2018 NBCA 26, 2018 NBCA 26

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK J.S. and J.N. APPELLANTS 58-17-CA J.S. et J.N. APPELANTS - and - - et - MINISTER OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (Now the MINISTER OF FAMILIES AND CHILDREN) RESPONDENT MINISTRE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL, (maintenant le MINISTRE DES FAMILLES ET DES ENFANTS) INTIMÉE J.S. and J.N. v. Minister of Social Development (now Minister of Families and Children), 2018 NBCA 26 J.S. et J.N. c.

Ministre du Développement social (maintenant Ministre des Familles et des Enfants), 2018 NBCA 26 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: March 7, 2017 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 7 mars 2017 History of case: Decision under appeal: Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: January 11, 2018 Judgment rendered: February 8, 2018 Reasons delivered: May 10, 2018 Appel entendu : le 11 janvier 2018 Jugement rendu : le 8 février 2018 Motifs déposés : le 10 mai 2018 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green Counsel at hearing: For the Appellant, J.S.: Joseph Wilfred John FitzPatrick For the Appellant, J.N.: Misty Amber Matthews-Emery For the Respondent: Corry Anne Toole Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante, J.S. : Joseph Wilfred John FitzPatrick Pour l’appelant, J.N. : Misty Amber Matthews-Emery Pour l’intimée : Corry Anne Toole THE COURT The appeal is dismissed.

LA COUR L’appel est rejeté.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A. [1] On February 8, 2018, the appeal was dismissed with reasons to follow. Here are those reasons. I. Introduction and Background [2] J.S. is the biological mother of C.S. who was born on April 23, 2013. J.N. stands in loco parentis to C.S. and is a parent as defined by the Family Services Act , S.N.B. 1980, c. F.-2.2, (the “ Act ”). [3] When C.S. was three months old, the Minister of Social Development (now the Minister of Families and Children) (“Minister”), applied for a custody order.

The Minister alleged the appellants were unable to properly care for their child. Hearing dates were set for five days between September and October 2013. On October 10, 2013, a judge issued an order granting the Minister custody of C.S. for a period of “up to five months” commencing July 2013. The parents were granted supervised visits with C.S. and there were a number of social workers and third party service providers engaged by the Minister to assist the parents with issues that had been identified in the initial Case Plan. The concerns related to the following:

i) There was a lack of formula and supplies for C.S.; ii) There were safety issues in the home; iii) There were numerous animals in the home, including cats, a dog and a rat; iv) There were budgeting concerns;

v) There were problems with “basic child care and parenting”; vi) There was an issue with attachment and bonding. [4] In December 2013, a decision was made by the Minister to extend the custody order for three months. In February 2014, the custody order was extended for a further six months; and, in May 2014, it was extended again for six months.

In December 2014, the Minister applied for permanent guardianship of C.S. with the intention of placing him for adoption, pursuant to ss. 8, 55(2.2) and 56(1), of the Act , Rules 3.02 and 73.15 of the Rules of Court and s. 11.4(1) of the Judicature Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. J-2. [5] In support of her application for guardianship, the Minister filed 21 affidavits of social workers and service providers.

In addition, she sought an order pursuant to s. 9 of the Act requesting the court to consider 16 affidavits of social workers and service providers which were filed in support of the Minister’s initial application for a custody order. [6] On December 10, 2014, during their first court appearance, the appellants advised they opposed the Minister’s application, and that they would be retaining legal counsel.

As will be discussed further in these reasons, the matter then proceeded intermittently over a period of 30 months, resulting in a decision and reasons dated March 7, 2017, and an Order dated March 13, 2017, which granted guardianship to the Minister, but reserved a right of access to C.S. with J.S. and J.N. The child, C.S., has remained in the care of the foster parents since July 2013. [7] The following are the amended grounds of appeal:

i) The Honourable Application Justice made an error of law in determining that there was no breach of the Respondent’s right pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically with respect to:

a. Delays in hearing the matter promptly b.

Failing to control the presentation of the case by the Applicant. ii) The Honourable Application Justice made an error of law when, in the context of her analysis of the best interests of the child,she considered the child’s bond with the foster parents, and she considered that “if the Respondents’ plan is successful, there is risk thatthe child will lose the bonds he has with the foster parents”; iii) The Honourable Application Justice made an error in mixed fact and law, in her weighing of the evidence, and in focusing herdecision on historical information, despite that the grounds for the application for guardianship were by the end of the trial substantiallydifferent than and less than that which was pled; iv) The Honourable Application Justice made an error in law by not fully and equally considering the credibility and reliability of allparties and all witnesses before the Court, and in so doing, misrepresented this Honourable Court’s decision in S.H. and M.D. v.

TheMinister of Social Development, 2014 NBCA 20, 419 N.B.R. (2d) 377. II. Standard of Review [8] The Court has clearly established the standard of review in child protection matters. The scope of appellatereview is narrow. If the trier of fact has made a manifest error in his or her

interpretation of the evidence, the Court will intervene. Ifthere has been an error in law, the Court will intervene. At the end of the day, the best interests of the child are pre-eminent. Anallegation raising a breach of procedural fairness or the denial of natural justice will be reviewed on the standard of correctness. [9] In M.D. v.

Minister of Family and Community Services and D.R., J.-P.L. and S.L, 2006 NBCA 7, 294 N.B.R.(2d) 258, Deschênes J.A. states: …[I]t is important to remember that the scope of appellate review is quite narrow as it applies to how the trial judge chooses to promotethe best interests of the children. In this regard, an appellate court must show a great deal of deference. [para. 5] [10] In S.B. v. Minister of Family and Community Services, 2006 NBCA 41, [2006] N.B.J.

No. 167 (QL), RichardJ.A. reiterates the above: It is common ground that the scope of appellate review in child protection matters, including guardianship cases, is very narrow.Considering the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and of this Court on point, it would have been futile for any of theparties not to acknowledge the limited circumstances where appellate intervention may be justified: see, for example, New Brunswick(Minister of Health and Community Services) v. C. (G.C.), (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1073 at para. 5, New Brunswick(Minister of Health and Community Services) v.

L. (M.), (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 534 at paras. 34-36, D.B. v. NewBrunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) (2000), (NB CA), 228 N.B.R. (2d) 218 (C.A.), at paras. 6-7, Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires) v. A.N. et Y.N. (2003), 264 N.B.R. (2d) 80 at para. 11, NewBrunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) v. M.D., 2006 NBCA 7 , [2006] N.B.J. No. 11 (C.A.)(QL) at paras. 5-7 and T.T. v. New Brunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services), [2006] N.B.J. No. 39 (C.A.)(QL) at para. 3.

These casesstand for the proposition, succinctly stated by Drapeau C.J.N.B. in A.N. at para. 11, that an appellate court will not intervene in childprotection cases “unless the trial judge’s decision has no factual merit or was based on an error in principle, a failure to consider allrelevant factors or the consideration of an irrelevant factor.” [para. 3] See also N.J.P. v. The Minister of Social Development, 2012 NBCA 3, 382 N.B.R. (2d) 245, per Quigg J.A.; S.H. v. The Minister ofSocial Development, 2013 NBCA 35, 406 N.B.R. (2d) 242; S.H. and M.D. v.

The Minister of Social Development, 2014 NBCA 20, 419N.B.R. (2d) 377, per Larlee J.A.; V.C. and J.C. v. The Minister of Social Development et al., 2015 NBCA 28, 435 N.B.R. (2d) 205, perQuigg J.A.

III. Analysis [11] Guardianship proceedings are described as “the capital punishment” in family law. This is so due to the fact a guardianship order has the effect of severing the legal rights, duties and obligations between a parent and a child. These proceedings are lengthy, and often complicated by the fact the hearings are preceded by interventions on the part of the Minister, in an effort to keep the family unit together as required by the Act . A guardianship order is sought when all other measures have failed. [12] The

Preamble to the Act recognizes that children and their families are entitled to “the least invasion of privacy and interference with freedom that is compatible with their own interests and those of their families and of society”, and the “best interests and safety of the child must always prevail when there is a conflict between risk to the child and the preservation of the family unit”. [13] The

Preamble also recognizes the need to avoid procedural delays in the decision-making process concerning the permanent plans for a child. Further, there is an acknowledgement that social services are “essential to prevent or alleviate the social and related economic problems of individuals and families”.

