2011 QCCA 2248, 2011 QCCA 2248

Unofficial English Translation Droit de la famille — 113877 2011 QCCA 2248 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No. 500-09-021489-117 (760-12-020246-082) DATE: December 7, 2011 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE PIERRE J. DALPHOND, J.A. JULIE DUTIL, J.A. JACQUES A. LÉGER, J.A. N. H. APPELLANT – Plaintiff v. H. HE.

RESPONDENT – Defendant JUDGMENT [ 1 ] THE COURT; – Ruling on the appeal from a judgment rendered on February 4, 2011, by the Superior Court, District of Beauharnois (the Honourable Madam Justice Hélène Langlois), which, in the context of the liquidation of the parties' matrimonial regime, a partnership of acquests, determined that certain property attached to the use of the respondent's taxi permit was his private property and, therefore, ordered that the sum of $102,752.15, held in a trust account, be remitted to the respondent; [ 2 ] For the reasons of Léger J.A., with which Dalphond and Dutil JJ.A. agree; [ 3 ] ALLOWS the appeal; [ 4 ] VARIES in part the judgment of the Superior Court for the sole purpose of substituting the following paragraphs for paragraphs 121 and 122: [TRANSLATION] [121] ORDERS the trustee to remit to N.

H., in payment of her share of the partnership of acquests, the sum of $81,662.40, with the interest accrued on that amount; [122] ORDERS the trustee to remit to H. He. the balance of the trust account; [ 5 ] WITHOUT COSTS , given the nature of the dispute.

(

s) PIERRE J. DALPHOND, J.A. (

s) JULIE DUTIL, J.A. (

s) JACQUES A. LEGER, J.A. Mtre. Claude Blanchard For the appellant Mtre. Sébastien Jonathan St-Clair For the respondent Date of hearing: October 6, 2011 REASONS OF LÉGER, J.A. [ 6 ] In the context of the liquidation of the parties' matrimonial regime, a partnership of acquests, as a result of their divorce, the trial judge determined that the property related to the enterprise associated with the taxi permit, including the vehicle, was the respondent's private property.

Although the impugned judgment is much broader in scope, the sole question raised in this appeal is whether that property must be considered an acquest and in the event that it is not, whether the appellant can claim compensation. I. CONTEXT [ 7 ] To paint a general picture, the salient facts required to provide a response are as follows. [ 8 ] The respondent came to Canada a few years before the appellant and, during that period, he worked as a delivery man for a restaurant, in addition to receiving social assistance.

As of 1990, he held that job full time. [ 9 ] On May 25, 1992, the parties wed in Iran, without a marriage contract. In 1994, the appellant immigrated to Canada. It is not contested that they are governed by the regime of partnership of acquests, the legal regime of their first matrimonial home, namely, Quebec.

A child, X, was born of their union on ..., 1998. [ 10 ] The appellant obtained her travel agent's diploma in March of 1997, after which she began to work in that industry. [ 11 ] On July 30, 1997, the respondent purchased a taxi permit ($50,000), an Oldsmobile for its operation ($2500), a taximeter ($300) and a radio ($1200), for a total of $54,000. Of that amount, $40,000 was financed by the Caisse populaire d'économie Desjardins and the balance of $14,000 was paid in cash. The loan of $40,000 was repaid in weekly instalments of $310.22, drawn from a joint account in which the spouses deposited their incomes.

The account was managed by the respondent at the Caisse, until the debt was completely paid off in 2002. The judge wrote the following on that point:

[TRANSLATION] [49] Lastly, during their life together, Mr. He. managed the family's finances, to the exclusion of Ms. H.. She entrusted her salary to him and he gave her the money required to meet her personal needs. . . . [81] The loan of $40,000 was paid off in weekly instalments, over a period of five years, from a bank account opened and administered by Mr. He. It can be inferred that the parties' incomes were deposited in the account without distinguishing what belonged to whom. [ 12 ] During the first year after the vehicle was purchased, the respondent was the sole driver.

Subsequently, however, he rented the vehicle to other drivers in the evenings and on weekdays, and only drove it himself during the day on weekends. In the spring of 2006, he fractured his spine in a diving accident and was no longer able to return to his work as a taxi driver because he was unable to remain seated for extended periods of time. The respondent had to replace his taxi a few times during the period from 1997 to 2008. [ 13 ] The appellant stopped working after the birth of their daughter in ... of 1998 and, the following fall, she returned to Iran to visit her family.

