2023 QCCA 1216, 2023 QCCA 1216

Dopson-Gariépy c. R. 2023 QCCA 1216 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-007185-190 (500-01-139228-164) DATE: 22 September 2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. PATRICK HEALY, J.A. STÉPHANE SANSFAÇON, J.A. JONATHAN DOPSON-GARIÉPY APPELLANT – Accused v. HIS MAJESTY THE KING RESPONDENT – Prosecutor JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The appellant raises five grounds against a verdict of guilty on one count of first-degree murder [1] pronounced by a jury on 26 June 2019 at the conclusion of a trial before Dadour J. of the Superior Court, District of Montreal. Following a

summary of the salient facts, the grounds of appeal can be addressed under three headings: (

I) the admission of a fragment of a recorded statement by the appellant to police; (II) the directions to the jury on

section 16 of the Criminal Code ; and (III) the reasonableness of the verdict. Facts [ 2 ] The essential facts are agreed between the parties, beginning with the admission that the appellant caused the death of the victim by stabbing on 5 June 2016. The central issue in the case was the appellant’s state of mind in the commission of the killing. It is convenient to reproduce the

summary provided by the appellant and accepted by the respondent: 1. Le 26 juin 2019, un jury a déclaré l’Appelant coupable d’avoir commis, le ou vers le 5 juin 2016, un meurtre au premier degré sur la personne Pappa Kofi Kwao Boakye, ci-après « Pappa ». L'événement a eu lieu le 5 juin 2016, dans l'appartement de l'Appelant. À l'époque des faits, il était en relation avec Nadia Demers, ci-après « Nadia » depuis avril 2016 et ont cohabité dès mai 2016. 2. Selon Nadia, l’Appelant présente une double personnalité. Il est « doux », « fin » quand il ne consomme pas de molly.

Il devient « rough », « la met dehors », quand il en consomme. Il l’a expulsé à deux reprises, une fois parce que les lumières de l’appartement étaient allumées et l’autre, il l'a sentie et a dit qu'elle sentait la prostituée. Bien qu’elle ait pris une douche, il a maintenu qu’elle puait. 3. Le 4 juin 2016, vers 19:30, ils conviennent de se rejoindre à l’appartement. Sur son chemin, elle a acheté 4 speeds. À l'appartement, elle a consommé 1,5 speed, et lui, 2,5. Vers 23h00, ils ont consommé du speed. Au bar, elle a bu une bière et lui un ou deux verres.

Vers 2-3 h, ils ont quitté pour se rendre au club Stereo, after hour . Elle y a consommé de la molly et l’Appelant 3 molly. Ils ont consommé plus de drogues que d'habitude cette nuit-là en plus d’avoir consommé de la cocaïne. 4. Au Stereo, l’Appelant dit à Nadia qu'il parlait et envoyait des textos à Pappa au sujet d’armes à feu. Lors de la conversation, l’Appelant avait l'air mécontent, en disant que Pappa ne voulait pas donner l’argent pour acheter les armes à feu. Nadia affirme qu'ils n'ont jamais récupéré d'armes et qu'elle n’avait jamais vu l’Appelant avec des armes à aucun moment dans le passé. 5.

Nadia a déclaré que peu de temps après avoir consommé le molly, l’Appelant était « mêlé ». Il a affiché cet état de confusion durant toute la soirée, absent, dans sa bulle, dans son propre monde. Lorsqu'ils ont quitté vers la station McGill, l’Appelant faisait des allers- retours sans direction spécifique, il semblait paranoïaque, sur un « high » et ne savait pas où il s’en allait. Il semblait toujours attendre

une réponse de Pappa. Ils ont marché de la station McGill jusqu’au poste de police, où l’Appelant a retiré sa chemise et se regardait par la vitre. Ils sont entrés dans le poste et l’Appelant a demandé s'il y avait un mandat contre lui. Cet évènement est corroboré par M. Houle et M. Forget qui travaillaient au C.O. Sud. 6. Vers 11h30, ils sont de retour à l'appartement, les lumières du passage sont allumées. Cela le dérange. Il est stressé et il lui dit qu'il va tuer Pappa. Il a dit cela deux fois, Nadia ne l'a pas cru.

