r v. RICHARD, 2017 QCCQ 8155

R. c. Chandroo 2017 QCCQ 8155COURT OF QUÉBEC CANADAPROVINCE OF QUÉBECCITY OFMONTRÉAL"Criminal and penal division"N° : 500-01-071480-120 DATE : June 29th, 2017 ____________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ROBERT MARCHI, J.C.Q.____________________________________________________________________ THE QUEENProsecutorv.

RICHARD CHANDROOAccused JUDGMENT ON A MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS[1] (SECTIONS 7, 11b) AND 24(1) OF THE Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) [1] On May 29th last, in the middle of his trial, at the end of the Crown’s case, the Accused, Richard Chandroo (Chandroo or theAccused), argued, for the first time since the laying of the charges against him in 2012, that his right to be tried within a reasonable timeprotected by

Section 11b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) had been infringed and that the charges shouldbe stayed. [2] Needless to say that the Accused application (the Application) stems directly from the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Jordan[2]. Since Jordan, and since the Application was argued on May 29th, the Supreme Court has rendered itsjudgment in the case of R. v.

Cody[3] in which the Court confirms Jordan and where it deals with the two issues argued in this case, i.e.the delay caused by defence conduct and the applicability of the transitional exceptional circumstance for cases pre-Jordan. [3] Given that, the Court has re-heard the parties on June 22nd. The Court is now ready to render judgment.

THE JORDAN CASE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CODY CASE [4] Clearly, in Cody, the Supreme Court has refused to re-visit Jordan and has stated so in the clearest of terms: [3] A number of the provincial Attorneys General who intervened in this matter asked this Court to modify the Jordan framework toprovide for more flexibility in deducting and justifying delay. But Jordan was released a year ago. Like any of this Court’s precedents, itmust be followed and it cannot be lightly discarded or overruled (Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 , [2013]3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 38; Carter v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 , [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 44). The Jordanframework now governs the s. 11(

b) analysis and, properly applied, already provides sufficient flexibility and accounts for thetransitional period of time that is required for the criminal justice system to adapt. THE TOTAL DELAY - THE END OF THE TRIAL [5] In Cody, the Court recalls that the first step under the Jordan framework entails calculating the total delay, i.e. the delay goingfrom the date of the laying of the charges to the actual or anticipated end of trial[4]. In this case, the charges against the Accused were laid on April 13th 2012.

This is thus when the clock started ticking[5]. [6] In this case, since the trial of the Accused has not been completed, the Court will have to determine the “anticipated” end of the trial. For the reasons that follow, the Court sets the “anticipated” end of the trial on the 28th of February 2017. Here is why. [7] The trial of the Accused was set to proceed for five consecutive days commencing on the 23rd of January 2017[6]. The then “anticipated” end of the trial was January 27th 2017.

Unfortunately, on the first day of the trial, on Monday January 23rd, the Accusedappeared unrepresented, which prevented the trial from starting as expected. [8] At the suggestion of the Court, Me Barbacki, who had had in the past discussions with Crown counsel about the possibility of

representing the Accused, was contacted by the Accused. Me Barbacki then attended court in the following minutes. After discussions between the Court, the Crown, Me Barbacki and the Accused, Me Barbacki accepted to enter the file and represent the Accused, but requested an adjournment before doing so. [ 9 ] In light of those circumstances, the Court granted Me Barbacki an adjournment until the Wednesday, when the trial started. The Crown then proceeded to present its case which was completed in the morning of Friday January 27 th .

Me Barbacki then requested that the trial be continued to a later date either to present a defence, should he decide to do so, or to file a Jordan application. Me Barbacki’s request was granted and the trial was continued on the 29 th of May [7] , where the Jordan Application was argued. [ 10 ] In those circumstances, it is obvious that had the Accused been represented by counsel on the first day of the trial, on Monday the 23 rd of January, the whole trial (at least the evidence and the submissions by both counsels) would have been completed within the expected timeframe of 5 days, on the 27 th of January.

