2016 QCCA 1086, 2016 QCCA 1086

Fraternité des policiers et policières de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu inc.c. St-Jean-sur-Richelieu (Ville de) (QC CA), 2016 QCCA1086COURT OF APPEAL CANADAPROVINCE OF QUEBECREGISTRY OF MONTREAL NO.: 500-09-024635-146(755-17-001765-133) DATE: June 23, 2016 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. ROBERT M. MAINVILLE, J.A. ÉTIENNE PARENT, J.A. FRATERNITÉ DES POLICIERS ET POLICIÈRES DE SAINT-JEAN-SUR-RICHELIEU INC.APPELLANT – Impleaded partyv.

VILLE DE SAINT-JEAN-SUR-RICHELIEURESPONDENT – ApplicantandPIERRE LAPLANTE, in his capacity as grievance arbitratorIMPLEADED PARTY - Defendant JUDGMENT [1] The appellant Fraternité des policiers et policières de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu inc. appeals from a judgment of the SuperiorCourt, District of Iberville (the Honourable Madam Justice Nicole-M.

Gibeau), rendered on July 2, 2014, that granted the application forjudicial review of the respondent Ville de St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, reversed the arbitral award of the impleaded party Pierre Laplante, andupheld the disciplinary sanction of suspension without pay and dismissal of Robert St-Martin the respondent imposed on March 3, 2008. [2] For the reasons of Hilton, J.A., with which Mainville and Parent, JJ.A. agree, THE COURT: [3] DISMISSES the appeal, with legal costs. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. ROBERT M. MAINVILLE, J.A. ÉTIENNE PARENT, J.A.

Mtre Serge GagnéRoy, Bélanger, Dupras, attorneysFor the appellant Mtre Richard CoutuMtre Pierre-Alexandre BoucherBélanger, SauvéFor the respondent Date of hearing: February 24, 2016

REASONS OF HILTON, J.A. I INTRODUCTION [ 4 ] With leave from a judge of this Court, [1] the appellant Fraternité des policiers et policières de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court rendered on July 2, 2014, by the Honourable Madam Justice Nicole-M. Gibeau granting the application for judicial review of the respondent Ville de St-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

The judgment under appeal reversed the arbitral decision rendered by the impleaded party Pierre Laplante on May 17, 2013, setting aside the March 3, 2008, dismissal of Robert St-Martin, a captain on the City’s police force, and restoring his dismissal. [2] [ 5 ] The grounds for dismissal invoked by the City are connected with allegations of harassment, one of which was sexual in nature, against two civilian employees, the improper use of a police vehicle for personal reasons, wasting time at work, insubordination and, most important, the use of the Centre de renseignements policiers du Québec (commonly known as the “CRPQ”) for personal purposes on at least 54 occasions between 2002 and 2006. [ 6 ] The letter from the interim director of the police force informing St-Martin of his dismissal provides a detailed list of the allegations against him, then summarizes the grounds as follows: [ translation ] Therefore, by all of your actions, you have breached your employer’s trust and abused the autonomy you enjoyed as a result of your position.

This conduct, which includes harassment, insubordination, wasting time at work, and use of the C.R.P.Q. for personal purposes, has been ongoing, repeated, and systematic. Indeed, your many actions do not relate to a single incident but have taken place over several months or several years, thus increasing their seriousness. Moreover, the acts of harassment you committed against two employees were extremely serious, as were the 54 occasions you used the C.R.P.Q. to obtain confidential information about women with whom you had or wished to have an intimate relationship, even though you had received training.

What is more, you committed two acts of insubordination after you had already been assigned to desk duty. You have deliberately and repeatedly breached fundamental obligations in your employment contract, namely, loyalty, honesty and integrity. In view of the frequency and regularity of your actions and the great likelihood that you will reoffend, and in view of your high-level responsibilities when these breaches were committed, the faults you have committed are very serious and have breached the trust essential to maintaining the contractual relationship that bound you to the police force.

You have effectively undermined the trust that subordinates must have in their superiors, you have undermined the trust that citizens must have in police officers, and, as a senior officer of the police force, you have breached the trust that the force had in you. Moreover, you have greatly tarnished the image and effectiveness of the Service de police de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. You have provided no explanation or any other information that would enable me to reconsider this decision.

For all of these reasons, and in view of the fact that the police force must fulfil the mission conferred upon it by the Police Act , the Municipal Council adopted resolution number CE-2008-02-0090 on February 28, 2008, dismissing you. You will find a copy of this resolution attached. Any and all amounts you may be due on that day will be paid to you shortly. [ 7 ] The impugned judgment substituted the dismissal with a 23-month suspension and a retroactive demotion from the rank of captain to constable, and ordered the City to compensate Mr.

St-Martin for any and all amounts and benefits lost from the date of the end of the 23-month suspension to the date of his reinstatement as a constable. In the arbitrator’s opinion, the City was wrong in considering that all the faults listed in the letter of dismissal on March 3, 2008, [ translation ] “... were proved and that together they constituted a single gross fault, an irreparable gross fault, a gross fault permanently breaching the fundamental relationship of trust”.

That is why the arbitrator analyzed each fault individually and imposed a sanction only for those that were proved on a balance of probabilities. [3] [ 8 ] As stated in its application for leave before this Court, the Fraternité sought to reverse the judgment a quo and restore the arbitral award. Regardless of the outcome of the dispute, such a result is no longer possible in view of the other proceedings involving Mr. St-Martin since the City’s decision to dismiss him in March of 2008. [ 9 ] On February 2, 2012, in a highly detailed judgment, Provost, J. of the Court of Quebec convicted Mr.

