r v. McGILL UNIVERSITY, 2014 QCCA 1695

Poplawski c. McGill University 2014 QCCA 1695 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-024100-133 (500-17-079229-137) DATE: September 17, 2014 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE JACQUES CHAMBERLAND, J.A. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. SLAWOMIR POPLAWSKI Petitioner v.

McGILL UNIVERSITY and MANULIFE FINANCIAL Respondents JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This judgment disposes of: • The petitioner's motion for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered on November 19, 2013, by the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Madam Justice Hélène Le Bel) dismissing his motion for judicial review filed pursuant to art. 835.1 C.C.P ; • The Chief Justice's notice in conformity with sections 94 and 95 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal of Quebec in Civil Matters dated January 16, 2014 (copy attached to this judgment). [ 2 ] For the following reasons, the motion for leave to appeal is dismissed and the petitioner is not declared a vexatious or quarrelsome litigant in the Quebec Court of Appeal.

Motion for leave to appeal [ 3 ] Rather than summarizing their contents, the following is a complete transcript of: (1) the reasons and judgment rendered orally on November 19, 2013 dismissing petitioner's motion for judicial review of a judgment rendered on May 23, 2013 by the Quebec Court, Small Claims Division, District of Montreal (the Honourable Judge Martine L.

Tremblay) and (2) the judgment of Tremblay J.C.Q.: Transcript of Judgment rendered on November 19, 2013 [1] The Court must decide a Motion to seek dismissal of the Motion for judicial review filed by the Plaintiff Poplawski against McGill University and Manulife Financial. The Plaintiff asks the Court to set aside a judgment dated May 23, 2013 made by the Honourable Martine L. Tremblay from the Québec Court ( Small Claims Division ) which dismissed a claim made by Poplawski against the Defendants. Background [2] The Plaintiff worked for McGill University as a research technician from 1988 until November 2010 .

As an employee, he was covered by a Benefit Plan. He was terminated on November 15, 2010 . It seems that at the time of his termination, McGill deducted from his final cheque the premiums for Dental and Health coverage. [3] ln the weeks that followed his termination, the Plaintiff or members of his family incurred expenses that would have been covered by the Benefit Plan and he therefore filed a claim for $817 with the Defendant Manulife as administrator of the Benefit Plan.

Manulife admitted that he would be entitled to receive $602.70 under the Benefit Plan but declined to pay because « Plaintiff's termination of employment entails the termination of his coverage under Benefit Plans » .

[4] On December 21, 2010, McGill refunded to Poplawski through direct deposit the premiums deducted for the Health and Dental coverage on the cheque issued to him on November 11, 2010 . McGill claimed that the deductions had been made by error. [5] The Small Claims Court judge agreed with McGill and Manulife that coverage under the Benefit Plan had ended with the termination of employment and dismissed Poplawski's action, without costs. [6] The Plaintiff was unhappy with this decision. He filed a " Motion for revocation of judgment under art. 5 C.C.P. » dated June 21, 2013.

On July 26, he sent an email to the Honourable Michel Pinsonnault as " Supervisor of Small Claims » and on August 27, 2013, he sent a letter of complaint to the Chief Justice of the Quebec Court. [7] He also received on or before August 30, 2013, from the Honourable Pinsonnault a letter dated August 21, 2013 painting out to him that his motion for revocation had been dismissed because "your reasons to justify the revocation were of the nature of an appeal » and that the judge could not "review or correct a judgment already rendered » except pursuant to art. 475 C.P.C.

The letter also draws the Plaintiff's attention to the provisions of sec. 984 C.C.P. and states: As the process to seek judicial review of the judgement is subject to conditions and time limitations, 1 strongly urge you to seek legal advice as soon as possible should you wish to seek the judicial review of the judgment. [8] The documents are attached to the motion for judicial review and they are therefore part of the record before the Court.

