R. v. Ford, 2013 NBCA 63

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 46-13-CA HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN APPELLANT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE APPELANTE - and - - et - CATHERINE DARLENE FORD RESPONDENT CATHERINE DARLENE FORD INTIMÉE R. v. Ford, 2013 NBCA 63 R. c.

Ford, 2013 NBCA 63 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Robertson The Honourable Justice Bell The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l'honorable juge Robertson l'honorable juge Bell l'honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: March 11, 2013 Appel d'une décision de la Cour provinciale : le 11 mars 2013 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : Inédite Appeal heard: September 19, 2013 Appel entendu : le 19 septembre 2013 Judgment rendered: November 7, 2013 Jugement rendu : le 7 novembre 2013 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Bell Motifs de jugement : l'honorable juge Bell

Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Robertson The Honourable Justice Green Souscrivent aux motifs : l'honorable juge Robertson l’honorable juge Green Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Karen Lee Lamrock For the respondent: Catherine Darlene Ford appeared in person Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelante : Karen Lee Lamrock Pour l’intimée : Catherine Darlene Ford a comparu en personne THE COURT The application for leave to appeal is allowed. The appeal is dismissed. LA COUR La demande d’autorisation d’appel est accueillie. L’appel est rejeté. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BELL, J.A. I. Introduction and

Summary [ 1 ] The appellant contends this appeal raises one narrow issue: whether a trial judge may refuse to impose a fine pursuant to s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 because of the offender’s inability to pay? Relying upon R. v. Lavigne , 2006 SCC 10 , [2006] 1 S.C.R. 392, and R. v. Robichaud , 2011 NBCA 112 , 388 N.B.R. (2d) 394, the appellant contends the answer is clearly “no”. However, in my view, the real issue on this appeal is whether the conditions precedent for the imposition of a fine under s. 462.37(3) have been met.

For the reasons set out below, I would answer that question in the negative, allow the application for leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal. II. Facts [ 2 ] On September 13, 2012, the respondent, a former Wealth Management Advisor at ScotiaMcLeod, pled guilty to six counts of theft totaling $1.3 million from her clients ( s. 380(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code ). ScotiaMcLeod compensated the clients for their losses. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment. Crown counsel contends on appeal that she applied for a forfeiture order pursuant to s. 462.37(1) and, acknowledging that forfeiture would be unlikely, requested a fine in lieu of forfeiture pursuant to s. 462.37(3) . Those sections provide as follows:

462.37

(1) Subject to this

section and sections462.39 to 462.41, where an offender isconvicted, or discharged under

section 730, of adesignated offence and the court imposingsentence on the offender, on application of theAttorney General, is satisfied, on a balance ofprobabilities, that any property is proceeds ofcrime and that the designated offence wascommitted in relation to that property, the courtshall order that the property be forfeited to HerMajesty to be disposed of as the AttorneyGeneral directs or otherwise dealt with inaccordance with the law. 462.37

(1) Sur demande du procureurgénéral, le tribunal qui détermine la peine àinfliger à un accusé coupable d’une infractiondésignée — ou absous en vertu de l’article730 à l’égard de cette infraction — est tenu,sous réserve des autres dispositions du présentarticle et des articles 462.39 à 462.41,d’ordonner la confiscation au profit de SaMajesté des biens dont il est convaincu, selonla prépondérance des probabilités, qu’ilsconstituent des produits de la criminalitéobtenus en rapport avec cette infractiondésignée; l’ordonnance prévoit qu’il estdisposé de ces biens selon les instructions duprocureur général ou autrement en conformitéavec la loi. 462.37

(3) If a court is satisfied that an orderof forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01)should be made in respect of any property ofan offender but that the property or any part ofor interest in the property cannot be madesubject to an order, the court may, instead ofordering the property or any part of or interestin the property to be forfeited, order theoffender to pay a fine in an amount equal tothe value of the property or the part of orinterest in the property. In particular, a courtmay order the offender to pay a fine if theproperty or any part of or interest in theproperty (

a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, belocated; (

b) has been transferred to a third party; (

c) is located outside Canada; (

d) has been substantially diminished in valueor rendered worthless; or (

e) has been commingled with other propertythat cannot be divided without difficulty. 462.37

(3) Le tribunal qui est convaincuqu’une ordonnance de confiscation devrait êtrerendue à l’égard d’un bien — d’une

partie d’unbien ou d’un droit sur celui-ci — d’uncontrevenant peut, en remplacement del’ordonnance, infliger au contrevenant uneamende égale à la valeur du bien s’il estconvaincu que le bien ne peut pas faire l’objetd’une telle ordonnance et notamment dans lescas suivants :

a) impossibilité, malgré des efforts en ce sens,de retrouver le bien;

b) remise à un tiers;

c) situation du bien à l’extérieur du Canada;

d) diminution importante de valeur;

e) fusion avec un autre bien qu’il est parailleurs difficile de diviser. [3] A careful review of the transcript demonstrates that Crown counsel never applied for a forfeiture order ascontemplated by s. 462.37(1). At the very beginning of the argument on sentencing the trial judge observed that, according to its victimimpact statement, ScotiaMcLeod was “asking for restitution” in the amount of $1.6 million.

In commenting upon the discrepancybetween the $1.3 million loss and the $1.6 million claimed as “restitution”, Crown counsel informed the court that the difference of$300,000 represented “loss of opportunity of investment”. Near the close of the sentencing hearing, Crown counsel acknowledged thatthe respondent would no doubt be unable to pay a “restitution order” and requested a fine in lieu. The trial judge took the respondent’sability to pay into consideration and refused to make “an order of restitution”. III. Analysis [4]

Section 718(

e) of the Code informs us that one of the objectives of sentencing is to “provide reparations for harmdone to victims or to the community”. Section 738(1) provides, in part, that a court may, upon application by the Attorney General or onits own motion, order that the “offender make restitution to another person […]”. In deciding whether to make a restitution order a trialjudge is required to consider the offender’s ability to pay: R. v. Fitzgibbon, (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1005, [1990] S.C.J.No. 45 (QL); R. v. Zelensky, (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, [1978] S.C.J. No. 48 (QL); R. v.

Blackler,2006 NLCA 48,[2006] N.J. 247 (QL); R. v. Bradbury, 2004 NLCA 82, [2004] N.J. No. 420 (QL); R. v. DeBay, 2001 NSCA 48, [2001] N.S.J. No. 105(QL). [5] Crown counsel had clearly requested the trial judge make a restitution order, as opposed to a forfeiture order. This

is evident from a reading of the transcript and is consistent with the request for restitution made by ScotiaMcLeod in its victim impact statement. An application for a forfeiture order by the Attorney General and a determination by the trial judge that a forfeiture order should issue are conditions precedent to the imposition of a fine under s. 462.37(3) . There having been no application for forfeiture before the sentencing judge, there is no merit to the Crown’s contention that the judge should have imposed a fine in lieu thereof. The appeal must therefore fail. IV.

Disposition [ 6 ] I would allow the application for leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal. I would note, tangentially, that this appeal does not raise the appropriateness of the global sentence of 42 months. It follows that the dismissal of this appeal does not constitute an endorsement of the adequacy of the sentence in these circumstances. _________________________________ B. RICHARD BELL, J.A. WE CONCUR: __________________________________ J.T. ROBERTSON, J.A. __________________________________ BRADLEY V. GREEN, J.A.