St-Martin on eleven counts of having, in connection with his illegal use of the CRPQ, fraudulently and without colour of right obtained, directly or indirectly, a computer service, thereby contravening paragraph 342.1(1)(

a) Cr. C . [4] On April 4, in a judgment rendered from the bench that was not transcribed, the judge imposed a $200 fine and a victim surcharge on each of the counts. Mr. St-Martin filed an application for leave to appeal the conviction before this Court, but he discontinued it before it was adjudicated. [5] After the discontinuance, on June 13,

2013, the City dismissed Mr. St-Martin, pursuant to paragraph 2 of

section 119 of the Police Act , [6] which reads as follows: 119. Est automatiquement destitué tout policier ou constable spécial qui a été reconnu coupable, en quelque lieu que ce soit et par suite d’un jugement passé en force de chose jugée, d’un acte ou d’une omission visé au paragraphe 3° de l’article 115, poursuivable uniquement par voie de mise en accusation. Doit faire l'objet d’une sanction disciplinaire de destitution tout policier ou constable spécial qui a été reconnu coupable, en quelque lieu que ce soit et par suite d'un jugement passé en force de chose jugée, d'un tel acte ou d'une telle omission, poursuivable soit sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure

sommaire, soit par voie de mise en accusation, à moins qu'il ne démontre que des circonstances particulières justifient une autre sanction. 119. Any police officer or special constable who is found guilty, in any place, of

an act or omission referred to in subparagraph 3 of the first paragraph of

section 115 that is triable only on indictment, shall, once the judgment has become res judicata , be automatically dismissed. A disciplinary sanction of dismissal must, once the judgment concerned has become res judicata , be imposed on any police officer or special constable who is found guilty, in any place, of such

an act or omission punishable on

summary conviction or by indictment, unless the police officer or special constable shows that specific circumstances justify another sanction. [ 10 ] On January 21, 2014, following a citation filed by the police ethics commissioner, the Comité de déontologie policière dismissed Mr. St-Martin for breaching

section 7 of the Code of Ethics of Quebec police officers [7] by using the CRPQ on numerous occasions for personal purposes. [8] This provision reads as follows: 7. Le policier doit respecter l'autorité de la loi et des tribunaux et collaborer à l'administration de la justice. Notamment, le policier ne doit pas: 1° empêcher ou contribuer à empêcher la justice de suivre son cours; 2° cacher ou ne pas transmettre une preuve ou un renseignement dans le but de favoriser ou de nuire à une personne. 7.

A police officer must respect the authority of the law and of the courts and must collaborate in the administration of justice. A police officer must not: (1) prevent or contribute to preventing justice from taking its course; (2) conceal or fail to pass on evidence or information in order to benefit or harm any person. [ 11 ] On February 25, 2015, the Court of Quebec dismissed Mr. St-Martin’s appeal from that decision. [9] That judgment was final and without appeal, [10] and Mr. St-Martin did not challenge it by applying for judicial review. [ 12 ] Because the arbitrator’s order prevents Mr.

St-Martin from being reinstated as a police officer employed by the City, the Fraternité now asks the Court, should it decide to allow the appeal, to adopt the following conclusions in the formal order of its judgment: [translation] RESTORE the impleaded party defendant’s arbitral award of May 17, 2013, except for the order to reinstate the plaintiff as a police officer; ORDER the respondent to compensate the plaintiff Robert St-Martin for any and all benefits and amounts lost from the date of the end of the suspension imposed by arbitral award to the date of his dismissal on June 13, 2013. [ 13 ] The parties agree that the Court’s analysis must be limited to the facts giving rise to the City’s decision to dismiss Mr.

St- Martin on February 28, 2008, and to the merits of the Superior Court judgment as to the reasonableness of the impugned arbitral award, while taking no account of judgments in criminal and professional ethics cases, save with respect to its conclusions should the Court allow the Fraternité’s appeal. II THE FACTS AND THE ARBITRAL AWARD [ 14 ] Mr. St-Martin began his career as a police officer for the City in 1985. Until his dismissal in 2008, he was, by turns, a patrolling officer, a sergeant, a lieutenant, and, as of 2006, a captain.

Between 2003 and 2006, his employer’s overall evaluations indicate that his performance was [ translation ] “very satisfactory”. During the same period, he was awarded a Governor General’s Award in recognition of his 20 years of exemplary service.

[ 15 ] In July of 2007, the City decided to carry out a disciplinary investigation into Mr. St-Martin after being informed of harassment complaints from two civilian employees of the police force. When Mr. St-Martin returned from vacation the following month, he was told that he was under investigation. He was consequently relieved of his duties as captain and assigned to desk duty indefinitely. [ 16 ] On October 16, 2007, Mr.

St-Martin received a letter informing him that the investigation had revealed that he had committed several breaches of the Règlement sur la discipline des policiers du Service de police de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (by-law respecting the discipline of police officers in the Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu police force). A list of these breaches accompanied this letter.

A meeting was planned for October 31, 2007, to give him an opportunity to present his version of the facts, but it was ultimately postposed. [ 17 ] In view of the results of the final report of the disciplinary inquiry and an investigation report on his use of CRPQ data, Mr. St- Martin was suspended with pay on February 15, 2008. He was then once again invited to present his version of the facts before the interim director of the police department, Mario Rainville.

Essentially, he invoked his right to privacy, the falsity or vagueness of the allegations, and the prescription of the disciplinary charges against him. [ 18 ] On February 28, 2008, the City’s executive committee adopted a resolution dismissing Mr. St-Martin, and he was informed of this fact by the letter dated March 3, 2008. In the following days, the Fraternité filed two grievances. It contested Mr. St-Martin’s initial suspension with pay [11] and his dismissal.

The conclusion sought by the Fraternité was St-Martin’s retroactive reinstatement as captain. [12] [ 19 ] The arbitrator devoted 37 days to the grievance hearing between May of 2008 and September of 2012. In his 138-page decision rendered on May 17, 2013, [13] he analyzed the 6 complaints listed in the letter of March 3, 2008, each in turn. 1. Harassment complaint of civilian employee Caroline Goyette (

i) The facts [ 20 ] The arbitrator found that Mr. St-Martin [ translation ] had indeed “licked” Goyette’s ear outside a bar where she went late one evening in June of 2007 with a friend whose spouse was performing there as a singer. She met up with a group of people that included Mr. St-Martin, and during their conversation he referred to her ears several times. The incident giving rise to the harassment complaint occurred when Madam Goyette tried to re-enter the bar after stepping outside briefly with her friend. Mr.

St-Martin, who was also outside, prevented her from going back inside by blocking the door with his arm. When Madam Goyette turned around, she saw Mr. St- Martin was there. That was when he leaned towards her and licked her ear. [ 21 ] In her testimony, Madam Goyette acknowledged that Mr. St-Martin seemed to have been drinking, that he was [ translation ] “squinting” and [ translation ] “cross-eyed”. He tried to talk to her again that evening, but she did not answer him.

She attributed his actions to his consumption of alcohol and as a result thought she could forgive him, but nevertheless, before the arbitrator, she remarked that Mr. St-Martin was her superior. [ 22 ] The arbitrator stated that Mr. St-Martin’s conduct was clearly vexatious and unwanted. Nevertheless, he found that it was an isolated act that was not repeated and therefore did not qualify as harassment. This action also cannot be characterized as a single incident of serious misconduct constituting harassment. He therefore concluded that Mr.

