2021 NBCA 6, 2021 NBCA 6

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK CHRISTOPHER SCOTT RAYWORTH APPELLANT 34-20-CA CHRISTOPHER SCOTT RAYWORTH APPELANT - and - - et - STEPHANIE JEAN MORE RESPONDENT STEPHANIE JEAN MORE INTIMÉE Rayworth v. More, 2021 NBCA 6 Rayworth c.

More, 2021 NBCA 6 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’sBench: March 9, 2020 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de laReine : le 9 mars 2020 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2020 NBQB 64 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2020 NBQB 64 , 2020 NBBR 64 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune

Appeal heard: November 27, 2020 Judgment rendered: November 30, 2020 Reasons delivered: February 11, 2021 Appel entendu : le 27 novembre 2020 Jugement rendu : le November 30, 2020 Motifs déposés : le 11 février 2021 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Grant Ogilvie, Q.C.

For the respondent: Amanda Dawn McCordic Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Grant Ogilvie, c.r. Pour l’intimée : Amanda Dawn McCordic THE COURT On November 30, 2020, the substantive grounds of appeal were dismissed, except for the issue of costs, with reasons to follow. On that issue, the appeal is allowed. The cost award in the court below is set aside and substituted costs of $2,500 plus taxable disbursements in favour of Ms. More are ordered.

Since the respondent was largely successful, she is awarded costs on the appeal in the amount of $2,500. LA COUR Le 30 novembre 2020, les moyens d’appel portant sur le fond ont été rejetés, sauf quant à la question des dépens. La Cour a alors indiqué que les motifs suivraient. Sur la question des dépens, l’appel est accueilli. Les dépens accordés par l’instance inférieure sont annulés. Des dépens de 2 500 $ plus les débours taxables sont accordés à M me More. L’intimée ayant eu gain de cause dans une large mesure, la Cour lui accorde des dépens de 2 500 $ en appel. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an appeal of a judge’s decision to dismiss a motion to vary the time-limited spousal support provisions of a consent order under the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2 nd Supp .) ( Act ). Following the expiration of the defined term, the appellant filed a motion to vary under ss. 15.2 and 17(1) of the Act . The judge dismissed the motion on the basis the appellant failed to meet the required threshold tests for variation under s. 17 . II.

Background [ 2 ] In March 2013, after approximately nineteen years of marriage, the appellant and the respondent separated. There was one child of the marriage, born in 2001. The respondent wife is a professional engineer and the appellant husband was employed as an engineering technician until the birth of the child, following which it was agreed he would become a stay-at-home father. This was the status quo for eleven years until separation. Divorce proceedings were initiated by the husband in November 2013. [ 3 ] The parties negotiated a resolution of all matters at a settlement conference.

Both were represented by counsel and there are no allegations of undue influence, failure to disclose, improvidence, unfair bargaining, or inequity, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Miglin v. Miglin , 2003 SCC 24 , [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303 . On November 10, 2014, the terms of the settlement were incorporated into a final consent order. The appellant agreed to time-limited spousal support in the amount of $3,114 monthly, commencing November 1, 2014 and continuing until June 1, 2019. At the time, the respondent’s annual income was assessed at $150,288 and the appellant’s annual income was imputed at $20,800.

Although the parties agreed to the following terms, they were not ordered by the judge. The divorce judgment records:

Section 10 of the order includes those additional provisions the parties agreed were binding upon them despite their not having been ordered by the Court: (a) “Neither party shall now or at any time in the future seek, ask, demand or in any manner require or make any claim for monies for their own support or maintenance from the other except in accordance with paragraph number 5 above.

The parties further acknowledge that this Final Consent Order is equitable and appropriate in the circumstances with particular regard to the objectives and factors contained in sections 15 and 17 of the Divorce Act as well as all similar considerations contained in the Family Services Act , R.S.N.B., 1980, c. F-2.2. Both parties accept the terms of the Final Consent Order in full satisfaction of all claims and causes of action while he or she now has or may hereafter acquire against the other for support whether under the Divorce Act , the Family Services Act , the Provisions for Dependents Act , S.N.B. 1991, c.

P-22.3 or otherwise, and whether under presently existing legislation or future legislation and whether in this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction; (

b) The parties acknowledge and agree that, subject to paragraph 5 above, regardless of any change in their respective financial circumstances whether by reason of health, employment, cost of living change or otherwise, neither party shall be entitled to receive spousal support from the other pursuant to any legislative provision or the operation of common law.

Both parties accept the provisions of the Final Consent Order in full settlement of all claims and demands for their own support or maintenance, past, present or future, and both parties agree that this Final Consent Order may be plead by either as estoppel in respect of any claim which may be made by the other for support, maintenance, alimony or any similar form of maintenance at any proceeding in the future except in accordance with paragraph number 5 above.

It is further acknowledged and agreed by the parties that they have recognized the particular circumstances of their marriage, the termination of their marriage, their current economic circumstances and consequences of their marriage and fully and fairly makes provision for all claims of spousal support based on either need, compensatory support, contractual support or any other form of statutory or legislated support; (

c) The Petitioner covenants and agrees to save harmless and indemnify the Respondent and her estate from any present or future demand or Court Order for alimony, support or maintenance for himself beyond that set out in paragraph 5 above; (

d) The Respondent covenants and agrees to save harmless and indemnify the Petitioner and his estate from any present or future demand

or Court Order for alimony, support or maintenance for herself; and, (

e) The parties agree that during the term spousal support is payable under paragraph 5 above, neither shall seek a variation of either the amount or duration of spousal support, regardless of any change in their respective financial circumstances whether by reason of health, employment, cost of living change or otherwise.” [ 4 ] The respondent argues this paragraph operates as an estoppel to any attempt either party might make to vary the terms of spousal support; alternatively, she asserts the appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish economic hardship, as required under s. 17(10), and he erroneously argued the motion as if it were a request for a spousal support order in the first instance under s. 15(2).

This distinction is important because once the terms of a spousal support agreement are incorporated into an order, it is presumed they met the objectives set out in s. 15.2(1) at the time the order was signed; however, a consent order can still be varied under s. 17(4.1), provided the moving party meets the objectives and the criteria set out in s. 17 . The judge who granted the divorce judgment in this case endorsed the order accordingly, as a tacit recognition she did not have the authority to oust the residual jurisdiction of the court to vary an order under s. 17 .

The threshold changes, however, when a motion to vary a time-limited support order is filed following the expiration of the term. In that event, the moving party has an additional onus to prove that the variation is necessary to relieve economic hardship arising from a change described in s. 17(4.1) that is related to the marriage, and the change in circumstances, if it had existed at the time the support order issued or the last variation order was made, would likely have resulted in a different order. [ 5 ] In his motion, the appellant requested the following relief:

a) the order dated November 10, 2014 be varied such to eliminate the termination date for spousal support pursuant to s. 17(1) of the Act ; alternatively,

b) the terms of the order dated November 10, 2014 be set aside and spousal support be ordered paid in accordance with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines , commencing July 1, 2019 under ss. 15.2 and/or 17(1) of the Act . [ 6 ] The grounds for the motion were framed as follows: 1) the existing order did not reflect the objectives set out in s. 15.2(6) of the Act because this was a long-term marriage and the appellant had stayed at home for eleven years to be a caregiver to their child; and 2) the appellant had an economic need that was causally connected to the marriage and its breakdown, due to his inability to attain economic self-sufficiency within the limited period set out in the order. [ 7 ] In this case, s. 17(10) applied because the motion was filed following the expiration of the term.

The appellant argued he agreed to time-limited spousal support based on his understanding that he would be able to re-enter the workforce within the specified period, and his inability to do so constituted a material change. At paragraph 28 of his affidavit, he states: “At the time of the settlement conference and at the date of my signing our consent order, the respondent and I were both of the belief that I would be able to re-enter the work force quickly, as I had been successfully employed for many years leading up to the birth of our daughter.