There were numerous interventions by social workers and third-party service providers retained by the Minister to work with the parents in keeping with the above principle. [14] In her 417-paragraph decision, the application judge carefully reviewed the evidence, and she provided a detailed analysis of the best interests of the child, as she was required to do. In the end, she determined a guardianship order should issue; however, she reserved a right of access to C.S. with the appellants, the terms of which were to be defined by the Minister. A.

Section 7 [15] I begin with the respondents’ assertion their rights pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter were breached as a result of the delays in hearing this matter, and the manner in which the Minister conducted herself, including the grounds she relied upon to support her application for guardianship. The following is a chronology of the various proceedings.

Date Proceeding July 8, 2013 Notice of Application for protective care was filed December 3, 2014 Notice of Application for guardianship was filed July 27, 2015 First day of trial, delayed by consent to be re- scheduled for 6 days Minister updated her Notice of Application by filing further Affidavits.

November 23, 2015 Hearing commenced for four days but was adjourned November 26, 2015 Hearing re-commenced January 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 2016 Hearing of Minister’s case February 1, 2, 3, 4, 2016 Hearing of Minister’s case April 18, 2016 Continuation of Minister’s case Minister filed a Supplemental Record on Application with five additional Affidavits May 16, 17, 18, 19, 2016 Minister’s case continues Minister filed a Supplemental Record on Application with three additional Affidavits September 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 2016 Minister’s case continued December 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2016 Minister’s case continued and closed on December 14, 2016 December 16, 2016 J.S. brought an oral motion seeking an Order pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter and was directed to file a Motion.

[16] J.N. contends he and J.S. did not receive a fair trial as a result of procedural delays, skewed affidavit evidence,and that he was denied the opportunity to be a full participant. In dismissing these arguments, the application judge referred to NewBrunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, [1999] S.C.J. No. 47(QL), where the Supreme Court concluded the s. 7 Charter right is not absolute, but is subject to the principles of fundamental justice(paras. 69-73).

In G. (J.), Lamer C.J. writes: “Thus, the principles of fundamental justice in child protection proceedings are bothsubstantive and procedural. The state may only relieve a parent of custody when it is necessary to protect the best interests of the child,provided that there is a fair procedure for making this determination” (para. 70).

Recall that s. 7 of the Charter dictates that “[e]veryonehas the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles offundamental justice”. [17] The principle of fundamental justice in child protection hearings was defined by L’Heureux-Dubé J. inWinnipeg Child and Family Services v.

K.L.W., 2000 SCC 48, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519, where she writes: In order to be fair, the hearing must involve reasonable notice with particulars to the parents, as well as an opportunity for them toparticipate meaningfully in the proceedings: see G. (J.), supra, at para. 73; B. (R.), supra, at para. 92. The Manitoba Act clearly meets thenotice and hearing requirements: ss. 24 and 30-37. The child’s need for continuity in relationships provides the most compelling basis for requiring a prompt post-apprehension hearing: seess. 2(1)(a), (

d) and (

g) of the Act; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. M. (C.), (SCC), [1994] 2S.C.R. 165, at pp. 205 and 206; Young, supra, at p. 41; Re Agar, McNeilly v. Agar, (SCC), [1958] S.C.R. 52, at p. 54; P.D. Steinhauer, The Least Detrimental Alternative: A Systematic Guide to Case Planning and Decision Making for Children in Care(1991), at pp. 13 ff. [paras. 123-124] [18] The respondents argue, as this matter was heard well beyond the statutory time frame set out in s. 53 of the Act,it should have been dismissed for delay.

They assert the principle of fundamental justice was violated when the Minister continued to fileupdated affidavits, as it received new information, and, because she did not amend its Notice of Application, they were denied proceduralfairness. In reply, the Minister submits, as the issue of procedural fairness was not raised at the trial level, it is not a matter properlybefore the Court. As an aside, I observe the Minister filed two Supplemental Records on Application during the proceedings. See Ross v.Human Rights Board of Inquiry (N.B.) (1990), (NB CA), 110 N.B.R. (2d) 107, [1990] N.B.J.

No. 847 (C.A.) (QL), atpara. 55 on the issue of procedural fairness. She argues the appellants fully participated in the proceedings and the issue of delay shouldhave been raised prior to the last week of the hearing in December, 2016. Only then did the appellants request permission to file a Noticeof Motion in which they raised the issue of delay.

I agree with the Minister on the issue of procedural fairness; however, more will besaid on the issue of delay. [19] In Winnipeg Child and Family Services, L’Heureux-Dubé J. concludes child protection hearings should begiven high priority due to the interests at stake: As in G. (J.), supra, the interests at stake in cases of apprehension are of the highest order, given the impact that state action involvingthe separation of parents and children may have on all of their lives, and particularly on their psychological and emotional well-being.From the child’s perspective, state action in the form of apprehension seeks to ensure the protection, and indeed the very survival, ofanother interest of fundamental importance: the child’s life and health.

Given that children are highly vulnerable members of our society,and given society’s interest in protecting them from harm, fair process in the child protection context must reflect the fact that children’slives and health may need to be given priority where the protection of these interests diverges from the protection of parents’ rights tofreedom from state intervention. [para. 94] [20] The Supreme Court refined the above in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v.

Canada(Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, where McLachlin C.J.C. concludes: However, the “best interests of the child” fails to meet the second criterion for a principle of fundamental justice: consensus that theprinciple is vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice. The “best interests of the child” is widely supported in legislation andsocial policy, and is an important factor for consideration in many contexts. It is not, however, a foundational requirement for the

dispensation of justice. Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child describes it as “a primary consideration” rather than“the primary consideration” (emphasis added). Drawing on this wording, L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted in Baker v. Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 75: [T]he decision-maker should consider children’s best interests as an important factor, give them substantial weight, and be alert, aliveand sensitive to them.

That is not to say that children’s best interests must always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not beother reasons for denying an H & C claim even when children’s interests are given this consideration. [para. 10] [Emphasis in original.] [21] Sections 53(2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Act require a court to fulfil the following mandate: 53(2) When disposing of an application underthis Part the court shall at all times placeabove all other considerations the bestinterests of the child. 53(2) Lorsqu’elle statue sur une demande enapplication de la présente partie, la cour doit àtout moment placer l’intérêt supérieur del’enfant au-dessus de toute autreconsidération. 53(3) The court shall dispose of anapplication made under this Part within thirtydays after it is made unless the court issatisfied that exceptional circumstancesrequire the disposition of the application to bedelayed beyond such day, in which case thecourt may so order, stating in the order thecircumstances that gave rise to the order; buta failure to comply with this subsection doesnot deprive the court of jurisdiction. 53(3) La cour doit dans les trente jours statuersur une demande faite en vertu de la présentepartie à moins qu’elle ne soit convaincue quedes circonstances exceptionnelles exigent unreport de sa décision, auquel cas elle peutrendre une ordonnance à cet effet en yindiquant ces circonstances; mais un défautde conformité au présent paragraphe ne rendpas la cour incompétente. 53(4) No application shall be dismissedbecause of a procedural defect or lack ofconformity with any requirement of this Partif the court is satisfied that (

a) the defect or lack of conformity has beenor can be compensated for by such substitutedprocedures as the court determines to beadequate in the circumstances; or (

b) failure to cure or compensate for thedefect or lack of conformity has not resultedin or will not result in substantial prejudice tothe interests of a person who may be affectedby the outcome of the proceedings. 53(4) Aucune demande ne peut être rejetéepour vice de procédure ou manque deconformité à toute exigence de la présentepartie si la cour est convaincue que

a) le vice de forme ou le manque deconformité a été ou peut être suppléé partoute autre procédure que la cour estimeconvenir dans les circonstances; ou

b) le défaut de remède ou de suppléance auvice de procédure ou au manque deconformité n’a pas été ni ne sera gravementpréjudiciable aux intérêts de la personne quipeut être touchée par le résultat de laprocédure. 53(5) The court shall give reasons for makingan order or dismissing any application. 53(5) La cour donne les raisons motivant uneordonnance ou le rejet de toute demande. [22] Since R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, and R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659,there has been a heightened awareness concerning institutional delay in the criminal law context.

