r v. MORA ANNE MONTGOMERY ROZUM, 2019 QCCQ 5640

R. c. Montgomery Rozum 2019 QCCQ 5640 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF BEAUHARNOIS TOWN OF SALABERY-DE-VALLEYFIELD « Criminal and Penal Division » No: 760-01-082470-169 DATE: August 29, 2019 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE RICHARD MARLEAU, J.C.Q., PRESIDING ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecutor v. MORA ANNE MONTGOMERY ROZUM Accused ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________

PREAMBLE [ 1 ] The hearing was a blended voir-dire – trial. Both parties agreed that the whole of the evidence heard, including the accused’s testimony, could be used for the issues to decide. [ 2 ] The voir-dire was necessary following a Charter motion presented by the accused arguing that she was unnecessarily handcuffed and detained. She is seeking a stay of proceeding as relief.

This will be analysed at the end of the judgment. [ 3 ] The first and foremost issue is to decide if the accused is guilty or not of having refused to comply with an order of providing a breath sample into an approved screening device (ASD) in the circumstances that follow. Three tests were performed. None gave a proper reading or result. Crown’s theory is that the accused behaviour and conduct are the cause, namely that she voluntarily did not provide a suitable sample as ordered. [ 4 ] The Court does not have to address in detail each and every one of the pieces of evidence presented.

Neither does it have to systematically position itself in regard of each argument proposed [1] . [ 5 ] Therefore, only the relevant evidence useful for the resolution of the issues will be discussed. The parties have to assume that for every other evidence or argument not present in the judgment, they were nevertheless considered. [ 6 ] As to the jurisprudence, the judgment does not pretend to present an exhaustive review of the law on each issue discussed, nor a review of each case argued by the parties.

ASD RELIABILITY [ 7 ] Officer Maheu used the same "embout buccal" or mouthpiece for the three tests performed. [ 8 ] Some questions were put to the officer concerning the possibility that the mouthpiece could have been partially obstructed to start with or that the accused might have spit in it. [ 9 ] In light of the testimonies heard, this is simply hypothetical and not supported by the evidence.

We simply have no evidence that the ASD was malfunctioning or had warning signs of anomaly or defect that could raise an alarm as to the reliability of the ASD used. [ 10 ] On this issue, the Court adopts the reasoning expressed in R. c.

Tremblay , 2016 QCCS 770 : [28] L’ADA est un appareil de dépistage . [29] Il a pour fonction limitée de justifier, compte tenu de la présence d’autres symptômes d’ivresse, une analyse plus poussée au moyen d’un alcootest dont les résultats sont présumés fiables et qui peuvent fonder une accusation de conduite avec une alcoolémie supérieure à la limite légale. [30] Puisque l’ADA est « approuvé », la poursuite n’a pas le fardeau de prouver que l’appareil est fiable et en bonne condition de

fonctionnement, dans la mesure où le policier croît raisonnablement qu’il fonctionne de manière adéquate. [19] [31] Le policier peut donc, en principe, se fier aux résultats de l’ADA, à moins d’une preuve crédible de non-fiabilité apportée par la défense. [20] [32] Les ADA peuvent en effet présenter des enjeux de fiabilité. [33] Comme le souligne la Cour suprême dans Goodwin c.

Colombie-Britannique (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) , il peut y avoir de sérieux doutes dans certains cas quant à l’exactitude des mesures d’alcoolémie affichées par un ADA et les résultats d’un ADA sont « potentiellement non fiables ». [21] [34] Puisque l’ADA est un appareil « approuvé », la preuve requise pour démontrer sa non-fiabilité est qualifiée. [22] Il ne peut s’agir d’une preuve abstraite, spéculative, conjecturale ou soulignant une possible inexactitude des résultats de l’appareil. [23] [35] Dans le cas où les résultats de l’ADA sont déterminants, la preuve scientifique établissant de manière prépondérante que l’ADA présente un degré important de non-fiabilité dans les circonstances particulières de son utilisation annihile le caractère raisonnable des motifs du policier. [24] [36] Une telle preuve peut également vicier les motifs subjectifs du policier s’il connaissait ou aurait dû connaître les limitations quant à la fiabilité d’un ADA dans certaines circonstances. [25] [37] La Cour suprême souligne en effet dans R. c.

