His Majesty the King - v. -, 2022 SKPC 40

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2022 SKPC 40 Date: October 3, 2022 Information: 991197586 Location: Regina _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: His Majesty the King - and - Jessica Rae Fehr Appearing: A. Breker For the Crown B. Jaggi For the Accused PUBLICATION RESTRICTION: The publication of these reasons is restricted pursuant to ss. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code such that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. SENTENCING DECISION D.

KOVATCH , J BACKGROUND [ 1 ] The accused, Jessica Rae Fehr, entered a guilty plea to one charge that on May 11, 2021, she did, by criminal negligence, to wit: giving beverage alcohol to L.W., cause bodily harm to L.W., contrary to s. 221 of the Criminal Code [ Code ].

[ 2 ] The Crown proceeded summarily. On May 30, 2022, the accused appeared before me with her counsel. At that time, a guilty plea was entered to the charge. By agreement, an Agreed Statement of Facts was read in court, and a pre-sentence report (PSR) was requested. On August 5, 2022, the matter came before me for sentencing submissions. At that time, the Agreed Statement of Facts was entered as an exhibit, as was a photobook, a report from the doctor, and victim impact statements. Each party made lengthy submissions. I reserved my decision, and this is that decision.

THE FACTS [ 3 ] The accused is now 31 years of age. She lives in Regina, together with her husband and two children. Until the time of this offence, she was working as a babysitter and caring for children in her home. [ 4 ] The victim, L.W., was just shy of 21 months old, on May 11, 2021, the date of the incident. The victim’s parents were both employed outside of the home. They regularly took L.W. to the accused’s home to be cared for while they were at work. This was the situation since L.W. was three weeks old. The mother and the accused became close friends.

On occasion, the parents would leave L.W. with the accused overnight. The accused felt that she was very emotionally connected to L.W. and described herself as being like a second mother to L.W. [ 5 ] On May 11, 2021, the parents took L.W. to the accused’s home at approximately 7:30 a.m. Most of the day was fairly uneventful, except for the fact that the accused reported that L.W. was “a bit irritable, whiny, and clingy that day due presumably to discomfort from her diaper rash”. [ 6 ] L.W. was staying at the accused’s home that night. Late in the afternoon, the accused’s husband returned home.

The accused made supper, and the family ate supper. After eating, the accused gave L.W. a bath. The Agreed Statement of Facts then continues as follows: During the bath, L.W. initially threw up — but seemed fine afterwards according to Ms. Fehr, continuing with the bath. At this point, Ms. Fehr admits she gave L.W. alcohol. She claimed that she was drinking a mixed drink of rum and coke and that L.W. was asking for sips. She admits that she gave her multiple sips — and also used an infant medicinal syringe to give her at least 3, 10 mL plunges of the mixed drink.

She admits that she gave her more than this — but does not recall specifically how or how much. Ms. Fehr told police that she immediately had no idea why she did what she did — and she was immediately scared and scared herself. After the bath concluded, Ms. Fehr laid L.W. down for a nap — now sometime after 6 p.m. Ms. Fehr was concerned about having just given her alcohol so checked on her 3 times which she estimated was every ten minutes or so after the ‘nap’ began. She admitted the reason she checked on her so much and so frequently is that she knew she had given her alcohol and was worried about her.

The third time Ms. Fehr checked on L.W., she was in distress, having thrown up, and was described as struggling to breathe and turning blue. She called for her husband to call for help — and he called 911… On scene, Jessica [Fehr] did not tell police of any alcohol consumption, reporting that she thought perhaps the bath had been too hot for her. She was asked for a detailed accounting of her ingestion that day — and made no mention of anything related to alcohol. She was further interviewed some hours later and also made no mention of alcohol consumption.

Subsequent search of the residence by RPS revealed an empty bottle of rum in the residence, and a partially full rum bottle in the freezer. A sippy cup which was found in the kitchen sink and which contained chocolate milk was found to contain beverage alcohol —however the volume of alcohol was unable to be ascertained as the container had leaked prior to testing. [ 7 ] L.W. was in Regina General Hospital over the night of May 11 to May 12. In the early morning hours of May 12, she was flown to Saskatoon to the children’s hospital. By the time of her arrival in Saskatoon, L.W. was stable.