St-Martin did not harass Madam Goyette. [ 23 ] He nevertheless characterized Mr. St-Martin’s conduct as an assault against Madam Goyette, adding that his action was [ translation ] “vulgar, disrespectful, insulting, and totally unacceptable”. The arbitrator was of the view that the fact that Mr. St-Martin had never admitted that his action was wrongful was not an aggravating factor given his state of intoxication. He also recognized that, as captain, Mr. St-Martin exercised a certain authority over Madam Goyette, which was an aggravating factor. [ 24 ] In short, the arbitrator concluded that Mr.

St-Martin’s conduct toward Madam Goyette, although regrettable, was not such as to discredit the police force in the eyes of the public, [ translation ] “however repugnant it may be”, essentially because the impact of this [ translation ] “perverted act” was limited to the police environment. (ii) The sanction [ 25 ] The arbitrator suspended Mr. St-Martin for four months, taking into account the fact that it did not amount to harassment as the City claimed, but nevertheless a fault that could not be excused by his drunkenness.

An aggravating factor was his high rank as captain and the need for the sanction to be exemplary, given his behaviour. 2. Harassment complaint of civilian employee Karine Boutin (

i) The facts [ 26 ] The arbitrator carried out a lengthy analysis of the allegations that Mr. St-Martin’s psychologically harassed Madam Boutin in some of their exchanges relating to her private life after she had recently broken up with a romantic partner. He took note of the fact that the two crossed paths socially from time to time, and found that Madam Boutin’s characterization of Mr. St-Martin’s conduct as harassment was [ translation ] “excessive”. He recognized, however, that Mr.

St-Martin should not have taken time away from work, to the detriment of his duties as captain, to engage in certain personal conversations with Madam Boutin, which the arbitrator characterized as a [ translation ] “lesser and included fault” in harassment. (ii) The sanction [ 27 ] After deciding that the City had no grounds to characterize the incidents involving Madam Boutin as harassment, the arbitrator nevertheless suspended Mr. St-Martin for one month for having [ translation ] “hindered” Madam Boutin’s work and for having [ translation ] “taken care of personal business on work time”.

3. Breaches relating to the use of a police vehicle (

i) The facts [ 28 ] Mr. St-Martin was alleged to have committed three types of acts, which took place between the evening of June 24 and the morning of June 25, 2007. [ 29 ] First, the arbitrator concluded that the City was wrong in claiming that Mr. St-Martin had not told the director of the police force why he wanted to borrow an undercover car for a weekend and that his use of the vehicle failed to comply with the restrictions the director had communicated to him verbally. [ 30 ] Then, the arbitrator rejected the City’s allegations whereby Mr.

St-Martin used the unmarked vehicle to unsafely intercept the vehicle of his former spouse, Geneviève Caron. [ 31 ] Finally, although the evidence does not establish that Mr.

St-Martin drove while intoxicated, he nevertheless drove the police force vehicle on two occasions very shortly after consuming alcoholic beverages, which constitutes [ translation ] “conduct likely to cause loss of the trust and consideration required for the rank of police captain, as well as conduct undermining the effectiveness and prestige of the City’s police force ...”. (ii) The sanction [ 32 ] The arbitrator found that the only allegation that was established – the fact that St-Martin drank alcoholic beverages while he was responsible for a police vehicle and drove said vehicle – was aggravated by the fact that he was a highly ranked member of the police force.

He suspended him for one month. 4. Waste and theft of time at work (

i) The facts [ 33 ] The Cty makes five allegations against Mr. St-Martin in connection with wasting time at work. The arbitrator accepted four in whole or in part.

They are: • improper use of telephones for personal purposes, regarding which he received a verbal warning in 2006 and a written warning in 2007; • improper use of an unknown number of emails for personal purposes, both before and after a guideline from the employer on May 2, 2007, that [ translation ] “all of the police force’s computer equipment may be used for work purposes only”; [14] • frequent, pointless and unjustifiable early-morning trips in a police vehicle during working hours to a location a good distance from his work place to visit his girlfriend, between March and June of 2007; • unjustified claim of overtime when Mr.

St-Martin was using many working hours for personal purposes. [ 34 ] Regarding the alleged theft of time, the arbitrator was of the view that this was never Mr. St-Martin’s intent. He was nevertheless harsh in describing Mr. St-Martin’s attitude towards his duties as police captain: [ translation ] [336] Instead, the evidence reveals carelessness and misconduct on the part of the complainant in the use of his time at work. The complainant did whatever he felt like doing at any given time, whether or not he was at work.

The facts related to this carelessness and misconduct lead us to find that the complainant [ translation ] “wasted” a lot of work time on numerous occasions, and that he did so for personal reasons. In other words, the evidence reveals a certain aspect of the complainant that I might characterize as [ translation ] “I don’t really care”. [337] From the evidence emerges an overall portrait revealing that it made little difference whether the complainant was at work or not. He was a police captain and he enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.

He did what he wanted, regardless of time of day or his daily responsibilities. (ii) The sanction [ 35 ] The arbitrator suspended him for one month for each of the four allegations listed in paragraph [33]. Despite his harsh comments reproduced above, he imposed no sanction for theft of time. 5. Use of the CRPQ for personal purposes (

i) The facts [ 36 ] Before embarking on a detailed analysis of Mr. St-Martin’s conduct in this respect, the arbitrator very clearly explained the purpose of the CRPQ, the nature of the information it contains, the circumstances authorizing access, and the training that police officers receive on its use, [15] which Mr. St-Martin acknowledges having received: [ translation ]

[341] The Centre de renseignements policiers du Québec, more commonly known as the “CRPQ”, is essentially a huge network of interconnected computer databases where all authorized police officers in Quebec can obtain a great deal of personal information about citizens. [342] In addition to its own databases, the CRPQ provides access to other databases, including those of the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), the National Crime Information Centre (NCIC), and the Société d'assurance automobile du Québec (SAAQ). [343] On the computer screens in their patrol cars, police officers can use a car’s licence plate number to access a large amount of information about citizens’ private lives.

Any patrol officer, for example, can look up a person’s address and age, whether he or she has ever committed any offences, whether he or she owns a firearm, and whether he or she has a criminal record, among other things. [344] The information in the CRPQ or that can be obtained through the CRPQ may be used only to support police investigations.

