R. v. Bryson Date:, 2014 BCPC 127

Citation: R. v. Bryson Date: 20140516 2014 BCPC 0127 File No: 76096 Registry: Nanaimo IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. LARRY MICHAEL JOHN BRYSON and DENISE BRYSON REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE GOUGE Counsel for the Crown: B. McCormick Appearing in person: Denise Bryson

Counsel for Larry Michael John Bryson : M. Screech Place of Hearing: Nanaimo , B.C. Dates of Hearing: February 12, March 11, May 13, 2014 Date of Judgment: May 16, 2014 Introduction [ 1 ] The charges in this case arise from events which occurred at the home of Mr. & Ms. Bryson between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. on September 27, 2102. Ms.& Mr. Bryson are charged with wilfully obstructing or resisting a police officer engaged in the execution of his duty. Mr. Bryson (but not Ms. Bryson) is also charged with assaulting a police officer engaged in the execution of his duty. [ 2 ] For the reasons which follow, I conclude that: (

i) Mr. Bryson is guilty of each of the offences with which he is charged; (ii) Ms. Bryson is guilty of the lesser included offence of attempting to obstruct a police officer in the course of his duty. The Evidence Police Evidence [ 3 ] With one important exception, noted in paragraph 7, the evidence of Constables Nyberg and Sundar was consistent, and may be recited as a single narrative. [ 4 ] Constables Nyberg and Sundar each said that they were on patrol, in police uniform, in separate marked police vehicles, after midnight on September 27, 2012.

They received a call from their dispatcher at 00:50 hours, informing them of an “abandoned” 911 call from 3712 Belaire Drive in Nanaimo. The dispatcher informed them that a male at that address had previously been charged with a domestic assault. [ 5 ] An “abandoned” 911 is call is one in which the caller hangs up before speaking with the 911 operator.

An abandoned 911 call is given top priority because it may mean that the caller has been prevented from completing the call by someone else, and that may indicate that the caller is in immediate danger. [ 6 ] Constables Nyberg and Sundar proceeded separately to 3712 Belaire Drive. Constable Nyberg arrived first and parked in the driveway. He rang the doorbell and knocked on the door. There are glass panels on either side of the door, but they are made of bevelled glass, and so are translucent rather than transparent.

Through the glass panels, Constable Nyberg observed that an interior light was on at the rear of the house and saw the flickering of a television screen. He also observed movement, which appeared to be a person approaching the door. Constable Sundar then arrived and parked on the street. He joined Constable Nyberg at the front door. Each of them stood slightly to one side of the door, a measure which they described as commonly adopted for reasons of officer safety. A male, whom the officers identified at trial as Mr. Bryson, opened the door.

His face was flushed, his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled strongly of liquor. Constable Nyberg asked if he had called 911. Mr. Bryson replied that he had not. Constable Nyberg asked if anyone else was at home. Mr. Bryson replied in the negative. The officers then heard the sound of an interior door being closed. Mr. Bryson then said that his wife and dog were at home, but that his wife was in bed. Constable Bryson said that he was obliged to check the residence to make sure that no one was in need of assistance. Mr.

Bryson became angry, said that the officers had the wrong house and began to close the door with his left hand. Constable Bryson blocked the door with his foot. He and Constable Sundar forced the door open with their shoulders, entered the house, and confronted Mr. Bryson in the foyer. Mr. Bryson was flailing his hands about and yelling at the police officers. They tried to explain the reason for their investigation, but Mr. Bryson would not listen. Mr. Bryson tried to walk to the rear of the house, but was restrained by Constable Nyberg. Mr.

Bryson adopted a hostile posture, with his fists clenched, and shouted obscenities at the officers, telling them to leave his house. A female, whom the officers identified at trial as Ms. Bryson, then entered the foyer from a bedroom. She was dressed in a bathrobe. Her eyes were bloodshot and watery and a strong odour of alcohol was on her breath. She also displayed hostile behaviour, shouting obscenities and telling the officers to leave the house. Constable Nyberg asked her if she had called 911, and she replied in the affirmative.

He asked her why, and she said something about being locked out of the house and needing a taxi. Mr. Bryson announced that he was going to throw the police out of his house, and took two steps toward Constable Nyberg. Constable Nyberg then decided to arrest Mr. Bryson and seized his left arm. Constable Sundar seized his right arm. Mr. Bryson backed away and the two officers moved to seize control of him. [ 7 ] At this point, there is an important divergence between the evidence of Constable Nyberg and that of Constable Sundar. Constable Nyberg said that: a. Ms.