Bernshaw qu’« un test [de dépistage d’alcool] non fiable ne peut constituer le fondement juridique nécessaire d’un ordre de se soumettre à un alcootest ». [26] (References Omitted) [ 11 ] This reasoning is the same in D'Amour c. R. , 2016 QCCS 2665 where Justice Dionne reviewed the principles and the jurisprudence related to ASD reliability [2] . [ 12 ] The failure to obtain a proper reading with the ASD did not originate from a malfunction.

THE FACTS [ 13 ] The facts are quite straightforward. [ 14 ] There are no issues as to why the officers intercepted the accused at 1 h 42 and the subsequent interaction that led officer Maheu to order the accused to submit to an ASD sample at 1 h 47. [ 15 ] They is no dispute either that the order was properly made or that the instructions as how to proceed were given. A "trial test" was even asked and performed with the accused blowing without the ASD to verify if she had understood and was inhaling and exhaling properly. It was the case. Both officers had by then noticed that the accused was wearing a corset.

From there, the following happened : − First test at 1 h 51: the accused blew weakly and exhaled the rest of the air once the ASD removed after the « FLO INS » reading. The instructions were repeated. The accused said that she had difficulty with her corset. The officer was of the opinion that the corset was not at play, since she could inhale properly. The accused is told that if she continues in that way, a refusal could follow and that she would not have many chances to obey the order; − Second test at 1 h 51: the accused again exhaled insufficiently.

She pinched her lips and looked like she was putting her tongue in the mouthpiece. She is told again that she does not blow properly. She mentions that she suffers from asthma. A new trial test with no ASD is made and she blows properly. Instructions are again given and a warning for the consequences of a refusal. She is told that it will be her last chance and an arrest for refusal would happen if she again blows improperly; − Third test at 1 h 52. She again blows improperly seeming to pinch the mouthpiece or putting her tongue to obstruct it.

When the ASD was taken away, she started, according to the officer, to simulate an asthma attack by breathing rapidly as if she was looking for air. The officer’s opinion as to the simulation is based on the fact that she stopped hyperventilating very soon after it started with no help of an inhaler. [ 16 ] The refusal was then declared and the accused was verbally put under arrest at 01 h 53. [ 17 ] Documents had to be completed concerning the tow of the vehicle, plus a promise to appear, since the officers were not to detain the accused.

She was put in the police cruiser and handcuffed due to the fact that she had been disruptive from the start. [ 18 ] Once seated, her rights were again given, this time by reading the card, which included the right to retain counsel. This worsened the situation. She felt that she had been denied that right from the beginning. She screamed for an ambulance and a blood test. She focused on the fact that the head lights of her vehicle were open. And she requested to go to the station to talk to a lawyer after being told that should she wish to do so, she had to be brought at the station.

She refused to be released on the scene. [ 19 ] They arrived at the station at 2 h 14. A call was made to the lawyer of her choice, but he did not answer .A message was left. She is informed after a short delay that she could always contact Legal Aid or the Bar duty counsel. Informed of this, the accused « lost it ».

She hyperventilated again, coughed to the point of almost vomiting and requested again a blood sample. An ambulance was called and arrived at 2 h 37. Her behaviour continued later while the paramedics were attending to her. She removed her corset alone and offered to give another sample. She decided to leave by ambulance for the Valleyfield hospital. She refused to sign the promise to appear. We now know that she was released by the hospital not long after her arrival and her mother brought her back home. [ 20 ] The mother testified.

We can resume the highlights of her testimony as follows : − When she picked up the accused at the hospital, she was feeling very ill, was shaking and tearful; − The accused is prone to anxiety and panic attack and had been treated and seen by professionals between the ages of 15 and 17. She has medication to take to alleviate her situation since; − When she suffers from panic attack, she will gasp, cry, cough, shake and have difficulty to breathe.

She can also shout and express difficulty to say what she thinks and understand what she is being told; − It can last a few hours if no medication is taken; − She also suffers from asthma and has an inhaler [3] . [ 21 ] The accused testified. [ 22 ] The corset that she was wearing was for cosmetic purpose.

