2011 QCCA 1823, 2011 QCCA 1823

Mayuran c. R. 2011 QCCA 1823 COUR D’APPEL CANADA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL N° : 500-10-003804-075 (500-01-018372-042) DATE : Le 4 octobre 2011 CORAM : LES HONORABLES MARC BEAUREGARD, J.C.A. ANDRÉ ROCHON, J.C.A. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, J.C.A. SUGANTHINI MAYURAN APPELANTE - Accusée c.

SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTMÉE - Poursuivante ARRÊT [ 1 ] LA COUR ; Statuant sur l'appel d'un verdict rendu le 16 février 2007 par un jury présidé par la Cour supérieure, district de Montréal, (l'honorable France Charbonneauj) qui a trouvé l'appelante coupable d'un meurtre au deuxième degré; [ 2 ] Pour les motifs du juge Beauregard, ainsi que pour les motifs de la juge Duval Hesler; [ 3 ] ACCUEILLE l'appel; [ 4 ] ANNULE le verdict de culpabilité; [ 5 ] ORDONNE la tenue d'un nouveau procès; [ 6 ] RETOURNE le dossier en Cour supérieure à cette fin; [ 7 ] Pour sa part, le juge Rochon, pour d'autres motifs, aurait rejeté l'appel.

MARC BEAUREGARD, J.C.A. ANDRÉ ROCHON, J.C.A. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, J.C.A. Me Daniel Royer LABELLE, BOUDRAULT, CÔTÉ & ASSOCIÉS Pour l'appelante Me Louis Bouthillier

PROCUREUR AUX POURSUITES CRIMINELLES ET PÉNALES Pour l'intimée Date d’audience : 3 mai 2011 REASONS OF DUVAL HESLER, J.C.A. [ 8 ] The Appellant Suganthini Mayuran was found guilty by a jury of the second degree murder of her sister in law, Dayani Manchutan, who was stabbed to death in the apartment she shared with six other people, all members of her husband's family. [ 9 ] The Appellant Suganthini Mayuran emigrated to Canada in the summer of 2004. Earlier in the year, through an arranged marriage, she had become the wife of Mayuran Thangarajah, twin brother of the husband of the victim.

Upon her arrival to Canada, she moved in with her husband's family in a 5½ rooms apartment in Montréal. The family included both Mayuran's parents, his younger sister, his identical twin brother Manchutan and the victim, wife of Manchutan. [ 10 ] The family and the accused paint a different picture of events.

According to the family members, the two sisters-in-law and the younger sister were left alone in the apartment on the morning of the murder, at around 7:30 am, when the father went to the temple and the twin brothers, Manchutan and Mayuran, left together with their mother in Manchutan's car and drove to Laval, where the family owned and operated a convenience store. [ 11 ] Manchutan and his mother left Mayuran in charge at the store while they went shopping for supplies. Upon their return to the store, Mayurian and his mother left Manchutan in charge of the store and returned to Montréal.

It bears mentioning at this point that Manchutan was seen at the store, alone, at 10:30 am by Johanne Girard, a delivery person. Manchutan also gave the police interrogating him on December 3 and 4 a receipt from Loblaws, in Laval, indicating a purchase there at 10:02 am, when he would have been shopping with his mother, according to the family's account of events. [ 12 ] The younger sister stayed at the apartment until 10 or 10:30 am to attend a private class with a tutor, that began at 11 am.

She testified that she called her brother Mayuran at the store, at around 9:30 am, to ask him if he could give her a lift later on in the day. According to her testimony, when she left, only the Appellant and her sister-in-law, the victim, were at the apartment. [ 13 ] Around 11 or 11:30 am, the Appellant called her father-in-law at the temple and asked him to come home right away. She said that a thief had come in and hurt the victim. She sounded afraid [1] . The father-in-law called at the store and asked Manchutan to come home right away because a robbery had occurred [2] .

He asked a member of the temple to contact the police. [ 14 ] Manchutan made a cellphone call to Mayurian, who was then driving back to Montreal with his mother, and asked him to rush home. He later talked to his brother again and was told to come home quickly, which he did. [ 15 ] When the father arrived at the apartment, without a key, there was no answer when he buzzed the intercom. He went to a nearby store and asked the employee there to use the phone. There was no answer. He went back to the apartment building and buzzed a neighbour, who let him in.

He found the Appellant locked up in the master bedroom, crying. She directed him to the room where the victim, lying on the floor, was bleeding profusely. He called 911 but cut the conversation short when a first team of patrolmen arrived. Mayuran and his mother showed up some 30 minutes later. [ 16 ] The Appellant was crying and had a cut in her hand. She repeated that a thief had come in and left through the kitchen door to the outside.

The kitchen door was indeed open, but there were no traces of steps in the freshly fallen snow. [ 17 ] The victim was taken by ambulance and declared dead upon arrival at the hospital. An autopsy found that the victim had been stabbed 45 times. Some of the wounds were quite superficial, but one pierced the right carotid artery and three the left lung. Death probably occurred within some 15 minutes of the attack and was caused by severe internal and external bleeding.