Bryson intervened at this point and tried to pull Constable Sundar’s hands away from Mr. Bryson; b. that attempt having failed, she then tried to pull the handcuffs away from Mr. Bryson’s wrists; and c. he warned Ms. Bryson that she would be arrested for obstructing an officer if she persisted. Constable Sundar said that he recalled no such intervention at the moment in question, although (as described below) both officers said that Ms. Bryson exhibited aggressive behaviour a few minutes later. [ 8 ] Ms. Bryson then left the foyer and returned to the bedroom from which she had previously emerged.

The two officers succeeded in handcuffing Mr. Bryson. They seated him in a dining-room chair, which they described as being 20 - 30 feet from the foyer, toward the rear of the house.

[ 9 ] Ms. Bryson then returned, now fully dressed. She was screaming obscenities, demanded that the officers leave the house, and flailed her arms about. Constable Sundar warned her that she risked arrest for assaulting a police officer. She said “If you won’t get out, I will lock you in”, and proceeded to lock the front door of the house. She then approached Constable Sundar, who was standing in the foyer and pushed him on the chest with both hands. He pushed her back and she fell into the closet doors in the foyer, knocking them off their hinges.

Constable Sundar advised her that she was under arrest for assaulting a police officer. She began to strike Constable Sundar with her hands. The officers wrestled her to the floor. She struck them as they did so. One officer kneeled on either side of her as they tried to gain control of her hands to place her in handcuffs. [ 10 ] Mr. Bryson then rose from his chair, ran 20 or 30 feet toward the officers and kicked Constable Nyberg on the side of his face as he was kneeling beside Ms. Bryson. [ 11 ] The officers took Mr. & Ms. Bryson to the police station in separate police cars. The Evidence of Mr.

Bryson [ 12 ] Mr. & Ms. Bryson went out for dinner on the evening of September 26, 2012. He consumed no alcohol. Ms. Bryson drank wine with dinner. They returned to their home about 9:00 p.m., after which they watched a movie on their television. Each of them had some wine while they watched the movie. Ms. Bryson went to bed about 11:00 p.m. and Mr. Bryson fell asleep while watching the end of the movie. [ 13 ] Mr. Bryson was awoken by Constable Nyberg’s knock on the front door. He was not then aware that any 911 call had been made from his home.

He thought that the knock was that of his tenant, who frequently forgot his keys. Mr. Bryson opened the door cautiously, and saw no one outside, but caught, out of the corner of his eye, the sheen of light on the hair of someone standing beside the door. He feared a home invasion, and started to shut the door. Before he could do so, it was forced open by Constables Nyberg and Sundar. [ 14 ] During his examination in chief, he said that no words were exchanged before the officers entered the house.

In cross- examination, he said that the officers “… might have been saying all kinds of things and I didn’t hear them ...” because of the suddenness and intensity of the assault. [ 15 ] Once inside the foyer, the officers threw Mr. Bryson to the floor and began to beat him. He did not then realize that they were police officers, and so resisted their attack. The officers handcuffed him and lifted him to his feet by his arms (constrained by handcuffs), which was very painful. [ 16 ] Ms. Bryson then entered the foyer from the bedroom in which she had been sleeping and turned on the lights. At that moment, Mr.

Bryson saw the police uniforms, and realized for the first time that the individuals who were assaulting him were police officers. Ms. Bryson screamed. [ 17 ] Mr. Bryson did not see Ms. Bryson intervene to try to stop the police from assaulting or handcuffing him. [ 18 ] The officers sat Mr. Bryson on a dining room chair about 7 feet from the front door. Having realized that they were police officers, he sat calmly in the chair until the police officers (he used the word “they”) pushed Ms. Bryson into the closet door in the foyer. They then threw her to the floor and began to beat her. Mr.

Bryson jumped to his feet and yelled at the officers to leave Ms. Bryson alone. He did not step in the direction of the police officers. Constable Sundar then tackled Mr. Bryson, as a result of which Mr. Bryson “became airborne”. Constable Nygard joined Constable Sundar in the renewed assault on Mr. Bryson. In the course of that assault, Mr. Bryson may have accidentally struck Constable Nygard with his foot, but does not recall having done so, and did not do so intentionally. The Evidence of Ms. Bryson [ 19 ] On the evening in question, Ms.

