2023 QCCQ 3685, 2023 QCCQ 3685

Viola c. Badiei 2023 QCCQ 3685 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-22-258039-190 DATE: June 5, 2023 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE ELIANA MARENGO, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ ANTONINO VIOLA and LYNE COBETTO and DARIUSZ SIENKO Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants v.

FIROOZEH BADIEI Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Plaintiffs are suing defendant in damages for having allegedly defamed them. [ 2 ] In their originating application, dated September 18, 2019, they allege the following, inter alia : 6. On or about September 27 th , 2018, the Syndicat des Copropriétaires du [...] held an Annual General Meeting; 7. Plaintiffs were present at the meeting in their capacities as employees of Services Immobiliers Ton-Der Inc; 8.

Also present at the meeting were approximately 80 co-owners of the building; 9. Defendant was a candidate for an administrator position within the Syndicat des Copropriétaires du [...] and delivered a presentation in support of her candidacy at the meeting; 10. During said presentation and in full presence of those in attendance, Defendant adamantly referred to Plaintiffs as “Mafia”; 11. Plaintiffs submit the representations made by Defendant were a deliberate, malicious attack on their dignity, honour and reputation; 12.

Plaintiffs equally submit that the comments made by Defendant were not only injurious and degrading but also included insults and false accusations which Defendant knew or should have known were totally untrue and unfounded; 13. As a result of Defendant’s malicious and defamatory lies, Plaintiffs have suffered serious consequences both personally and professionally, having subsequently suffered stress, anxiety and angst and had their reputation amongst the members of the Syndicat des Copropriétaires du [...] tarnished; 14.

Plaintiff Viola was especially affected by Defendant’s remarks as he is of Sicilian descent and feels as if his lineage makes him more susceptible to such remarks with the damage caused to his reputation more pronounced and has therefore suffered an elevated amount of stress and anxiety; 15. Consequently, Plaintiff Viola respectfully submits that he is entitled to claim damages from Defendant in the amount of $35,000.00 and Plaintiffs Cobetto and Sienko thus respectfully submit that they are each entitled to damages in the amount of $25,000.00; 16.

Moreover, as Defendant made her comments with a clear intent to damage Plaintiffs’ reputation amongst the co-owners of the property located at [...], Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they are each entitled to punitive damages from Defendant in the amount of $5,000.00; 17. On or about March 25 th , 2019, Defendant was served with a demand letter dated March 15 th , 2019, the whole as can be seen from a copy of the demand letter and proof of service communicated herewith as Exhibit P-2;

18. Hitherto, Defendant has yet to acquiesce to the demands therein and therefore Plaintiffs are well justified in their present recourse before this Honourable Court; […] [ 3 ] On October 30, 2019, defendant responded as follows: ANNEX «A» (Oral Defence ) 1. The words pronounced were made with respect to the nomination process for the election of the administrator for the Syndicate and not towards any individual or group of persons and not with the intent to attack the dignity, honour and reputation of the persons present, let alone the Plaintiffs; 2.

On September 28, 2018, the day after said meeting, Defendant sent an apology E-mail explaining the circumstances in which the words were pronounced. 3. The words pronounced by Defendant during the meeting do not constitute grounds for Plaintiffs’ law suit. 4. Plaintiffs’ claim are abusive and frivolous and without admission, grossly exaggerated. […] [ 4 ] Subsequently, on February 24, 2021, defendant filed the following cross-application: 1.

That for the reasons alleged in Defendant’s Oral defence, Plaintiffs’ Application is unfounded in fact and in law and an abuse of procedure and clearly unfounded, frivolous or intended to harm Defendant; 2. That in view of Plaintiffs’ abusive conduct, Defendant is entitled to and does hereby claim damages from Plaintiff in the amount of $ 20 000 . 00 , as hereinafter detailed: a. Payment of professional fees and disbursements: $7 500.00 b. Punitive damages: $7 500.00 c.

Troubles, inconveniences and stress: $5 000.00 [ 5 ] On November 3, 2023, at trial, defendant amended her cross-application, increasing her demand for professional fees and disbursements to $14,365.57, and the aggregate amount of her claim to $28,865.57. THE FACTS [ 6 ] In 2019, plaintiffs operated a property management business called Ton-Der Property Services Inc. (“Ton-Der”). Cobetto and Sienko were shareholders and directors of the company (exhibit P-1).

