R. v. Felix, 2013 ONCJ 261

Citation: R. v. Felix , 2013 ONCJ 261 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN — AND — J. J. FELIX Before Justice Hall Heard on January 9, 10, 30, 31, February 8, February 15, February 26, 2013 Reasons for Judgment released on May 14, 2013 S. Olver ..................................................................................................................... for the Crown R. Posner .................................................................................................. for the accused J. J.

Felix HALL J.: INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] This is a case in which a search warrant was executed at Mr. J.J. Felix’s apartment, where a firearm and ammunition were found. He argued that the search was illegal because it was based on an invalid search warrant that ought not to have been issued, therefore rendering the search and seizure unreasonable. Counsel for Mr. J.J. Felix seeks to exclude the evidence on the grounds that his client’s Charter right under

section 8 was breached by the unauthorized search and seizure. OVERVIEW [ 2 ] On May 31, 2012, D.C. Morgan obtained a Criminal Code search warrant from a Justice of the Peace for Mr. J.J. Felix’s home. The Gun and Gang Task Force attempted to execute this initial warrant, but their efforts were rebuffed as they were unable to locate Mr. Felix on that day. This warrant expired. [ 3 ] A second warrant was obtained the next day by D.C. Taylor on the strength of the same information that D.C. Morgan had presented to the issuing justice. This search warrant was executed on the 1st of June 2012 on Mr. J.J.

Felix’s home around 7:13 p.m., whereupon the police discovered a firearm located in an office area and ammunition was found in various parts of the apartment including what is believed to be Mr. J.J. Felix’s bedroom. Mr. J.J. Felix himself was seen exiting the apartment at the time of the execution of the search warrant, and was arrested and charged with the following offences: (

a) Possession of prohibited firearm with ammunition; (

b) Firearm careless storage; (

c) Unauthorized possession of firearm; (

d) Possession of a firearm obtained by the commission of an offence; (

e) Weapon dangerous; (

f) Careless storage ammunition. [ 4 ] The information to obtain (“ITO”) the search warrant revealed that the police investigation was initiated as a result of information received from a confidential informant. The informant claimed that Mr. J.J. Felix was in possession of a firearm that, when not on his person, would be kept in his home at 125 Bamburgh Circle, unit 702, in the City of Toronto. [ 5 ] The defence filed a Charter motion seeking to have the evidence excluded on the following ground: that the information to obtain was insufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant. Without proper authorization, the accused’s

section 8 right under the Charter was violated, and evidence obtained through this violation should be excluded under section 24(2). THE ISSUE

[6] The issue to be decided is whether the ITO presented to the Justice of the Peace revealed sufficient grounds to haveauthorized the issuing of the search warrant. [7] At the start of the trial the defence argued the search warrant is not valid because the edited ITO, as disclosed, did notprovide any or sufficient premise on which a justice of the peace could have issued a search warrant. Thus it was argued that given theabsence of a valid search warrant, the search of Mr. Felix’s residence was a breach of his

section 8 Charter rights. [8] The Crown acknowledged that the ITO was “heavily vetted” and concedes that the redacted ITO does not, on its face,disclose reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a firearm and ammunition would be found in the accused’s residence. TheCrown however insisted that the ITO was heavily edited not to subvert the requirements of prior judicial authorization but rather toprotect the identity and safety of the confidential informant (“CI”). [9] As a result of this concession, the Crown argued that I should engage the “Step 6” procedure as set out by the SupremeCourt in R. v.

Garofoli (1991), (SCC), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 161. The defence did not oppose this approach. [10] There is a recognized tension between the right to full answer and defence and the need to protect police confidentialinformants: R. v. Learning (2010), 2010 ONSC 3816 , 258 C.C.C. (3d) 68. In the context of the admissibility of evidenceobtained pursuant to a warrant, the Supreme Court struck a balance between these two interests in R. v. Garofoli, supra. Specifically, theCourt set out a series of steps a defendant can take in order to challenge the validity of a judicially authorized search.

The last step of theprocedure is an option for Crown counsel to apply for a review of as much of the un-redacted ITO as is necessary to ascertain theauthorization’s validity: 6. If, however, the editing renders the authorization insupportable, then the Crown may apply to have the trial judge consider so much ofthe excised material as is necessary to support the authorization. The trial judge should accede to such a request only if satisfied that theaccused is sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it [the nature of the excised material] in argument or byevidence.