Bryson had a glass or a glass and a half of wine with dinner, but none after she returned home. Mr. Bryson consumed no alcohol before he returned home, and had only one glass of wine before Ms. Bryson retired to bed at about 9:30. [ 20 ] She was awakened by a loud crashing sound at about 1:00 a.m. She put on her bathrobe and went into the foyer, where she saw Mr. Bryson on the floor with his hands handcuffed behind his back. Two individuals were hauling Mr. Bryson to his feet by the handcuffs, which was causing him considerable pain.

She could see immediately that they were police officers because the word “police” was printed in large letters on the back of their jackets. [ 21 ] She made no attempt to restrain the police from handcuffing Mr. Bryson. The handcuffs had been applied before she entered the scene. [ 22 ] The chandelier in the foyer was on and the foyer was brightly illuminated. That light was off when she went to bed. She did not turn it on. [ 23 ] The officers then seated Mr.

Bryson, handcuffed, in a dining room chair, about 3 feet from the centre of the foyer. [ 24 ] She asked the officers what they were doing, and they replied that they were investigating a 911 call. She told them that no one had placed a 911 call from her house. She did not tell them that she had placed the 911 call. She turned to go to the kitchen to retrieve her purse, from which she proposed to extract identification to demonstrate to the officers that the house was hers.

One of the officers put his hand on her arm to restrain her. [ 25 ] She said to the officers: “No one is going anywhere until I get some answers.”

She then moved in the direction of the front door, with the intention of turning the deadbolt to lock the officers in. She did not pusheither of the officers. One of the officers (she does not recall which one), then grabbed her and threw her into the closet doors, knockingthem off their hinges. The officers threw her to the floor and pulled her hands behind her back. Both officers knelt beside her, holdingher down, as they applied handcuffs to her wrists. [26] Mr. Bryson rose from his chair, his hands cuffed behind his back. He took one step toward the officers, in his stocking feet on aslippery wooden floor.

He slipped and fell. As he fell, his foot made contact with one of the officers, somewhere between the officer’sshoulder and his face. She is convinced that the contact was accidental. Both officers were kneeling beside her when the contactoccurred. [27] In answer to my questions, Ms. Bryson confirmed that: a. When she first came out of her bedroom after hearing the loud crash, Mr. Bryson was in handcuffs and in the grasp of the twopolice officers. b. She inferred that the officers had arrested Mr. Bryson and intended to take him to the police station. c.

She was determined to prevent that, at least until she could “… get some answers”. d. For that reason, she resolved to lock the front door, so as to prevent the officers from leaving with Mr. Bryson in their custody. e. She was prevented from implementing that resolve by the police officer who pushed her into the closet door, and by thesubsequent act of handcuffing her. Questions to be Decided [28] The following are the key factual issues: a. Did Mr.

Bryson know that Constables Nyberg and Sundar were police officers engaged in a police investigation when he tried tostop them from entering his house, or when he resisted the officers’ attempts to handcuff him? b. Did Mr. Bryson lie to Constables Nyberg and Sundar, by telling them that no one else was at home? c. If so, did he know when he told that lie that Constables Nyberg and Sundar were engaged on a police investigation and that the liewas germane to the investigation? d. Did Mr. Bryson deliberately kick Constable Nyberg in the head? e. Did Ms.

Bryson attempt to interfere with the officers’ attempts to handcuff Mr. Bryson by grabbing their arms? f. Did Ms. Bryson attempt to interfere with the officers’ attempts to arrest Mr. Bryson by attempting to lock the front door to preventthem from taking Mr. Bryson to the police station? Assessment of the Evidence [29] The approach which I am to take in considering those questions was stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R vs W(D) (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 742 @ paragraph 28: First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit. Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence whichyou do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. As noted in paragraph 38, below, that approach may require some modification in relation to the charges against Ms. Bryson. Do I Believe the Evidence of the Accused? [30] The evidence of Mr. and Ms.

Bryson differs fundamentally on the most important of the questions which I must decide; i.e.whether Mr. Bryson deliberately kicked Constable Nyberg. Each of them said that Mr. Bryson rose from his chair to protest the officers’action in throwing Ms. Bryson to the floor and handcuffing her. Mr. Bryson denied that he stepped toward the officers. He said that heremained standing by his chair and that one of the officers stood up, charged toward him and tackled him, hurling him into the air. Ms.Bryson said that both officers were kneeling beside her, and remained so. She said that Mr.