The collected and computerized data in the CRPQ must be used exclusively for law enforcement purposes. [345] In other words, the information in the CRPQ is confidential and may be used only for the purposes of preventing or suppressing crime. [346] More directly, it is strictly forbidden to obtain and use the information in the CRPQ for personal purposes. [347] These rules are clearly set out in the CRPQ policy and procedural manual, the contents of which are familiar to all Quebec police officers who are authorized to access the CRPQ. [348] Police officers receive specific training not only on how to use the CRPQ but also on the legality of accessing the information in the CRPQ network (FLAIR). [349] Incidentally, during training sessions, instructors emphasize the official prohibition against using CRPQ data for personal purposes. [350] On May 25, 2004, the complainant took the FLAIR training. [351] In addition, in his testimony, the complainant admitted that he knew that he was prohibited from using the CRPQ for personal purposes. [352] Finally, it is important to know that when a request is made to the CRPQ, a warning appears on the user’s computer screen.

This warning informs the police officer-user that the information obtained from the CRPQ is confidential and that it may be used only for law enforcement purposes in the context of police work. [353] This warning also clearly states that any police officer who breaches the above rule is liable to disciplinary measures. [354] In short, all steps are taken to guarantee that the right of citizens to privacy in a democratic society will be respected. [355] A panoply of mechanisms has been created to ensure secure access to the CRPQ. All police officer-users have their own identification codes and passwords.

All police officer-users must identify themselves with their code and password if they want to sign in to the CRPQ. [356] The complainant had his own access code and password. [ 37 ] In Mr. St-Martin’s case, the arbitrator found that, according to the evidence adduced, he consulted the CRPQ illegally for purposes that he characterized as [ translation ] “strictly personal” on 70 occasions to look up 10 different individuals. He then went on to describe the nature of these illegal consultations. (

A) Mireille Beaubien [ 38 ] Mr. Saint-Martin admits that he used the database on 10 occasions between 2002 and 2006 to look up Madam Beaubien, whom he dated from 1980 to 1984, to satisfy his [ translation ] “personal curiosity”. The arbitrator characterized the [ translation ] “uncontrollable urge” given as a reason as [ translation ] “highly unlikely” and [ translation ] “not very credible”. (

B) Stéphanie Dumais Rousseau [ 39 ] Mr. St-Martin admits to accessing the CRPQ twice in February of 2003 to look up Madam Dumais Rousseau, a dispatcher at the police station who was also a neighbour. The arbitrator found that the reason Mr. St-Martin provided for these consultations – specifically, that he saw her illegally park close to a mailbox to pick up her mail – was [ translation ] “implausible”. This consultation took place at the same time as Madam Dumais Rousseau’s interview for the position of police dispatcher.

In the arbitrator’s opinion, it would have been simpler and more effective to intervene immediately if Madam Dumais Rousseau had in fact parked illegally. In the circumstances, it was pointless to consult the CRPQ. (

C) Julie Boutin [ 40 ] The situation involving Madam Boutin, a police officer for the City between 1995 and 1997 who dated Mr. St-Martin in 1996, is similar to that involving Madam Beaubien. Motivated by [translation] “mere personal curiosity”, Mr. St-Martin looked her up three times, in January and May of 2004. At the time, Madam Boutin was living in Montreal and had not seen Mr. St-Martin since the summer of 1998. The arbitrator had [ translation ] “trouble following” the reasoning Mr. St-Martin provided. (

D) Geneviève Caron

[ 41 ] Madam Caron was a civilian employee at the police station and dated Mr. St-Martin for about two years starting in 2004. Between March and September of 2004, he looked her up illegally eight times, a fact that he also shared with her. Although he admitted making these illegal consultations in his testimony, he justified them as motivated by [ translation ] “excitement at the beginning of his romantic relationship” with Madam Caron. The arbitrator characterized this reason as [ translation ] “disconcerting”, coming as it did from a highly ranked member of the police force. (

E) Mtre Évelyne Bilodeau [ 42 ] Between 1999 and 2004, Mtre Bilodeau was Mr. St-Martin’s spouse, and the evidence reveals that he looked her up three times during that period. He admits doing so only once and that it was for law enforcement purposes, to determine whether she had a driver’s licence because he knew that shortly before he carried out that consultation, she did not have one. The arbitrator was of the opinion that he had [ translation ] “no reason” to look up Mtre Bilodeau. (

F) Annick Sénécal [ 43 ] Madam Sénécal was an employee at the police station and a friend of Madam Caron’s. While Madam Caron and Mr. St-Martin were dating, the three of them saw each other regularly at a bar. During the summer of 2004, Mr. St-Martin looked up Madam Sénécal eight times. He remembers doing so only once: when he saw her, as he said, [ translation ] “run a stop sign” and he wanted to make sure that her SAAQ file was [ translation ] “in order”. [ 44 ] The arbitrator did not believe him at all. He explained why, in terms that assigned no credibility to Mr.

St-Martin: [ translation ] 6.6- The complainant’s justification does not stand up to scrutiny. Aside from the contradictions about whether or not there is a mandatory stop on Grand Bernier road, which is allegedly at the origin of the complainant’s CRPQ consultation on Madam Sénécal, and aside from the other contradictions about whether or not a post-offence telephone conversation took place on Grand Bernier road, why are there two different dates, more than a week apart, between the two series of consultations?

If Madam Sénécal violated the Highway Safety Code, why did the complainant not give her a ticket or at least a warning? Why carry out these consultations, in absolute secrecy? There is no explanation to answer these questions. (

G) Stéphanie Massé [ 45 ] Madam Massé was a career counsellor who met Mr. St-Martin in a non-work situation in 1996. The following week, Mr. St- Martin went to meet her in a police vehicle and showed her a photo of herself that was taken upon her arrest for impairment a few years earlier. He had obtained the photo from the police station archives. They did not see each other often after that, and have not seen each other at all since 1999. [ 46 ] Nevertheless, Mr.