In this regard, a judicial

summary of the excised material should be provided if it will fulfill that function. It goes withoutsaying that if the Crown is dissatisfied with the extent of disclosure and is of the view that the public interest will be prejudiced, it canwithdraw tender of the wiretap evidence. [11] The validity of the Step 6 procedure has been confirmed in obiter by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Blake, [2010] O.N.C.A.1, and more recently in R. v. Rocha, [2012] O.N.C.A. 707.

In Rocha, Juriansz J.A. encourages Crowns and trial courts to resort to Step 6of Garofoli so that its contours and procedures can be properly explored by jurisprudence. [12] Jurisansz J.A. points out that policy rationale militates towards the use of Step 6. He argues that without Step 6, thewarrant authorization process would seem “artificial” to the general public – as there would be unreasonably one test for theauthorization of the search warrant, and another for its subsequent affirmation (Rocha at paras 49-50).

This divide subsequentlyundermines the public’s confidence in the justice system by unfairly suggesting that the police have acted improperly and violated theprivacy of the accused, even though they may have had proper justification. Setting aside a properly obtained search warrant, moreover,would be to waste the resources that went into both its execution and investigative hours that furnished the initial authorization. [13] Further, Code J. notes in Learning that the Garofoli procedure is situated in a context where the merits of the case are notwhat is being decided.

Rather, the Garofoli procedure is a process designed to test the admissibility of the seized evidence via thevalidity of the warrant. As such, the accused’s rights to full answer and defence at the admissibility stage is reduced comparatively thanthe subsequent trial on its merits. Step 6 is therefore a supportable mechanism, as at this stage the “attenuated rights” of the accused tohave full and answer and defence must yield to the necessity of protecting police informants and confidential sources.

In this context, it isunsurprising that trial courts have been increasingly willing to resort to the use of such a procedure: see R. v. Farrugia, [2012] O.N.C.J.830, and R. v. Herdsman, [2012] O.N.C.J. 739. [14] The cases above have made it clear that under the dictates of Step 6, a trial judge can review the un-redacted ITO toexamine if sufficient grounds were before the authorizing justice. However Step 6, as its name implies, is a method of last resort.

In adesire to provide the accused with as much disclosure as possible, Step 6 should only be resorted to once Steps 1 through 5 outlined inGarofli have been exhausted. It is only when these preceding procedures fail to create a discloseable and supportable search warrant thatthe Crown should invite the trial judge towards the use of the Step 6 mechanism. [15] As a matter of policy, Crown counsel should not automatically resort to Step 6 where a CI is used as the source of theinformation.

To do so would unacceptably tip the balance solely towards the protection of police informants at the cost of the accused’srights to disclosure. If a scenario presents itself where even the creation of the edited affidavit or the judicial

summary wouldcompromise the identity of the CI, the solution would not be Step 6 but rather a withdrawal of the wiretap evidence or an attempt atinclusion through section 24(2). [16] Put another way, a trial judge can only properly look behind the face of the edited authorization if they are satisfied thatthe accused is “sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence”. In my view, suchawareness is achievable through a good faith adherence to the procedure set out in steps 1 through 5 of Garofoli. [17] The Crown in the instant case provided me with a proposed draft judicial

summary of the redacted contents of the ITO. Iendorsed this judicial

summary, and a copy of it was delivered to the defence. Upon its receipt, Mr. Posner desired more information aspart of the judicial

summary, arguing specifically that information on past performance and reliability of the confidential informantshould be made available to him. In response, some additional information was provided to the defence along those lines. However,further information, in my view, would have run the risk of exposing the identity of the informant. [18] Marshalling this disclosed information, Mr. Posner was able to advance several arguments before me relating to thevalidity of the ITO. Specifically, he attacked the reliance and reference to a series of YouTube videos depicting Mr. Felix rapping aboutcriminal conduct.

