Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2017 SKPC 045

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2017 SKPC 045 Date: May 17, 2017 Information: 30572952 Location: Prince Albert _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Roy Christianson Appearing: Maureen Longworth For the Crown Tumi Odele For the Accused DECISION ON VOIR DIRE F.M. D AUNT , J [ 1 ] Roy Lyle Christianson stands charged that he did, on or about the 9 th day of July, 2015, at or near Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, while his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug, have the care or control of a motor vehicle, contrary to section 255(1) and section 253(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] Mr. Christianson also faced a charge of having care or control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol content exceeded .08, but the Crown directed a stay of proceedings on that charge before any evidence was called. [ 3 ] The trial commenced with a voir dire to determine the admissibility of evidence. Defence filed a Charter notice alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9 and 10. Defence seeks the remedy of exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Charter , pursuant to

section 24(2). Alternatively, defence seeks a stay of proceedings, pursuant to section 24(1). EVIDENTIARY ISSUE [ 4 ] I must decide a preliminary evidentiary issue before discussing the merits of the application. The Crown called one witness on the voir dire : Constable Rob Lindsay. Although a video depicted the events described in his testimony, the Crown neither played it in court nor tendered it into evidence. Rather, in cross-examination, defence counsel played a portion of the video for the purpose of testing the reliability of Constable Lindsay’s evidence.

After the witness was dismissed, defence counsel realized she had neglected to tender as an exhibit the disc containing the video file. Crown counsel agreed to have the DVD entered as Exhibit-D1. Later, Crown sought clarification of which files on the disc were admitted into evidence. The disc contained two videos as well as numerous files of unknown import. Ms. Odele, for the defence, clarified that she was tendering into evidence only the portion of the video file that was played in court and put to the witness.

Crown objected to only a portion of the video going into evidence and asks that the Court consider portions of the video not played in court and not put to the witness. She says she would not have consented to defence tendering the exhibit after the close of her case if the whole of the video was not going in.

I reserved my ruling on that issue, but allowed the Crown in argument to refer to the portion of the video that was not played in court. [ 5 ] Keeping in mind that the Crown chose not to tender the video as part of its case, I conclude that only the portion of the video played in court and put to the witness may properly be considered in deciding the issues on this voir dire . First of all, Ms. Odele’s mistake was a technical one. She neglected to ask to have the disc marked as an exhibit. The part of the video she relied on was already in evidence, having been played in court and put to the witness.

It was a minor oversight that the physical disc was not marked as an exhibit. Ms. Odele did not need Ms. Longworth’s consent to correct that minor error. [ 6 ] Furthermore, this voir dire concerns the lawfulness of police actions. In such a case, the Crown bears the burden to justify these actions.

As Smith J.A. states at paragraph 35 in R v Besharah , 2010 SKCA 2 : Where the lawfulness of the police arrest is put at issue on a Charter challenge, as it was here, the onus must fall on the Crown through police witnesses to establish that the police had subjectively and objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, for, as a practical matter, this proposition is asserted and relied upon by the Crown and is within the peculiar knowledge of the police.

Thus, fairness requires that the burden of proving this matter fall on the Crown and that the accused have an opportunity to challenge the police evidence by way of cross-examination. [ 7 ] In our adversarial system, trial lawyers are given the responsibility of choosing which evidence to call and in what order. In this case, Crown counsel chose not to lead evidence of a video, and chose not to tender that video into evidence, as is her prerogative.

Defence counsel chose to cross-examine the witness with a portion of the video contradicting the officer’s version of events to cast doubt on the accuracy of his observations, as she is entitled to do. Similarly, she may cross-examine the witness on his notes without tendering into evidence the notes in their entirety. If she cross-examines a witness on a prior inconsistent statement, she is not required to tender the statement into evidence.

As with a statement, counsel may, on re-direct -- if the portion of the video is misleading or taken out of context -- play more of the video or put the entire video to the witness and allow him to explain or expand on any discrepancies. In this case, the Crown did not. [ 8 ] For these reasons, only the portion of the video from time code 00:51:07 to 00:53:09 is properly in evidence and will be considered in deciding the issues raised in the voir dire . That is the portion of the video that was played in open court and put to the witness on cross-examination.