Viola acted as “a consultant” (pre-trial examination of December 9, 2019, Cobetto’s deposition page 22, line 10 of the transcript). [ 7 ] Ton-Der managed a condominium building located at [...], in Pierrefonds. This building was comprised of 109 units, and was administered by the Syndicat des Copropriétaires du [...] (“the Syndicate”). [ 8 ] Cobetto was the face of Ton-Der. She was “very visible” in the building.

She dealt with the contractors and subcontractors, and was “in the foreground when it comes to the residents”, while Sienko and Viola were “in the background” (testimony of Cobetto). [ 9 ] Defendant was the owner of unit 601, which she bought in 2011. [ 10 ] Defendant worked for a company which manufactures promotional products. She was its controller and “financial and accounts manager”. [ 11 ] Over the years, defendant noticed “many discrepancies” in the day-to-day administration of the building.

She asked for explanations, but all her requests fell on deaf ears. [ 12 ] In 2018, a litigious matter regarding damages to a carpet, emerged between the Syndicat and defendant. The matter was eventually settled (claim filed in the Small Claims Division, on January 27, 2018, exhibit D-2). [ 13 ] Over the years, defendant met with Cobetto on a few occasions, whom defendant described as “very professional” and polite.

She had no interaction whatsoever with Sienko, and spoke to Viola, whom she described as “very friendly”, on few occasions. [ 14 ] This whole case revolves around events which occurred at a general meeting of the co-owners, on September 27, 2018. The purpose of the meeting was to, inter alia , elect the directors of the Syndicate. [ 15 ] Defendant had been planning to present her candidature for the position of director, and had been working feverishly to that end. She wanted “to give 100% (of herself) to help the building”.

It was “her home”, and she felt her experience as a controller and financial and accounts manager, made her the perfect candidate for the job.

[ 16 ] On September 27, 2018, approximately 80 co-owners (or their representatives) were present for the meeting. [ 17 ] It was a long and vociferous 4-hour meeting. According to Viola, the meetings in this building were all loud and “tended to be long and uncivilized”. At his pre-trial examination, Viola stated that this meeting in particular “was one of the more vocal ones… but nothing irregular for that building… Because there are

interpretations of some co-owners that their rights are not being followed” (transcript, pages 16 and 17). [ 18 ] The following subjects were discussed in the following order, as per Cobetto: 1-Opening of the session 2-Nomination of the officers of the assembly 3-Confirmation of the quorum 4-Adoption of the revised agenda 5-Adoption of the Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held on September 27, 2017 6-Presentation and approval of the audited financial statements for the year ending June 30, 2018 There followed questions from the co-owners concerning the financial statements for 2017-2018: Q1- The current fund and the contingency fund déficit (Mrs J.

Dalton) Q2- The operating expenses (Mr M. Da i gneault) Q3- Confirmation of the deficit in the operating fund (Mrs J. Montpetit) Q4- The accounting of the suit (Mrs J. Montpetit) Q5- The income tax reports (Mrs J. Dalton) 7-Presentation of the budget for the fiscal year July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019 The treasurer opens a question period on the budget: Ql- The column titled " Audited budget 2017-18" (Mr E. Farah) Q2- The contribution to the contingency fund (Mrs J. Dalton) (Mr M. Da i gneault) Q3- The funds attributed to the contingency fund (Mrs D.

Marcog l iese) 8-No min ation of the auditors for the year 2018-2019 9-Approval of the actions taken by the administrators during the fiscal year 2016-2017 10-Ru l es and information A. Interior parking (amendment and vote) B. New rule concerning the use of fireplaces (information) C. Implementation of Law 141 D. Cannabis (information) E. Maintenance inside the units: the responsibility of the co-owners (information) F. Videotron – end of the agreement 11-Reading and answers to questions submitted by co-owners prior to the deliberations of the meeting Ql- Incident in condo 804 and the operating expenses (Mrs J.

