2017 QCCQ 7893, 2017 QCCQ 7893

Unofficial English Translation Villeneuve c. SSQ Groupe financier 2017 QCCQ 7893 COURT OF QUEBEC “Small Claims Division” CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF QUEBEC LOCALITY OF QUEBEC “Civil Division” No.: 200-32-063562-150 DATE: July 17, 2017 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDED BY: THE HONOURABLE CHRISTIAN BRUNELLE, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ ALEXANDRE VILLENEUVE …Laurier-Station, Quebec, … Plaintiff v. SSQ FINANCIAL GROUP 2525 Laurier Boulevard P.O.

Box 10500, Station Sainte-Foy Quebec City, Quebec G1V 4H6 Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The plaintiff, Alexandre Villeneuve, claimed from the defendant, SSQ Financial Group (“SSQ”), the amount of $12,737.50 as a result of an accident that caused him to lose three of his teeth and for which SSQ, in its capacity as insurer, refused to compensate him fully.

I) CONTEXT [ 2 ] On January 28, 2008, Mr. Villeneuve began working for Groupe Promutuel. As a salaried employee, he was covered by group insurance that his employer underwritten by SSQ. [ 3 ] On March 26, 2014, at about 10:20 p.m., he had an unfortunate accident during a hockey game and sustained fractures to three of his upper front teeth. [ 4 ] The next morning, he obtained an emergency appointment with Jérôme Charest, a dental surgeon who extracted the three teeth. [ 5 ] On April 8, 2014, André Lavallée, a dental surgeon and a colleague of Dr.

Charest, completed a note that confirmed he was working on [ translation ] “the production of a partial acrylic transitional prosthesis”, while waiting for the patient to obtain a [ translation ] “consultation concerning implants”. [ 6 ] On April 23, 2014, Dr. Jacques Bernier of the Centre d’implantologie dentaire de Ste-Foy established a treatment plan at a cost of $12,300.00. [ 7 ] On April 28, 2014, Dr. Lavallée completed the adjustment of the transitional prosthesis. SSQ covered 90% of the eligible expenses of $600.00 for the fabrication of this prosthesis. [ 8 ] On May 1, 2014, Dr.

Lavallée sent the treatment plan proposed by Dr. Bernier to SSQ. The insurer’s first refusal

[ 9 ] On May 12, 2014, SSQ’s health insurance management – benefits department wrote to Mr. Villeneuve: [ translation ] … After analyzing your file, we are unfortunately unable to accede to your request for benefits, because your contract does not cover implants and other related treatments. Please be assured that only reasons of a contractual nature prevent us from providing you with a favourable answer. … [D-8] [ 10 ] On May 14, 2014, SSQ refused to pay the costs of Mr. Villeneuve’s consultation with Dr.

Bernier on April 23, 2014, for the following reason: [ translation ] “Refused because the treatment is related to implants” (D-9). [ 11 ] During the same period, Mr. Villeneuve contacted his employer’s human resources department to obtain more information about the reasons his claim had been refused. [ 12 ] On June 16, 2014, Ms. Isabelle Tremblay, a health and disability management advisor with Promutuel, wrote to him that she had [ translation ] “verified the overall contract”.

That being said, she specified: [ translation ] Having performed a full verification, I therefore confirm that implants are not covered by our group insurance contract, whether accidental or non-accidental or claimed as medical care or dental care. [P-1, p. 30] The compromise treatment [ 13 ] On July 3, 2014, Dr. Lavallée told Mr. Villeneuve that in his opinion [ translation ] “the ideal solution … was definitively to place two implants and a fixed bridge”.

Failing that, he said that [ translation ] “a compromise treatment could be a six-unit fixed bridge”, which would involve grinding three other healthy teeth, [ translation ] “with the risks of cavities and pulpal injury associated with that procedure”. And he added, [ translation ] “Moreover, because the edentulous area is wide and curved, the longevity of a six-unit bridge is compromised”. He estimated the cost of the compromise treatment at $6,375.00 (D-10). [ 14 ] As an illustration, Mr.