St-Martin looked Madam Massé up no fewer than nine times on November 6, 2006, [ translation ] “out of mere curiosity”, according to his own explanation. The arbitrator recognized that this conduct was inappropriate, and added: [ translation ] That being said, and in addition, it is utterly inconceivable for a highly ranked police officer to appropriate part of the contents of his police station’s archives to benefit from them personally. (

H) Sylvie Pinard [ 47 ] Madam Pinard did not know Mr. St-Martin but had smiled at him during a softball game she attended in August of 1995, in which her husband was playing. Madam Pinard wanted to be sociable, as she was with the other people she met during these games. A few days later, knowing that her husband would be absent, Mr. St-Martin called her at home to ask her what her smile meant. He had gotten her telephone number from the CRPQ. Mr. St-Martin had no other reason to access the CRPQ and has offered no justification for this illegal consultation. (

I) The St-Martin family [ 48 ] Mr. St-Martin consulted the CRPQ eight times in October of 2003. He claims that he did so to look up the addresses of family members so he could mail them invitations to a party. He also looked up several other members of his family in October of 2003, February of 2004, and January of 2006. There is no explanation for these consultations. (

J) Personal consultations [ 49 ] The evidence reveals that Mr. St-Martin looked himself up 15 times between January of 2003 and January of 2007, but he admits to effecting only 4 of these consultations and casts doubt on the 11 other occasions.

He explains that he simply wanted to make sure that his file was [ translation ] “valid”, in particular with respect to the payment of his driver’s licence and registration. ************* [ 50 ] Concluding on this aspect of the file, the arbitrator stated the following: [ translation ] [365] The overall picture is damning. [370] Some 70 illegal consultations spread out over 4 of the only 5 years that were accessible to SQ Investigator Côté. That is a high

number of illegal consultations by a person who represents [ translation ] “the law” in the eyes not only of the public – which in fact includes the persons who were illegally looked up – but also all the police officers under the responsibility and leadership of their captain. [367] The long period of time over which the complainant committed the offences relating to the CRPQ obviously prevents the arbitration tribunal from seeing his actions as an isolated fault or a momentary weakness. (ii) The sanction [ 51 ] First, the arbitrator reviewed arbitration cases sanctioning the same type of offence as the one before him.

This case law revealed minimal sanctions for minor illegal consultations, as well as the ultimate sanction of dismissal in a case where the information thus obtained by a police department employee who made 288 illegal consultations was used to sexually harass a woman. [ 52 ] As aggravating factors, the arbitrator took into account the fact that Mr. St-Martin was a superior officer with the rank of captain, that he tried to minimize the impact of his actions, and that his explanations were nonsensical.

The extended period of time during which he acted this way also shows that these were not isolated incidents. [ 53 ] The arbitrator was particularly harsh when commenting on the impact of Mr. St-Martin’s call to Madam Pinard [16] after he obtained her telephone number by illegally consulting the CRPQ: [ translation ] [462] ... This victim, confronted with a sudden, rude and senseless intrusion into her private life, was plunged into a situation that caused a great disruption in her marital relationship in a way that is not necessary to relate in detail.

In short, in her testimony, Pinard ultimately expressed her total powerlessness at the time, faced as she was with such an unfair situation: [ translation ] “ How was I supposed to complain... who was I supposed to complain to? He was the police captain! ” [17] [ 54 ] Following the arbitration case law, the arbitrator accepted as a mitigating factor the fact that the illegally accessed information was not obtained for criminal purposes, to be transmitted to third parties, or to harm anyone.

These were offences committed while he was engaged in [ translation ] “puerile surfing”. [ 55 ] The sanction determined was therefore a 12-month suspension and a demotion from the rank of captain to constable. 6. Insubordination (

i) The facts [ 56 ] The city alleged that two incidents occurred, while the arbitrator accepted only one in part. [ 57 ] When Mr. St-Martin was relieved of his functions as captain on August 7, 2007, he was warned that he could no longer go to the dispatch area and ordered to refrain from contacting the two dispatchers, Caroline Goyette and Karine Boutin. On November 14, 2007, wishing to speak with a colleague, he opened the door to the reception area where he saw the colleague in question on the telephone. At the same time, he saw Madam Boutin, but he did not speak to her.

He waited a little while, but because his colleague continued talking on the phone, he closed the door and left the reception area. [ 58 ] The arbitrator found that Mr. St-Martin had no malicious intent. He had not wanted to talk to Madam Goyette or Madam Boutin. His intention to talk to his colleague was also legitimate.

Nevertheless, he breached the prohibition against going to the dispatch area. (ii) The sanction [ 59 ] In view of the fact that the prohibition had been communicated a short time before the violation, that the act was not malicious, and that it was an isolated incident, the arbitrator suspended him for one month. ************* [ 60 ] After adjudicating the allegations and determining the sanction for each one, the arbitrator reviewed Mr. St-Martin’s overall disciplinary situation as revealed by the evidence. [ 61 ] First, he emphasized Mr.

St-Martin’s status as captain in the police force, an institution he describes as a work environment that is crucial to society and one that entails a high level of responsibility and autonomy. This is why the arbitrator found that it was not possible for Mr. St-Martin to preserve his rank as captain or even lieutenant or sergeant: [ translation ] [475] A police captain is a highly ranked officer occupying a very important role in our society. He is a citizen invested with significant powers to ensure the safety of citizens and compliance with law and order.

He is in fact on the front lines in the maintenance of law and order. [476] By the very nature of his or her role, a police captain must set an example of integrity, dignity, civility, and good morals for all citizens. By the very nature of his or her role, a police captain must be a model of virtue, or very close thereto. [477] What is more, he or she must direct police officers and civilians under his or her authority, in particular by ensuring compliance with the guidelines and regulations that govern the police force.

[478] In my opinion, as of late February of 2008, once the investigation was complete, the complainant could no longer occupy the rank of police captain for the City of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, or even that of lieutenant or sergeant. [479] The complainant’s track record as police captain in recent years has been unsatisfactory, indeed, unworthy of a police captain. I will summarize: (

A) From November of 2002 to June of 2007, approximately 70 illegal CRPQ consultations; (

B) In 2006 and 2007, time wasted at work for strictly personal reasons on numerous occasions; (

C) In 2006 and 2007, improper use of police department communications devices for personal reasons; (

D) On June 22, 2007, physical assault against a police department dispatcher; (

E) On June 24 and 25, 2007, driving a police vehicle after having consumed alcoholic beverages in the preceding hours; (

F) In November of 2007, flagrant act of insubordination by going to the dispatch area. [ 62 ] That said, the arbitrator recognized that Mr. St-Martin had been [ translation ] “a very good police officer” for many years and, in particular, that: (

A) For the twenty years between from 1986 to 2006, the complainant had an exemplary career as a police officer. Indeed, the complainant was given the Governor General’s Award for police officers who have completed 20 years of exemplary service; (

B) The police department evaluations for the approximately three years prior to the complainant’s moral collapse in 2007 show not that his performance was merely satisfactory but rather very satisfactory, earning high praise from his superiors; (

C) The complainant had no disciplinary record; (

D) The complainant had no history of ethical breaches; (

E) What is more, even in the summer of 2007, the complainant was the one called in as a replacement during Inspector Rainville’s vacation, which is but one more example of the recognition garnered by the complainant’s work. [ 63 ] The ratio of the arbitrator’s decision to set aside Mr.