Montpetit) Q2- Communication and unacceptable behaviour towards the co-owners (Mrs J. Montpetit) Q3- Cleanliness of the common areas (Mr M, Daigneault) Q4- Operating expenses / administration costs (Mrs M. Jacques) Q5- Condo fees (Mrs L. Jones) Q6,7,8- Tasks of the caretaker (Mr A. Di Cesare) Q9- Election of the administrators (Mr A. Di Cesare)

Q 10 - Transmission of information (Mr A . D i Cesare) Q 11 - Tasks of the caretaker (Mrs C. Montpetit) Q12- Security of the building (Mrs C. Montpetit) Q13- Protection of the riverbank / protective covers (Mr and Mrs Kapuscinski) Q14- Documents of the AGM / tasks of the caretaker (Mrs S. Vockathaler) (minutes, exhibit D-4) [ 19 ] Towards the end of the meeting, the process of electing directors began. [ 20 ] Me Éric Dugas presided the meeting.

Under pressure from the staff of the Pierrefonds Cultural Centre to “wrap it up”, as the building was closing soon, he asked the candidates to briefly introduce themselves and make their representations. [ 21 ] After all the other candidates had spoken, defendant got up to speak with the many documents she had prepared. She was last to speak, and was told that she only had 30 seconds. [ 22 ] Defendant was nervous, stressed and dismayed. She had much to say, but practically no time to speak.

She had been preparing for days, and then this… [ 23 ] It should be noted that defendant’s mother tongue is not English. [ 24 ] She was facing the crowd. Cobetto was in the back of the room. Viola and Sienko were not in defendant’s line of vision. [ 25 ] In a frustrated and agitated state, feeling slighted and dismissed, defendant said the following: FIROOZEH BADIEI: My name is Firoozeh Badiei. For so many people, they know me as Rosa, in the building. I'm your new candidate for the board of directors. I have been living in the building for the past 11 years.

So many years that I wanted to be in charge of the board of directors, I'm the kind of person I put 150% of myself, if anybody give me a job. But, to be honest with you, always I got disappointed because I feel our building is run by (inaudible) kind of Mafia. MULTIPLE VOICES: Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. (inaudible) FIROOZEH BADIEI: No, because — MALE VOICE: Retract it. FIROOZEH BADIEI: Because these (inaudible) people, they come here with 40 proxy (ph) – MALE VOICE IN MIC: Madame,— FIROOZEH BADIEI: — their pocket, That’s not fair.

MULTIPLE VOICES: (inaudible) FIROOZEH BADIEI: — for the rest of you, you think your vote (ph) counts. I think - I have been - okay, for rest of you, I'm saying that. Not (inaudible). MALE VOICE: It's too late. Too late. FIROOZEH BADIEI: I've worked as a controller for past 20 years, for (inaudible) Corporation. I have a finance and accounting degree, and I think my vocation can - is a benefit that (inaudible) for our building that I can decree (ph) so many expenses that I know it’s not (inaudible) –

MALE VOICE IN MIC: (French) MULTIPLE VOICES: (inaudible) MALE VOICE IN MIC: (French) FIROOZEH BADIEI: I withdraw myself. FEMALE VOICE: Good. MULTIPLE VOICES: (inaudible) Bravo. (APPLAUSE AND CHEERING) FIROOZEH BADIEI: Are we (inaudible) in fairness (inaudible) MULTIPLE VOICES: (inaudible) FIROOZEH BADIEI: Sorry, Jack (ph). You are very brave. MULTIPLE VOICES: (inaudible) FIROOZEH BADIEI: You know already (inaudible) MULTIPLE VOICES: (inaudible) FIROOZEH BADIEI: They have – they have 40 proxy (ph) in their pockets.

MALE VOICE: (French) FIROOZEH BADIEI: No, no, there are so many people – MALE VOICE IN MIC: (French) […] (official transcript, pages 3 to 6, exhibit P-4) [ 26 ] Given the crowd’s negative reaction to defendant’s presentation, she withdrew her candidacy. [ 27 ] It is important to note that defendant never addressed the defendants directly or mentioned their names, while she was speaking. [ 28 ] It is also important to note that this incident was not mentioned in the minutes of the meeting.

[ 29 ] The next day, regretting how she acted, defendant sent the following letter of apology to Gilles Bertrand of the Syndicate: Hi Mr. Bertrand Before anything, I have to apologize that I lost my composure last night at the meeting . I should not have called our syndicate " like kind of Mafia". I hope you understand our frustrations . we all pay same condo fees and live in this building where we call it " home" . we all are co- owners and no matter of what kind of ideas we have to run the building, we should be treated equally, fairly and with total respect and zero arrogance .

