2016 NLCA 58, 2016 NLCA 58

Justin Elliott Young (applicant/appellant) v. Sarah Noble (respondent) (16/39) Indexed As: Young v. Noble 2016 NLCA 58 1 C.A.N.L.R. 197 Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador Green C.J.N.L. October 26, 2016

Summary: The respondent, Ms. Noble, made an application to have a tort claim against her heard by means of a

summary trial. The application was granted. The applicant, Mr. Young, appealed. This Court issued an order granting leave to appeal but dismissing the appeal as moot, given that the Trial Division had decided to re-hear the application to proceed by

summary trial. On re-hearing, the Trial Division once again granted the application to proceed by

summary trial. The applicant applied for leave to appeal. Leave to appeal was denied. The applicant applied to the Chief Justice to have the application for leave re-heard by a panel of the Court. Held: Application dismissed. Green C.J.N.L.: The discretion of the Chief Justice to allow a re-hearing by a panel of three in relation to a matter already decided by a single judge under

section 10 of the Judicature Act , RSNL 1990, c. J-4 must be exercised on the basis of proper principle. There is a rebuttable presumption that the original decision was correct. The party seeking re-hearing has the burden of raising questions as to the correctness of the original decision or must point to some other good reason as justification for having the issue re-examined. Since the filing of this application, a new set of rules, the Court of Appeal Rules , NLR 38/16, came into effect. The new rules made a fundamental change in the requirement for leave to appeal interlocutory orders.

Now, orders in “uncompleted matters” (as interlocutory matters are now called) may be appealed as of right. However, under rule 35, the responding party may apply, following the filing of the appeal, to have the notice of appeal struck. Nonetheless, this does not affect the current application for a re-hearing. The focus on such an application, as the

summary of the case law above indicates, is on whether questions have been raised as to the correctness of the original decision on the leave issue or there is some other good reason justifying reconsideration. If the Chief Justice decides that reconsideration is not warranted, that is the end of the matter.

If, on the other hand, the Chief Justice decides to allow the matter to be re-heard, it would be up to the panel ______________________________ Leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2017 NLCA 48 . hearing the matter to determine, applying the transitional provisions in rule 60 of the new rules, whether to apply, on the question of leave, the old law requiring leave or to apply the new law which would allow an appeal as of right in the absence of an application by the other party under rule 35 to strike the notice of appeal.

The applicant argued that he was not given the opportunity to present arguments in support of his leave application, that the arguments he did make were not addressed and the order was not based on proper principles. He also argued that the procedure adopted by the Trial Division in light of the first order of this Court granting leave, was improper, since the first order contemplated that the application for

summary trial would be re-issued. There was no substance to the last argument because, while the language of the first order was clumsy, its clear intent was that a new document did not have to be filed but the application could be re-initiated using existing materials.

As for the second application for leave to appeal, although the single judge opened the hearing with a general description of the policy ofnot granting leave in interlocutory matters until a final decision was obtained, she then presented the applicant with the opportunity tomake any further submissions as to why there should be an exception to the policy in this case and why leave should nevertheless begranted. Moreover, it was obvious she understood the nature of the case and the issues involved.

The applicant argued that the procedure adopted by the Court below was wrong because preliminary issues and the merits issue shouldbe dealt with together. He argued that the fact that there are conflicting decisions on the point should be a justification for granting himleave to appeal. However, the fact that one or more of the factors listed in rule 57.02(4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986 mightbe engaged does not give an automatic ticket to leave being granted.

The judge hearing the leave application was of the view that,considered collectively, the asserted justifications for granting leave, as asserted in Mr. Young’s written argument were overbalanced bythe general policy. There was no error in principle in the original decision in this regard. The weight of authority is in favour of allowinga bifurcation of the appropriateness and merits issues, at least in some circumstances.