St-Martin’s dismissal and substitute a 23-month suspension with demotion to the rank of police constable can be found in the following paragraphs: [ translation ] [482] While all of the complainant’s faults have led me to decide that the complainant deserved a lengthy suspension and that he could no longer hold a position as an officer within the Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu police force, his long and excellent service as a police officer has also led me to believe that the elements constituting a total and permanent breach of the employment relationship have not taken place in this case.

Incidentally, after analyzing all the faults alleged against the complainant, I find that the majority of the faults he committed were known only by members of the police department and members of the public. [483] I am of the view that the plaintiff may continue to serve as a police constable, and that in this capacity, the relationship of trust with his employer is not irremediably broken. There is a very clear distinction between the levels and degrees of responsibility of a police captain and those of a police officer. Robert St-Martin was a good police officer and he remains fit to perform such work.

To the arguments I mention in

section 13.5 of this

Chapter XIII, I add that, because he is demoted from captain to police constable, the complainant loses his administrative responsibilities and his role as exemplary leader in the police force. The complainant also loses his autonomy and his very broad freedom to act and manage his time at work.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that it will be much easier for the employer to oversee and monitor the complainant’s work as a police constable. [484] I also note that the complainant’s faults, taken individually or overall, do not justify his dismissal. [485] Finally, I note that the complainant had no opportunity to modify his behaviour over time, for example, by way of a gradation of sanctions. [486] An overall analysis of the complainant’s disciplinary faults do not justify a conclusion of generalized and irredeemable misconduct as a police constable, but it does justify such a conclusion in his capacity as police captain.

Incidentally, if I had not reached this conclusion in

section 5 of

Chapter XIII, my overall analysis would have led me to the same decision that the complainant may no longer occupy the position of ranked policer officer in the Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu police department. III THE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGMENT [ 64 ] In her decision granting the City’s application for judicial review and overturning the arbitral award, the Superior Court judge concluded that it was unreasonable for the arbitrator to find that Mr.

St-Martin could no longer act as police department captain but could nevertheless continue as a constable because in this respect the relationship of trust with his employer had not been irremediably breached . Her reasoning is clearly set out in the following paragraphs of her judgment: [ translation ] [32] There is no legal syllogism justifying the conclusion that St-Martin would be less dishonest if he were a mere police constable.

Furthermore, why should the City bear the burden of supervising, monitoring, and overseeing him in the performance of his duties as constable?

How can it be said that the relationship of trust still exists with his employer, when he betrayed that trust on countless occasions? [33] The arbitrator recognized that it was the City’s prerogative to impose one overall sanction for all of St-Martin’s wrongful actions. [34] Nevertheless, without really explaining why, he chose a method meting out one sanction per count, thus determining that St- Martin should be suspended for 23 months and demoted. [35] Such a sentence also raises a few questions. What would the sentence be for a mere constable who committed similar offences, since demotion would be impossible?

Should a superior officer benefit from a more lenient regime because of his years of service? Is there a double standard for senior officers and constables? [36] What message will be sent to the citizens if the City is required to keep an individual who knowingly committed multiple offences, some of them under the Criminal Code , in its police department? [37] In the view of the Court, Mtre Laplante rendered an unreasonable decision and minimized the connection between the proved faults and the special role of a police officer. [38] St-Martin used the CRPQ for personal reasons approximately 70 times.

Such conduct is so serious that a finding of guilt must incur the ultimate punishment of dismissal. [39] It is difficult to reconcile Mtre Laplante’s reasoning with the seriousness of St-Martin’s actions and the preservation, in his words, of the relationship of trust necessary to the performance of the duties of a police officer. IV ANALYSIS OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL [ 65 ] The appellant raises two questions: the first asks whether the arbitral award is reasonable, and the second concerns the effect of the criminal and professional ethics findings of guilt rendered after the City’s decision to dismiss Mr.

St-Martin.

(1) Whether the arbitral award is reasonable [ 66 ] In disciplinary matters, an arbitrator may confirm, amend or set aside the decision of the employer and, if such is the case, substitute the decision he or she deems fair and reasonable taking into account the circumstances of the matter. [18] As we have seen, taking into account all the circumstances of the matter, the arbitrator found it appropriate to substitute a demotion to the rank of police constable and a 23-month suspension for the dismissal imposed. [ 67 ] The Court must determine whether the trial judge chose the correct standard of review and whether she applied it correctly. [19] The judge found that the applicable standard of review was that of reasonableness; the parties agree that this is the standard that applies in this case, and I concur.

It now remains to be determined whether it was correctly applied by the trial judge. [ 68 ] The reasonableness of a decision depends primarily on its justification and the transparency and intelligibility of the decision- making process.

The standard requires that the reviewing court determine whether the decision falls “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts and law”. [20] In other words, if it is to intervene, the reviewing court must be satisfied that the outcome fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes open to the decision maker under its grant of authority.

Deference must therefore be shown, and the reviewing court may not substitute its own opinion for that of the decision maker, even if it might have decided the issue differently: [21] [59] La raisonnabilité constitue une norme unique qui s’adapte au contexte. […] Lorsque la norme de la raisonnabilité s’applique, elle commande la déférence. Les cours de révision ne peuvent substituer la solution qu’elles jugent elles-mêmes appropriée à celle qui a été retenue, mais doivent plutôt déterminer si celle-ci fait

partie des « issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit » ( Dunsmuir , par. 47 ). Il peut exister plus d’une issue raisonnable. Néanmoins, si le processus et l’issue en cause cadrent bien avec les principes de justification, de transparence et d’intelligibilité, la cour de révision ne peut y substituer l’issue qui serait à son avis préférable. [59] Reasonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from the context. … Where the reasonableness standard applies, it requires deference.

Reviewing courts cannot substitute their own appreciation of the appropriate solution, but must rather determine if the outcome falls within “a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” ( Dunsmuir , at para. 47 ). There might be more than one reasonable outcome.