Congratulations to all of you on another term as board of directors , You all won legally but not Fairley . you all won with the help of lots of proxies !! you know it and we know it !! But legal is legal !! Another point which is not fair , Only give 30 seconds to introduce ourselves as new candidates and tell other co- owners what we can offer, it is not enough at all. I do not know whose decision was you or the notary 100% is not acceptable. Please arrange at least 3- 5 minutes for next year.

I wish a total harmoney and respect from both siedes {board of directors and co-owners) in our building for years to come. Thanks Firoozeh Badiei (Accounting & Finance Manager) (email, exhibit D-1) [ 30 ] On December 13, 2018, defendant sent another email to the Syndicate: I just received your registered mail dated December 07. I sent e mail below on September 28 legally consider " written ". I suggest you to read your e- mails once in a while . you are wasting our condo fees money to pay and send me registered mail 2 months after the incident when I sent you apologize letter the day after the meeting .

And also you are wasting my time and put me in stress , This is total " HARRASEMENT" . Now, I need you to send me " written apology letter" . Please !! it does not need to be registered ! you wasted enough money on the first letter . E- mail apology is good enough !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Firoozeh Badiei ( Accounting & Finance Manager) ( email, exhibit D-1) [ 31 ] On March 15, 2019, plaintiffs’ lawyers sent the following demand letter to plaintiff: Mrs. Badiei, We represent the interests of Mr. Antonino Viola, Mrs.

Lynn Cobetto and Derek Sienko of Services immobiliers Ton-Der Inc. who have mandated us to forward you the present letter of demand. As you are aware, on September 27 lh , 2018, there was an Annual General Meeting regarding Le Syndicat des Copropriétaires du [...] at which our clients were all present on behalf of Services Immobiliers Ton-Der Inc. as part of its property management mandate with le Syndicat des Copropriétaires du [...]. There were about 80 co-owners present at the meeting, including the President of the Assembly, who is a notary in Quebec.

During your presentation of your candidacy for an administrator position at same, you willfully spread false and misleading comments about our clients, stating that they are the mafia. Your statement was utterly false and without merit and it constitutes grounds for slander and defamation. Your attempt to spread misleading and malicious misinformation regarding our clients has raised serious and irreparable damage to their reputation. Our clients will not tolerate that this misconduct continue.

We therefore demand you immediately cease and desist in spreading, directly or indirectly, defamatory statements about our clients and that you compensate our client for the damages they have suffered in the amount of seventy five thousand dollars ($75 000.00).

Failure to remit payment in the amount of seventy five thousand dollars ($75 000.00) within a delay of ten (10) days after the reception of this present letter payable to the order of "Brook Legal Inc. in trust", and/or spreading defamatory comments about our clients, we shall institute the necessary judicial proceedings on behalf of our clients without further notice and/or delay. DO GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY. (sig.) Me Karolina Izydorczyk ;

(exhibit P-2) and, on September 18, 2019, plaintiffs filed their suit for $40,000,00, $30,000.00 and $30,000.00 respectively. [ 32 ] No demand for a retraction was ever made to defendant. ANALYSIS AND DECISION

A) ORIGINATING APPLICATION [ 33 ] In La Responsabilité Civile, [1] the authors define defamation, and underscore that, without a fault or omission, there can be no defamation: 1. Nature du recours 1-297 Nécessité d’une faute – Pour que la diffamation donne ouverture à une action en dommages-intérêts, son auteur doit avoir commis une faute.

Cette faute peut résulter de deux genres de conduite, La première est celle où le défendeur, sciemment, de mauvaise foi, avec intention de nuire, s’attaque à la réputation de la victime et cherche à la ridiculiser, à l’humilier, à l’exposer à la haine ou au mépris du public ou d’un groupe ce qui correspond à l’ancienne notion de délit. La seconde résulte d’un comportement dont la volonté de nuire est absente, mais où le défendeur a, malgré tout, porté atteinte à la réputation de la victime par sa témérité, sa négligence, son impertinence ou son incurie. Ce qui correspondait au quasi-délit.