That could have been the “anticipated” end of the trial. [ 11 ] However, during the Jordan hearing, Me Barbacki argued that since it is unlikely that the Court would have rendered judgment séance tenante on the 27 th of January, the Court should assume, in fixing the “anticipated” end of the trial, that a délibéré would have been necessary to render judgment and suggested that a délibéré of more less a month could be envisaged, which would bring the “anticipated” end of the trial to the 28 th of February 2017.

The Court agrees with Me Barbacki and, for calculating the total delay, sets the end of the trial on February 28 th 2017. [ 12 ] That being said, the Court must underline the fact that the dates of the trial had been set as early as April 30 th 2015. The Accused, who was not represented by counsel and who was uncertain if he would be represented or not at trial and by whom, was present when the dates were set and confirmed to the presiding judge that in any event, he would be ready to proceed on the expected dates.

He was then clearly advised by the presiding judge that the trial would proceed on the 23 rd of January 2017, with or without counsel. Still, close to two years later, the Accused appeared unrepresented. As already stated, this prevented the trial from commencing on time and from being completed within the expected time reserved for the trial.

Manifestly, the Accused was not the most diligent in pursuing the services of counsel and he did not show a very strong desire to have an early trial. [ 13 ] Moreover, on the 16 th of January 2017, just a week before the commencement of the trial, Crown counsel informed the Court that no counsel had communicated with her in order to represent the Accused. It is only on the following day, on the 17 th of January, that she was informed by Me Barbacki that “ M. Chandroo lui a récemment demandé de le représenter pour le procès qui doit débuter lundi prochain ” [8] .

Clearly, there again, the Accused did not show much diligence. The Total Delay [ 14 ] Given the date set for the “anticipated” end of the trial, the total delay to start the Jordan framework is thus the delay from April 13 th 2012 until the 28 th of February 2017: roughly 58 months and one half, way over the 30-month ceiling established by the Supreme Court in Jordan and reiterated in Cody . The Net Delay [ 15 ] Jordan (and Cody reiterates) indicates that any time attributable to or caused by the defence must be deducted from the total delay to determine the “net delay”.

It is that “net delay” that is then compared to the 30-month ceiling set by the Supreme Court. [ 16 ] In preparation for her submissions, Crown counsel has prepared a “tableau” entitled “TABLEAU DES DÉLAIS” which details the various segments of the “total delay”, the dates involved, a brief description of the various stages of the process, her comments, her qualification of the segments (where applicable, i.e. other that the Jordan delay) and the number of days between dates [9] .

The “tableau” is annexed to the present judgment as Appendix A. [ 17 ] Both parties agree on most of the qualifications made by Me Robert in her tableau. Me Barbacki disagrees on two instances, where Me Robert attributes the delay to the Defence: segments F and G (before the preliminary hearing) and segment J (a supplemental case management hearing allegedly “caused” by a lack of admissions by the Defence).

The delay caused by the defence [ 18 ] In Cody , the Court also recalls that the defence delay is divided into two components (1) delay waived by the defence; and (2) delay that is caused solely by the conduct of the defence” [10] . [ 19 ] In this case, no delay was waived by the Defence. But as already said, one of the issues is to determine if part of the total delay, an important

part in this case, has been “caused solely by the conduct of the defence” in light of Jordan and Cody . [ 20 ] In Cody , the Supreme Court addressed specifically the notion of “delay caused by the defence”. It first specifies that not all delay caused by defence conduct should be deducted. It writes: [29] […] In setting the presumptive ceilings, this Court recognized that an accused person’s right to make full answer and defence requires that the defence be permitted time to prepare and present its case.

To this end, the presumptive ceilings of 30 months and 18 months have “already accounted for [the] procedural requirements” of an accused person’s case (Jordan, at para. 65 ; see also paras. 53 and 83).

For this reason, “defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay” and should not be deducted (Jordan, at para. 65 ). [ 21 ] According to the Supreme Court, the only deductible delay under this component is, therefore, that which: [30] […] (1) is solely or directly caused by the accused person; and (2) flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch as it is

not taken to respond to the charges. As we said in Jordan, the most straightforward example is “[d]eliberate and calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests” (Jordan, at para. 63 ). Similarly, where the court and Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not, the resulting delay should also be deducted (Jordan, at para. 64 ). These examples were, however, just that — examples. They were not stated in Jordan, nor should they be taken now, as exhaustively defining deductible defence delay.