This information is found in paragraph 3.05 of the ITO. Moreover, he pointed out that the informant provided nodetails regarding the two dogs that were present in Mr. Felix’s apartment. Through these lines of questioning, Mr. Posner questioned the

validity of the search warrant by suggesting that the informant’s allegations was inadequately corroborated and insufficiently compelling to formulate reasonable grounds for authorization. [ 19 ] During this hearing the Crown agreed to make available Detective Peterson for cross-examination. In addition, leave was granted by myself for the affiant, Detective Morgan, to be cross-examined. The defence argued that based on this evidence, the judicial

summary, the redacted ITO and the other disclosure given to the defence, that paragraph 3.05 of the ITO was erroneous. It was argued that this erroneous information and lack of disclosure to the issuing Justice renders the warrant invalid because the police attempted to mislead the judicial officer. [ 20 ] Based on the arguments presented and the information disclosed, I am satisfied in this case that counsel for Mr. J.J. Felix was made sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to permit a resort to Step 6.

But before I can assess the validity of the un-redacted warrant, I must first address the merits of Mr. Posner’s argument on paragraph 3.05 of the ITO. THE IMPUGNED PARAGRAPH IN THE ITO [ 21 ] Detective Constable Peterson’s evidence can be summarized as follows. He testified that he provided certain information to D.C. Morgan who is the affiant on the search warrant regarding Mr. J.J. Felix and his involvement in, or his control of, the drug trade in the Tuxedo Court Community. This information was included in paragraph 3.05 of the Information to obtain. D.C.

Peterson in cross- examination testified that the source of this information came from school children some three years back when he was working the streets in the Scarborough area, before he was assigned to the Gun and Gang Unit. [ 22 ] While testifying he acknowledged that in June of 2012 he did not know whether Mr. J.J. Felix had any control or even involvement in the drug trade in Tuxedo Court Community. However, later in his evidence D.C. Peterson changed that view and then asserted that in June of 2012 he remained of the opinion that Mr. J.J.

Felix controlled the drug trade in the Tuxedo Court community. [ 23 ] There was no factual basis presented to me for this opinion. As a result, I find that at its highest this information was at least three years old and was the product of gossip from school children. [ 24 ] D.C. Morgan, the affiant on the search warrant, testified he tasked P.C. Peterson to confirm Mr. J.J. Felix’s address. D.C. Morgan as well acknowledged receiving the information from P.C. Peterson regarding his belief that Mr.

Felix controlled the drug trade or to use his words was a “big player” in the drug trade in the Tuxedo Court community. [ 25 ] This information became part of what constituted paragraph 3.05 of the ITO. The second portion of paragraph 3.05 described a rap video that D.C. Morgan located on “YouTube” of Mr. Felix in the company of a number of other young people delivering a rap performance. It is the evidence of P.C. Morgan that, from his experience, individuals in Toronto that are rapping about guns are generally involved with guns. [ 26 ] D.C.

Morgan admitted he should have been more scrupulous with regard to this information from D.C. Peterson. However, he points out that this case was not a drug investigation, but rather was an investigation about illegal gun possession. More importantly, he asserted that the information did not form part of the grounds for the search warrant. D.C. Morgan, after being pressed by counsel for the defence, agreed this

section of the ITO played some

part in informing the grounds even if it’s a small part. [ 27 ] In my view paragraph 3.05 of the ITO, particularly the segment that claimed Mr. J.J. Felix was in control of the drug trade in the Tuxedo Court Community is three years old and outdated. Furthermore, the source of the information was from unknown school children. I find this information not to be reliable. The age and nature of this information was never disclosed to the issuing Justice and should have been, in my view. [ 28 ] The YouTube video in which Mr. J.J. Felix was rapping about guns, when considered in combination with the assertion that Mr.

J.J. Felix was heavily involved in the drug trade, might reasonably be seen as a form of corroboration. However, given my finding on the validity of the information regarding Mr. J.J. Felix’s involvement in the drug trade, such a view would lose its potency. The YouTube video of Mr. J.J.

Felix and company by itself, or combined with the outdated information, is of little consequence in this analysis, because its content does not demonstrate the presence of reasonable and probable grounds. [ 29 ] It is important to note that non-disclosure to the issuing justice, in certain circumstances, may lead, by itself, to the invalidation of a search warrant. This was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Araujo, [2000] S.C.C. 65. At paragraph 54, citing R. v. Morris, [1998] CanLII 1344 (N.S.