Les deux conduites donnent ouverture à responsabilité et droit à réparation, sans qu’il existe de véritable différence entre elles sur le plan du droit. En d’autres termes, il convient de se référer aux règles ordinaires de la responsabilité civile et d’abandonner résolument l’idée fausse que la diffamation est seulement le fruit d’un acte de mauvaise foi emportant intention de nuire. Par contre, il ne faut pas conclure de ces principes que l’incivilité et la grossièreté constituent en toutes circonstances des fautes puisque les tribunaux «ne sont pas les gardiens du savoir-vivre ni du bon goût».

De plus, la diffamation, en droit civil, ne résulte pas seulement de la divulgation ou de la publication de nouvelles fausses ou erronées. S’il n’y a généralement pas de responsabilité lorsque les faits publiés sont exacts et d’intérêt public, lorsque la publication n’a pour autre but que de nuire à la victime elle constitue sans aucun doute de la diffamation. Il en est ainsi par exemple lorsqu’on est en présence de références au nazisme, lesquelles outrepassent le droit à la libre expression.

En d’autres termes, on ne peut se réfugier derrière le droit à la libre expression dans le seul but de porter préjudice à autrui. [ 34 ] Defendant chose the words she chose, on September 27, 2018, because she felt that the election process was unfair, and violated her right to present her candidacy to sit on the Board of Directors. [ 35 ] As above stated, defendant need not have acted with bad faith, for her words to be defamatory. [ 36 ] Nonetheless, the problem with plaintiffs’ case is that defamation requires not only a fault; it also required a victim, and plaintiffs did not prove, according to a preponderance of evidence, that they were personally targeted. [ 37 ] Defendant did not address or even look at plaintiffs while she was speaking, nor did she mention them.

In fact, she didn’t even know Viola and Sienko were in the room. [ 38 ] At trial, defendant stated, “The words were never for them. They are not in authority. I was upset and frustrated with the Board of Directors”. [ 39 ] She also stated that she had very cordial relations with Cobetto over the years; that Viola was “very friendly” the rare times that she spoke to them; and that she had never even met Sienko.

Clearly, defendant had no bones to pick with plaintiffs, and wished them no ill will. [ 40 ] What is more, both at his pre-trial examination and during his cross-examination, Viola declared that defendant “referred to” and “referenced” both the Board of Directors and “Management”, when she spoke about a “kind of mafia”; but she did not.

He also stated that he never listened to and refused to listen to the recording of the meeting; yet, he sued defendant for $40,000.00, without carefully revisiting the events of that evening. [ 41 ] Plaintiffs may have felt like they were being targeted, but feeling it and proving it are two different things: [55] Il importe de retenir que la diffamation ne se définit pas selon l’appréciation subjective de la personne visée par les propos en cause puisque cela reviendrait à dire que le concept de la diffamation est une cible mouvante au gré des sensibilités des individus.

Il faut plutôt évaluer le préjudice à travers les yeux du citoyen ordinaire, ce qui permet d’éviter l’appréciation subjective du préjudice et, partant, la stérilisation arbitraire de la liberté d’expression : [26] Le préjudice qui définit la diffamation est l’atteinte à la réputation. Dans notre droit, l’atteinte à la réputation est appréciée objectivement, c’est-à-dire en se référant au point de vue du citoyen ordinaire (Néron, par. 57; Prud’homme, par. 34; Métromédia C.M.R. Montréal inc. c. Johnson, 2006 QCCA 132 , [2006] R.J.Q. 395 , par. 49 ). […]

[28] C’est l’importance de ces « autres » dans le concept de réputation qui justifie le recours à la norme objective du citoyen ordinaire qui les symbolise. Un sentiment d’humiliation, de tristesse ou de frustration chez la personne même qui prétend avoir été diffamée est donc insuffisant pour fonder un recours en diffamation. Dans un tel recours, l’examen du préjudice se situe à un second niveau, axé non sur la victime elle-même, mais sur la perception des autres.

Le préjudice existe lorsque le « citoyen ordinaire estim[e] que les propos tenus, pris dans leur ensemble, ont déconsidéré la réputation » de la victime (Prud’homme, par. 34). Il faut cependant se garder de laisser glisser l’analyse du préjudice vers un troisième niveau et de se demander, comme semble l’avoir fait la majorité de la Cour d’appel (par. 73), si le citoyen ordinaire, se portant lui-même juge des faits, aurait estimé que la réputation de la victime a été déconsidérée aux yeux d’un public susceptible d’ajouter foi aux propos de M. Arthur.

