2023 QCCA 858, 2023 QCCA 858

P.G. c. V.C. 2023 QCCA 858 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-029993-227 (500-17-103951-185) DATE: July 3, 2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. STÉPHANE SANSFAÇON, J.A. SOPHIE LAVALLÉE, J.A. P. G. APPELLANT – Plaintiff v. V. C. RESPONDENT – Defendant JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The appellant appeals against a judgment rendered on February 28, 2022, by the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Mark Phillips), which dismissed his re-amended originating application as well as the respondent’s cross-application. [1] I.

Context [ 2 ] At trial, the appellant, P. G., argued that the respondent, V. C., his former father-in-law, had played a major role in the conduct of his divorce file, which proved to be highly acrimonious. [ 3 ] In the early 1990s, he began to work with the respondent, who already had an established business. In July 1995, he married the respondent’s daughter (J. C.), who held shares in some of the respondent’s companies and subsequently held shares in the appellant’s company. [ 4 ] In 2015, after nearly 20 years of marriage, Ms. C. filed a motion in Superior Court for separation from bed and board. [2] [ 5 ] Ms.

C., who alleged that the appellant had committed various wrongdoings to deprive her of her fair share of the family assets, also sought a Mareva injunction, which resulted in the majority of the appellant’s assets being frozen. [3] In the ensuing two years, until the July 13, 2017 divorce judgment, numerous court applications were filed to obtain releases for certain assets affected by the Mareva injunction in order to authorize certain expenses the appellant and his companies needed to incur. [4] [ 6 ] In October 2015, the appellant filed a divorce application.

The divorce judgment was rendered by the Honourable Danielle Mayrand, J.S.C. on July 13, 2017 (hereinafter the “Mayrand Judgment”). [5] [ 7 ] In June 2018, the appellant filed an originating application against the respondent, [6] alleging that he would not have had to incur such high legal fees and disbursements in his divorce proceedings were it not for the respondent’s active participation, the respondent having acted as his daughter’s adviser in those proceedings. He therefore claimed damages from the respondent.

He also claimed damages from the respondent for defamatory statements he alleges the respondent made about him during a telephone interview the respondent granted a journalist. In a newspaper

article that did not name the appellant, the journalist reported that he was seeking to deprive his then wife of her rightful share of the couple’s assets. This appeal pertains only to the portion of his claim seeking the payment of the legal fees and disbursements he incurred. [ 8 ] In his originating application, the appellant set out the following reasons in support of the damages claimed: II. THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE CLAIM […] 14. [...] the trial judge found - inter alia - that: Defendant was piloting the Proceedings; The goal of the Proceedings, and in particular

of the Mareva Order, was to paralyse and render powerless the Plaintiff herewith; That this was nothing but a vendetta on the part of the Defendant - a rich and powerful man - against his son-in-law; That Defendant - and not his daughter - was the real opposing party to Plaintiff in the divorce litigation; That all of the facts alleged in the Proceedings in order to obtain a Mareva Injunction came from the Defendant; That these facts are incorrect, untrue, false or incomplete; That Defendant considered himself above the law; That the Defendant - through his daughter - deliberately misled the Court by way of allegations he knew to be false for the purposes of obtaining the Mareva Order and that such Order would never have been issued were it not for those lies; and That the Mareva was abusive. 15.

The Judgment leaves absolutely no doubt as to the bad faith of the Defendant. 16. While the Judgment was partially appealed by Plaintiff’s ex-wife, the appeal does not touch upon the above, which will therefore remain unaltered no matter what decision the Cour of Appeal renders. LIABILITY OF THE DEFENDANT AND DAMAGES 17. Although vindicated at trial, the Plaintiff suffered and still suffers from extraordinary damages. Those extraordinary damages are specified at paragraphs 18 to 24 below. 18. First, the Judgment having been rendered in a family case cannot be disseminated publicly to vindicate Plaintiff. 19.

Second, the malicious actions of the Defendant forced the Plaintiff to incur millions of dollars in legal and expert fees to contest the Proceedings. 20. While there would undoubtedly have been divorce proceedings between the Plaintiff and his ex-wife even in the absence of the false and malicious allegations fabricated by the Defendant, the scope of those proceedings would not have had any common measure with the 20-day trial that ensued. […] 22.

Moreover, as indicated at paragraph 118 of the Judgment, the Defendant - notwithstanding the existence of a sealing order - gave an interview to the Journal de Montréal which led to the publication of an extremely damaging and defamatory

article regarding the Plaintiff. […] [7] [References omitted] [ 9 ] The appellant’s appeal relies on the following passages from the Mayrand Judgment: [2] La séparation survient en décembre 2014, lorsque P... G… (« P... ») quitte la résidence familiale. Les enfants demeurent avec leur mère, J…C... (« J... »). [3] Le 9 avril 2015, J... intente une demande en séparation de corps, conjuguée à une demande d’injonction Mareva qui est pilotée par le père de J..., V...

C..., de concert avec la procureure de J... à l’époque, Me Anne-France Goldwater. [4] La Mareva est plaidée ex parte le 10 avril 2015 et l’ordonnance est accueillie par la juge Masse de notre Cour, le 15 avril 2015, avec mise sous scellés. Elle est signifiée le même jour à P..., lorsqu’il est en Floride. [5] L’ensemble des biens et éléments d’actifs de P..., des fiducies et des corporations sous son contrôle (les codéfenderesses) sont saisis, ses comptes bancaires et cartes de crédit gelés. La valeur des biens saisis est de 80 M$.

Tous les biens saisis, sauf un condo en Floride, sont au Québec, pour la plupart de l’argent ou des placements dans des institutions financières établies ou des biens immobiliers. [6]

Malgré la nature confidentielle de l’ordonnance, les huissiers, retenus par la demanderesse, publient, à l’index aux immeubles, la déclaration assermentée de J... au soutien de la Mareva, de sorte que l’information confidentielle est divulguée aux tierces parties saisies y compris aux institutions financières qui transigent avec P.... [7] Le [...] 2015, le Journal A publie un

article rapportant les accusations de J..., dont le fait que P... aurait dérobé sa part de la fortune familiale évaluée à 150 M$. Même si les noms ne sont pas divulgués dans l’article, il y a peu de doute sur l’identité des personnes visées. [8] Après la parution de l’article du journal, les deux enfants, qui jusqu’alors vivaient avec leur mère, lui demandent d’abandonner la Mareva, ce qu’elle refuse. Ils quittent la résidence familiale et vont vivre avec leur père.

Les deux enfants n’ont plus de contact avec elle non plus qu’avec leur grand-père V.... [9] En octobre 2015, P... introduit une demande en divorce et il dépose une contestation, demande reconventionnelle et en rejet de la Mareva, à l’encontre de la demande introductive d’instance produite par J.... Vu la complexité des questions soulevées par la Mareva, les parties évaluent à plus de huit jours la durée pour l’audition sur la demande en rejet. Les délais pour que les parties soient entendues sont aussi longs que pour une audition au fond qui trancherait toutes les questions en litige.