It did affect her breathing by constricting her rib cage and impeding her ability to fully inflate her lungs. [ 23 ] She was feeling well that night before the arrest, save for chronic pain. [ 24 ] Her anti-anxiety medication is to avoid panic attack that can erupt when she is stressed, tearful, etc. [ 25 ] She relates that she started feeling nervous upon her first interaction with the officers. Once told that she would have to submit to an ASD, she mentioned the corset and that she was unable to remove it alone and that it would impede her breathing.

The officers refused to help her remove it. [ 26 ] From there, she basically agrees to the narrative of the officer regarding the orders made and the instructions received. [ 27 ] The main differences are as follows : − She requested both after the first and second sample help to remove her corset. It was denied; − She was told that she was faking the tests; − Once handcuffed and in the police cruiser, she wanted access to her medication and her asthma inhaler (they were in her purse at the other end of the back seat).

It was denied; − She did indeed suffer an asthma attack and it lasted longer that the officer described; − She was by then very upset and distressed; − she was told before the third test that she would go to prison if she failed again, and told again that she was going to prison once arrived at the station; − The paramedics helped her remove the corset at the station; − She asked for her inhaler after the first test, it was denied; − She did try to give a proper sample each time and it was her intent to do so. THE LAW [ 28 ] The Court is bound by the three steps analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.

W(D) [4] in regard of assessing the evidence: − First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit; − Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit; − Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, based on the evidence that you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. [ 29 ] Furthermore, the judge must factor in all of the evidence tendered in order to determine if the accusation has been proven without a reasonable doubt or if it still subsist a reasonable doubt in favor of the accused [5] .

ANALYSIS [30] Both parties agreed that the Court would have to evaluate the accused's credibility as for the reasonable excuse offered. If thetestimony of the accused is not retained, the issue would basically be decided.

Put simply, once the malfunctioning of the ASD excluded,it could flow that by rejecting the accused's testimony as to her reasonable excuse, the only conclusion is that she is to be found guiltysince the only logical conclusion left is that by her actions and behaviour, she voluntarily refused to comply. [31] This reasoning has been recently reviewed by the Superior Court by Justice Lachance in Nyisztor[6] where, as here, asthma wasat play. [32] The Court will quote the following extracts as relevant to our affair : [69] Le juge de première instance rend un jugement écrit qui résume bien les éléments essentiels de l’infraction : [5] Dans R. c.

Lewko, 2002 SKCA 121 , la Cour d’appel de la Saskatchewan expose les éléments essentiels de l’infractionprévue par le paragr. 254(5) du Code criminel que la poursuite doit prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable : 1) l’existence d’un ordre valide donné par un agent de la paix suivant les exigences du paragr. 254 (2) ou (3) du Code criminel ; 2) l’omission (défaut) ou le refus de l’accusé(

e) de fournir l’échantillon requis par la loi (actus reus); 3) le défaut intentionnel de fournir un échantillon convenable (mens rea). [6] Une fois les trois éléments établis hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’accusé fera face à une déclaration de culpabilité à moins qu’iln’invoque une excuse raisonnable pour justifier son omission ou refus. [7] Dans R. c.

Goleski, [2015] 1 R.C.S. 399, 2015 CSC 6 , la Cour suprême, dans un bref jugement rendu oralement, est d’avisque « la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique (2014 BCCA 80 ) a eu raison de conclure que, suivant l’interprétation qu’ilconvient de lui donner, le par. 794(2) du Code criminel, L.R.C. 1985, c. C-46, impose à l’accusé le fardeau de persuader le tribunal del’existence d’une " exception, exemption, limitation, excuse ou réserve, prévue par le droit " ».

