R. v. Crawford, 2015 ONCJ 523

Citation: R. v. Crawford , 2015 ONCJ 523 ONTARIO COURT OF Justice Central West Region Her Majesty the Queen -and- Lindsay Crawford Proceedings conducted, 20 January 2015, at Brantford, Ontario Decision and Reasons issued September 23, 2015 Appearances: Hawkes, V. for the Province of Ontario Dover, S. for the Defendant Statutes Considered or Cited: Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended (“POA”) Witnesses: David Lickers, Six Nations Police Alison Sandy, civilian witness Lindsay Crawford, defendant Decision of the Court 1 . For the reasons set out below, I find Ms.

Crawford guilty of the three offences of driving while her license was suspended. Background and Evidence 2 . Lindsay Crawford is charged that on 20 August, 2013, she was driving while suspended (three counts) and operating a motor vehicle as owner without insurance. 3 .

The prosecution evidence establishes: a. that the investigating officer from Six Nations Police, David Lickers, seated in the passenger seat of a police cruiser operated by his partner, observed a motor vehicle approaching the intersection of 4 th Line and Chiefswood Road, Ohswegan, as it made a right turn at that intersection; the motor vehicle where the officer was situated was approaching the suspect motor vehicle from the opposite direction; b. he believed that the motor vehicle was being operated by a person known to him and who he believed to be a suspended driver; he requested the driver of the police car to follow the defendant, whose motor vehicle arrived at a residential address and pulled into the driveway; c. he arrived momentarily after the subject motor vehicle stopped in the driveway.

d. he alone approached the driver’s side of the motor vehicle, observed the defendant in the driver’s seat, who was said to make a spontaneous utterance to the effect that “I know I ain’t supposed to drive”. The officer made a demand for identification and confirmed the identity of this person by reference to an Indian status card provided to him; there is no dispute about the identity of the defendant. 4 . As a further part of the investigation, the officer made a demand for proof of insurance, and in response, an expired card was provided.

The officer then issued the summonses charging the defendant with the offences. 5 . On cross examination, the officer indicated that he had observed a passenger exit the passenger seat of the motor vehicle as soon as they had arrived at the residence. 6 . Further, Mr. Lickers was asked about the Ministry of Transportation record of suspensions put before the court in relation to Ms. Crawford. It indicates on the one hand “never licensed” while also reporting that her licence was suspended.

The witness was asked to explain how this would be, to which the officer offered the understanding that if a person without a licence is convicted of offences related to use of the road, that person is assigned a licence number; further, if that person, for example, fails to pay any fines, they their licence may be identified as “suspended”, notwithstanding that s/he have never been licenced. 7 . The prosecution tendered as Exhibits on consent confirming that Ms. Crawford’s “driver’s license” was subject to suspension on the alleged offence date.

The first was for was for non-payment of fines, effective 24 November, 2011, the second for medical reasons, effective 20 January, 2013, and the third for a conviction for driving while suspended, effective 20 June, 2013. 8 . The defence tendered on consent a document establishing proof of the existence of insurance in respect of the motor vehicle owned by Ms. Crawford and driven that day. 9 . Ms. Sandy started her evidence by indicating she was not aware of Ms. Crawford being arrested on the day in question and had no specific recollection of the day of the alleged offences.

Notwithstanding that, she then proceeded to give evidence that she was waiting at the residence for the arrival of her son and his common law partner, the defendant, as they had arranged through text messages that she would drive the defendant to a medical appointment later that afternoon. This was necessary (and a typical arrangement) as Ms. Crawford has no license and Ms. Sandy is “her primary driver on her insurance”. At approximately 3:30pm, she observed the motor vehicle arrive and, after it stopped on the driveway, she observed her son exit the driver`s seat and proceed to the house.

She indicated that she saw the defendant in the passenger seat. She advised that at that time, she made no observation regarding any police cruiser. 10 . After leaving the window location and going to the door to the residence, she then saw the police cruiser turn onto the street where she lives. She gave evidence that at this time, an officer approached the door to the house, and she asked him what was going on. She got no response. She did give evidence that the officer with whom she interacted was not David Lickers. 11 .