Paragraph 1 of the Jordan decisionreads: “[t]imely justice is one of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society”. In June 2017, on the heels of Jordan, the StandingSenate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs tabled its report entitled Delaying Justice is Denying Justice: An Urgent Need toAddress Lengthy Court Delays in Canada. The report identifies concerns expressed by litigants and the judiciary in the criminal lawcontext, and offers a series of recommendations in an attempt to address the growing complaints about trial delays.

Challenges aboutover-crowded court dockets and lengthy wait times for trials are common in the civil law context as well. The advent of case

management protocols, status hearings, alternative dispute measures, triage courts and Masters have been initiated in many provinces in an attempt to alleviate these pressures. [23] In the child protection context, delays may lead to extended placements in foster care which are not in keeping with the intention of the legislation and the long term best interests of a child. These issues were identified in C.M. v. Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo , 2015 ONCA 612 , [2015] O.J. No. 4705 (QL) .

The court did not equivocate when it cautioned lawyers, judges, and others who are involved in child protection matters, against inordinate delay. In that case, a twelve day trial was spread over 165 days, and a judgment was rendered three years after the children had been taken into care. The foster parents had expressed the desire to adopt the children. In spite of the delays, the court affirmed the guardianship order, without access to the parents.

The court writes, however: Where a statute requires that events occur within a specified time frame, it is simply unacceptable that justice system participants fail to adhere to those time frames. As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé commented on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v.

K.L.W. , 2000 SCC 48 , [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519 , at para. 136 , “[t]he six-month delay prior to the hearing to determine whether John was in need of protection appears, on its face, to be highly unreasonable, particularly in the case of a newborn child.” This court spoke about the importance of timeliness in child welfare cases in Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v. W.T.C. , 2013 ONCA 491 , [2013] O.J. No. 3438 .

That requires, among other things, that assessment reports be prepared with dispatch; that Children’s Aid Societies make decisions in accordance with statutory timelines about how to proceed in a particular case; that meaningful case management occur in which timetables are set and witness lists are fully canvassed; that trials be scheduled so that trial days are not stretched over months; and that trial judges receive adequate time to prepare reasons in a timely fashion. [paras. 33-34] [24] Governments are attempting to address these problems in response to the ever increasing number of complaints concerning delays in child protection cases.

As an example, in February 2017, the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba announced there would be new time limits imposed for child protection cases. Under the new model, trials must be scheduled within three to six months with the aim of speeding up the process and reducing the number of children who remain in foster homes for an unacceptable period of time. These changes came about as a result of a decision in Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v. HH and CG , 2017 MBCA 33 , [2017] M.J.

No. 78 (QL) , where this issue was discussed at length. [25] I agree with the appellants that children and parents have a right to expect compliance with statutory requirements; however, when parties have participated without complaint, and have consented to adjournments, as they did in this case, their complaints become attenuated. This issue of prejudice was discussed in Jordan where the Supreme Court writes: Second, the new framework resolves the difficulties surrounding the concept of prejudice. Instead of being an express analytical factor, the concept of prejudice underpins the entire framework.

Prejudice is accounted for in the creation of the ceiling. It also has a strong relationship with defence initiative, in that we can expect accused persons who are truly prejudiced to be proactive in moving the matter along. Prejudice has been one of the most fraught areas of s. 11(

b) jurisprudence for over two decades. Understanding prejudice as informing the setting of the ceiling, rather than treating prejudice as an express analytical factor, also better recognizes that, as we have said, prolonged delays cause prejudice to not just specific accused persons, but also victims, witnesses, and the system of justice as a whole. [paras. 109-110] [26] In The Minister of Family and Community Services v. S.B ., 2008 NBCA 16 , 327 N.B.R. (2d) 101 , the Court concluded, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the statutory time lines set out in the Act are to be respected.

As observed, this is in keeping with the interests at stake conclusions reached by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, however, the application judge distinguished S.B . on the basis the Order, which issued on August 5, 2015, delayed the proceedings for five months by consent, and there were a number of other adjournments, due to the fact the parties underestimated the amount of trial time they needed.

The application judge provided a chronology of the proceedings, starting with the first appearance, noting the various adjournments, and she concluded much of the delay was “due to the extensive cross-examination of witnesses, the eight days of hearing time extended to close to 30 non- consecutive days”. She finds:

The delays in this matter were not the result of state action. They are attributable to all parties, as a result of the adjournment for the respondents to obtain counsel, the decision of all the parties to delay the trial pursuant to the August 2015 Delay Order, as well as the time it took for the presentation of all the evidence. [para. 332] [27] I agree with this statement and I agree there were exceptional circumstances that militated against dismissal of the proceedings for institutional delay.

The Court in S.B . stated it is the responsibility of all parties to ensure statutory timelines are respected, by, in the first instance, communicating with the Registrar of the Court of Queen’s Bench, and then to the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench if there are problems with court scheduling. Robertson J.A. writes: It is not my purpose to attach blame to anyone for the unexplained delay in processing the guardianship application. My point is simply this: the law must be respected, and for good reason. The court is dealing with matters of fundamental importance to children, their parents and society.

If ever there were an area of the law that speaks to the matter of the right to security of the person, be it parent or child, this is it. That is why inordinate delays are unacceptable. In my view, it falls on the Minister to address this problem in one of two ways: either the provisions are unrealistically stringent, in which case legislative amendments are warranted, or in the future the Minister should take appropriate steps to ensure that the legislation is respected.

In some cases, the reasons for the delay will be self-evident and attributable to factors beyond the control of the parties and the court ( e.g. , the preparation of expert assessments or the unavailability of key witnesses). But if the reasons for the delay are not self-evident and there is non-compliance with ss. 52(2) or 53(3), the Minister is obliged to write to the Registrar of the Court of Queen’s Bench to ask for compliance with the legislation or, at the very least, a statute- complying explanation for the delay.

If the response is not in conformity with the spirit of the legislation, the Minister is obligated to bring the matter to the attention of the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench. Correlatively, on an application for the variation or termination of an order that has been issued under

Part IV of the Act , an applicant has the corresponding right to seek reasons for the delay and the non-compliance with the legislation and, if necessary, to bring the matter to the attention of the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench . [para. 21] [Emphasis added.] [28] The above is in keeping with Jordan , as observed.

Although concerns were expressed on the Record in November 2015, January, May and September 2016, there is no evidence the appellants or the Minister sought a remedy from the application judge, nor did they communicate their concerns to the Registrar of the Court of Queen’s Bench or to the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench concerning the scheduling of these proceedings.

It was evident from the affidavits of the social workers and the service providers, that although family reunification was not part of the Minister’s plan, once she decided to proceed with the guardianship application, the Minister continued to provide services to the appellants, thus requiring the filing of updated affidavits. This begs the question, why the appellants consented to the various adjournments, and did not raise their concerns earlier. See R. v. Regan , 2018 ABCA 55 , [2018] A.J.

No. 147 (QL) , on this issue. [29] The application judge correctly concluded the allegations concerning a breach of Charter rights lacked traction and she could not stay the proceedings in the best interests of the child. To support her conclusion, she relied on Jewish Family and Child Service of Toronto v. J.Z. , 2014 ONCJ 119 , [2014] O.J.

No. 1123 , where Spence J. referred to Lamer J. in the G.(J.) decision: There are only two possible remedies a judge can order under s. 24(1) to avoid a prospective s. 7 breach in circumstances where the absence of counsel for one of the parties would result in an unfair hearing: an order that the government provide the unrepresented party with state-funded counsel, or a stay of proceedings. A stay of proceedings is clearly inappropriate in this case, as it would result in the return of the children to the appellant’s custody.

Children should not be returned to their parent’s care when there is reason to suspect that they are in need of protection . Indeed, this would run contrary to the purposes of

Part 1V of the Family Services Act [...]. [para. 341] [Underlining in original.] [30] J.N. argued as well the Minister should have been monitored by the court to ensure she complied with the statutory timelines. I have already dealt with this issue. As noted, there were extensive cross-examinations of the Minister’s witnesses, in some cases, extending for days, which could not have been predicted by the Minister when she entered the case for trial. Neither J.S. nor J.N. complained about the scheduling of the case, until the last week of the hearing in December 2016.