However, notwithstanding my ongoing efforts, this has not been the case.” In support, the following was offered as proof of his inability to secure full-time employment:

a) a list of the names of employers, the positions he applied for and the dates of those contacts since 2014;

b) a statement that he participated in additional training and educational programs;

c) a statement that, in 2015, he began coaching sessions and attended the New Brunswick Community College to study business analysis and project management;

d) a statement that, in April 2016, he began on-the-job training with a Fredericton company for a period of one year;

e) a statement that he had started a French-language program;

f) a statement that, in both 2017 and 2018, he obtained the certification necessary for software tester and Agile Scrum Master; and

g) a statement that, in 2018, he obtained a six to seven-month contract position with a business known as Culinary Therapy. [ 8 ] In reply, the respondent requested that:

a) the motion be dismissed in its entirety on the basis it was intended the order would be final and not subject to variation;

b) in the alternative, the motion be dismissed under s. 17(10) of the Act ;

c) in the alternative, the motion be dismissed on the basis the appellant failed to provide adequate proof of his claim;

d) in the alternative, the motion be dismissed as the Province of New Brunswick was no longer the proper jurisdiction because both parties and the child of the marriage were relocating to the province of Nova Scotia; and

e) costs of the motion on a solicitor-client basis. [ 9 ] Following the hearing, the appellant secured full-time employment. As well, on June 26, 2020, the respondent’s position became redundant, and she received her severance package.

Prior to the hearing of the appeal, a motion for the introduction of fresh evidence was filed, and, by way of a Consent Order, we received a Book of Agreed Evidence, which included the appellant’s proof of income for the period from October 24, 2019 to March 26, 2020, an email to the respondent from her former employer concerning her severance, and DivorceMate calculations prepared on September 11, 2014, and January 23, 2014. [ 10 ] At one point, the respondent suggested the changes in their respective financial situations rendered the appeal moot; however, this was not seriously pursued with good reason and need not be addressed further.

III. The Motion Judge’s Decision [ 11 ] The motion was heard and decided on the affidavit evidence and the oral and written submissions of counsel. The judge determined the requirements of s. 17(10) had not been met, and he found the appellant failed to prove material change under s. 17(4.1) of the Act . The judge dismissed both the motion and the respondent’s request to change the jurisdiction of the proceedings to the Province of Nova Scotia, and he granted costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.

There has been no cross-appeal filed with respect to the dismissal of the wife’s request to change the jurisdiction of the proceedings. IV. Grounds of Appeal [ 12 ] There are eleven grounds of appeal, some of which assert errors of law and others, palpable and overriding errors of fact and of mixed fact and law. Reviewing them as a whole, the appellant advances four errors in the judge’s analysis. He states the judge misapprehended the evidence and committed palpable errors that affected the result.

This ground is linked to the judge’s erroneous findings concerning the appellant’s attempts to secure full-time employment. The appellant’s chief complaint, however, is directed toward the process. He contends this motion required a hearing with viva voce evidence and that the judge’s decision to determine the matter based on the affidavits, particularly because they conflicted on many points, constituted an error in law.

He argues that the motion should have been adjourned to a date for a hearing with viva voce evidence, where the judge’s critical findings of fact and credibility would have been better determined. Finally, he submits the decision to order costs against him in the amount of $5,000 was not justified. V. Standard of Review

[13] The standard of review on support issues is highly deferential (see Hickey v. Hickey, (SCC),[1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, [1999] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL), at paras. 11-12). As Larlee J.A. reiterated in B.P. v.

A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 N.B.R.(2d) 99, spousal support decisions are reviewable if there has been an error in principle or a significant misapprehension of the evidence,or if the award is clearly wrong (para. 12). [14] These decisions are generally stamped with deference, unless it is determined a judge erred in law or principle,committed a palpable and overriding error in his or her application of the facts which influenced the result, or there was an error of mixedlaw or fact. In New Brunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) v. A.R. et al. (2007), (NB CA), 322N.B.R. (2d) 372, [2007] N.B.J.

No. 345 (QL) (C.A.), the Court concluded: “[…] such a decision will not be interfered with on appealunless it can be shown that the motion judge did not direct herself correctly in law and did not observe the applicable principles, ormisapprehended the evidence to the point that an injustice would result” (para. 15). This principle has been consistently applied by theCourt. Finally, whether the matter should have been adjourned was a discretionary decision, which will generally be accorded deference. VI. Analysis A.

The application of s.17(10) in motions to vary time-limited support orders [15] The motion was framed and argued under s. 17(4.1) and, in the alternative, under s. 15(2). As stated, therespondent submits that, under s. 17(10), when a motion to vary is filed following the expiration of a time-limited spousal support order,an additional burden is imposed on the moving party to prove the variation is necessary to relieve economic hardship that is related to achange related to the marriage, as noted.

As will be seen, finality is the public policy reason behind this limitation. [16] Subsection 17(10) of the Act states: Limitation

(10) Notwithstanding subsection (1), where aspousal support order provides for support fora definite period or until a specified eventoccurs, a court may not, on an applicationinstituted after the expiration of that period orthe occurrence of the event, make a variationorder for the purpose of resuming thatsupport unless the court is satisfied that (

a) a variation order is necessary to relieveeconomic hardship arising from a changedescribed in subsection (4.1) that is related tothe marriage; and (

b) the changed circumstances, had theyexisted at the time of the making of thespousal support order or the last variationorder made in respect of that order, as thecase may be, would likely have resulted in adifferent order. Restriction

(10) Par dérogation au paragraphe (1), letribunal ne peut modifier l’ordonnancealimentaire au profit d’un époux dont la duréede validité est déterminée ou dépend d’unévénement précis, sur demande présentéeaprès l’échéance de son terme ou après lasurvenance de cet événement, en vue de lareprise de la fourniture des aliments, que s’ilest convaincu des faits suivants :

a) l’ordonnance modificative s’impose pourremédier à une difficulté économique causéepar un changement visé au paragraphe (4.1)et lié au mariage;

b) la nouvelle situation, si elle avait existé àl’époque où l’ordonnance alimentaire auprofit d’un époux ou la dernière ordonnancemodificative de celle-ci a été rendue, auraitvraisemblablement donné lieu à uneordonnance différente. [17] Subsection 17(4.1) of the Act states:

Factors for spousal support order

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation orderin respect of a spousal support order, thecourt shall satisfy itself that a change in thecondition, means, needs or othercircumstances of either former spouse hasoccurred since the making of the spousalsupport order or the last variation order madein respect of that order, and, in making thevariation order, the court shall take thatchange into consideration. Facteurs — ordonnance alimentaire auprofit d’un époux

(4.1) Avant de rendre une ordonnancemodificative de l’ordonnance alimentaire auprofit d’un époux, le tribunal s’assure qu’ilest survenu un changement dans lesressources, les besoins ou, d’une façongénérale, la situation de l’un ou l’autre desex-époux depuis que cette ordonnance ou ladernière ordonnance modificative de celle-cia été rendue et tient compte du changementen rendant l’ordonnance modificative. [18] The judge quoted extensively from Eidt v. Eidt, 2009 NBQB 152, 348 N.B.R. (2d) 390, where Wooder J.explained that s. 17(10) offers finality to the support process and she described variations under this

section as exceptional (see paras. 84-85 of his decision). As a matter of public policy, stricter criteria apply when a variation of an expired time-limited spousal support orderis sought. Once paid, if they were subject to variation indefinitely, these orders would be rendered meaningless. [19] Both ss. 17(4.1) and 17(10) apply to variation motions filed under s. 17 of the Act; however, when s. 17(10) isin play, there is an additional evidentiary burden imposed on the applicant (see Embree v. Embree, 2016 NBCA 42, 451 N.B.R. (2d)369).

The applicable factors have been the fodder for continuing discussion by the Supreme Court. Miglin established the two-stepanalysis to be applied when a spouse seeks to set aside the terms of a consensual agreement. Following Miglin, the Supreme Courtdecided Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 295. Where Miglin dealt with spousal support, Rick dealt with a propertysettlement. In neither of these cases was there a need for the court to discuss the issue of the binding effect of a court order.

In Miglin, theSupreme Court reiterated that when parties act in a mature and responsible fashion to settle their financial affairs and the settlement is notvulnerable to attack on another basis, it should not be undermined by the courts (para. 45, citing Pelech v. Pelech, (SCC),[1987] 1 S.C.R. 801, [1987] S.C.J. No. 31 (QL)). See also Masters v. Masters, (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 883, [1994]S.C.J. No. 33 (QL). [20] The appellant submits, because this was a long-term marriage and he stayed at home to care for the child, hesuffered an economic disadvantage, and the decision in Moge v.

Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, [1992] S.C.J. No.107 (QL), applies. In that case, an order for indefinite spousal support was made under s. 15(2). Ms. Moge later filed a motion to vary theorder when she became unemployed. The husband replied with a motion of his own, to terminate the spousal support payments.L’Heureux-Dubé J. discussed the objectives set out in s. 17(7): 1) to alleviate economic disadvantage; 2) to apportion the financialconsequences of the care of the children; 3) to alleviate economic hardship related to the marriage; and 4) to promote self-sufficiency andallowed Ms.