Dans les circonstances, les parties décident de procéder sur le rejet de la Mareva et le fond du litige en même temps. [10] Le dossier chemine devant différents juges pour être finalement assigné à un juge de cette Cour qui en assume la gestion jusqu’en décembre 2013. Plusieurs ordonnances interlocutoires sont rendues, libérant partiellement les biens saisis. Au début du procès, le 3 avril 2017, les saisies sont toujours maintenues à concurrence d’environ 50 M$. [11] La querelle est amplifiée par les moyens financiers des deux parties qui ont dépensé des frais professionnels d’au-delà de 3 M$ chacune.

L’ordonnance Mareva a rajouté à l’intensité du débat . [...]

[…] [14] Bien qu’il s’agisse d’une demande en séparation de corps et en divorce, l’essentiel du procès est consacré à d’autres questions dont la validité d’un gel successoral mis en place en 2003 et la Mareva . [15] Par sa demande initiale, l’objectif de J... est de paralyser et rendre P... impuissant, tant psychologiquement que matériellement, par une ordonnance Mareva.

En fait, il s’agit d’un règlement de compte entre V..., le père de J..., homme d’affaires fortuné et dominant dans sa communauté, contre son gendre, P..., qui a bâti une entreprise impressionnante dans le domaine de l’alimentation et des produits surgelés. […] [112] Pour l’essentiel, la version de P... est retenue .

Non seulement témoigne-t-il franchement et avec aplomb, mais les faits postérieurs aux évènements reprochés corroborent sa version. [113] J... livre un témoignage vague et plaide l’ignorance de tous les faits pertinents, référant constamment à son père ou son comptable , sur tous les sujets visés par sa demande.

Un témoignage imprégné de réticences, dénué de sincérité et de sens commun. [114] J... admet que les faits, énoncés dans sa déclaration assermentée, au soutien de la Mareva, consistent en la version de son père et qu’elle n’en a pas une connaissance personnelle. [115] Après la séparation, qu’elle n’a jamais acceptée, J... demande l’aide de son père qui pilote le dossier pour se venger de son gendre, V... est

partie prenante dans ce dossier, en fait, il est le véritable « client » des procureurs de J.... [116] Les allégations contenues à la Mareva sont de son cru et sont soit inexactes, fausses ou incomplètes . […] […] [118] V... se croit au-dessus de tout . Il donne une entrevue au journaliste du Journal A en dépit de l’ordonnance de mise sous scellés.

Il ignore l’ordonnance qui oblige J... à fournir l’information financière, reliée aux placements qu’elle détient dans les sociétés qu’il contrôle, dont [la Compagnie O] et [la Compagnie S], empêchant ainsi l’expert de P... d’obtenir l’information financière pour préparer son rapport évaluant les actifs de J.... […] [120] J... souscrit une déclaration assermentée, de complaisance, au soutien d’une procédure exceptionnelle, prête à tout pour ruiner P.... Est-ce son vouloir ou celui de son père, difficile à dire. Peu importe, elle est la seule responsable de ses gestes et elle a induit la Cour en erreur .

Elle a créé une situation précaire, dommageable et irréversible pour P... et pour elle-même, puisque sa crédibilité est affectée et brimée. […] [123] Les procureurs de J... ont tenté de miner la crédibilité de P... en le confrontant à une déclaration assermentée, souscrite il y a vingt- cinq ans, dans les procédures de divorce avec sa première épouse et dont il n’avait pas de souvenir. [124] Les faits énoncés dans cette déclaration et la convention de règlement décrivent sa situation financière en 1993, laquelle est moins reluisante que celle qu’il présente avant d’être confronté à la procédure.

Toutefois, cela n’est pas significatif dans les circonstances où ces affirmations sont faites, pour affecter sa crédibilité. [125] C’est la seule faiblesse de son témoignage et elle ne porte pas à conséquence. La déclaration assermentée en question a été souscrite il y a vingt-cinq ans et P... l’a relue, pour la première fois, lors de son contre-interrogatoire. Quoiqu’il en soit, elle ne porte pas sur des faits essentiels au litige.

Autrement, sa version des faits est très crédible et retenue. […] [343] S’il est un dossier qui confirme la grande prudence dont doivent faire preuve les tribunaux, lorsque confrontés à une Mareva, celui-ci est l’exemple parfait. Souvent surnommée « l’arme nucléaire du droit » la Mareva porte bien son nom. Elle paralyse ceux contre qui elle est émise, sans qu’ils n’aient eu la chance de faire valoir leur point de vue.

Cette ordonnance est exceptionnelle et extrême puisque, si elle est utilisée à mauvais escient, elle devient un moteur de chantage et d’abdication pour ceux qui ne peuvent se permettre de la contester. […] [345] La demande de révision et de cassation de l’ordonnance est souvent académique, compte tenu du manque de ressources judiciaires et des longs délais pour être entendus.

D’où la condition préalable, essentielle à l’émission d’une injonction Mareva, à savoir une divulgation franche, complète et honnête par celui qui la demande et cela avant de considérer les critères qui la régissent, soit les mêmes que ceux qui s’appliquent à l’injonction interlocutoire, émise provisoirement. […] [347] Les fausses représentations et omissions, alléguées par J..., ont déjà été relatées à plusieurs reprises, dans différents chapitres du présent jugement, dont la signature d’une déclaration assermentée de complaisance pour laquelle elle n’avait pas de connaissance personnelle.

Elle a induit la Juge Masse en erreur, dépeignant des agissements frauduleux de P..., qu’elle savait erronés. On peut présumer que la Mareva n’aurait pas été accordée si la vérité avait été dévoilée en premier lieu.

[348] L’analyse des autres critères requis pour son émission n’est pas nécessaire puisque la condition préalable, à savoir la divulgation franche, complète et honnête, n’est pas satisfaite. [349] La Mareva est abusive. Elle est rejetée et toutes les saisies cassées. [350] J... demande une provision pour frais de 500 000 $. P... réclame des dommages de 250 000 $ en vertu de l’article 54 C.p.c. ainsi que des dommages moraux pour atteinte à sa réputation et humiliation de 25 000 $ et des dommages punitifs de 25 000 $. [351] Accorder une provision pour frais à J... serait l’équivalent de cautionner la guérilla judiciaire causée par la Mareva qui a déjà été qualifiée d’abusive. [352] Une

partie importante des frais découle des multiples vacations à la Cour, en raison des refus répétés de donner mainlevée partielle des saisies pratiquées à la suite de la Mareva. Ainsi, à la suite d’une ordonnance qui accueille la demande de P... de libérer 7 M$, celui-ci dépose les fonds, par erreur, dans un compte déjà sous saisi par la Mareva. J... refuse qu’ils soient tout simplement transférés dans un autre compte libre de saisie, et ce, malgré de multiples demandes.

P... ne reçoit les fonds que cinq mois plus tard. [353] Une demande d’avoir accès à une carte de crédit pour un séjour de trois jours, en Floride, est refusée, J... exigeant d’obtenir tous les détails de ses dépenses et de son budget pour donner mainlevée. [354] Enfin, compte tenu de la valeur de ses actifs, arbitrée dans le présent jugement, J... disposait de ressources suffisantes pour faire valoir ses droits légitimes. V... a piloté et financé les procédures, ce qu’il admet dans son témoignage .