Bryson stepped toward her, lost his footing,fell and, in falling, accidentally struck Constable Nyberg with his foot. Clearly, one or both of them is an unreliable raconteur of thatevent. [31] Mr. Bryson said that he did not realize that the intruders were police officers until after they had subdued him and sat him in achair in the dining room. He was at some pains to explain that there were no lights on in the house and that the street lighting was sodistant as to afford no useful illumination, either on the front step or in the foyer.

For that reason, he said, he was unable to see theintruders clearly until Ms. Bryson turned on the light in the foyer. Ms. Bryson said that she did not turn on the light in the foyer. Shesaid that the light switch is beside the front door and that she did not approach the front door until she attempted to lock it to prevent theofficers from taking Mr. Bryson to the police station. She was prevented from doing that when the officers threw her into the closet

doors. It is clear that neither Mr. Bryson nor the officers turned on the light before Ms. Bryson joined them. All of them were too busily engaged in their altercation to concern themselves with light switches. There are two possibilities: (

i) the light in the foyer was on when the officers arrived at the house; (ii) Ms. Bryson turned on the light after she came on the scene. If the former, Mr. Bryson’s evidence cannot be relied upon. If the latter, Ms. Bryson’s evidence cannot be relied upon. [ 32 ] I conclude that neither Mr. nor Ms. Bryson is a reliable witness as to the events in question, and do not accept their evidence. Does the Evidence of Mr. or Ms.

Bryson Leave Me With a Reasonable Doubt? [ 33 ] The answer to that question is different in relation to each of the several offences charged. [ 34 ] I begin with the most serious allegation, the charge that Mr. Bryson deliberately kicked Constable Nyberg. Mr. Bryson said that he remained standing beside his chair until Constable Nyberg charged him and threw him into the air. Ms. Bryson said that Mr. Bryson stepped toward the officers, each of whom was kneeling beside her, slipped and struck Constable Nyberg accidentally with his foot.

Except for the question whether the strike was accidental or deliberate, the officers’ evidence is consistent with that of Ms. Bryson. Whether it was an accident or deliberate kick is an inference in respect of which Ms. Bryson is quite likely to be mistaken. After all, at the moment in question, she was handcuffed, face-down on the floor and being restrained by two kneeling officers. As a result, her opportunities for observation were limited. By contrast, Mr. Bryson’s account of the event is completely inconsistent with that of the police officers and Ms. Bryson. Mr.

Bryson’s evidence does not cause me to doubt the objective facts as recounted by Ms. Bryson and the police officers. I conclude that Mr. Bryson’s account is false. [ 35 ] The next question is whether Mr. Bryson knew that the intruders were police officers when he tried to prevent them from entering the house, or when he subsequently resisted their attempts to subdue or handcuff him. He said that he could see that they were police officers as soon as Ms. Bryson turned on the light in the foyer. He explained that he did not realize that earlier because it was dark in the foyer. However, Ms.

Bryson said that she did not turn on the light in the foyer. If that is so, the light must have been on before the officers entered. When compared to Ms. Bryson’s evidence, Mr. Bryson’s evidence does not raise a doubt that Mr. Bryson knew that the intruders were police officers as soon as he opened the front door in response to Constable Nyberg’s knock. [ 36 ] During his evidence in chief, Mr. Bryson said that the officers did not identify themselves as police officers when he opened the door, and simply forced their way in without speaking.

During his cross-examination, he acknowledged that they may have done so, and that he did not hear them because he was preoccupied with their sudden assault. He denied that there was any discussion of a 911 call and denies that he told them that no one else was in the house. Having found his evidence to be incredible on the two points mentioned, his denial on these points does not cause me to doubt the truth or accuracy of the police evidence. [ 37 ] Ms. Bryson’s evidence does not suffer from similar deficiencies. Her evidence is contradicted by others on two points only: a. Mr.