Selon Nadia, il « n'était pas là », il faisait les cent pas dans l'appartement, il était dans sa tête, comme s’il ne l’entendait pas. Il semblait encore être dans un autre monde, paranoïaque, en train de parler à quelqu'un d'autre. À un moment donné, il se battait avec une personne imaginaire. Ce comportement a eu lieu pendant tout le temps qu'elle était avec lui à l'intérieur de l'appartement et qu’elle n’avait jamais vu l’Appelant dans un tel état avant. 7. L’Appelant a sorti le tapis de la salle de bain et l’a posé sur le plancher du salon. Il a également étendu la douillette du lit sur le plancher.

Il semble encore dans un état paranoïaque. Vers 12:15, ils commandent d’autres speed. Vers 12:50, Pappa arrive. Une fois Pappa à l'intérieur, l’Appelant l'a étranglé avec son bras. Papa s'évanouit. Il l’a traîné dans la cuisine et le salon. Nadia voit Pappa au sol, l’Appelant était au-dessus de lui, et elle a vu deux coups de couteau. Après le 2e coup, elle a eu peur et lui a demandé d’arrêter. Ce dernier ne l’écoutait pas et « ne semblait pas là ». Il a mis sa main sur la poitrine de Pappa et lui a dit « Don’t stress, Nadia, He’s dead ». Il lui a demandé de l’aider à nettoyer le sang, ce qu’elle a fait. 8.

Nadia a reçu la livraison du runner qu’elle a laissé dans un bac de recyclage bleu pour l’Appelant et a quitté avec le runner . Une fois seule, elle a appelé sa sœur, et lui dit que l’Appelant a tué son ami. Elle lui a répondu d’aller se coucher, qu’elle était trop « gelée ». Ensuite, elle est retournée à son appartement où elle se cache dans une garde-robe parce qu’elle a peur. Le lendemain, sa sœur a téléphoné à l’appelant qui pleurait. Il lui dit ne pas vouloir aller prison. Vers 11h, Nadia se rend à son travail, et raconte à des collègues que l’Appelant avait tué son ami devant elle.

Elle appelle ensuite le 911 et informe qu’elle a vu l’Appelant tuer son ami. 9. Kayla Pace était la conjointe de Pappa et ils sont allés se coucher vers 6h le 5 juin. À 7h, Pappa a commencé à recevoir des appels de Magic qu'elle a identifié comme étant l’Appelant sans pouvoir confirmer que c’était lui qui parlait. Il y a eu entre 7 à 15 appels effectués sur 2h. Les échanges entre Pappa et l’Appelant étaient acrimonieux. Elle a relaté certaines déclarations faites par Pappa, il était en colère durant les appels, mais elle n'entendit aucun mot de l'interlocuteur. 10.

N’ayant pas eu de nouvelles de lui de la journée, Mme Pace va se rendre à plusieurs reprises devant l’immeuble de l’Appelant. Le 6 juin au matin, n’ayant toujours pas de nouvelle, elle est retournée au même immeuble, a trouvé la porte de l’Appelant. Il lui a entrouvert la porte sans la laisser entrer. Elle l’a questionné sur Pappa, il lui a fourni des réponses très courtes. Mme Pace a indiqué qu’il avait l’air intoxiqué. Ses yeux étaient vraiment grands et il n'arrêtait pas de se mordre les lèvres comme si sa mâchoire bougeait. Mme Pace a ensuite quitté. 11. M.

Ronnie Noël, un ami de l’Appelant, a témoigné avoir vu l’Appelant le 6 juin. Dans sa déclaration, M. Noël avait déclaré que l’Appelant lui a dit qu'il était arrivé quelque chose à un gars qui voulait voler sa maison et qu’il l’a poignardé à l'intérieur de sa maison. Il a aussi déclaré que l’Appelant lui avait dit qu'il avait poignardé quelqu'un dans sa maison parce qu'il lui avait donné une clé de sa maison et que cette personne a tenté de le voler. M. Noël lui a demandé où était le gars qui s'était fait poignarder, et l’Appelant avait répondu qu'il avait pris la fuite et s'était enfui. M.

Noël a indiqué que l’Appelant semblait perdu, le regardait avec de grands, grands yeux, transpirait et n'était pas comme d'habitude. 12. Vers 16h18, les agents Fournier-Langelier et Badreddine, sont appelés en renfort pour un homme en crise, se cognant contre le plancher. Au 3ème étage, le policier a vu l'Appelant, allongé sur le ventre, torse nu, il était inerte. Il ne pouvait pas dire s'il était conscient ou non, même s'il lui avait dit « police ». Lorsqu’il a tenté de menotter l'Appelant, ce dernier a repris connaissance et est devenu très agité (mouvements involontaires), criant et grognant.

