Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk v. K.N., 2016 ONCJ 412

This is a case under

Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 45(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act . These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—

(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The Court may make an order, . . . (

c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85.—

(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(

c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. Information No. FO-384 FO-393 DATE: 2016-06-22 CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk v. K.N. , 2016 ONCJ 412 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N: CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF HALDIMAND-NORFOLK Applicant - and - K.N. Respondent - and - W.A. Respondent - and - CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES, SIX NATIONS COUNCIL Respondent PROCEEDINGS AT TEMPORARY CARE HEARING BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE K. BAKER on June 22, 2016, at BRANTFORD, Ontario APPEARANCES : S. Labadie Counsel for the Children’s Aid Society L. Delong Counsel for K.N. P. Vandervet Counsel for W.A. E. Montour Counsel for M.N. M. Bulbrook Agent for A.

MacDonald (OCL) WEDNESDAY JUNE 22, 2016 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BAKER, J. (Orally): This is my judgment on the Temporary Care Hearing with respect of the three subject children, S.A., born […], 2008, now age 7; D.A., born […], 2012, now age 4; and M.A., born […], 2013, now age 2.

The children had been residing with the maternal grandmother, M.N., since March, 2015. M.N. is an added party to the proceeding andshe is seeking an order placing the children in her care, subject to the supervision of the Society. The Six Nations Band, of whom the children are members, supports this position. The mother of the children, K.N., is seeking an order placing the children in her care, subject to the supervision of the Society. The father, W.A., is seeking an order placing the children in his care, subject to supervision.

The Society was somewhat equivocal in its position, but it would seem that the Society is opposing placement with the mother, and isindifferent as to placement between either the maternal grandmother or the father. The legal test for a Temporary Care Hearing is set out at

Section 51 of the Child and Family Services Act. The legislation sets out ahierarchy of orders that the court may make. The preference is for the least intrusive order that is consistent with the best interests,protection, and wellbeing of the subject children. The onus is on the Society to show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm ifreturned to the person having charge of the child immediately prior to the intervention, and that the child cannot be adequately protectedby a Supervision Order.

The Society must show that it is more probable than not that if returned to the parents, the child will suffer harm. The risk must be realand not merely speculative. In order to apply the proper test at the Hearing, it is necessary to determine which person or persons had charge of the childrenimmediately prior to the intervention. The term charge is not defined in the Child and Family Services Act, but it has been interpreted inthe case law. In Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v.

S.D., 2008 49155 (ON SC), Justice Harper considered the meaning of the phrase,“Person who had charge of the child.” The court noted that the term charge is not defined in the legislation. The court then went on to review the existing case law interpretingthe phrase. The first such case was the Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. Tina G., (ON CJ), 2002 125 ACWS 3D1020, adecision of Justice Kukurin. The court found therein that charge has a connotation of authority and responsibility for a child. The charge of a child suggests someestablished relationship, not something transient or temporary.

Specifically, the court did not think that simply having possession of a charge was sufficient to bring the person within the meaning ofthe term charge. In Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. H.C. & C.C. (ON SC), 2003 127 ACWS 3d 1159, Justice Blishen alsoconsidered the meaning of the term charge in

Section 51 of the Act. Justice Blishen found that charge was linked to the term care and

custody, and found that the term charge is akin to questioning who had care and custody. Like Justice Kukurin, Justice Blishen was of the opinion that there had to be an active relationship of care and not mere possession of thechild. In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.A. 2008 ONCJ 348 , 2008 OJ 3110, Justice Spence considered the same issue. In thatcase, the court splits the idea of charge and the idea of custody, and adopted a definition of charge that is grounded in actively caring fora child, and potentially distinct from the notion of custody. Justice Spence ultimately determined charge meant an active caring relationship. He went on to say, Clause 51(2)(

a) of the Child and Family Services Act does not talk about returning the child to the person who had custody, but ratherreturning the child to the person who had charge of the child. There clearly is a difference between the meaning of custody and charge. There could be many instances where the person has custody of the child, and another person has charge of that child. Justice Spence then went on to give an example of his reasoning to demonstrate the difference. He described a situation whereby asingle mother who has custody of a child informally relinquishes that child to an aunt for care purposes.