Pour paraphraser les propos de la procureure de P..., il est le chef d’orchestre dans ce litige et il doit, tout comme J..., assumer les conséquences qui en découlent et on ne peut demander à P... d’en assumer les frais. [355] La demande de provision pour frais de J... est rejetée. [356] Par contre, malgré ses agissements répréhensibles, la condamner à payer des dommages de l’ordre de 250 000 $ à P... n’est pas une solution pour mettre un terme à leur dispute, déjà trop coûteuse . Les parties ont dépensé plus de 3 M$ chacune, en honoraires professionnels.

Il est temps de mettre un terme à cette guérilla, sans rajouter de l’huile sur le feu. [357] La procureure de P..., en fin de plaidoirie et sans renoncer à sa demande, a invité le Tribunal à « compenser ou effacer » les deux demandes, ce qui est raisonnable dans les circonstances. [358] Les dommages réclamés par P... de 25 000 $ ainsi que les dommages punitifs de 45 000 $ ne lui sont pas accordés. [359] Reste le dernier chef de réclamation de P... de 25 000 $ pour dommages moraux, atteinte à sa réputation, humiliation, stress et inconvénients. [360] La situation vécue par P... a été infernale, son témoignage, parfois troublant, ne laisse aucun doute sur l’anxiété, l’humiliation et les démarches qu’il a dû faire pour assurer la survie de ses entreprises, sans compter les deux enfants qui se sont retrouvés dans ce tourbillon, bien malgré eux. [361] Se rajoute la mesquinerie de J... qui a valu au père de P..., âgé de 92 ans, la perte de sa carte de crédit dont il était si fier et la visite d’huissiers.

Après la séparation, J... acheminait tous les comptes à P... qui les payait. Toutefois, elle a omis de lui transmettre les comptes American Express du père de P... que celui-ci a toujours payés, à la connaissance de J.... Le père de P... a perdu sa carte, qu’American Express a annulée.

P... a passé l’éponge sur beaucoup, mais il ne peut oublier la peine infligée à son père, un homme d’honneur. [362] Des dommages de 10 000 $ lui sont octroyés pour atteinte à sa réputation, l’humiliation, le stress et les inconvénients subis . [363] Ce montant est symbolique, mais cette réclamation ne pouvait être occultée. [8] [References omitted; emphasis added] [ 10 ] The respondent, who denied the appellant’s allegations relying on these passages from the Mayrand Judgment, replied by filing a cross-application in which he claimed his own legal fees based on an alleged abuse of process, as well as damages for injury to his reputation. [ 11 ] The respondent also filed a motion to dismiss the appellant’s proceedings, which motion was dismissed on January 28, 2019, by the Honourable Kirkland Casgrain, J.S.C., who explained that the matter should be debated on the merits. [9] The respondent sought to appeal Justice Casgrain’s judgment but was denied leave to appeal. [10] [ 12 ] The debate on the merits therefore took place and Justice Phillips rendered the judgment under appeal on February 28, 2022.

II. The judgment under appeal [ 13 ] Justice Phillips dismissed the appellant’s application and the respondent’s cross-application. [ 14 ] After a lengthy

summary of the facts, [11] he began his analysis as follows: [57] The Court is of the view that this claim fails for two distinct reasons, either of which alone is sufficient to lead to its dismissal. First, the Court is of the view that the Mayrand judgment is res judicata . Second, on the merits of the claim, plaintiff has failed to meet the requisite criteria, namely to make out fault to the degree required in such circumstances and in failing to prove the quantum of his

damages. [12] [ 15 ] He was of the view that Justice Mayrand had already ruled on the appellant’s claim for extrajudicial fees when she decided the issue of abuse of process in her judgment and that, consequently, the absolute presumption of res judicata applied to the matter before him.

He rejected the appellant’s argument that Justice Mayrand’s factual determinations regarding the respondent’s active role in the divorce proceedings could not be ignored and should enjoy a simple – rebuttable – presumption of truth. [ 16 ] He concluded that, in any event, the appellant had not proved the quantum of the damages he was seeking.

The authority of res judicata [ 17 ] Justice Phillips was of the opinion that, regarding the issue in dispute before him, the Mayrand Judgment was res judicata . [ 18 ] He indicated that it was not contested that the appellant had claimed his legal fees at trial before Justice Mayrand and had done so based on abuse of process in those proceedings. There was thus identity of object and cause.

Consequently, the only live issue was that of the identity of parties. [13] He pointed out that this criterion does not require physical identity but, rather, is satisfied by the juridical identity of the parties. [14] He cited authorities supporting the fact that, at times, the mechanism of representation can lead to a finding of juridical identity between two otherwise distinct parties. [15] He explained that it was ultimately Ms.

C. who was responsible for the abuse of process and that Justice Mayrand had refused to condemn her to pay the extrajudicial fees, being of the view that the appellant had not discharged his burden of proving a sufficiently serious fault on the part of his former wife. [16] Justice Phillips was of the view that this conclusion in the Mayrand Judgment was res judicata and prevented the appellant from succeeding in the present proceedings. [17] The following are the relevant passages from his judgment: [70] So for purposes of applying the criterion of identity of parties, what is to be made of the factual matrix that prevails in this case? [71] In the Court’s view, the critical point here is that, in the case of a claim for legal fees based on abusive conduct in the proceedings, it is the litigant himself — or, in this case, herself —, who bears ultimate responsibility for having overstepped the bounds of propriety and thereby having forced the other side to incur excessive costs.

Here, Madam Justice Mayrand declined to grant the claim against her. In such circumstances, a person who encouraged the litigant — nay, who goaded her on to conduct the proceedings as she did — must have the benefit of a judgment that ruled that the conduct in question, conceived first and foremost as being that of the party herself, was not of a kind that deserves the censure of the Court. Such a conclusion must surely also benefit a third-party working on the sidelines [72] Indeed, liability of this kind is very narrow to begin with, in terms of the range of individuals potentially subject to it.

Plaintiff argues that liability for damages, be it in the form of recovery of legal fees or otherwise, is not limited to the culpable party to the litigation — as

article 54 C.C.P. appears to suggest: “order a party to pay […] legal costs” — but extends to directors and officers of corporate entities and administrators of other people’s property, as per

article 56 C.C.P. That is true, but it is hard to see how that helps plaintiff here, defendant being none of the above. If anything, that provision only serves to reinforce the legislative intent to limit the range of persons potentially liable for legal fees on the basis of abusive proceedings. Plaintiff does cite one small claims matter where a third party was condemned to pay $1,000 in legal fees. Be that as it may, defendant himself does not argue that he falls outside the range of potential defendants and it is therefore neither necessary nor appropriate to decide the case on such a basis.