Moge’s request to vary. [21] In Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, [1999] S.C.J. No. 14 (QL), theSupreme Court refined its previous decisions concerning spousal support by introducing principles that are the current bedrock of theentitlement analysis under s. 15.2 of the Act: the compensatory, non-compensatory and contractual principles, which are applicablewhether the order is one of first instance under s. 15.2 or whether it is a variation order under s. 17. [22] In L.M.P. v.

L.S., 2011 SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775, the analysis was further refined by requiring the partywho seeks to vary a spousal support order, to show that the original agreement or court order no longer meets the statutory objectives setout in s. 15.2. This is an important distinction, which, from a public policy perspective, acknowledges it would be unfair to require aformer spouse to continue to pay spousal support for reasons unrelated to the marriage and accords with the principle of finality.

When ajudge signs an order in which there are provisions for time-limited spousal support, as in this case, there is a presumption the entitlementquestion has been satisfactorily dealt with. The material change analysis becomes critical, more so in those cases where the time-limitedsupport order has expired. [23] On the issue of material change, in Dedes v. Dedes, 2015 BCCA 194, [2015] B.C.J. No. 883 (QL), the courtconcluded: As articulated in L.M.P., the test for material change is based not on what one party knew or reasonably foresaw, but rather on what the

parties actually contemplated at the time the order was entered by agreement. A function of the material change threshold is to preventparties from re-litigating issues that were already considered and rejected; in such cases, an application to vary would amount to anappeal of the original order (see Gordon at para. 15). As was stated by L’Heureux-Dube J. in Willick at p. 734, “the diversity of possiblescenarios in family law dictates that courts maintain a flexible standard of judicial discretion which does not artificially limit theadaptability of the Divorce Act provisions”. See also G. (L.) v.

B. (G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370 at paras. 49-51 andJakob v. Jakob, 2010 BCCA 136 at para. 40. [para. 25] [Emphasis in original.] [24] As the Supreme Court made clear in L.M.P., a variation motion is neither an appeal nor a de novo hearing. InL.M.P., the parties had executed a comprehensive separation agreement, later incorporated into a court order. The wife received $3,688monthly in spousal support, to be indexed.

Four years later, the former husband filed a variation application under s. 17(4.1), in which hesought a reduction of the spousal support payments on the basis his financial circumstances had materially changed. The Supreme Courtexamined the public policy objectives animating ss. 15.2 and 17(4.1).

Abella and Rothstein JJ. followed L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s lead inMoge, writing: For sound policy reasons, family law permits and encourages separating spouses to work out their own arrangements through the use ofseparation agreements (Berend Hovius and Mary-Jo Maur, Hovius on Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (7th ed. 2009), at p. 783).Agreements are desirable because individuals should largely be free to order their lives as they wish; because “the parties themselves arein the best position to evaluate the comparative advantages of alternative arrangements”; and because a negotiated settlement avoids thesignificant personal and financial costs of litigation […]. [para. 14] [25] Abella and Rothstein JJ. concluded: […] there are differences between what a court is directed to consider in making an initial support order and on a variation of that order.Notably, unlike on an initial application for spousal support under s. 15.2(4)(c), which specifically directs that a court consider “anyorder, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse”, s. 17(4.1) makes no reference to agreements and simply requiresthat a court be satisfied “that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred” sincethe making of the prior order or the last variation of that order.

Because of these differences in language, it is important to keep the s.15.2 and s. 17 analyses distinct. On an application under s. 15.2, the court is expressly concerned with the extent to which the terms of an existing agreement should beincorporated into a first court order for support.

On an application under s. 17, on the other hand, the court must determine whether tovary or rescind that support order because of a change in the parties’ circumstances. […] In determining whether the conditions for variation exist, the threshold that must be met before a court may vary a prior spousal supportorder is articulated in s. 17(4.1).

A court must consider whether there has been a change in the conditions, means, needs or othercircumstances of either former spouse since the making of the spousal support order. […] The decisions in Willick and G. (L.) also make it clear that what amounts to a material change will depend on the actual circumstances ofthe parties at the time of the order. In general, a material change must have some degree of continuity, and not merely be a temporary set of circumstances (see Marinangeliv. Marinangeli (2003), (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 40, at para. 49).

Certain other factors can assist a court in determiningwhether a particular change is material. […]. […]

The examination of the change in circumstances is exactly the same for an order that does not incorporate a prior spousal supportagreement as for one that does. A general statement that the agreement must be accorded “significant weight”, even though itsimplications in a concrete case are unclear, in effect raises the threshold necessary to establish a “material change” under s. 17 when thereis an agreement and emphasizes legal certainty and finality at the expense of the statutory requirements of s. 17.

Such a result isreminiscent of the “clean break” approach of the Pelech trilogy, rejected in Moge and Miglin because it was held to be inappropriate inthe context of the current Divorce Act. [paras. 23-24, 29, 34-35 and 46] [Emphasis in original] [26] The Supreme Court observed that, although the objectives of a variation order are “virtually identical” in s. 17to those in s. 15.2, the “factors to be considered […] are significantly different” (para. 22), particularly when there is an order or anagreement that emphasizes legal certainty and finality (para. 46).

L.M.P. clarified any confusion that lingered on this point from Miglin(paras. 26-27). The threshold test for variations under s. 17(4.1) was described as a material change that was not contemplated by theparties and that has occurred following the making of the previous order. It reiterated its approach to material change that was set out inWillick v. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, [1994] S.C.J. No. 94 (QL), and G.(L.) v. B.(G.), (SCC),[1995] 3 S.C.R. 370, [1995] S.C.J. No. 72 (QL) (para. 49).

However, as Cromwell J. observes at para. 92 in the minority judgment,L.M.P. did not address variation applications that are subject to the limitation set out s. 17(10), which requires the moving party toestablish that his or her economic hardship is related to a change described in s. 17(4.1). To do so, the moving party must providedetailed financial disclosure and prove the economic hardship is related to the marriage. [27] In Embree, this Court wrote: Julien D.

Payne and Marilyn Payne in their text, Canadian Family Law, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) observe the following: Furthermore, any order, whether on consent or otherwise, which fixes the duration of spousal support for a definite period or until theoccurrence of a specified event, falls subject to the additional stringent requirements imposed by section 17(10) of the Divorce Act, if anapplication to vary is brought after expiry of the order.

In that event, the court must be satisfied that a variation order is necessary torelieve economic hardship arising from a change that is related to the marriage and that the changed circumstances would have resultedin a different order had they occurred at the time of the making of the order that is sought to be varied.

Economic hardship that arisesfrom extrinsic circumstances unconnected with the marriage, such as an involuntary loss of employment due to illness or disability or aninability to find employment before expiry of the fixed-term that is unrelated to the duration of and functions performed during themarriage and arises solely by reason of the economic climate, falls outside the protection of section 17(10) of the Divorce Act. The morestringent criteria imposed by section 17(10) of the Divorce Act apply even when the purpose of the variation application is simply toextend the term of support.

Where the termination date arises from spousal agreement, the original order will be assumed to havecorrectly and equitably redistributed the economic consequences of the marriage and its breakdown and the order will be varied onlywhen the changed circumstances distort the equity of the original redistribution of those economic consequences when measured by theobjectives defined in sections 15(7) and 17(7) of the Divorce Act. [p. 285] [para. 15] [Emphasis added.] [28] In the companion decision to L.M.P., the Supreme Court in R.P. v.

R.C., 2011 SCC 65, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 819,dismissed a husband’s motion to vary on the basis there was no evidence of permanent material change in his financial circumstances, hefailed to provide evidence that the change he was relying on was not within the contemplation of the parties when the order was signed,but, more importantly, the financial evidence which would have established his financial circumstances at the time the order was signedwas not produced. [29] Abella and Rothstein JJ. observe: Under s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act, the moving party must establish that there has been a material change of circumstances since themaking of the prior order or variation.

The applicable framework for this case is the one elaborated in the companion decision, L.M.P.To be material, a change must be one which, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms to the existing order. Onan application to vary, the court should consider the terms of the order and the circumstances of the parties at the time the order wasmade to determine whether a particular change is material. The existing order is deemed to have been correct and only if therequirements of s. 17 of the Divorce Act are met will there be a variation. [para. 25]

B. Application of ss. 17(10) and (4.1) to this case [30] In this case, when the parties agreed to time-limited spousal support, there was a tacit acknowledgment theterms of the agreement presumptively met the objectives of s. 15.2 of the Act. The appellant’s material change argument focussed on hisinability to secure full-time employment before the expiration of the support payments. The judge accepted the respondent’s evidencethat this possibility was within their contemplation when the settlement was negotiated.