She stayed there for nine months and returned to Canada in June of 1999. She worked in telemarketing from 2001 to early 2006, at which time she began to work as a cashier in a bank. [ 14 ] Finally, on January 11, 2008, the parties ceased living together and, the same day, the appellant served the respondent with divorce proceedings. Shortly thereafter, on October 23, 2008, while the divorce proceedings were under way, the respondent sold the 2001 Camry ($3000), the taxi permit ($226,000), a taximeter ($400), a radio ($500) and a dome ($100), for a total of $230,000.

The parties admit that this property had the same value at that point as at the time of petition for divorce. [ 15 ] It must be noted that, as of the diving accident mentioned above and until the sale of the property attached to the taxi enterprise, the respondent continued to receive income from the rental of the property to other drivers. At the time of the trial, [1] the respondent had acquired another permit for the A City area, but could not yet use it, since he had to complete 20 hours of training. lI.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT [ 16 ] At trial, the appellant argued that half of the selling price of the taxi permit, the vehicle, and the other property connected with that activity belonged to her, on the ground that the property constituted the assets of an enterprise that the respondent had set up during their life together and had been acquired with the parties' incomes. According to her, that property should be considered to constitute acquests. [ 17 ] The respondent, in turn, claimed that that property should be considered private property, since it constituted instruments required for his occupation.

He also argued that the income from that enterprise had to be reinvested in order to keep it going, particularly to repair or replace the vehicle on several occasions. Hence, there was no reason for any compensation whatsoever. [ 18 ] The judge accepted that the taxi permit and vehicle could constitute instruments required for his occupation pursuant to paragraph 6 of

article 450 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q) . She explained: [TRANSLATION] [53] Any property is presumed to constitute an acquest unless it is established that it is private property.

[54] However, in enacting

article 450 CCQ, the legislator chose to provide for certain exceptions, including one for instruments belonging to one of the spouses, instruments that are required by that spouse for his or her occupation, and are thus private property, saving compensation where applicable. [55] According to scholarly commentary and case law, the car and the taxi permit are instruments required for a spouse's occupation within the meaning of paragraph 6 of

article 450 CCQ. [56] In particular, Dalphond J.A., in Ceracaise v. Catalfamo, when, in the context of the taking in payment of a taxi vehicle and permit, he had to interpret and determine the scope of paragraph 3 of

article 552 of the Code of Civil Procedure , which allows instruments of work needed for the personal exercise of a professional activity to be withdrawn from seizure, and found [TRANSLATION] ". . . that the automobile and the permit are essential to a person who earns his or her living as a taxi operator . . .”.

He also recognized that the taximeter and radio are accessories of the car and must also be excluded from seizure. [References omitted.] [Emphasis added.] [ 19 ] In the next paragraph of her judgment, she concluded that, in this case, it was a matter of property required for the respondent's occupation, which made it his private property, but she did not consider or discuss the facts particular to the case, especially the changes in the use of the property over the years. She then questioned the existence of compensation for the respondent's acquests, which the appellant wanted partitioned.

She wrote the following on the subject: [TRANSLATION] [57] Once it is established that the property in question is Mr. He.'s and knowing that, according to the parties' representations, the debt of $6247.85 on the mass of private property was paid by Mr.

He., the second stage consists in examining whether compensation is warranted. [58] The notion of compensation is defined as [translation] " equal to the enrichment enjoyed by one mass to the detriment of the other". [59] The legislator set out certain cases of compensation, including the case where acquests were used to purchase instruments required for an occupation. The instruments remain private property but compensation must be provided. [60] That said, if there was compensation, Ms. H. would not be the beneficiary; rather, Mr. He.'s mass of acquests would be, even though Ms.

H. contributed, with her acquests, to the enrichment of Mr. He.'s private property. Indeed: [TRANSLATION] Compensation is carried out between the mass of private property and the mass of acquests of the same spouse. At no time is compensation drawn from the patrimony of one spouse and placed in the patrimony of the other spouse. That mechanism is used to balance the mass of acquests of each spouse at the time of dissolution of the regime. [Emphasis added.] [61] In order to determine whether compensation between the parties applies, it must be ascertained whether Mr.