Immediate indications were that she was expected to make a full recovery. She was sent back to Regina and later discharged on May 13, 2021. [ 8 ] Dr. Juliet Soper, of the Regina General Hospital, prepared a formal Child and Family Medical Service Report, which was entered as Exhibit P-3. Dr. Soper stated that L.W. was suffering from “acute ethanol poisoning.” The Agreed Statement of Facts sums up her report as follows: The victim was diagnosed with acute ethanol poisoning. Her blood ethanol level — which measures beverage alcohol was at 82.6

milimoles per litre at 10:13 p.m. — which correlates to BAC of 0.38mg%. According to the pediatrician who treated and assessed her case, the victim had life threatening consequences as a result of this alcohol poisoning including hypovolemia which is a dangerous condition that happens when you suddenly lose a lot of blood or fluids from your body, lactic acidosis, which occurs when the body produces too much lactic acid and cannot metabolize it quickly enough, as well as abnormal respiratory status, and reduced level of consciousness. Children metabolize alcohol faster than adults.

Blood serum levels of greater than 10 mmol/L may produce clinically significant effects. The victim was over 8 times that level. This level could have undoubtedly been fatal had she not been treated as promptly as she was. There was no sign of any other dangerous poisons or substances in her bloodstream other than those administered in the course of treatment at hospital.

There is very little data related to BAC extrapolations in small children because of course, incidences are very rare, unsafe, and therefore difficult to study — however, to achieve a blood ethanol level of 82.6 mmol/L — the opinion of the pediatrician in consultation with toxicologists is that she would have ingested at minimum, more than 45 ml (1.5 ounces) of a substance containing 45% ethanol.

The toxicologist opined that at the time of the 911 call, her BAC was likely at least 330mg% — which is more than quadruple the legal driving limit in adults. [ 9 ] The PSR indicates that the accused had an unhappy childhood. Her parents were in and out of her life and had drinking problems. She did not feel supported by them. She felt she was bullied at school. She dropped out of school in grade eleven and began employment. [ 10 ] The accused was in a relationship with an individual for about four years and has one child from that relationship.

This is the accused’s older daughter, who continues to live with the accused. For approximately eight and a half or nine years, the accused has been with her present husband, Sheldon Fehr. They have one child together, age seven. The PSR indicates that the accused was in good physical health. However, approximately two years ago, she was diagnosed for depression and prescribed medication. Since this incident, in June 2022, the accused made a suicide attempt. She has been under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr.

Olabisi, since then and was prescribed medication. [ 11 ] The writer of the PSR stated that the accused was unable to explain why she gave L.W. alcohol. She lacked insight into her behaviour and the steps she might take to avoid further problems. The writer also stated, however, that the accused was very remorseful for her behaviour and very motivated to make positive changes in her life. The accused was requesting programming and counselling. Lastly, the PSR indicated that the accused is a low risk to reoffend. [ 12 ] Both of the parents prepared victim impact statements, which were filed as Exhibit P-4.

The statements advised that L.W. has a scar on her knee from the first IV given to her by the paramedics. Apart from that, it appears that L.W. does not suffer from any other ongoing physical problems. She does have some emotional difficulties. L.W. is now very shy and very slow to interact with other people. She often freaks out or is very frightened about being left at any other person’s house. She refuses to take any form of oral medication. [ 13 ] In addition, the parents reported that the incident has affected them and their relationship.

They have suffered from a great deal of stress, and the mother has trust problems. Both are very fearful of meeting with the accused at any time. POSITION OF THE PARTIES [ 14 ] Mr. Breker, for the Crown, described this incident as “every parent’s worst nightmare”. The accused was in a position of trust. Indeed, he described it as the ultimate position of trust, where the accused was entrusted with the care of a small child. She breached that trust and committed a severe offence, abusing a child under the age of 18 years.