J.N. could have registered his complaint with court administration, or the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench. In addition, J.S. asserted J.N. was not granted equal status as a “parent”. In response to this assertion, the application judge found “J.N. was rendered invisible as a result of his own decision not to participate until March 2014” (para. 320). These complaints were correctly dealt with by the application judge. This ground of appeal is devoid of merit, in my opinion. B. Skewed Affidavits

[31] J.S. and J.N. state their cross-examinations of the Minister’s witnesses, most notably Rachel Robichaud, revealed the Minister’s affidavit evidence was skewed to portray only the negative characteristics of the appellants; therefore, the Minister was biased against them. This issue has been before the Court before: see Larlee J.A. in S.H. and M.D. v. The Minister of Social Development .

In that case, the appellants asserted they were denied procedural fairness as a result of omissions in the Minister’s affidavits and the “slanted presentation” of the case, which affected the reliability of the evidence (para.10). Larlee J.A. disagreed.

In dismissing this ground she observes: S.H. and M.D. submit they were denied their procedural right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by the legislation and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , and that the security of the children’s rights were breached in a manner that was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice ( s. 7 of the Charter ). They allege, among other things, omissions in, and the argumentative nature of, the Minister’s affidavits.

According to them, the trial judge failed to recognize the Minister’s slanted presentation of the case, which affected the reliability of the evidence. In the end, they claim the trial judge should not have granted the guardianship order. A review of the record reveals the appellants were given full opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and to present their position to the trial judge. Once the Minister determined it would be in the best interests of the children to seek a guardianship order, there was nothing wrong with the Minister’s lawyer advocating this position. [para. 10] See also S.H. v.

The Minister of Social Development . [32] Counsel for the Minister submits as the process is adversarial, she has the discretion to decide what evidence is relevant and necessary to support her case, provided there has been full disclosure, as there was in this case. The disclosure included notes made by social workers and service providers. These can be voluminous, particularly in a case where the Minister has been involved with a family for an extended period of time. The notes are summarized by legal assistants who prepare the affidavits.

The cross-examinations of the various service providers in this case, confirmed there were positive changes in the appellants’ household, and in their behavior, which were not included in the affidavits. The application judge therefore was able to assess the evidence in context. [33] The application judge concluded procedural fairness was not breached on the basis the respondents were given ample opportunity to challenge the Minister’s witnesses through extensive cross-examinations. I agree with this conclusion. C.

Best Interests of the Child Analysis [34] The appellants argue the application judge’s analysis concerning the best interests of the child was flawed. I disagree. [35] When disposing of an application pursuant to

Part IV of the Act , the court shall, at all times, place above other considerations, the best interests of the child. In 2013, the Case Plan prepared by the Minister listed the following concerns:

i) Lack of formula and supplies for C.S.; ii) Safety in the home; iii) The number of animals in the home; iv) Budgeting concerns;

v) Basic child care and parenting; vi) Attachment and bonding. [36] In July 2015, a Revised Parenting Plan was prepared listing the following ongoing concerns;

i) Safety in the home and supervision of C.S.;

ii) Parenting issues; iii) Cleanliness of the home; iv) Financial and budgeting issues. [37] The following excerpts from the application judge’s reasons illustrate some of the evidence of the social workers and service providers she considered to be important: Tammy Heath sets out her concerns arising from visits between November 2014 and April 2015 in her affidavit sworn on June 2, 2015.

She observed the respondents spent money on items like tissues, pop, coffee mate, cat litter, rat food, Subway, flea treatments and cigarettes, but only bought a can of soup for C.S. and a toy from the Dollar Store; they did not have enough money for cat food or dog food but took in another cat. Tammy Heath noted that the respondents did not maintain the cleanliness of their home. She often noted a foul smell in the home, clutter, dirty floors, dog urine on the floors and dirty dishes. C.S. became dirty and full of dog hair on several visits.

She also noted examples of J.S. not being engaged with C.S. during visits. When they went to lunch at the church with C.S., Tammy Heath had to cue the respondents to retrieve C.S. when he left the eating area. When they were outside, she noted the respondents would let C.S. go near the road. She also noted the respondents leaving things within C.S.’s reach, such as a full coffee cup, ashtray with cigarette butts, a knife, and a can of aerosol spray. The respondents did not always use the baby gate at the top of the stairs when C.S. was at the home. Lynn Otis prepared a Revised Parenting Plan.

It was presented to the respondents at a meeting on July 28, 2015. A copy of it was marked Exhibit RN-12. It sets out that: Upon a request by the lawyers for [J.S.] and [J.N.], to consider implementation of a different style of parenting instruction to address low cognitive functioning (particularly the low verbal cognitive skills) of [J.S.] and [J.N.], the following plan will be implemented [and] developed between July 28, 2015 and August 17, 2015 with full implementation beginning the week of August 17, 2015.

In her Affidavit sworn on April 28, 2016, Lynn Otis writes at paragraph 7: From October 23, 2015 to present, I have worked with the family in the capacity as their primary Social Worker.

Since the filing of my updated Affidavit on November 13, 2015, I have observed the following: (a) [J.S.] and [J.N.] have not met all of the objectives outlined in the Minister’s Case Plan including: (i.) They have not maintained a clean home on a consistent and ongoing basis and have not maintained the home to prevent safety hazards (knives, tools, cigarette butts, hot coffee, wires, etc.); (ii.) There is a lack of budgeting and financial management to ensure proper care of [C.S.] (i.e. not limiting the number of animals in the home which contributes to financial stress, trouble paying rent (currently in arrears), and, at times, limited quantity of food is available.) (iii.) The parents have learned basic child care and parenting skills to date to promote development and bonding with [C.S.], however, reports from service providers indicate concerns once their services are removed from the home; and (iv.) [J.S.] has not followed through with Mental Health recommendations. (b) [J.S.] and [J.N.] have had difficulty in following programming provided by their Human Service Counselor (budgeting, parenting programming, etc.) and have made limited progress despite the fact that some programming has been implemented on more than one occasion.

(c) [J.S.] and [J.N.] have participated in most supervised visits with their child (now four mornings a week) since being taken into care, however, some visits have been cancelled due to snow storms, transportation problems or personal appointments.

During visitation, the parents have been cooperative, however, they do not recognize proper growth or development of their child, and do not anticipate safety hazards that could harm their child, continue to struggle in managing their household income to maintain secure housing, food and basic necessities, continue to have multiple pets in the home which affect their household budgeting and cleanliness of the home. [paras. 108, 109, 126 and 153] [38] In her November 2016 affidavit, social worker Lynn Otis observed the parents had cancelled many supervised visits between August and October 2016, the parents were bickering in the presence of the child, they were not often prepared for the visits, cleanliness of the home remained a problem, and they continued to “struggle” to provide food and snacks for C.S. during the visits (para. 169 of the reasons). [39] Although budgeting concerns were raised by the Minister, it is evident from the affidavits the issue of the appellants’ low income status was not the Minister’s sole focus.

As noted, there were a number of other documented concerns.

Section 1 of the Act sets out the criteria for the analysis in child protection matters. In her reasons, the application judge referred to the criteria and she considered the evidence in context. An application judge who has a body of evidence, such as was the case in these proceedings, does not have to recite every minute detail, but he or she must demonstrate they considered the criteria, reviewed the evidence in context, and crafted a decision which reveals how he or she reached their conclusion. It is evident the application judge did just that. She applied the law to the facts, and her decision is sound in my view. D. The Foster Parents

(1) Bonding and Attachment [40] In her reasons, the application judge considered the bond and attachment C.S. has with the foster parents. The appellants submit this was an error. I disagree.

Section 1 of the Act requires the trier of fact to consider the relationship a child has with his or her significant others, prior to making a custody and/or access order. The bonding and attachment a child has with significant caregivers in his or her life is a significant consideration in terms of continuity, particularly when the relationship is meaningful and longstanding. [41] In S.H. and M.D. , the Court observed: The trial judge found the foster parent is the children’s “psychological parent” since two of the children have been in her care longer than with their parents.

It is at the foster mother’s patient, skillful and caring hands that the children have, for the first time in their lives, found structure, consistency, nurture, guidance, discipline and, above all, true understanding of their needs and unwavering focus on them. [para. 17] [42] By the time this matter was heard, C.S. had been in foster care for approximately four years, and the application judge acknowledged he had bonded and attached with the foster parents. In fact, there was evidence he believed he had two sets of parents.