Again, as was made clear in Jordan, it remains “open to trial judges to find that other defence actions or conduct have caused delay” warranting a deduction (para. 64). [ 22 ] The Court continues as follows: [32] […] To determine whether defence action is legitimately taken to respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may therefore be considered. The overall number, strength, importance, proximity to the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice or filing requirements and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant considerations.

Irrespective of its merit, a defence action may be deemed not legitimate in the context of a s. 11 (

b) application if it is designed to delay or if it exhibits marked inefficiency or marked indifference toward delay. [ 23 ] And it concludes: [34] This understanding of illegitimate defence conduct should not be taken as diminishing an accused person’s right to make full answer and defence counsel may still pursue all available substantive and procedural means to their clients. What defence counsel are not permitted to do is to engage in illegitimate conduct and then have it count towards the Jordan ceiling.

In this regard, we recognize the potential tension between the right to make full answer and defence and the right to be tried within a reasonable time — and the need to balance both — in our view, neither right is diminished ​by the deduction of delay caused by illegitimate defence conduct. [ 24 ] In this case, the most contentious period is the one between the date where the preliminary hearing was requested by the Defence and set to proceed (February 15 th 2013 – for a duration of three hours) and the date it was actually to proceed (October 2 nd 2014), especially in light of the fact that a few days before that later date, roughly 19 months and a half after it was fixed, the Defence waived the holding of the preliminary hearing (the record shows no explanation by the Defence). [ 25 ] Crown counsel submits that in those circumstances, the whole period should be attributed to the Accused while the latter submits it should not, since, according to the Accused, he only exercised his right to the holding of a preliminary inquiry and since in the circumstances, his request for a preliminary inquiry had nothing frivolous or dilatory, or, in light of Cody , was not “illegitimate”. [ 26 ] In a case of B.F. [11] , rendered before Cody , this Court wrote the following in light of similar circumstances: [16] […] la poursuite invite le Tribunal à examiner les agissements de la défense et à conclure que le fait que l’accusé ait fixé une enquête préliminaire et qu’il ait ensuite renoncé à sa tenue démontre que l’enquête était inutile et que le délai encouru avant la tenue de l’enquête devrait donc être imputé à l’accusé. [17] Dans la présente affaire, le Tribunal ne peut conclure de la preuve que la décision de la défense de demander la tenue d’une enquête préliminaire était motivée par le désir de retarder la tenue du procès ou par quelle qu’autre raison illégitime. […] [19] Clairement, le Tribunal n’a rien constaté d’illégitime dans les actions de la défense. [20] Cela étant, qu’en est-il d’un accusé qui « demande » la tenue d’une enquête préliminaire (alors que rien ne l’y oblige – c’est son choix) dans une affaire relativement simple (le témoignage annoncé et divulgué de la victime alléguée était manifestement suffisant pour renvoyer l’accusé à procès – l’accusé pouvait difficilement espérer être libéré au stade de l’enquête), qui constate que son enquête préliminaire est fixée dans sept mois, qui ne dit rien et qui, sans explication aucune, décide, au bout de ces sept mois, de renoncer à la tenue de son enquête.

Surtout, comme dans le cas présent, lorsqu’aucune explication n’est offerte par l’accusé pouvant expliquer sa renonciation tardive à la tenue de l’enquête? [21] Le Tribunal estime que dans ces circonstances, l’accusé doit assumer pleinement sa décision de requérir la tenue d’une enquête préliminaire, de même que les délais qui s’y rattachent.

Il ne peut, a posteriori, blâmer le système pour ce délai de sept mois. [22] Il ne s’agit pas de blâmer l’accusé pour sa décision de demander la tenue d’une enquête mais plutôt de constater que cette décision de l’accusé a causé un délai qui, en l’absence d’explication de sa part, peut lui être imputé. [23] Dans les circonstances, le délai de 188 jours sera donc imputé à la défense et soustrait du délai total. ( Omitted reference ) [ 27 ] In B.F. , even though there was nothing illegitimate (as the Court understood the expression at the time) in the actions of the defence, the Court was of the opinion that it was the decision made by the Accused to request a preliminary hearing that caused the delay (as in this case), that the Accused had to bear the burden of causing that delay, especially since he waived the holding of the preliminary hearing a few days before the date set for it (as in this case) without any explanation (as in this case) and that in those circumstances, the system could not be “blamed” for that delay.