Villeneuve compared the ideal solution to a [ translation ] “ hardwood floor ”, with the compromise treatment being more like a simple [ translation ] “ floating floor ”, to use his expression. [ 15 ] On August 27, 2014, he wrote to Ms. Tremblay and sent her the letter signed by Dr. Lavallée on July 3, 2014, so that she could follow up directly with the administrator of the group insurance plan. He asked that any compensation refusal by SSQ be [ translation ] “…specified in writing, with the exact

article (and exclusion number) in the contract”. And he concluded: [ translation ] I still believe, as does the dentist, that, despite the exclusion of implants, this treatment should be accepted, given that the costs will be lower over the long term and above all that there will be less additional risk for my health . [Underlining in original] The insurer’s acceptance [ 16 ] In the fall, discussions took place between the employer and the insurer, leading, on October 29, 2014, to an agreement that was favourable to Mr.

Villeneuve. [ 17 ] On November 6, 2014, SSQ said it was prepared to assume 90% of the eligible costs of the compromise treatment, namely the amount of $5,737.50, [ translation ] “on the condition that the treatments are provided within the 12 months following the date of the accident”. The insurer wrote, [ translation ] “we agree to reimburse the equivalent of a standard six-unit bridge, payable on the placement of the bridge on implants”.

In this regard, the insurer specified: [ translation ] Once the costs have been incurred, please send us a claim for benefits along with a copy of this letter to enable us to effect reimbursement. [D-11] [ 18 ] On December 15, 2014, Mr. Villeneuve went to the Clinique dentaire Céline Rochette to complete treatment. Dr. Rochette referred him to Dr. Jean El-Fata at the Clinique spécialisée de Québec. [ 19 ] His first consultation with Dr. El-Fata could not take place until February 3, 2015. [ 20 ] On February 9, 2015, Dr. El-Fata said in a note to his colleague, Dr.

Rochette, that the surgery was scheduled for [ translation ] “the morning of March 19, 2015, with the possibility of loading in the afternoon”. [ translation ] “We are working on coordinating the appointments with your office for immediate loading”, Dr. El-Fata said, it being understood that [ translation ] “the transfer abutments for immediate loading will be given to Mr. Villeneuve on the day of the surgery” (D-15). [ 21 ] On February 10, 2015, Dr. Rochette proposed a treatment plan at a cost of $6,001.00 (P-1, p. 19).

[ 22 ] On February 18, 2015, she made the impressions. [ 23 ] On March 18, 2015, Mr. Villeneuve saw Dr. Rochette and asked her to prepare her invoice for the agreed-on dental care without delay. That same day, Mr. Villeneuve gave her a partial payment of $1,000.00 (D-14). [ 24 ] On the morning of March 19, 2015, Dr. El-Fata performed the surgery. Then, in the afternoon, Dr. Rochette completed the placement of the temporary bridge (three units on two implants) at her office. [ 25 ] On March 27, 2015, Mr. Villeneuve went back to see Dr.

El-Fata for a post-operative examination that showed that he was [ translation ] “experiencing no pain” and [ translation ] “was healing well” (D-15). That day, Mr. Villeneuve paid the amount of $6,000.00 to Dr. El-Fata. [ 26 ] On March 30, 2015, Mr. Villeneuve submitted his claim to SSQ and insisted on being paid by cheque rather than by direct deposit (D-12). At the hearing, he explained that he had made this request so that he could more quickly pay Dr.

Rochette’s fees, because he owed her a balance of $4,495.00, which he was not able to pay. [ 27 ] On April 23, 2015, SSQ asked for [ translation ] “proofs of payment (photocopy of a cashed cheque, a credit card receipt or a debit receipt) for the services received from Dr. Céline Rochette and Dr. Jean El-Fata in 2015” (D-14). The insurer’s second refusal [ 28 ] On May 11, 2015, SSQ’s health investigation department wrote to Mr.

Villeneuve: [ translation ] … Having analyzed the additional information obtained, we see that your bridge on implants … was not placed in your mouth in March 2015, when the benefit claims were issued. With regard to dental treatments resulting from an accident involving natural teeth, your contract stipulates that the treatment must be provided within 12 months from the date of the accident, namely, in your case, no later than March 26, 2015 .

Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of your contract, we must inform you that we refuse the dental care included in your claim of March 30, 2015, because the costs are not eligible . However, please note that you can submit a claim for dental care once the placement of your bridge on implants is completed, that is, in or about September 2015. This claim will then be treated in accordance with the guarantees in effect under your contract. … [D-16] [Emphasis added] [ 29 ] On May 14, 2015, Mr.