The weapon used was very probably a knife with a broken tip. [ 18 ] The expert analysis of the blood found at the crime scene revealed the following : • Both Appellant's and the victim's blood were found on the blade of a knife with a broken tip, as well as the Appellant's DNA on the handle. • Appellant's blood was found on the door handle of the master bedroom, but not on the floor.

Appellant's blood was also found in the bathroom and the staircase. • In the bathtub, the investigators found a bucket filled with bloody water and clothes; no conclusion on DNA could be made, because too many profiles were found, including a male profile. • The clothes were Appellant's. [ 19 ] In testifying in her defence, Appellant said her brother-in-law Manchutan had killed his wife. She said the younger sister left at around 9:15 am to go to school and that around 9:45 am, she had heard the victim and Manchutan fight in their room.

She added that they would often fight, but this time it sounded more violent and she heard the victim scream. She went to their room and saw Manchutan with a knife, about to attack the victim. She explained that she tried to take the knife away from him and that's how she was injured.

[20] She said that she panicked and hid in the master bedroom. She also said that Manchutan, speaking to her through the door,ordered her not to tell anyone about what she had seen and to tell everyone that a robber had done it. When silence returned, she left theroom and found the victim in a pool of blood. Not knowing what to do, she chose to call her father-in-law[3] and the police and theambulance then showed up.

THE ISSUES IN APPEAL [21] At trial, the admissibility of Appellant's declarations to the police was raised, as well as that of declarations she would havemade to members of her husband's family. [22] The issue of Appellant's declaration to the police, which the trial judge excluded, is not in appeal as Appellant was foundguilty nonetheless. [23] At the hearing of the appeal, it was also raised that the trial judge failed to give a standard instruction regarding circumstantialevidence. The remaining issues are thus the following : 1.

Whether the trial judge erred when she invited the jury to use the Appellant's confessions to family members as they would any otherevidence; 2. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the matter of motive; 3. Whether the trial judge improperly gave her own opinion of the evidence without at the same time reminding the jury that it was todraw its own conclusions from such evidence; 4. Whether the trial judge was fair in her directives; 5. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the matter of circumstantial evidence; 6.

Whether the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury on a defence of provocation which may have arisen from the evidence. 1. The Appellant's confessions to family members [24] Mayuran, Appellant's husband, and his mother both testified to the fact that the Appellant had confessed killing the victim tothem, by telephone, while in detention pending her trial. When they asked her why, she said the victim was mocking her and ridiculingher for being less educated.

After a few phone calls, however, they testified that she changed her version and told them she had not killedthe victim and had been forced into silence by the real murderer, whose identity she would not reveal out of fear. [25] The Appellant, at trial, denied ever having made such confessions and said she had told her husband many times thatManchutan was the real murderer and that she had tried to tell the truth to her mother-in-law many times, but that the latter would hangup on her. [26] The fact that these "confessions" were challenged mandated a caution to be given to the members of the jury that they had tobe convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had indeed made such confessions before they could be used as evidence.Appellant contends that by telling the jury that this evidence had to be considered like any other, the trial judged misdirected it in amanner which may have had an impact on the verdict and thus cannot be remedied by the curative provision of the Criminal Code. [27] The Crown admits that the trial judge erred in her instructions on this point.

It argues, however, that the error could have hadno impact on the verdict, since Appellant testified in her own defence and was obviously not believed by the members of the jury. [28] In Timm, Justice Proulx spelled out the instructions to be given to the jury in a case where there is evidence of a confessionwhich is denied by the accused: 27 L'arrêt MacKenzie [ (SCC), [1993] 1 R.C.S. 212] nous fournit la réponse.

Quand l'accusé soulève l'authenticité despropos contenus dans une déclaration, le juge doit inviter le jury à rejeter cette déclaration si un doute raisonnable subsiste à ce sujet,mais en autant que pour arriver à cette conclusion le jury prenne en considération la preuve dans son ensemble : ... where a statement by an accused at trial is entirely at odds with a previous out-of-court statement by the accused, and the jury believesthe statement at trial, or is left in reasonable doubt that it is true, then the jury must reject the out-of-court statement; the accused must begiven the benefit of the doubt.

In arriving at that conclusion, the jury should, of course, give consideration to the evidence as a whole.(MacKenzie, p. 239) [...] The jury instruction in the present case is an accurate reflection of the law as stated in Nadeau: an accused's version of events is entitledto the benefit of the doubt as against a competing version, providing the comparison is made having due regard to all the evidence.(MacKenzie, p. 241) […] 30 Appliquant cette règle à l'espèce, il était donc erroné d'inviter le jury à se satisfaire par la "prépondérance des probabilités" del'authenticité de la déclaration que l'appelant répudiait.

Plutôt, la directive devait préciser que : Si le jury croit la déclaration faite au procès ou qu'il subsiste dans son esprit un doute raisonnable à son sujet, il doit alors rejeter ladéclaration imputée, en donnant à l'accusé le bénéfice du doute. Par ailleurs, pour arriver à cette conclusion, le jury doit, naturellement,

prendre en considération la preuve dans son ensemble (R. v. MacKenzie, p. 239).[4] [29] The question of instructions to the jury regarding an accused's confessions was also analyzed by Justice Hilton of this Court inBernier, a case of which the trial judge did not have the benefit at the time of Appellant's trial: 140 It should be noted that despite the error attributed to the trial judge in Timm, the guilty verdict was nevertheless affirmed, and that anappeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed unanimously, "substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Courtof Appeal of Quebec".