In my view, the application judge had a duty, in the best interests of C.S., to consider this fact. It was but one consideration, and was not given any more weight than other factors noted in the reasons. I see nothing wrong with this approach and I would dismiss this ground of appeal as well.

(2) Foster Parents Desire to Adopt C.S. [43] Between September and December 2016, the foster parents made the decision they would apply to adopt C.S. should a guardianship order issue. To that end, they approached the lead social worker and told her of their intention. The social worker sent them the application forms, which they completed but had not forwarded to the Minister. During the last week of the hearing, the foster parents appeared with counsel and were present in the courtroom.

Over the objections of the Minister, J.S. insisted they be called to give evidence with respect to their intention to adopt C.S. The adoption coordinator also testified the Minister did not oppose the foster parents’ decision to adopt, and they would be given “serious consideration”.

[44] The appellants assert this evidence may have influenced the application judge. The application judge rejected this argument. The appellants submit the Minister, by supporting the foster parents’ decision to adopt, effectively usurped the role of the application judge, and shifted the onus to them to prove they were better able to care for C.S. [45] The appellants, relying on New Brunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) v. S.P. et al. (2008), 329 N.B.R. (2d) 340 , [2008] N.B.J. No. 263 (QL) , contend the “position of the Minister did not go far enough”.

In S.P. , Robichaud J. writes: “In guardianship Applications, the Court should not consider whether or not the foster parents present a better alternative than the natural parents and their extended family” (para. 62). He concludes that foster parents should not intervene until the court has decided whether to grant the order requested of the Minister, so as not to prejudice the rights of the natural parents. In the Minister of Social Development v. T.A.P., A.H., F.M. and D.W. , 2015 NBCA 39 , [2015] N.B.J.

No. 150 (QL) , the Court expressed a concern that parents in guardianship applications could be prejudiced if they were required to prove their parenting capabilities in comparison with others who would have competing interests. I agree. In A.H. , the foster parents had actually filed Motions requesting the opportunity to participate as parties in the proceedings. In New Brunswick ( Minister of Family and Community Services) v.

S.S. , 2008 NBQB 34 , 334 N.B.R. (2d) 1 , Rideout J. found, “the right of foster parents to bring proceedings for custody and/or adoption should be severely limited, if not precluded, until such time as a court has granted guardianship to the Minister” (para. 19). I agree. [46] The Minister has a statutory obligation to promote family reunification, when possible. The Minister cannot “wear two hats”. She cannot offer assistance to parents in conformity with the

Preamble to the Act , on the one hand, and on the other hand, actively assist foster parents who may wish to adopt a child placed in their care. In doing so, a valid concern emerges with respect to the integrity of the process. [47] It is not the Minister’s decision whether, or not, a guardianship order issues. The Minister must fastidiously remain an “honest broker”, executing her functions and fulfilling her mandate as prescribed by law. Until a court order issues which determines the outcome of the Minister’s application, the Minister should not overtly or covertly support a non-parent third party.

In doing so, the Minister runs the risk of undermining her role as an independent participant in the process. Although, in this case, the Minister’s representative provided the foster parents with the adoption application forms, I conclude this action did not affect the result. The foster parents were not participants, they did not ask to be joined as parties, and the application judge, although she was aware of their intention to adopt C.S., only made a passing reference to this fact, and in my opinion, this was neither an error in fact nor in law.

I note in passing that the Minister’s plan with respect to the adoption of a child is a permissible part of her evidence. E. Credibility and Reliance on Historical Evidence [48] The application judge summarized the evidence of every witness. Following her examination of the evidence, she was entitled to accept or reject certain portions of it, and she was entitled to make her findings. These were not conclusory reasons; they were fulsome ( see V.C. and J.C . ).

The appellants assert the application judge had an obligation to assess the credibility of every witness and to discuss what weight, if any, she placed on that evidence. In addition, they submit the application judge should not have relied on historical evidence. I disagree with all of the above. [49] In S.B. v.

Minister of Family and Community Services , Richard J.A. writes: “[f]indings of facts or credibility are within the domain of the trial judge and it is trite law that such findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are the product of a palpable and overriding error” (para. 6). [50] This was not a criminal trial. Implicit in the application judge’s findings is her reliance on the evidence presented by the Minister’s witnesses. Their credibility did not wither in the spotlight of lengthy cross-examinations.

The application judge stated her reasons for her findings, and she based those findings on the evidence she found to be credible. Although the application judge did not expressly state she favoured the testimony of one witness over the other, nor did she make specific findings of credibility, it is evident she was persuaded the Minister’s application was meritorious in the totality of the evidence.

In Winnipeg Child and Family Services , L’Heureux-Dubé concludes the interests at stake in the child protection context dictate a “somewhat” different balancing analysis than that undertaken with respect to an accused’s s. 7 and s. 8 Charter rights in the criminal context. The state has a different “protective purpose” in child protection proceedings which is distinguishable from the state’s punitive purpose developed in the criminal context. In my opinion, courts should be reluctant to import procedural protections developed in the criminal context into the child protection arena. [51] In Burns v.

University of New Brunswick , 2018 NBCA 11 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 23 (QL) , the Court writes:

As we have underscored on numerous occasions, we are not at liberty to intervene on the basis of a different assessment of the weight tobe attributed to the various items of evidence and the factors of influence in the decision-making at first instance. Our mandate precludesintervention absent reversible error on the part of the trial judge. The appellant invites us to reweigh the evidence and the factors thatbore upon the determination of the key issue at trial. [para. 3] [52] As observed, with the passage of time, the Minister filed updated affidavits which offered current informationconcerning this family.

I see nothing wrong with this practice. In fact, pursuant to s. 9 of the Act, the affidavits of social workers andservice providers were filed in support of the Minister’s application for a custody order. This was historical information which may, ormay not have been, relevant at the time of the final hearing; however, it was part of the narrative. The circumstances of the appellantsand the child changed over time. Concerns that were raised in 2013 may not have been relevant in 2016.

As an example, concernsrelating to baby formula would not be relevant to the care of C.S. today; however, as I have observed, some of the behaviours thattriggered a response by the Minister in 2013, were still evident in 2016. The historical evidence in this case was relevant. A child’s futureshould not be determined based on a snapshot of his or her life; rather, it should include the historical overview of his or her situation,from the point in time when the state takes the decision to intervene, up to and including the date of the hearing. In S.H. v.

The Ministerof Social Development, Quigg J.A. stated the application judge erred when he refused to hear further evidence concerning the currentstate of the children at the time he rendered his decision. Quigg J.A. concluded the judge had an obligation to consider up-to-dateevidence “on the circumstances of the children and of the parties” (para. 21). By receiving the updated affidavits in the case at bar, theapplication judge was better able to fulfil her statutory mandate.

I see no error in this approach. [53] The appellants argue a supervisory order should have issued, on the basis the lead social worker agreed thismight have been an option; however, there was evidence the appellants would learn certain skills, and then would regress and return totheir old habits and there were documented inconsistencies in their parenting strategies. As a counter point, I note that supervisory ordersare designed as a temporary measure, until such time as a final decision issues on the merits of the application. [54] Finally, on the issue of the expert’s report. Mr.

Doucet was asked to conduct a parenting capacity assessment,with the consent of all parties. He was extensively cross-examined concerning his mandate, his methodology, why he conductedpsychological testing, and how much he was paid for his services. In her 417-paragraph decision, the application judge devotedapproximately two and a half pages to it. In New Brunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) v. S.S.P., 2004 NBCA 79, 279N.B.R. (2d) 199, Larlee J.A. adopts the reasons in Gauthier v. Beaumont, (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1998] S.C.J.

No.55 (QL), where the Supreme Court concludes there is no obligation to accept the opinion of any witness, including an expert. See alsoNew Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. M.R. and A.R. (1998), (NB CA), 198 N.B.R. (2d)201, [1998] N.B.J. No. 142 (C.A.) (QL), at para. 20. [55] In

summary, in child protection matters, an application judge may consider historical information as part of thecontextual analysis. As a general rule, an appeal court will not interfere with findings of fact made by a lower court for the simple reasonthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses is better placed to assess their reliability and to draw inferences from their evidence.Appellate intervention is justified if it is found no reasonable court could have reached the conclusions (see V.C. and J.C. at para. 20). F.