The dispute [9] Today, McGill University asks the Court to dismiss the motion for judicial review on the ground that it was filed « more than four [4} months after the judgment from Martine L. Tremblay, j.c.Q. was rendered ». lt points out that the Plaintiff is « familiar and well aware of the rules relating to judicial review » and that he has been explicitly informed by J. Pinsonnault. [10] Poplawski disputes the Motion for Dismissal. The merits [11] The Court must decide a « Motion for judicial review » filed by the Plaintiff, Mr. Poplawski.

The motion is dated September 26, 2013, and it is supported by an affidavit sworn on October 4, and it attacks a decision from the Québec Court, Small Claims Division, a decision made by Justice Martine L. Tremblay and dated May 23rd, 2013. [12] On its face, the application does not comply with Sec. 835.1 of the Code of civil procedure which requires that such a motion be filed « within a reasonable time of the judgment, order, decision, contested procedure, tact or event giving right to the recourse ».

The record shows that the Plaintiff is or ought to be familiar with this particular provision of the Code of civil procedure as it was brought to his attention by a judge of this Court in a judgment rendered orally in July 2012. [13] ln addition, the record shows that he was advised by J.

Pinsonnault in August 2013 that his recourse was probably an application for judicial review but that it was important that he act promptly and he was urged « to seek legal advice as soon as possible » because judicial review « is subject to conditions and time limitation ». [14] Yet, this motion is dated September 26, 2013 and it was only filed on October 4, 2013. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT : [15] DISMISSES the Motion for judicial review; [16] WITHOUT COSTS .

Judgment rendered on May 23, 2013 [1] Plaintiff claims $ 817 from Defendants solidarily, representing Health and Dental benefits payable under the collective insurance plan covering the employees of McGill University (the "Benefit Plans") (Exhibits DF-1 and DF-2). QUESTION IN DISPUTE [2] What is the effect of Plaintiff's termination of employment on his coverage under the Benefit Plan? THE FACTS [3] Plaintiff worked for Defendant, McGill University ("McGill"). from 1988 until November 2nd, 2010, as a research technician. [4] As an employee of McGill, Plaintiff benefited from the Benefit Plans.

Premiums are deducted at source from the employee's pay, twice a month. [5] On November 11, 2010, McGill issued a cheque (Exhibit D-3) to pay Plaintiff's vacation bank. It deducted premiums for Dental and Health coverage under the Benefit Plans. [6] On November 15, 2010, McGill issued a pay cheque covering the pay period terminated on that day (Exhibit D-4) and deducted 50% of the insurance premiums payable under the Benefit Plans for the month of October and 50 % payable for the month of November 2010, that is to say up to that date.

These premiums were never refunded and McGill advised Manulife (Exhibit DF-3) that, for purpose of the Benefit Plans, the date Plaintiff's employment was terminated was November 15, 2010, which is the last day of the period for which a premium was deducted from Plaintiff's pay.

[7] Plaintiff consulted a chiropractor on November 22, and December 6, 2010 . His wife and children consulted a dentist on December 7, 2010 (Exhibit P-1). He filed a combined claim of $817.

Defendant Manulife Financial ("Manulife"), as administrator of the Benefit Plans, admits that $ 602.70 is eligible under the Benefit Plans, but declined to pay, alleging that Plaintiff's termination of employment entails the termination of his coverage under the Benefit Plans. [8] On December 21, 2010, McGill refunded through direct deposit (Exhibit D-6), the premiums deducted on the cheque of November 11, 2010 (Exhibit D-3) for the Health and Dental coverage. It claims that the deductions were made by error.

ANALYSIS [9] The Court is not seized with an action for wrongful dismissal. lt cannot determine, in a vacuum, if McGill was entitled or not to terminate the Plaintiff's employment and, in the negative, what amount of damages, if any, are payable to Plaintiff and what is the nature of the damages. [10] The Court must decide only Defendant's contractual obligations towards Plaintiff under the Benefit Plans, considering that premiums were paid up to November 15, 2010. [11] As an agent of McGill, Manulife does not assume McGill's liabilities under the Benefit Plans. Its role is administrative in nature and

article 2157 of the Civil Code of Quebec obliges the Court to dismiss the action in as much as it is directed towards Manulife. [12] The claim against McGill must also be dismissed considering the clear wording of