The respondent specifically made reference tothis in her affidavit, going so far as to attach a copy of her brief from the proceedings in the lower court, in which she expressed a concernthe appellant might not locate full time employment within the time specified because of his poor work ethic. The judge found theappellant’s evidence of economic hardship was incomplete and that he did not meet the preconditions for a variation based on economichardship and material change. [31] The judge was alive to these preconditions.

He found: 1) the appellant failed to provide evidence to support hiscontention the terms of the settlement did not meet the objectives of the Act; 2) he failed to establish a link between his inability to findemployment as a result of the marriage; 3) the consent order specifically stated the terms met the objectives of ss. 15.2 and 17 of the Act;4) the appellant could not link his “financial difficulties to the marriage breakdown”; 5) the appellant had financial resources; and 6) theappellant’s problems were “virtually” identical to the financial problems he had when the order was signed in 2014 (para.73). [32] In their text, The 2020 Annotated Divorce Act (Toronto Carswell, 2019), authors James MacDonald and AnnWilton acknowledge that s. 17(10) “creates a different and apparently higher threshold for a specific type of variation application – onewhich seeks to resume support after the expiry of a time-limited order” (p. 963).

Under s. 17(4.1), the court is required to satisfy itselfthere has been a change in the condition, means and needs or other circumstances of the applicant, taking into consideration theobjectives set out in s. 17(7); however, s. 17(10) limits the court’s power to vary an order that provides for spousal support for a specifiedperiod or to the happening of an event.

In my view, the judge recognized this distinction. [33] In this case both parties acknowledged the judge mischaracterized the appellant’s job search and the evidencehe supplied to support his contention he had unsuccessfully tried to find full-time employment. Although this was a palpable error, in myview it did not affect the result, because the motion was decided for different reasons. There was evidence the appellant had workedfollowing the execution of the agreement; however, the judge found there was insufficient proof of that income. There were schedulesmissing from his income tax returns.

His financial statement showed that he was the owner of a house worth $216,900, that he hadhousehold and personal property valued at $9,350, and savings and pensions of $352,196.19, for a total net worth of $578,446.19, againstwhich there was debt of $98,971.47. The judge found the income disclosure was inadequate and the affidavit evidence did not meet theappellant’s burden to prove economic hardship related to the marriage, nor did it satisfy the requirements of s. 17(4.1). The appellant’srequest to re-open the settlement and have a hearing under ss. 15.2 and 17(4.1) was not supported by the evidence.

It is my view thejudge applied the proper test. I would not interfere with his decision and would dismiss this ground of appeal. C. Should there have been an adjournment with a date set for a hearing? [34] Rule 72.22(1) governs the process for variation motions under the Act. Rule 37 provides that motions shall beaccompanied by affidavits, and cross-examination is permitted, with leave (Rule 39.02(2)). Rule 39.01(1) directs that on a motion orapplication, evidence may be given by affidavit unless directed otherwise by the Rules or by court order.

Motions, by their very nature,are to be heard expeditiously and are generally determined on the affidavit evidence. [35] The importance of pleadings cannot be overstated. The statutory relief requested anchors the court’sjurisdiction to make an order (see Waugh et al. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. et al. (2000), (NB CA), 224 N.B.R.(2d) 391, [2000] N.B.J. No. 80 (QL) (C.A.), per Drapeau, J.A. at paras. 12-13). [36] A judge has control over his or her court and may dispose of a motion in a variety of ways (Rule 37.10).

In myview, when a motion judge is satisfied that he or she has sufficient and reliable evidence before him or her to decide the germane issue indispute, he or she has a wide, but not unfettered, discretion to proceed in the manner he or she determines is in the interests of justice.This is a vested discretion to which deference is accorded. In full compliance with the Rules, parties need to put their “best foot forward”in their affidavits, as there is no guarantee a judge will want to hear viva voce evidence during a motion hearing.

Given the crowdeddockets and the lengthy delays in obtaining trial dates in certain judicial districts, it would become impractical and would interfere withthe administration of justice if every motion to vary a support order were to be decided in the same way as a trial.

[37] In this case, the first issue was whether the appellant met the thresholds of economic hardship and materialchange. At the outset, the respondent drew the court’s attention to the fact the motion was filed following the expiration of the timelimited order, thereby invoking the additional burden of proof under s. 17(10). The appellant’s request to have a hearing came well intohis submission. He proposed: So, I’m asking today that this Court grant an extension of the spousal support, either indefinitely or until a fixed time.

My friend talkedabout the absence of any request for viva voce evidence and it’s an old dance we do, do we get in here now or do I wait six months to getin? It is open to the Court to say, “I’ll grant an interim order now and let’s come back and hear further evidence”. I suggest that theevidence of my client will just further reiterate what he’s done. [38] The judge’s decision to not grant the adjournment was discretionary, and as such, the standard of review islimited (see Burtt v. Boyle et al. (2011), (NB CA), 382 N.B.R. (2d) 206, [2011] N.B.J. No. 471 (QL) (C.A.); TheBeaverbrook Canadian Foundation v.

The Beaverbrook Art Gallery, 2006 NBCA 75, 302 N.B.R. (2d) 161, per Drapeau C.J.N.B. (as hethen was), at para. 4; S.B.-B. v. B.J.S., 2020 NBCA 9, [2020] N.B.J. No. 31 (QL), at para. 40; J.D.F. v. J.L.F.-F., 2020 NBCA 70, [2020]N.B.J. No. 252 (QL), per Quigg J.A., at paras. 38-39). [39] On the issue of whether there should have been a trial, the appellant relies on N.E.R. v. J.D.M., 2011 NBCA57, 377 N.B.R. (2d) 147, and submits the judge could not properly assess credibility without a trial.

He contends the judge violated theguidance of the Court in N.E.R., where Quigg J.A. concluded the judge erred when he decided the motion on the basis of the conflictingaffidavits. N.E.R. dealt with child custody. In this case, the appellant did not seek leave to cross-examine the respondent, nor did he seekleave to amend his pleadings. [40] The general rule has been that in child custody cases when there is conflicting affidavit evidence, a motionjudge should have a hearing. (see Benoît v. Reid (1995), (NB CA), 171 N.B.R. (2d) 161, [1995] N.B.J. No. 553 (QL)(C.A.)).

However, in keeping with changes in judicial attitudes and the Rules concerning expedited hearings, there is an increasingappetite on the part of some judges to even dispose of child custody matters by way of affidavit evidence (see Minister of SocialDevelopment v. A.M. et al., 2020 NBQB 208, [2020] N.B.J. No. 261 (QL); New Brunswick (Minister of Social Development) v. A.A.,2018 NBQB 38, [2018] N.B.J. No. 53 (QL); New Brunswick (Minister of Social Development) v. A.S., 2019 NBQB 77, [2019] N.B.J.No. 104 (QL); New Brunswick (Minister of Social Development) v. V.T. and C.H., 2020 NBQB 167, [2020] N.B.J.

No. 281 (QL)). [41] In this case, the judge was required to conduct an analysis, narrowly circumscribed. His job was not toconduct a de novo trial on entitlement. Not every case where there are conflicting affidavits requires a hearing. As an example, in AlanSchelew et al. v. Lillian Schelew et al., 2016 NBCA 14, [2016] N.B.J. No. 323 (QL), Green J.A. upheld the decision of a judge to disposeof a

summary judgment motion in a civil case on the basis of conflicting affidavit evidence. He writes: For my part, I am satisfied with the approach taken by the motion judge. The conclusions he reached were open to him, and weresupported by the evidence. The responsibility to assess the credibility of the affiants was vested in the motion judge, and in my opinionhe discharged that responsibility appropriately. I would not interfere. [para. 27] [42] Rule 1.03(2) requires courts to “secure the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of everyproceeding on its merits.” In O’Toole v.

Peterson, 2018 NBCA 8, [2018] N.B.J. No. 58 (QL), Drapeau C.J.N.B. (as he then was)provided an in-depth analysis of the

summary judgment process. Although the case before us does not invoke Rule 22, similar principlesapply, in my opinion. Those principles flow from Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, where the Supreme Courtexplained, as quoted in O’Toole, at para. 5, the following: There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion forsummary judgment.

This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows thejudge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result. These principles are interconnected and all speak to whether

summary judgment will provide a fair and just adjudication. When asummary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary facts and resolve the dispute, proceeding to trial would generally not beproportionate, timely or cost effective. Similarly, a process that does not give a judge confidence in her conclusions can never be theproportionate way to resolve a dispute. It bears reiterating that the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as atrial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as toresolve the dispute.