The point here is the central position of the litigant herself, who must be seen as representing any backstage advisors she may also have had, whose advice would inevitably have to go through the filter of her ultimate authority over the case. That is one compelling reason for concluding that one must view the criterion of identity of parties as having been satisfied in this case. [73] But there is also another.

Ironically, while resisting the res judicata argument, plaintiff relies heavily on the Mayrand judgment, as we shall see under the next rubric, stressing the fact that defendant, although present in Court only for his own testimony, was the subject of a slip of the tongue by his daughter’s lawyer, who described him as “my client,” as was duly noted by Madam Justice Mayrand. [74] Along the same lines, at paragraph 354 of her judgment, Madam Justice Mayrand quoted plaintiff’s counsel in the divorce proceedings, who had said that not only plaintiff’s ex-wife, but also her father, must assume the consequences for their actions in the proceedings.

So defendant’s conduct was, as it were, top of mind. [75] In that context, had she thought there was any merit to those allegations, Madam Justice Mayrand had a number of different options: (

i) she could have reserved plaintiff’s rights to pursue further action against defendant; (ii) she could have condemned plaintiff’s ex-wife to pay the full amount of the legal fees that she felt were warranted, leaving it to her to bring a recursory action against her father if she felt so inclined. Instead, Madam Justice Mayrand dismissed the claim for legal fees, moreover insisting on the need to put an end to any and all litigation in the matter.

This particular nexus of facts strongly favours viewing plaintiff’s ex-wife as having represented her father for the purpose of the claim for legal fees, which means that there is “juridical” identity for purposes of applying res judicata . [76] Plaintiff argues that where a judgment makes a finding of fault with respect to someone who was not a party, res judicata does not apply. There is lack of identity of parties, to say nothing of the fact that the third party in question can scarcely be bound by a judgment following a trial in which he had no opportunity to defend himself.

That general principle, sound though it is, does not in any way negate the conclusions reached above with respect to our particular situation. [77] As has been alluded to above, plaintiff also argues that for, as it were, procedural reasons, he could not have pursued any claim for legal fees against defendant in the context of the divorce proceedings, given that the latter was not a party thereto. If one takes it only that far, that statement is of course true.

The fact remains, however, that plaintiff had a strategic choice to make at that point: either to pursue — as he in fact did — the recovery of his legal fees against only the opposing party herself; or to reserve his rights in order to undertake such action in a separate proceeding, which is also possible, against both his ex-wife and her father. Having elected to follow the first course, it was not open him to relitigate the issue against defendant alone in a subsequent proceeding.

[78] Finally, plaintiff points out that defendant was unsuccessful in his attempt to have his action dismissed on the basis of res judicata in the context of a preliminary motion and that he was denied leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal. Suffice it to say that neither the Superior Court judge nor the Court of Appeal judge, sitting alone on the motion for leave, was of the view that the situation was sufficiently clear to dismiss the case at a preliminary stage. Caution was the order of the day.

That decision does not bind the judge sitting on the merits, who can now rule with the benefit of having heard all of the evidence. [79] In conclusion, the Court is of the view that all of the criteria for res judicata are satisfied, in particular the disputed criterion of identity of parties, and that plaintiff’s claim for legal fees incurred in the divorce must be dismissed on that ground. [18] [References omitted] [ 19 ] As regards the appellant’s claim for extrajudicial fees, Justice Phillips concluded that Ms.

C. had represented the respondent, her father, and that Justice Mayrand could then have either reserved the appellant’s rights to institute proceedings against the respondent or could have condemned Ms. C. to pay all the fees. [19] He pointed out that, in the divorce proceedings, the appellant had chosen to attempt the recovery of his legal fees solely from Ms.

C., rather than file separate proceedings against her and the respondent, such that he could no longer relitigate this issue. [20] The simple presumption of truth or accuracy [ 20 ] Justice Phillips indicated that even if he had found that res judicata did not apply, he would nevertheless have dismissed the appellant’s claim on its merits. [21] He explained that the appellant had relied on the simple presumption of truth of the Mayrand Judgment to support his case [22] but that this approach had a fatal flaw because the appellant had taken certain paragraphs of the Mayrand Judgment out of context, while disregarding others. [23] Indeed, the appellant chose passages from the judgment in which Justice Mayrand had highlighted the respondent’s role in the dispute – namely where she had stated that the respondent had driven the litigation; that his purpose had been to paralyze the appellant’s business affairs in the context of a personal vendetta; that the facts alleged in support of the Mareva injunction were false and incomplete; that the respondent had been the true client; that the respondent had acted as if he were above the law; that, acting through his daughter, the respondent had deliberately misled the Court; and that the Mareva injunction had ultimately been characterized as abusive. [ 21 ] Justice Phillips stated that by choosing these passages from the Mayrand Judgment, however, the appellant had disregarded not only the ultimate disposition of the claim for legal fees based on abuse, but also a crucial paragraph in which Justice Mayrand had stressed that it was time to bury the hatchet. [24] In the circumstances, it was not open to the appellant to latch on to certain paragraphs, to the detriment of the judgment’s overall conclusions and intent. [ 22 ] Justice Phillips noted that to prove the respondent’s fault, the appellant had merely stated, without providing specifics, that the Mareva injunction contained multiple false allegations. [25] He further noted that the respondent’s main intention in driving the divorce proceedings had been to help his daughter, not to harm the appellant. [26] Proof of the quantum of damages [ 23 ] Justice Phillips indicated that, at trial, the appellant had alleged two faults committed by the respondent: his false statements in support of the Mareva injunction and the interview he gave to a journalist, which was reported in a newspaper article. [27] [ 24 ] He noted that there was insufficient evidence of the harm resulting from the effects of the Mareva injunction. [28] He also stated that the appellant had not tried to challenge the Mareva injunction prior to the divorce proceedings on the merits. [29] Ultimately, on the matter of fault, Justice Phillips concluded that there was no evidence that the respondent had committed a fault sufficiently serious to justify the payment of extrajudicial fees. [30] [ 25 ] Finally, with regard to damages, the trial judge added that he did not accept the appellant’s assertion that the consequences of the Mareva injunction had given rise to approximately 80% of the legal fees he incurred in that dispute. [31] Justice Phillips explained that he simply did not believe that the divorce proceedings would have been so much simpler without the injunction.

He was of the view that the appellant’s argument that, but for the Mareva injunction, the divorce would have required only a few days of hearings rather than 20 did not stand up to scrutiny. Citing Meyerco Enterprises Ltd. v. Kinmont Canada inc. and Electrolux Canada Corp. v. American Iron & Metal , he concluded that it was not up to the court to quantify, on an arbitrary basis, what it thought the amount of the additional legal fees incurred might have been. [32] [ 26 ] In his view, this was sufficient to determine the matter of damages.

He concluded that, in sum, even if the respondent had not been able to rely on res judicata , the appellant’s $3,000,000 claim against the respondent for the recovery of the legal fees incurred in the divorce proceedings would nevertheless have failed both because the appellant had failed to prove a fault and because he had failed to prove the quantum of damages: [110] That is sufficient to dispose of the issue of damages. The issue of fault has also been addressed.