L'agent a noté la transpiration excessive et a qualifié son état de « syndrome de délirium agité ». Lors de son arrestation, l’Appelant ne semblait pas comprendre ce qui se passait et Urgence-Santé est appelée étant donné son état d’agitation, décrit comme animé d'une force surhumaine, il était dans un état critique, transpirant abondamment, comme s'il était possédé et manifestant des convulsions violentes. 13. M. Cully, un paramédical, qui est intervenu sur les lieux, décrit l’Appelant comme totalement incohérent, en état de psychose, très agité, combatif et transpirant beaucoup.

Il était tellement en sueur et agité qu’il était impossible de coller des électrodes sur sa peau. Son rythme cardiaque était aussi élevé que celui d'un homme qui courait à grande vitesse. Mme Jaulp était la partenaire de M. Cully. Selon elle, l’Appelant a montré des signes s’apparentant à un état de delirium tremens , il y avait danger pour sa vie. Il n’a pas été possible de transporter l’Appelant à l’hôpital. Par conséquent, une autre équipe d'ambulanciers appelée Advanced Life Support (« ALS »), fut appelée. Compte tenu de l'état de l'Appelant, l'équipe de l'ALS lui a administré du Midazolam.

Il a fallu 3 doses pour qu’il devienne suffisamment calme et non combatif pour être mis sur une civière.

14. L’Appelant a fait une déclaration vidéo le 7 juin. Il dit se sentir à 40 % et comme de la « crap » pendant la déclaration. Il se souvenait du nom de l’enquêteur Riddle parce que Dieu tout puissant l'avait renvoyé dans sa tête. Il a affirmé qu’en arrivant chez lui, il était bouleversé et a explosé en voyant les lumières allumées. Il essayait de comprendre qui continuait à rentrer chez lui. Il continuait à sentir des odeurs bizarres dans sa maison, telles que l'odeur de vagins sales. Il reconnait avoir dit à Nadia qu'il allait tuer Pappa.

Il précise qu’il était défoncé lorsqu'il a fait cette affirmation à Nadia. Il était comme il dit « high of his ass ». Il a déclaré qu'il se promenait dans la maison avec un couteau sur lui, attendant Pappa. Il décrit qu'il avait commencé à se battre avec Pappa, l'avait mis au sol puis l'avait poignardé avec un couteau de cuisine. Il a reconnu avoir nettoyé son appartement. Il a déclaré qu'il était un peu paranoïaque après la mort de Pappa. Il a déclaré que sa décision était prise avant même de se rendre à la maison. Il a ajouté: " I was already on the decision to do something to this guy but I don't...

I don't know, like I don't think I was honestly... like maybe I was like seventy (70), eighty percent (80%) that I was going to do something to him but not really ." 15. Le Dr Morissette était le médecin traitant de l’Appelant et expert mandaté pour évaluer la responsabilité criminelle de l’Appelant. Il a indiqué que l’Appelant souffrait de psychose aiguë, trois critères permettaient de conclure à une psychose: les hallucinations, les délires et le comportement désorganisé.

Les symptômes psychotiques aigus étaient liés non seulement à la maladie elle-même mais aussi au fait qu'il ait pris beaucoup drogues dans les heures précédant l'événement. Il conclut qu’il a tué la victime en raison d'une croyance paranoïaque liée à un épisode psychotique aigu, qui entravait sa capacité à juger ce qu'il faisait et à apprécier ce qu'il faisait.

Il a agi à cause de certaines pensées paranoïaques, d'événements insignifiants, tels que des lumières allumées, son ordinateur ou de mauvaises odeurs, qui sont devenus très importants et lui ont donné le l'impression que la victime était contre lui ou mauvaise avec lui. 16. Le Dr Morissette a déclaré que l’Appelant savait que mettre un couteau dans la poitrine de quelqu'un causerait la mort, car il était intelligent. Il savait que le coup de couteau pouvait causer la mort. Cependant, au moment où il l'a fait, ce n'était pas mal pour lui.

Le Dr Morissette a ajouté que l’Appelant ne pouvait pas appliquer la connaissance de ce qui n'allait pas à ce qu'il faisait, en raison de son état d'esprit. Il a également dit pour lui, il n'y avait qu'une seule solution, soit de le poignarder. Ses croyances, dans son esprit, ne correspondaient pas à la réalité. Il a indiqué que l’Appelant n'avait jamais reçu de diagnostic de trouble simulé. Admission of part of the appellant’s recorded statement [ 3 ] The trial judge admitted a video-recorded statement made by the appellant to investigators on 7 June 2016.