The Court also explained in B.F. that it was not blaming the Accused for his choices but that I was merely stating a fact, nothing more. [ 28 ] In Cody , the Court underlines the fact that what it called deliberate and calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests, were only examples of defence actions that should be deducted [12] . In other words, defence actions that are not “deliberate and calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay” may also be deducted from the total delay as “defence action”.

The Court added that in assessing the conduct of the defence, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may be considered [13] .

[ 29 ] This Court is of the opinion that the situation in this case is tantamount to the one alluded to by Brunton J. in the case of Rice [14] . In that case, Brunton J. referred to useless preliminary inquiries that could lead to delay be deducted: [54] The Court suspects that many members of the Court of Quebec have presided preliminary inquiries which had no legitimate aim. In some cynical situations, one could infer that the preliminary inquiry was used to stall the arrival at trial or to pad a legal aid bill.

In such cases, it would be perfectly proper for the prosecution to produce the transcripts of the preliminary inquiry in order to invite the Jordan judge to review them and to find that there was no legitimate motive to hold one. If such a finding was made, the entire period devoted to the preliminary inquiry would be subtracted, as constituting an “illegitimate” defence action. [ 30 ] In Rice , Brunton J. deducted the period devoted to the preliminary inquiry.

In B.F. , this Court deducted the period between the date where the preliminary was set and the date where it was set to proceed and where the Accused waived the holding of the inquiry. [ 31 ] This Court read nothing in Cody that should make it decide otherwise. Especially since the explanation given at the Jordan hearing by the Accused shows his clear intention to “wait and sit” and wait for the delay to pass in order to complete his reimbursements to the Plaintiff, which, in his mind, would close the file.

For this Court, that is not a step taken by the defence for the purpose of responding to the charges [15] . [ 32 ] Therefore, the 19 months and a half between February 15 th 2013 and October 2 nd 2014 is attributed to the Defence and will therefore be deducted from the total delay. [ 33 ] And again, this is not done to “punish” the Accused for his choices. But only constitutes a normal consequence because of his choices.

THE DELAY BETWEEN MARCH 23 rd and April 30 th 2015 [ 34 ] Another instance where the parties do not agree is the delay between the two case management dates, between March 23 rd 2015 and April 30 th 2015, namely 38 days. [ 35 ] Essentially, the case shows that at the first case management date, on the 23 rd of March, Crown counsel summarized the evidence to be presented, announced the hearing of 9 witnesses, 4 of them who would testify through “ visio-conférence ”, as well as her intention to present similar fact evidence.

According to the “tableau” (this has not been contradicted), Defence stated “ ne pas pouvoir faire beaucoup d’admissions ”.

Nevertheless, the judge requested the Defence to examine the possibility of making such admissions. [ 36 ] On the second case management date, on April 30 th , a few admissions were made by the Defence, but admissions that would do not have much impact on the length of the trial, inasmuch that the presiding judge suggested that more admissions could have been made by Defence. [ 37 ] Given those circumstances, defence counsel wants the Court to attribute the responsibility of that segment to the prosecution, since, in his opinion, it is incumbent to the prosecution to prepare and submit admissions that will later be presented and accepted or not by the defence.

Unsurprisingly, the Prosecution attributes the responsibility to the Accused, for not having proposed admissions. [ 38 ] In those circumstances, given the apparent unwillingness of the Accused to make admissions that would have a real impact on the length of the trial, the 38 days between the two case management dates will be attributed to the Accused and will be deducted from the total delay.

THE NET DELAY – THE ILLNESS OF CROWN COUNSEL [ 39 ] After deducting the delay caused by the Defence (19 months and a half plus 38 days, or roughly one month), the net delay is therefore more less 38 months. [ 40 ] From those 38 months, a three month delay that was caused by the illness of Crown counsel will also be deducted as being a “discrete event” [16] . Both parties agree that those three months should be deducted from the total delay. THE “FINAL” NET DELAY [ 41 ] The “final” net delay will therefore be of more less 35 months.

