r v. Quebecor Media Inc., 2011 QCCQ 15413

Québec (Procureur général) c. Québecor Média inc. 2011 QCCQ 15413 COURT OF QUEBEC Canada PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF QUEBEC CITY OF QUEBEC “Criminal and Penal Division” No.: 200-01-126818-081 DATE: December 15, 2011 ______________________________________________________________________ THE HONOURABLE CAROL ST-CYR, J.C.Q., PRESIDING ______________________________________________________________________ Attorney General of Quebec Prosecutor v. Quebecor Media Inc. Canoe Inc.

Corporation Sun Media ( Journal de Québec ) Defendants ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ I.

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Quebecor Media Inc., Canoe Inc., and Corporation Sun Media ( Journal de Québec ) are jointly charged with violating a publication ban on April 30 (1st count) and May 1, 2008 (2nd count), an order that was rendered in the context of an interim release hearing (section 517(2) Cr .C .). [ 2 ] On April 30, 2008, the journalist Bernard Plante, who worked as a freelancer for the Nomad News Agency, attended an interim release hearing concerning one Yvan Paré, charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm.

At the hearing, the Honourable Judge Hélène Bouillon ordered a publication ban under section 517(1) Cr. C. The journalist wrote an

article containing facts revealed by the evidence, while stating that a publication ban had been ordered. The Nomad News Agency sold his text to Quebecor Media Inc. and sent it electronically to Canoe Inc., which in turn forwarded it electronically to Corporation Sun Media ( Journal de Québec ), the latter three companies being part of the same holding company.

Canoe published the complete text by the journalist Plante on its website on April 30, 2008, while the Journal de Québec published it on May 1, 2008, having made no changes to the content. [ 3 ] The Ministère de la Justice, considering that the content of the articles broadcast, transmitted, and published violated the ban ordered by Bouillon J., filed a complaint against Bernard Plante and the three defendants. [ 4 ] While the journalist Plante pleaded guilty to the charge, the three corporations charged chose to stand trial. II.

FACTS ENTERED IN EVIDENCE [ 5 ] The evidence was adduced through the filing of a certain number of exhibits from various sources and the hearing of a witness. [ 6 ] As evidenced in his statement filed as P-4, his testimony, and the document filed as D-1, Sylvain Chamberland is the sole shareholder of Nomade Management Inc., founded in May 2004. [ 7 ] Nomade Management Inc. is a news agency (Nomad News Agency) that provided news content to various media, mainly Quebecor Media Inc.

Unlike other agencies, Nomade Inc., according to its service contract with its main client, transferred its rights to the written, photographic or video content sold to its client. It therefore had no control over the management and use of its product from that moment on. [ 8 ] Bernard Plante, one of the forty or so employees at the agency, worked as a journalist on a contractual basis and wrote articles on a variety of subjects, including politics, legal affairs, and general news. According to the billing adduced, he was paid every two weeks.

According to the witness Chamberland, Bernard Plante was a cautious and skilled journalist with more than thirty years’ experience in a number of areas. [ 9 ] Although the decision whether or not to publish a text once delivered to a client was no longer up to Nomad News Agency, the

agency had a certain amount of control over its freelancers’ articles, which could be edited by supervisors. In general, there was a period of thirty to sixty minutes between receiving an

article from a journalist and forwarding it to the news buyer. [ 10 ] While mentioning that a certain Yves Malette was responsible for the supervision of Bernard Plante, he repeated that Mr. Plante was trusted by his employers because of his experience. This was an important factor in the milieu, because a freelancer’s professionalism was a guarantee of objective factual coverage and compliance with legal guidelines, especially in the context of a publication ban, as mentioned by the journalist Plante. [ 11 ] Nadia Royer was the clerk of the court during the hearing of the evidence for the release of the accused Yvan Paré. In ordering the publication ban provided in

section 517 Cr. C., the judge read aloud part of the provision, thus indicating the guidelines it contained. [ 12 ] During a break in proceedings, the journalist Plante approached her and asked whether the publication ban applied to the facts entered in evidence. The clerk answered that the judge had read out part of

section 517 Cr. C. , which spoke for itself. [ 13 ] After the hearing, Mr. Plante wrote a text which he sent to the Nomad News Agency. Under the service contract between the agency and Quebecor Media Inc., this text was forwarded to Canoe and then run the next day by the Journal de Québec . The

article reads as follows (Exhibit P-1): [ translation] CANOE Network Canoe NEWS Update: 30/04/2008 20:26 Drinking and driving: Paré remains in custody The charges could get more serious (Canoe) Bernard Plante Yvan Paré, 36, appeared again today in the Quebec City courthouse, facing a charge of impaired driving causing bodily harm. The life of the victim, a young woman of 22, still hangs in the balance at Enfant-Jésus Hospital. At the time the respondent appeared at his bail hearing, the Crown stated that the victim was still in very critical condition.