The parties subsequently agreed on an edited version of this statement, which was tendered in evidence, with the exception of a fragment in which the appellant said: “ And I am letting you know right now, I’m just going to plead guilty .” The appellant argued that this fragment should be excluded because it was irrelevant and, even if it were relevant and otherwise admissible, it should be excluded in the judge’s discretion because its prejudicial effect exceeded its probative value.

The judge admitted the fragment on the basis that it was relevant and that its probative value, though limited, exceeded any risk of prejudice to the defence. He identified its relevance as an imprecise awareness, but not more, of some degree of participation in the killing. [2] [ 4 ] More precisely, the judge noted the fragment was relevant specifically as an admission of involvement in the killing because the appellant explicitly affirmed at several points in the statement that he had killed the victim, and indeed there were other items of evidence to the same effect.

In this regard the fragment was redundant as evidence of the actus reus . Otherwise, it was imprecise because it did not convey explicitly or implicitly any communication of the appellant’s state of mind in the commission of the homicide. [3] [ 5 ] At the conclusion of the voir dire concerning this fragment, the judge acknowledged that there might be some prejudice if the probative value of that evidence was exaggerated and he noted that a “pedagogical or limiting instruction” might be appropriate in due course. [4] In his instructions the judge did not give such an instruction about the fragment.

The judge accepted that the fragment was neutral and that the jury could assess it in conjunction with any other evidence relevant to the appellant’s state of mind at the time of the killing. [ 6 ] The appellant argues that the fragment provided no evidence relevant to his state of mind and effectively prejudiced the defence by creating a risk that the jury would attribute undue weight to the fragment as evidence of a culpable mental state.

For this reason, he submits that the fragment should have been excluded or at least that the judge should have given a limiting direction to the jury to minimise the risk of prejudice in the form of an inference of the mental state required for proof of first-degree murder. [ 7 ] This court is unable to detect the supposed risk of prejudice precisely because the amorphous nature of the disputed fragment cannot sensibly displace the focused assessment of whole of the evidence that the judge directed the jury to consider in relation to the mental state of the appellant in the act of stabbing the victim.

The fragment is inconclusive, as expressly noted by the judge, and both its probative value and the risk of prejudice are diminished. The risk identified by the appellant in the circumstances of this case is a hypothetical possibility and not a present and material danger. That hypothetical possibility is neutralised by the judge’s directions on specific elements of evidence relating to the appellant’s mental state.

This exercise of his discretion is entitled to deference in this court in the absence of any demonstrable risk of prejudice. [5] [ 8 ] The appellant also suggests that the statement should be considered as evidence of conduct after the fact. The judge did not treat it as such [6] and rightly so; [7] otherwise any statement by a suspect to a person in authority after an alleged offence would have to be considered as evidence after the fact. Directions on

section 16 of the Criminal Code [ 9 ] The appellant argues that the judge did not adequately direct the jury with respect to the defence of mental disorder under

section

16 of the Criminal Code because he did not direct that the defence should succeed if they were satisfied on a balance of probabilities thatthe appellant was incapable of appreciating, as a result of mental disorder, the nature and quality of his acts in stabbing the victim. Thetest of this argument is whether the judge directed the jury in accordance with the law and the evidence presented to the jury. [10] According to

section 16, a defence of mental disorder can succeed if in the commission of the alleged offence a “disease of themind”[8] rendered the accused incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or of knowing that his acts were morally (notlegally) wrong.[9] The substantive law in this respect is disjunctive in the sense that proof on a balance of probabilities of either fact issufficient for the defence to succeed. For convenience these facts may be identified as A and B.

The judge instructed the jury to consideronly the evidence of B in this case because there was no evidence to support A.[10] [11] If A or B will suffice for a successful defence of mental disorder, it is equally clear that the defence will succeed if the evidenceproves A and B conjunctively: that is, if the evidence proves that as a result of mental disorder the accused was both unable to appreciatethe nature and quality of his acts and incapable of knowing that those acts were morally wrong. [12] It does not follow that in every case in which

section 16 is raised the judge must instruct the jury on both A or B disjunctivelyand A and B conjunctively. The judge must direct the jury to consider A and B, disjunctively or conjunctively, if and only if theevidence before the jury is sufficient to satisfy the evidential burden with respect to those possibilities.[11] That burden is satisfied if areasonable jury acting judicially could conclude that A or B, or A and B, has been proved on a balance of probabilities. The viability ofthese three options is entirely dependent on the evidence adduced before the jury in the specific case.