In my view, consistent with what the majority of this Court decided in Timm, as confirmed by the Supreme Courtof Canada, it would have been appropriate for the trial judge to instruct the jury in a manner consistent with the extract the reasons ofProulx, J.A. I have quoted at the end of paragraph [139]. 141 That being said, should the appeal be allowed on this basis and a new trial ordered? I would answer the question in the negative,since I believe that under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) Cr.

C., there has been no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.[5] [Court's references omitted] [30] Justice Hilton's analysis in Bernier applies mutatis mutandis to the case at hand, It is only upon an examination of thedirectives of the trial judge as a whole that it can be determined whether or not a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice hasoccurred. 2. The instructions on motive. [31] The trial judge told the jury that the prosecution thought that the Appellant had a motive to kill the victim: out of rage forbeing ridiculed and humiliated.

She also said that if they believed this evidence, it could be used to identify the murderer. [32] The Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by not telling the jury to weigh the motive that she herself attributed toManchutan in her testimony: that he was jealous because his wife was cheating on him with his twin brother.

She adds that she herselfhad no motive to kill the victim, as all the witnesses testified that she was in good terms with the latter. [33] This Court in Proulx[6] opined that a directive on motive has to be equitable, in that it must lay out other possible motives, notjust those of the accused: C'est dans l'arrêt Lewis c. R. [ (SCC), [1979] 2 R.C.S. 821.], que la Cour Suprême du Canada a énoncé les six (6)propositions de base qui doivent guider un juge dans ses directives quant au mobile:

(1) La preuve du mobile est toujours pertinente: il s'ensuit qu'elle est recevable. […]

(2) Le mobile ne fait aucunement

partie du crime et n'est pas juridiquement pertinent à la responsabilité criminelle. Il ne constitue pas unélément juridiquement essentiel de l'accusation portée par le ministère public. […]

(3) La preuve de l'absence de mobile est toujours un fait important en faveur de l'accusé et devrait ordinairement faire l'objet decommentaires dans une adresse du juge au jury. […]

(4) A l'inverse, la présence d'un mobile peut être un élément important dans la preuve du ministère public, notamment en ce qui regardel'identité et l'intention lorsque la preuve est entièrement indirecte. […]

(5) Le mobile est donc toujours une question de fait et de preuve et la nécessité de s'y référer dans son adresse au jury est régie par ledevoir général du juge de première instance de [Traduction] "ne pas seulement récapituler les thèses de la poursuite et de la défense maisde présenter au jury les éléments de preuve indispensables pour parvenir à une juste conclusion".

(6) Chaque affaire dépend des circonstances uniques qui l'entourent. La question du mobile est toujours une question de mesure.

And further: En l'espèce, contrairement aux propositions (3) et (4), il ressort de la directive que le premier juge, après avoir clairement expliqué quela poursuite n'avait aucune obligation de prouver un mobile, n'en a pas présenté la contrepartie en faveur de l'appelant, soit que la preuvede l'absence de mobile ou l'absence de preuve de mobile est un des éléments de la théorie de la défense et que le jury pouvait considérercet élément comme un chaînon manquant dans l'ensemble de la preuve circonstancielle.

Davantage, nous devons ajouter qu'en disant aujury "si vous percevez dans la preuve le mobile il est évident que vous pouvez vous en servir ou en tenir compte", le juge incitait plutôt lejury à spéculer, d'autant plus que le juge n'a pas souligné quels faits seraient de nature à démontrer le mobile.[7] [Emphasis added]

[ 34 ] The appropriate directions were not given here, and it is not possible to fathom the extent of the influence this lapse may have had on the guilty verdict. [ 35 ] In addition, as can be seen from paragraph 24 above, this issue may have some bearing on the issue of provocation, to which I shall revert. 3. The expression of an opinion on the evidence by the trial judge [ 36 ] Appellant was taken to the hospital on the day of the attack on the victim.

In her instructions, the trial judge surmised that the reason Appellant was in such poor condition was that she was tired after striking the victim several times with a knife: Vous pouvez aussi prendre en considération le témoignage de l'accusée lorsqu'elle dit qu'elle mesure cinq pieds et pèse 90 livres, soit le même poids que celui de la victime. Elle a dit à plusieurs reprises, qu'après les incidents dans la maison, à l'hôpital et au poste de police, elle était très fatiguée.

On peut penser qu'une personne pesant 90 livres, qui vient d'assener 45 coups de couteau au point de tuer une autre personne, doit éprouver une grande fatigue . [8] [Emphasis added] [ 37 ] While the trial judge had told the members of the jury that they were not bound by her opinion as to what the evidence showed, she had done so as a part of her general instructions and did not repeat the warning at this point in her instructions. [ 38 ] Arguably, the above statement was very prejudicial to Appellant.