Under cross examination, she indicated that there was a period of approximately four minutes between the time she saw the motor vehicle stop on the driveway and when she saw the cruiser pull onto the driveway from the door at the far end of the house. Consistent with that, she reported that she lost sight of the defendant for that four minute period, however, on further reflection, indicated it could have been as much as ten minutes. 12 . It was also her evidence that she understood that her son Richard (also known as Tyler) was the primary insured on the motor vehicle, although Ms.

Crawford was said to be a named insured, as she owns the motor vehicle. She advised that she went with her son to the insurance company when insurance was placed on the car, although she did not indicate when that might have been. 13 . Ms. Sandy advised that after these events transpired, she, her son and the defendant all went into the house and Ms. Crawford did not go for her medical appointment. Ms. Sandy asserted that at no time did she discuss why the police were there or what happened to Ms. Crawford with Ms. Crawford prior to the trial. 14 . Ms. Crawford gave evidence.

In her testimony, she also reported that Mr. Bomberry had been driving as she knew she was not allowed to drive for medical reasons. She explained that she was involved in a motor vehicle accident and suffers long term effects of injuries sustained. The injuries include spinal/vertebral injury, a ruptured kidney, a ruptured spleen, and a brain injury. As a result of these, she suffers memory problems, seizures and frequent panic attacks. In relation to her brain injuries, she sometimes cannot tell who people are; forgets things that she needs to remember and finds it hard to perform household duties. 15 .

As she is unable to drive, she has organized a standing arrangement with Ms. Sandy to take her to appointments. She had arranged with Ms. Sandy for Ms. Sandy to take her to a medical appointment that day, and was making her way over to Ms. Sandy’s house for that purpose, since Ms. Sandy was unable to come to her residence to take her from there. She stated that Mr. Bomberry was driving as she was not entitled to. 16 .

Although she acknowledges receiving summonses from the officer, she also indicated that she did not know what was happening, including whether she was being arrested or what she may be charged with. 17 . Under cross examination, Ms. Crawford admitted that she did not recall everything that may have occurred that day, but “bits and pieces”. 18 . In contrast to the evidence provided by Ms. Sandy that her observations would have been at approximately 3:30pm, Ms. Crawford recalled that this would have happened at around 2:30-3:00pm, as her appointment was for 3:30pm. 19 . She acknowledged that Mr.

Bomberry was unable to drive her to the medical appointment as he was not licensed to drive. 20 . In contrast to the evidence given by Mr. Lickers, she claimed that the person she interacted with was not the one who gave evidence in this trial. She advised that the officer who gave her the “tickets” was the driver of the police cruiser. 21 . Finally, she advised that after the police departed, she entered her mother-in-law’s house with Richard, and talked about how

upset she was with what happened, including being upset with being harassed repeatedly by being stopped even though she legitimately owns the motor vehicle. 22 . Neither Mr. Bomberry nor the other officer was called to give evidence. Issues and Analysis 23 . To start with, the Crown concedes that the admission of the document demonstrating that insurance was in place on the motor vehicle, and that this should result in my dismissing the insurance related charge. I accept that and dismiss that count. 24 . With regard to the drive suspended charges, the defence position rests on the consistent claims of both Ms.

Crawford and Ms. Sandy, which contradicts the evidence of the charging officer. In particular support of this, the defence indicates that Ms. Sandy is a person with no criminal record, with full time employment and no reason to mislead the Court. 25 . Obviously, this calls on me to assess the credibility of the defence witnesses, and, if I determine the defence witnesses to be credible and their evidence answers the charge(

s) before the Court, I am bound to dismiss [1] . 26 . Clearly, the events described by both Ms. Sandy and Ms. Crawford are consistent in respect of the actus reus itself. Both deny that Ms. Crawford was driving the motor vehicle and both insist that Mr. Bomberry was the driver. 27 . That said, it is notable that Ms. Sandy started her evidence by advising that she had no recollection of the events of the day of the alleged offences, and that she had no interaction with police on that day.

In spite of this, she was then lead through a series of questions in which it becomes clear that she recalls many aspects of the events of that day in significant detail. Likewise, Ms. Crawford gave evidence that she suffers significant challenges arising from a motor vehicle accident in which she was injured, and among other things, suffers from memory issues. Notwithstanding that, Ms. Crawford seemed to be able to recall significant details of that day.