This point was summarised by theCourt in Turcotte: [65] The accused is therefore presumed to be of sound mind, but this presumption can be rebutted. The judge must first determine inlaw whether the mental condition alleged by the defence is included in the notion of mental disorder within the meaning of sections 2and 16 Cr. C. and then determine whether this condition satisfies the applicable legal test. In R. v. Stone, (SCC), [1999]2 S.C.R. 290, Bastarache J. explains: 197 Taken alone, the question of what mental conditions are included in the term “disease of the mind” is a question of law.

However,the trial judge must also determine whether the condition the accused claims to have suffered from satisfies the legal test for disease ofthe mind.

This involves an assessment of the particular evidence in the case rather than a general principle of law and is thus a questionof mixed law and fact. ... [66] In addition, before submitting a defence of mental disorder to a jury, the judge must ensure in the first place that there isevidence supporting the existence of the alleged mental condition and, in the second place, that there is evidence that the mentalcondition caused the incapacity to appreciate the nature and the quality of the act or omission or to know that it was wrong.

In makingthis double determination, which is an issue of law, the judge is required to apply the air of reality test and ensure that there is a factualbasis for each element of the defence, like for any other defence, as the Chief Justice of Canada pointed out in R. v. Pappas, 2013 SCC56: [27] ... The question is whether a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could be left in a state of reasonable doubt as to the presenceof each of the elements of the defence of provocation.

There must be an evidential foundation for both the objective and subjectiveelements of the defence. ... [67] When analyzing the air of reality test, the judge must assess the overall evidence, even if this assessment is limited (R. v.Pappas at para. 26 and R v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55at para. 21). [68] Even when in doubt, the judge will leave it up to the jury to determine whether the evidence in question is sufficiently persuasiveon a balance of probabilities, as set out in R v. Cairney: 22 If this air of reality test is met, the judge should leave the defence to the jury.

While judges must ensure that there is an evidentialfoundation for the defence, they should resolve any doubts as to whether the air of reality threshold is met in favour of leaving thedefence to the jury.[12] [13] In the present case the judge directed the jury to consider B alone. He did not direct the jury to consider A alone, or A and Bconjunctively, because the evidence did not support those hypotheses. The judge reviews the testimony of various witnesses who saw theappellant at points in the sequence of events and notes their perceptions that his behaviour was aberrant, bizarre and seeminglydisconnected.

Apart from the non-expert observations of witnesses of the appellant’s conduct at the relevant times, the only evidence ofmental disorder was the expert evidence of the psychiatrist, Dr. Morissette. He testified that in his opinion, as a result of mental disorder,the appellant did not know that his acts were morally wrong (B). At no point did his evidence support or justify a direction to the jurywith respect to A alone or both A and B.

Further, the judge clearly rejected the option of A alone, or both A and B, in part because theaccused asserted explicitly before the stabbing that he was going to kill the victim. It may be noted that at trial the defence did notrequest that instruction be given on A.[13] [14] In the absence of a sufficient evidentiary foundation for A alone, the appellant’s argument would require a judge to instruct thejury in every case on the three options that are theoretically possible: A or B, or A and B.

This position is unsustainable because it wouldrequire a judge to give instructions that are inappropriate in view of the evidence of facts actually put before the jury. In short, without arequirement that directions on the law be anchored in the factual particulars of the instant case,[14] the appellant’s position would invitea judge to provide a direction that does not comply with applicable legal requirements concerning the evidential burden, as explained inTurcotte.

In the present case the judge was satisfied that only the evidence of B met the evidential burden to go before the jury and thereis no identifiable error in that conclusion. [15] While Dr. Morissette was definitive in his opinion that the appellant suffered from mental disorder at the time of the homicide,he could not be certain whether his condition was induced by intoxication.[15] The trial judge accordingly followed the direction of theSupreme Court that these two defences are mutually exclusive and that questions relating to mental disorder should addressed first by thejury.[16] At points Dr.

Morissette’s opinion appeared not to differentiate explicitly between the two branches of mental disorder in

section 16(1). [17] Elsewhere he affirms that in committing the appellant appreciated the nature and quality of the act of stabbing. On this point, however, the judge reminded the jury that Dr. Morissette evidently concluded that the appellant was aware of the harmful effects of stabbing another person. [18] The judge also reminded the jury that in Dr. Morissette’s opinion the symptoms of continuing schizophrenic psychosis in the appellant were in remission at the time of the killing. [19] [ 16 ] The judge further reminded the jury that Dr.