Bryson contradicts her on the point discussed in paragraph 35. b. Constable Nyberg said that she tried to pull Constable Sundar’s hands away from Mr. Bryson as Constable Sundar was attempting to handcuff Mr. Bryson. However, Constable Sundar had no recollection of such an action, and so corroborates Ms. Bryson. So, while I do not believe Ms. Bryson’s evidence, it is not inherently incapable of raising a reasonable doubt. [ 38 ] Ms. Bryson’s problem is that her own evidence, summarized in paragraph 27, clearly establishes that she attempted to commit the offence with which she is charged.

There could be no clearer case of obstructing a police officer in the course of his duty than to lock the officer in a house for the purpose of preventing the officer from transporting to the police station a person whom the officer had arrested. Ms. Bryson said that was what she was trying to do. I have said that I do not believe Ms. Bryson’s evidence. However, the law would fully deserve Mr. Bumble’s characterization if I were to acquit her in the face of her own resolute assertion that she attempted to commit the offence with which she is charged.

Of What Facts Am I Satisfied Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? [ 39 ] In the end, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence of Constables Nygard and Sundar was truthful, and that, with one exception (noted in paragraph 7), it was an accurate account of the events in question. In saying that, I acknowledge that the officers may have been mistaken on some points of detail, and probably were mistaken about the distance from Mr. Bryson’s chair to the foyer. Memories of such points, which are not of central importance, are often unreliable, and the most truthful witness may well be mistaken about them.

By contrast, being kicked in the head makes a lasting impression, about which a witness is unlikely to be mistaken. [ 40 ] The exception is Constable Nygard’s assertion that Ms. Bryson attempted to intervene while the officers were attempting to handcuff Mr. Bryson in the foyer. Constable Sundar had no recollection of such an attempted intervention. Mr. Bryson said that he had no such recollection. Ms. Bryson denied it. In those circumstances, I cannot be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Constable Nygard’s recollection of the point is accurate.

It may be that he confused her later behaviour, after she had changed her clothes, with the events which occurred while the officers were attempting to handcuff Mr. Bryson. [ 41 ] Considering all of the evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: a. As soon as he opened the door, Mr. Bryson realized that the individuals on his doorstep were police officers engaged in an investigation. b. The officers told Mr. Bryson that they were investigating a 911 call. c. Mr. Bryson told the officers that he was the only person in the house. That was a deliberate lie.

d. Mr. Bryson tried to prevent the officers from entering the house. e. Ms. Bryson perceived that the officers had arrested Mr. Bryson as soon as she emerged on the scene from the bedroom. Sheinferred that the officers intended to take Mr. Bryson to the police station. She attempted to lock the front door for the purpose ofpreventing them from doing that. f. Mr. Bryson deliberately kicked Constable Nyberg in the head. Conclusions [42] Mr. Bryson committed the offence of assaulting a police officer by deliberately kicking Constable Nyberg. [43] Mr.

Bryson obstructed the police officers’ investigation of the abandoned 911 call in two ways: a. by attempting to prevent them from entering the house, as they were lawfully entitled to do: R vs Godoy (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 311; b. by his false assertion that no one else was in the house.

The governing principle was stated in Rice vs Connollly [1966] 2 QB414; [1966] 2 All ER 649 @ page 652: It seems to me quite clear that though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty to assist the police, there is no legal dutyto that effect, and indeed the whole basis of the common law is that right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him bypersons in authority, and a refusal to accompany those in authority to any particular place, short, of course, of arrest.

Counsel for therespondent has pointed out that it is undoubtedly an obstruction, and has been so held, for a person questioned by the police to tell a 'cockand bull' story, to put the police off by giving them false information, and I think he would say: well, what is the real distinction, it isvery little away from giving false information to giving no information at all; if that does in fact make it more difficult for the police tocarry out their duties then there is a wilful obstruction.

In my judgment there is all the difference in the world between deliberately tellinga false story, something which on no view a citizen has a right to do, and preserving silence or refusing to answer, something which hehas every right to do. That passage was adopted as an accurate statement of Canadian law, in the context of allegation of criminal obstruction of a policeofficer, in R vs Lawson [1973] OJ #1333 @ paragraph 15. [44] The conclusion reached in paragraph 43 renders it unnecessary for me to consider whether it has been proven that Mr.

Brysonthereafter resisted the officers’ attempts to arrest and subdue him, although it is clear that he did. [45] The next question is whether it is appropriate to convict Mr. Bryson of both of the charges which he faces, in light of theprinciple stated in Kienapple vs The Queen (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729.