C’est plutôt ce citoyen ordinaire qui est observé par le juge et qui incarne les « autres ». [29] Le recours à la norme objective du citoyen ordinaire présente des avantages certains, que décrit bien la juge Bich dans ses motifs : [Cette norme] a l’avantage de ne pas rendre l’exercice de qualification du propos litigieux et, par conséquent, la détermination du préjudice tributaires de l’émotion ou du sentiment purement subjectif de la personne qui s’estime diffamée.

S’il suffisait en effet, pour établir le caractère préjudiciable d’un propos, de faire état de son sentiment d’humiliation, de mortification, de vexation, d’indignation, de tristesse ou de contrariété personnelle ou encore d’un froissement, d’un heurt ou même d’un piétinement de la sensibilité, il ne resterait pas grand-chose de la liberté d’opinion et d’expression.

En outre, ce serait faire dépendre l’idée même de diffamation, entièrement, de l’affectivité particulière de chaque individu. [par. 40] [2] [ 42 ] Furthermore, even if plaintiffs believed that they were being targeted by defendant, that which the Court does not believe, as part of a loosely formed group (Board of Directors and “management”, of which they believed to be a part), plaintiffs’ onus was to prove that they were being personally targeted: La règle, en droit commun, est la même en matière de diffamation. Une personne uniquement à

titre de membre d'une collectivité visée par les propos injurieux, n'a pas l'intérêt suffisant pour former une instance civile basée sur telle diffamation; il faudra qu'elle allègue qu'elle a été visée et atteinte personnellement. La diffa​mation doit être personnelle. C'est ainsi que dans l'arrêt Ortenberg c.

Plamondon et Autres, (1915) 24 B.R. 69 et 385, notre cour a reconnu au demandeur l'intérêt suffisant parce que l’injure, en plus de la collectivité dont il faisait partie, le visait personnellement [3] . [ 43 ] Lastly, there is not an iota of evidence that plaintiffs suffered any damage as a direct and immediate consequence of defendant’s words. [ 44 ] At his pre-trial examination, Viola stated: The thirty-five thousand (35,000) is a pittance compared to the damages and the harm that somebody's words can do to somebody. It's not the thirty-five thousand (35,000).

If it was up to me, it would be thirty-five million (35, 000, 000) . It is a point to be made that you cannot go and discuss, and say lies about people, and then on the pretense, "I was frustrated." If it was up to me, it would be far worse. But we live in a society in Quebec where damages to a victim are not important.

So, that being said, we decided that the number of thirty-five thousand (35,000), which represents a meaningless amount. . . can't even buy a car for thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), but it is enough of an amount that the next time somebody wants to utter words that are lies, and malicious words… (transcript, p. 25, lines 6 to 23) [ 45 ] At trial, Viola stated that, four years after the fact, he had not in fact suffered any financial losses as a result of the meeting of September 27, 2018.

Indeed, even the contract with the building in question was renewed. [ 46 ] At her pre-trial examination, Cobetto also stated that no third parties ever brought up the events of September 27, 2018, to her, after the fact (p. 29). She was worried about “future business prospects” (p. 31), but could offer no concrete proof of loss, not then, and not at trial, four years later. She also stated that no third party had ever spoken to her about the events at bar, up to and including the day of her testimony. [ 47 ] Sienko’s testimony was to the same effect. [ 48 ] In Horic c.

Nepveu , above-cited, the Court stated: [53] Quant à la démonstration du préjudice, autre composante essentielle de toute action en responsabilité civile, la Cour suprême rappelle que le recours en diffamation est un domaine du droit où il importe de bien distinguer entre la faute et le préjudice. En effet, la démonstration de la commission d’une faute n’établit pas, sans plus, l’existence d’un préjudice susceptible de réparation.