These factors must be specifically considered by the court, pursuant to s. 718.2 of the Code . [ 15 ] He said that the accused’s actions caused very significant injury and harm to this child. The fact that the child has made a fairly complete recovery was good fortune and attributable to prompt medical care and did not in any way mitigate nor reduce the seriousness of the offence. Mr. Breker further indicated that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing factors to be considered by the court. He specifically pointed out s. 718.01 of the Code .

He stated that the court must make a significant statement that abuse of a helpless child will not be tolerated and will be met with significant punishment. He asked the court to impose a sentence in the range of 12 to 18 months in actual jail, followed by a lengthy period of probation. [ 16 ] The accused’s brother, D.W., testified at the sentencing hearing. D.W. testified that he is a year younger than the accused. He described her as a wonderful and very caring person. He said the accused provides great care to her own children and to other children.

He indicated that he has absolutely no worry or concern about leaving his children in the accused’s care. He stated that sometimes“parents screw up” and make mistakes. This was such an incident. [17] He indicated that he loves his nieces very much and is very concerned for them if the accused is removed from their lives. Heis also very concerned for his sister and does not want her to lose her caring attitude. He wants her to maintain her compassion and lovefor children.

He made an impassioned plea to the court to impose a sentence that did not involve jail time. [18] The accused, Jessica Fehr, read a letter of apology in court. She repeatedly said how very sorry she was for this. She saidL.W. was like a daughter to her, and what she did to L.W. was a “cruel and mean thing”. She also said she can’t forgive herself. Ms.Fehr was very emotional and had difficulty reading the letter. I believe her remorse and apology are genuine. [19] Defence counsel, Mr. Jaggi, stated that the cases that are relied upon by the Crown are very different and distinguishable.

Hesaid the facts in those cases are much more severe than in the case at bar. He pointed to the care that the accused provided for this youngchild for many months prior to this incident. Further, since this incident, the accused has been on strict conditions and has complied withall of them. He pointed to her genuine and extreme remorse and the strong family support. He said the court should consider all of thethings she has going for her and deal with this matter by way of a rehabilitative sentence.

He also pointed out that in the case of R vProulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 SCR 61, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that a conditional sentence can meet the sentencing objectiveof denunciation and deterrence. As a result, there is no need for actual jail here, and nothing will be accomplished by actual jail. ANALYSIS [20] One of the frequently cited cases dealing with child abuse and sentencing is R v McCauley, (Ont Sup Ct).At paragraph 28 of that case, Mr.

Justice Hill attempts to distill a number of principles from sentencing decisions involving child abuse.That paragraph reads as follows: [28] By way of an overview and non-exclusive list only, certain principles have emerged in sentencing cases involving shaken babysyndrome and related child abuse: 1. [T]he law must protect children and those who are defenceless from unwarranted bodily interference”: R. v. E.(A.), at 461; R. v.Cooper, [1985] O.J. No. 138 (C.A.) at 2-3; R. v. Cudmore (1972), (ON CA), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 536 (Ont. C.A.) at 538. 2.

Denunciation and deterrence are the paramount sentencing considerations in child abuse sentencing: R. v. S.E.C., [2003] B.C.J. No.1768 at para. 16. 3. While the appropriate sentence must depend on the particular facts in each case, a contested “typical case” of shaken baby syndromemay attract a sentence of 3 to 5 years’ imprisonment although “the range must extend to accommodate the rare or exceptional case”: R.v. Habib (2000), (ON CA), 147 C.C.C. (3d) 555 (Ont. C.A.) at 561. 4.

Although the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are particularly pressing in child abuse cases “with the result thatincarceration would generally be preferred” (R. v. Ewen (2000), 144 (3d) 277 (Sask. C.A.) at 286; R. v. O’Brien, 2000 BCCA 199, [2000] B.C.J. No. 669 (C.A.) at para. 7-10), a conditional sentence may be imposed where special mitigating circumstancesexist: R. v. Habib, at 561-2; R. v. Carle, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1797 (C.A.) at para. 9-11. 5. Parents…cannot escape all responsibility for their actions simply by relying on their own problems”: R. v. Turner, [2001] E.W.J.