Crown attorney Christine Gosselin emphasized that, according to the latest medical report, the young woman, who suffered serious head injuries, remains in a neurovegetative state and that final tests will determine “whether to keep her alive.” If the victim succumbs to her injuries, the charge will be amended. Yvan Paré was involved in a collision as he drove his car very quickly along Hamel Boulevard in Quebec City. The accused, who had just left the restaurant Le Bifteck, had a blood alcohol concentration of more than twice the legal limit.

More information about the circumstances surrounding this terrible tragedy and the testimony of the witnesses were provided in court, but these details cannot be revealed because of a publication ban . Paré, a landscaper, tried to obtain his release until proceedings resume. Judge Hélène Bouillon found that the proposed bail ($1,000) and family supervision were not sufficient. He was ordered to be detained in pre-sentence custody. Paré has no previous criminal record. Copyright © 1995-2008 Canoe Inc.

All rights reserved. [Emphasis added.] [ 14 ] On Thursday, May 1, 2008, the Journal de Québec , citing Canoe as its source, reproduced the

article in full, as shown by Exhibit P-2, with no changes: [ translation] DRINKING AND DRIVING Paré remains in custody (Canoe) – Yvan Paré, 36, appeared again today in the Quebec City courthouse, facing a charge of impaired driving causing bodily harm. The life of the victim, a young woman of 22, still hangs in the balance at Enfant-Jésus Hospital. At the time the respondent appeared at his bail hearing, the Crown stated that the victim was still in very critical condition. Crown

attorney Christine Gosselin emphasized that, according to the latest medical report, the young woman, who suffered serious head injuries, remains in a neurovegetative state and that final tests will determine “whether to keep her alive.” If the victim succumbs to her injuries, the charge will be amended. Yvan Paré was involved in a collision as he drove his car very quickly along Hamel Boulevard in Quebec City. The accused, who had just left the restaurant Le Bifteck, had a blood alcohol concentration of more than twice the legal limit.

More information about the circumstances surrounding this terrible tragedy and the testimony of the witnesses were provided in court, but these details cannot be revealed because of a publication ban . Paré, a landscaper, tried to obtain his release until proceedings resume. Judge Hélène Bouillon found that the proposed bail ($1,000) and family supervision were not sufficient. He was ordered to be detained in pre-sentence custody.

Paré has no previous criminal record. [Emphasis added.] [ 15 ] Documents P-5 and P-6 show that Quebecor Media Inc. is the sole shareholder of Canoe Inc. and of a numbered company that is the sole shareholder of Corporation Sun Media, one of whose divisions is the Journal de Québec . [ 16 ] All these companies are separate corporate entities, autonomous from a corporate viewpoint, each having its own board of directors. [ 17 ] Subsequently, the parties agreed to file Exhibit D-3, a series of admissions concerning a certain Patrick White. [ 18 ] The document indicates that Mr.

White was news editor for the Journal de Québec at the time of the events. Mr. White states that news agencies were information wholesalers offering complete news coverage in exchange for payment. They provided a turnkey product that could be published in whole or in part or even reworked by the media. [ 19 ] Mr. White, who has worked in the past for Reuters and The Canadian Press, states that, in his experience, texts are checked by one or two supervisors at the news agencies before being sent to the client.

That is standard practice in the industry. [ 20 ] In his opinion, Sylvain Chamberland and Bernard Plante are both seasoned journalists. He personally worked with Mr. Plante and considers him to be a journalist who has always respected court orders. [ 21 ] During all the years he acted as news editor at the Journal de Québec , he always relied on the statements of news agencies concerning the content of their articles.

It was impossible to check whether or not a publication ban had been respected without doing the journalist’s work over again, which would have been impossible given the large number of texts that came in every day. [ 22 ] According to him, there were between two and four people per shift at Canoe Inc. responsible for the digitization of the texts received. At both Canoe and the Journal de Québec , the texts could be published as submitted or with changes.