Although the applicant argued that the order of the single judge effectively barred him from returning to this Court before the end of thetrial, the judge’s remarks were not specifically directed to making a formal order preventing him from coming back in any otherconceivable circumstance. Her remarks can, and should be regarded as simply indicating to the applicant that any attempt at appeal of aninterlocutory order has a high burden to meet before leave will be granted and his focus should be on dealing with the merits of the claimin the Trial Division. In

summary, the arguments in favour of granting leave were not so compelling as to suggest that there was anything incorrect in theinitial decision denying leave. There is nothing in the record to indicate a sufficient degree of doubt as to the correctness of the result that would justify a re-hearing. Furthermore, there is no other good reason to justify are-hearing in the current circumstances. Cases cited: Stacey v. Stacey, 2009 NLCA 50, 289 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 180 White v. Conception Bay South (Town), 2013 NLCA 10, 334 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 325 Langor v. Spurrell (1997), (NL CA), 157 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 301 (Nfld.

C.A.) United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1252 v. Cashin et al. (1994), (NL CA), 124 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 201 (Nfld.C.A.) Anstey v. St. John’s (City), 2014 NLCA 35, 356 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 117 Dalley v. Northern Arm (Town), 2016 NLTD(G) 68 Marco Ltd. v. Newfoundland Processing Ltd. (1995), (NL SC), 130 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 317 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) Hrnyiak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 Counsel: Appearing on his own behalf, the appellant; Peter N. Browne Q.C., for the respondent. This application was heard on October 18, 2016 before Green C.J.N.L.

The following judgment was delivered on October 26, 2016 by Green C.J.N.L. ______________________________________________________________

Green C.J.N.L.: [ 1 ] This is an application by the intended appellant, Justin Elliott Young, requesting leave of the Chief Justice, pursuant to rule 57.31(4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986 , to allow an application for leave to appeal, which has been earlier dismissed by Welsh J.A. in an oral decision, to be reheard by a panel of three judges. [ 2 ] Since the filing of this application, rule 57 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986 (the “former rules”) was replaced with a new set of rules, cited as the Court of Appeal Rules , NLR 38/16 (the “new rules”) which came into effect on October 17, 2016, the day before the hearing of the application.

Rule 31(2) of the new rules continues the former procedure under rule 57.31(4) of the former rules requiring leave of the Chief Justice for the rehearing of a single-judge decision by a panel of the Court (with the one exception that such an application must be brought within 15 days of the making of the original order). This Court’s jurisprudence on the application of the former rule therefore continues to be relevant on this issue under the new regime. [ 3 ] That jurisprudence can be summarized as follows.

The discretion which the Chief Justice may exercise to allow a re-hearing by a panel of three in relation to a matter already decided by a single judge under s. 10 of the Judicature Act , RSNL 1990, c. J-4 is not open- ended. It must be exercised on the basis of proper principle. There must be “some good reason for requiring the parties to suffer the delay and expense that would inevitably be associated with re-arguing a matter that has already been decided” ( Stacey v. Stacey , 2009 NLCA 50 , 289 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 180 at paragraph 21 ). There is a rebuttable presumption that the original decision was correct.

The party seeking re-hearing has the burden of raising questions as to the correctness of the original decision or must point to some other good reason as justification for having the issue re- examined ( White v. Conception Bay South (Town) , 2013 NLCA 10 , 334 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 325 at paragraph 4 ). Impact of Changes in Leave-to-appeal requirements on this re-hearing application [ 4 ] The new rules made a fundamental change in the requirement for leave to appeal interlocutory orders. Now, orders in “uncompleted matters” (as interlocutory matters are now called) may be appealed as of right.

However, under rule 35, the responding party may apply, following the filing of the appeal, to have the notice of appeal struck on the basis that “the appeal should not proceed until the matter has been completed” because of prejudice to a party, or delay, inconvenience or inefficient use of judicial resources would result or there is other good reason for delaying the appeal until the matter is completed. [ 5 ] Thus, if the original application for leave to appeal the interlocutory order in question had arisen after October 17, 2016, the intended appellant would have had the right to file a notice of appeal without seeking leave and it would have been up to the intended respondent to make application to strike the notice of appeal if she felt the appeal should not be heard until after the matter in the Trial Division was completed.

Otherwise, the appeal would proceed in this Court. [ 6 ] Notwithstanding this, I do not believe it affects the current application for a re-hearing. The focus on such an application, as the

summary of the case law above indicates, is on whether questions have been raised as to the correctness of the original decision on the leave issue or there is some other good reason justifying reconsideration. This focus must be at the time of the original decision: is there anything to indicate that the single judge, applying the law as it stood then, may not be correct. [ 7 ] In approaching the request for a re-hearing by a panel, therefore, I must apply the law as it existed at that time. If I were to decide that reconsideration was not warranted, that would be the end of the matter.