In sum, even if defendant were unable to rely on res judicata , plaintiff’s claim would have failed nevertheless. [33] [ 27 ] The rest of the judgment under appeal, [34] which dealt with the dismissal of the defamation claim and the dismissal of the cross- application, has not been appealed. III. Analysis

A. Did the trial judge err in law in concluding that the Mayrand Judgment is res judicata with respect to the proceedings in the case at bar? [ 28 ] The conditions giving rise to the presumption of res judicata are set forth in

article 2848 of the Civil Code of Québec : 2848. The authority of res judicata is an absolute presumption; it applies only to the object of the judgment when the demand is based on the same cause and is between the same parties acting in the same qualities and the thing applied for is the same. However, a judgment deciding a class action has the authority of res judicata with respect to the parties and the members of the group who have not excluded themselves therefrom. 2848.

L’autorité de la chose jugée est une présomption absolue; elle n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du jugement, lorsque la demande est fondée sur la même cause et mue entre les mêmes parties, agissant dans les mêmes qualités, et que la chose demandée est la même. Cependant, le jugement qui dispose d’une action collective a l’autorité de la chose jugée à l’égard des parties et des membres du groupe qui ne s’en sont pas exclus. [ 29 ] In Roberge v.

Bolduc , the Supreme Court of Canada explained that this irrebuttable presumption is “anchored in public social policy to ensure the security and stability of relations in society. The converse would be anarchy, with the possibility of endless trials and contradictory judgments”. [35] This social necessity of the first order was reiterated more recently in Hébert c.

Montréal (Service de police de la Ville de) (SPVM) : [36] [46] La chose jugée « fait obstacle à ce que soit tranché de nouveau ce qui l’a déjà été, répond à un souci de stabilité juridique et vise à ce que soient évitées la multiplicité des procès et la possibilité de jugements contradictoires ». La litispendance est régie par les mêmes principes, car « les deux moyens servent des fins médiates similaires qui consistent essentiellement à éviter la multiplicité des procès et la possibilité de jugements contradictoires ».

Chose jugée et litispendance « réalisent ultimement un objectif d’intérêt public de protection de la sécurité et de la stabilité des rapports sociaux », alors que la chose jugée « protège les droits acquis en faveur des parties » et que la litispendance « évite au défendeur les inconvénients pouvant découler des poursuites multiples ». [References omitted] [ 30 ] It is accepted that the presumption of res judicata [ translation ] “attaches not only to the conclusions of the judgment but also to the reasons”, [37] although the latter must nevertheless be “intrinsically tied to such conclusions”. [38] To conclude that this absolute presumption exists, three conditions must be met: identity of parties, identity of object and identity of cause.

In the case at bar, identity of cause and identity of object are not disputed. [39] [ 31 ] The matter of identity of parties, however, calls for further comment. On this subject, in Buchanan c. Commission des accidents du travail , [40] Bisson, J.A. stated: La qualité dont parle l’art. 1241 C.civ.[B. - C.] est la qualité juridique par opposition à une identité physique. Par exemple, une même personne physique peut avoir agi dans un litige à

titre personnel et la solution judiciaire de ce litige ne constituera pas autorité de la chose jugée dans un litige identique où la personne agit en une autre qualité juridique comme par exemple à

titre de fiduciaire, de curateur, etc. [ 32 ] The identity of the parties refers to juridical, not physical, identity, it being understood that there can be juridical identity of parties through the mechanism of representation. [41] [ 33 ] The presumption of res judicata applies to the parties to a judgment but can also extend to all the persons represented by these parties, [42] as the Court recently explained: [25] L’identité des parties « ne signifie pas que les parties doivent être physiquement identiques dans les deux cas ».

C’est l’identité juridique des parties, et non leur identité physique, qui est recherchée . [26] L’identité des parties peut exister par le biais du « mécanisme de la représentation », lequel peut prendre différentes formes. [43] [References omitted; emphasis added] [ 34 ] As the Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment written by L’Heureux-Dubé, J., pointed out, there are many examples of the “mechanism of representation”: The examples of representation by one party of another are too numerous to list or discuss here.

Aubry and Rau, op. cit., at pp. 335-56, review them in detail and even such review is not necessarily exhaustive. Representation may depend on the facts of the particular case and the interests of the parties involved . Suffice it to say that, for the identity of parties in so far as it relates to res judicata , juridical identity is all that is required . [44] [Emphasis added] [ 35 ] In Ungava Mineral Exploration Inc. c. Mullan , our colleague Bich, J.A. noted that the case law has given a broad

interpretation to the notion of representation or juridical identity of the parties. [45] The following examples, in which the authority of res judicata may apply in certain situations, come to mind: universal successors and successors by general or particular title representing their

predecessors; a debtor and the debtor’s chirographic creditors; a trustee in bankruptcy and the bankrupt’s creditors; [46] representatives of legal persons sued in their personal capacity for acts committed in the exercise of their functions; [47] a union representing employees or a body acting on behalf of an employee; and a mandator and the mandatary as regards the performance of the mandate. [48] [ 36 ] On what basis would representation be recognized in the case at bar? [ 37 ] Although the notion of identity of parties seems to have been interpreted particularly broadly for purposes of applying res judicata , it is clear that Ms.

C. did not represent her father in her own divorce proceedings. The respondent’s interests were not at stake in those proceedings and, thus, he did not need to be represented. In all the other examples mentioned above, there was either a clear reason for representation (the union member and his union, for example), or the third party’s interests were implicated in the dispute and one of the parties had interests aligned with those of the third party (such as the debtor and his chirographic creditors). [ 38 ] In the present matter, as no mandate was proved, juridical identity between Ms.

C. and the respondent, a third party to the dispute, was not established. As our colleague Schrager, J.A., writing for the Court, stated: [28] Je note par ailleurs que notre Cour a déjà établi qu’un jugement qui conclut à la faute d’une tierce

partie n’a pas l’autorité de la chose jugée alors qu’un véritable débat contradictoire n’a pas été tenu sur cette question précise avec la participation de la tierce

partie en question. [49] [ 39 ] The broad

interpretation of the identity of parties, as argued by the respondent’s attorney, cannot therefore be accepted in the case at bar. [ 40 ] With all due respect, the trial judge’s conclusion that the absolute presumption of res judicata applied is not well founded. B. Did the trial judge correctly apply the simple presumption of truth? [ 41 ] The appellant claims, without providing an explanation, that Justice Phillips drew factual conclusions that differ from those of Justice Mayrand. He sees this as a distortion of the principle of the simple presumption of truth.

In his view, Justice Mayrand’s conclusions regarding the respondent’s involvement in the decision to apply for a Mareva injunction are legal facts that Justice Phillips should have accepted as true, since the respondent presented no evidence to the contrary. [ 42 ] The main findings of the Mayrand Judgment on which the appellant relies can be summarized as follows: the respondent was driving the litigation; his goal was to paralyze the appellant’s business affairs in the context of a personal vendetta; the facts alleged in support of the Mareva injunction were false and incomplete; the respondent was the true client of Ms.

