2014 QCCA 2041, 2014 QCCA 2041

Rosenberg c. Canada (Procureur général) 2014 QCCA 2041 COUR D'APPEL CANADA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL N o : 500-09-024437-147 (500-17-068799-116) PROCÈS-VERBAL D'AUDIENCE DATE : Le 6 novembre 2014 CORAM : LES HONORABLES françois doyon , J.C.A. marie st-pierre , J.C.A. mark schrager , J.C.A. APPELANTS AVOCAT MICHAEL ROSENBERG CHANIE ROSENBERG LANDAU M e Alain gutkin ( Laframboise Gutkin ) INTIMÉ AVOCATES PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU CANADA M e NADINE DUPUIS Me ÉRIN MORGAN ( Ministère de la justice ) En appel d'un jugement rendu le 16 avril 2014 par l'honorable Stephen W. Hamilton de la Cour supérieure, district de Montréal

NATURE DE L'APPEL : Irrecevabilité – prescription du recours Greffière d’audience : Linda Côté Salle : Pierre-Basile-Mignault AUDITION 09h27 Début de l'audience. La Cour s'adresse à Me Alain Gutkin. 09h30 Plaidoirie de Me Gutkin. 10h24 Suspension de l'audience. 10h34 Reprise de l'audience. Il ne sera pas nécessaire d'entendre les procureures de l'intimé. 10h35 Arrêt unanime prononcé par l'honorable François Doyon – voir page 3. 10h36 Fin de l'audience. Greffière d’audience PAR LA COUR ARRÊT [ 1 ] Saisi d'une requête en rejet fondée sur les articles 54.1 et 165

(4) C.p.c ., le juge de première instance rejette la requête introductive d'instance, car le recours est manifestement voué à l'échec puisque prescrit : le point de départ du délai de prescription se situe au 30 mai 2007 alors que le recours n'a été entrepris que le 9 novembre 2011, au-delà du délai de prescription applicable de trois ans ( art. 2925 C.c.Q .). [ 2 ] Les appelants soutiennent que le juge a erré en concluant que le point de départ du délai de prescription se situait au 30 mai 2007.

À leur avis, la prescription ne pouvait courir contre eux qu'à compter de 2011, car ce ne serait qu'à ce moment-là que de simples soupçons se sont transformés en une connaissance suffisante de la faute génératrice du droit réclamé. [ 3 ] Nous ne partageons pas le point de vue des appelants. [ 4 ] Le juge de première instance a eu raison de conclure que le point de départ du délai de prescription se situait au 30 mai 2007, et cela étant, de rejeter le recours entrepris. [ 5 ] Les appelants ne remettent pas en question les faits de l'affaire que le juge de première instance résume ainsi : [9] The facts underlying the prescription issue are not contested: ● The Plaintiffs bought the Building in 1998, and the Department of Public Works was then the tenant of the Building with leases expiring in 2004; ● In early 2004, the Department of Public Works advised the Plaintiffs that it intended to vacate the Building when the leases expired in November 2004, and it did in fact vacate the Building in November 2004; ● The Plaintiffs made various proposals to upgrade the Building and lease it to the Department of Public Works between 2004 and

2006, but those proposals were either refused or ignored; ● The Plaintiff Michael Rosenberg was approached in the spring of 2005 by a friend of his, Alex Wertzberger, who told him that he had been approached by representatives of the Department of Public Works who asked him to get control of the Building because they would be interested to do a lease with Mr. Wertzberger but not with Mr. Rosenberg. The Plaintiffs gave Mr. Wertzberger an option to buy the Building but the deal did not close; ● The Plaintiff Michael Rosenberg was approached by Richard Hylands later in 2005 who said “I’d like to buy this building.

I can do something with this building.” Mr. Rosenberg’s assumption was that he was trying to bring the Department of Public Works in as a tenant; ● On March 29, 2006, the Plaintiffs sold the Building to 4345177 Canada Inc. (the company for which Mr. Hylands was acting) for $15 million; ● In May 2007, 4345177 Canada Inc. delivered a signed lease to the Department of Public Works which the Department formally accepted in September 2007. Mr.