The witness stated that if a seasoned journalist, in this case Bernard Plante, wrote in a text that there was a publication ban, then he, as news editor, was entitled to assume that the order had been complied with. III. POSITION OF THE PARTIES

A) Defence’s position [ 23 ] The defence consists of three separate defendants, whose liability vis-à-vis the offences charged may be different. [ 24 ] The question that the Court must ask is whether, under section 517(2) Cr.

C. , following the usual standards is a lawful excuse and whether the defendants have raised a reasonable doubt in this regard. [ 25 ] According to the defence, we must start from the basic premise that the Nomad News Agency, which had some forty employees, was managed by an experienced bureau chief who had to trust his journalist, who was, after all, in the best position with regard to the publication ban and who knew the guidelines. [ 26 ] Like the Canadian Press, the Nomad News Agency sold news content to various media, including Quebecor Media Inc., which redistributed it to Canoe Inc. and Corporation Sun Media. [ 27 ] According to the defence, these companies had shown reasonable diligence, since from their point of view, they could trust the Nomad News Agency and its journalist Plante. [ 28 ] In the view of the defence, the arguments it makes apply to the three defendants, although it emphasizes that Quebecor Media Inc. played no role in the decision whether or not to publish the

article in dispute. [ 29 ] As for Canoe and the Journal de Québec , these companies must digitalize and publish hundreds of texts received every day. How could they not put their trust in the Nomad News Agency, which is paid to provide a turnkey service, and the experience of its journalist Bernard Plante? The two companies had no reason to doubt the quality of the article, and in any case, they could not check everything they received for publication.

This relationship of trust with the news agencies is necessary for operations to run smoothly and, in the eyes of the defence, it is a lawful excuse within the meaning of the law because they were observing the industry standard and it is not the media’s role to check everything that they publish.

B) Prosecution’s position [ 30 ] As far as the prosecution is concerned, under

section 21 Cr. C. , Quebecor Media Inc. is responsible for the articles published by

Canoe Inc. and the Journal de Québec . [ 31 ] In its opinion, since the final decision whether to broadcast, transmit, or publish was up to the other two defendants, the very content of the

article (P-1, P-2) should have raised questions and led to some checking. It was their responsibility to ensure that the text was [ translation] “suitable to be broadcast, transmitted, published”. [ 32 ] It argues that the Court should not consider industry standards and journalistic imperatives to be a lawful excuse. As far as the prosecution is concerned, none of the defendants did the minimum required in this case, whereas a verification was all the more necessary given that Bernard Plante’s text refers very clearly to the facts and mentions the existence of a publication ban. IV.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE [ 33 ] Can a natural or legal person charged with an offence under section 517(2) Cr. C. invoke a defence of due diligence with the aim of raising a reasonable doubt as to criminal intent? [ 34 ] If not, can the defence raised be considered, on a balance of probabilities, to be a lawful excuse, in light of all the circumstances presented? V. ANALYSIS

A) Legal concepts [ 35 ] The broadcast or transmission of the facts in criminal proceedings may be restricted either by law, as illustrated by

section 517 Cr. C. , or by the common law power to cite for contempt of court, as set out in

section 9 Cr. C. [ 36 ] The main goal of such bans is to ensure a fair trial by safeguarding the impartiality of the trier of fact and by protecting the complainants and witnesses. [1]

Section 517 Cr. C. [ 37 ] Subsection 517(1) Cr. C. defines the parameters of the publication ban as follows: If the prosecutor…to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused…make an order directing that the evidence taken , the information given or the representations made … shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way … [Emphasis added.] [ 38 ] Subsection 517(2) Cr.

C. deals with failure to comply with the order: Every one who fails, without lawful excuse , the proof of which lies on him , to comply with an order made under subsection (1)… [Emphasis added.] [ 39 ] In R . v .

Daly , [2] the Court of Appeal for British Columbia determined that the mens rea of this offence was “[t]o intentionally publish, with knowledge of the existence of the ban or recklessness or wilful blindness as to whether such a ban existed”. [ 40 ] In the case of this offence, the requisite criminal intent does not compel the prosecution to establish the intent to violate a publication ban duly ordered by the court, but rather to show the intent to publish elements of the said order. [ 41 ] Therefore, the defence may present evidence to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the intentional element of the offence.