However, as long as the process and the outcome fit comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome. [ 69 ] Let us now consider the Superior Court’s intervention. [ 70 ] First, I am of the view that the arbitrator could reasonably consider the City’s allegations listed above in paragraphs [20] to [24], [26], [28] to [31], [33] and [34], and [56] to [58] individually instead of analyzing them together with Mr. St-Martin’s illegal consultations of the CRPQ.

This is all the more true in view of the fact that the arbitrator rejected some of the City’s allegations in whole or in part. In this respect, there is no valid reason to question the arbitrator’s pure findings of fact and the conclusions about Mr. St- Martin’s conduct that he drew therefrom.

[ 71 ] That said, and regardless of the Superior Court judge’s reasons, I find that the arbitrator committed a reviewable error in his analysis of the evidence of the illegal consultations as well as an error of law which taints his conclusion. [ 72 ] The reviewable errors concern the arbitrator’s finding that Mr. St-Martin did not illegally obtain information, among other things, with the objective of harming the person whose information he sought. On the contrary, the evidence is clear that this statement is inaccurate with respect to two persons, and that Mr.

St-Martin committed concrete actions affecting them after he obtained information about them to which he had no right. [ 73 ] It is difficult to believe that, when Mr. St-Martin illegally looked up Madam Stéphanie Massé and Madam Sylvie Pinard, he did not intend to unlawfully observe them. As we have seen in the arbitrator’s description of their testimony, Mr. St-Martin rudely and senselessly intruded into their private lives. [ 74 ] We can only imagine Madam Massé’s utter astonishment when Mr.

St-Martin came to see her unannounced in a police vehicle and showed her a photo taken during her arrest for impaired driving a few years earlier, which he had illegally obtained from the police department archives. One thing is certain, he failed to provide the arbitrator with any explanation for these searches that was in any way compatible with the performance of his police duties or respectful of Madam Massé’s private life. In my view, in light of all of the evidence, it is obvious that his goal was to begin a romantic relationship with her. [ 75 ] With regard to Madam Pinard, he had the same objective.

Evidently, her relationship was thrown into turmoil when Mr. St- Martin called her (knowing that her husband was not home) for a purpose that had nothing to do with his role as a police officer. Undoubtedly to minimize the impact of this intrusion on Madam Pinard, the arbitrator chose not to provide any more details than those I reproduce in paragraph [53] above. [ 76 ] Merely acting this way towards these two women in the situations I have just described means that Mr.

St-Martin acted knowingly and intentionally, and that he used illegally obtained information to harm these people by contacting them and inappropriately interfering in their private lives. This factor is far from mitigating; it is in fact aggravating. [ 77 ] This leads me to discuss whether the arbitrator was correct in law to characterize as mitigating the fact that Mr. St-Martin did not obtain the information for criminal purposes or to transmit to third parties.

In this respect I recognize, as the arbitrator stated, that this point has been so held in arbitration cases, as it has in professional ethics cases involving charges of a breach by police officers of

section 7 of the Code of ethics of Quebec police officers , [22] which is reproduced in paragraph [10] above. [ 78 ] With respect, however, the arbitrator’s determination that Mr. St-Martin’s not having sent the illegally obtained information about the private lives of eight people and several members of his family to third parties is a mitigating factor is an error of law.

To the extent that the arbitrator based himself on the arbitration case law, that case law is also unfounded in law. [ 79 ] The mere fact that a given circumstance is not an aggravating factor does not mean that it is therefore a mitigating factor. At most, it is a neutral factor, which should neither negatively nor positively influence the nature or scope of the sanction to be imposed. [23] The same must be said about the arbitrator’s finding that few members of the public were aware of most of the faults committed by Mr. St-Martin.

Even if this finding is true, it has nothing to do with the reprehensible nature of his behaviour and is at best a neutral factor. [ 80 ] Mr. St-Martin knowingly violated the private lives of all of these persons, contrary to

section 5 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms . [24] 5. Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée. 5. Every person has a right to respect for his private life. [ 81 ] This is a serious offence, committed on multiple occasions over an extended period of time by a high-ranking police officer who was aware that his actions were illegal every time he accessed the CRPQ or, in Madam Massé’s case, when he obtained compromising information about her from the police department archives.

He has tried to diminish the impact of his actions and provided no reasonable explanation for his conduct. [ 82 ] The other mitigating factors accepted by the arbitrator – i.e ., Mr. St-Martin’s long and excellent service as a police officer, his evaluations testifying to his [ translation ] “very satisfying” performance, and his spotless disciplinary and ethical records – could not on their own reasonably lead to his final ruling. [ 83 ] What is more, it is clear that Mr. St-Martin’s testimony did not at all impress the arbitrator, who, as we have seen, frequently used disparaging terms to characterize Mr.

St-Martin’s conduct, explanations, or attempts to justify his illegal actions: • [ translation ] “vulgar, disrespectful, insulting and totally unacceptable” conduct; [25] • [ translation ] “carelessness and misconduct on the part of the complainant in the use of his time at work”; [26] • “The complainant wasted a lot of time at work on numerous occasions, and he did so for personal reasons”; [27] • The reason for looking up a dispatcher at the police department in the CRPQ was [ translation ] “implausible”; [28] • [ translation ] “Trouble following” his reasoning; [29] • A [ translation ] “disconcerting” reason for consulting the CRPQ; [30] • The justification for one of the consultations [ translation ] “does not stand up to scrutiny”. [31]

[ 84 ] I recognize, of course, that no one is perfect, and that also applies to Mr. St-Martin. That said, given such a devastating analysis of his credibility in this case, how can the arbitrator imagine that Mr. St-Martin would be a credible witness before the criminal law courts if he were called to testify as a mere police constable and that, consequently, there is no obstacle to reinstating him in the City’s police department? The question answers itself. [ 85 ] The arbitrator was wrong to conclude that Mr. St-Martin could be demoted and reinstated as a police constable.

The seriousness of the breaches identified by the arbitrator conflicts with such a conclusion. We need merely recall that Mr. St-Martin illegally consulted the CRPQ more than 70 times, gaining access to confidential information about dozens of individuals, to which, it should be added, he would still have access as a mere constable. Given the circumstances of this case, we must wonder how many illegal consultations of the CRPQ would have justified Mr.

St-Martin’s dismissal in the arbitrator’s mind. [ 86 ] He acted knowingly, with staggering recklessness, in situations where the persons concerned were entitled to expect the strictest of confidentiality. Consider, also, Mr. St-Martin’s action towards Madam Goyette, which was, it goes without saying, highly disrespectful and unacceptable, especially since Mr. St-Martin occupied a relationship of hierarchical authority in respect to Madam Goyette.