C.’s lawyers; and the respondent acted as if he were above the law by deliberately misleading the Court about the facts that led to the Mareva injunction, which was ultimately characterized as abusive in the Mayrand Judgment. [ 43 ] According to the appellant, Justice Phillips should therefore have found that the respondent had played a leading role in the issuance of the Mareva injunction and had committed a fault against the appellant, which fault resulted in substantial additional legal fees for the latter. [ 44 ] The respondent counters that by selecting the passages that favour his allegations while ignoring the conclusions of the Mayrand Judgment which only very partially upheld the claim of abuse against Ms.

C., the appellant is distorting the analysis and cannot thereby invoke the presumption of truth in the context of these proceedings. [ 45 ] He also submits an argument based on Globe Technologie , [50] in which the Court had to consider whether an abuse of process that had already been punished within the scope of the proceedings in which the abuse occurred could be the subject of an action for extracontractual civil liability in subsequent proceedings so as to recover the balance of the extrajudicial fees caused by the abuse.

The appellant in Globe Technologie posited that the trial judge had erred by improperly applying the rules governing res judicata and had thereby overshadowed the rules of solidarity. [51] [ 46 ] In that case, however, it was because the Court found that there was identity of the parties, and thus res judicata , that it concluded that – through the mechanism of legal representation – a person or their representative who have committed a common fault cannot be sued if one of them has previously been condemned on the basis of their solidary extracontractual liability. [ 47 ] In short, solidary liability only prevents a second recourse against the solidary co-debtor if there is identity of parties.

This reasoning cannot hold when, as in the case at bar, there is no identity of parties. [ 48 ] In the present case, there is no res judicata , and the solidarity between Ms. C. and the respondent [52] did not prevent the appellant from suing the respondent for the payment of the balance of his legal fees that Justice Mayrand did not award to him against Ms. C.. [ 49 ]

Article 1526 C.C.Q. provides for the solidary liability of co-debtors who have caused the same injury through their extracontractual fault. Under the rules of solidarity, each debtor is liable to the creditor for the entire debt, and although the creditor generally chooses to sue the debtor with the most assets, the creditor may decide to make the same claim against only one or the other of his debtors [ translation ] “and even abandon the claim already made in order to make a new claim against another defendant.

The debtor may call his co-debtors into the proceedings, if the creditor has not already done so, so that they can be condemned and so that the debtor can exercise a recourse against the co-debtors, if necessary”. [53] [ 50 ] There has not been much discussion in the doctrine regarding the limits of mutual representation of solidary co-debtors in legal proceedings. Professors Pierre-Gabriel Jobin and Nathalie Vézina approach the question as follows: 630 – Limites de l’idée de représentation mutuelle eu égard à l’action en justice – La représentation mutuelle des débiteurs soulève,

en pratique, des problèmes délicats quant à la portée de l’action en justice intentée contre un seul d’entre eux. Ainsi, il est permis de se demander si le jugement qui condamne l’un des débiteurs solidaires a force de chose jugée à l’égard des autres, non présents à la contestation. Il nous semble que la réponse à cette question doit être négative. Il est, en effet, difficile d’admettre que la condamnation de l’un des débiteurs puisse avoir un effet sur les autres qui auraient pu avoir, eux, des motifs juridiques sérieux à faire valoir à l’encontre de l’action.

De plus, un jugement qui condamne solidairement deux personnes n’a pas l’effet de chose jugée entre elles sur leur part respective de responsabilité, sauf si cette question a été tranchée par le tribunal. [54] [ 51 ] In light of the foregoing, there is no legal representation resulting from the perfect solidarity between Ms. C. and the respondent, her father.

The Court must therefore reject the respondent’s argument based on solidarity and consider whether the appellant’s claims based on the simple presumption of truth have merit. [ 52 ] It should first be noted that the strength of the presumption of truth or accuracy cannot vary depending on the context, that is, depending on the nature of the relationship between the solidary co-debtors in the present matter.

In all cases, the presumption is a simple one, and it is either rebutted or not. [ 53 ] It should further be noted that where the presumption of res judicata does not apply, a judgment may, in certain circumstances, benefit from this simple presumption of truth or accuracy. The classic case on this subject is Ali c.

Compagnie d’assurance Guardian du Canada , [55] which dealt with the effect of a criminal conviction on civil proceedings and in which Thibault, J.A. wrote that [ translation ] “[t]he doctrine and jurisprudence unanimously recognize that a criminal conviction does not constitute ‘ res judicata ’ between the parties […] and that, consequently, it cannot be given the authority of an absolute presumption”. She added, however, that [ translation ] “the admissibility in evidence of such a conviction in civil proceedings and its effect remain controversial issues”.

For her part, she tended towards the admissibility of such evidence: Le jugement pénal est un fait juridique que nul ne peut ignorer, qui est pertinent et qui peut s’imposer quant à sa valeur probante.

Le juge civil donc, sans attribuer à la condamnation pénale l’autorité de chose jugée en droit ou en fait, est libre, selon les circonstances, d’en tirer les conclusions et les présomptions de fait appropriées. [56] [ 54 ] In the sixth edition of the Précis de la preuve , Professor Léo Ducharme writes that the simple presumption of truth should benefit not only judgments rendered in criminal matters but also judgments rendered in civil matters. [57] [ 55 ] Unlike the absolute presumption of res judicata , the presumption of truth or accuracy can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary presented by the opposing party. [58] [ 56 ] In Union des consommateurs c.

Bell Canada , [59] the Court of Appeal, in a judgment written by Chamberland, J.A., summarized the law on this presumption as follows: [62] En résumé, je retiens ceci : 1) sujet à sa pertinence quant aux questions en litige, une décision judiciaire ou quasi judiciaire est admissible en preuve dans un procès civil; 2) il s’agit d’un fait juridique que le juge ne peut ignorer et qui, selon le contexte, peut s’imposer quant à sa valeur probante, et ce, même si on ne saurait lui attribuer l’autorité de la chose jugée; 3) s’agissant d’un jugement pénal, la force probante peut varier considérablement selon qu’il s’agit d’un verdict d’acquittement ou d’un verdict de culpabilité prononcé au terme d’un procès, le premier pesant nécessairement moins lourd que le second dans un procès civil; 4) la présomption simple de vérité (ou d’exactitude) ne peut être reconnue que dans le cas d’une conclusion arrêtée par un tribunal judiciaire ou quasi judiciaire; 5) la force probante du fait juridique peut être affectée par une multitude de facteurs, notamment par le fait que la

partie à qui on l’oppose n’a pas eu l’opportunité de contredire la preuve avant que la décision soit rendue ou dans le cadre de la procédure dans laquelle la décision antérieure est invoquée à

titre de fait juridique. [60] [Emphasis added] [ 57 ] In Desgagné c. Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail , [61] the Court further stated: [43] La présomption de vérité rattachée à un tel jugement sera plus ou moins difficile à renverser selon le contexte dans lequel la décision a été rendue. C’est ainsi que la conclusion d’un jugement rendu par défaut sera plus facile à mettre de côté que celle à laquelle le décideur est arrivé à la suite d’un débat contradictoire.