At this stage, however, a mistake, even an honest one, is no defence. As the Court of Appeal for British Columbia wrote in the aforementioned case, repeating the words of the trial judge: The fact that Mr. Daly honestly believed but was mistaken that the publication did not violate the publication ban is, in these circumstances, no defence . [3] [ 42 ] In light of the evidence adduced as a whole, if the court finds that the Crown has discharged its burden of proof, the application of a lawful excuse will then be assessed.

In other words, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the actus reus and the mens rea of the alleged offence must be made before “the lawful excuse” may be analyzed. [4] [ 43 ] This offence, which identifies a means of exoneration, is distinct from contempt of court, which, although no sanction is provided by legislation, allows disobedience to be punished or compels compliance with a court order. For example, a breach of the sub judice rule could result in citing a defendant for contempt. [5] 2. Due diligence [ 44 ] Can a due diligence defence be raised in criminal proceedings without creating confusion?

Traditionally, this defence is applicable in regulatory offences or criminal offences alleging negligence or inadvertence. In such a case, [ translation] “the accused’s conduct is assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person placed in the same circumstances”. [6] [ 45 ] The history of the emergence of the due diligence defence traces the judicial consideration of this issue over a number of years, regarding which the Supreme Court of Canada created initial inroads in 1970 in R . v.

Pierce Fisheries Ltd. [7] [ 46 ] Subsequently, in 1976, the Law Reform Commission of Canada recommended the adoption of a minimum standard of liability

in regulatory offences and suggested that, henceforth, defendants should be required to establish a due diligence offence on a balance ofprobabilities. In 1978, in Sault Ste-Marie, the Supreme Court of Canada classified public welfare offences into three distinctcategories:[8] 1. Mens rea offences that Parliament can create even in regulatory matters; 2. Strict liability offences for which a due diligence defence may be raised; 3.

Absolute liability offences, which correspond to liability without fault. [47] As the Supreme Court noted in that case,[9] mere negligence is not a mental element leading to conviction for a criminaloffence. Therefore, the mental element the Crown must establish is that the accused who committed the prohibited act did sointentionally or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts constituting the offence, or with wilful blindness toward them.

This differs fromthe degree of fault in a strict liability offence, which is constituted by mere negligence measured according to an objective standard.[10]In short, strict liability is the middle ground between full mens rea and absolute liability. [48] It is clear that in strict liability offences, a conviction requires only that the prosecution establish the actus reus.

In such a case,the defendant may avoid conviction by raising a due diligence defence, which is assessed on the basis of his conduct, or in other words,according to whether the defendant took all reasonable care to prevent the actus reus.[11] [49] For instance, contempt of court caused outside of court (ex facie) should be dealt with as a strict liability offence so that theaccused, who could face a prison sentence if convicted, may exonerate himself by showing that it was not his fault or that he took allreasonable steps to avoid liability.[12] 3.

Lawful excuse [50] Authors agree that the notion of lawful excuse is difficult to define. For instance, professors Fortin and Viau write: [translation] The case law is unanimous in stating that a general definition of lawful excuse is impossible. If the law creating the offence does notassign a specific meaning to it, the meaning must be inferred from the purpose of the charge.[13] [51] The authors add the following: [translation] Next, however lawful it must be, a lawful excuse does not repudiate the offence itself.

In other words, the excuse must be lawful, but notnecessarily the conduct behind it.[14] [52] Where a provision creating an offence places on the accused the burden of proving a lawful excuse, the accused assumes adouble burden.

The first is that of proving the excuse or justification, and the second that convincing the trier of fact, on a balance ofprobabilities, of the existence of the excuse or justification.[15] [53] In Jorgensen,[16] the Supreme Court distinguishes between the terms “justification” and “excuse” by referring to Perka:[17] The former challenges the wrongfulness of the action while the latter concedes the wrongfulness of the action but asserts that due to thecircumstances the actor should be exempted from responsibility for it.

The rationale upon which the actor is excused is "the perceivedinjustice of punishing violations of the law in circumstances in which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice available; theact was wrong but it is excused because it was realistically unavoidable". [Emphasis added.] [54] The Ontario Provincial Court, which had before it a charge of breach of commitment, characterized a lawful excuse as follows: In other words, a lawful excuse is an event which prevents the accused from attending in court over which he or she does not have anycontrol.