Perhaps strikingly, it was notable that when asked about her travels on that day, she was alert to the Crown`s use of the phrase “when you were driving…” and diligently responded with the evidence that she was not driving. 28 . Ms. Sandy gave evidence that she had no conversations with Mr. Bomberry or Ms. Crawford after the summonses were issued, however, Ms. Crawford is clear that she and Mr. Bomberry stayed at Ms. Sandy’s apartment after the summonses were issued and that she expressed her anger at being “harassed” constantly while in her legitimately owned motor vehicle. 29 .

There are significant ambiguities in Ms. Sandy’s testimony. She says she never spoke with an officer, however, she also advised that she asked the officer who approached the door what was happening, without response. 30 . No questions were asked to explain the apparent difference between the evidence set out above that Ms. Sandy was the “primary driver” on Ms. Crawford’s insurance, and that Mr. Bomberry was the “primary insured”. 31 . Both Ms. Sandy and Ms. Crawford deny having any interaction with Cst. Lickers that day, even though it is clear he was there and issued the summonses which Ms.

Crawford acknowledges having been served that day. 32 . Both Ms. Sandy and Ms. Crawford would have the Court believe that Mr. Bomberry was driving the motor vehicle that day, notwithstanding that both knew he was not licenced to drive. Neither was asked for any explanation for this although neither appeared to be troubled by this fact, even though Ms. Crawford, as owner of the motor vehicle would be, by this admission, acknowledging that she permitted the operation of her motor vehicle by an unlicensed driver. 33 . Moreover, on the date of the alleged offence, Ms.

Crawford was subject to three separate driving suspensions. One was for unpaid fines, one was for driving while suspended and the third was for medical reasons. Questions of the prosecution witness by counsel for the defence highlighted that, indeed, Ms. Crawford has never been licensed. 34 . Ms. Crawford gave no evidence in relation to these prior convictions, however, her claim that she knew she was not supposed to be driving rings hollow, given that the three suspensions were of relatively recent vintage in relation to the alleged offence date.

Interestingly, the first of the convictions for driving while suspended was for unpaid fines, even though the defence position highlighted that she was never licensed to drive at any time. 35 . In her evidence, Ms. Crawford did clarify that while she might have made the utterance attributed to her (“I know I ain’t supposed to drive”) she did not mean it as an admission that she was driving but rather an acknowledgement of her driving status. 36 .

While it may be that, as a result of the second, or perhaps more likely the third conviction, she had had an epiphany with regard to the restrictions on her driving status, she did not claim that and I do not accept as credible that on a balance of probabilities. 37 . Finally, while the evidence of Ms. Sandy would normally be dispositive of the issues, there were inconsistencies in her evidence. It is also notable that given the passage of time, identifying her son – who was otherwise not entitled to drive on that day – as the driver is not persuasive in the circumstances.

I note that he could no longer be charged with the offence of driving while suspended at this late date nor could Mr. Bomberry be charged with being the owner of a motor vehicle and permitting an unlicensed driver. 38 . As noted above, neither the officer partnered with Mr. Lickers nor Mr. Bomberry were called to give evidence. Although there may be adverse inferences that could be taken from this, it might be seen as balancing off one against the opposing adverse inference, so I take nothing from this observation. 39 . In these circumstances, I am not prepared to accept that Ms.

Crawford’s evidence, to the extent that it is supported by that of Ms. Sandy, as credible and therefore, cannot rely upon it to dismiss the charges on that basis.

40 . I am then left to determine whether the evidence, to the extent I accept it, raises a reasonable doubt with regard to the prosecution evidence that I accept. 41 . In that regard, it is clear that the investigating officer and prosecution witness gave compelling evidence that he saw Ms. Crawford operating the motor vehicle on the date and time. While he conceded under cross-examination that it is possibly mistaken in this observation, in the same way that “anything is possible”, it is clear he had no doubt as to who was driving the motor vehicle. 42 .

There is nothing in the defence evidence which raises a reasonable doubt as to the essential elements proven by the prosecution. 43 . I am therefore left with his otherwise credible evidence proving all the essential elements of the three charges before the Court and no evidence which I accept which raises a reasonable doubt as to what happened on that date and time. As a result, I am finding Ms. Crawford guilty of the three offences of driving while suspended. Issued at Brantford, Ontario, 23 September, 2015 _____________________________ His Worship Donald Dudar Justice of the Peace