No.2494 (C.A.) at para. 17. 6. Offenders with low intellectual ability or poor anger control who shake a child in frustration cannot, on that account alone, escapeincarceration (R. v. J.H., [1999] E.W.J. No. 5454 (C.A.) at para. 8, 16) although frustration by an unskilled and immature parent is a farcry from the deliberate infliction of harm: R. v. Marks (1994), (NL CA), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) at430.

7. Evidence of a pattern of abuse is an aggravating factor: R. v. S.E.C., at para. 14, 18. 8. Permanent injury to the child increases the seriousness of the crime: R. v. G.B., [2003] S.J. No. 335 (C.A.) at para. 12-4; R. v. C.P.,[2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 3019 at para. 7. 9. Summoning medical assistance promptly for the injured child tends to mitigate the severity of the circumstances; R. v. Habib, at 561;R. v. J.H., at para. 14; R. v. Y., [1998] E.W.J. No. 2542 (C.A.) at para. 8, 10-11. 10.

Post arrest acknowledgement of anger control problems and voluntary steps toward addressing control measures can serve to temperthe sentence to be imposed; R. v. C.P., at para. 8, 111; R. v. Carle, at para. 10; R. v. Wigley, 2005 ABCA 295 , [2005] A.J. No.1191 (C.A.) at para. 3; R. v. J.D.B., [2002] N.S.J. No. 211 (S.C.) at para. 4-5, 11-12, 43 (22-yr.-old offender with ADD taking no steps in2 ½ yr. to assist in controlling his emotions). 11.

As with most crimes, remorse of the offender, contributes to mitigation of sentence. [21] Some of the decisions, such as R v Ewen, 2000 SKCA 36, 189 Sask R 239 speak of lengthy terms of incarceration. Someinvolve penitentiary time. Other cases, such as R v J.H. (1999), (ON CA), 135 CCC (3d) 338 (Ont CA) [J.H.] or R vHabib (2000), (ON CA), 147 CCC (3d) 555 (Ont CA) determine that in some cases, a conditional sentence orderwill be appropriate. The range is very broad.

As a result, both counsel are able to refer to sentencing decisions that arguably support theirrespective positions on sentencing in this matter. [22] The Criminal Code has a number of sections that speak of the principles and objectives in any sentencing decision. Thesentencing judge is required to consider and apply these principles and objectives in arriving at a just and suitable sentence.

I haveconsidered and apply the following Code sections: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect forthe law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the followingobjectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community. 718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall giveprimary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. … 718.04 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personalcircumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the court shall give primary consideration to the objectivesof denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence. … 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offenceor the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

… (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years, … (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim. [ 23 ] In the case of R v J.H ., the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with a factual situation similar to the case at bar. In that case, the accused administered cocaine to her five-year-old son. The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less a day.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal stated in part: “While denunciation was an important objective, given the unique circumstance of the offence and the offender, general deterrence was of lesser importance. A conditional sentence was not necessarily inconsistent with the sentencing principles, provided appropriate conditions were imposed.” The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to time served and imposed a lengthy period of probation. [ 24 ] At first blush, this decision appears to support defence counsel’s request for a conditional sentence order.

However, a number of factors have intervened during the past 20 years that cause me to not make a conditional sentence order, but to impose a jail sentence. At the time J.H. was decided, s. 718 was in full force, with the same terms as present. It appears that s. 718.2 , stating the other sentencing principles, was also in full force and in effect. However, s. 718.01 was not present. That

section was enacted in 2005. It specifically mandates that when sentencing for an offence involving the abuse of a child under the age of eighteen years, the Court shall “give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct”. [ 25 ]

Section 718.04 was also not in the Code at the time of J.H . This

section was enacted in 2019. It specifically requires that when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involves the abuse of a vulnerable person, the court “shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence”. [ 26 ] In J.H ., at paragraphs 22 and 23 , the Court specifically stated that the trial judge erred in placing emphasis on denunciation and deterrence and rejecting the objective of rehabilitation.