Failure to Amend the Notice of Application [56] The appellants suggest the Minister should have amended her Notice of Application to reflect the emerginggrounds she relied on at the hearing. In an ideal world, this would have been preferable; however, given the fact this matter wasprolonged for the reasons noted, the Minister provided updated affidavits from social workers and service providers that containedinformation concerning the circumstances of this family. The Minister filed two Supplemental Records on Application in which sheincluded updated affidavits.

In my opinion, the appellants were fully aware of the case against them and they were given an abundance oftime to cross-examine the Minister’s witnesses. [57] An amendment to the Notice of Application may have triggered an avalanche of pleadings with the attendantrisk of further delay. The appellants were not disadvantaged, nor were they prejudiced. I conclude, if this was an error, it was aprocedural error which is easily remedied through the application of Rule 1.03.

IV. Disposition [58] While the adjournments in this matter were not ideal, I conclude the appellants did not suffer prejudice as a result, nor did the delays lead to an unfair hearing. Both the appellants and the respondent must share some responsibility for the delays. In my opinion, the application judge correctly dismissed the appellants’ submissions their Charter rights were breached. [59] In my view, the application judge exercised her discretion judiciously, she applied the law to the facts in the best interests of the child, and her analysis is sound.

In my opinion, there is no demonstrable error of law or fact which would warrant appellate intervention. It is for these reasons I agreed with my colleagues to dismiss the appeal. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD [ 1 ] L’appel a été rejeté le 8 février 2018, avec motifs à suivre. Voici ces motifs. I. Introduction et contexte [ 2 ] J.S. est la mère biologique de C.S. qui est né le 23 avril 2013. J.N. tient lieu de père à C.S. et il est un « parent » au sens de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F.-2.2 (la « Loi »). [ 3 ] Lorsque C.S. était âgé de trois mois, la ministre du Développement social (maintenant ministre des Familles et des Enfants) a déposé une demande afin d’obtenir une ordonnance de garde. La Ministre prétendait que les appelants étaient incapables de fournir à leur enfant des soins convenables. Une audience de cinq jours a été inscrite au rôle des mois de septembre et d’octobre 2013.

Le 10 octobre 2013, un juge a rendu une ordonnance qui accordait la garde de C.S. à la Ministre pour une période [TRADUCTION] « maximale de cinq mois » à compter de juillet 2013. Les parents ont obtenu des visites surveillées auprès de C.S. et la Ministre a fait intervenir un certain nombre de travailleurs sociaux et de tiers prestateurs de services afin qu’ils aident les parents à régler certains problèmes qui avaient été soulevés dans le plan d’intervention initial. Les motifs de préoccupations étaient les suivants : i. Il manquait de préparation pour nourrissons et de fournitures pour C.S.; ii.

Il y avait des problèmes de sécurité dans la maison; iii. Il y avait de nombreux animaux dans la maison, y compris des chats, un chien et un rat; iv. Il y avait des préoccupations liées à l’établissement d’un budget; v. Il y avait des problèmes liés aux [TRADUCTION] « soins de base à donner à l’enfant et au parentage »; vi. Il y avait un problème sur le plan de l’attachement et de la formation de liens affectifs. [ 4 ] En décembre 2013, la Ministre a pris la décision de faire proroger l’ordonnance de garde pour une période de trois mois.

En février 2014, l’ordonnance de garde a été prorogée pour une période supplémentaire de six mois puis, en mai 2014, elle a de nouveau été prorogée pour une période de six mois. En décembre 2014, la Ministre a demandé la tutelle permanente de C.S. dans l’intention de le placer en vue de l’adoption, conformément à l’art. 8, et aux par. 55(2.2) et 56(1) de la Loi , aux règles 3.02 et 73.15 des Règles de procédure et au par. 11.4(1) de la

Loi sur l’organisation judiciaire , L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. J-2. [ 5 ] À l’appui de sa demande de tutelle, la Ministre a déposé vingt et un affidavits faits par des travailleurs sociaux et des

prestateurs de services. De plus, elle a sollicité une ordonnance et a demandé à la Cour, conformément à l’art. 9 de la Loi , de prendre en considération seize affidavits faits par des travailleurs sociaux et des prestateurs de services qui avaient été déposés à l’appui de la demande initiale de la Ministre en vue d’obtenir une ordonnance de garde. [ 6 ] Le 10 décembre 2014, lors de leur première comparution devant la Cour, les appelants ont dit qu’ils contestaient la demande de la Ministre et qu’ils retiendraient les services d’un avocat.

Comme nous le verrons plus en détail dans les présents motifs, l’affaire a ensuite été instruite par intermittence sur une période de trente mois et a au final donné lieu à une décision accompagnée de motifs datée du 7 mars 2017 ainsi qu’à une ordonnance datée du 13 mars 2017 qui accordait la tutelle à la Ministre, mais réservait un droit d’accès auprès de C.S. à J.S. et J.N. L’enfant, C.S., est à la charge des parents d’accueil depuis juillet 2013. [ 7 ] Les moyens d’appel modifiés sont les suivants : i.

La juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur de droit en concluant qu’il n’y avait pas eu violation des droits qui étaient garantis aux intimés par l’art. 7 de la Charte des droits et libertés , en ce qui concerne plus précisément ce qui suit : 1. les retards à entendre l’affaire dans les plus brefs délais 2. le défaut de contrôler la présentation de la preuve par la requérante; ii.

La juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur de droit lorsque, dans le cadre de son analyse de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, elle a pris en considération les liens affectifs de l’enfant avec les parents d’accueil, et a estimé que [TRADUCTION] « si le plan des intimés réussit, on court le risque de voir l’enfant perdre les liens affectifs qu’il a avec les parents d’accueil »; iii.

La juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur mixte de droit et de fait dans son appréciation de la preuve, et en articulant sa décision autour de renseignements historiques, malgré le fait que les motifs qui fondaient la demande de tutelle étaient, à la fin du procès, substantiellement différents de ceux qui avaient été plaidés et moindres que ceux-ci; iv.

La juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur de droit en n’examinant pas pleinement et de façon égale la crédibilité et la fiabilité de toutes les parties et de tous les témoins qui ont comparu devant la Cour et, ce faisant, elle a appliqué de manière inexacte la décision de la présente Cour dans l’affaire S.H. et M.D. c. Ministre du Développement social , 2014 NBCA 20 , 419 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 377 . II. La norme de contrôle [ 8 ] Notre Cour a clairement établi la norme de contrôle qui s’applique en matière de protection de l’enfance. La portée de l’examen, en appel, est étroite.

Si le juge des faits a commis une erreur manifeste dans son interprétation de la preuve, la Cour interviendra. Si une erreur de droit a été commise, la Cour interviendra. Au bout du compte, c’est l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant qui prédomine. La norme de contrôle qui s’applique à une allégation de manquement à l’équité procédurale ou de déni de justice naturelle est celle de la décision correcte. [ 9 ] Voici ce qu’a dit le juge d’appel Deschênes dans l’arrêt M.D. c.

Le ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires et D.R., J.-P.L. et S.L , 2006 NBCA 7 , 294 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 258 : [I]l est important de rappeler la portée étroite de l’examen en appel du bien-fondé de l’option choisie par le juge du procès pour promouvoir l’intérêt supérieur des enfants. Sur cette question, la révision en appel doit faire preuve d’une très grande déférence. [par. 5] [ 10 ] Dans l’arrêt S.B. c. Le Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires , 2006 NBCA 41 , [2006] A.N.-B. n o 167 (QL) , le juge d’appel Richard a expliqué cette notion dans les termes suivants :

Chacun sait que la révision en appel des décisions en matière de protection de l’enfance, y compris dans les affaires de tutelle, est trèsrestreinte. Compte tenu des nombreuses décisions rendues par la Cour suprême du Canada et par notre Cour à ce sujet, il aurait été futilepour l’une ou l’autre des parties de ne pas reconnaître les circonstances limitées dans lesquelles la Cour d’appel peut intervenir à bondroit : voir, par exemple, Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires) c.