C.A.) with authority, the Court says the following: These cases stress that errors, even fraudulent errors do not automatically invalidate the warrant. This does not mean that errors, particularly deliberate ones, are irrelevant in the review process. While not leading to automatic vitiation of the warrant, there remains the need to protect the prior authorization process.

The cases just referred to do not foreclose a reviewing judge, in appropriate circumstances, from concluding on the totality of the circumstances that the conduct of the police in seeking prior authorization was so subversive of that process that the resulting warrant must be set aside to protect the process and the preventive function it serves. [ 30 ] I am of the view that the case before me is not one which the extent of the error or lack of disclosure to the issuing Justice would justify invalidating the search warrant. Rather, the better course of action on my

part is to excise paragraph 3.05 of the ITO for the reasons indicated above. THE LAW ON REVIEWING SEARCH WARRANTS

[31] Now that I have excised paragraph 3.05 from the ITO I must decide whether or not the remainder of the informationfound in the ITO provides the necessary reasonable and probable grounds to justify the issuance of the search warrant. Clear guidance onthis point has been provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ebanks (2009), 2009 ONCA 851 , 249 C.C.C. (3d) 29 atpara. 28 (emphasis added): It is settled law that a reviewing Judge must exclude erroneous information from an affidavit supporting a wiretap authorization; see R vArujo, (2000) 2000 SCC 65 , 2 S.C.R. 992 at paragraphs 56-58.

However, there is no authority for the reviewing Judge toexclude correct information. Instead, the proper approach is for the reviewing judge, after excluding the erroneous information, to assessthe affidavit as a whole to see whether there remains a basis for the authorization in the totality of the circumstances. [32] Further, in R. v. Campbell, [2010] O.N.C.A. 588, para. 23 (affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2011) said thefollowing: The warrant is to be examined as a whole that is with respect to the totality of the circumstances.

The court is not to analyze isolatedpassages, for to do so would be inconsistent with the legal requirement that the issuing justice must act judicially, which would includethat he or she ‘diligently and independently’ review the entire information to obtain (ITO) and consider all of its content. [33] Search warrants are generally presumed to be valid. A search warrant becomes invalid if the applicant is able todemonstrate on the balance of probabilities that there is an absence or insufficient reasonable grounds to support or justify theauthorization. In R. v. Brown, 2011 ONSC 6223 , [2011] O.J.

No. 4624 (S.C.J.), at para. 7, O’Marra J., dealing with similarissue to the one I am addressing in this case noted: Under s. 487 (1) 0f the Criminal Code an authorizing Justice must be satisfied based on the information presented that there wasreasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be found of a criminal offence. Where a search warrant has judicially authorizedpursuant to s. 487, as in this case, it is to be considered presumptively lawful by the reviewing justice.

As a lawful search the onus is onthe applicant to establish that the pre-condition have not been met, that is there is no basis for the authorization of the warrant. [34] My task is additionally guided by R. v. Campbell, supra at para. 45, which states that the presumption in this contextmeans that the decision of the authorizing Justice must be upheld unless the applicant meets the burden of demonstrating the invalidity ofthe warrant.

In otherwords, “[t]he reviewing judge on a Garofoli hearing only inquires into whether there was any basis upon which theauthorizing judge could be satisfied that the relevant statutory preconditions existed”: see R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, 2005 SCC 66, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67. [35] The test to be applied by the reviewing judge on the question of the issuing of the search warrant was set out by theSupreme Court of Canada in R. v. Garofoli, supra. The Court says the following: The reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge.

If, based on the record which was before theauthorizing judge as amplified on the review, the reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing judge could have granted theauthorization, then he or she should not interfere. In this process, the existence of fraud, non-disclosure, misleading evidence and newevidence are all relevant, but, rather than being a prerequisite to review, their sole impact is to determine whether there continues to beany basis for the decision of the authorizing judge. [36] Further guidance is found in in R. v.

Nguyen, [2011] O.N.C.A. 465 at para 23, where the Court of Appeal stated: The ultimate test is whether – after excising any offending portions of the ITO – there remains a sufficient basis on the record before theissuing justice, as amplified on the review, for issuance of the warrant [37] At para 57, Nguyen, supra, provides further directions as to the nature of review I must conduct.