EVIDENCE ON VOIR DIRE [ 9 ] Constable Lindsay testified that he has been with the Prince Albert Police Service for eight years. He has conducted more than 200 impaired driving investigations. He was unaware of how many of these resulted in convictions or acquittals. He has had no dealings with the accused either before or since the incident in question. He is certified to operate the ASD and he had one with him on the night in question.

His testimony differs from the video in several important respects. [ 10 ] In Constable Lindsay’s testimony, he says that on July 9, 2015, he was in uniform and on duty, working the night shift, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. He was alone, operating a black unmarked Dodge Charger, equipped with emergency lights. While parked facing west on River Street West near the exit of Georgie’s Beer and Wine Store, he observed a red half-ton truck exit the drive-through and turn east onto River Street. Constable Lindsay could see no tail lights, so he turned the police vehicle around and followed the truck.

The officer testified that he caught up to the truck at River Street and Central Avenue. However, the video shows that he did not catch

up until one long block later, at River Street and 1st Avenue East. The video also shows that Constable Lindsay did not immediately pursue the accused, but waited a few moments before putting the police vehicle in motion. [ 11 ] The officer testified that he engaged his emergency lights at Central Avenue, but the vehicle continued to travel eastbound to 1st Avenue East without stopping. The vehicle turned south onto 1st Avenue East, drove “a couple hundred metres”, then pulled into the parking lot of the Co-op gas station.

He says there were “lots” of opportunities for the vehicle to stop before then. [ 12 ] The video, on the other hand, shows that the officer did not catch up to the red truck until the driver was already signalling his right turn onto 1st Avenue East. After the truck made this right hand turn, as Constable Lindsay was himself turning right onto 1st Avenue, he turned on his emergency equipment. I note this is a sharp right turn, affecting the visibility of the officer’s lights to the accused. As the red truck entered the first intersection, Constable Lindsay activated a short siren burst.

The red truck continued through the intersection and immediately turned right into the Co-op Gas Bar parking lot. The truck’s brake lights were functioning, and the driver signalled appropriately. Nothing unusual could be noted about the manner of driving. [ 13 ] Constable Lindsay pulled over the accused at 12:52 a.m. He testified that he stopped behind the vehicle. The driver “jumped out right away.” This caught the officer off guard. He thought the accused might be fleeing, so Constable Lindsay quickly grabbed his radio and approached the accused. He asked for the driver’s licence and registration.

The accused said he had no driver’s licence. Constable Lindsay took this to mean that he had no identification. Constable Lindsay did not ask for another form of identification, nor did he ask the accused’s name. Constable Lindsay testified that the accused dropped his keys and lost his balance when he bent over to pick them up. Constable Lindsay smelled an odour of alcohol coming from the accused. To establish identity, and to isolate the smell of alcohol, Constable Lindsay directed the accused to go to the back of the police vehicle. He testified that he was detaining Mr.

Christianson for an impaired driving investigation, but he admitted in cross-examination that he did not tell the accused why he was being detained. Constable Lindsay did not look in the truck to see if the lights were turned on and he made no inquiry as to why the tail lights were off. He did not check to see if the problem was with the truck or with the driver. Rather, he immediately took the accused into custody. [ 14 ] As Constable Lindsay was walking beside the accused, he testified, he observed Mr. Christianson swaying side to side and losing his balance. He brushed the side of the truck.

He wasn’t walking very well, says Constable Lindsay. [ 15 ] The video paints a slightly different picture. After Constable Lindsay pulls up behind the accused, Mr. Christianson does nothing for a few moments. Then he opens the driver’s side door. He sits sideways in the driver’s seat, looking back toward the police vehicle. Constable Lindsay approaches, and then the accused exits the vehicle and closes the door. He bends over to retrieve something from the ground, apparently without difficulty.

