2017 NBCA 48, 2017 NBCA 48

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK COUR D’APPEL DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 12-16-CA STEPHEN CHARLES BERNARD APPELLANT STEPHEN CHARLES BERNARD APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Bernard v. R., 2017 NBCA 48 Bernard c.

R., 2017 NBCA 48 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: January 27, 2016 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 27 janvier 2016 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2016 NBQB 21 , 444 N.B.R. (2d) 319 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: 2010 NBPC 30 Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2016 NBBR 21 , 444 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 319 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : 2010 NBCP 30 Appeal heard: November 28, 2016 Judgment rendered: October 26, 2017 Appel entendu : le 28 novembre 2016 Jugement rendu : le 26 octobre 2017

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Richard Concurred by: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Naiomi Metallic, Rosalie M. Francis and Roy Stewart For the respondent: William Richards Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Richard Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Naiomi Metallic, Rosalie M. Francis et Roy Stewart Pour l’intimée : William Richards THE COURT Leave to appeal is granted but the appeal is dismissed.

LA COUR La demande d’autorisation d’appel est accueillie mais l’appel est rejeté. The judgment of the Court was delivered by RICHARD, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] On August 10, 2010, a judge of the Provincial Court found Stephen Charles Bernard guilty of having hunted deer without a valid licence: 2010 NBPC 30 , 365 N.B.R. (2d) 207. A few months later, the judge sentenced Mr. Bernard to the minimum penalty prescribed by law: seven days in jail and a $2,000 fine. That same day, the sentence was stayed pending Mr. Bernard’s appeal to the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court. On January 27, 2016, a judge of that Court dismissed the appeal: 2016 NBQB 21 , 444 N.B.R. (2d) 319. However, exercising what he described as his “inherent jurisdiction”, the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge permanently stayed execution of the sentence. Mr. Bernard now seeks leave to appeal the dismissal of his

summary conviction appeal. No one has challenged the judge’s decision to stay the sentence. [ 2 ] The sole issue at trial was whether Mr. Bernard, a Mi’kmaq member of the Sipekne’katik First Nation, was exercising an Aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , when he hunted without a licence in the northern part of the City of Saint John. This issue turns on the application of the test elaborated by the Supreme Court of Canada for such claims. Mr. Bernard submits the trial judge, and by extension the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge, for the most part, properly applied the governing analytical framework. Most of the trial judge’s findings, upheld on appeal, favoured Mr. Bernard. However, Mr. Bernard claims the trial judge erred in one critical respect. The trial judge held that, for Mr. Bernard to exercise an Aboriginal right to hunt at the location in

question, he had to show he was exercising the communal right of a contemporary Mi’kmaq community (of which he was a member) with links to the historic community that had once used the area as its hunting grounds. The evidence disclosed no such contemporary community of which Mr. Bernard was a member. The question of law on appeal is whether this criterion forms part of the analytical framework. In my view, the Supreme Court held that it does. II.

Factual background [ 3 ] The relevant facts are drawn from the trial judge’s reasons for decision, portions of which are borrowed verbatim and others paraphrased. [ 4 ] Mr. Bernard’s grandfather was a registered Indian under the Indian Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. He grew up on the Indian Brook reserve, located in Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia. However, as a young man, he relocated to Saint John, New Brunswick. [ 5 ] Stephen Charles Bernard was born in Saint John and has been a lifelong resident of that city.

He is a status Mi’kmaq Indian and a member the Sipekne’katik First Nation community, formerly known as the Indian Brook band. [ 6 ] In 1996, a conservation officer of New Brunswick’s Department of Natural Resources encountered Mr. Bernard and two others on the western side of the St. John River. Mr. Bernard had been hunting. He produced a “band card” showing him to be a Mi’kmaq from the Shubenacadie band in Nova Scotia. The officer issued Mr.

Bernard a written warning after informing him he could not hunt at that location without a licence, because the area was part of the Maliseet’s traditional hunting grounds. [ 7 ] Following this encounter, Mr. Bernard communicated with a conservation officer to inquire where he, as a Mi’kmaq, could hunt. He was told he could hunt east of the “St. John River system” but no particular location was specified. Mr. Bernard disagreed with the officer’s view and subsequently hunted within the St.

John River system. [ 8 ] On several occasions between 1997 and 2004, at various locations, members of the Department of Natural Resources encountered Mr. Bernard while he was hunting. On each occasion, he produced his band card and no further action was taken. In 2000, staff at the Department of Natural Resources issued Mr. Bernard a permit to transfer moose meat to another person without taking issue with his Mi’kmaq status. [ 9 ] On November 16, 2004, Mr. Bernard and another were hunting in the Highland Road area in the northern part of the City of Saint John when they encountered a conservation officer.

When asked to produce a hunting licence, Mr. Bernard showed the officer his native status card. This time, Mr. Bernard was charged under the Fish and Wildlife Act , S.N.B. 1980, c F-14.1, for hunting without a licence. [ 10 ] The charge was laid on March 16, 2005, and trial began on October 5 that same year. Over the next few years, there were numerous adjournments. These are explained in the trial judge’s decision at paras. 11-12. On August 16, 2010, Mr. Bernard was convicted. [ 11 ] The trial judge concluded the prosecution had proven – as the defence had readily admitted – that Mr.