If, on the other hand, I were to decide to allow the matter to be re-heard it would be up to the panel hearing the matter to determine, applying the transitional provisions in rule 60 of the new rules, whether to apply, on the question of leave, the old law requiring leave or to apply the new law which would allow (in the absence of an application by the other party under rule 35 to strike the notice of appeal) an appeal as of right.

This second option would, in theory, be open to the panel because a re-hearing by a panel of three involves a reconsideration de novo and is not an appeal from the original single-judge decision.

Arguably, therefore, the re-hearing on the merits could take place on the basis of the new legal regime. (I make no definitive pronouncement on this issue because that would be a matter for any resulting panel to decide, if a re-hearing were ordered). [ 8 ] I will therefore proceed to deal with the application for a re-hearing without reference to the fact that the procedure respecting leave in uncompleted matters has changed. History [ 9 ] Mr. Young sued the intended respondent, Sarah Noble, for the tort of false imprisonment. Ms. Noble made application for a

summary trial of the issue. Mr. Young claimed that on the day of the application, he was directed to the wrong court room and an order for

summary trial was made in his absence. Mr. Young then obtained a postponement of the

summary trial itself to enable him to appeal the

summary trial order. On application for leave to appeal in this Court, Barry J.A. granted leave to appeal [1] but declared the proposed appeal to be moot in view of the postponement of the trial that had been given in the Trial Division. He remitted the matter to the Trial Division, ordered that the matter proceed to case management and gave leave to Ms. Noble to “issue, or re-issue the existing” application for

summary trial. I interpret this last part of the order as requiring the application for

summary trial, including the question whether it was appropriate to proceed by way of

summary trial, be re-addressed in the Trial Division, before the disposition on the merits could occur. [ 10 ] Mr. Young says that, back in the Trial Division, after a number of false starts, a new date to hear the

summary trial application was set by Butler J. in December 2015. It was ultimately postponed. At a case management meeting on February 16, 2016, Mr. Young says that counsel for Ms. Noble incorrectly represented to the case management judge that the hearing that had been set by Butler J. was for an actual

summary trial and not merely an application to decide whether a

summary trial was the appropriate procedure to use. As a result, Mr. Young says, the matter was set for “a bifurcated”

summary trial, i.e. a hearing that would proceed in two stages, the first involving a determination as to whether the issues were appropriate to be dealt with by

summary trial as opposed to a full traditional trial, followed by a second subsequent hearing (if

summary trial was decided at the first hearing

to be appropriate) to decide the merits of the dispute.[2] [11] When the matter came before Faour J. on May 30, 2016, he heard the parties on the issue of whether it was appropriate toproceed by way of

summary trial and found in favour of doing so. He also set a case management meeting for July 7 at which time adate could be set for the

summary trial on the merits. (I was told during the re-hearing application that a date for the actual

summarytrial had in fact not yet been set). The Application for Leave to Appeal [12] Mr. Young then applied for leave to appeal Faour J.’s order in this Court. Although not described in this way in his applicationfor leave to appeal or in his written argument, his complaints with Faour J.’s order can be summarized as follows: (

i) Ms. Noble did not give any notice of a new application for a

summary trial in accordance with Barry J.A.’s order (I takefrom this assertion that what Mr. Young is saying is that since Ms. Noble did not comply with Barry’s order that she “issue a new or re-issue the existing” application but that it was ordered to be proceeded with informally (and presumably inadequately) through casemanagement, Faour J. had no authority to decide the issue of the appropriateness of the

summary trial procedure and should not havedone so); (ii) No proper application to determine the appropriateness of a

summary trial occurred and the issue was therefore not properlycanvassed; (iii) Faour J. improperly “bifurcated” the

summary trial into two hearings contrary to existing case law. In this regard he relieson the Trial Division decision in Murphy v. Crosshair Exploration and Mining Corp., 2010 NLTD 176 , 2010 NLTD (G) 176,308 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 157 which he says stands for the proposition that the threshold question of whether it is appropriate to proceed byway of

summary trial must be dealt with as part of the

summary trial on the merits, and not as a preliminary application. [13] Welsh J.A. denied the application for leave. The essence of her decision is reflected in the following passages from the transcriptof the hearing: So, I would not grant leave today because there’s no basis for granting leave. You need to finish in the trial division what you started inthe trial division.