Villeneuve sent an email to the insurer with a [ translation ] “request for a formal review of the denial of benefits”. [ 30 ] On May 20, 2015, SSQ reiterated its position, essentially for [ translation ] “contractual reasons”, [ translation ] “because the treatments will be completed after the contractual time limit” of [ translation ] “12 months from the date of the accident” (D-18). [ 31 ] On May 25, 2015, Mr.

Villeneuve lost his job with Promutuel. [ 32 ] On May 28, 2015, he sent SSQ a letter demanding to be paid the amount of $5,737.50 (D-20). [ 33 ] On June 19, 2015, the insurer refused his application for review and maintained its decision. [ 34 ] On June 29, Mr.

Villeneuve brought his action claiming [ translation ] “$5,737.50 for dental care” and $7,000.00 for [ translation ] “loss of enjoyment and payment of the costs already incurred”. [ 35 ] On July 22, 2015, SSQ contested the application and argued that it had paid all the insurance benefits due under the master policy (D-2), namely the amount of $1,089.00 for the dental costs associated with the accident of March 26, 2014. II) QUESTIONS AT ISSUE [ 36 ] Following his accident of March 26, 2014, did Mr. Villeneuve receive all the sums to which he was entitled? [ 37 ] If not, is he entitled to damages?

III) ANALYSIS AND DECISION [ 38 ] The

interpretation of the group insurance contract binding Groupe Promutuel, Fédération des sociétés mutuelles d’assurance générale and SSQ is central to this dispute. [ 39 ]

Article 2389 of the Civil Code of Québec [1] (“ C.C.Q .”) defines a contract of insurance as follows: 2389 . A contract of insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes, for a premium or assessment, to make a payment to the client

or third person if an event covered by the insurance occurs. Insurance is divided into marine insurance and non-marine insurance. [ 40 ] “Non-marine” insurance, with which we are concerned here, includes “insurance of persons”, [2] which is defined under

article 2392 C.C.Q. : 2392 . Insurance of persons deals with the life, physical integrity or health of the insured. Insurance of persons is divided into individual insurance and group insurance. Group insurance of persons, under a master policy, covers the participants in a specified group and, in some cases, their families or dependents . [Emphasis added] [ 41 ] The policy (D-2) evidences the existence of the group insurance contract [3] under which Mr. Villeneuve made his claim. We shall see that this policy was amended during the period when the events described above took place. [ 42 ] The first paragraph of

article 2405 C.C.Q. provides the manner in which such amendments may be made: 2405 . In non-marine insurance, changes to the contract made by the parties are evidenced by riders attached to the policy . … [Emphasis added] [ 43 ] When such a rider is concluded between the policyholder, in this case Groupe Promutuel, and the insurer, in this case SSQ, the law requires that it be interpreted in favour of the adhering party, in this case Mr. Villeneuve, because a contract of adhesion is involved. [4] [ 44 ] Now that the legal framework is better defined, the insurance policy must be analyzed (D-2).

A) The exclusion of dental implants [ 45 ] The insurance policy comprises two plans that are relevant to the facts: a dental insurance plan and a medical insurance plan. [ 46 ] On March 26, 2014, the day of the accident, both plans contained an exclusion concerning dental implants. [ 47 ] Thus, in the

section on [ translation ] “dental insurance”, the heading of

article 4 states [ translation ] “Exclusions, limitations and general restrictions”. The seventh paragraph of that

section stipulates: [ translation ] In the following cases, the dental coverage provides no reimbursement: ...

i) for implants or for any act, treatment or prosthesis related to an implant; ... [ 48 ] Similarly, in the

section on [ translation ] “medical insurance”,

article 4 also has the heading “Exclusions, limitations and general restrictions”. The second paragraph of this

section includes the following provision: [ translation ] In the following cases, the medical coverage provides no reimbursement: ...

q) for surgically implanted prostheses; ... [ 49 ] It appears that these are the contractual provisions that explain SSQ’s refusal of May 12, 2014, to cover the costs of the treatment plan proposed by Dr. Bernier. [ 50 ] In its written contestation, SSQ states that [ translation ] “on or about October 29, 2014, the defendant and the Policyholder agreed to add an alternative clause concerning dental implants, retroactive to January 1, 2014 ”. [5] [ 51 ] Then, on May 25, 2015, the day when Mr.