De la même manière, la preuve du préjudice ne permet pas de présumer qu’une faute a été commise. [54] Ainsi, s’il s’avère, dans un premier temps, qu’une faute a été commise, il faut, néanmoins, dans un deuxième temps, déterminer s’il y a eu préjudice. Pour ce faire, il y a lieu de recourir à la norme objective du citoyen ordinaire afin de déterminer si les propos en cause ont diminué l’estime que le citoyen ordinaire porte à la personne visée par les propos. [ 49 ] Simply stated, as in all civil matters, creditors must prove, according to a preponderance of evidence,

a) fault or omission,

b) damages and

c) a causal like between the two, that which plaintiffs failed to do. [ 50 ] Insofar as future injury is concerned, it must be certain and assessable for it to be taken into account in awarding damages (s. 1611 C.C.Q.). This is absolutely not the case in the present instance. [ 51 ] What is more, as stated in Lizotte c. Dubé: [4]

« La seule crainte d’un dommage futur ne constitue pas un intérêt suffisant. » [ 52 ] Furthermore, even if plaintiffs had proven that defendant defamed the so-called “management” of the building, it is Ton-Der who would have been potentially victimized and not plaintiffs personally. [ 53 ] For all of the above reasons, plaintiffs’ recourse must be dismissed.

B) CROSS-APPLICATION [ 54 ] As outlined above, defendant is seeking damages for professional fees and disbursements incurred, for punitive damages and for stress, trouble and inconvenience. [ 55 ] Plaintiffs wrongly and strongly assumed that defendant’s words were directed towards them personally, when they were not, and litigation ensued. [ 56 ] Does this however constitute sufficient basis to grant her cross-application? [ 57 ] The Court thinks not. [ 58 ]

Section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: 17. The court cannot rule on an application, or take a measure on its own initiative, which affects the rights of a party unless the party has been heard or duly called. In any contentious matter, the court, even on its own initiative, must uphold the adversarial principle and see that it is adhered to until the judgment and during execution of the judgment.

It cannot base its decision on grounds the parties have not had the opportunity to debate. [ 59 ] Even if their recourse was, in the end, considered to be unfounded, plaintiffs had the right to bring it before the Court and the right to a debate. [ 60 ] Given that plaintiffs were genuinely, albeit subjectively, affected by the words pronounced by defendant on September 27, 2018; given that defendant admitted to having “lost (her) composure”; and given that defendant also admitted that she should not have “called (the) syndicate like kind of Mafia” (email, exhibit D-1), the Court cannot conclude that there was abuse of procedure on plaintiffs’ part (s. 51 C.P.C.). [ 61 ] Accordingly, the Court does not find that the application was clearly unfounded, frivolous or in conduct that was vexatious or quarrelsome.

The Court does not find that plaintiffs’ use of procedure was excessive or unreasonable or attempted to defeat the ends of justice; nor does the Court believe that plaintiffs acted in bad faith. [ 62 ] Consequently, the Court shall not apply s. 54 C.P.C., and shall not award the damages sought. [ 63 ] In closing, the Court wishes to cite the following passage from a decision rendered by the Court of appeal in Groupe Guy Pépin inc . c.

Nova PB inc . [5] . [22] L’appelante reproche au juge de première instance d’avoir erré en concluant que les faits allégués ne justifiaient pas les conclusions recherchées à propos de l'abus de procédures. Elle soutient en substance qu’elle a dû encourir d'importants frais pour exercer le recours en délaissement forcé et qu’elle a subi des dommages substantiels pour préparer et présenter une preuve dont plusieurs éléments essentiels n'ont pas été contredits. L’intimée aurait posé des gestes déloyaux et haineux à son égard.

De plus, cette dernière aurait contesté de façon vexatoire et déraisonnable la créance qui faisait l'objet du recours en délaissement forcé. [23] Notre Cour s'est déjà penchée il y a quelque temps sur la question de l'octroi des honoraires extrajudiciaires à

titre de dommages dans les arrêts Viel c. Les entreprises immobilières du terroir ltée et Société Radio-Canada c. Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing inc. . Comme le signale le juge Rochon dans l'arrêt Viel , la seule indemnisation possible d'un plaideur victorieux doit être régie par les principes de la responsabilité civile. Dans cette décision unanime, la Cour débute son analyse par une distinction essentielle entre l’abus de droit sur le fond du litige et l’abus du droit d’ester en justice. L’abus de droit sur le fond du litige intervient lorsqu’une «

partie abuse de son droit par une conduite répréhensible, outrageante, abusive, de mauvaise foi ». Ce type d’abus se présente avant que les procédures judiciaires n’aient débuté puisqu’il incite la

partie adverse à prendre un recours pour sanctionner ce comportement ou pour obtenir une compensation. S'appuyant sur l'opinion du juge Baudouin dans l'affaire Sigma Construction , le juge Rochon définit l'abus du droit d’ester en justice comme une « [...] faute commise à l’occasion d’un recours judiciaire. Ce sera le cas où la contestation judiciaire est, au départ de mauvaise foi, soit en demande ou en défense. Ce sera encore le cas lorsqu’une

