2e) 346, aux par. 15 et 16, et Brooks c. Barreau du Nouveau- Brunswick et autres, 2015 NBCA 18, 433 R.N.-B. (2e) 371, aux par. 6 à 8. [21] En ce qui concerne ce moyen, J.C.M. allègue que le juge saisi de la requête a fait preuve departialité à son égard en acceptant seulement la preuve et les arguments qui favorisaient M.J.M. et en accordant trop de poids à sontémoignage à elle. Son argument est également lié à sa croyance qu’il a été limité indûment dans son contre-interrogatoire, comme nousl’avons vu précédemment.

Il affirme que bon nombre des faits que refermait le témoignage de vive voix de M.J.M. de même que sesaffidavits et états financiers étaient faux. [22] J.C.M. soutient que les motions qu’il a déposées étaient nécessaires en raison du défaut deM.J.M. de lui permettre d’exercer les droits d’accès et de visite qui lui avaient été reconnus dans une ordonnance antérieure. Il avanceque le juge saisi de la requête l’a pénalisé en lui ordonnant de payer des dépens. Il soutient donc que le juge a fait preuve de partialité.

Lecritère auquel il faut satisfaire est le suivant : une personne raisonnable et bien renseignée qui étudierait la situation en profondeur et defaçon pratique et réaliste serait-elle d’avis que, selon toute vraisemblance, le juge, consciemment ou non, ne rendra pas une décision juste (voir C.M.H. c. J.R.H., 2012 NBCA 71, 393 R.N.-B. (2e) 154; et Bossé et autre c. Lavigne, 2015 NBCA 54, 440 R.N.-B. (2e) 118, aupar. 7).

[23] J.C.M. a inclus dans son mémoire plusieurs paragraphes des motifs du juge afin d’étayer cette prétention. Ils sont longs et nous y ferons référence au moyen de leurs numéros. Il s’agit des par. 15, 16, 25, 68, 19, 50, 20, 59, 22 et 36 des motifs. Après avoir examiné les éléments de preuve et les motifs, je ne peux souscrire à la prétention voulant que les déclarations du juge saisi de la requête aient atteint le niveau de partialité allégué et je suis d’avis de rejeter ce moyen d’appel.

Le juge saisi d’une requête est en droit de tirer des conclusions sur le fondement de son évaluation et de son interprétation de la preuve et je ne vois aucune erreur qui justifierait l’intervention de notre Cour. D. Le juge saisi de la requête a-t-il mal cité sa décision antérieure? [24] Les parents ont accepté de participer à une évaluation des capacités parentales comprenant un volet psychologique (ÉCP). Le rapport a été déposé auprès de la Cour en 2015. Dans son rapport, la personne chargée de l’évaluation a indiqué que S. avait exprimé le désir d’un arrangement de garde partagée.

J.C.M. prétend que le juge saisi de la requête a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a écrit ce qui suit dans ses motifs antérieurs datés du 13 juillet 2013 et d’août 2013 : [TRADUCTION] « L’intimée devait conserver l’arrangement de garde en cours ». Dans sa décision finale, le juge a ajouté les mots suivants : [TRADUCTION] « recommandé dans l’évaluation des aptitudes parentales ». De toute évidence, il s’agit d’une erreur, car cette déclaration ne figure pas dans le rapport.

J.C.M. prétend que le juge saisi de la requête avait une croyance erronée au sujet des arrangements de garde lorsqu’il a mal cité le rapport dans sa décision finale. [25] Je conviens que J.C.M. a constaté à juste

titre une erreur dans le choix de mots du juge; toutefois, à mon avis, il ne s’agissait pas d’une erreur dominante. En fin de compte, le juge a reconnu que ces parents partageaient la garde de leur fils. Il n’est pas nécessaire que les motifs soient parfaits. Dans l’arrêt Blanchard c. Légère , 2009 NBCA 2 , 339 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 357 , la juge Larlee a indiqué ce qui suit : « il faut se rappeler que la perfection de l’énoncé des motifs n’est pas une exigence » (par. 17). Voir Doiron c. R. , 2013 NBCA 31 , 405 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 22 , le juge d’appel Richard, au par. 27; Jennings c.

R. , 2014 NBCA 60 , 433 R.N.- B. (2 e ) 1 , le juge d’appel Richard (dissident), au par. 13; Commission de police du Nouveau-Brunswick c. Smiley , 2017 NBCA 58 , [2017] A.N.-B. n o 294 (QL) , le juge d’appel Green, aux par. 21, 22, 26 et 27; et T.M.D. c. J.P.G. , 2018 NBCA 15 , [2018] A.N.-B. n o 44 (QL) , au par. 29 . E. Le juge saisi de la requête n’a pas tenu compte de l’ensemble de la preuve. [26] Pendant l’audience, le juge a informé les parents qu’il n’examinerait pas tous les reçus aux fins du calcul des dépenses susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un remboursement au

titre de l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices . Il a fixé par défaut à 80 $ par mois la contribution de J.C.M. aux dépenses liées aux activités parascolaires. Le 1 er septembre 2016, il a déclaré ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] Par conséquent, je ne vais pas examiner chaque reçu, je ne vais pas examiner chaque docu

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