Villeneuve lost his employment, this alternative clause was, as it were, included in the standard contract in the form of rider no. 9 . [ 52 ] The effect of rider no. 9 was first to strike out the following:

[ translation ] - “for dental insurance, the exclusion concerning implants or any act, treatment or prosthesis related to an implant” (art. 4, sec. 7( i )); - “for medical insurance, the exclusion concerning surgically implanted prostheses” (art. 4, s. 2, para. ( q )). [ 53 ] Rider no. 9 also added two new provisions in the master policy, in both of the sections: [ translation ] - “Eligible costs” of dental insurance, under the heading “Prosthodontic services”; - “Other medical costs (medical insurance)”, under the heading “Dental treatment resulting from an accident involving natural teeth”. [ 54 ] These new provisions are worded in exactly the same way: [ translation ] For the purposes of this insurance and subject to prior approval by SSQ, the costs incurred for dental implants may be subject to reimbursement after final placement of the prosthesis.

Such reimbursement is limited, however, to the amount that would have been reimbursed for the least costly equivalent treatment which is covered by this insurance and which SSQ believes would give appropriate results. [ 55 ] The effective date of rider no. 9 is [ translation ] “January 1, 2014, unless otherwise indicated”. [ 56 ] Thus, it appears from both the alternative clause agreed upon on October 29, 2014, and rider no. 9 dated May 25, 2015, that there was a common intention on the part of the policyholder (Promutuel) and the insurer (SSQ) to give retroactive effect to the new coverage so offered, for the benefit of the adhering party.

B) The time limit for submitting a claim [ 57 ] When SSQ wrote to Mr. Villeneuve on November 6, 2014, it finally agreed [ translation ] “to reimburse the equivalent of a standard six-unit bridge payable on placement of the bridge on implants”. [ 58 ] That being said, it reiterated that it would reimburse [ translation ] “the professional fees of a dental surgeon, whether or not the services are prescribed by a physician for the repair of accidental damage to natural teeth, provided that the treatment is received within 12 months from the date of the accident”. [ 59 ] Mr.

Villeneuve testified that it was only at that point that he learned of the 12-month time limit. [ 60 ] If that is the case, it appears difficult to ascribe the fault to the insurer. [ 61 ] First,

article 2401 C.C.Q. states that the adhering party “may examine and make copies of the policy at the place of business of the client”. At the hearing, Simon Tanguay, a dispute management advisor for SSQ, stated that the policy was available for consultation by employees. [ 62 ] Second, under the heading [ translation ] “Management information”, the standard contract includes the following mention: [ translation ] The policyholder shall inform the adhering parties of their rights and obligations under this contract.

It shall also provide them with the documents enabling them to exercise their rights. [ 63 ] That being said, one must acknowledge that [ translation ] “it is not the responsibility of a group insurance policyholder to take the adhering party by the hand ”, nor [ translation ] “to explain to him each paragraph of the application for insurance” [6] or of the insurance policy. [ 64 ] Third, on April 28, 2014, SSQ wrote to Mr.

Villeneuve and specified that reimbursement of the transitional prosthesis was conditional on [ translation ] “the treatments being given within 12 months from the date of the accident” (D-5). [ 65 ] Lastly, in his capacity as an adhering party to Group 20P08, Mr. Villeneuve was covered under the policy by [ translation ] “Plan 9 – Medical care option 2 and dental care option 2”.

For that group, it is expressly provided that [ translation ] “dental treatment in the case of an accident to natural teeth” is [ translation ] “reimbursable within 12 months from the accident”. [7] [ 66 ] In this context, one cannot reasonably fault the insurer for breaching its obligation of information in any way.

C) The retroactive effect of the alternative clause and rider no. 9 [ 67 ] Nothing prevented the policyholder (Promutuel) and the insurer (SSQ) from agreeing on an alternative clause favourable to Mr.