Il appartient donc à l’accusé de fournirune « excuse raisonnable » au moyen d’une preuve prépondérante pour s’exonérer de l’infraction libellée au paragr. 254(5) du Codecriminel, et ce, contrairement à un certain courant jurisprudentiel qui prévalait antérieurement. [71] C’est dans le cadre de l’analyse de la mens rea que le juge d’instance indique qu’il ne croit pas l’appelant compte tenu desversions des policiers. [72] Suite à cette conclusion, le juge de première instance n’évalue pas si malgré tout, un doute raisonnable ressort du reste de lapreuve qu'il a acceptée. [33] More important is what follows : [87] Le juge d’instance choisit d’appliquer la défense d’excuse raisonnable aux explications de l’appelant plutôt que de les évaluerlors de l’analyse du troisième élément essentiel de l’infraction, soit l’intention criminelle. [88] Il existe des divergences jurisprudentielles quant à savoir si une condition médicale relève de la mens rea ou d’une défensed’excuse raisonnable, mais la tendance est de la considérer aussi dans l’analyse de l’intention criminelle. [89] De cette façon, le juge des faits doit d’abord déterminer si la poursuite a démontré hors de tout doute raisonnable l’intention decommettre l’infraction prévue à l’article 254(5) C. cr., en tenant compte des explications de la défense. [90] Le Tribunal fait sienne la position de l’honorable David M.

Paciocco (tel qu’il était alors) dans l’affaire R. v. Soucy : [54] I am also mindful that applying an “intention” mens rea removes all claims of “inability to produce a sample” from thereasonable excuse category, meaning that the “reasonable excuse” category has relatively little application in the case of “failures.” Itstill has an important function to perform in cases of refusal, however, which explains its inclusion: see for example, R. v.Greenshields, supra, and the many cases digested in Joseph F.

Kenkel, Impaired Driving in Canada [2012/2013 Edition], (Toronto:Lexis/Nexis, 2012). [55] Finally, I am aware that the effect of recognizing a mens rea of intention increases the burden of proof on the Crown, leaving itto disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that a failure was intentional, rather than calling on the subject to establish an inability to complyon the balance of probabilities, or at least discharge an evidential burden. This, in turn, makes it easier for individuals who have beendriving under the influence to avoid detection by feigning inability. These concerns should not be exaggerated, however.

The first isnothing more than a mundane application of the presumption of innocence.

Nor is the corollary concern - the prospect that feigninginability might be encouraged - a reason that a court can use for deviating from established interpretive principles relating to moral fault.The way that courts address feigning is to evaluate the credibility of such claims when they are made, in light of all of the evidence, notby convicting individuals even in the face of reasonable doubt because of fear that applying ordinary principles of law will enable others to avoid detection. [41] (Soulignements ajoutés) (Références omises) [34] Justice Lachance continues by quoting numerous decisions to the same effect before concluding as follows:

[94] En raison du fardeau nettement moins onéreux pour la défense d’une preuve qui relève de l’intention criminelle plutôt que de l’excuse raisonnable, il est possible que l’appelant ait pu susciter un doute sur son intention de ne pas obtempérer, malgré qu’il n’ait pas réussi à démontrer par prépondérance des probabilités qu’il possédait une excuse raisonnable de ne pas le faire. [95] Comme le souligne la Cour d’appel d’Ontario dans l’arrêt R. v. Degiorgio , le refus doit être non-équivoque : « … if it is indeed an outright refusal.

The refusal ends the inquiry for the purposes of s. 254(5) [45] . » [96] Le Tribunal est d’avis que l’intention criminelle requise pour l’infraction de faire défaut d’obtempérer à un ordre que donne un agent de la paix aux termes de l’article 254(2)

b) C. cr. va au-delà d’une simple connaissance ou conscience de le faire. [97]

Malgré la conclusion du juge d’instance voulant qu’il ne croyait pas l’appelant et que sa déposition ne soulevait pas de doute raisonnable, il devait se demander s'il était convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable de sa culpabilité en vertu du reste de la preuve qu'il avait acceptée, et ce, quant à chacun des éléments essentiels de l’infraction de refus dont l’intention criminelle [46] . [98] En conséquence, l’omission de prendre en compte des éléments de preuve significatifs et favorables à un accusé constitue une erreur de droit donnant lieu à une intervention en appel [47] . [ 35 ] Applied here, we first have to note the following : − The accused was wearing to the knowledge of the officers a corset that could potentially impede her capacity to fully inhale before providing a sample; − She is indeed suffering from asthma, evidence supported by both her mother and the letter from her physician; − The same applies to her anxiety and the panic attacks to which she is prone; − Officer Maheu recognizes that she appeared as a very, very nervous person as soon as the ASD was in play and that her behaviour only deteriorated afterwards; − She did try to blow on each of the three demands and never said anything to the effect that she was refusing or would not cooperate to the orders made. [ 36 ] The court will briefly address another issue before concluding.