The judge made no mention of Appellant's testimony that she had spent the day before in bed, exhausted and tired because of her menstruation, and that in addition, she was shocked and exhausted as a result of having been a witness to a brutal crime. [ 39 ] The Crown counters that the trial judge was simply offering a possible inference to be drawn from the evidence. [ 40 ] The issue here is not whether Appellant's explanation was believable or whether the trial judge believed it, which, obviously, she did not.

By telling the jury that one could be indeed tired after stabbing the victim 45 times, in effect setting aside the explanation given by the Appellant, which was an important part of her testimony, the trial judge may have overstepped the limits of her role by strongly implying that Appellant was indeed the murderer in this case. [ 41 ] In Gunning , Justice Charron, writing for the Court, explained the limits that apply to the expression of an opinion by the trial judge to the jury on the very questions which the jury is called upon to decide: 27 It is perhaps trite but nonetheless fundamental law that on a jury trial, it is for the judge to decide all questions of law and to direct the jury accordingly; but the jury, who must take its direction on the law from the judge, is the sole arbiter on the facts.

The judge also has the duty, insofar as it is necessary, to assist the jury by reviewing the evidence as it relates to the issues in the case. The judge is also entitled to give an opinion on a question of fact and express it as strongly as the circumstances permit, so long as it is made clear to the jury that the opinion is given as advice and not direction. […] 31 Hence, it is never the function of the judge in a jury trial to assess the evidence and make a determination that the Crown has proven one or more of the essential elements of the offence and to direct the jury accordingly.

It does not matter how obvious the judge may believe the answer to be. Nor does it matter that the judge may be of the view that any other conclusion would be perverse. The trial judge may give an opinion on the matter when it is warranted, but never a direction. [9] (Emphasis added) [ 42 ] The Respondent relies on the unanimous decision in Gauthier [10] to propose that a trial judge is always entitled to give his or her opinion on the facts as long as he or she warns the jury that they are not bound by this opinion.

However, in Gauthier , the trial judge had not given his opinion on the very question of guilt or innocence to be answered by the jury, but rather had presented his views on what some of the witnesses had brought forward, giving the jury much latitude to conclude from their own recollection of the evidence.

This was clear from the judgement on appeal: 49 En premier lieu, il est permis à la ou au juge du procès d'émettre son opinion sur une question factuelle s'il n'en fait pas une directive contraignante et informe les jurés que leur opinion l'emporte sur la sienne, ce à quoi le juge du procès s'est appliqué à plusieurs reprises, mentionnant d'emblée qu'il n'avait aucunement l'intention d'émettre une opinion sur la culpabilité de l'accusé. 50 De plus, l'appelant passe sous silence que plusieurs commentaires du juge étaient formulés de manière interrogative, laissant clairement au jury la tâche de décider des faits. [11] [References omitted, emphasis added] [ 43 ] Such is not the case here. [ 44 ] The trial judge did not have the benefit of Caron , which was published after the Appellant's conviction and in which Hilton, J.A., pointed out the inappropriateness of comments on the evidence such as the one that was made here: 97 En l'espèce, il s'agissait d'un dossier où la preuve était essentiellement circonstancielle, mais non uniquement circonstancielle vu les déclarations de l'appelant et le témoignage de M.

Tremblay. Néanmoins, il est un principe fondamental que le juge présidant un procès devant jury doit laisser à ce dernier le soin de tirer les inférences découlant d'une preuve uniquement circonstancielle. En se prononçant directement sur la question de l'identité de l'assassin en l'espèce, après avoir procédé à une révision de la preuve pertinente à cet égard, la première juge émettait clairement son opinion sur la culpabilité de l'appelant. […]

102 En l'espèce, la juge a donné son opinion quant à l'inférence pouvant être tirée de la preuve circonstancielle. Cela n'était pasnécessaire non plus qu'utile. La preuve relative à l'identité de l'appelant comme auteur du crime découlait de plusieurs faits mis enpreuve. Bien qu'un juge puisse exprimer son opinion sur une question de fait lorsque les circonstances le permettent, il doit mentionnerclairement qu'il s'agit de son opinion.

En l'espèce, la juge a servi cette mise en garde avant d'entamer ses directives sur la preuved'identité : Il se peut également que j'émette un commentaire, une opinion au sujet de questions de fait. Vous n'êtes pas tenus de tirer la mêmeconclusion que moi. C'est vous et non moi qui décidez de ce qui s'est passé dans la présente affaire. […] 103 À mon avis, cette mise en garde générale ne saurait pallier au tort causé à l'appelant.

La première juge, en résumant les faits, aexprimé son opinion à quelques reprises, d'une manière plus ou moins subtile selon le cas, sans jamais indiquer clairement qu'il s'agissaitde son opinion. Or, dans les circonstances propres à l'espèce, de telles mises en garde s'avéraient nécessaires. En commentant lacrédibilité de la thèse de l'appelant et en faisant part de sa conviction en sa culpabilité, la première juge a dépassé les limites del'acceptable.