He.'s acquests were used to acquire the taxi vehicle and permit. [62] The evidence has shown that they were acquired by means of a sum of $14 000 in cash and a loan of $40 000. [References omitted.] [ 20 ] On the basis of her analysis, she concluded that the respondent's income remained his private property so that there was no need

for compensation. [TRANSLATION] [83] Despite the financial contribution that Ms. H. may have made out of her income, she is not entitled to compensation, since compensation can only occur between the mass of private property and the mass of acquests of the same spouse. [84] The income used to repay the loan was derived from taxi transportation services. [85] The legislator enacted in

section 4.1 of the Act respecting transportation services by taxi a presumption that the holder of a taxi permit is deemed to carry on an organized economic activity consisting in providing services of a commercial nature. Mr. He. is therefore deemed to carry on an enterprise, since the presumption in

section 4.1 corresponds to the definition of "enterprise" in the third paragraph of

article 1525 of the Civil Code : 1525. . . . The carrying on by one or more persons of an organized economic activity, whether or not it is commercial in nature, consisting of producing, administering or alienating property, or providing a service, constitutes the carrying on of an enterprise. [86] Furthermore, in Ceracaise v. Catalfamo , Dalphond J.A. stated the following: [TRANSLATION] The regular supply of a remunerated service for the transportation of people under a permit and using one's vehicle constitutes an organized activity within the meaning of a 1525 CCQ, and therefore the carrying on of an enterprise. . . . [87] According to paragraph 1 of

article 449 CCQ, the income of each spouse normally constitutes acquests; however, the supply of transportation services by taxi being considered the carrying on of an enterprise, the income generated by that activity is, pursuant to

article 457 CCQ, private property, if it is reinvested in the enterprise, with no need for compensation, if the investment is necessary in order to maintain the income. [88] In this case, the income earned from transportation by taxi during the matrimonial regime having been used to cover daily expenses, including, in particular, the repayment of the debt guaranteed by a movable hypothec and loans taken out to replace the taxi, which were required to maintain the operation and the income of the enterprise, remained private property with no need for compensation. [References omitted.] III.

GROUNDS FOR APPEAL [ 21 ] For the purpose of my analysis, I will group the grounds for appeal under two headings:

(1) Are the respondent's taxi permit and other property required to carry on his enterprise his private property or his acquests?

(2) Depending on the answer to the first question, should we calculate a divisible compensation or another form of compensation for the appellant?

IV. ANALYSIS [ 22 ] One of the practical difficulties in this appeal is that the parties did not file a transcript or any evidence adduced before the trial judge. We must therefore rely on the statement of the facts as reported by her. [ 23 ] Before analyzing these questions, it is worthwhile recalling briefly the parties' contentions. [ 24 ] The appellant argued that, over the years, the respondent rarely drove the taxi used under his permit himself, preferring to rent it to other drivers.

Hence, she contended that that property could not be considered private, that is, "instruments required for [his] occupation". [2] According to her theory, the respondent did not carry on the occupation of taxi driver, but rather he became the manager of a transportation or equipment rental enterprise.

Therefore, his property could not be considered private and was part of the acquests, just like the income from the enterprise in question. [ 25 ] She claimed half the net value of the selling price of the property, established by consent at $193,324.79, from which certain expenses (notary, automobile debt, capital gains tax) were deducted, minus the $15,000 she has already received, for a total of $81,662.39. [ 26 ] Alternatively, the appellant contended that, should the Court determine that the property in dispute is the respondent's private property, it is nevertheless appropriate to consider that it should be subject to compensation.

Under that heading, her theory was that the taxi income used to repay the initial investment ($40,000) was not used to maintain the income of the enterprise, within the meaning of

article 457 CCQ Hence, that income remained part of the respondent's acquests (a 449 CCQ ) and its use to repay a debt associated with private property gives rise to compensation.

In that case, the compensation is $170,370.36 [3] ($40,000 divided by $54,000, multiplied by $230,000), half of which is owed to the appellant, who opted for the partition of the respondent's acquests. [ 27 ] For his part, the respondent contended that, despite the fact that the property of the enterprise was used for rental purposes rather than for himself as a driver, it remained necessary for his occupation throughout the relevant time period given that he continued to practice the trade of taxi driver during the weekend.