If was also argued that the three demands were within a very short delay and could have added to the confusion of the accused and that in the circumstances, the officers should have given her more chances to comply. [ 37 ] The undersigned has already dealt with this argument in R. c. Daigle [7] : [40] Il n’y a pas d’inférence défavorable à tirer non plus que tout se joue en quelques minutes. [41] Il faut garder à l’esprit que le libellé de l’article 254(2) pose une exigence « d’immédiateté » à l’ordre donné une fois les soupçons acquis. Il n’y a donc rien d’étonnant à ce que tout se fasse rapidement.

Un refus aurait pu être constaté après la première tentative. Que l’agent offre à l’accusé de se reprendre relève de sa discrétion, pas de la loi. À ce sujet, les propos de la Cour suprême dans Woods [9] sont toujours d’actualité : 43 Il est vrai, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, que dans le contexte du par. 254(2) du Code criminel , le mot « immédiatement » peut, dans des circonstances inhabituelles, recevoir une interprétation plus souple que celle que son sens ordinaire semble strictement lui réserver.

Par exemple, un délai court et inévitable de 15 minutes peut ainsi se justifier si cela est conforme aux exigences d’utilisation de l’appareil : voir Bernshaw . 44 Il me semble, toutefois, que l’exigence d’immédiateté prévue au par. 254(2) évoque un ordre prompt de la part de l’agent de la paix et l’obéissance immédiate de la part de la personne visée par cet ordre. L’on ne peut accepter comme étant le fait d’obtempérer « immédiatement » la fourniture d’un échantillon d’haleine plus d’une heure après l’arrestation pour défaut d’obtempérer.

Cela constituerait, à mon avis, un élargissement sémantique qui va au-delà des frontières de la littéralité et des limites constitutionnelles. […] [46] Dit autrement, il peut être de la discrétion de l’agent d’offrir à un accusé plus d’une occasion de se soumettre à l’ordre afin d’éviter toute ambiguïté quant à la compréhension des consignes et de l’ordre donné.

Mais, il n’appartient pas à l’accusé de dicter ou choisir quand s’y soumettre, notamment : - de changer d’idée s’il avait refusé et que le refus a été constaté; - ou de continuer à vouloir souffler une fois le refus constaté en offrant ou en demandant à l’agent une « autre chance » [11] . (Références omises) [ 38 ] The principle remains that a short delay between the first test and the eventual refusal does not allow in itself a negative inference as proposed by the accused nor does it justify that additional chances should be given.

CONCLUSION [ 39 ] This being said, considering the whole of the evidence, it could very well be that indeed the accused was knowingly blowing improperly as described by officer Maheu in the ASD during the three tests. However, that is not the proper path to follow unless one

simply retain a version because he thinks that it is the one more likely to be true or he has put the parties to a credibility contest. Both analysis are prohibited by the Supreme Court. [ 40 ] Reviewing the evidence of the accused, there is firstly no reason to exclude the evidence presented by the accused’s mother as to the problems (and the reactions that follows when in play) that afflict her daughter.

There is no indicia that this testimony is one of complacency. [ 41 ] As to the testimony of the accused, once the principles of analysis described in Nyisztor applied, the conclusion is that in light of the whole of the evidence, at the second stage of the three steps proposed by W. D. , the evidence of the accused is such as to raise a reasonable doubt in regard of her intent to not obey the order of providing a breath sample. [ 42 ] The accused is therefore acquitted of the infraction. CHARTER MOTION [ 43 ] The issue is basically moot following the acquittal of the applicant.

However, an appeal is always possible and the matter would not have been dealt with. Therefore, in the context of hopefully avoid an order of a new trial should that be the case, the Court will briefly address the issue. [ 44 ] At the end of the trial, the applicant abandoned part of her motion.