When that’s finished, … you may say, “Well, I don’t agree with that”, that’s fine … then you can come to this Court,but you should not be coming to this court, back and forth, because the judge sets a date or the judge decides you’re going to proceed in aparticular way … So, the difficulty you have is you must not … come back to this Court until you have a decision and then if you are unsatisfied you cancome back … All right so, Mr.

Young, I hope you understand now what I was trying to say is that all the procedural things they get finished next doorat the trial division … When you’ve got a final decision, if you’re not satisfied then you come to this Court. Wait till you have a finaldecision. The Application for Reconsideration [14] In support of his request for a re-hearing, Mr. Young claims that: (

a) at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal before Welsh J.A., he was not given the opportunity to make his argument insupport of his application for leave before being told that leave would not be granted and that he should only seek to appeal if he wasdissatisfied with the final decision following the

summary trial; (

b) the arguments he had made in support of his application for leave were not dealt with; (

c) the decision of Welsh J.A. was not made on proper principles. (

d) the effect of Welsh J.A.’s decision was to bar him from making any further appeal or application for leave to appeal from anyother order made in the Trial Division before a final decision has been made on the ultimate issue in the litigation. [15] Mr. Young also submits that the procedure adopted by the Trial Division subsequent to Barry J.A.’s order was wrong becausehis order contemplated that Ms. Noble would make a new application for a

summary trial, whereas all that was done was to treat theprevious

summary trial application is still existing. This argument is not sustainable in light of the wording of the order that Ms. Noblecould issue a new, “or re-issue the existing” application. While the language is clumsy, the clear intent is that a new document did nothave to be filed but the application could be re-initiated using existing materials. This was effectively done. I see no substance in thisargument.

Considerations [16] Although Mr. Young says he did not have a proper opportunity to present his arguments in support of leave at the originalhearing, I listened to and considered the arguments he said he would have made had he been given the opportunity. They were,essentially, that: (

a) Faour J. should not have set a hearing for determination of the appropriateness of holding a

summary trial until Ms. Noblehad re-issued a new, or re-issued the existing, application; (

b) The hearing on the appropriateness issue is intimately intertwined with the hearing on the merits and, therefore, both mattershave to be heard and dealt with together. [17] In telling Mr. Young that he should wait until a final decision is reached on the merits of his claim in the Trial Division beforelaunching an appeal in this Court, Welsh J.A. was expressing the longstanding policy of this Court of “fostering avoidance of trial delay”that would unduly hinder timely progress of an action, by limiting the circumstances when appeals of pre-trial or intra-trial rulingsshould be considered (Langor v.

Spurrell (1997), (NL CA), 157 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 301 (NF CA) at paragraph 19). While the language she used was couched in terms perhaps more understandable by persons untrained in the law (because Mr. Youngwas unrepresented), she was effectively stating that interlocutory decisions that have no final effect on the merits of the decision shouldgenerally not be appealable before the end of the trial.

An appeal, particularly in relation to purely procedural and trial organizationalmatters, is the exception rather than the rule. [18] The policy was expressed this way by Marshall J.A. in United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1252 v.

Cashin et al (1994), (NL CA), 124 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 201 (NFCA) at p. 209: If decisions taken in the process of trial were appealable as a matter of right, litigation might never be brought to completion and disputescould be interminably protracted as trial courts waited on outcomes of appeals. [19] For the same reasons, the policy applies not only to mid-trial rulings but also to pre-trial decisions that are not final in nature, aswell.

In Langor, I observed: [15] While orders made in the course of trial are perhaps the paradigm case justifying a limit on appeals because of the delays andinterruptions in the trial process that they would engender, appeals of pre-trial procedural orders can also be productive of mischief byunduly delaying a case getting to trial.

The policy underlying the leave requirement applies to such situations as well. [20] There therefore has to be good reason to allow the procedural flow of pre-trial and trial proceedings to be interrupted by an interlocutory appeal.[3] The reasons were generally reflected in the list contained in rule 57.02(4) of the former rules, although the Courtretained a discretion to grant leave in any case: rule 57(6). As well, even if the case could be brought within one or more of theconsiderations in the list in rule 57.02(4), that does not mean that there would be an automatic ticket to leave being granted.