Of course, these are merely two examples from the many allegations the arbitrator considered to be proven, but they are good illustrations of the seriousness of the breaches alleged against Mr. St-Martin. It goes without saying that this type of conduct runs contrary to the exemplary image and integrity required to perform the duties of a police officer. [32] Mr. St-Martin abused the power and privileged status conferred by his rank as a police officer. His actions seriously tarnish the image of the police forces and contribute to public loss of confidence in and respect for in these forces.

He displayed contempt for justice, the very value he should have exemplified. [ 87 ] In my opinion, the City had ample grounds to dismiss Mr. St-Martin, even if the arbitrator accepted only a few of the allegations set out in the letter of March 3, 2008. For the reasons I have just laid out, the arbitrator’s decision allowing the Fraternité’s grievance in part does not have all of the attributes of a reasonable decision, and the Superior Court judge was therefore right to intervene as she did.

(2) The effect of the convictions after the City’s dismissal of St-Martin [ 88 ] The Fraternité claims that when the judge affirmed that there was no need to refer the file back to the arbitrator, she was obviously basing herself on the Court of Quebec’s conviction of Mr. St-Martin on 11 counts nearly 4 years after his termination by the City, since Mr.

St-Martin was permanently dismissed once the conviction became final upon his discontinuance of his application for leave to appeal. [33] According to this argument, the judge erred because she justified her intervention with a fact subsequent to the termination. [ 89 ] This is not at all the case. [ 90 ] First, the 11 counts on which Provost, J. of the Court of Quebec convicted St-Martin were based on paragraph 342.1(1)(

a) Cr. C ., which reads: ,342.1

(1) Est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans ou d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure

sommaire, quiconque, frauduleusement et sans apparence de droit :

a) directement ou indirectement, obtient des services d’ordinateur; [Soulignage ajouté.] 342.1

(1) Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years, or is guilty of an offence punishable on

summary conviction who, fraudulently and without colour of right, (

a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service; [Emphasis added.] [ 91 ] A large part of the argument before Provost, J. concerned the applicability of the notion of fraudulent use of a computer, [34] an element of the offence that was not at issue before the arbitrator. The reasons for the conviction were not relevant to the judicial review, even though the conviction became final on January 13, 2013, before the arbitral award on May 17, 2013. [ 92 ] Its only relevance resided in the difficulty the judge had in referring the case back before the arbitrator.

She clearly explained her point of view on this subject: [ translation ] [40] The arbitral award must be set aside because it is unreasonable. [41] The City asks that the disciplinary sanction of dismissal be upheld. [42] Judicial review is not an appeal. The principle is that the reviewing court may not substitute its own decision for that of the decision maker. There are exceptions to this principle, however, particularly where referral would be pointless. [43] St-Martin was dismissed following a judgment of the Court of Quebec convicting him on the 11 counts against him.

There is therefore no reason to refer the file back before the arbitrator. [ 93 ] Admittedly, at the end of paragraph [36] of her judgment, reproduced in paragraph [64] above, the judge stated that St-Martin

had committed several offences, some under the Criminal Code . In the circumstances of this case, these remarks were made in obiter and did not constitute the ratio of her judgment. [ 94 ] This ground is therefore rejected.

V CONCLUSION [ 95 ] Clearly, the circumstances of this case shine a light on the fact that the message of denunciation and deterrence intended for offending police officers in disciplinary and professional ethics cases involving illegal CRPQ consultations has failed to achieve the objective sought, since illegal consultations of the CRPQ, as St-Martin’s case illustrates, are still inexplicably frequent today. [ 96 ] A possible reason for this frequency might be the very lenient punishment such consultations incur, despite the objectively serious nature of this type of breach. [35] In recent judgments, the Comité de déontologie policière has characterized illegal consultations of the CRPQ as [ translation ] “serious breaches” [36] that are [ translation ] always reprehensible”, [37] as [ translation ] “disrespectful of the authority of the law and the courts and a failure to collaborate with the administration of justice”, [38] and as [ translation ] “misconduct that undermines the role of the police”. [39] Nevertheless, the sanctions imposed for this offence, which is in fact criminal in nature, have been trivial, ranging from reprimands to a few days’ suspension for every illegal consultation. [ 97 ] In short, the time has come to emphasize deterrence when sanctioning such behaviour, instead of imposing sanctions that represent nothing more than brief inconveniences. [ 98 ] I would therefore dismiss the appeal, with legal costs against the appellant.

ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. SCHEDULE: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND PROCEEDINGS • On March 3, 2008, Mr. St-Martin was informed by letter of his dismissal by the City. • On March 6 and 10, 2008, the Fraternité filed two grievances. The grievances were referred to arbitration. The hearings before the arbitrator began in May of 2008 and continued until September of 2012. • On February 2, 2012, Provost J. of the Court of Quebec convicted Mr. St-Martin on 11 counts of having fraudulently and without colour of right obtained, directly or indirectly, a computer service, thereby contravening paragraph 342.1(1)(

a) Cr. C ., in connection with his illegal use of the CRPQ. • On March 2, 2012, Mr. St-Martin filed an application for leave to appeal the February 2, 2012, judgment of the Court of Quebec. • On April 4, 2012, Mr. St-Martin was ordered to pay a fine of $200 and a victim surcharge on each of the counts. • On January 14, 2013, this Court took note of Mr. St-Martin’s discontinuance of his application for leave to appeal from the February 2, 2012, judgment of the Court of Quebec. That judgment thus became res judicata . • On May 17, 2013, the final arbitral award was rendered.

The arbitrator allowed in part the grievance against Mr. St-Martin’s dismissal, substituted a 23-month suspension for the dismissal imposed by the City, and demoted Mr. St-Martin from the rank of captain to that of constable, retroactively to March 23, 2008. • On June 13, 2013, the City dismissed Mr. St-Martin pursuant to paragraph 2 of

section 119 of the Police A ct. • On January 21, 2014, the Comité de déontologie policière rendered a decision dismissing Mr. St-Martin for breaching

section 7 of the Code of Ethics of Québec police officers by using the CRPQ numerous times for personal reasons. • On February 18, 2014, Mr. St-Martin filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the Comité de déontologie policière. • On February 25, 2015, the Court of Quebec dismissed the appeal from the decision of the Comité de déontologie policière in a judgment that is final and without appeal. Mr. St-Martin did not challenge that judgment by applying for judicial review.