Et encore plus si le moyen plaidé dans la seconde action l’avait été dans la première avant d’être tranchée par le juge. En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement les tiers, l’honorable Marc Schrager, pour la Cour, écrivait « qu’un jugement qui conclut à la faute d’une tierce

partie n’a pas l’autorité de la chose jugée alors qu’un véritable débat contradictoire n’a pas été tenu sur cette question précise avec la participation de la tierce

partie en question ». [62] [Emphasis added] [ 58 ] In the present case, the appellant maintains that the respondent’s fault has been proved by the simple presumption of truth. He argues that Justice Phillips erred in drawing factual conclusions that differ from those of Justice Mayrand. In his view, Justice Mayrand’s conclusions regarding the respondent’s involvement in the decision to apply for a Mareva injunction are legal facts that Justice Phillips should have accepted as true.

Consequently, the conclusion he should have come to is that the respondent had played a leading role in the issuance of the Mareva injunction and had committed a fault against the appellant, which fault resulted in substantial additional legal fees for the latter.

[ 59 ] In Union des consommateurs c.

Bell Canada , [63] cited hereinabove, Chamberland, J.A., writing for the Court, emphasized that [ translation ] “(4) the simple presumption of truth (or accuracy) can be recognized only in the case of a conclusion reached by a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal [and] (5) the probative force of a legal fact may be affected by multiple factors, including by the fact that the party against whom it is asserted did not have the opportunity to contradict the evidence before the decision was rendered or in the proceedings in which the prior decision is being invoked as a legal fact”. [64] [ 60 ] In the case at bar, Justice Mayrand’s factual findings regarding the respondent’s role, on which the appellant relies in these proceedings, were not given effect in [ translation ] “a conclusion reached by a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal” and the respondent “ [ translation ] “did not have the opportunity to contradict the evidence before the decision was rendered” [65] in the Mayrand Judgment.

Consequently, these factual findings must be approached with caution. Their probative value, while not negligible, is nevertheless considerably less than it would be had there been a trial where the respondent had had the opportunity to challenge the appellant’s evidence. [ 61 ] It is inaccurate to claim, without providing an explanation – as the appellant is doing – that Justice Phillips disregarded Justice Mayrand’s factual findings, which, according to the appellant, enjoy a simple presumption of truth. [ 62 ] After having heard the witnesses, including the appellant, the respondent and Ms.

C., Justice Phillips explained that Justice Mayrand’s factual findings regarding the respondent’s role in his daughter’s divorce proceedings had to be placed in context and nuanced by the fact that the respondent had wanted to help his daughter. [66] Indeed, Ms.

C. appealed the divorce judgment, seeking to reverse its conclusions regarding the compensatory allowance she had claimed, and won on appeal, with the Court awarding her $2,985,931.23. [67] [ 63 ] The Court is of the opinion that Justice Phillips did not err in stating that by relying on the simple presumption of truth of the Mayrand Judgment to support his case, the appellant could not take certain paragraphs of that judgment out of context while disregarding others.

By selectively reading various passages of the judgment, the appellant disregards Justice Mayrand’s final conclusion on the claim for fees based on abuse of process, which she rejected. [ 64 ] Justice Phillips rightly concluded that “[i]n that context, had she thought there was any merit to those allegations, Madam Justice Mayrand had a number of different options: […] (ii) she could have condemned plaintiff’s ex-wife to pay the full amount of the legal fees that she felt were warranted, leaving it to her to bring a recursory action against her father if she felt so inclined.

Instead, Madam Justice Mayrand dismissed the claim for legal fees, moreover insisting on the need to put an end to any and all litigation in the matter”. [68] [ 65 ] Although Justice Phillips erred in concluding that there was identity of parties between Ms.

C. and the respondent (and although what he wrote about “reserving the rights” of the appellant is not entirely accurate, since the absence of such a reservation is not fatal to the appellant [69] ), this passage of his reasons is nonetheless relevant for purposes of deciding on the appellant’s argument, which is based on the presumption of truth. [ 66 ] Justice Phillips was correct in stating that the appellant’s claim rests in large part on certain paragraphs of the Mayrand Judgment, in which Justice Mayrand had highlighted the respondent’s role in the dispute, but that the difficulty with this approach is that it disregards certain other conclusions of the judgment that are highly relevant, including the central conclusions on abuse of process. [ 67 ] Indeed, as Justice Phillips pointed out, if the Mareva injunction lasted from April 2015 to July 2017, it was because the appellant decided not to challenge it.

Despite the delays inherent in such a challenge, it is incorrect to claim, as the appellant does, that it was impossible for him to challenge it during this period. Justice Phillips was right not to accept the appellant’s position that, given the amount of court time required to challenge this injunction, it had been impossible for him to contest it. [ 68 ] The following are the relevant passages from the judgment under appeal on this point: [92] Plaintiff argues that there were numerous false allegations in the Mareva proceedings. But strangely, he provides remarkably few specifics.

He relies in part on paragraph 116 of the Mayrand judgment, where reference is made notably to defendant’s hand-written estimate of plaintiff’s net worth. [93] Indeed, at trial, plaintiff clearly took umbrage at the fact that defendant had thus attempted to estimate his net worth. He stressed that at the time, in 2015, he himself did not know what it was, not having evaluated the value of his businesses. So how could some else do it, having no access to the details of his businesses?

Plaintiff also disagreed with the values shown in that the reference to the family trusts was “double dipping,” given that they simply held the value of the businesses whose value was already included. [94] On this point, the Court is of the view that far too much was made of a half-page handwritten document. It was merely an attempt to arrive at an approximate number. The attempt was sincere, defendant’s former lawyer having been enlisted to assist.

Counsel for plaintiff himself insisted on an extract from defendant’s testimony where he said that he was simply trying to come up with a “reasonable” estimate of plaintiff’s net worth. The numbers are impressive and were perhaps excessive, but it must not be forgotten that plaintiff is indeed a very wealthy man. Ultimately, at least certain elements were perhaps not that far off. [95] The Court also finds that defendant’s sincere wish was to save his daughter’s marriage. To that end, he met with plaintiff alone on two occasions. The latter remained undeterred, perhaps with good reason.

Nevertheless, it was clearly not defendant’s intention at that point to crush his son-in-law. He also called upon his brother-in-law to attempt to help the spouses come to an amicable settlement. Those are not the actions of a malevolent person.

That of course does not exclude the possibility that defendant later took a more aggressive stance once litigation was under way, but defendant’s desire to protect his daughter’s interests justified that. [96] Cross-examined at trial as to the precise grievances that constituted the basis of the present action against his former father-in- law, plaintiff pointed to two “faults”: the Mareva injunction and the newspaper article. The latter issue will be of course be dealt with below under the heading of the claim in defamation.

Our focus here is the Mareva, which was described at trial as “debilitating,” “crippling,” “paralyzing.” Of all the grievances raised, it is therefore a very central point that deserves careful analysis.