The focus must be onwhat is the “heart” of the application: However, the review is not an exercise in examining the conduct of the police with a fine-toothed comb, fastening on their minor errorsor acts or omissions, and embellishing those flaws to the point where it is the police conduct that is on trial rather than the sufficiency ofthe evidence in support of the application. THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN SEARCH WARRANTS [38] R. v. Debot, (SCC), [1989] S.C.J.

No. 118 at para. 53 directs the reviewing judge to ask three questionsto ascertain whether the information relied upon by the police is capable of justifying the search: 1. Was the information predicting the commission of a criminal offence compelling? 2. Where that information was based on a “tip” originating from a source outside the police, was that source credible? 3.

Was the information corroborated by police investigation prior to making the decision to conduct the search? [39] These factors are not to be analysed and evaluated each in isolation, weakness in one factor can be offset by the strengthin another. The reviewing judge must consider the totality of the circumstances, the balance of the information in the ITO and determineif the standard of reasonable grounds to believe justifying the granting of the search warrant were met. As noted in R. v. Campbell, supra,at para. 57: Considered independently each of these grounds may not have justified the authorization.

However, a justice of the peace could havefound from their cumulative effect that there were reasonable grounds to issue the warrant.

ANALYSIS [ 40 ] From the case law, it is clear that a degree of deference is owed to the authorizing justice: absent jurisdictional error, his decision will not be interfered with, regardless of what I would have done. Thus, in determining if the search warrant is valid in the context of this analysis and given my ruling above, the remaining issue is whether there remains a justifiable basis for the issuance of the warrant. [ 41 ] As noted earlier, the edited ITO does not, by itself, present valid grounds to justify a search warrant.

As a result, the Crown requested that I engage in the Step 6 mechanism developed by the Supreme Court in R. v. Garofoli , supra , at para. 79 . This procedure allows me to examine and assess the un-redacted portion of the ITO that was presented to the issuing Justice. Thus, my analysis will be premised on the unredacted version of the ITO and will determine whether the full gamut of information from the confidential informant was sufficiently credible, compelling and corroborated. In other words, whether the Debot requirements had been met. [ 42 ] I shall be assessing each factor separately.

However, I am mindful that the test is the totality of the circumstances, and the information in the ITO must be considered in its entirety to determine whether there were reasonable grounds for the search warrant’s authorization. It is important to note that the details with respect to my findings will be restricted because of the sensitive nature of the information I am assessing and my obligation to protect the identity of the confidential informant. 1.

WAS THE INFORMATION COMPELLING? [ 43 ] The first question I must ask is whether the information was compelling. [ 44 ] The following are relevant questions to be asked in order to determine if indeed the information was compelling. (

a) Was the CI’s information firsthand knowledge or hearsay? (

b) Was the information common knowledge, easily obtained or was it suggested by the very nature of the information that the CI had personal knowledge of Mr. J.J. Felix’s criminal activities? (

c) Was the information provided by the CI precise, detailed and specific about the firearm to be found in Mr. J.J. Felix’s home, i.e., type, colour, and size of the firearm? (

d) Was the nature of the information such that it could be said to be based on more than just rumours and gossip? And did the CI have specific information about Mr. J.J. Felix and the other individual connected to the apartment? (

e) Was the information from the CI such that it clearly reveals how he or she had the opportunity to obtain the knowledge of the firearm and of Mr. J.J. Felix’s connection to the firearm? (

f) Was the information from the CI relative to Mr. J.J. Felix and the firearm current or not ? [ 45 ] The un-redacted information I reviewed led me to conclude that the justice could have found that the information from the CI viewed in its entirety to be compelling in nature. It was greatly detailed and descriptive in its details, revealing a significant breadth of knowledge on the subject. [ 46 ] Unfortunately, for me to provide further reasons for my finding, I am of the view that I would run the risk of exposing the identity of the CI. 2. WAS THE INFORMANT CREDIBLE? [ 47 ] In order to determine this issue I am of the view that that the following questions must be asked (

a) Did the CI ever provide reliable information to the police in the past? (

b) Does the CI have a criminal record with entries of dishonesty, fraud, perjury or obstruction of justice? (