C. (G.C.), (SCC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 1073, par. 5, Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires) c. L.(M.), (SCC), [1998] 2 R.C.S. 534, aux par. 34 à 36, D.B. c. New Brunswick (Minister of Family and Community Services) (2000), (NB CA), 228 R.N.-B. (2e) 218 (C.A.), aux par. 6 et 7, Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires) c. A.N. et Y.N. (2003), 264 R.N.-B. (2e) 80 au par. 11, Nouveau-Brunswick (le ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires) c. M.D., 2006 NBCA 7 , [2006] A.N.-B. no 11 (C.A.) (QL) aux par. 5 à 7 et T.T. c.

Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires), [2006] A.N.-B. no 39 (C.A.) (QL) au par. 3.

Ces arrêts posent comme postulat,lequel a été énoncé de façon succincte par le juge en chef Drapeau dans l’arrêt A.N., au par. 11, qu’une cour d’appel n’interviendra dansles affaires de protection de l’enfance « que si la solution prescrite par le juge du procès est dénuée de fondement dans les faits ou sicette solution est fondée sur une erreur de principe, le défaut de prendre en considération tous les facteurs d’influence pertinents ou laconsidération d’un facteur dénué de pertinence. » [par. 3] Voir aussi les arrêts N.J.P. c.

La ministre du Développement social, 2012 NBCA 3, 382 R.N.-B. (2e) 245, la juge d’appel Quigg; S.H. c. La ministre du Développement social, 2013 NBCA 35, 406 R.N.-B. (2e) 242; S.H. et M.D. c. Ministre du Développement social, 2014 NBCA 20, 419 R.N.-B. (2e) 377, la juge d’appel Larlee; et V.C. et J.C. c. La ministre du Développement social et autre, 2015 NBCA 28, 435 R.N.-B. (2e) 205, la juge d’appel Quigg. III. Analyse [11] Les demandes de tutelle sont qualifiées de [TRADUCTION] « peine capitale » du droit de la famille.

La raison en est qu’uneordonnance de tutelle a pour effet de rompre les obligations, droits et devoirs légaux qui existent entre un parent et un enfant. Cetteprocédure est longue et est souvent compliquée par le fait que les audiences sont précédées d’interventions de la part du Ministre qui ontpour but de tenter de préserver l’unité du noyau familial ainsi que le prescrit la Loi.

L’ordonnance de tutelle est demandée lorsque toutesles autres mesures ont échoué. [12] Le préambule de la Loi reconnaît que les enfants et leurs familles ont le droit de « ne subir que le minimum d’intrusion dansleur vie privée et d’entrave à leur liberté qui soient compatibles avec leurs propres intérêts, ceux de leurs familles et ceux de la société »et que « l’intérêt supérieur et la sécurité de l’enfant doivent toujours prévaloir lorsqu’il y a conflit entre la protection de l’enfant contreles dangers et le maintien du noyau familial ». [13] Le préambule reconnaît également la nécessité d’éviter les délais procéduraux dans le processus de prise de décisionconcernant les plans permanents destinés aux enfants.

De plus, on y reconnaît le « caractère essentiel des services sociaux en tant quemoyen d’éviter ou de réduire les problèmes sociaux et les problèmes économiques connexes des individus et des familles ».

Il y a eu denombreuses interventions de la part des travailleurs sociaux et de tiers prestateurs de services dont la Ministre avait retenu les servicesafin qu’ils travaillent avec les parents dans le respect du principe susmentionné. [14] Dans sa décision, qui compte quatre cent dix-sept paragraphes, la juge saisie de la demande a fait un examen attentif de lapreuve et elle a effectué une analyse détaillée de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, ainsi qu’elle en avait l’obligation.

Au final, elle a décidéqu’il y avait lieu de rendre une ordonnance de tutelle; elle a toutefois réservé un droit d’accès auprès de C.S. aux appelants, lesconditions de ce droit d’accès devant être définies par la Ministre. A. L’article 7 [15] Je commence par examiner l’assertion des appelants selon laquelle il y a eu violation des droits qui leur sont garantis parl’art. 7 de la Charte par suite des retards à entendre l’affaire et de la façon dont la Ministre s’est conduite, y compris les motifs qu’elle ainvoqués à l’appui de sa demande de tutelle. Voici la chronologie des différentes instances ou procédures.

Date Procédure Le 8 juillet 2013 Dépôt d’un avis de requête en vue d’un placementsous un régime de protectionLe 3 décembre 2014 Dépôt d’un avis de requête en vue d’obtenir uneordonnance de tutelleLe 27 juillet 2015 Premier jour du procès, reporté du consentementdes parties en vue de sa réinscription au rôle pourune durée de six joursLa Ministre a mis à jour son avis de requête en déposant d’autres affidavits.Le 23 novembre 2015 L’audience a commencé, a duré quatre jours, mais aété ajournée.Le 26 novembre 2015 L’audience a repris.Les 18, 19, 20, 21 et 22 janvier 2016 Audition de la preuve de la Ministre Les 1er, 2, 3 et 4 février 2016 Audition de la preuve de la Ministre Le 18 avril 2016 La présentation de la preuve de la Ministre s’estpoursuivie.La Ministre a déposé un dossier supplémentaire afférent à la requête accompagné de cinqaffidavits additionnels.Les 16, 17, 18 et 19 mai 2016 La présentation de la preuve de la Ministre sepoursuit.La Ministre a déposé un dossier supplémentaire afférent à la requête accompagné de troisaffidavits additionnelsLes 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20 et 21septembre 2016 La présentation de la preuve de la Ministre s’estpoursuivie.Les 12, 13, 14, 15 et 16 décembre2016 La Ministre a poursuivi la présentation de sa preuvequ’elle a close le 14 décembre 2016.Le 16 décembre 2016 J.S. a présenté une motion orale dans laquelle elle asollicité une ordonnance en vertu de l’art. 7 de laCharte et on lui a enjoint de déposer une motion. [16] J.N. prétend que J.S. et lui n’ont pas eu un procès équitable en raison des délais procéduraux et du manque d’objectivité de lapreuve par affidavit et qu’on ne lui a pas donné la possibilité d’y participer pleinement.

La juge saisie de la demande a rejeté cesarguments, s’appuyant à cet égard sur l’arrêt Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires) c. G. (J.), (SCC), [1999] 3 R.C.S. 46, [1999] A.C.S. no 47 (QL), où la Cour suprême a conclu que le droit garanti par l’art. 7 de laCharte n’est pas absolu mais est subordonné aux principes de justice fondamentale (par. 69 à 73). Dans l’arrêt G. (J.), le juge en chefLamer a écrit ceci : « En conséquence, les principes de justice fondamentale dans les instances concernant la protection des enfantsintéressent autant le fond que la procédure.

L’État ne peut retirer au parent la garde de son enfant que si cela s’avère nécessaire pourprotéger l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, pourvu que cette décision soit prise selon une procédure équitable » (par. 70).

On se rappelleraque l’art. 7 de la Charte dispose que « [c]hacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte àce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale ». [17] Les principes de justice fondamentale applicables lors d’une audience relative à la protection d’un enfant ont été définis par lajuge L’Heureux-Dubé dans l’arrêt Office des services à l’enfant et à la famille de Winnipeg c.

K.L.W., 2000 CSC 48, [200] 2 R.C.S. 519,où elle a écrit ceci : Pour être équitable, l’audience doit faire l’objet d’un avis raisonnable et détaillé aux parents et leur donner la possibilité d’y participer defaçon significative : voir G. (J.), au par. 73, et B. (R.), au par. 92, précités. La loi manitobaine satisfait manifestement aux exigencesd’avis et d’audience: art. 24 et 30 à 37. Le besoin pour l’enfant de continuité dans ses relations constitue le motif le plus important pour exiger que se tienne une audiencerapidement après l’appréhension : voir les al. 2(1)a),

d) et

g) de la Loi; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto c. M.(C.), (SCC), [1994] 2 R.C.S. 165, aux pp. 205 et 206; Young, précité, à la p. 41; Re Agar, McNeilly c. Agar, (SCC), [1958] R.C.S. 52, à la p. 54; P. D. Steinhauer, Le moindre mal: La question du placement de l’enfant (1996), à la p. 27 et suiv. [par. 123 et 124] [18] Les intimés prétendent que puisque l’instance a été entendue bien après l’expiration du délai fixé à l’art. 53 de la Loi, elleaurait dû être rejetée pour cause de retard.