After several months in the aunt’s care, the child would no longer be in the mother’s charge, but rather the aunt’s. This reasoning is adopted by Justice Harper in Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.D., 2008 49155 (ON SC). Heexplained his reasoning at paragraph 30 saying, I’m of the view that

Section 51 is structured in the manner that it is because the statute establishes a priority to the person who may havehad the most active and responsible involvement with the child immediately prior to the intervention. The Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex is a decision of the Superior Court of Justice. I’m of the view that it would bebinding on this court. Aside from that, I also find Justice Harper’s reasoning highly persuasive. Other cases have discussed the extent to how the placement arose impacts on the establishment of the status of having charge of thechild.

In the Catholic Children’s Society of Toronto v. W.I., 2014 ONCJ 62, Justice Sherr found that the court must concern itself with thenature of the relationship between the person and the child to determine whether or not the person has acquired the status of charge of thechild, rather than considering how the placement arose. The criterion applied by Justice Sherr is whether or not there is existence of, “Active caring” by the person and thus taking ofresponsibility for the child. The same reasoning was adopted by Parent, J. in Children’s Aid Society, Region of Peel v. A.C., 2015 ONCJ4A2.

It is also important to consider the definition of the phrase immediately prior to the intervention. The Act requires assessment of whohad charge of the child in relation to a particular time-frame. The term intervention is not defined in the statute. It has, however, received some consideration in the case law. In Justice Sherr’s decision in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. W.I., 2014 ONCJ 62, the court was faced with a situationwhere prior to the commencement of the Protection Application, the mother had signed a Voluntary Services Agreement that placed thechildren in the care of the father.

Prior to the signing of the agreement, the mother would undoubtedly have had charge of the children.

The court found that the circumstances of the signing of the Temporary Care Agreement were such that the mother had little choice but to accede to the Society’s demand to temporarily place the children with the father. The mother, therefore, had not conceded that the children should remain with the father, she did not relinquish her custodial rights, and she did not waive the legal status of having had charge of the children. It would, thus, be unfair for her to lose the protection of Subsection 51(2).

In coming to that conclusion, Justice Sherr addressed and distinguished the case of Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. J.M., 2008 OJ NO 5850 , where in entering into a Voluntary Services Agreement was found to constitute a voluntary relinquishment of the child. The principle to be derived from these decisions is that it is important to look into the circumstances of the signing of any Agreement as between the parents and the Society to determine whether or not the parents voluntarily relinquished the child, or whether the parent merely submitted to a demand by the Society.

The former would seem to deprive the parent of charge of the child, whereas the latter would constitute the intervention and would not deprive the parent of the protection of Section 51(2) of the Child and Family Services Act . This is a situation of three competing family plans. Pivotal to the analysis is the determination as to which of these individuals, either singularly, or concomitantly had charge of the child prior to the intervention.

The Society and the parents took the position that all three respondents had mutual charge of the child prior to the intervention, and that accordingly, each is entitled to equal priority. The maternal grandmother takes the position that she had charge of the children prior to the intervention. She was joined in that position by the OCL. In determining this issue, it is important to review the chronology of events that led to the children entering into the care of the maternal grandmother. The Society started working voluntarily with the parents in October of 2014.

At that time, the maternal grandmother was residing in the United States. In January of 2015, the maternal grandmother returned to Brantford and made contact with the Society. She reported that she had returned to assist her adult children who were, “Not making the right choices.” On March 23, 2015, the maternal grandmother reported that she was caring for the subject children and she requested the Society worker attend and meet with her and the children. The worker did attend that day, at which time the maternal grandmother reported the children had been with her for about two weeks.

The mother was apparently staying elsewhere and had not been in communication with the maternal grandmother. In her affidavit sworn February 19 th , 2016, the maternal grandmother says that by the point of the call to the worker on March 23 rd , 2015, the mother had been “gone” for a week and the father had been “gone” for four days. She said that even prior to that, the parents had been leaving the children in her care for “Days on end.” Over the ensuing days, the Society worker seems to have embarked on negotiations with the family in relation to a Kinship Agreement.