À sa décharge, soulignons qu'elle ne bénéficiait pas des enseignements de l'arrêt Gunning au moment du procès.[12] [45] Justice Hilton concluded that the trial judge had erred: […] en émettant son opinion sur la principale question en litige. Étant donné que cette dernière erreur a entaché l'équité du procès, laCour est dans l'impossibilité d'appliquer la disposition réparatrice du sous-alinéa 686(1)b)(iii) du Code criminel.[13] [46] This kind of mistake occurred here.

The issue of the credibility of the Appellant was of paramount importance, the evidencebeing solely circumstantial in view of the exclusion of some of Appellant's declarations, as well as the possible dismissal by the jury ofher declarations to family members had appropriate directives been given. 4.

The issue of the fairness of the instructions as a whole. [47] Appellant contends that the trial judge failed to mention in her instructions several elements favourable to the defence whichwere adduced in evidence, among which: (1) the fact that the Appellant, in her evidence, denied having ever made the confessions put inevidence by the testimony of her husband and mother-in-law, saying instead that the purpose of the calls was to accuse her brother-in-law of having killed his wife in a fit of jealous passion; (2) indicia which arose from the pathologist's and the biologist's testimoniesregarding the strength required to stab someone with a knife with a broken tip, the Appellant being very small; (3) the male DNA foundon the Appellant's nightgown and on a towel on the bathroom floor; (4) the fact the Appellant regularly used the murder weapon forpreparing food, which would explain the presence of her DNA on same;

(5) Appellant's testimony that contradicted that of the youngersister who said that the accused and the victim were alone in the apartment when she left; (6) the fact that when she called her father-in-law, the Appellant sounded scared; (7) that no probative value could be attached to the lack of traces in the snow since the Appellantadmitted having lied under pressure about an unknown robber assailant. [48] It is Appellant's contention that all in all, the trial judge did not direct the jury to the appropriate evidence which would haveenabled it to answer some of the trial's fundamental questions, and thus erroneously led the jury to believe that there was no independentevidence that supported the Appellant's testimony. [49] Relying mostly on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Daley[14], the Respondent argues that the extent of the trial judge'sreview of the evidence was sufficient.

The facts of the case being simple, the trial judge need not go further than to remind the jury thatthe Appellant had denied her involvement in the crime, particularly in light of the fact that Appellant's lawyer, when asked for commentsor suggestions regarding the instructions, answered that she was satisfied. [50] Certainly the Crown's position that it was sufficient for the trial judge to remind the jury that the Appellant had denied herinvolvement in the crime is overly simplistic.

However, it is to be noted that the trial judge read to the jury the parties' positions asdrafted by their attorneys, a common practice. [51] The duty of the trial judge is to treat the parties fairly and to make sure that the jury is in possession of the required elementsto understand the respective contentions of the parties in order to return a proper verdict: 30 It must also be stressed that the review described need not be exhaustive: R. v. John (1970), (SCC), 2 C.C.C. (2d)157 at 166 (S.C.C.). The trial judge is not expected to rehash each and every argument made by counsel.

The charge is proper if it leavesthe jury with a sufficient understanding of the evidence relating to the positions taken by the parties on the various issues.[15] [52] Justice Thibault's comments in Devillers are particularly apt: 65 Dans l'arrêt R. c. Charlebois, la Cour suprême a rappelé une règle séculaire quant au rôle du juge à l'égard de la thèse de la défense,en référant à l'extrait suivant de l'arrêt R. c.

G.(R.M.) : Lorsqu'il donne des directives au jury, il est essentiel que le juge du procès résume la thèse ou la position de la défense et qu'ilmentionne les éléments essentiels qui influent sur cette défense de façon à permettre au jury de bien apprécier la preuve. [Je souligne.] 66 Ce principe fait aussi l'unanimité chez les auteurs qui y voient la consécration du devoir du juge du procès de s'assurer de lacompréhension du jury de tous les éléments qui lui permettent de décider du verdict. Les directives n'ont pas à être parfaites, mais il estimportant qu'elles soient appropriées.

En particulier, l'exposé du juge doit être "juste" et "adéquat".[16] [Court's references omitted]

[ 53 ] It would be unfair to describe the review of the evidence for the jury by the trial judge in this case as one-sided. She gave clear instructions on how to evaluate the Appellant's testimony [17] and did mention elements favourable to the Appellant in reviewing the evidence of the various witnesses. [ 54 ] In addition, it does not sit well for Appellant to argue that the treatment of her position by the trial judge was unfair when her attorney failed to comment on the instructions at all, stating instead, as previously mentioned, that she was satisfied.

In Khela , Justice Fish, writing for the majority, explained that counsel must assist judges in this respect: 49 While the obligation to ensure that juries are properly instructed clearly falls to the trial judge, counsel should not abdicate their duty of assisting the court. As Bastarache J. recently explained in R. v. Daley , 2007 SCC 53 , [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523: ... it is expected of counsel that they will assist the trial judge and identify what in their opinion is problematic with the judge's instructions to the jury. While not decisive, failure of counsel to object is a factor in appellate review.

The failure to register a complaint about the aspect of the charge that later becomes the ground for the appeal may be indicative of the seriousness of the alleged violation. [para. 58] In this light, I note without more that counsel did not object to the judge's charge in this case. [18] [ 55 ] This view was echoed in Royz : 3 […] The judge's review of the evidence was succinct but adequate. While we agree that juries may tend to place more weight on what a trial judge says about the evidence than on the argument by counsel, there was no objection to the charge from defence counsel.