They cannot prevent it.[18] [55] The lawful excuse claimed by the accused must be assessed in light of all the facts in the record[19] and must not be left to thesole discretion of the accused.[20] The question that may arise in a case involving a lawful excuse is whether the accused’s burden ofproving this defence on a balance of probabilities is evidentiary or persuasive. [56] Although there may be a certain confusion in the case law between these two types of burdens, it appears that the spirit ofsection 517(2) Cr. C. dictates that an evidentiary burden be the required standard. [57] Indeed, in R. v.

Holmes,[21] the Supreme Court, which was split on the issue, construed the phrase "without lawful excuse, theproof of which lies upon him" as imposing an evidentiary burden on the accused. Dixon J., however, was of the opinion that thisexpression imposed a persuasive burden, compelling the accused to prove the existence of an excuse on a balance of probabilities. [58] A few years later, the Supreme Court cited Holmes and made the following remark: In R. v.

Holmes, (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914, this Court acknowledged that the words "without lawful excuse, the proofof which lies upon him" were capable of creating a legal burden but interpreted them to require the accused to raise a reasonabledoubt.[22]

[ 59 ] In other words, to raise a reasonable doubt and exonerate himself or herself, the accused should highlight evidence suggesting the existence of certain facts that may or may not be considered to be a lawful excuse, but is not required to convince the judge of anything. [23] 4. Complicity [ 60 ] In Kirkness , Wilson J., discussing the rules governing complicity in

section 21 Cr. C. , noted the following: The concept of liability for those who assist in the commission of crime has long been part of our criminal law. This concept springs from the notion that those who assist others to commit crimes are fully as blameworthy as the actual perpetrators . [24] [ 61 ] The Supreme Court states that aiding and abetting in the context of party liability take a somewhat different form from that taken in the case of the principal offenders, while pointing out, that mere presence at the scene of a crime or passive acquiescence is not sufficient for a conviction.

The Court also notes that distinguishing between acts amounting to “mere acquiescence” and acts amounting to “encouragement” is often difficult. Guilt implies a necessary state of mind and evidence supporting an inference that the accused had prior knowledge that an offence of this type was planned . [Emphasis added.] [ 62 ] The Supreme Court of Canada also analyzed the state of mind required for party liability within the meaning of

section 21 Cr. C. in Hibbert . [25] [ 63 ] The expression used in section 21(1)(

b) Cr. C. , namely, that of doing or omitting to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit an offence, refers directly to the accused’s intention and goes beyond the concept of a mere desire. This provision includes its own mens rea requirement that is separate from that applicable to the actual perpetrator of the offence at issue.

B) Application to the facts in the present case [ 64 ] In light of the tests set out in the case law, and even though counsel for the defence referred to it as such, is it in fact appropriate to speak of due diligence on the part of the defendants in a case involving an offence in

section 517 Cr. C. ? [ 65 ] In such a case, contrary to what would be possible in a case involving contempt of court, the Court must answer this question in the negative. [26] [ 66 ] As previously indicated, as a general rule, the due diligence defence applies to strict liability offences or criminal offences involving negligence or recklessness and must establish conduct on the part of the accused that justifies a conclusion of due diligence on a balance of probabilities. [ 67 ] In this case,

section 517 Cr. C. requires that the Crown prove the actus reus and the mens rea . The evidence shows that the

article broadcast or transmitted and published clearly violated the order issued by Bouillon J. Indeed, section 517(1) Cr.

C. does not merely prohibit certain details of the evidence from being broadcast, transmitted, or published, as the journalist Plante suggests in his article, but also requires “that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made… shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way”. [27] [ 68 ] The description of the victim’s physical condition, the comments on the nature of her injuries, the description of the speed of the accused’s vehicle, and the report of his blood alcohol concentration are elements that clearly violate the publication ban. [ 69 ] The evidence also shows that the defendants knew that a publication ban existed because the journalist Plante’s

article expressly mentions it. [ 70 ] As stated previously, the prosecution does not need to prove the defendants’ intent to violate a publication ban. Rather, it is required to show the intention to publish while knowing that such a ban existed. [ 71 ] At this stage, the Court finds that the Crown has discharged its double burden regarding both material facts and intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 72 ] The evidence adduced in defence does not contain any particular evidence able to raise a doubt as to the lack of criminal intent. Mr.