The children remained with the maternal grandmother. On April 17, 2015, the mother and maternal grandmother signed a Kinship Service Agreement which said that the children would reside with the parents and the maternal grandmother. It further stated, “The parents agree to a one week on, one week off exchange Monday- to-Monday.” It went on to say that the mother would be supervised at times when she was in a caregiving role to the children. Mother also informed the Society that she would be staying at the maternal grandmother’s residence during her week with the children.

A subsequent Kinship Agreement was signed by the maternal grandmother, mother and father later, with father finally signing May 4 th , 2015. The father had not been prepared to sign the earlier Agreement and insisted on changes prior to signing this version. The Agreement was to govern for a specified period of three months until June 30 th , 2015. At paragraph 4, the Agreement stated that the children would reside with the maternal grandmother at her home in O[…].

Somewhat incongruously, it then went on to say, “In regards to the children’s residence, the families have agreed to alternate one week on with one week off at the aforementioned addresses; Monday-to-Monday during which time the access parent would be present to provide child-care with their supervisors during that assigned week.” The only aforementioned address in that Agreement is that of the maternal grandmother. At the expiry of the Agreement on June 30 th , 2015, there was then a 10 day period during which there was no written governing agreement.

The children remained in the de facto care of the maternal grandmother at that time. On July 10 th , 2015, a Temporary Care Agreement was executed by the parents and the maternal grandmother, which placed the child technically in the care of the Society, but the Society then designated the maternal grandmother as a foster parent. This Agreement expired December 10 th , 2015. Thereafter, the Society commenced the Care and Protection Application with a first return date of December 14 th , 2015. A Temporary Without Prejudice Order was made at that time placing the children in the care of the Society.

The Society has continued the placement of the children with the maternal grandmother, essentially deeming her a foster parent. There is virtually no evidence as to the circumstances of the signing of the various Agreements. There is, however, nothing in the evidence to suggest the Society gave the parents an ultimatum requiring them to sign or face apprehension of the children. The Society provided the parents ample time in which to consider the Draft Agreements, first proffering them on March 30 th , 2015 and allowing the elapse of over 2 weeks before they were signed by the mother.

The father, of course, took even more time to sign, waiting until early May. Both parents required changes to the Drafts to provide for a week-about time-sharing. This was conceded by the Society. This suggests that the parents and the Society were in negotiations rather than the parents being in a situation of compulsion. Although both Agreements seem to contemplate an important and substantial caregiving role for both parents given the week-about proviso, there’s little evidence to show that this was, in fact, a reality.

In fact, in early May, 2015, the maternal grandmother was complaining that the parents were, “Occasional parents.” By mid-May, 2015, the mother agreed to have her access on alternating weekends at the home of the step-father. On June 2 nd , 2015, the maternal grandmother said she was unable to contact the mother, and that the children, “Had been crying for” the mother; thus implying that the mother was only an occasional presence in the children’s lives at that point in time.

By the time of the Temporary Service Agreement, the parents’ access was one weekday evening per week and alternating weekends respectively, both of which were supervised. In her Affidavit of February 19 th , 2016, the maternal grandmother said the father has continued to miss visits. That does not seem to be disputed by the father.

I accept that the maternal grandmother assumed primary care of these children on or about March 9th, 2015. This would be consistentwith the maternal grandmother’s statement that the children had been in her care for about two weeks prior to her call to the Society. That statement was made reasonably approximate to the event. It would have been when the events were clearest in the maternalgrandmother’s memory.

The maternal grandmother’s statement that the father had been “gone” for four days, and mother had been “gone” for about a week doesnot detract from that earlier assertion. “Gone” implies a total absence, it does not derogate from the previous statement that maternalgrandmother had been caring for the children for about two weeks prior to her call to the Society. Even prior to that, the parents had left the children in the care of the maternal grandmother for days on end. This was an entirelyvoluntary relinquishment of the children’s care to the grandmother. Then came the first and second Kinship Agreements.