[paras. 49-50] [ 43 ] Surely, in keeping with Rule 1.03, when a judge determines that he or she can make findings of fact, findings of credibility and can apply the relevant legal principles, from the affidavit evidence, a judge need not hear oral evidence.

In those cases where a judge is not satisfied the matter can be properly adjudicated on the basis of conflicting affidavits, he or she may still order a hearing and require viva voce evidence when it is determined necessary to do so in the interests of justice (Rule 39.02). [ 44 ] In this case, the judge assessed the credibility of the affidavit evidence and he applied the criteria. He found there was sufficient evidence to enable him to properly adjudicate the motion, applying the criteria, as noted. The conflicting affidavits were not material to the result because the appellant failed to prove his case.

I would not interfere with his decision and I would dismiss this ground of appeal. D. Was the cost award justified? [ 45 ] The judge ordered costs against the appellant in the amount of $5,000. I agree with the appellant that this is a higher than average cost award for a motion. [ 46 ] In Rademaker v. Rademaker , 2002 NBCA 47 , 251 N.B.R. (2d) 177 , Larlee J.A. wrote: […] I agree that in cases involving family disputes regarding the custody and access of children and child and spousal maintenance orders awarding costs under Rule 59 may generally not be appropriate.

However in cases where division of property is at issue and an amount involved is easily determined, as in a civil case, then it is appropriate to apply the Tariff under Rule 59. [para. 28] [ 47 ] Rademaker has been cited numerous times on this point. Although an award of costs is generally accorded deference by the Court, when there is a challenge to an award, we look to the reasons to examine whether, or not, the decision accords with the criteria laid out in Rule 59 (see Doucet and Dauphine v.

Spielo Manufacturing Incorporated and Manship , 2011 NBCA 44 , 372 N.B.R. (2d) 1 ). [ 48 ] The judge awarded the respondent global costs of $5,000. He acknowledged she had requested solicitor and client costs, but he rejected the claim, finding the appellant’s conduct did not meet the threshold requirements of being reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous.

The appellant submits the award is too high, particularly given the fact the motion was heard by way of the oral submissions of counsel. [ 49 ] The judge appears to have rejected the use of Rule 59 on the basis the claim for extended spousal support could not be quantified (para. 90). He correctly described the appellant’s claim as an attempt to “renegotiate the terms” of the final consent order. He observed the appellant failed “to provide proper financials,” but that failure “did not affect the arguments before the [c]ourt.” [ 50 ] In M.R. v. J.R. , 2018 NBCA 12 , [2018] N.B.J.

No. 104 (QL), this Court wrote: A review of the jurisprudence persuades me that the most common form of sanction is costs and/or the imputation of income, both of which were requested by M.R. and were not ordered (see D.L.H. v. J.V.H. , 2016 BCPC 65 , [2016] B.C.J. No. 543 (QL) ; Neff v. Neff , 2015 BCSC 2385 , [2015] B.C.J. No. 2792 (QL) ; and Rana v. Rana , 2014 BCSC 530 , [2014] B.C.J. No. 548 ). The production of accurate, complete and timely financial disclosure is not optional ( see Sutton v. Kay , 2002 NBCA 33 , 250 N.B.R. (2d) 106 , per Drapeau J.A., as he then was; O’Brien v.

O’Brien , 2007 NBCA 22 , 312 N.B.R. (2d) 302 , per Larlee J.A.; and D.L.M. , per Larlee J.A.). [para. 34] [ 51 ] The judge did not link the appellant’s failure to provide complete and adequate financial disclosure to a finding that the proceedings were complicated, delayed and longer than they should have been, thus supportive of an increased cost award, and perhaps justifying his decision.

[ 52 ] In para. 93, the judge concludes that the appellant, by filing an “unnecessary and expensive court procedure”, for that reason alone, merited an award of costs against him that was “somewhat more than a normal [ per diem ] rate.” The cost analysis provides some justification for the award; however, it ignored the fact the respondent’s request to move the proceedings to another jurisdiction was also dismissed, therefore dividing the success between them. It is my view the motion judge’s decision to award costs of $5,000 was not justified on the facts of this case.

Finally, the judge erroneously made an “all-inclusive” order, which would include disbursements. Under Rule 59.08(8), disbursements are not included in cost awards ( see Noel v. Butler , 2016 NBCA 49 , 452 N.B.R. (2d) 207 , at para. 28 ). I would interfere, and I would reduce the cost award in the lower court to $2,500 plus taxable disbursements. VII. Disposition [ 53 ] It is for these reasons that on November 30, 2020 I joined my colleagues in dismissing the appeal, save for the issue of costs.

On that issue, I would allow the appeal, set aside the cost award in the court below and order substituted costs in the amount of $2,500 plus taxable disbursements. I would award the respondent costs of $2,500 on the appeal. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD I. Introduction [1] L’appel dont notre Cour est saisie porte sur la décision d’un juge de rejeter une motion en modification des dispositions relatives à la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale de durée limitée d’une ordonnance sur consentement rendue sous le régime de la

Loi sur le divorce , L.R.C. 1985, ch. 3 (2 e suppl .) (la Loi ). Après l’échéance du terme de l’ordonnance alimentaire, l’appelant a déposé une motion sollicitant une ordonnance modificative sous le régime de l’ art. 15.2 et du par. 17(1) de la Loi . Le juge a rejeté la motion, ayant conclu que l’appelant ne satisfaisait pas aux critères préliminaires établis par l’ art. 17 . II. Le contexte [2] En mars 2013, après un mariage ayant duré environ dix-neuf ans, l’appelant et l’intimée se sont séparés. Il y a une enfant à charge, née en 2001.

L’épouse intimée est ingénieure et l’époux appelant a travaillé comme technicien en génie jusqu’à la naissance de l’enfant. Il a alors été convenu qu’il resterait à la maison pour prendre soin de l’enfant. La situation est restée inchangée pendant onze ans, soit jusqu’à la séparation. L’époux a entamé une instance en divorce en novembre 2013. [3] Les parties ont négocié toutes les questions lors d’une conférence de règlement à l’amiable.

Toutes deux y étaient représentées par avocat, et personne n’a allégué d’influence indue, de défaut de communiquer des renseignements, d’imprévoyance, de négociation déloyale ou d’injustice, à la différence de ce que l’on peut lire dans l’arrêt Miglin c. Miglin , 2003 CSC 24 , [2003] 1 R.C.S. 303 , rendu par la Cour suprême. Le 10 novembre 2014, les conditions convenues ont été intégrées à une ordonnance sur consentement finale. L’appelant a accepté une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale de durée limitée de 3 114 $ par mois pour la période du 1 er novembre 2014 au 1 er juin 2019.

Le revenu annuel de l’intimée était alors évalué à 150 288 $ et celui de l’appelant à 20 800 $. Les parties ont consenti aux conditions énoncées ci-dessous, qui sont reproduites dans le jugement de divorce, mais qui n’ont pas été ordonnées par le juge : [TRADUCTION] L’article 10 de l’ordonnance contient les dispositions supplémentaires ci-dessous, dont les parties reconnaissent le caractère exécutoire même si elles n’ont pas été ordonnées par la Cour :

a) Ni l’une ni l’autre des parties ne doit, maintenant ou à l’avenir, solliciter, demander, exiger, réclamer ou revendiquer de quelque manière que ce soit de l’autre

partie de l’argent pour son propre entretien ou soutien, sous réserve du paragraphe 5 ci-dessus. Les parties conviennent par ailleurs que la présente ordonnance sur consentement finale est équitable et appropriée dans les circonstances, au regard, particulièrement, des objectifs et des facteurs établis par les articles 15 et 17 de la

Loi sur le divorce ainsi que des considérations similaires de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.R.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2. Les deux parties acceptent que les dispositions de l’ordonnance sur consentement finale constituent le règlement intégral de toutes les réclamations et causes d’action que chacune a ou pourrait avoir acquis à l’encontre de l’autre en matière de soutien sous le régime de la

Loi sur le divorce , de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , de la

Loi sur la provision pour personnes à charge , L.N.-B. 1991, ch. P-22.3, ou autrement, sous le régime d’une loi existante ou future, dans notre province ou ailleurs.

b) Les parties reconnaissent et conviennent que, sous réserve du paragraphe 5 ci-dessus, sans égard à ce que pourrait devenir leur situation financière respective pour des raisons de santé, d’emploi, d’un changement du coût de la vie ou autre, aucune d’elles n’a le droit de recevoir de l’autre une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale sous le régime d’aucune disposition législative ou de la common law. Les deux parties acceptent que les dispositions de l’ordonnance sur consentement finale constituent le règlement intégral de toutes réclamations et demandes passées, présentes et futures visant leur propre soutien.