Lack of objection is not fatal, but it may be informative, because defence counsel would have understood that additional evidentiary matters reviewed at his request might result in the judge repeating additional portions of the evidence requested by the prosecution on the same point, which might in the end have been expected to be more prejudicial than helpful to the defence.

Trial counsel are well situated to assess whether the judge has given the jury an adequate review of the evidence for the purpose of the defence theory being pursued. [19] [ 56 ] It must also be remembered, once again, that the trial judge's review of the position of the defence, indeed, of both parties, was as stated by the attorneys. 5.

The Absence of an Appropriate Direction on Circumstantial Evidence [ 57 ] In a case such as the present one, a jury ought to be cautioned that before a verdict of guilty can be based on circumstantial evidence, it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts: …The essential component of an instruction on circumstantial evidence is to instill in the jury that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty. [20] [ 58 ] Such an instruction is not to be found in the transcript. 6.

The Defence of Provocation [ 59 ] Appellant argues that a defence of provocation should have been presented to the jury in the event that it believed that the confessions about which the mother-in-law and the husband of the accused testified had truly been made, since they contain sufficient evidence to support the idea that Appellant acted in an excess of rage and anger (see paragraphs 24 and 31 above). Appellant adds that such a submission could obviously not be made at trial by Appellant's attorney, but is one that the trial judge had the obligation to volunteer, as was decided in Augusma [21] .

On this basis alone, a new trial should be ordered. [ 60 ] The Crown points out that Appellant could have asked the trial judge to explain this defence to the jury once the attorney's arguments had ended. It adds that no evidence of provocation was presented by the defence and neither was any evidence made that the provocation was sudden, which is an essential element under s. 232(2) Cr.C . Finally, it contends that it would be unreasonable to propose that an insult regarding one's level of education meets the required threshold as described in Thibert [22] and Parent [23] . [ 61 ]

Section of the Criminal Code deals with provocation: 232.

(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. What is provocation

(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this

section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool. Questions of fact

(3) For the purposes of this section, the questions (

a) whether a particular wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and (

b) whether the accused was deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation that he alleges he received, are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given provocation to another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything that the accused incited him to do in order to provide the accused with an excuse for causing death or bodily harm to

any human being. [62] Appellant's counsel did not hint at the possibility of a defence of provocation. Should the judge have raised it on her own? [63] It was so decided in Augusma, although the fact pattern in that case differed from the present: 20 Le juge, si les conditions de l'article 232 C.cr. sont rencontrées, à l'obligation d'instruire le jury sur cette défense, même si elle n'a pasété soulevée par l'accusé lors du procès, comme c'est le cas en l'espèce. Dans R. c.

Faid, (SCC), [1983] 1 R.C.S. 265, lejuge Dickson a écrit (à la page 274): It is commonplace that the fact that an accused does not raise a defence does not relieve the trial judge from the duty of putting thematter before the jury, where there are facts in evidence for the jury to consider. 21 Dans R. c. Thibert, (1996) (SCC), 1 R.C.S. 37, la Cour suprême a précisé ce que l'on doit retrouver dans la preuveafin de pouvoir soumettre au jury la défense de provocation.

Le juge Cory s'est exprimé comme suit (à la page 43): That is to say that before the defence of provocation is left to the jury, the trial judge must be satisfied (

a) that there is some evidence tosuggest that the particular wrongful act or insult alleged by the accused would have caused an ordinary person to be deprived of self-control and (

b) that there is some evidence showing that the accused was actually deprived of his or her self-control by that act or insult.This threshold test can be readily met, so long as there is some evidence that the objective and subjective elements may be satisfied. Ifthere is, the defence must then be left with the jury. 22 Le critère objectif de "la personne ordinaire" doit s'apprécier à la lumière de plusieurs caractéristiques communes. Reprenant lesparoles du juge Cory dans l'arrêt R. c.

Thibert, (à la page 49): The "ordinary person" must be of the same age, and sex, and share with the accused such other factors as would give the act or insult inquestion a special significance and have experienced the same series of acts or insults as those experienced by the accused. In

summarythen, the wrongful act or insult must be one which could, in light of the past history of the relationship between the accused and thedeceased, deprive an ordinary person, of the same age, and sex, and sharing with the accused such other factors as would give the act orinsult in question a special significance, of the power of self-control. 23 Quant à l'élément subjectif, il requiert que l'accusé ait effectivement agi de façon impulsive, à la suite d'une excitation imprévue despassions et sans avoir eu le temps de reprendre son sang-froid.[24] [64] Direct evidence from the accused on the provocative effect of the victim's taunts or insults is not essential in order for thedefence of provocation to be left with the jury.[25] [65] Similarly, it was decided in R. v.

Gill that an air of reality inquiry does not require that the accused support a particulardefence in his/her testimony.[26] [66] In the case at hand, it cannot be ruled out that the jury may have found that a defence of provocation had been proved in thelight of the confessions reported by family members. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that stabbing a sister-in-law 45 times,certainly a violent act, occurred in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, particularly in the absence of any other motive.