Nothing in the evidence would suggest the parents were in any way coerced intoentering into these Agreements. While the first Kinship Agreement suggested that all 3 individuals, being the parents and the maternal grandmother, were to becustodians to the children, this does not then seem to have been the reality. All of the parents’ caregiving was supervised and occurred inthe home. In the case of the mother, supervised visits took place in the maternal grandmother’s home; and in the case of the father,supervised visits took place at the home of the paternal grandmother.

The second Agreement was exclusive in saying the children would reside with the maternal grandmother. Once that Agreement lapsed on July 1st, the parents seemed to have been completely content to leave the children in the care of the maternal grandmother. There isnothing to suggest that at that juncture they sought return of the children. The Voluntary Care Agreement was then signed, placing the children technically in the care of the Society.

It is clear on the totality ofthe evidence that in signing the Agreement, the parents would have anticipated that the children would remain in the care of the maternalgrandmother and indeed, this is what actually occurred. The children have since remained with the maternal grandmother and since December 14th, 2015, this has been pursuant to a TemporaryWithout Prejudice Order, placing them in the care of the Society, which in turn, deemed the maternal grandmother akin in careplacement. There is some discussion in the case law, specifically in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v.

K.N., 2008 ONCJ 340 , 2008 OJNO 3074, to suggest that a Temporary Without Prejudice Order may have a shelf-life. The court, in that case, suggested that a 3 to 6month period might be sufficient to displace the without prejudice component. That decision was followed in the case of Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. J.M., 2010 ONSC 7119 , 2010 OJ NO 5646,where the court considered that a lapse of 8 months from the date of the Without Prejudice Order was a relevant factor in assessingplacement. I agree with Justice Sherr, speaking in his judgment of Catholic Children’s Society of Toronto v.

W.I. and D.T., that the facts of each caseneed to be carefully examined to determine if the shelf-life of a Without Prejudice Order has run out. I also agree that the court shouldnot lightly deprive a parent of the protection of Section 51(2) of the legislation. On the facts of this case, however, we have a situation where over a series of events, and over a number of months, the parents madesequential decisions to voluntarily relinquish the responsibility for the care of the children to the maternal grandmother.

I do not think it can be said now, some 15 months after maternal grandmother began caring for the children, that the parents had charge immediately prior to the intervention. The inescapable conclusion is the maternal grandmother had charge of these children at the relevant time-frame, regardless of whether that is characterized as the signing of the Voluntary Services Agreement, as is argued by the Society, or the commencement of the Protection Application.

Even if one characterizes the relevant time-frame as that of March, 2015, the circumstances were such that the parents had left the children with the maternal grandmother for two weeks and then gone off to points unknown. This is not akin to a situation where parents leave a child with a babysitter for a defined period of time. That arrangement would surely not displace charge of the child from the parent, because it would be temporary and it would be transient.

It’s a completely different situation where parents abdicate responsibility of the children’s care to another person, especially perhaps, a family member, with no indication of when or if they plan to resume their caregiving obligations. I therefore find that the maternal grandmother had charge of the children prior to the intervention of the Society and maintenance of that placement is therefore the priority, pursuant to Subsection 51(2). All parties have conceded that a Supervision Order is sufficient to mitigate the risk of the placement with the maternal grandmother, and I agree.

The children will accordingly be placed with the maternal grandmother under a Temporary Order of Supervision. There is some modest dispute about what terms of supervision are required. Ms. Monture, on behalf of the maternal grandmother, quite rightly makes the point that maternal grandmother was previously designated as a foster parent for the children. That would seem to reflect a concession by the Society and other parties that the paternal grandmother’s care does not require supervision or supervision terms.

Having said that, however, it is clear on the evidence that there has been some conflict amongst the parties, most markedly as between the maternal grandmother and the father. Some terms of supervision are required to mitigate risk in that area. Some more general terms should also ensue, simply to confirm the Society’s authority to undertake the necessary supervision. As a foster mother, the maternal grandmother would have been subject to the Society’s rules governing foster parents. These no longer apply, and so some general guidelines are required. There is, however, no need for extensive terms.