On cross-examination, Constable Lindsay admitted that he assumed he dropped his keys; he did not see the keys in his hands. It looks from the video that something fell out of the truck when the accused opened the door. In any event, there is no loss of balance. The accused reaches into the truck, and has the keys in his hands when he emerges. [ 16 ] Similarly, the video discloses no evidence of swaying while the accused walks to the police vehicle. His shoulder slightly brushes the truck as he walks, but he is between Constable Lindsay and the truck, without much room to maneuver.

He hands Constable Lindsay his keys, and walks around the police vehicle and out of frame. Again, there is no swaying or loss of balance. [ 17 ] Constable Lindsay testified that Mr. Christianson sat in the back of the police vehicle, but did not immediately put his legs inside. Constable Lindsay told him “a couple times” to put his legs in, and the accused complied. Constable Lindsay shut the door, locking him in, and went back to the truck to talk to the passengers, to get their names to see if any of them had warrants for their arrest, for “officer safety,” and to make sure the vehicle was safe.

He testified that Constable Hickie arrived to assist, and Constable Lindsay sent the passengers on their way. On cross-examination, though, he agreed that the passengers were already gone before Constable Hickie arrived. [ 18 ] Once the passengers were gone, Constable Lindsay sat in the front of the police vehicle. He confirmed that the odour of alcohol was coming from the accused’s breath. At 12:59 a.m., he formally arrested Mr. Christianson for impaired driving. He read his right to counsel, police warning, and breath demand. He said the accused spoke very softly and was difficult to hear.

At 1:05 a.m., they arrived at the Prince Albert police station. [ 19 ] Sometime later, Constable Lindsay asked the accused when he had his last drink. He replied “5 o’crock” then changed it to “8 o’crock.” This was long after he had already been arrested, however. Also, at some point during their interaction, the accused told Constable Lindsay that he was dyslexic, and that he had been up since 5:30 a.m.

[ 20 ] The accused had difficulty providing suitable samples into the Intoxilyzer machine, but he was eventually successful. At 2:03 a.m., the accused was dozing off in his chair as he waited to give a second sample. He provided a second sample at 2:10 a.m. Constable Lindsay drove him home at 2:18 a.m. CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE EVIDENCE [ 21 ] Overall, I found Constable Lindsay’s evidence to be unreliable. He tended to exaggerate.

For example, when asked to place the accused’s indicia of impairment on a scale or spectrum, when he answered the question at all, he invariably placed him on the very high end of the scale. Constable Lindsay was asked about the strength of the odour of alcohol when the accused was standing outside the truck. After giving a series of reasons the smell might not be very noticeable, he testified that the smell was “very strong.” When asked to place Mr. Christianson’s level of intoxication on a scale, with 10 being comatose and 9 being barely conscious, falling all over oneself, he placed him at an 8.

He said he was “highly intoxicated.” Yet he was confident that the accused understood his rights. Constable Lindsay was confident the accused was slurring his words, yet could not say which words he slurred because he could not hear them. His memory also has been affected by the passage of time and the fact that he has conducted over 200 impaired driving investigations in his career. At some point, they must all run together in his memory.

Specifically, I cannot accept as reliable any observations not recorded in his notes at the time. [ 22 ] Constable Lindsay said he viewed the video before court to refresh his memory, yet much of his testimony is contradicted by the video. When Constable Lindsay was testifying, he had his notes and occurrence report open in front of him and he looked at them frequently. This further leads me to believe his memory of the events is not very good. Furthermore, many of his answers were non- responsive to the questions asked.

He also testified to some grounds for the detention and arrest only upon specific prompting by the Crown, after which these grounds took on particular significance. I do not accept all of his evidence. [ 23 ] Constable Lindsay, when asked, says he formed the opinion that the ability of the accused to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, based on the following observations: 1. He did not stop right away when the emergency lights were activated. (He did.) 2. His tail lights were not on. (To Constable Lindsay, this indicated an error in judgement.