section 6.1 (

a) of the Benefit Plans (Exhibit DF-1 and DF-2) to the effect that coverage ceases at the date of an employee's termination of service. [13] Plaintiff invokes

section 12.5 of the Benefit Plans (Exhibit DF-1 and DF-2) and argues that the Benefit Plans procure him coverage for an additional period of 90 days following the termination of his employment. The Court disagrees. This

section governs the relationship between McGill and Manulife regarding the payment of claims in the event the Benefit Plans are terminated. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [14] DISMISS Plaintiff's action; [15] THE WHOLE without costs. [ 4 ] There is no appeal from a judgment dismissing a motion for judicial review (a judgment rendered under

article 846 C.C.P .) unless a leave to appeal is granted under article 26 (2) C.C.P . [ 5 ] Article 26 (2) C.C.P . reads as follows: 26. Unless otherwise provided, an appeal lies [ … ] An appeal also lies, with leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal, when the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal, particularly where, in the opinion of the judge, the matter at issue is a question of principle, a new issue or a question of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial precedents, [ … ] (4) from any judgment rendered under

article 846; [ … ] 26.

Peuvent faire l'objet d'un appel, à moins d'une disposition contraire: [ … ] Peuvent aussi faire l'objet d'un appel, sur permission d'un juge de la Cour d'appel, lorsque la question en jeu en est une qui devrait être soumise à la Cour d'appel, ce qui est notamment le cas s'il est d'avis qu'une question de principe, une question nouvelle ou une question de droit faisant l'objet d'une jurisprudence contradic​toire est en jeu: [ … ] 4. les jugements rendus en application de l'article 846; [ … ] [ 6 ] Consequently, petitioner had the burden to convince the Court that the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court, namely a question of principle, a new issue or a question of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial precedents. [1] He has failed to discharge said burden. [ 7 ] Le Bel J. dismissed petitioner's motion on the basis of

article 835.1 C.C.P. concluding that, "on its face", the application had not been filed within a reasonable time of the judgment giving rise to the recourse. [ 8 ]

Article 835.1 C.C.P . reads as follows: 835.1. The motion must be served within a reasonable time from the judgment, order, decision, contested procedure, fact or event giving rise to the recourse. 835.1 La requête doit être signifiée dans un délai raisonnable à partir du jugement, de l'ordonnance, de la décision, de la procédure attaquée ou du fait ou de l'événement qui donne ouverture au recours. [ 9 ] Assessing the reasonableness of the delay involves the exercise of a broad discretionary power by the trial judge. Therefore, as

[ 9 ] Assessing the reasonableness of the delay involves the exercise of a broad discretionary power by the trial judge. Therefore, as this Court has repeatedly written, an intervention will only take place when a palpable and overriding error is established. [2] [ 10 ] In Matane , [3] Justice Paré wrote: Le délai raisonnable auquel réfère l'article 835.1 s'apprécie selon les faits particuliers de chaque cas.

La part du juge de première instance dans cet exercice est très large, et à moins que les appelants ne démontrent que le juge s'est appuyé sur des critères erronés ou à tirer de critères autrement valides, des conclusions abusives, je crois qu'une Cour d'Appel ne devrait pas simplement substituer son appréciation à la sienne. [ 11 ] In Deschênes , [4] Chief Justice Michel Robert observed: [28] L’article 835.1 C.p.c. stipule que le recours en révision judiciaire doit être exercé dans un délai raisonnable. Selon l’arrêt de notre Cour dans Loyer c.

Commission des affaires sociales, le délai raisonnable pour présenter ce recours est de 30 jours, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles. […] [30] Par ailleurs, la détermination du caractère raisonnable d’un délai constitue une question mixte de faits et de droit, puisqu’elle nécessite « l’application d’une norme juridique à un ensemble de faits ». Bien que l’arrêt Housen c.