The terms of supervision shall be as follows; (

a) The maternal grandmother, M.N., shall comply with the following terms; (

i) allow the Society worker scheduled and unscheduled access to the children in her care, and permit the workers to attend at her home for both scheduled and unscheduled visits; (ii) she shall facilitate any services for the children deemed necessary by the Society after consultation with the maternal grandmother; (iii) she shall sign releases of information to permit the Society workers to exchange information with service providers to the children, including but not limited to schools, daycares, physicians and counsellors; (iv) she will advise the Society of any

change in address or telephone number 5 days in advance of any change; (

v) she will not permit any new residents in the home without the express written consent of the Society given in advance; (

v) she will follow the Society’s direction regarding access by the parents to the children and not permit the parents access unless approved by the Society; (vi) the maternal grandmother will not discuss the court proceedings or the issues underlying the court proceedings with the children, nor allow anyone else to do so within the children’s hearings, except for the OCL; and (vii) she will ensure that the children are not exposed to any form of adult conflict. The remaining issue is that of access by the parents. Currently, access is at the discretion of the Society.

The OCL and the First Nation have recognized that the father is doing well and have advocated for increased access by the father, should the children not be returned to his care. Unfortunately, as the focus of this hearing has been placement, there has been little evidence and little argument describing and advocating on behalf of the father’s current access arrangements. I also do not have the benefit of specific proposals from each of the parties.

I do know that there have been problems at times with the father’s access, including earlier his lack of diligent attendance, and the children suffering adverse medical events following visits. There have also been issues with the father driving the children in a vehicle when he does not have a license. The father’s girlfriend also seems to be an issue. Given these concerns, any

schedule of increasing access needs to be carefully calibrated to ensure its success and the children’s protection. The parties need to meet to develop a plan in this regard and if they cannot reach agreement, it can be returned to me for adjudication. The other issue addressed by the OCL is the need for terms of access to delineate the expectation of the parents during visits. I accept that this will be helpful to everyone including the parents, so that the rules of the game are clear to all. When this was last before the court, I asked the parties to develop some draft terms for access.

Has that been accomplished, Ms. Labadie? MS. LABADIE: Your Honour, if I can just have an opportunity to speak with my client, if I could just have a moment, please. In terms of terms for access, Your Honour, I understand the Society’s position is simply that the parents arrive in time for access, follow the terms of the access. Mom’s access, of course, is supervised. That the parents do not engage in any drug use 24 hours prior to, drug or alcohol use 24 hours prior to or during access with the children. THE COURT: I was thinking perhaps it would be helpful if the terms of access could be reduced to writing.

This might be the subject of some negotiation amongst the parties. My guess is that the OCL might want to have some input into particular terms of access. MS. BULBROOK: My understanding from Ms. Macdonald is that she did request some terms and she also was hoping that Your Honour would give some direction as to the services required for the children. I’m assuming that you contemplated that when you made the term that the Society will facilitate services for the children after the consult with the grandmother. THE COURT: Right. MS.

BULBROOK: If the OCL has any issues or beliefs that the children’s needs are at risk, then Macdonald could make the Society aware.

THE COURT: All right. Here is what I am going to suggest. I am going to suggest that I stand the matter down, you negotiate some terms of access, perhaps have some discussion about what father’s access is going to look like. You might also want to

schedule a meeting so that you can make some plans with respect to the proposed increase in father’s access. In other words, you need to address where that’s going to happen, if there’s going to be supervision of all of it, or if it is going to be more of a drop-in nature, how exchanges will take place, particularly given there is some conflict. So, I will stand the matter down so that you can negotiate that and perhaps you can give some though also as to where you would like to go from here, whether you would like to

schedule a settlement conference, or what you would like to do. After you have had that discussion, of course, it might also become clearer whether or not it is likely that you are going to need to bring back the matter for adjudication on the issue of the parents’ access. I am hopeful that after a good meeting, you might not be able to have it here today, but subsequently, you won’t need to have that matter determined, you’d be able to come to a resolution. But I will just add it to my endorsement. For oral reasons given, Temporary Order to Go.