The delay is therefore superior to the 30 month delay over which the delay is presumptively unreasonable. In those circumstances, given the fact that the charges in this case were laid before Jordan , the applicability of the transitional exceptional circumstance must be examined. THE TRANSITIONAL EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE [ 42 ] The new framework in Jordan applies to cases already in the system. However, in some cases, a transitional exceptional circumstance may justify a presumptively unreasonable delay where the charges were brought prior to the release of Jordan .

The transitional exceptional circumstance exists since [17] : It recognizes “the fact that the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly, against a standard of which they had no notice” and that “change takes time” (Jordan, at paras. 96-97 ).

The Crown may rely on the transitional exceptional circumstance if it can show that “the time the case has taken is justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed”. [ 43 ] The Court then continues [18] : Put another way, the Crown may show that it cannot be faulted for failing to take further steps, because it would have understood the delay to be reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan and the way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness of the

offence and prejudice would have been assessed under Morin. [ 44 ] The determination of whether delay in excess of the presumptive ceiling is justified on the basis of reliance on the law as it previously existed must be undertaken contextually and [19] : […] with due “sensitiv[ity] to the manner in which the previous framework was applied” (Jordan, at paras. 96 and 98 ). Under the Morin framework, prejudice and seriousness of the offence “often played a decisive role in whether delay was unreasonable” (Jordan, at para. 96 ).

Additionally, some jurisdictions are plagued with significant and notorious institutional delays, which was considered under Morin as well (Jordan, at para. 97 ; Morin, at pp. 799-800). For cases currently in the system, these considerations can inform whether any excess delay may be justified as reasonable (Jordan, at para. 96 ). [ 45 ] In this case, the analysis of the delay shows that the delay of roughly 35 months for a case like this one is one that the Court would not have been judged unreasonable under the “old” Morin [20] analysis.

Without going into a minute analysis of the delay, under the “old” Morin framework, given the circumstances already described, a proper balance of the factors listed in Morin would have brought this Court to decide that the delay was not unreasonable. And according to Jordan , a reasonable delay under Morin is not automatically transformed into an unreasonable delay under Jordan [21] . [ 46 ] It is therefore the opinion of this Court that the transitional exceptional circumstance should apply. [ 47 ] This is a relatively simple case. It should have commenced and finished a lot earlier, a long time ago.

It did not. For the reasons already alluded to, the delay has become inordinately long for a simple case. [ 48 ] That being said, the record indicates that the way the case moved shows that the parties relied reasonably on the law that previously existed. [ 49 ] Moreover, the case proceeded in a jurisdiction with significant institutional delay problems.

In Jordan , the Supreme Court has made it clear that “Judges in jurisdictions plagued by lengthy, persistent, and notorious institutional delays should account for this reality, as Crown counsel’s behaviour is constrained by systemic delay issues” [22] . [ 50 ] Furthermore, as Cournoyer J. wrote in the case of Antoine [23] : [122] De l’avis du Tribunal, un arrêt des procédures ne se trouvera justifié durant la période de transition exceptionnelle établie par l’arrêt Jordan que si la poursuite a été la source de délais qu’elle pouvait éviter et sur lesquels elle se trouvait en mesure d’agir. [ 51 ] In this case, not only the prosecution has not been the source of delays but given the systemic delay problems in this jurisdiction, it was not open for the prosecution to circumvent those problems and offer the Accused an early trial. [ 52 ] Courts need time to adjust.

Huge efforts have already made by all participants in the criminal justice system in this jurisdiction to reduce the significant delay problems. Those delays have already been substantially reduced but a lot more work needs to be done. Again, change needs time. [ 53 ] Furthermore, before or after Jordan , the Accused never complained about the delay. Until the last minute, he never showed any desire to have an early trial.

Even though Jordan was rendered in July 2016, the Accused only announced his Jordan application during his trial and filed and argued it at end of the Crown’s case, late in January 2017. [ 54 ] To that effect, Me Barbacki has submitted that he only entered the file in January 2017 and that, otherwise, he would have filed his motion earlier. That might be the case.