Nikolaisen ne fût pas unanime quant à la norme d’intervention applicable aux cours d’appel face à un jugement sur une question mixte de faits et de droit, notre Cour a adopté la position des juges majoritaires et affirmé qu’il convient d’appliquer la norme de l’erreur manifeste et dominante, à moins qu’une erreur de principe isolable ait été commise. […] [34] Il faut donc déterminer si la Cour supérieure a commis une erreur manifeste et dominante en concluant que l’appelante n’avait pas été confrontée à de telles circonstances. (References omitted) [ 12 ] More recently, in Bélanger [5] , Justice Fournier, then of this Court, reiterated the same principles: [30] Sur cette question, je rappelle que la Cour supérieure, en vertu de son pouvoir de surveillance, jouit d'un large pouvoir discrétionnaire pour déterminer si le délai entre l'acte attaqué et la signification des procédures judiciaires avait un caractère raisonnable. [31] Dans l'arrêt Matane (Ville) c.

Fraternité des policiers et pompiers de la ville de Matane, la Cour a décidé, en regard de la norme d'intervention d'une cour d'appel, que : « à moins que les appelants ne démontrent que le juge s'est appuyé sur des critères erronés ou a tiré des critères autrement valides des conclusions abusives, je crois qu'une Cour d'appel ne devrait pas simplement substituer son appréciation à la sienne ». [32] Il est généralement acquis que le délai pour se pourvoir par voie de révision judiciaire est de 30 jours.

Il appartient au demandeur de faire la démonstration de circonstances exceptionnelles justifiant un délai plus long. (…) […] [35] Ces motifs sont valables. En l'absence d'une erreur manifeste par la juge de première instance, la Cour doit faire preuve de déférence à l'égard de l'exercice de la discrétion de la Cour supérieure.

Ce moyen d'appel sera rejeté. (Reference ommitted) [ 13 ] It is well settled law that, absent special circumstances, a motion for judicial review should be filed within 30 days from the judgment that is the object of the motion. [6] [ 14 ] In the present file, Le Bel J. was faced with a delay of approximately four months, four times that which the courts usually consider to be reasonable. [ 15 ] She took into account all the relevant facts and came to the conclusion that no "special circumstances" were established. [ 16 ] Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, in so concluding, she committed a palpable and overriding error or exercised her discretion in an unreasonable manner. [ 17 ] In any event, had she concluded differently, we are of the opinion that it would not have changed the end result: the motion for judicial review would have been dismissed on its merits. [ 18 ] The Quebec Court, Small Claims Division, had jurisdiction over petitioner's claim (article 953 C.C.P : a claim which did not exceed $7,000).

As noted by Tremblay J., petitioner claimed $817, representing health and dental benefits payable under the collective insurance plan covering the employees of McGill University. [ 19 ] Even though the Quebec Court, Small Claims Division, is subject to judicial review by the Superior Court, as the Supreme Court said in Procureur general de la province de Québec v.

Labrecque , [7] a motion for judicial review will only be granted in the presence of an unreasonable decision. [ 20 ] No appeal lies from a judgment rendered by the Small Claims Division of the Quebec Court (article 984 C.C.P .) and no judicial review may be sought except where there is want or excess of jurisdiction.

984. The judgment is final and without appeal. Actions involving small claims are not subject tothe superintending and reforming power of theSuperior Court, except where there is want orexcess of jurisdiction. 984. Le jugement est final et sans appel. Une cause relative à une petite créance n'est passujette au pouvoir de surveillance et de contrôlede la Cour supérieure, sauf en cas de défaut oud'excès de compétence. [21] As our colleague Dalphond J. wrote in Labonté v.

Quebec Court , while sitting in the Superior Court and before theDunsmuir[8] case: Tous ces éléments considérés dans le cadre d’une analyse pragmatique et fonctionnelle sont indicatifs de la volonté du législateur demettre en place, quant au recouvrement des créances de peu d’importance, un mécanisme facilement accessible, peu coûteux et rapide,dont les décisions sont finales. Le respect de cette volonté commande une très grande déférence de la part de la Cour supérieure à l’égard des décisions rendues par ladivision des petites créances.