c) Does the CI have some particular motivation, i.e., outstanding charges or receiving benefits for the information provided to the police. [ 48 ] An examination of the disclosed ITO and the judicial summaries revealed the following. The CI provided information in the past to the police as disclosed in the judicial

summary. He has a record of past performance. Whether or not the CI has a criminal record and what it entails was disclosed to the issuing justice and this information was included in the judicial

summary provided to the defence. The motivation of the CI for proving the information to the police was disclosed by the affiant to the justice and if what or any consideration was sought by the CI. [ 49 ] The CI was well known to the police to be entrenched in the criminal sub-culture. Further, there is additional information in the un-redacted portion of the ITO on the question of credibility as it relates to past conduct of the CI that I am not able divulge as part of this analysis but have nevertheless taken into consideration. [ 50 ] As already indicated, Mr.

Posner argued the failure of the CI to mention the presence of dogs in the apartment brings into question the credibility of the informant. After careful examination of the un-redacted ITO, I do not share that view. I find that in combination with the disclosed information, there is other information found in the ITO that diminishes Mr. Posner’s argument and

speaks strongly to the credible nature of the information. [51] From my perspective relying on the information that was presented to the justice, I conclude that the CI was a crediblesource of information. 3. WAS THERE CORROBORATION? [52] To conduct this prong of the analysis the following questions are crucial: (

a) Were the police able to verify any information beyond that which is ordinarily available to anyone? (

b) Was the information collected by the police able to confirm the criminal conduct being investigated? [53] In this case the police were able to verify a significant amount of biographical information that was provided by the CI.These included the specific apartment number, the persons with whom Mr. J.J. Felix resided (namely Ms. Samantha Santos, and theirthree children) and that the apartment was leased to both of them as tenants. I hasten to note by itself that such biographical detailrepresents little in terms of corroboration.

In other words it is somewhat weak. [54] Given the nature of the alleged offence – possession of a firearm in an apartment unit – it appears to me that there werelimited opportunities for corroboration of the alleged offence, i.e. to confirm the actual presence of a firearm in Mr. J.J. Felix’sapartment. As I understand the case law, there need not be confirmation of a crime being committed for the question of sufficiency tosupport the issuance of a warrant, what is required as noted in R. v. Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380 , [2007] A.J.

No 1342, at para. 23;aff’d [2008] 3 S.C.R. is that: The issue on review is whether there is some evidence that might reasonably be believed to support the issuance of a warrant, notwhether there is some guarantee that the informant is telling the truth when he makes the allegation of criminal activity. Information of acrime being committed does not have to be confirmed: Koppang, [2004] A. J. No. 1300, at para 8. I agree with the comments of DohertyJ. A. in R.v.

Lewis (1998), (ON CA), 38 O.R. (3d) 540, 107 O.A.C. at para.22: In concluding that the totality of thecircumstances did not provide reasonable grounds for the arrest, I do not suggest that there must be confirmation of the very criminalityof the information given by the tipster.

The totality of the circumstances approach is inconsistent with elevating one circumstance to anessential prerequisite to the existence of reasonable grounds. [55] The corroboration in this case was weak; however, given the nature of the alleged criminality, I am of the view not muchmore could have been done short of going into the apartment to confirm the presence of the firearm. Weakness in one factor can bestrengthened by the other factors, when the evaluation is done in the context of the totality of the circumstances.

In this case theinformant provided information that was not only detailed, but credible as well. In the context of the totality of the circumstances, Iconclude that there were sufficient reasonable grounds that could justify the Justice issuing the search warrant. [56] At this point, I wish to add that I am aware that the reasons provided are not as detailed and robust as one would expect.However, when assessing the criteria I have just mentioned, I am limited in the reasons that I can give because there is a risk that anyfurther comments may very well disclose the identity of the informant.

The sparseness of my sentence underscores the need for theGarofoli Step 6 procedure to be one of last resort. CONCLUSION [57] After considering the totality of the information and disregarding the excised paragraph, I am of the view that theapplicant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that his rights pursuant to

section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms has been breached. As a result the application is denied. The search on Mr. J.J. Felix’s home was executed pursuant to aproperly authorized warrant. Released: May 14, 2013 Signed: “Justice Hall”