According to him, the reduction in the time spent behind the wheel was justified, and he insisted on the fact that it was always his intention to return to work as a taxi driver. [ 28 ] As regards the alternative ground, the respondent argued that the appellant's contribution could not give rise to compensation since that can be effected only between the masses of the same spouse. Furthermore, in his opinion, the income invested in the enterprise is private property, not subject to compensation. Lastly, no other compensation is owed.

(1) Are the respondent's taxi permit and other property required to carry on his enterprise his private property or his acquests? • APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES [ 29 ] As a preliminary, it is useful to recall that articles 448 to 450 and 457 to 469 CCQ are at the heart of the reasoning required to answer this question. [ 30 ]

Article 459 CCQ lays down a presumption that all the property of the spouses is presumed to constitute acquests unless it is established that it is private property.

Article 460 CCQ creates a presumption that the private property or acquests of a spouse that cannot be proven to belong to that spouse exclusively belong to both spouses, in undivided ownership, one half by each: 459. All property is presumed to constitute an acquest, both between the spouses and with respect to third persons, unless it is established that it is private property.

460. Any property that a spouse is unable to prove to be an exclusively private property or acquest is presumed to be held by both spouses in undivided co-ownership, 1/2 by each. As for the share of each spouse in the undivided property, it will, in principle, be an acquest because of the presumption. [ 31 ] Regardless of the source of the amounts used for its acquisition, some property must be characterized as private property. That is true of the instruments required for a spouse's occupation: 450 .

The private property of each spouse consists of . . . (6) the instruments required for that spouse's occupation, saving compensation where applicable. However, the provision recognizes entitlement to compensation if the instruments were acquired with an acquest. [ 32 ] Normally, the proceeds of work or the income from property, whether private or an acquest, are acquests: 449.

The acquests of each spouse include all property not declared to be private property by law, and, in particular, (1) the proceeds of that spouse's work during the regime; (2) the fruits and income due or collected from all that spouse's private property or acquests during the regime. [ 33 ] That means that, generally, even the income from an enterprise considered the private property of one spouse is an acquest. However, if the income is invested in a private enterprise, it is then considered private property, but subject to compensation.

On the other hand, if the investment is required to maintain the level of income of the private enterprise, no compensation is owed to the mass of the acquests.

Article 457 CCQ is worded as follows: 457. Income derived from the operation of an enterprise that is the private property of either spouse remains that spouse's private property, subject to compensation, if it is reinvested in the enterprise. No compensation is due, however, if the investment was necessary in order to maintain the income of the enterprise. [ 34 ] It is also worth recalling that, pursuant to

article 476 CCQ, property susceptible of compensation must be estimated according to its condition at the time of dissolution of the regime and to its value at the time of liquidation. That provision must also be read with

article 465 CCQ, which provides that, between spouses and in the event of divorce, the effects of dissolution are retroactive to the day of the application for divorce [4] or the day on which they ceased living together. [ 35 ] For the following reasons, I am of the opinion that the appeal must be allowed. The applicable principles in matters of liquidation of a partnership of acquests having been clearly identified, the trial judge failed to pursue her examination of the specific facts of the case, which resulted in the principles being improperly applied.

[ 36 ] Thus, she wrote the following: [TRANSLATION] [55] According to scholarly commentary and case law, the car and the taxi permit are instruments required for the spouse's occupation within the meaning of paragraph 6 of

article 450 CCQ. [5] [56] In particular, Dalphond J.A., in Ceracaise v. Catalfamo, when, in the context of the taking in payment of a taxi vehicle and permit, he had to interpret and determine the scope of paragraph 3 of

article 552 of the Code of Civil Procedure , which allows instruments of work needed for the personal exercise of a professional activity to be withdrawn from seizure, and found [TRANSLATION] ". . . that the automobile and the permit are essential to a person who earns his or her living as a taxi operator . . .”.

He also recognized that the taximeter and radio are accessories of the car and must also be excluded from seizure. [References omitted.] [Emphasis added.] [ 37 ] The judge thus seemed to accept that it was sufficient for a type of property to be considered private by case law for it to be so in all circumstances, whereas nothing prevents a change in the nature of property (see articles 451 and 452 CCQ ).

I believe that the judge should have examined the actual use of the taxi permit and associated vehicle over time before drawing a conclusion about its nature, i.e., whether private or an acquest, at the time of dissolution of the regime. [ 38 ] As for the case law of our Court cited by the judge, I believe that the term "taxi operator" in it did not automatically apply in the respondent's case at the time of the parties' separation. In actuality, the use of the taxi permit and the property associated thereto varied over the years, from the time when the property was acquired in 1998 until the date of separation.