Ils font valoir qu’il y a eu violation des principes de justice fondamentale du fait que laMinistre a continué à déposer des affidavits mis à jour, à mesure qu’elle recevait de nouveaux renseignements, et, parce qu’elle n’a pasmodifié son avis de requête, ils ont été victimes d’un déni d’équité procédurale. La Ministre rétorque que puisque la question de l’équitéprocédurale n’a pas été soulevée au procès, ce n’est pas une question dont la Cour est régulièrement saisie. Incidemment, je fais observer

que la Ministre a déposé deux dossiers supplémentaires afférents à la requête pendant l’instance. Voir l’arrêt Ross c. Human Rights Board of Inquiry (N.B.) (1990), (NB CA), 110 R.N.-B. (2e) 107, [1990] A.N.-B. no 847 (C.A.) (QL), au par. 55, en cequi concerne la question de l’équité procédurale. Elle prétend que les appelants ont pleinement participé à l’instance et que la questiondes délais ou des retards aurait dû être soulevée avant la dernière semaine de l’audience en décembre 2016.

Ce n’est qu’à ce moment-làque les appelants ont sollicité la permission de déposer un avis de motion dans lequel ils ont soulevé la question des retards.

Je souscrisaux prétentions de la Ministre sur la question de l’équité procédurale; toutefois, nous examinerons davantage la question des délais etretards. [19] Dans l’arrêt Office des services à l’enfant et à la famille de Winnipeg, la juge L’Heureux-Dubé a conclu que les audiencesrelatives à la protection d’un enfant devraient se voir accorder la plus grande priorité étant donné les intérêts en jeu : Comme dans l’arrêt G. (J.), précité, les intérêts en question dans les cas d’appréhension sont de la plus haute importance, compte tenudes répercussions que l’action de l’État comportant la séparation des parents de leurs enfants peut avoir sur toute leur vie, en particuliersur leur bien-être psychologique et affectif.

Du point de vue de l’enfant, l’action de l’État, sous forme d’appréhension, vise à assurer laprotection, sinon la survie d’un autre droit d’une importance fondamentale : la vie de l’enfant et sa santé.

Étant donné que les enfantssont des individus très vulnérables dans notre société et étant donné l’intérêt qu’a la société à les protéger contre tout préjudice, leprocessus équitable dans le contexte de la protection des enfants doit tenir compte du fait qu’il faut parfois accorder la priorité à leur vieet à leur santé lorsque la protection de ces intérêts diverge de celle du droit des parents d’être à l’abri de l’intervention de l’État. [par. 94] [20] La Cour suprême a davantage précisé ces propos dans l’arrêt Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law c.Canada (Procureur général), 2004 CSC 4, [2004] 1 R.C.S. 76, où la juge en chef McLachlin en est arrivée à la conclusion suivante : Toutefois, l’« intérêt supérieur de l’enfant » ne satisfait pas à la deuxième condition requise pour constituer un principe de justicefondamentale : le consensus quant à son caractère primordial et fondamental dans la notion de justice de notre société.

L’« intérêtsupérieur de l’enfant » est largement défendu dans les lois et les politiques sociales, et il constitue un élément important qui doit être prisen considération dans de nombreux contextes. Toutefois, il ne s’agit pas d’une condition essentielle à l’exercice de la justice. Leparagraphe 3(1) de la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant le décrit comme « une considération primordiale » et non comme « laconsidération primordiale » (je souligne). Se fondant sur cette formulation, la juge L’Heureux-Dubé fait remarquer ce qui suit, dansl’arrêt Baker c.

Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 817, par. 75 : [L]e décideur devrait considérer l’intérêt supérieur des enfants comme un facteur important, lui accorder un poids considérable, et êtreréceptif, attentif et sensible à cet intérêt.

Cela ne veut pas dire que l’intérêt supérieur des enfants l’emportera toujours sur d’autresconsidérations, ni qu’il n’y aura pas d’autres raisons de rejeter une demande d’ordre humanitaire même en tenant compte de l’intérêt desenfants. [par. 10] [Souligné dans l’original.] [21] Les paragraphes 53(2), (3), (4) et (5) de la Loi enjoignent aux tribunaux de s’acquitter du mandat suivant : 53(2) When disposing of an application underthis Part the court shall at all times placeabove all other considerations the bestinterests of the child. 53(2) Lorsqu’elle statue sur une demande enapplication de la présente partie, la cour doit àtout moment placer l’intérêt supérieur del’enfant au-dessus de toute autreconsidération.

(3) The court shall dispose of an application made under this Part within thirty days after it is made unless the court is satisfied that exceptional circumstances require the disposition of the application to be delayed beyond such day, in which case the court may so order, stating in the order the circumstances that gave rise to the order; but a failure to comply with this subsection does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. 53

(3) La cour doit dans les trente jours statuer sur une demande faite en vertu de la présente

partie à moins qu’elle ne soit convaincue que des circonstances exceptionnelles exigent un report de sa décision, auquel cas elle peut rendre une ordonnance à cet effet en y indiquant ces circonstances; mais un défaut de conformité au présent paragraphe ne rend pas la cour incompétente. 53

(4) No application shall be dismissed because of a procedural defect or lack of conformity with any requirement of this

Part if the court is satisfied that (

a) the defect or lack of conformity has been or can be compensated for by such substituted procedures as the court determines to be adequate in the circumstances; or (

b) failure to cure or compensate for the defect or lack of conformity has not resulted in or will not result in substantial prejudice to the interests of a person who may be affected by the outcome of the proceedings. 53

(4) Aucune demande ne peut être rejetée pour vice de procédure ou manque de conformité à toute exigence de la présente

partie si la cour est convaincue que

a) le vice de forme ou le manque de conformité a été ou peut être suppléé par toute autre procédure que la cour estime convenir dans les circonstances; ou

b) le défaut de remède ou de suppléance au vice de procédure ou au manque de conformité n’a pas été ni ne sera gravement préjudiciable aux intérêts de la personne qui peut être touchée par le résultat de la procédure. 53

(5) The court shall give reasons for making an order or dismissing any application. 53

(5) La cour donne les raisons motivant une ordonnance ou le rejet de toute demande. [ 22 ] Depuis les arrêts R. c. Jordan , 2016 CSC 27 , [2016] 1 R.C.S . 631, et R. c . Cody , 2017 CSC 31 , [2017] 1 R.C.S. 659 , il existe une sensibilisation accrue en ce qui concerne les délais institutionnels dans le contexte du droit criminel. On peut lire ceci au paragraphe 1 de l’arrêt Jordan : « La justice rendue en temps utile est l’une des caractéristiques d’une société libre et démocratique ».

En juin 2017, dans la foulée de l’arrêt Jordan , le Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles a déposé son rapport intitulé Justice différée, justice refusée : l’urgence de réduire les longs délais dans le système judiciaire au Canada . Le rapport fait état de préoccupations exprimées par les parties aux litiges et la magistrature dans le contexte du droit criminel et fait une série de recommandations qui tentent de répondre aux plaintes sans cesse plus nombreuses à propos des délais judiciaires.

Les contestations liées à la surcharge des rôles et aux longs temps d’attente avant la tenue des procès sont fréquentes dans le contexte du droit civil également.

Plusieurs provinces ont pris l’initiative de mettre en action des protocoles de gestion des instances, des audiences sur l’état de l’instance, des mesures substitutives de résolution des litiges, des tribunaux de triage et des conseillers-maîtres pour tenter d’alléger ces tensions. [ 23 ] S’agissant de la protection de l’enfance, les délais peuvent donner lieu à des placements prolongés en famille d’accueil, lesquels ne sont pas conformes à l’intention exprimée dans le texte législatif ni compatibles avec l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant à long terme. Ces questions ont été évoquées dans l’arrêt C.M. c.

Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo , 2015 ONCA 612 , [2015] O.J. No. 4705 (QL) . La Cour n’a pas usé de faux-fuyants lorsqu’elle a mis les avocats, les juges et les autres personnes qui œuvrent en matière de protection de l’enfance en garde contre les retards ou délais excessifs. Dans cette affaire, un procès de douze jours

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