Rosenberg admitted in his examination out of Court that he knew on May 30, 2007 that the government was leasing the Building; ● In January 2011, 4345177 Canada Inc. (then known as 200 Sacré-Coeur Holdings Inc.) was trying to sell the Building.

In the marketing materials put together by the broker, there are details of the work done by 4345177 Canada Inc. to renovate the Building for the Department of Public Works and details of the lease with the Department of Public Works; ● On April 11, 2011, 200 Sacré-Coeur Holdings Inc. sold the Building to a third party for $51.3 million; ● On November 7, 2011, the Plaintiffs sued the Attorney General for $21,833,000. [ 6 ] Comme l'écrivait notre Cour dans Furs by Leonard Gorski Inc. c. Global Furs Inc .

« la jurisprudence établit sans ambigüité que le point de départ de la prescription extinctive est le premier moment où le titulaire du droit aurait pu prendre action pour le faire valoir » [1] . [ 7 ] C'est aussi ce qu'énonce le professeur Pierre Martineau dans son traité de droit civil : La prescription extinctive suppose l’inaction du titulaire d’un droit.

Le point de départ de la prescription est donc le premier jour où il aurait pu agir, le jour où il aurait pu pour la première fois prendre action pour faire valoir son droit . [2] [Nos soulignements.] [ 8 ] En matière de responsabilité civile, ce moment (ce premier jour) survient dès que le titulaire du droit acquiert une connaissance suffisante d'une faute, d'un dommage et du lien de causalité qui les unit [3] ( art. 1457 C.c.Q. ) en faisant preuve de diligence raisonnable dans la recherche des faits [4] . [ 9 ] Le juge de première instance a énoncé et appliqué ces principes de droit. [ 10 ] Établir le point de départ de la prescription c'est se prononcer sur une question de fait ou sur une question mixte de fait et de droit de sorte que la Cour ne peut intervenir qu'en présence d'une erreur manifeste et déterminante [5] . [ 11 ] Or, les conclusions que le juge énonce aux paragraphes 20 à 23 du jugement entrepris trouvent largement appui dans la preuve : [ 20 ] Counsel for the Attorney General argued that everything in the Plaintiffs’ introductory Motion for Damages dated November 9, 2011 was known to the Plaintiffs on May 30, 2007, except for the paragraphs 35 and 49 [ … ] . [ 21 ] The principal relevance of those paragraphs relates to the quantum of damages , in that the Plaintiffs use the 2011 sale price as evidence of the value of the Building with the Department of Public Works as tenant.

The fact that the Plaintiffs did not have that element of proof in May 2007 did not prevent them from suing. It is sufficient that they knew that they had suffered damages. The amount of the damages need not be known with precision and can be amended later based on the evidence and expert reports as the case progresses . [ 22 ] The other relevance of the 2011 sale is the details disclosed in the broker’s information package with respect to the lease between the purchaser and the Department of Public Works. The Plaintiffs argue that these details confirmed their suspicions and allowed them to sue.

In my view, the Plaintiffs has sufficient knowledge in May 2007 to sue, in that they knew that the Department of Public Works had leased the building from the purchaser. It was not necessary to know the exact terms and conditions of the lease before instituting proceedings . [ 23 ] In fact, not only in my view did the Plaintiffs have sufficient basis for a suit by May 2007, but also they could not have had the reasonable expectation that they would obtain any further information. In other words, the Plaintiffs had, as of May 2007, the only information they were likely to ever have about this potential claim.

They chose not to sue at that time and as a result the claim was prescribed in May 2010. The fact that they fortuitously obtained further information in 2011 about the lease and the sale of the building does not revive their claim. [ Nos soulignements. ] [ 12 ] C'est donc en vain que les appelants cherchent à nous convaincre d'une erreur manifeste et déterminante dans l'analyse des faits de l'affaire par le juge de première instance. POUR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR : [ 13 ] REJETTE l'appel avec dépens.

FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.C.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.C.A. MARK SCHRAGER, J.C.A.