Villeneuve and giving retroactive effect to rider no. 9. [ 68 ] That being said, from a legal standpoint, it is obviously not without consequence. Giving retroactive effect to rider no. 9 to January 1, 2014, meant that, at the time of the accident sustained by Mr. Villeneuve, on March 26, 2014, he could legally benefit from the new coverage so offered. [ 69 ] In these conditions, it is reasonable to suppose that, on May 12, 2014, he would not have received a denial of coverage from SSQ. [ 70 ] In fact, Mr.

Villeneuve made a great deal of effort to convince the insurer to pay him the benefits to which he would finally be entitled. [ 71 ] Even if the 12-month time limit can be set up against him, he cannot be faulted for the long delay that occurred between the first refusal on May 12, 2014, and the insurer’s agreeing to finally pay for the [ translation ] “compromise treatment”, on November 6, 2014. [ 72 ] Had it not been for this long, nearly six-month interval, Mr. Villeneuve – who always acted with diligence in the circumstances – would have had ample time to consult the specialist, Dr.

El-Fata, to undergo the surgery and to have the necessary healing time before final placement of the bridge on implants. [ 73 ] By consenting to the alternative clause and by giving rider no. 9 retroactive effect without taking into account the time periods inherent in the nature of the required treatment, the insurer placed Mr.

Villeneuve in a [ translation ] “medically impossible” situation. [8] [ 74 ] In the view of the Court, given the very particular circumstances of this dispute, the insurer’s insistence on maintaining the obligation to respect the 12-month time period constitutes an unreasonable requirement that is akin to abuse of contractual rights. [9] [ 75 ] In fact, the treatments that Mr.

Villeneuve had to undergo could not be carried out in a single step, given the time required for healing after the surgery. [ 76 ] In such circumstances, a clause limiting insurance coverage to care provided in the 12 months following the accident has already been deemed abusive when some of the treatments could not be carried out within that period for medical reasons. [10] [ 77 ] Moreover, this

interpretation seems to be most in keeping with the intention of the legislature, judging by

article 1432 C.C.Q. : 1432 . In case of doubt, a contract is interpreted in favour of the person who contracted the obligation and against the person who stipulated it. In all cases, it is interpreted in favour of the adhering party or the consumer. [Emphasis added] [ 78 ] In short, one must presume that Mr.

Villeneuve’s right to obtain the full compensation agreed to in the alternative clause (D-11) would have crystallized well before the 12-month period expired had it not been for the time lost, through no fault of his own, in claiming a right that would ultimately be accorded him retroactively. [ 79 ] In the view of the Court, the insurer, in good faith, had to take into account this situation, over which the adhering party had absolutely no control.

D) The retroactive effect of rider no. 10 [ 80 ] On June 29, 2015, Mr. Villeneuve brought his action. [ 81 ] Then, on July 17, 2015, the policyholder and the insurer signed rider no. 10, which added new exclusions to the dental and medical insurance coverage. [ 82 ] From then on, the two types of coverage stipulated that the adhering party was not entitled to any reimbursement: [ translation ] for implants as well as for any act or complementary treatment (surgery, graft, etc.) or any prosthesis related to an implant, except in the cases provided herein; [ 83 ] We are back, so to speak, to square one.

In fact, once again, the parties to the master policy agreed to make the provisions retroactive to [ translation ] “January 1, 2014”. [ 84 ] This rider no. 10 cannot have the effect of depriving Mr. Villeneuve of the rights that he acquired under the terms of the alternative clause and rider no. 9. [ 85 ] By its nature, group insurance is a [ translation ] “stipulation for another” (in favour of employees) [11] within the meaning of

article 1444 C.C.Q. : 1444 . A person may make a stipulation in the contract for the benefit of a third person. The stipulation gives the third person beneficiary the right to exact performance of the promised obligation directly from the promisor. [ 86 ] The adhering party constitutes the “third person beneficiary”. When the third person beneficiary acquires the right to a benefit and has clearly manifested the will to exercise it, he alone can waive it. That is what is logically inferred from the terms of

article 1446 C.C.Q. :

1446 . The stipulation may be revoked as long as the third person beneficiary has not advised the stipulator or the promisor of his will to accept it. [ 87 ] Not only did Mr. Villeneuve not waive his right to be reimbursed under the terms of the letter of November 6, 2014, but today he is still seeking to have it upheld. [ 88 ] Therefore, he cannot be deprived of this right by means of a retroactive rider. The retroactivity that the parties freely conferred on a contractual provision cannot cancel the vested rights of third person beneficiaries.