[97] The adjectives quoted above are indeed striking at first. However, when one attempts to scratch below the surface to explore the concrete consequences of the Mareva order, one finds that there is no allegation, and very little proof, of any concrete harm having flowed therefrom. The worst situation, raised by both plaintiff himself and by Mtre Schachter, was in the context of one particular transaction, where there was a delay of approximately 10 days for getting one particular mainlevée for purposes of securing the necessary funds to purchase certain merchandise for import.

In that case, as in all others, the disbursement was ultimately permitted. [References omitted] [ 69 ] Moreover, the appellant’s appeal before us, which focuses on certain passages of the Mayrand Judgment in which Justice Mayrand criticized the respondent’s conduct, obscures her ultimate conclusion on the appellant’s claim for fees, which is based on the following paragraphs of her judgment: [350] J... demande une provision pour frais de 500 000 $.

P... réclame des dommages de 250 000 $ en vertu de l’article 54 C.p.c. ainsi que des dommages moraux pour atteinte à sa réputation et humiliation de 25 000 $ et des dommages punitifs de 25 000 $. […] [356] Par contre, malgré ses agissements répréhensibles, la condamner à payer des dommages de l’ordre de 250 000 $ à P... n’est pas une solution pour mettre un terme à leur dispute, déjà trop coûteuse . Les parties ont dépensé plus de 3 M$ chacune, en honoraires professionnels.

Il est temps de mettre un terme à cette guérilla, sans rajouter de l’huile sur le feu. [357] La procureure de P..., en fin de plaidoirie et sans renoncer à sa demande, a invité le Tribunal à « compenser ou effacer » les deux demandes, ce qui est raisonnable dans les circonstances. [358] Les dommages réclamés par P... de 25 000 $ ainsi que les dommages punitifs de 45 000 $ ne lui sont pas accordés. [359] Reste le dernier chef de réclamation de P... de 25 000 $ pour dommages moraux, atteinte à sa réputation, humiliation, stress et inconvénients. [360] La situation vécue par P... a été infernale, son témoignage, parfois troublant, ne laisse aucun doute sur l’anxiété, l’humiliation et les démarches qu’il a dû faire pour assurer la survie de ses entreprises, sans compter les deux enfants qui se sont retrouvés dans ce tourbillon, bien malgré eux. [361] Se rajoute la mesquinerie de J... qui a valu au père de P..., âgé de 92 ans, la perte de sa carte de crédit dont il était si fier et la visite d’huissiers.

Après la séparation, J... acheminait tous les comptes à P... qui les payait. Toutefois, elle a omis de lui transmettre les comptes American Express du père de P... que celui-ci a toujours payés, à la connaissance de J... Le père de P... a perdu sa carte, que American Express a annulée.

P... a passé l’éponge sur beaucoup, mais il ne peut oublier la peine infligée à son père, un homme d’honneur. [362] Des dommages de 10 000 $ lui sont octroyés pour atteinte à sa réputation, l’humiliation, le stress et les inconvénients subis. [363] Ce montant est symbolique, mais cette réclamation ne pouvait être occultée. [References omitted; emphasis added] [ 70 ] Thus, although Justice Mayrand not only quashed the Mareva injunction but also characterized it as abusive, [70] she nevertheless dismissed the claim for attorneys’ fees that had been based on the abusive proceedings. [71] It must be concluded that, in her opinion, the injunction was not so abusive as to have triggered liability of any kind. [ 71 ] Finally, as will now be discussed, even if Justice Phillips had accepted the appellant’s contention that the Mayrand Judgment’s presumption of truth applied, it would not have been possible for him to allow the claim since, as he correctly concluded, the appellant did not discharge his burden of proof with respect to the quantum of damages he was claiming.

C. Did the trial judge err in concluding that the appellant’s amount of damages had not been proved? [ 72 ] With regard to proving the quantum of damages, the Court is of the opinion that Justice Phillips did not err, since it is true that the appellant’s $3,000,000 claim against the respondent for the recovery of the legal fees incurred in the divorce proceedings could not succeed due to the absence of proof of the harm suffered by the appellant: [110] That is sufficient to dispose of the issue of damages. The issue of fault has also been addressed.

In sum, even if defendant were unable to rely on res judicata , plaintiff’s claim would have failed nevertheless. [72] [ 73 ] In his brief, the appellant refers the Court to a single paragraph of the Mayrand Judgment to justify his claim that Justice Phillips erred.

This paragraph, located towards the very beginning of the judgment, mentions that “[ translation ] “the bulk of the trial was devoted to other issues, including the validity of an estate freeze put in place in 2003 and the Mareva injunction”. [73] With all due respect to the appellant, it is difficult to see how this paragraph, drafted in an unspecific manner, could compensate for the deficiencies in his evidence regarding the damages claimed from the respondent in the present matter. [ 74 ] Indeed, the appellant submitted only two pieces of evidence to prove the damages claimed: the testimony of his lawyers and the invoices filed in the court record. [ 75 ] With regard to the testimony, Justice Phillips considered it and concluded that the evidence of the harm resulting from the effects of the Mareva injunction was insufficient, [74] explaining that he rejected the appellant’s claim that the consequences of this injunction

had given rise to approximately 80% of the legal fees he incurred in that dispute. [75] With regard to the invoices, [76] it is not possible from an overview thereof to distinguish the measures undertaken solely in connection with the Mareva injunction from those that would have had to be been undertaken in any event with respect to the other matters.

The appellant did not make precise allegations, merely claiming $3 million. [ 76 ] The appellant did not discharge his burden of proof in first instance and, absent a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s analysis, he cannot use the appeal proceedings to remedy this failure. [ 77 ] Moreover, Justice Phillips aptly pointed out that the appellant had not tried to quash the Mareva injunction prior to the divorce proceedings on the merits. [77] Nor did he appeal the dismissal of his $250,000 claim against Ms.

C. for abuse of process (art. 54 C.C.P. ), which claim Justice Mayrand had dismissed in its entirety. [ 78 ] Lastly, citing Meyerco Enterprises Ltd. v. Kinmont Canada inc. [78] and Electrolux Canada Corp. v.

American Iron & Metal , [79] Justice Phillips concluded that it was not up to him to quantify, on an arbitrary basis, the amount of the additional legal fees that might have been incurred. [80] [ 79 ] This conclusion is flawless, all the more so since, at the appeal hearing, counsel for the respondent stated that a significant portion of the appellant’s legal fees had been paid by the appellant’s companies, a statement that was not challenged.

Therefore, the personal pecuniary loss actually suffered by the appellant, which he claims resulted from the fault alleged against the respondent, was not proved at first instance. [81] [ 80 ] In view of the foregoing, the appeal should be dismissed, without legal costs, however, given the dispute which is the extension of a family file. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 81 ] DISMISSES the appeal, without costs. YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. STÉPHANE SANSFAÇON, J.A. SOPHIE LAVALLÉE, J.A. Mtre Karim Renno RENNO VATHILAKIS For the appellant Mtre Ronald M.

Auclair Mtre Chloé Giampaolo KAUFMAN AVOCATS For the respondent Date of hearing: May 3, 2023