My understanding of the evidence, as reported by the trial judge, is that that property was used by the respondent as a taxi operator or taxi professional exclusively during 1997. As of 1998, the property was used by the respondent as a professional and in part as assets of a rental enterprise; and later, as of 2006, it was used solely for the purpose of rental by third parties that operated their own taxi enterprise. [ 39 ] It is clear that the specific circumstances of this case raise a difficulty with respect to qualifying the property in question.

This is not an obvious situation in which the respondent was the only one to carry on transportation activities using his taxi permit and the associated vehicle, the source of the income from his taxi enterprise (remunerated transportation of people or property). What appears from the evidence is that he used the property in dispute as instruments required for his occupation only for a limited period of time. Afterwards, the situation evolved and the property was mostly rented to third parties before being used for that sole purpose as of 2006.

The respondent's income was then derived from his property rental enterprise, not from his enterprise for the transportation of people or property. [ 40 ] Throughout the year that followed the acquisition of the property in dispute in 1997, there is no doubt that it was the respondent's private property, since he was just about the only person to use it and did so for his work. However, as of the second half of 1998 and until the spring of 2006, the property in dispute was intended more for rental to third parties than for use by the respondent himself.

It is, in fact, the appellant's contention that the property no longer consisted of instruments required for his occupation, but rather of the assets of a property rental enterprise. [ 41 ] The appellant's theory is not convincing, however, considering the evidence available since, during that period, there remain grey areas. In contrast to what she contends, it is not certain at first glance that the characterization of instruments required for an occupation cannot leave the requisite leeway for such property to also be rented for other purposes.

Despite the fact that the respondent substantially reduced the time he himself devoted to driving a taxi between 1998 and 2006, the property nonetheless could, to a certain extent, be needed by him as instruments required for his occupation. [ 42 ] Therefore, in the absence of any other evidence, the examination of the facts reported by the judge does not automatically make it possible to accept the appellant's theory, since it is difficult to see how the sole fact that, as of 1998, the property was used by the respondent for renting to third parties would render that property less necessary to the exercise of his occupation. [ 43 ] In short, given the circumstances in this case, it is difficult to find in paragraph 6 of

article 450 CCQ anything that prevents property from being used both as an instrument required for an occupation and an asset of a small rental enterprise.

[ 44 ] That means that, if we were to stop right there, I would not be inclined to find any error in the trial judge's conclusion. However, the same cannot be said as of the respondent's above-mentioned accident in the spring of 2006. As of that time, and for an indeterminate period, he was unable to drive his taxi himself. In fact, he did not resume driving a taxi up to the sale of the property in dispute in October of 2008, approximately six months after the start of the divorce proceedings. [ 45 ] This leads me to make two comments.

First, I find it difficult to see how the respondent can claim that his property was required for his occupation if he could not practise that occupation for an extended period of time. Second, we must not automatically find that the "instruments required for an occupation" of a person who is injured become acquests simply because that person temporarily can no longer practise his or her occupation. [ 46 ] What is unusual in the case at bar is that, shortly after the appellant filed for divorce, the respondent sold the property.

Once the property was sold, how can he claim, without any other explanation or demonstration, that it was required for his occupation? In other words, how could it be necessary to an activity no longer engaged in? The matter having been reflected upon, it certainly cannot be the object of paragraph 6 of

article 450 CCQ, particularly since the evidence shows that, until the trial hearing, the respondent had earned no income of any nature whatsoever. [ 47 ] In my opinion, in some cases, the facts subsequent to dissolution of the matrimonial regime can constitute a factor in, or a useful indication for, the Court's proper assessment of a factual situation existing at the time of dissolution in order to correctly qualify the property.

In this case, the following facts can be accepted in that regard: – the date of the sale of the property, which was contemporaneous with the dissolution of the matrimonial regime; – the respondent did not work as a taxi driver in the months following dissolution of the matrimonial regime; – the respondent lived on the proceeds of the sale of his property; – the respondent sold the property in bulk. [ 48 ] That leads me to conclude that, given the particular circumstances of the case and according to the facts related by the judge, at the relevant time, the respondent no longer held the taxi permit, the vehicle associated thereto, or the other related property.