En somme, la Cour supérieure ne doit intervenir que si elle conclut au défaut ou à l’excès de compétence Par contre, une erreur alléguée dans le cadre de l’exercice de la compétence, une erreur intra juridictionnelle, par exemple relative àl’interprétation d’une disposition d’une loi ou encore de la preuve, n’autorisera une intervention de la Cour supérieure que si la décisionattaquée est manifestement déraisonnable. [9]. [22] Since Dunsmuir, the highest degree of deference still applies as Dalphond J. wrote in Martial Excavation inc. v.

ConstructionCanalex inc.: [5] J’ajoute qu’il est bien connu qu’en matière de décisions rendues par la division des petites créances, il n’existe pas d’appel. Parconséquent, le seul recours possible est la révision judiciaire qui doit être exercée uniquement dans les cas où il y a excès de compétenceou lorsque la décision doit être considérée comme étant déraisonnable au sens de l’arrêt Dunsmuir c.

Nouveau-Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 190.[10] [23] Judge Tremblay's decision dismissing petitioner's claim is a reasonable one. [24] Had Le Bel J. decided the motion on its merits rather than on the basis of reasonable delay, in the absence of a want or excess ofjurisdiction and of an unreasonable decision by the Quebec Court, she would have had no choice but to dismiss petitioner's motion forjudicial review. [25] Therefore, the motion for leave to appeal should be dismissed because petitioner has failed to show that the matter at issue isone that "ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal" under

article 26 C.C.P.

Notice in conformity with sections 94 and 95 of the Rules [26] Petitioner has been declared quarrelsome by judgment rendered on September 12, 2012 by the Superior Court, District ofMontreal (the Honourable Madam Justice Sophie Picard),[11] and his motion for leave to appeal from that judgment was dismissed onApril 12, 2013.[12] [27] We are not sitting in appeal from that declaration. [28] The matter before us is a different one; it is a new issue since we must decide whether petitioner ought to be declared vexatiousor quarrelsome before the Court of Appeal pursuant to sections 94 and 95 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal in Civil Matters, whichread as follows: 94.

Vexatious proceedings. Where the Court issatisfied that a party before it is conducting aproceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order,proprio motu or upon the motion of a party, astay of proceedings, or a suspension thereof, onthe conditions it deems appropriate. 94. Procédures vexatoires. Lors​qu'elle estconvaincue qu'une

partie en appel agit demanière vexatoire, la Cour peut, d'office ou surrequête d'une partie, ordonner le rejet de laprocédure ou sa suspension aux conditionsqu'elle estime appropriée.

95. Quarrelsome conduct.

(1) Where a person acts in a quarrelsome manner, that is to say exercises litigious rights in an excessive or unreasonable manner, the Court may, proprio motu or upon the motion of a party, declare the person to be a quarrelsome litigant and prohibit that person from filing any other proceeding in the Court without prior authorization of the Chief Justice or the judge the Chief Justice designates for this purpose.

(2) In cases which admit of it, the order may prohibit access to the Court's premises.

(3) No person may be declared a quarrelsome litigant without being first afforded the opportunity to be heard by the Court as to why that person should not be so declared. (4 If the Court acts proprio motu against a party, the Clerk shall inform that party, by registered mail or any other appropriate means, with a copy to the other parties to the case, of the date when the Court will hear the affected party.

(5) The application to file a proceeding must be accompanied by the prohibition order and the proceeding the applicant seeks to institute.

(6) The Chief Justice or the judge the Chief Justice designates may refer the application to file a proceeding to the Court, in which case the applicant must serve it on the parties contemplated by the proposed proceeding, with a 10-day notice of presentation.

(7) An unauthorized proceeding is deemed never to have existed. When informed of a prohibition order, the Clerk must refuse to accept an unauthorized proceeding, except for an application to file a proceeding mentioned above. 95. Quérulence.

(1) Lorsqu'une personne fait preuve d'un comportement quérulent, c'est-à-dire qu'elle exerce son droit d'ester en justice de manière excessive ou déraisonnable, la Cour peut, d'office ou sur requête d'une partie, déclarer cette personne plaideur quérulent et ordonner qu'aucune autre procédure ne soit déposée par elle à la Cour sans autorisation préalable du juge en chef ou du juge que le juge en chef désigne à cette fin.