But the Accused had been represented by other lawyers in the past and then again, he did not show any sign of wanting an early trial. [ 55 ] For pre-Jordan cases, the gravity of the offence as well as to the seriousness of the offence can be considered to assess the reasonableness of the delay. [ 56 ] As part of his Application, the Accused testified that he suffered prejudice because of the delays incurred in this case and that it stemmed directly and solely from those delays. [ 57 ] The evidence presented by the Accused on this point is not convincing.

First, this Court is of the opinion that the prejudice suffered by the Accused, if any, is due not because of the delays but because of the charges themselves. [ 58 ] Furthermore, the Accused did not establish that the elements of prejudice were due to the delays in this case or from other causes, namely another pending case of fraud he faces or from his criminal record. [ 59 ] As to the “relative” objective gravity of the offences faced by the Accused, they do not justify, when put in balance with the other factors analyzed in Morin , the granting of the Application and the remedy sought by the Accused. [ 60 ] Finally as I wrote in a case of Charles [24] : [23] In fact, this case is no different from the thousands and thousands of cases that appear on the court docket every year in this jurisdiction.

In the Court’s opinion, a stay of proceedings in these circumstances would permit a repeat of the “post-Askov” fall-out, since all charges in similar circumstances would likely have to be stayed and as a result, simply “clean up the docket”. [24] Yet, as the Supreme Court wrote in Jordan : […] the administration of justice cannot tolerate a recurrence of what transpired after the release of Askov , and this contextual application of the framework is intended to ensure that the post- Askov situation is not repeated […].

[…] the administration of justice cannot countenance a recurrence of Askov . […] […] Such swift and drastic consequences risk undermining the integrity of the administration of justice. […]. FOR ALL THOSE REASONS, THE COURT: APPLIES the transitional exceptional circumstance, and DISMISSES the application for a stay of proceedings. _________________________________ ROBERT MARCHI, J.C.Q. M e Émilie Robert Attorney of the DPCP M e Andrew Barbacki Attorney of the Accused Date of hearing: May 29 th , 2017 TABLEAU DES DÉLAIS : Analyse Jordan DOSSIER LA REINE c.

RICHARD CHANDROO Délai total du 13-04-2012 au 29-05-2017 = 1872 jours (5 ans, 1 mois et 16 jours ou environ 61 mois) Du délai total primaire on doit faire des soustractions (renonciations, actions de la défense, actes distincts) pour déterminer si le plafond présumé est atteint. Ces soustractions sont en couleur rouge dans le tableau et totalisent 1068 jours, soit environ 35 mois. 1872 - 1068 = 804 jours ou environ 26 mois lorsque les soustractions Jordan sont effectuées.

Date Étapes Commentaires Qualification du délai entre la date et la prochaine Délai entre cette date et la prochaine (A) 13-04-2012 Dénonciation assermentée 82 jours, soit 2 mois et 21 jours (B) 04-07-2012 Comparution et dossier reporté p.f. au 13-09-2012 71 jours, soit 2 mois et 9 jours (C) 13-09-2012 Dossier remis p.f. au 15-11-2012 Preuve remise à la défense (M e Mimran) Accusé présent. 63 jours, soit 2 mois et 2 jours

(D) 15-11-2012 p.f. dossier remis au 09-01-2013 L’accusé a remis des documents à son avocate et celle-ci demande une remise afin de pouvoir prendre connaissance des documents et les remettre à la poursuite si nécessaire. Le juge Braun indique que le dossier devra être prêt pour prise de position à la prochaine date. 55 jours, soit 1 mois et 24 jours (E) 09-01-2013 p.f. dossier remis au 15-02-2013 L’avocate de Chandroo (M e Mimran) remet à la poursuite un acte notarié dans lequel il est indiqué que l’accusé doit rembourser le plaignant.

Accusé présent. 37 jours, soit 1 mois et 6 jours (F) 15-02-2013 Dossier fixé pour enquête préliminaire (durée de 3h) le 4- 2-2014 Enquête préliminaire à la demande de la défense. Accusé présent. Délai défense 354 jours, soit 11 mois et 17 jours (G) 04-02-2014 Enquête préliminaire remise au 02-10- 2014 Absence du témoin/plaignant (il étudie en Espagne). M e Chartier entre au dossier. Accusé présent. L’EP est fixée au 2 octobre 2014. (Le procureur de la couronne n’était pas disponible à la mi-juin 2014.