Two grievances remained: her unnecessary handcuffing on the scene until they reached the police station and her unnecessary detention since she should have been released on the scene once the arrest made. [ 45 ] Both arguments have to be dismissed. [ 46 ] The law concerning the unnecessary handcuffing in the context of an ASD investigation has been recently canvassed by two decisions [8] . [ 47 ] Our situation differs, the applicant having not been handcuffed until put under arrest and seated in the police cruiser. [ 48 ] One has to remember that following arrest, an accused is in the custody of police until a decision has been made as to his or her release. [ 49 ] The Court accepts the testimony of the officers that they wanted to release her on the scene with a promise to appear. [ 50 ] At that time, that document had to be completed, including also the documents related to the tow and impound of the vehicle, etc. [ 51 ] However, the applicant was getting more and more agitated and erratic in her behaviour.

Not knowing how she would react in the police cruiser, the officers decided to handcuff her for safety reasons. The Court accepts the officer’s testimony. The law concerning officer's safety has been largely canvassed over the years. We are here in a situation where it did not result in an abuse triggering a Charter violation.

The officers did not act with wilful disregard of well-established Charter standards for police conduct. [ 52 ] There is no violation on the first issue. [ 53 ] The second argument is the transportation to the police station. [ 54 ] Once handcuffed and in the back-seat of the police cruiser, the applicant admits that the officer proceeded to formally put her under arrest by reading her the card to that effect, including her right to counsel. She admits wanting to speak to a lawyer and a specific one at that. She was told that it had to be done at the station. She insisted.

They went. [ 55 ] Applicant presented the issue as an unnecessary transportation, and therefore illegal detention. Why bring her at the station when the arrest had been done and the investigation over? This is not presenting the issue in the proper angle. [ 56 ] First off, were are not faced with officers who insist that an accused exercise her rights when she clearly does not want to exercise it. This could have triggered a violation by prolonging for no valid reasons the detention. [ 57 ] Secondly, the officers could not ignore the wishes of the applicant.

Had they done so, they would have triggered a violation by arbitrarily denying the plaintiff her right to counsel. [ 58 ] The applicable law is explained by the Supreme Court in Taylor [9] . [ 59 ] The first conclusion is that the officers discharged themselves of two obligations formulated by the Supreme Court: inform applicant of her rights and abstain to elicit evidence between the arrest and the exercise of her right to counsel.

Since the applicant had already mentioned upon her arrest her desire to consult, it remains to determine if the officers gave her a reasonable possibility to do so [10] while waiting for the tow and relief. [ 60 ] Needless to say, the condition and conduct of applicant rendered the possibility to consult on the scene impossible. [ 61 ] Furthermore , Taylor mentioned twice that the possibility to consult implies also that this conversation be private or sufficiently private to the detained person (par. 29 & 34). [ 62 ] The Court of Appeal of British-Columbia came to the same conclusion in Nguyen [11] .

[ 63 ] Confidentiality was not feasible in the circumstances. There was no reasonable opportunity therefore. [ 64 ] The conclusion is that the transportation to the station was not « over holding » the detention of the applicant. It was to respect her rights.

And the circumstances were such as to allow it when we factor in the following : − When it became clear that applicant wanted to speak to a lawyer, the officers wasted no time to call for a back-up team that could handle the tow while they would proceed to the station; − It took very little time for the back-up to arrive; − They were only 5 minutes away from the station; − Once the applicant secured at the station, the handcuffs were removed; − The lawyer of choice was called, but did not answer; − A message to call back was left in the voicemail; − Applicant was informed that should he not call back, she could contact Legal Aid or the Barreau duty counsel; − Before they reached that point, paramedics had been called and arrived, had taken over the person of the applicant and she accepted to leave with them for the hospital without any further demands concerning right of counsel. [ 65 ] There is no violation on the second issue in these circumstances. __________________________________ RICHARD MARLEAU, J.C.Q.

Me Karim Ainmelk Counsel for criminal and penal prosecutions For the Prosecutor Me Steven G. Slimovitch For the accused Dates of hearing: March 19 and June 14, 2019