(2) Dans les cas qui le justifient, la Cour peut interdire l'accès à ses locaux.

(3) Une personne ne peut être déclarée plaideur quérulent sans avoir eu l'occasion de faire valoir les raisons pour lesquelles la Cour devrait s'abstenir de la déclarer quérulente.

(4) Dans les cas où la Cour agit d'office, le greffier transmet à la personne visée, par courrier recommandé ou par tout autre moyen approprié, avec copies aux autres parties au litige, un avis l'informant du jour où elle pourra être entendue par la Cour.

(5) Doivent être produits avec la demande d'autorisation de déposer un acte de procédure l'ordonnance d'assujettissement et l'acte de procédure projeté.

(6) Le juge en chef ou le juge que le juge en chef désigne peut déférer la demande à la Cour, auquel cas la personne qui demande l'autorisation doit la faire signifier aux parties visées par l'acte de procédure projeté, au moins 10 jours avant la date de présentation.

(7) L'acte de procédure non autorisé préalablement est réputé inexistant et le greffier, informé de l'ordonnance, doit refuser de le recevoir, exception faite de la demande d'autorisation mentionnée précédemment. [ 29 ] Concerning the criteria applicable to the review of a litigant behaviour, the Court wrote in Brousseau v.

Montreal (City of) : [2] Les critères pouvant donner ouverture à une déclaration de quérulence ont été définis par le juge Gascon, alors à la Cour supérieure, en ces termes : [82] Ces facteurs indicatifs se résument pour l'essentiel à ceci : 1º Le plaideur quérulent fait montre d'opiniâtreté et de narcissisme; 2º Il se manifeste généralement en demande plutôt qu'en défense; 3º Il multiplie les recours vexatoires, y compris contre les auxiliaires de la justice.

Il n'est pas rare que ses procédures et ses plaintes soient dirigées contre les avocats, le personnel judiciaire ou même les juges, avec allégations de partialité et plaintes déontologiques; 4º Il réitère les mêmes questions par des recours successifs et ampliatifs : la recherche du même résultat malgré les échecs répétés de demandes antérieures est fréquente; 5º Les arguments de droit mis de l'avant se signalent à la fois par leur inventivité et leur incongruité.

Ils ont une forme juridique certes, mais à la limite du rationnel; 6º Les échecs répétés des recours exercés entraînent à plus ou moins longue échéance son incapacité à payer les dépens et les frais de justice afférents; 7º La plupart des décisions adverses, sinon toutes, sont portées en appel ou font l'objet de demandes de révision ou de rétractation; 8º Il se représente seul;

9º Ses procédures sont souvent truffées d'insultes, d'attaques et d'injures. [83] Pour sa part, le Tribunal ajouterait à cette énumération deux autres traits assez courants en la matière :

a) La recherche de condamnations monétaires démesurées par rapport au préjudice réel allégué et l'ajout de conclusions atypiques n'ayant aucune commune mesure avec l'enjeu véritable du débat;

b) L'incapacité et le refus de respecter l'autorité des tribunaux dont le plaideur quérulent revendique pourtant l'utilisation et l'accessibilité. [84] Cela dit, pour conclure à un comportement quérulent, excessif et déraisonnable sur la foi de ces caractéristiques, il ne faut pas qu'elles soient nécessairement toutes présentes. Chaque cas est d'espèce.

C'est la globalité de l'analyse qui importe. [13] [Citation omise] [ 30 ] Our analysis must be made from the content of petitioner's files before this Court. [ 31 ] Our review reveals the following results : no files were opened before 2012 and, since 2012, six motions were introduced before this Court at the initiative of the petitioner, all relating directly or indirectly to his dismissal from McGill University after many years of employment: • Poplawski v. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass. (500-09-023008-21); • Poplawski v.

McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass. (500-09-023034-127) ; • Poplawski v. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass. (500-09-023074-123) ; • Poplawski v. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass. (500-09-023247-133); • Poplawski v. Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse et al. (500-09-023318-132); • Poplawski v. McGill University et al. (the present file). [ 32 ] In Poplawski v.

McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass . (500-09-023008-121), petitioner presented a motion for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered by the Superior Court on August 29, 2012 dismissing a motion in revocation of judgment and a motion for postponement. The motion was heard on November 27, 2012 and dismissed by judgment rendered on December 6, 2012. [14] No further proceedings were filed thereafter. The file is now closed. [ 33 ] In Poplawski v.

McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass . (500-09-023034-127), petitioner applied for leave to appeal from another judgment rendered by the Superior Court dismissing a motion for postponement, a motion in recusation and a motion in revocation of judgment. The motion was heard on December 5, 2012 and the judgment dismissing it rendered on December 21, 2012. [15] No further proceedings were filed thereafter. This file is also closed. [ 34 ] In Poplawski v. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass . (500-09-023074-123), petitioner applied for leave to appeal on October 29, 2012.

The motion was heard on December 17, 2012 and dismissed by judgment rendered on January 7, 2013. [16] No further proceedings were filed thereafter. This file is also closed. [ 35 ] In Poplawski v. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Ass . (500-09-023247-133), petitioner filed a motion for leave to appeal under

article 523 C.C.P. from a judgment rendered on July 5, 2012, corrected on September 12, 2012, declaring him quarrelsome and condemning him to pay damages in the amount of $10,264.21. Many letters were exchanged between petitioner, Chief Justice Nicole Duval Hesler and other members of the Court, but petitioner undertook no other proceedings except for a motion dated May 8, 2013 complaining about the handling of the file (a motion that was never placed on the roll since it did not comply with the Court's rules). As to the motion made under

article 523 C.C.P ., it was heard on April 8, 2013 and dismissed by judgment rendered on April 12, 2013. [17] No further proceedings were filed thereafter. This file is also closed. [ 36 ] In Poplawski v. Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse et al. (500-09-023318-132), petitioner filed a motion for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered on January 7, 2013 by the Tribunal des droits de la personne dismissing his claim since the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the said claim. This motion was not heard by the Court since it was not filed in due time.

Many letters were exchanged between petitioner, Chief Justice Nicole Duval Hesler and other members of the Court, but no other judicial proceedings were filed by petitioner. This file is also closed. [ 37 ] In none of the above five files, did petitioner contest systematically our judgments through motions for revocation, for revision or through motions to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. He did not bring repetitious motions to contest the

judgments of the trial courts either. [ 38 ] At the time of the hearing before us, only one file remains active (the present one): we are of the opinion that it is highly relevant to the issue we are asked to decide. Taking into account that petitioner has been declared quarrelsome on September 2012 by judgment of the Superior Court, he cannot, as a matter of fact, introduce any further matter before us unless it relates to a judgment dismissing a motion seeking permission to introduce a new claim before a trial court or a matter where such a permission has been granted.

No such matters have come before us since the judgment declaring him quarrelsome in the Superior Court. [ 39 ] Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that we are faced with a situation that deserves or gives rise to a declaration of vexatious or quarrelsome litigant before the Court of Appeal under sections 94 and 95 as per the criteria mentioned in Brousseau v.

Montreal (City of) . [ 40 ] However, since our analysis of the correspondence files between petitioner and the Court reveals that he has occasionally display disruptive conduct or been inappropriately insistent in his letters or in person, when presenting himself at the Courts' premises, we take this opportunity to remind him that the Court will tolerate neither abusive language in correspondence addressed to its members or to any of its jurists or other employees, [18] nor inappropriate, arrogant or abusive behaviour on its premises.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 41 ] DISMISSES the motion for leave to appeal, with costs. [ 42 ] Concludes that, on the basis of his record before this Court, Mr. Poplawski ought not to be declared a vexatious or quarrelsome litigant before the Court of Appeal. JACQUES CHAMBERLAND, J.A. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. Slawomir Poplawski In person Mtre Annie Marie Bourgeois LANGLOIS KRONSTRÖM DESJARDINS, S.E.N.C.R.L. For the respondent McGill University Mtre Louis-Stéphane Rousseau FINANCIÈRE MANUVIE For the respondent Financière Manuvie Date of hearing: March 13, 2014