In my view, the effect of ss. 718.01 and 718.04 is to specifically alter the law as set out in the J.H . case. [ 27 ] In the case of R v Lis , 2020 ONCA 551 , the Court specifically discussed the effect of s. 718.01. At paragraphs 46 to 48, the Court stated: [46] The determination of whether a sentence is fit requires us to consider the sentencing objectives in s. 718 and the sentencing principles included in s. 718.2: Lacasse , at para. 54.

(4) The effect of s. 718.01 [47] By enacting s. 718.01, Parliament prioritized denunciation and deterrence for offences that involve abuse of children. The words "primary consideration" prescribe a relative ordering of sentencing objectives, a feature that does not appear in their listing in s. 718. This ordering reflects Parliament's intention that sentences "better reflect the seriousness of the offence": Friesen , at paras. 101-102. [48] The enactment of s. 718.01 also qualifies the previous direction of the Supreme Court that it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which sentencing objectives are to be prioritized.

Section 718.01 confines the sentencing judge's discretion from elevating other sentencing objectives to an equal or higher priority. However, the sentencing judge retains the discretion to assign significant weight to other factors, such as rehabilitation, in giving effect to the fundamental principle of proportionality: Friesen , at para. 104; R. c.

Rayo , 2018 QCCA 824 , at paras. 103 , 107 and 108. [ 28 ] At paragraph 99, the Court indicates it was an error of law on the part of the sentencing judge to elevate the prominence of rehabilitation, and not respect “the primacy of the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence”. The Court stated at paragraph 99: [99] This sentence fails to respect the primacy of the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence as required by s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code .

It elevates the objective of rehabilitation to a place of prominence that is unwarranted, not only because of the mandate of s. 718.01 , but also on a consideration of the evidence as a whole, including the fresh evidence. This offence was no momentary lapse in judgment, rather it extended over several weeks in connection with food and water and months for medical attention. The sentence also failed to reflect the consequences of the increased maximum punishment enacted by Parliament.

[ 29 ] Much earlier, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in R v Allen , 2012 BCCA 377 , 293 CCC (3d) 455 [ Allen ]. At paragraphs 48 to 52, the Court stated: [48] The principles of sentencing have been codified in

Part XXIII of the Code . As mentioned earlier s. 718.3(1) provides that sentencing is in the discretion of the court imposing sentence subject to the limitations of the enactment. [49] While s. 718 of the Code lists the objectives of sentencing (such as denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation), s. 718.01 requires that two of the objectives, denunciation and deterrence, be given primary consideration when a court imposes sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under 18.

To repeat, s. 718.01 provides: 718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. [50]

Section 718.2 of the Code , which is also relevant to this appeal, provides in part: 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, … (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years. … shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances. [51] Thus, the discretion of the sentencing judge in applying all of the factors set out in

Part XXIII of the Code has been circumscribed by these provisions. As they apply to this case, the sentencing judge was bound to give primary consideration and importance to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence in fashioning her sentence on both counts and, at least with the respect to the assault count, was bound to find that the age of the victim was an aggravating factor. [52] In my view the reasons for sentence reveal that the sentencing judge considered denunciation and deterrence as sentencing objectives, but did not give primary importance to those principles.

As I read the reasons for sentence the sentencing judge first considered denunciation, but went on to consider rehabilitation as an equally important objective. Thus, the sentence imposed was based on an incorrect premise. [ 30 ] The Allen case dealt with the sentencing on charges of possession and distribution of child pornography. At paragraph 60, the Court made some general statements about the importance of protection of children. I regard these statements as being equally applicable to the case at bar.

The Court has stated at paragraph 60: [60] Parliament has made it very clear that the protection of children is a basic value of Canadian society which the courts must defend. It has done this by creating a minimum sentence of imprisonment for the distribution of child pornography ( s. 163.1(3) (a)) and by requiring that offences that involve the abuse of persons under 18 years of age be both an aggravating factor in sentencing and the subject of a sentence which primarily addresses denunciation and deterrence ( ss. 718.2 and 718.01 ). Thus the sentence imposed on Mr.

Allen ought to have communicated society's condemnation of his conduct. It ought to have been one which represented a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct “should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law”. [ 31 ] I note that this last quoted paragraph from Allen has been cited and quoted in a significant number of other sentencing decisions. [ 32 ] There are a number of judicial decisions where abuse of a child has been dealt with by way of a conditional sentence order.

