2020 QCCA 1247, 2020 QCCA 1247

Lubecki c. Cour du Québec 2020 QCCA 1247 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-029064-201 ( 460-17-002799-203 ) MINUTES OF HEARING DATE: September 29, 2020 THE HONOURABLE PATRICK HEALY, J.A.

APPLICANT COUNSEL William John Leopold Lubecki PRESENT AND UNREPRESENTED By videoconference RESPONDENT Cour du Québec ABSENT AND UNREPRESENTED IMPLEADED PARTIES COUNSEL Ville de Granby Mtre VANESSA GRAVEL ( Normandin Gravel Rhéaume Avocats ) By videoconference TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DU QUÉBEC ABSENT AND UNREPRESENTED DESCRIPTION: Application for leave to appeal from a judgment terminating the proceeding rendered on May 1 st , 2020 by the Honourable François Tôth of the Superior Court , District of Bedford ( Art.30, para. 2 and 357 C.C.P .).

Clerk at the hearing : Mélanie Camiré Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING 9:59 Commencement of the hearing. Identification of counsel. Preliminary remarks.

10:00 Submissions by Mr Loubecki. 10:17 Submissions by Mtre Gravel. 10:21 Reply by Mr Loubecki. 10:22 BY THE JUDGE: Judgment will be rendered on the minutes of the hearing today. Conclusion of the hearing. Mélanie Camiré, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The self-represented petitioner invokes the second paragraph of

article 30 C.C.P. in a motion for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Superior Court, District of Bedford, [1] that dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Court of Quebec [2] that dismissed his application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Tribunal administratif du Québec (“TAQ”). [ 2 ] This matter concerns the evaluation of an indemnity for the expropriation of land by the immoveable property division of the TAQ. A first decision (“TAQ-1”) was rendered on 30 January 2019. As permitted by

section 154 of the Act respecting Administrative Justice (“the Act”), [3] the petitioner sought a review of that decision by another panel of the TAQ on the ground that the first decision disclosed a substantive or procedural defect is of a nature likely to invalidate the decision. The petitioner did not seek to appeal TAQ-1 under

section 159 of the Act. The application for review was dismissed on all grounds presented except one concerning the method of calculating the appropriate indemnity. As a result, the amount was increased by the second panel (“TAQ-2”). [ 3 ] The petitioner sought leave to appeal TAQ-2 in the Court of Quebec under

section 159 of the Act: An appeal lies to the Court of Québec, irrespective of the amount involved, from decisions rendered by the Tribunal in matters heard by the immovable property division, and from decisions rendered in matters concerning the preservation of agricultural land, with leave of a judge, where the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Québec. [ 4 ] In the Court of Quebec the judge enumerated the criteria governing an application for leave to appeal: [20] Les critères permettant l’octroi de la permission d’appeler sont bien connus et peuvent se résumer, avec sans doute une simplicité exagérée, en indiquant qu’il doit s’agir de questions sérieuses, controversées, nouvelles ou d’intérêt général. [4] [ 5 ] The judge specified that the only issue in the application for leave was whether, according to these criteria, it could be argued that TAQ-2 erred in its revision of TAQ-1 when it found that there was a substantive error in the method of calculating the indemnity.

The judge of the Court of Quebec found that there was no such error and dismissed the application for leave that the issues raised were concerned only with matters of fact in the assessment of the evidence. [ 6 ] The petitioner sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which may be granted only if the court finds an absence or loss of jurisdiction or a significant procedural irregularity in accordance with the principles developed in Vavilov . [5] The court noted the presumption that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness and that this standard applied to the exercise of a discretion whether to grant leave to appeal from a decision of the TAQ. [ 7 ] The respondent sought

summary dismissal of the application for judicial review on the basis that it disclosed no error of law, even assuming that the facts alleged were true. [6] The respondent’s position was that the application for review failed to identify or explain in what manner the decision of the Court of Quebec to deny leave to appeal could be considered unreasonable according to the principles examined in Vavilov . [ 8 ] The Superior Court underscores that there is no bar to

summary dismissal of an application for review by means of a preliminary exception under

article 168 C.C.P. It refers to the observations of Parent J. in Giguère v. Court of Quebec (Small Claims Division) : [28] Bien que les allégations du pourvoi ne mentionnent pas explicitement le qualificatif « déraisonnable » en regard du jugement attaqué, cela ne suffit pas pour conclure à l’irrecevabilité de la procédure. Il faut s’attarder au fondement même du pourvoi. [29] Or, cet examen permet de constater l’absence d’allégations pouvant donner ouverture au remède recherché.

Ainsi, les nombreux griefs formulés à l’encontre du jugement sont de la nature de ceux d’un appel. […] [38] En somme, bien qu’il soit, de manière générale, préférable de disposer d’une demande en irrecevabilité d’un pourvoi en contrôle judiciaire en une seule occasion, soit à la suite de l’audition du pourvoi, les principes de saine administration de la justice et d’utilisation efficiente des ressources judiciaires peuvent exceptionnellement commander de trancher, de manière préliminaire, de telles demandes. [39] Le pourvoi en contrôle judiciaire de la demanderesse constitue l’un de ces cas.

Le Tribunal doit constater que cette demande est

irrecevable et prononcer son rejet. [7] [ 9 ] The court concludes that the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal and his application for judicial review only repeat questions and submissions that had been previously rejected in the TAQ and the Court of Quebec and, moreover, that the petitioner failed to demonstrate in what way the decision of the Court of Quebec could be considered unreasonable. [ 10 ] This conclusion is sound.

Even the most cursory examination of the questions that the petitioner sought to raise in his motion for leave to appeal and in his application for judicial review reveal that they are essentially questions of fact relating to the assessment of the evidence. The Court of Quebec was entirely justified to refuse leave to appeal because these questions do not meet the criteria for granting leave. They are not sufficiently serious, controversial or new and they manifestly do not present legal issues of general interest.

For its part the Superior Court was equally justified in deciding that the application for judicial review, like the application for leave to appeal, should be stopped on a motion to dismiss because it was “plain and obvious” that it had no chance of success. [8] CONCLUSION [ 11 ] FOR THESE REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED : [ 12 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal, with the costs of justice. PATRICK HEALY, J.A. [3] CQLR, c.

J-3, s. 154(3) : “ The Tribunal, on an application, may review or revoke any decision it has made […] (3) where a substantive or procedural defect is of a nature likely to invalidate the decision. In the case described in subparagraph 3, the decision may not be reviewed or revoked by the members having made the decision. ”