M e Chartier ne l’était pas au début août 2014) 240 jours, soit 7 mois et 26 jours (H) 02-10-2014 549 c.cr. et ré- option j.c.p. Dossier reporté au 17-12-2014 3 jours avant la tenue de l’EP, la défense y renonce et la poursuite y consent (549 C.cr.). Ré-option j.c.p. Dossier remis au 17 décembre 2014 pour une gestion d’instance. 76 jours, soit 2 mois et 15 jours (I) 17-12-2014 Dossier remis au 23-03-2015 pour Gestion d’instance La procureure de la couronne étant malade, la gestion d’instance est remise au 23 mars 2015. Accusé présent.

Événement distinct 96 jours, soit 3 mois et 6 jours (J) 23-03-2015 Gestion d’instance. Dossier remis au 30-04-2015 La procureure de la couronne résume les faits et annonce 9 témoins, dont 4 en visio- conférence, ainsi qu’une preuve d’actes similaires. La défense mentionne ne pouvoir faire beaucoup d’admissions. La juge demande à la défense de vérifier les admissions qu’il est possible de faire. Délai défense 38 jours, soit 1 mois et 7 jours. (K) 30-04-2015 Gestion d’instance.

Dossier fixé à procès pour 5 jours du 23 au 27 janvier 2017 Quelques admissions sont faites mais avec très peu d’impact sur la durée du procès. Juge Ouimet mentionne directement à M. Chandroo que selon elle d’autres admissions auraient pu être faites. Elle qualifie la preuve d’accablante (en référence notamment à la reconnaissance de dette notarié

e) Procès fixé pour 5 jours du 23 au 27 janvier 2017, mais un pro forma est prévu devant la juge Morin après le procès dans le dossier de Longueuil (7 au 9 décembre 2015), soit le 31 mars 2016. 634 jours, soit 1 an, 8 mois et 23 jours (entre cette gestion et le début du procès) (L) 31-03-2016 Gestion d’instance. Audio non disponible - (M) 04-10-2016 Requête pour cesser d’occuper accueillie. Nouvelle sommation émise. Requête de M e Chartier pour cesser d’occuper accueillie par la juge Morin. Absence de l’accusé (malgré signification). La juge émet nouvelle sommation. -

(N) 07-10-2016 Nouvelle sommation pour que l’accusé soit présent le 20 octobre 2016 (nouvelle adresse de l’accusé) M e Duplessis mentionne que M e Legris lui a laissé un message vocal à l’effet qu’il a communiqué avec M. Chandroo pour l’informer de cette date et qu’il ne le représentera pas dans le dossier de Montréal. - (O) 20-10-2016 L’accusé confirme devant la juge Morin qu’il sera prêt à procéder, avec M e Legris ou M e Barbacki. La juge Morin lui indique que le dossier procèdera avec ou sans avocat. - (P) 23-01-2017 Jour 1 du procès. Demande de remise refusée.

Début du procès le 25-01-2017 L’accusé demande la remise du procès afin qu’il puisse être représenté par son nouvel avocat, M e Barbacki. La poursuite propose d’accommoder M e Barbacki en ne débutant que le mercredi 25 janvier 2017 et estime que sa preuve peut être présentée en 2 jours, une fois la question des faits similaires retranchée. 2 jours (Q) 25 au 27-01- 2017 Début du procès : preuve de la poursuite La preuve de la poursuite est close après deux jours et une heure.

La défense demande un ajournement afin de prendre une décision sur l’opportunité de présenter une défense et/ou une requête en délais déraisonnables. Action de la défense sous Jordan 21 jours (à partir du 27 janvier, date de fin du procès) (R) 17-02-2017 Gestion d’instance. Fin du procès fixée pour une journée le 29-05-2017 Action de la défense sous Jordan 101 jours, soit 3 mois et 12 jours (S) 29-05-2017 Procès : défense et plaidoiries.