En outre, les deux parties conviennent que la présente ordonnance sur consentement finale peut être opposée par l’une ou l’autre en préclusion de toute réclamation future de la part de l’autre pour toute forme d’aliments et d’entretien, sous réserve du paragraphe 5 ci-dessus.

Les parties reconnaissent et conviennent en outre avoir tenu compte des circonstances particulières de leur mariage, de la rupture de leur mariage, de leur situation financière courante ainsi que des conséquences de leur mariage, et elles prennent des dispositions complètes et équitables en règlement de toute demande de prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, qu’il s’agisse d’une demande fondée sur le besoin, d’une prestation alimentaire compensatoire ou contractuelle ou de toute autre forme de pension alimentaire d’origine législative.

c) Le requérant s’engage à garantir l’intimée et sa succession contre toute demande ou ordonnance judiciaire présente ou future concernant le versement d’une prestation alimentaire à son intention outre ce qui est établi par le paragraphe 5 ci-dessus.

d) L’intimée s’engage à garantir le requérant contre toute demande ou ordonnance judiciaire présente ou future concernant le versement d’une prestation alimentaire.

e) Les parties conviennent que pendant la période où la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale est exigible en application du paragraphe 5 ci-dessus, ni l’une ni l’autre ne sollicitera la modification du montant ou de la durée de la prestation, peu importe si leur situation financière respective change pour des raisons liées à la santé ou à l’emploi, au changement du coût de la vie ou pour toute autre raison. [4] L’intimée soutient que ce paragraphe peut être opposé par voie de préclusion à toute tentative de l’une ou l’autre

partie de modifier les conditions de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale. Subsidiairement, elle fait valoir que l’appelant n’a pas fourni de preuve suffisante pour établir qu’il éprouve une difficulté économique, au contraire de ce qu’exige le par. 17(10), et qu’il a, à tort, présenté sa motion sous le régime du par. 15(2), comme s’il s’agissait d’une demande d’ordonnance initiale.

Cette distinction est importante, car une fois les conditions d’une entente visant la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale intégrées à une ordonnance, elles sont présumées satisfaire aux objectifs énoncés au par. 15.2(1) au moment où l’ordonnance est signée. Toutefois, une ordonnance sur consentement peut tout de même être modifiée au

titre du par. 17(4.1), si l’auteur de la motion satisfait aux objectifs et aux critères établis par l’art 17. La juge qui a rendu le jugement de divorce en l’espèce a signé l’ordonnance en conséquence, reconnaissant ainsi tacitement qu’elle n’avait pas le pouvoir d’écarter la compétence résiduelle de la cour de modifier une ordonnance rendue en vertu de l’ art. 17 . Le critère préliminaire n’est cependant pas le même si une

partie dépose une motion en modification d’une ordonnance alimentaire de durée limitée après l’échéance du terme de l’ordonnance. Le cas échéant, l’auteur de la motion doit prouver en outre que la modification qu’il sollicite s’impose pour remédier à une difficulté économique causée par l’un des changements décrits au par. 17(4.1) et liés au mariage, et que le changement est tel que si la nouvelle situation avait existé au moment où l’ordonnance alimentaire ou la dernière ordonnance modificative a été rendue, une ordonnance différente aurait vraisemblablement été rendue. [5] Dans sa motion, l’appelant sollicitait ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]

a) que l’ordonnance datée du 10 novembre 2014 soit modifiée de façon à éliminer la date de cessation de sa prestation alimentaire matrimoniale en vertu du par. 17(1) de la Loi ;

b) subsidiairement, que les dispositions de l’ordonnance du 10 novembre 2014 soient annulées et qu’il soit ordonné qu’une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale lui soit payée conformément aux Lignes directrices facultatives en matière de pensions alimentaires pour

époux , à partir du 1 er juillet 2019, en vertu de l’ art. 15.2 ou du par. 17(1) de la Loi . [6] Selon les moyens invoqués à l’appui de la motion : 1) l’ordonnance existante ne respectait pas les objectifs énoncés au par. 15.2(6) de la Loi étant donné la durée substantielle du mariage et le fait que l’appelant était resté à la maison pendant onze ans pour prendre soin de l’enfant qu’il a eue avec l’intimée; et 2) l’appelant éprouvait des besoins économiques ayant un lien de causalité avec le mariage et l’échec du mariage, puisqu’il a été incapable d’assurer son indépendance économique pendant la période restreinte établie par l’ordonnance. [7] La motion ayant été déposée après l’échéance du terme, c’est le par. 17(10) qui s’appliquait, en l’espèce.

L’appelant a fait valoir qu’il avait consenti à une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale de durée limitée parce qu’il croyait être en mesure de retourner sur le marché du travail avant la fin de cette période et que son incapacité à le faire constituait un changement important.

Au paragraphe 28 de son affidavit, il a écrit : [TRADUCTION] « Au moment de la conférence de règlement amiable et le jour où j’ai signé l’ordonnance sur consentement, l’intimée et moi croyions tous les deux que je pourrais retourner rapidement sur le marché du travail, puisque j’ai travaillé sans problème pendant de nombreuses années jusqu’à la naissance de notre fille. Or je n’y suis pas parvenu, malgré mes efforts continus. » Comme preuve de son incapacité à trouver un emploi à temps plein, l’appelant a fourni ce qui suit :

a) une liste des employeurs auprès desquels il a postulé un emploi depuis 2014, les postes auxquels il a posé sa candidature et les dates de ces communications;

b) une déclaration portant qu’il a participé à des programmes de formation et d’études;

c) une déclaration portant qu’en 2015, il a entrepris des séances d’accompagnement professionnel et a suivi une formation en analyse opérationnelle et gestion de projets au New Brunswick Community College;

d) une déclaration portant qu’en avril 2016, il a entrepris une formation d’un an en cours d’emploi au sein d’une entreprise de Fredericton;

e) une déclaration portant qu’il avait commencé à suivre des cours de français;

f) une déclaration portant qu’en 2017 et en 2018, il avait obtenu le certificat nécessaire pour être vérificateur de logiciels et maître Scrum (méthode Agile);

g) une déclaration portant qu’en 2018, il a obtenu un contrat de six à sept mois pour une entreprise appelée Culinary Therapy. [8] En réponse, l’intimée a demandé ce qui suit :

a) que la motion soit intégralement rejetée puisque l’ordonnance devait être finale et n’était donc pas susceptible d’être modifiée;

b) subsidiairement, que la motion soit rejetée en application du par. 17(10) de la Loi ;

c) subsidiairement, que la motion soit rejetée parce que l’appelant n’a pas étayé ses affirmations de preuve suffisante;

d) subsidiairement, que la motion soit rejetée parce que la province du Nouveau-Brunswick n’était plus le ressort approprié, les deux parties et l’enfant à charge vivant désormais en Nouvelle-Écosse;

e) les dépens afférents à la motion suivant le tarif des frais entre avocat et client. [9] Après l’audience, l’appelant a trouvé un emploi à temps plein. De plus, le 26 juin 2020, le poste de l’intiméea été déclaré superflu et celle-ci a reçu une indemnité de départ.

Avant l’audition de l’appel, une motion en présentation de preuvenouvelle a été déposée et nous avons reçu un [TRADUCTION] « exposé conjoint des éléments de preuve », intégré dans une ordonnancesur consentement, et comprenant une attestation du revenu gagné par l’appelant du 24 octobre 2019 au 26 mars 2020, un courriel envoyéà l’intimée par son ancien employeur concernant son indemnité de départ et des calculs effectués les 11 septembre 2014 et 23 janvier2014 à l’aide du logiciel DivorceMate. [10] À un moment donné, l’intimée a avancé que l’évolution de leur situation financière respective rendait l’appelpurement théorique, mais cette avenue a été écartée, à bon droit.

Il est donc inutile d’y accorder plus d’attention. III. La décision du juge saisi de la motion [11] La motion a été entendue et tranchée sur le fondement des affidavits et des mémoires et observations oralesdes avocats. Le juge a décidé que les critères du par. 17(10) n’étaient pas satisfaits et a conclu que l’appelant n’avait pas prouvé qu’il yavait eu un changement important au sens du par. 17(4.1) de la Loi.