Chamberland, the owner of the Nomad News Agency, prepares a general modus operandi for the supervision of articles intended for various clients. No one, however – neither a desk editor responsible for copy editing nor Mr. Malette, supervisor of the journalist Plante – has come forward to say that the

article in dispute was edited or that it was at least supervised. Mr. Chamberland adds that the agency relies on the experience of its journalists. [ 73 ] The evidence concerning the Journal de Québec and Canoe, characterized as exculpatory, emerged from Patrick White’s admissions. Mr. White did not describe any concrete action concerning the

article broadcast, transmitted, or published on April 30 and May 1, however. He took it for granted, based on his experience, that the text had already been undergone an initial verification by the Nomad News Agency.

He stated that, at both Canoe and the Journal de Québec, the workload makes it impossible to verify compliance or non-compliance with a publication ban. [ 74 ] He concluded his testimony by specifying that the journalist Plante’s experience gave him the right to assume that the ban had been complied with. [ 75 ] It is clear that the defendants took no particular measure even though, as the evidence reveals, they were free to edit, divide up, re-structure, reduce or simply refrain from broadcasting, transmitting, or publishing the

article provided by the Nomad News Agency and written by Mr. Plante. [ 76 ] The Court finds that neither the normal course of business nor industry standards may serve as a shield for the failure to be

thorough, and that due diligence involves more than merely affirming that these standards were met.. [ 77 ] Even if the defence of due diligence were possible, which the Court does not find, the defendants’ conduct contains nothing grounding a characterization of due diligence, since they did nothing more than rely on the first link in the chain and assume, without taking any steps at all, that it complied with the order issued. [ 78 ] Furthermore, can the defence raised constitute a lawful excuse within the meaning of section 517(2) Cr.

C. ? [ 79 ] The remarks made with respect to what the defence characterizes as due diligence also answer this question. [ 80 ] Let us remember that the defendants’ approach is based on good faith and an honest belief that the

article at issue did not breach the publication ban because it was written by a seasoned journalist and delivered by a responsible news agency. [ 81 ] Moreover, the defence relies on normal media practice, where a relationship of trust is needed for the smooth functioning of operations and constitutes an acceptable standard because it would be impossible to verify everything intended for broadcast, transmission, publication. As we have already seen, the versions of Mr. Chamberland and Mr.

White elaborate on these claims. [ 82 ] In other words, the defence argues that the law was violated under circumstances in which the defendants had no other viable or reasonable choice available and that this violation should be excused because it was realistically unavoidable. [28] [ 83 ] The defence’s argument does not withstand analysis. The decision to broadcast, transmit, or publish the partially or fully edited text was respectively that of Canoe and the Journal de Québec . The actual content of the text should have alerted a desk editor because it also stated that it was under a publication ban.

This alone should have resulted in a minimum amount of attention, which is not revealed by the evidence. [ 84 ] The belief that others had been vigilant in this respect is not an excuse justified by reason or common sense. In the view of the Court, the publication, in the form it appears in Exhibits P-1 and P-2, was entirely avoidable.

Media requirements are not a lawful excuse, especially when the defendants merely relied on the seller of the information without taking any particular action themselves. [ 85 ] The Court considers that a publication ban issued with the aim of safeguarding the presumption of innocence, among other things, requires the media to pay it all the attention it deserves and that it is the media’s responsibility to comply with the ban. [ 86 ] Furthermore, since the decision to broadcast, transmit, or publish came specifically from Canoe Inc. and Journal de Québec , the evidence does not show that Quebecor Media Inc. had any part to play in this decision.

Admittedly, Quebecor can be considered the parent company of the other two corporations, but the defendants are separate corporate entities that make their own decisions. [ 87 ] Aiding or abetting must result from a positive act, without which mere knowledge, as was the case here, cannot entail any criminal liability whatsoever. VI.

CONCLUSION [ 88 ] In light of the foregoing, Quebecor Media Inc. is acquitted of the two alleged offences, Canoe Inc. is convicted on the first count, and Corporation Sun Media ( Journal de Québec ) is convicted on the second count. __________________________________ CAROL ST-CYR, J.C.Q. Mtre Daniel Bélanger Crown prosecutor Mtre Isabel J. Shurman Counsel for the defendants Dates of hearing: May 11 and 12, 2011