It was therefore no longer private property but constituted acquests. [ 49 ] Given the foregoing, and with great respect, I believe that the judge erred in her application of the principle to the facts in the case, and it is therefore appropriate to allow the first ground of appeal.

(2) Depending on the answer to the first question, should we calculate a divisible compensation or another form of compensation for the appellant? [ 50 ] Once the property related to the taxi activity is characterized as acquests, the appellant is entitled to an amount equal to half of its net value. The net value is established by taking into consideration, as the case may be, sales expenses, the hypothec balance or another debt related to the property, taxes, and compensation. [ 51 ] The proceeds of the sale of the property totalled $230,000.

As agreed by the parties, it is appropriate to deduct a debt of $6247.85 representing the balance owing on the purchase of the vehicle, interest costs of $804.90, notary expenses of $1241.62 and capital gains tax of $28,380.84, for a balance of $193,324.79.

It is also appropriate to deduct $7000 in 1997 and $20,000 between 1997 and 2002 (half of the repayment of the bank loan of $40,000 out of the joint bank account that was deemed to belong equally to the two spouses) [6] as advances made by the appellant on the payment of the purchase price of the property, for a total of $27,000 refundable to the appellant [7] and constituting acquests in her regard (half of which the respondent is entitled to, since he did not renounce the appellant's acquests). A net value of $166,324.79 is left.

[ 52 ] It remains to be determined whether it is appropriate to deduct from that amount compensation in favour of the respondent's mass of private property. I do not think so. Here is why. [ 53 ] In this case, it is appropriate to accept that the respondent's share of the joint account was an acquest for him, since it was derived from his work. It was thanks to that acquest that he was able to acquire the property of the enterprise.

If that property was private, compensation in favour of his mass of acquests would be due, for the totality of the net value of the property, since no amount from the respondent's private property was used. Furthermore, the repayment of a hypothec used to pay the price of a property is no different from a price paid in cash at the time of the purchase; the spouse is merely paying off a debt, and

article 457 CCQ cannot be applied to make those payments private property. [8] In other words, if the property of the enterprise were, in this case, considered the respondent's private property, it would be appropriate to provide compensation in favour of the mass of his acquests, for its full net value, which would be divisible 50-50 with the appellant.

Since it is, in fact, considered to constitute acquests, it is obviously not appropriate to order any compensation in favour of the mass of private property. [ 54 ] Certainly, over the years, the vehicle used was replaced a few times, which inevitably generated costs. However, nothing in the evidence demonstrates that those expenses were paid out of the respondent's private property.

Hence, compensation in favour of the respondent's mass of private property in that regard is not appropriate. [ 55 ] That being so, the judge set the net value of the taxi permit and the vehicle used for that purpose at $193,324.79, which should be reduced to $166,324.79 for the reasons indicated earlier.

The appellant's claim resulting from the liquidation of the respondent's mass of acquests is therefore $83,162.40, from which it is appropriate to deduct the $15,000 already paid. [9] She is therefore entitled to receive $68,162.40, subject, however, to any adjustment for her share of any tax impact (that is, if the amount already deducted proves insufficient). [ 56 ] In addition, she is entitled to the repayment of her advances of $27,000, an amount that constitutes an acquest for her.

After deducting the respondent's claim resulting from the partition of the appellant's acquests, she is owed $13,500. [ 57 ] So instructions must be given to the person holding $106,000 in trust to remit to the appellant a principal of $81,662.40 ($68,162.40 + $13,500). She is entitled to the amounts indicated in paragraphs 125 and 126 of the Superior Court judgment. Conclusion [ 58 ] For these reasons, I would allow the appeal without costs and vary the trial judgment in order to substitute the following for paras 121 and 122: [TRANSLATION] [121] ORDERS the trustee to remit to N.

H. the sum of $81,662.40, with the interest accrued on that amount; [122] ORDERS the trustee to remit to H. He. the balance of the trust account; (

s) JACQUES A. LÉGER, J.A. [1] Held on December 9 and 10, 2010.

[2] Paragraph 6 of

article 450 CCQ. [6] The amount is actually larger, since interest was paid, which would proportionately reduce the net value of the property, but would increase the appellant's divisible acquests. Ultimately, this has no impact on the amount attributable to the appellant.