Morissette concluded the appellant did not know at the time of the act that the killing was morally wrong. [20] Despite the absence of any further differentiation between the two branches in section 16(1) any ambiguity is nevertheless of no legal consequence because that function lies with the judge in determining whether as a question of law the evidence satisfies the evidential burden on either A or B to a degree that should be put the jury as a question of fact for determination in accordance with the standard of persuasion defined by the legal burden. [21] The judge decided that only evidence of B met this test.

He carefully explained to the jury their proper role in the assessment of expert evidence and in particular that they were not bound to accept any facts or conclusions affirmed by Dr. Morissette. Moreover, it remained for the jury to determine as a matter of fact whether all the evidence satisfied the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities on the defence of mental disorder. [ 17 ] The judge’s instructions on the elements of criminal responsibility are clear and precise.

They are contained in what he identifies as Issue 3. [22] He directs the jury that they must consider whether the appellant suffered from mental disorder at the time of the killing and, if so, whether that condition had effect of preventing him from knowing that stabbing the victim was morally wrong. [23] He makes clear to the jury that a finding of mental disorder is only a determination of a necessary condition for a defence and that the defence is complete only if such a finding is complemented by a finding of the effect of rendering the appellant incapable of knowing that his homicidal action was morally wrong.

In doing so the judge expressly reminds the jury that they were not bound to accept the expert opinion of Dr. Morissette and that they should consider his evidence in conjunction with all the other evidence presented to them in order to decide whether the defence is proved on a balance of probabilities. [ 18 ] In short, while Dr. Morissette was unable to ascertain whether the cause of the appellant’s mental disorder was a disease of the mind or intoxication, the judge’s direction to the jury on this issue was explicit.

He directed them to determine first whether at the time of the killing the appellant suffered from mental disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong and if they rejected that defence to consider the separate question as a result of intoxication they had a reasonable doubt of mental state required for proof of murder. Reasonableness of the verdict [ 19 ] The appellant argues that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable because the evidence of mental disorder and intoxication was uncontradicted.

This position, to be precise, focuses on the result reached by the jury after assessing the evidence. The focus is thus the assessment itself and suggests that evidence sufficient to meet the evidential burden is necessarily sufficient for a successful defence. This position would entail that evidence of mental disorder that meets the standard of the evidential burden also meets the standard of the legal burden as proof of that fact solely by virtue of the absence of contradictory evidence.

Similarly, it would imply that uncontradicted evidence of intoxication necessarily raises a reasonable doubt of mens rea . [ 20 ] Neither proposition is tenable because both neglect the duty of the trier of fact to weigh the probative value of uncontradicted evidence.

This position overlooks the possibility that uncontradicted evidence of mental disorder might fail to come up to proof on a balance of probabilities and that uncontradicted evidence of intoxication might fail to raise a reasonable doubt of mens rea . [ 21 ] The evidence of these two defences was plainly rejected by the jury in the present case and the only explanation for this result is that the jury was not satisfied that the uncontradicted evidence of either defence was sufficient to succeed.

It is self-evident that uncontradicted evidence that satisfies the evidential burden is not necessarily sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt or, under

section 16 , to prove mental disorder on a balance of probabilities. [ 22 ] A guilty verdict is unreasonable if a trier of fact, acting judicially on applicable principles of law, could not reasonably render it. [24] This could occur if the verdict has no evidentiary foundation or if the evaluation of the evidence is demonstrably erroneous. [25] The absence of evidence to contradict evidence that is sufficient for the jury’s consideration does not meet this standard. If a guilty verdict was a plausible outcome on the evidence admitted, and it demonstrates no logical fallacy, an appellate court cannot second-guess the jury’s assessment of the evidence or substitute an alternative

interpretation. [26] The appellate court must defer to the decision- making of a trier of fact acting judicially in accordance with applicable principles of law. In the present case the judge made this same point clearly when he told the jury that in the trial before them there were two judges: the judge on questions of law and the jury on questions of fact. In the absence of demonstrable error the same logic compels this Court’s deference to the jury’s verdict. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 23 ] DISMISSES the appeal. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. PATRICK HEALY, J.A.

STÉPHANE SANSFAÇON, J.A. Mtre Réginal Victorin For the Appellant Mtre Louis Bouthillier DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL AND PENAL PROSECUTIONS For the Respondent Date of hearing: 20 September 2022