Many of these cases involve a more minor assault; many involve the shaken baby syndrome. These cases tend to involve a fairly momentary and impulsive reaction by the accused to a stressful situation. In my view, the facts here are more severe or egregious. As I read the facts quoted above, the accused’s actions were neither momentary nor impulsive. She gave this very young child a significant amount of alcohol in various ways. She gave L.W. drinks then used a medicinal syringe and perhaps gave her more alcohol after that.

The accused’s actions were deliberate and carried out over a significant period of time. [ 33 ] The accused gave no explanation for her actions. Her brother described her actions as a mistake. Unfortunately, I cannot accept this is a simple mistake. The time and effort required to administer all of this alcohol to L.W. is inconsistent with a momentary mistake or lapse of judgment. In addition, for a significant period of time, the accused actively withheld any disclosure about the

administration of alcohol. I can come to no other conclusion than that Ms. Fehr realized the severity of her actions and of this situation. She attempted to protect herself and exposed L.W. to further harm by not making an immediate disclosure. These actions were not a mistake. They were a planned and thoughtful response. [ 34 ] The parents of a 21-month-old child placed that child in the care of the accused. The accused was very clearly in a position of trust. The parents had entrusted their very young child to the care of the accused. The accused breached that trust by poisoning the infant child.

She abused that child and put that child in severe medical distress. The Criminal Code and the case law have clearly indicated that a breach of trust and abuse of a young child are aggravating factors that must be taken into account when sentencing. In ss. 718.01 and 718.04, the court is directed that the primary consideration must be denunciation and deterrence of the accused’s conduct. The case law has indicated that protection of children is a basic value of Canadian society and that a sentence for abuse of a young child must make a symbolic statement that such conduct will not be tolerated.

In my view, anything less than a period of actual jail will fail to properly reflect the heinous nature of this deliberate act of endangering a child’s life. [ 35 ] Mr. Breker, for the Crown, urged the court to consider a sentence in the range of 12 to 18 months. In my view, such a sentence would be too long. The J.H. case, I referred to above, is often cited for its enunciation of the principle of restraint.

The Court stated: “A first sentence of imprisonment, especially for a first offender, should be as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused, rather than solely for the purpose of a general deterrence.” It is necessary to impose a sentence which balances the need for denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, particularly since this accused has no previous record. [ 36 ] In the result, I find that an appropriate sentence for this offence, for this offender, is eight months imprisonment, to be followed by probation for a period of two years.

The conditions of the probation order will be as follows: 1. Keep the peace and be of behaviour; 2. Appear before the Court as when required to do so; 3. Within two business days of her release from the Pine Grove Correctional Centre, she shall report by phone to the probation officer in Regina and thereafter as and when required by the probation officer; 4. She shall live in a residence approved by the probation officer and not change that address without the prior written permission of the probation officer; 5.

She shall participate in any program related to the assessment, counselling, or treatment for addictions, as directed by the probation officer; 6. She shall participate in other programs related to personal counselling as may be directed by the probation officer; 7. She shall have no contact of any kind in any way, directly or indirectly, with L.W., J.W., R.C., or any member of their immediate family. She shall not refer to L.W., J.W., or R.C. or any member of their immediate family in any way, directly or indirectly, while using electronic social media.

She shall not be at the place of residence, workplace, or place of education of L.W., J.W., or R.C. or any member of their immediate family; 8. She shall have no contact directly or indirectly with any person under the age of 14 years, unless she is in the company of an adult who has been approved for such purpose by the probation officer. Provided that, she may at any time have contact with her own children; 9. She shall not obtain or continue any employment or be a volunteer in a capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person under the age of 14 years. [ 37 ] Ms.

Fehr has been without employment since this incident and obviously this situation will continue at least, for the term of her incarceration. Her husband and family will endure increased expenses and financial hardship. As a result the Criminal Victim Surcharge is waived. Dated at the City of Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 3rd day of October 2022.

________________________________ Kovatch, J