The Courtcould still refuse leave if it was of the view that the underlying policy of “fostering avoidance of trial delay” should prevail. Thedetermination of leave is very much a discretionary decision to be determined according to principle in relation to the specificcircumstances of the individual case. [21] In this case, Mr. Young addressed the potential grounds for granting leave in his written argument: Memorandum of Argument ofIntended Appellant, paragraphs 60–79. He says, however, that the way the oral hearing unfolded he did not get an opportunity to presenthis arguments in Court.

It is true that Welsh J.A. opened the hearing with a general description of the policy of not granting leave ininterlocutory matters until a final decision was obtained and made it clear that she thought Mr. Young should complete the procedures inthe Trial Division before seeking to appeal, but having done so, she stated: “Now, by having told you that, is there anything you want tosay?” At that point, Mr.

Young had the opportunity to make any further submissions as to why there should be an exception to the policyin this case and why leave should nevertheless be granted. [22] It cannot be said that Welsh J.A. did not consider whether any of the justifications for granting leave applied to Mr. Young’scase. They were all addressed in Mr. Young’s written argument. As noted by this Court in Anstey v. St.

John’s (City), 2014 NLCA 35,356 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 117 at paragraph 50 there is a “presumption that a judge will properly prepare for a hearing by reading the relevantmaterial.” From the way in which Welsh J.A. dealt with the matter and expressed herself, it is in any event obvious that she understoodthe nature of the case and the issues involved. Furthermore, there was nothing in Mr. Young’s submissions to me that would indicateanything to the contrary. [23] Mr. Young appears to have several principal concerns.

His first concern appears to be that he wished to have a full opportunity tooppose the notion that his claim for false imprisonment can be dealt with by way of a

summary trial instead of a full traditional trial,something he was apparently denied initially when the decision to proceed to

summary trial was made in his absence. That was rectifiedby the previous order of Barry J.A. in this Court. He therefore has achieved his goal of being heard on the threshold question of whetherthe case is appropriate for

summary adjudication. That matter was dealt with by Faour J. on May 30. [24] His second concern flows from the first. He also says that the procedure adopted to deal with the preliminary appropriatenessissue was flawed. As noted, he is of the view that the preliminary issue and the merits issue should be dealt with together. He relies onthe Murphy decision for this proposition. In his written materials and at the re-hearing application, however, he acknowledged that othercase law - Dalley v.

Northern Arm (Town), 2016 NLTD(G) 68 - recognizes that the preliminary issue of appropriateness can be dealtwith ahead of the hearing on the merits. He does say, however, that the fact that there are conflicting decisions on the point should be ajustification for granting him leave to appeal under rule 57.02(4)(

a) of the former rules. [25] As indicated above, however, the fact that one or more of the factors listed in rule 57.02(4) might be engaged does not give anautomatic ticket to leave being granted. The judge hearing the leave application must consider all circumstances in the context of the

fundamental policy of not fostering trial delay. In the current case, it was obvious from the tenor of Welsh J.A.’s remarks that she was ofthe view that, considered collectively, the asserted justifications for granting leave, as asserted in Mr. Young’s written argument(including the one previously discussed, above) were overbalanced by the general policy. I see no indication of a possible error inprinciple in the original decision in this regard. [26] I would also observe that the weight of authority is in favour of allowing a bifurcation of the appropriateness and merits issues, atleast in some circumstances.

In any event, I do not read Murphy as determining that in all cases there can never be a preliminary hearing.That would be counterproductive to the policy of conducting hearings in the most efficient and cost-effective way. As Dalley indicates,the decision in Marco Ltd. v. Newfoundland Processing Ltd. (1995), (NL SC), 130 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 317 (Nfld.S.C.T.D.) – which is a decision that is frequently cited and relied on in discussions of

summary trial law – implicitly recognizes that athreshold question can be dealt with in advance of any hearing on the merits. In fact in another Marco decision, this is explicitlyrecognized and asserted: Marco Ltd. v. Newfoundland Processing Ltd. (1995), (NL SC), 130 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 308(Nfld. S.C.T.D.) at paragraph 5. [27] It is important to appreciate, however, that the threshold question that can, on these authorities, be determined in advance of thesummary trial proper is truly a threshold question directed to determine whether, on the matters raised in the application, the caseappears to fall within the