Conclusion [67] The omissions in the trial judge's instructions raised by the Appellant, though not trivial, do not justify the Court's interventionas they could have had not impact on the verdict in light of the evidence. However, the lack of appropriate directions on the matter ofprovocation may have led the jury to convict the accused of murder where the evidence only justified a verdict of manslaughter and Ishare the views expressed by my colleague Beauregard in this respect.

I therefore propose that the appeal be allowed and that a new trialbe ordered. ___________________________________ NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, J.C.A.

MOTIFS DU JUGE BEAUREGARD [68] J'ai pris connaissance des motifs de la juge Duval Hesler. [69] N'eût été du fait que le jury n'a pas été avisé de voir si l'appelante n'avait pas agi « dans un accès de colère causée par uneprovocation soudaine » (article 232(1) du Code criminel), je n'aurais pas ordonné la tenue d'un nouveau procès, mais j'aurais fait uneapplication de l'article 686(1)b)iii) du même code. [70] Devant les éléments de preuve accablants contre l'appelante, il me paraît manifeste que, si la juge avait moins fait paraître son

avis sur les faits, le résultat aurait été le même. [ 71 ] D'autre part, mise à

part l'omission de la juge d'expliquer la notion de provocation, je suis d'avis que l'appelante a eu un procès juste et équitable.

Il ne s'agit pas d'un cas où l'accusé a été condamné par suite d'un élément de preuve irrecevable ou par suite du rejet d'un élément de preuve recevable ou par suite d'un point de droit erronément expliqué au jury ou par suite de toute autre irrégularité qui aurait fait que l'accusé n'aurait eu qu'une apparence de procès et non un véritable procès. [ 72 ] Mais, comme je l'ai suggéré plus haut, je suis d'avis que la juge aurait dû porter à l'attention du jury l'article 232. [ 73 ] Étant donné que l'appelante a offert son témoignage dans lequel elle a affirmé dur comme fer que c'est son beau-frère qui avait tué sa femme, l'avocate de l'appelante pouvait difficilement suggérer elle-même au jury de conclure à manslaughter plutôt qu'à meurtre. [ 74 ] On ne sait pas pourquoi l'avocate de l'appelante n'a pas prié la juge de renseigner elle-même le jury sur la question.

Était-ce par stratégie ? Était-ce parce que l'avocate était d'avis qu'il n'était pas dans l'intérêt de sa cliente de le faire ? Était-ce parce que sa cliente lui avait défendu de le faire ? On ne sait même pas si l'appelante avait été avisée de l'existence de l'

article 232 . [ 75 ] Certains peuvent penser que la juge était elle-même dans une situation difficile : ou bien elle n'attirait pas l'attention du jury sur l'

article 232 et se ferait faire le reproche qu'on lui fait aujourd'hui, ou bien elle renseignait le jury sur la « défense de provocation » et, devant une déclaration de culpabilité de meurtre, on lui reprocherait d'avoir miné la défense de l'appelante. [ 76 ] Un juge n'a que faire des reproches et ne doit pas tolérer qu'un accusé soit condamné pour meurtre alors qu'un jury, renseigné de l'existence de l'

article 232 , pourrait le déclarer coupable seulement de manslaughter. [ 77 ] Il est certain que la position de l'appelante n'est pas sympathique : après avoir fait un faux témoignage, elle prierait aujourd'hui la Cour d'appel de mettre son parjure de côté et d'ordonner la tenue d'un nouveau procès au motif que l'homicide résulte du fait que sa belle-sœur l'aurait provoquée. [ 78 ] Mais l'absence de sympathie qu'on peut avoir devant la stratégie adoptée par l'appelante ou son avocate ne saurait permettre que l'appelante soit déclarée coupable de meurtre si véritablement, lors de l'homicide, elle était en proie à un accès de colère causé par de la provocation. [ 79 ] Finalement, devant le fait que l'appelante a asséné 45 coups de couteau à sa victime, un jury pourrait très bien conclure qu'elle a effectivement agi dans un accès de colère.

D'autre part, les circonstances de l'agression n'excluent pas qu'un jury puisse également conclure que cet accès de colère fut causé par une provocation soudaine. [ 80 ] Pour ces motifs, je suis d'avis d'ordonner la tenue d'un nouveau procès, mais seulement sur la question de savoir si l'homicide est un meurtre du second degré ou un manslaughter en application de l'

article 232 du Code criminel . MARC BEAUREGARD, J.C.A. MOTIFS DU JUGE ROCHON [ 81 ] J'ai pris connaissance des motifs du juge Beauregard et de la juge Duval Hesler. [ 82 ] Tout comme eux, je suis d'avis que le seul moyen d'appel susceptible de réussir est celui relatif à la défense de provocation ( art. 232 du Code criminel ). Toutefois, soit dit avec égards, je conclus que cette défense n'avait pas à être soumise au jury puisque la preuve ne la rendait pas vraisemblable. [ 83 ] Environ deux semaines après son arrestation, l'appelante aurait téléphoné à sa belle-mère.