The subject children shall be placed in the care of the maternal grandmother, M.N., subject to the supervision of the Society. The terms of supervision, I have set out, which will be attached to my endorsement. MS. BULBROOK: Thank you, Your Honour. MS. LABADIE: Thank you, Your Honour. THE COURT: Thank you very much. RECESS UPON RESUMING: MS. LABADIE: Your Honour, the parties have been able to come up with some terms... THE COURT: Good. Ms. LABADIE: ...in respect of dad and mom’s access. THE COURT: Excellent. All right.

I’m glad the parties have been able to come up with some terms that are going to help the parents. They essentially can provide some guidance to them in their access and they will understand exactly what is expected of them. MS. MONTURE: We should page Ms. Bulbrook back here, as OCL counsel. THE COURT: Oh, yes we absolutely should. ...MAUREEN BULBROOK PAGED CLERK REGISTRAR: Mr. Vandervet, is your client here? MR. VANDERVET: I think he’s just outside, I’ll go out and remind him. THE COURT: Thank you for responding Ms. Bulbrook, we almost overlooked you, but Ms. Monture reminded us.

I’ve got some terms of access here for the parents. I gather you’re in agreement with them? MS. BULBROOK: As long as there were no changes the last time I looked at them, Your Honour. THE COURT: Would you like to see them? MS. BULBROOK: Yes, please. MR. VANDERVET: Your Honour, he was here 10 minutes ago, but I think we can carry on. I did obviously review the attendance with him. MS. BULBROOK: Yes, the terms are satisfactory. THE COURT: All right, thank you.

And I indicated just before you got in, that I think it’s very helpful we have terms of access for the parents to provide them with some guidance as to what’s expected of them. MS. BULBROOK: Of course. Your Honour, Ms. Macdonald did want me to ask if the Society would be amending its, providing, asking for the court to tell the Society essentially, to amend the Plan of Care, with respect to services required for the children. THE COURT: Right. MS. BULBROOK: Because I believe Ms.

Macdonald did express her concern about the child, S., during the submissions and that there should be services in place for, for the children. THE COURT: Right, thank you very much.

THE COURT: Ms. Labadie, what do you think about that? MS. LABADIE: Your Honour, the Society is agreeable. THE COURT: How long do you need to do that? MS. LABADIE: Two weeks. MS. BULBROOK: Thank you. MR. VANDERVET: Mr. A’s here. THE COURT: Oh, good. The parents’ access shall be subject to the terms per the Appendix A. The Society shall serve and file an updated Plan of Care to address inter alia, the appropriate services for the children and that is to be done by July 15 th . Where to from here? MS. LABADIE: I’m just trying to rush out. We’re looking at a to be spoken to in August.

The clerk advised that August 8 th at 10:00 a.m. is available. I’m unsure if every party is available at that time. THE COURT: Why to be spoken to as opposed to a settlement conference? MS. LABADIE: Because the parties are going to have a meeting on, in July regarding the parent’s access, and so on that to be spoken to, we’re going to determine whether we need motions to deal with access... THE COURT: Right. MS. LABADIE: ...or a settlement conference. THE COURT: Okay, I understand. MS. MONTURE: That’s good for me. MR. VANDERVET: That’s satisfactory, Your Honour. MS. BULBROOK: Yes, Your Honour, that’s fine.

THE COURT: Adjourned to August 8 th , 2016, 10:00 a.m. to permit the parties to meet and plan re expansion of the parents’ access. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. MONTURE: Thank you. MS. LABADIE: Thank you. ...WHEREUPON THESE PROCEEDINGS WERE ADJOURNED ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Legend [sic] - Indicates preceding word has been reproduced verbatim and is not a transcription error. (ph) - Indicates preceding word has been spelled phonetically.