However, it is unknown whether the lights in the truck were switched on or off. It is unknown whether this was an error in judgment or a mechanical failure.) 3. There was an odour of alcohol. (Given my problems with Constable Lindsay’s testimony, I find this odour was weak, not strong.) 4. He dropped his keys. (He did not.) 5. He had slurred speech. (The only words he could recall being slurred were the two times the accused said “o’crock.” That occurred at the police station, long after the arrest.) 6. He swayed when he walked. (He did not.) 7.

He lost his balance. (He did not.) [ 24 ] That was Constable Lindsay’s list of grounds for the arrest. [ 25 ] Crown counsel then prompted him as to other possible grounds. He was asked about the fact that the vehicle came out of Georgie’s drive-through. He said of people who use this service, “They’re picking up more alcohol.” Meaning, anyone who uses Georgie’s drive-through has already been drinking. They’re buying “more” alcohol, rather than “some” alcohol.

He gave no foundation for this belief, and he did not cite it as a ground for the arrest. [ 26 ] Crown counsel then asked if he noticed anything about the accused’s eyes. Only then did Constable Lindsay remember that he had red glossy eyes. He elaborated that the accused was unable to focus on any object or on Constable Lindsay. He said the accused wouldn’t look him in the eye, and his eyes were “bouncing” all over the place. Constable Lindsay admitted that these observations were not in his notes.

I do not accept that Constable Lindsay made this observation. [ 27 ] Crown counsel then asked what he thought of the accused getting out of his vehicle when he was stopped. Constable Lindsay said sometimes people want to get out into the fresh air to mask the smell of alcohol. Again, he provides no basis for his belief in this state of mind in Mr. Christianson or anyone else. This is speculation. Again, he did not cite this “fact” as one of his grounds. ISSUES

1. Were Mr. Christianson’s rights under sections 9 and 10 violated? 2. Was there an unreasonable search or seizure? 3. If so, should the evidence be excluded? 1. Arbitrary Detention/Reason for Detention/Right to Counsel [ 28 ] Because the alleged violations of sections 9 and 10 are so intertwined, I shall discuss them in one section. [ 29 ]

Section 9 of the Charter states: Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. [ 30 ]

Section 10 of the Charter states in part: Everyone has the right on arrest or detention (

a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor; (

b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right. [ 31 ] A detention not authorized by law will be arbitrary within the meaning of

section 9 ( R v Grant , 2009 SCC 32 , [2009] 2 SCR 32 [ Grant ]). In this case, I find the detention was not authorized by law. First of all, Constable Lindsay detained Mr. Christianson the moment he put on his emergency lights. That detention may be authorized by

section 209.1 of The Traffic Safety Act , ss 2004, LT-18.1, s 209.1 [ TSA ]. However, when the officer placed the accused in the back of the police vehicle, he did more than detain him; he took him into custody. This was a de facto arrest, and not the kind of momentary investigative detention sanctioned in R v Mann , 2004 SCC 52 , [2004] 3 SCR 59 [ Mann ]. This arrest was made without grounds. The officer did not inform the accused of the reason for this detention for at least seven minutes while he investigated the passengers in the vehicle. He did not inform him of his right to counsel, even though he could have made a call in private, as he was left alone in the vehicle. [ 32 ]

Section 209.1 of the TSA states:

(1) A peace officer may require the person in charge of or operating a motor vehicle to stop that vehicle if the peace officer: (

a) is readily identifiable as a peace officer; and (

b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties and responsibilities.

(2) A peace officer may, at any time when a driver is stopped pursuant to subsection (1): (

a) require the driver to give his or her name, date of birth and address; (

b) request information from the driver about whether and to what extent the driver consumed, before or while driving, alcohol or any drug or other substance that causes the driver to be unable to safely operate a vehicle; and (

c) if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver has consumed alcohol or a drug or another substance that causes the driver to be unable to safely operate a vehicle, require the driver to undergo a field sobriety test. [ 33 ] While

section 209.1 authorizes stopping a vehicle to check for certain things, it does not authorize a police officer to arrest an accused and take him into custody to facilitate those inquiries. Constable Lindsay did not ask Mr. Christianson for his name, address, and date of birth until after he had been detained in the back of the police vehicle for some time. Neither did he ask any questions about alcohol consumption before Mr. Christianson was under de facto arrest. He did not require Mr. Christianson to undergo a field sobriety test.