L'époux de l'appelante aurait écouté la conversation téléphonique et lui aurait posé des questions. C'est à cette occasion que l'appelante aurait admis avoir tué sa belle-sœur au motif que cette dernière se serait moquée d'elle. [ 84 ] Pour l'essentiel, le témoignage de l'époux de l'appelante est le suivant : A. At that moment, we asked her what happened and she said that out of her anger, she did like that and then, far from myself, I asked her why she did like that and she answered that she was learning more than me and I was very angry.

It was because of that, I did like that and after a while, the phone call, it was automatically there was a cut. […] A. I stopped because after she spoke for sometime, she passed the telephone to me. I asked her, my interlocutor or the… on the other side, that what happened, she told me in truth actually, I did it. Then, when I asked her why she did it, she gave me a reason that she was telling her that she was more educated than me. Q. Who was telling that ? A. Suganthini told me that she was sort of ridiculing her about her level of education.

[…] A. The moment when I spoke to her, I asked her why she did like that and she said that she was the one who did that and then Iasked her why and she said about the studies and it was because of that argument, she was angry and she said she did with a anger. [85] La belle-mère de l'appelante rapporte des propos similaires : Q. And how did the conversation go ? A. I asked her what happened, why did she do it. Q. What did Suganthini answer ? A. Suganthini said : I have done it. And when I asked her why did you do it, she said she scolded at, she reproached me andthat's why I did it. Q. Did she say anything else ?

A. I told her: Okay, she scolded at you but why didn't you just leave the place, go out of the apartment if she had provoked you? Q. What did she answer ? A. She said : She scolded at me and that's why I did it. Q. Did she say anything else ? A. Then the telephone after some time got cut off. I don't know, we did not hang up but automatically it was cut off. [86] L'appelante et la victime sont d'origine sri lankaise. Elles se connaissaient avant leur arrivée au Canada. Au Sri Lanka, ellesfréquentaient la même maison d'enseignement. Les deux jeunes femmes avaient marié les deux frères.

Elles s'entendaient bien entreelles. Les témoins affirment qu'elles ne se sont jamais disputées ou querellées. [87] Au procès, l'appelante a nié avoir tenu les propos rapportés par son époux et sa belle-mère, comme elle niait avec vigueur êtrel'auteure du crime. [88] Le procureur de la défense n'a jamais fait allusion à cette défense de provocation et n'a pas demandé au juge de la Coursupérieure de la soumettre au jury. La défense est soulevée pour la première fois dans l'exposé de l'appelante.

Elle n'apparaissait pasdans la requête pour permission d'appeler ni dans le jugement du juge unique qui y a fait droit. [89] Dans l'arrêt R. c. Thibert[27], le juge Cory traite de « Quand faut-il soumettre la défense de provocation à l'appréciation dujury ? ». Il écrit : Dans l'arrêt Parnerkar c.

La Reine, (SCC), [1974] R.C.S. 449, le juge en chef Fauteux, s'exprimant pour les juges de lamajorité, a conclu, à la p. 454, que la défense ne doit pas être soumise à l'appréciation du jury dans le cas suivant:: … si le dossier est dépourvu de toute preuve susceptible de permettre à un jury raisonnable agissant judiciairement de trouver une actioninjuste ou une insulte de la nature et du caractère mentionnés aux al.

a) et

b) du par. (3) de l'art. 203, il entre donc, comme question dedroit, dans le cadre des attributions exclusivement réservées au juge de première instance de la décider et celui-ci doit s'abstenir desoumettre au jury la défense de provocation. C'est donc dire qu'avant de soumettre la défense de provocation à l'appréciation du jury le juge du procès doit être convaincu

a) qu'ilexiste quelque élément de preuve tendant à indiquer que l'action injuste ou l'insulte dont l'accusé allègue l'existence aurait fait perdre àune personne ordinaire le pouvoir de se maîtriser, et

b) qu'il existe quelque élément de preuve que cette action ou insulte a effectivementprivé l'accusé du pouvoir de se maîtriser. Ce critère préliminaire peut être franchi sans peine dès lors qu'il y a quelque élément de preuveindiquant qu'il peut être satisfait aux volets objectif et subjectif.

Si c'est le cas, la défense doit alors être soumise à l'appréciation dujury.[28] [90] Ne serait-ce que dans l'examen du critère objectif, je ne peux conclure à l'existence d'une preuve qui soumise à un juryraisonnable, qui agit dans façon judiciaire, lui permettrait de conclure à l'existence d'une action injuste ou une insulte de telle naturequ'elle suffise à priver une personne ordinaire du pouvoir de se maîtriser. [91] Cette personne ordinaire, du même âge et du même sexe que l'accusée[29], qui entretient des relations normales, sansdifficulté particulière avec sa belle-sœur, ne lui assènerait pas quarante-cinq coups de couteau au motif que celle-ci la nargue un matin ausujet de sa capacité d'apprendre ou de s'éduquer. [92] Bref, la preuve ne présentait pas le caractère de vraisemblance requise pour que la défense soit soumise au jury. [93] Pour ces motifs, je propose le rejet de l'appel.

ANDRÉ ROCHON, J.C.A.