summary trial rule, whether the applicant has provided some evidentiary basis for the assertions made andwhether the nature of the case is such that it is potentially capable of being dealt with in the attenuated manner contemplated by asummary trial, bearing in mind the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hrnyiak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87about the salutary uses of such a procedure to ensure access to justice in appropriate cases. [28] Such a threshold question is distinct from another similar question that may arise in the course of the

summary trial itself:whether, even if the applicant fails to establish that there is no genuine issue for trial, the court should, nevertheless, on the

summarytrial record, determine the legal and factual issues that have been raised. That requires a determination, within the language of rule17A.03(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986, whether the judge “is unable on the whole of the evidence before the Court … tofind the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact or law” and whether “it would be unjust to decide the issues” by way of

summarytrial. Even though a judge may have decided, on a preliminary threshold screening as described above, that the

summary trial procedureshould be proceeded with, this latter inquiry is, of necessity, still at large and may have to be addressed and dealt with at the

summarytrial hearing itself. [29] Applied to the current case, this means that although, as a result of Faour J.’s determination, the matter is to proceed to asummary trial hearing, Mr. Young may still have to address the sufficiency of the trial record issue and whether it would be unjust todetermine the case on the basis of that record in the event the court were to determine that there is in fact a genuine issue for trial. [30] A further concern of Mr. Young is that, he says, Welsh J.A.’s order effectively barred him from appealing any otherinterlocutory orders before the end of the trial.

He indicated in his argument that this was a matter of concern for him since, for example,he was concerned about whether he would be prejudiced if he did not forthwith appeal another decision of Faour J. refusing to recusehimself from the case. He is of the view that the effect of Welsh J.A.’s order is to bar him from any other attempted appeal of an issue(such as recusal) that might arise during the continuation of the

summary trial proceeding. This, he says, is a denial of justice. [31] I do not read Welsh J.A.’s order in the all-encompassing manner that Mr. Young does. Generally, a potential litigant cannot bebarred from or controlled in his or her access to the court unless he is abusing the process or has been declared a vexatious litigant.Neither of these findings were made by Welsh J.A. While it is true that her remarks in Court were expressed in very general terms, theywere directed to explaining why it was not appropriate for Mr. Young to be granted leave to appeal in the current case.

They were notspecifically directed to making a formal order preventing him from coming back in any other conceivable circumstance. Her remarkscan, and should be regarded is simply indicating to Mr. Young that any attempt at appeal of an interlocutory order has a high burden tomeet before leave will be granted and that Mr. Young’s focus should be on dealing with the merits of the claim in the Trial Division. [32] To clarify the matter for Mr. Young, I am prepared to declare that, inasmuch as he has not been declared to have abused theCourt process and has not been declared a vexatious litigant, Mr.

Young is not presently barred from making further appropriateapplications or appeals to the Court in relation to other matters arising in the course of the

summary trial. Any such applications orappeals will, of course, be subject to the applicable procedural law and the rules of court, in particular rule 35 and will also be subject –as would any case - to having costs awarded against him if the Court were to consider any such appeals to have been inappropriatelybrought.

Summary and Conclusion [33] In

summary, looked at broadly, the matter which Mr. Young wishes to appeal is strictly a logistical procedural one which is thesort of matter that should generally be left to the trial court to determine pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction to manage and organize aclaim for adjudication. The arguments in favour of granting leave were not so compelling as to suggest that there was anything incorrectin the initial decision denying leave. There is nothing in the record to indicate a sufficient degree of doubt as to the correctness of theresult that would justify a re-hearing.

Furthermore, there is no other good reason to justify a re-hearing in the current circumstances.While I recognize Mr.

Young’s concern about the scope of the order that was made, insofar as it might, in his view, be construed asbarring him from further access to the Court of Appeal, there is no need for a re-hearing to deal with that matter, as I have clarified thelimits to the scope of the order that of necessity must be the case when it is considered against the backdrop of the general principle ofaccess to the Court in the absence of any finding of abuse of process or vexatious litigation. [34] Accordingly, I must deny the application for re-hearing. There should be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.