Il a rejeté à la fois la motion et la demande de l’intimée en vue duchangement de ressort de sorte que l’instance soit poursuivie en Nouvelle-Écosse, et il a accordé des dépens de 5 000 $ à l’intimée.Aucun appel reconventionnel n’a été déposé à l’égard du rejet de la demande de modification du ressort présentée par l’épouse. IV. Les moyens d’appel [12] Onze moyens d’appel ont été invoqués, notamment des erreurs de droit, des erreurs de fait manifestes etdominantes et des erreurs mixtes de droit et de fait. Dans l’ensemble, l’appelant fait valoir que l’analyse du juge est entachée de quatreerreurs.

Il soutient que le juge a mal interprété la preuve et a commis des erreurs manifestes qui ont influé sur l’issue de la procédure. Cemoyen d’appel est lié aux conclusions erronées du juge quant aux efforts déployés par l’appelant pour trouver un emploi à temps plein.La principale doléance de l’appelant, toutefois, a trait au processus. Il affirme que le juge saisi de la motion était tenu d’entendre destémoignages de vive voix et que sa décision de trancher l’affaire sur le fondement des affidavits constitue une erreur de droit, d’autantplus que les affidavits se contredisent à de nombreux égards.

Il prétend que l’audience aurait dû être ajournée et une date d’audiencefixée pour la présentation de témoignages de vive voix, qui auraient mieux permis au juge de tirer des conclusions quant aux faits et à lacrédibilité. Enfin, l’appelant estime que la décision de le condamner à des dépens de 5 000 $ n’était pas justifiée. V. La norme de contrôle [13] Pour ce qui est de la norme de contrôle applicable aux questions de prestation alimentaire, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve d’une grande retenue (voir Hickey c. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 518, [1999] A.C.S. no 9 (QL), par. 11 et 12).

Comme l’a rappelé la juge d’appel Larlee dans l’arrêt B.P. c.

A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 R.N.-B. (2e) 99, lesdécisions concernant la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale sont susceptibles de révision en cas d’erreur de principe ou d’erreursignificative dans l’interprétation de la preuve, ou encore si la décision est manifestement erronée (par. 12). [14] Ces décisions font généralement appel à une norme de contrôle empreinte de déférence, à moins qu’il soitdécidé qu’un juge a commis une erreur de droit ou de principe, que son interprétation des faits est entachée d’une erreur manifeste etdominante qui a eu une incidence sur l’issue de la procédure ou qu’il y a eu erreur mixte de droit et de fait.

Dans l’arrêt New Brunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) c. A.R. et al. (2007), (NB CA), 322 R.N.-B. (2e) 372, [2007] A.N.-B. no 345 (QL) (C.A.), la Cour a conclu « […] qu’une telle décision ne doit être modifiée en appel que s’il peut être démontré que la jugesaisie de la motion s’est mal enquise du droit et n’a pas respecté les principes qui s’appliquaient, ou si son appréciation de la preuve esterronée au point de créer une injustice » (par. 15). C’est un principe que notre Cour applique de façon uniforme.

Enfin, la décision dereporter l’audition de l’affaire relevait d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, qui commande généralement la déférence. VI. Analyse A. L’application du par. 17(10) aux motions en modification d’ordonnances alimentaires de durée limitée

[15] La motion a été présentée et débattue sous le régime du par. 17(4.1) et, subsidiairement, sous le régime du par. 15(2). Comme on l’a vu, l’intimée soutient que, en application du par. 17(10) , quand une demande de modification est déposée après l’échéance du terme de l’ordonnance alimentaire de durée limitée, l’auteur de la motion a le fardeau supplémentaire de prouver que la modification s’impose pour remédier à une difficulté économique causée par un changement lié au mariage, tel qu’il y est prescrit.

Comme on le verra, cette restriction est dictée par une considération d’intérêt public, soit celle de l’importance du caractère définitif de la pension. [16] Le paragraphe 17(10) de la Loi prévoit ceci : Limitation

(10) Notwithstanding subsection (1), where a spousal support order provides for support for a definite period or until a specified event occurs, a court may not, on an application instituted after the expiration of that period or the occurrence of the event, make a variation order for the purpose of resuming that support unless the court is satisfied that (

a) a variation order is necessary to relieve economic hardship arising from a change described in subsection (4.1) that is related to the marriage; and (

b) the changed circumstances, had they existed at the time of the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, as the case may be, would likely have resulted in a different order. Restriction

(10) Par dérogation au paragraphe (1), le tribunal ne peut modifier l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux dont la durée de validité est déterminée ou dépend d’un événement précis, sur demande présentée après l’échéance de son terme ou après la survenance de cet événement, en vue de la reprise de la fourniture des aliments, que s’il est convaincu des faits suivants :

a) l’ordonnance modificative s’impose pour remédier à une difficulté économique causée par un changement visé au paragraphe (4.1) et lié au mariage;

b) la nouvelle situation, si elle avait existé à l’époque où l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux ou la dernière ordonnance modificative de celle-ci a été rendue, aurait vraisemblablement donné lieu à une ordonnance différente. [17] Le paragraphe 17(4.1) de la Loi est libellé ainsi : Factors for spousal support order

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration. Facteurs — ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux

(4.1) Avant de rendre une ordonnance modificative de l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux, le tribunal s’assure qu’il est survenu un changement dans les ressources, les besoins ou, d’une façon générale, la situation de l’un ou l’autre des ex-époux depuis que cette ordonnance ou la dernière ordonnance modificative de celle-ci a été rendue et tient compte du changement en rendant l’ordonnance modificative. [18] La juge a cité abondamment la décision Eidt c. Eidt , 2009 NBBR 152 , 348 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 390 , dans laquelle la

juge Wooder a expliqué (par. 84 et 85 de la décision du juge) que le par. 17(10) assure un caractère définitif au processus de soutien, et aqualifié d’exceptionnelles les modifications apportées au

titre de ces dispositions. Il y va de l’intérêt public que les critères applicables àune motion en modification d’une ordonnance alimentaire de durée limitée sont plus stricts. De fait, ces ordonnances deviendraient videsde sens si, une fois la prestation alimentaire payée, elles étaient susceptibles de modification indéfiniment. [19] Les paragraphes 17(4.1) et 17(10) s’appliquent tous deux aux motions en modification déposées sous le régimede l’art. 17 de la Loi. Toutefois, si le par. 17(10) s’applique, le fardeau de la preuve imposé au demandeur est plus lourd (voir Embree c.

Embree, 2016 NBCA 42, 451 R.N.-B. (2e) 369). Les facteurs applicables ont alimenté des discussions continues par la Cour suprême.L’arrêt Miglin a établi l’analyse en deux étapes à laquelle il convient de procéder quand l’un des époux demande l’annulation decertaines dispositions d’une entente consensuelle. Puis est venu l’arrêt Rick c. Brandsema, 2009 CSC 10, [2009] 1 R.C.S. 295. Alors quel’arrêt Miglin traitait de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, l’arrêt Rick portait sur un règlement entre les parties concernant desbiens.

Dans ces décisions, la Cour n’a pas eu à se pencher sur la question de la force obligatoire d’une ordonnance judiciaire. Dans l’arrêtMiglin, la Cour suprême a rappelé que, lorsque les parties agissent en adultes responsables pour régler leurs affaires financières et que lerèglement ne peut être contesté sur aucun autre fondement, les tribunaux ne devraient pas miner ce règlement (par. 45, citant Pelech c. Pelech, (SCC), [1987] 1 R.C.S. 801, [1987] A.C.S. no 31 (QL)). Voir également Masters c.

Masters, (SCC), [1994] 1 R.C.S. 883, [1994] A.C.S. no 33 (QL). [20] L’appelant avance que la longue durée du mariage et le fait qu’il soit resté à la maison pour prendre soin del’enfant lui ont fait subir des inconvénients économiques, et que l’arrêt Moge c. Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 R.C.S. 813, [1992] A.C.S. no 107 (QL), s’applique donc. Dans cette affaire, une ordonnance alimentaire de durée indéterminée avait été rendue sous le régime du par. 15(2). Ayant perdu son emploi, Mme Moge a déposé une requête en modification de l’ordonnance.

Le mari a répliquéavec sa propre requête, demandant qu’il soit mis fin à la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale. Après avoir discuté des objectifs énoncésau par. 17(7), soit : 1) atténuer les inconvénients économiques; 2) répartir entre les époux les conséquences économiques découlant dusoin des enfants à charge; 3) remédier à toute difficulté économique que leur cause l’échec du mariage; et 4) favoriser l’indépendance économique, la juge L’Heureux-Dubé a accueilli la requête en modification présentée par Mme Moge. [21] Dans l’arrêt Bracklow c.

Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 420, [1999] A.C.S. no 14 (QL),la Cour suprême a raffiné ses arrêts antérieurs sur la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale en introduisant des principes devenus depuis lesfondements conceptuels de l’analyse du droit à des aliments qu’il faut mener sous le régime de l’art. 15.2 de la Loi, soit les fondementscompensatoire, non compensatoire et contractuel, tant dans le cas d’une ordonnance initiale rendue en vertu de l’art. 15.2 que dans celuid’une ordonnance modificative rendue en vertu de l’art. 17. [22] L’arrêt L.M.P. c.

L.S., 2011 CSC 64, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 775, a raffiné l’analyse davantage : désormais, la partiequi sollicite la modification d’une ordonnance alimentaire matrimoniale doit montrer que l’entente originale ou l’ordonnance initiale nerépond plus aux objectifs énoncés par l’art. 15.2 de la Loi.

Il s’agit là d’une distinction importante dans l’optique de l’intérêt public, ence qu’elle tient compte de l’injustice qu’il y aurait à exiger d’un ex-époux qu’il continue de verser une prestation alimentairematrimoniale pour des raisons qui ne sont pas liées au mariage et qu’elle respecte le principe du caractère définitif du règlement. Lorsquele juge signe une ordonnance contenant des dispositions relatives à une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale de durée déterminée, commec’est le cas en l’espèce, il est présumé que la question du droit à la prestation a été réglée de manière satisfaisante.

Il devient alorsessentiel de déterminer si le changement invoqué est important, d’autant plus si la durée de validité prévue de l’ordonnance alimentaireest échue. [23] Sur la question du changement important, la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique a conclu ce qui suit,dans l’arrêt Dedes c. Dedes, 2015 BCCA 194, [2015] B.C.J.

No. 883 (QL) : [TRADUCTION] Comme l’exprime clairement l’arrêt L.M.P., le critère du changement important n’est pas ce que l’une des parties savait ou pouvaitraisonnablement prévoir, mais ce que les parties ont effectivement envisagé au moment où l’ordonnance sur consentement a été rendue.Ce critère a pour but d’empêcher les parties de débattre à nouveau une question déjà examinée et rejetée; dans de tels cas, une demandede modification équivaudrait à un appel de l’ordonnance initiale (voir Gordon, par. 15).

Comme l’a écrit la juge L’Heureux-Dubé dansl’arrêt Willick (p. 734), « la diversité des scénarios possibles en droit de la famille impose aux tribunaux d’appliquer dans l’exercice deleur pouvoir discrétionnaire une norme souple qui ne limite pas artificiellement l’adaptabilité des dispositions de la

Loi sur le divorce ».Voir aussi G. (L.) c. B. (G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 R.C.S. 370, par. 49 à 51, et Jakob c. Jakob, 2010 BCCA 136, par. 40. [par.25.] [Soulignement dans l’original.]

[24] Comme la Cour suprême l’a énoncé clairement dans l’arrêt L.M.P., la demande de modification n’est ni unappel ni un procès de novo. Les parties à l’affaire L.M.P. avaient signé un accord de séparation global qui a plus tard été intégré à uneordonnance judiciaire et selon lequel l’épouse devait recevoir une prestation alimentaire indexable de 3 688 $ par mois. Quatre ans plustard, l’ex-époux a déposé une demande de modification en vertu du par. 17(4.1), sollicitant la réduction des paiements alimentairesmatrimoniaux sur le fondement d’un changement important dans sa situation financière.

La Cour suprême a étudié les principes d’intérêtpublic qui sous-tendent l’art. 15.2 et le par. 17(4.1) et, suivant l’orientation établie par la juge L’Heureux-Dubé dans l’arrêt Moge, lesjuges Abella et Rothstein ont écrit : Pour des raisons de principe judicieuses, le droit de la famille autorise et encourage les époux en instance de séparation à fixer eux-mêmes les modalités de leur séparation en signant un accord de séparation (Berend Hovius et Mary-Jo Maur, Hovius on Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (7e éd. 2009), p. 783).

Les accords sont souhaitables parce que les personnes devraient jouir d’une grandeliberté pour organiser leur vie comme elles l’entendent; parce que [traduction] « les parties elles-mêmes sont mieux placées pourcomparer les avantages de différentes modalités »; enfin, parce qu’un règlement négocié permet d’éviter les coûts personnels etfinanciers élevés d’un litige […]. [par. 14] [25] Les juges Abella et Rothstein ont conclu : [L]es directives données au tribunal quant aux éléments qu’il doit prendre en considération sont différentes selon qu’il rend uneordonnance initiale ou une ordonnance modificative.

Notamment, contrairement à l’al. 15.2(4)

c) qui demande expressément au tribunalde tenir compte de « toute ordonnance, toute entente ou tout arrangement alimentaire au profit de l’un ou l’autre des époux » lorsqu’ilexamine une demande initiale de pension alimentaire, le par. 17(4.1) ne mentionne nullement les ententes et demande simplement autribunal de s’assurer « qu’il est survenu un changement dans les ressources, les besoins ou, d’une façon générale, la situation de l’un oul’autre des ex-époux » depuis l’ordonnance initiale ou sa dernière modification.

Compte tenu de ces différences dans leur libellé, il estimportant de procéder à des analyses distinctes pour l’application des art. 15.2 et 17. Le tribunal saisi d’une demande en vertu de l’art. 15.2 se demande expressément dans quelle mesure les dispositions d’une ententeexistante doivent être intégrées dans une première ordonnance alimentaire.

Par contre, pour trancher une demande présentée en vertu del’art. 17, le tribunal doit déterminer s’il y a lieu de modifier ou d’annuler cette ordonnance alimentaire en raison d’un changement dans lasituation des parties. […] Le critère préliminaire auquel il doit être satisfait, lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si le tribunal peut modifier une ordonnance alimentaireantérieure au profit d’un époux, est énoncé au par. 17(4.1).

Le tribunal doit vérifier s’il est survenu un changement dans les ressources,les besoins ou, d’une façon générale, la situation de l’un ou l’autre des ex-époux depuis que cette ordonnance a été rendue. […] En outre, les arrêts Willick et G. (L.) indiquent sans équivoque que ce qui constitue un changement important dépend de la situationréelle des parties au moment de l’ordonnance. En règle générale, un changement important doit avoir une certaine continuité et ne pas être simplement temporaire (voir Marinangeli c.Marinangeli (2003), (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 40, par. 49).

Certains autres facteurs peuvent aider le tribunal à établirsi un changement particulier est important […] […] L’examen d’un changement de situation s’effectue exactement de la même façon, qu’une entente alimentaire entre époux ait été intégréeou non dans l’ordonnance.

Même si on ne sait pas très bien quelle incidence elle aurait dans un cas concret, une règle générale selonlaquelle il faut donner un « poids appréciable » à l’entente a pour effet de rehausser le critère préliminaire auquel il doit être satisfait pourqu’un changement important soit établi au sens de l’art. 17 dans les cas où il existe une entente et met l’accent sur la certitude et lerèglement définitif au détriment des exigences légales fixées par l’art. 17. Ce résultat rappelle l’approche de la « rupture nette » adoptée

dans la trilogie Pelech, qui a été rejetée dans Moge et Miglin, car elle ne convenait plus dans le contexte de l’actuelle

Loi sur le divorce. [par. 23, 24, 29, 34, 35 et 46] [Caractères en italique dans l’originale.] [26] La Cour suprême a souligné que, même si les objectifs d’une ordonnance modificative sont « presqueidentiques » sous le régime de l’art. 17 ou sous le régime de l’art. 15.2, les « facteurs à prendre en compte […] sont nettementdifférents » (par. 22), particulièrement dans les cas où une ordonnance ou une entente met l’accent sur la certitude et le règlementdéfinitif (par. 46). L’arrêt L.M.P. a dissipé la confusion, s’il en est, qui subsistait sur ce point après l’arrêt Miglin (par. 26 et 27). Il définitle critère préliminaire à satisfaire pour obtenir une modification au

titre du par. 17(4.1) comme un changement important que n’avaientpas envisagé les parties et qui s’est produit après le prononcé de l’ordonnance précédente. Il réitère la démarche analytique énoncée dans les arrêts Willick c. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 R.C.S. 670, [1994] A.C.S. no 94 (QL), et G. (L.) c.

B. (G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 R.C.S. 370, [1995] A.C.S. no 72 (QL) (par. 49), pour déterminer s’il y a eu un changement de situation important.Toutefois, comme le juge Cromwell l’a fait observer au par. 92 de l’opinion minoritaire, l’arrêt L.M.P. n’a pas traité des demandesd’ordonnance modificative qui sont assujetties à la restriction prévue au par. 17(10), disposition qui prescrit que l’auteur de la dem

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