partie de mauvaise foi, multiplie les procédures, poursuit inutilement et abusivement un débat judiciaire ». L’abus du droit d’ester en justice peut, également, naître pendant les procédures si une

partie s’aperçoit de son erreur et poursuit inutilement le débat judiciaire. Ainsi, la

partie abusant de son droit d’ester en justice cause un dommage à la

partie adverse qui est obligée de débourser des honoraires d’avocat inutiles. [24] Toujours sous la plume du juge Rochon, la Cour d’appel déclare que les honoraires extrajudiciaires ne peuvent être accordés, à

titre de dommages-intérêts, que s’il survient une situation constitutive d’un abus du droit d’ester en justice. Il écrit « En principe et sauf circonstances exceptionnelles, les honoraires payés par une

partie à son avocat ne peuvent, à mon avis, être considérés comme un dommage direct qui sanctionne un abus sur le fond. Il n'existe pas de lien de causalité adéquat entre la faute (abus sur le fond) et le dommage. [..] Seul l'abus du droit d'ester en justice peut être sanctionné par l'octroi de tels dommages ». Et il ajoute qu'« en matière d'abus du droit d'ester en justice, il faut éviter de conclure à l'abus dès que la thèse mise de l'avant est quelque peu fragile sans être abusive ».

[25] En l'occurrence, l'appelante plaide à la fois l'abus de droit sur le fond du litige et l'abus du droit d'ester en justice. En effet, les allégations contenues aux paragraphes 4 à 7 de la déclaration réamendée de l'appelante appuient, du moins en partie, des prétentions relatives à l'abus de droit sur le fond du litige. Mais l’appelante ne peut réclamer des dommages pour procédure abusive que s'il y a eu un abus du droit d'ester en justice. ; as well as par. 58 of Acadia et Subaru c. Michaud [6] , where the Court stated as follows: [58] When it is argued that a suit is "clearly unfounded" in law,

article 54.1 C.C.P. requires a further finding of blame on the part of the litigant who brought the suit. In other words, the litigant must not only have brought a suit that is unfounded in law, he or she must have done so in a manner that is so patent, or so frivolous or dilatory as to be an abuse of process. I take guidance on this point from the reasons of Dalphond J.A. in Royal Lepage: "le fait de mettre de l’avant un recours ou une procédure alors qu’une personne raisonnable et prudente, placée dans les circonstances connues par la

partie au moment où elle dépose la procédure ou l’argumente, conclurait à l’inexistence d’un fondement pour cette procédure". Dalphond, J.A. also noted, echoing the sentiment of Rochon J.A. expressed in Viel, that a finding of impropriety on this basis is not to be arrived at lightly. The compass for this evaluation of impropriety is expanded at

article 54.1 C.C.P. as against former

article 75.1 C.C.P., to include an evaluation of the evidence filed at whatever stage of the proceedings the motion for improper proceedings is brought. At whatever stage it may be, however the additionally blameworthy character of the litigant’s conduct must be shown for the claim to be declared "clearly unfounded" in law. Because Mr. Michaud has failed to show that the suit was unfounded pursuant to the criteria of article 165 (4) C.C.P., it is, perforce, not "clearly unfounded" in law under

article 54.1. ; and, finally, par. 26 of Multiscan Realties inc . c. 9159-4366 Québec inc . [7] : [26] Unlike the preliminary exception to dismiss under

article 168 CCP, the facts alleged are not deemed to be true. In addition, it is not sufficient that the suit be unfounded, the Court must find that the suit is abusive such that, to paraphrase Justice Dalphond in Royal Lepage, a reasonable and prudent person placed in similar circumstances would have concluded that there is no legal basis for the action. WHEREFORE THE COURT HEREBY: DISMISSES plaintiffs’ originating application; DISMISSES defendant’s cross-application; EACH PARTY paying its own costs. __________________________________ ELIANA MARENGO, J.C.Q. Me Dario Hajjar BROOK LÉGAL INC.

Lawyers for Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Me Jean Trottier Lawyer for Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff Dates of hearing: November 2 and 3, 2022, and March 6, 2023