Rather, the officer took the accused into custody, without telling him why, while he launched into an impaired driving investigation. I find Constable Lindsay was not acting under the authority of

section 209.1 of the TSA , as he made none of those inquiries when he stopped Mr. Christianson. [ 34 ] Police have a limited power to detain for investigation where there are reasonable grounds to detain. The detention must be

viewed as reasonably necessary on an objective view of the totality of the circumstances, informing the officer’s suspicion that there is aclear nexus between the person to be detained and a recent or ongoing criminal offence. The power to detain cannot be exercised on thebasis of a hunch, nor can it become a de facto arrest (Mann). I find in this case there was no investigative detention. When asked why hedidn’t make an ASD demand, Constable Lindsay replied that he didn’t need to; he already had grounds to arrest the accused.

In hismind, therefore, he was not implementing the kind of momentary detention envisioned in Mann. This was a de facto arrest from themoment Constable Lindsay directed Mr. Christianson to the police vehicle. [35] The question then becomes this: was this arrest authorized by law?

Section 495 of the Criminal Code states:

(1) A peace officer may arrest without warrant (

a) a person who has committed an indictable offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has committed or is about tocommit an indictable offence; (

b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; ... [36] In this case, Constable Lindsay arrested Mr. Christianson the moment he directed him to sit in the back of the police vehicle. He formally arrested the accused some time later, after he had dealt with the passengers. That is, the officer made the arrestimmediately, but did not engage in any formalities, such as informing the accused of the reason for the arrest, informing of his right tocounsel, or warning him of his right to silence. As in R v Gunn, 2012 SKCA 80, the issue is whether the officer made this arrest onreasonable grounds.

As Caldwell J.A. says at paragraph 18: … [W]hat is at issue in the instant Charter inquiry is the objective reasonableness of the investigating officer’s belief. Logically then,the assessment of the reasonableness of this belief must be centred around the factors which actually led the officer to conclude therewere reasonable grounds to believe [the accused’s] ability to operate a vehicle was impaired thereby satisfying the standard imposedunder s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code. [emphasis added] [37] It is what the officer knew before the decision to arrest that matters.

Information gathered after the arrest cannot retroactivelyground the arrest. [38] When an officer testifies to observations that led him to believe someone is impaired, before I can find grounds for arrest, Ifirst have to find that the officer actually made those observations. With Constable Lindsay, I have trouble in so finding. I cannot acceptmost of his grounds. The court must not evaluate the grounds for arrest piecemeal or in isolation, but as a whole. However, a whole lotof nothing is still nothing.

The grounds I do accept are that Constable Lindsay smelled a faint odour of alcohol and observed that Mr.Christianson’s tail lights were not on. Other factors, such as going through the drive-through liquor store, although they may provideretroactive justification, played no

part in Constable Lindsay’s subjective belief at the time of the arrest. [39] Between the de facto arrest and the formal arrest, no further investigation took place to provide grounds to arrest where noneexisted before. Constable Lindsay took Mr. Christianson into custody without reasonable grounds, and without informing him of thereason for the detention or informing him of his right to counsel “without delay,” violating his rights under ss. 9, 10(

a) and 10(b).

Section 8: Search and Seizure [40] I find Constable Lindsay’s primary purpose in placing the accused in the back of the police vehicle was to isolate the smell ofalcohol. He could not be sure it came from the accused until Mr. Christianson was separated from the truck. Furthermore, the smellwould be stronger in an enclosed space, such as a vehicle. This is a search within the meaning of

section 8. While the accused bears theburden of persuading the court that his rights have been infringed, once the accused has demonstrated that a search was conductedwithout warrant, the Crown has the burden of showing on a balance of probabilities that the search was reasonable. To be foundreasonable, the search must be authorized by a reasonable law, and the manner of search must be reasonable (R v Collins, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265). [41] In this case, there was no warrant to search. The police do have the power to search incidental to a lawful arrest (Cloutier vLanglois, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 158).