E) The end of employment [ 89 ] SSQ argued that the end of Mr.

Villeneuve’s employment on May 25, 2015, carried the forfeiture of his rights because he was no longer an adhering party within the meaning of the master policy. [ 90 ] It insisted on the fact that the costs had not yet been [ translation ] “incurred”, at that date because the final placement of the bridge on implants had not taken place. [ 91 ] Concerning the concept of [ translation ] “incurred costs”, the Court endorses remarks made in a context very similar to this situation: [ translation ] Clearly, the expression “ the costs must be incurred within six months from the accident ” means treatments that will be reimbursable have to begin before this period of time elapses .

The word engager [to incur] according to the Petit Robert and Le Petit Larousse dictionaries means, when used in a context such as that of this matter: to begin an action, to start, to commence or to get (sth.) going ... Nowhere do we find a definition of engager as meaning to finish or to complete. In the case under study, not only were the treatment costs incurred in the days that followed the accident, but the total they would amount to once all the work was complete, was even determined . [12] [ 92 ] Besides, for the reasons already expressed, Mr.

Villeneuve’s right to compensation was crystallized before the end of his employment. Under these conditions, he is entitled to the agreed upon amount: [ translation ] The fact that the adhering party was no longer covered when the last treatments were provided does not relieve the insurer of its obligation to provide complete coverage, when the costs were incurred within the time period provided in the clause cited . [13]

F) The reparation [ 93 ] On November 6, 2014, SSQ undertook to pay the amount of $5,737.50 to Mr. Villeneuve. He is entitled to this compensation in its entirety. [ 94 ] He also claimed the amount of $7,000.00 for loss of enjoyment and costs already incurred. [ 95 ] The file includes evidence of two payments, the one for $1,000.00 to Dr. Rochette and the other for $6,000.00 to Dr. El-Fata. [ 96 ] The amount of $5,737.50 proposed by SSQ was intended in part to pay these two professionals.

The insurer never undertook to pay the real cost of their fees in their entirety. [ 97 ] As for [ translation ] “loss of enjoyment”, Mr. Villeneuve testified emotionally about the many inconveniences that he suffered as a result of his accident. [ 98 ] On the day of the hearing, he was still using his temporary prosthesis: [ translation ] “ I don’t have the money to finish the work ”, he said. He testified that his prosthesis [ translation ] “ moves ”, that [ translation ] “ food residues accumulate there ”, which according to him creates [ translation ] “ odours that are not very pleasant ”.

Maintaining his oral hygiene is a constant concern for him. [ 99 ] Without wanting to minimize these inconveniences in any way, one must recognize that they were not caused by the fault of the insurer. [ 100 ] The precarious situation in which Mr. Villeneuve found himself after his dismissal no doubt obliged him to make difficult choices in managing his personal finances.

In this delicate situation, one can assume that the final placement of his permanent prosthesis was perhaps no longer his top priority. [ 101 ] Even so, this regrettable situation is in no way “an immediate and direct consequence of [SSQ’s] nonperformance” [14] of its contractual undertakings. The insurer cannot be held responsible for the financial difficulties of an adhering party. The claim for damages therefore cannot be granted.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: ALLOWS the application in part; CONDEMNS the defendant, SSQ Financial Group, to pay the plaintiff, Alexandre Villeneuve, the amount of $5,737.50, with interest

calculated at the annual legal rate of 5%, and the additional indemnity under

article 1619 of the Civil Code of Québec, from June 8, 2015. CONDEMNS the defendant, SSQ Financial Group, to pay the plaintiff, Alexandre Villeneuve, legal costs of $200.00. __________________________________ CHRISTIAN BRUNELLE, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: February 14, 2017 [6] Caisse populaire Mistral c. Boisvert, J.E. 97-243 (C.A.), (QC CA) (Beauregard, J.). [12] Simard c. Compagnie d'assurance-vie London Life, [1999] R.R.A. 1025, J.E. 99-2144 (C.Q.), p. 3 (Fournier, J.) [Emphasisadded]. [13] Ibid. See to the same effect: Lortie c. Assurance-vie Desjardins, [1988] R.R.A. 595 (C.P.).