Broadly stated, the principle is that a person maynot be convicted of two or more offences arising out of the same incident if, and only if, there is a sufficient factual and legal nexusbetween the two offences to justify the conclusion that multiple convictions arising from the single incident would be legallyobjectionable. The difficult question is defining a sufficient factual nexus and a sufficient legal nexus.

I am guided by the followingexposition of that issue, found in R vs Prince (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 480: … the factual nexus requirement will be satisfied by an affirmative answer to the question: Does the same act of the accused ground eachof the charges? … it will not always be easy to define when one act ends and another begins. Not only are there peculiar problemsassociated with continuing offences, but there exists the possibility of achieving different answers to this question according to the degreeof generality at which

an act is defined …. Such difficulties will have to be resolved on an individual basis as cases arise, having regardto factors such as the remoteness or proximity of the events in time and place, the presence or absence of relevant intervening events …,and whether the accused's actions were related to each other by a common objective. * * * … a single act of an accused can involve two or more delicts against society which bear little or no connection the one to the other. R. v.Logeman … involved charges of driving while suspended and impaired driving; R. v.

Lecky …, contributing to juvenile delinquency andtrafficking in a narcotic; R. v. Earle …, breach of recognizance and possession of a narcotic; R. v. Pinkerton …, breach of probation andcommon assault; R. v. Pere Jean Gregoire de la Trinite …, contempt of court and unlawfully detaining children. Notwithstanding that asingle act of the accused appears in each of these cases to have given rise to two charges, Kienapple was held to be inapplicable. In myview, these cases were correctly decided. If an accused is guilty of several wrongs, there is no injustice in his or her record conformingto that reality.

In short, I agree with the following remarks of Lambert J.A. in R. v. Harrison …: It is not sufficient to consider the charges and to ask whether conviction on one will involve conviction on another. It is not sufficient toconsider the facts and to ask whether only one act is involved. The facts and the charges must be considered together and in theirrelationship to each other. In this case, several minutes elapsed between the confrontation at the doorway (during which Mr. Bryson lied to Constable Nyberg) andthe kick administered by Mr. Bryson to Constable Nyberg’s face.

During that interval, the officers had forced their way into the Brysonhome, subdued Mr. Bryson after a considerable struggle, arrested him, handcuffed him and placed him in a chair. The deceitful, but non-violent, conversation in the doorway was a separate incident from the violent struggles, first with Mr. Bryson and then with Ms. Bryson,which followed it. The struggle with Mr. Bryson was a separate incident from the struggle with Ms. Bryson. The former was over, andMr. Bryson fully subdued (on his own evidence) before the latter began and prompted Mr. Bryson’s assault on Constable Nygard. I

conclude that the factual nexus between the lie and the assault is insufficient to justify the application of the Kienapple principle in thiscase. The legal nexus between the two is also, in my judgment insufficient. The two crimes in question are concerned with two differenttypes of legal interests. The obligation to refrain from lying to police officers derives from society’s interest in the prompt, efficient andeffective investigation of crimes. The prohibition against assaulting police officers derives from society’s interest in keeping its officerssafe from harm.

The two are unrelated. [46] Accordingly, I conclude that it is appropriate to convict Mr. Bryson of both of the charges which he faces. [47] Ms. Bryson attempted to commit the offence of obstructing a police officer by attempting to lock the front door to prevent theofficers from taking Mr. Bryson to the police station. She failed in that attempt because the officers prevented her from locking the door. It is therefore appropriate to convict her of the lesser included offence of attempting to obstruct a police officer under

section 463 of theCriminal Code, as was done in R vs Muswagon [1992] MJ #158; (MB KB), 79 Man R (2d) 277, and I convict her ofthat offence. To be clear, the evidence does not support a conviction on the allegation that she physically attempted to restrain theofficers from handcuffing Mr. Bryson. Other Matters [48] Ms. Bryson complained at length about two aspects of police conduct. She complained that the officers refused to secure herresidence and her dog (which was wandering loose) before taking Mr. and Ms. Bryson to the police station.

She had many complaintsabout the way she was treated when held in cells before being released. Because those complaints are irrelevant to the issues which Imust decide, I express no opinion as to the merits of her complaints. If she wishes to pursue them, the appropriate forum is a civilproceeding for breach of her common-law or Charter rights. May 16, 2014 ____________________________ T. Gouge, PCJ