However, in this case, the arrest was not lawful. I have found that the accusedwas in fact under arrest the moment Constable Lindsay directed him to sit in the back of the police vehicle. The search occurred whenthe officer smelled alcohol coming from the accused, after he had been in the back of the police vehicle. The arrest being unlawful,there was no power to search incident to that arrest.

[ 42 ] However, if I am wrong about that, and Mr. Christianson was only detained but not arrested before Constable Lindsay read him his rights and warnings, then I have to consider whether this was a valid search incident to detention. Where the officer has lawfully detained the person for investigation, the officer may undertake a protective pat down search where the officer believes on reasonable grounds that his or her safety or the safety of others is at risk. The search must be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to locate weapons ( Mann ).

Isolating the accused to ascertain the source of the odour of alcohol is not a valid search incident to detention. Discovering evidence against the accused is not a valid purpose for a search incident to detention. Furthermore, as the detention was arbitrary and unlawful, it cannot act as the foundation for such a search power. [ 43 ] I find Mr. Christianson’s

section 8 right to be secure against unreasonable search has been violated. 3. Grant Analysis [ 44 ]

Section 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states:

(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter , have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter , the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 45 ] The Supreme Court of Canada in Grant , outlined the analysis to be undertaken in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence obtained in breach of Charter rights.

Under Grant , in determining whether admitting the evidence will bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the court must focus on maintaining the integrity of and public confidence in the justice system in the long term. A section 24(2) analysis starts from the proposition that the breach has caused damage to the administration of justice and seeks to ensure that evidence obtained through the breach does not do further damage to the justice system. The purpose is neither to punish the police nor to compensate the accused. The court must take into account the following: 1.

The seriousness of the Charter -infringing state conduct. Admission may send the message that the justice system condones serious state misconduct. 2. The impact of the breach on the Charter -protected interests of the accused. Admission may send the message that individual rights count for little. 3. Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. [ 46 ] In this case, Constable Lindsay had an ASD device with him and was certified to use it. This is a less intrusive manner of screening for potential impaired drivers. Only those who blow an “F” will be further detained.

The officer chose not to use it, although it might have validated his grounds for the arrest. If he already had grounds to arrest, it would not be necessary to make an ASD demand. However, in this case, he did not have grounds. Furthermore, he investigated hardly at all before he decided to arrest the accused. In other words, he arrested first and asked questions later. He overstepped his authority and did not respect the liberty interests of the accused or his passengers. The fact that there were multiple breaches increases the seriousness of the conduct.

The public is sensitive to police overreach, and admission of this evidence would send the message that the court is complicit in the routine violation of Charter rights. This factor favours exclusion of the evidence. As to the second factor, the evidence obtained was conscriptive. The police officer gave orders to the accused so he could make incriminating observations, and so he could perform an unauthorized search, in order to obtain grounds after the de facto arrest. The accused was required to incriminate himself by following the officer’s order to get in the back of the police vehicle.

This facilitated an unreasonable search, by isolating the odour of alcohol. This search was the result of an arbitrary detention. This, too, favours exclusion. The third factor, society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits, usually weighs in favour of inclusion. However, in this case, based on the evidence heard so far, the Crown’s case is weak at best. It is by no means certain a conviction would follow admission of the evidence.

In this case, the third factor is neutral, as an acquittal is likely to follow either admission or exclusion of the evidence. [ 47 ] On balance, I find that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and I exclude all evidence obtained after the point that Constable Lindsay directed Mr. Christianson to walk to the police vehicle.

[48] Defence also sought a stay of proceedings as a remedy under subsection 24(1). A stay of proceedings will be granted only in“the clearest of cases” (R v Jewitt, (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 128). This is not the clearest of cases. Furthermore, given Ihave found exclusion of evidence to be an appropriate remedy under section 24(2), I decline to direct a judicial stay of proceedings in thiscase. Dated this 17th day of May, A.D. 2017, at the City of Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan. ______________________ F.M. Daunt, J