Bernard had been hunting without a licence as alleged. Initially, the prosecution framed the issues as: (1) whether the Aboriginal group of which Mr. Bernard was a member had the right to hunt at the location where he was apprehended; and (2) whether the excuse of officially induced error was available to Mr. Bernard. However, Mr. Bernard rejected any claim of induced error. In a subsequent submission, the prosecution amended its statement of the issues. Thus, the trial judge’s decision proceeded by determining: (1) whether Mr.

Bernard was an Aboriginal person entitled to rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 ; and (2) if so, whether Mr. Bernard was entitled to exercise Aboriginal rights in the St. John River Valley. [ 12 ] The trial judge began his analysis by addressing the onus of proof. Following the decision in Sockabasin et al. v. R. , 2003 NBCA 60 , 261 N.B.R. (2d) 177, per Robertson J.A., the trial judge concluded the onus was on Mr. Bernard to establish the Aboriginal right and its infringement.

[13] The judge then reviewed the law relating to Aboriginal rights. He set out the analytical framework for determining theserights under the following headings: 1. Characterization of the claim; 2. The integral to a distinct culture test; 3. Continuity of the claimed right with the pre-contact practice; 4. The site-specific requirement. [14] Under the first of those headings, the trial judge notes that Mr.

Bernard claims an Aboriginal right to hunt for food and relieson the pre-contact practice of hunting for food to establish his right notwithstanding the prohibition, in the Fish and Wildlife Act, ofhunting without a licence. The judge found the probability was high that large animals, such as moose or deer, were hunted for food aspart of the way of life of the Mi’kmaq people in the pre-contact period.

He also found, under the second heading, the practice of huntingfor food made the Mi’kmaq community distinctive. [15] Regarding the continuity of the right claimed with pre-contact practice, the judge asked: “has the nature of the right continuedfrom pre-contact to modern day such that it can be recognized as such?” (para. 42). He found: “there is evidence of continuity of thenature of the practice that the Mi’kmaq continued the same practice of hunting these animals for food post-contact, the practice remainedcommunal and continues in an evolved form” (para. 47).

Under this heading, the judge examined whether there was a contemporarycommunity for which the right was sought to be protected. Drawing on R. v. Van der Peet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,[1996] S.C.J. No. 77 (QL); R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686; and R. v. Marshall; R. v.

Bernard, 2005 SCC43, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, the judge concluded that “[a]n aboriginal right is not lost by abandonment or cessation of exercise if atraditional connection with the land has been substantially maintained by observance of the custom tradition or practice, including a linkto the resource in question” (para. 53). [16] The judge then turned to the Crown’s argument there was no evidence of “either an historic community or contemporarycommunity of Mi’kmaq in the subject area and with which [Mr. Bernard] can identify” (para. 54) and to their invitation that the judgeapply the test set out in R. v.

Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, to assess this. However, the judge opined that “the issue of theexistence of an historic community is more appropriately dealt with under the site specific requirement” as is “the issue of contemporarycommunity” (para. 55). With regard to the Powley test, the judge noted Mr. Bernard is a status Indian and held that “membership in anIndian band as a status Indian is a significant indication and verification of a right-claimant’s membership in the aboriginal community”(para. 65).

He distinguished several cases where the Powley test had been used in assessing rights claimed by non-status Indians. [17] The judge then acknowledged he would have to examine the site-specific requirement, because “simply being a status Indiandoes not afford universal rights in all areas of the country” (para. 74). He acknowledged having to consider “the issues of specificity as tocommunity and site as well as whether there was any disappearance, abandonment or extinguishment of that practice” (para. 75). [18] The analysis under the site-specific heading began with a review of the governing principles of law.

The trial judge noted theSupreme Court, in Sappier; Gray, acknowledged it had imposed a site-specific requirement on the Aboriginal hunting and fishing rightsit recognized in other cases. He continued: Lamer C.J. explained in Adams [R. v. Adams, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, [1996] S.C.J.

No. 87 (QL)] as follows (para.30) “... if an aboriginal people demonstrates that hunting on a specific tract of land was an integral part of their distinctive culture then, evenif the right exists apart from title to that tract of land, the aboriginal right to hunt is nonetheless defined as, and limited to, the right tohunt on the specific tract of land.

A site-specific hunting or fishing right does not, simply because it is independent of aboriginal title tothe land on which it took place, become an abstract fishing or hunting right exercisable anywhere; it continues to be a right to hunt or fishon the tract of land in question.” As noted above, the Court in Van der Peet emphasized specificity of the claimed right, that is a court must focus specifically on thepractices, customs and traditions of the particular aboriginal community claiming the right and the specific history of the group claimingthe right. The Court stated at para. 69:

Aboriginal rights are not general and universal; their scope and content must be determined on a case by case basis. The fact that one group of aboriginal people has an aboriginal right to do a particular thing will not be, without something more, sufficient to demonstrate that another aboriginal community has the same aboriginal right. The existence of the right will be specific to each aboriginal community”. [paras. 78-79] [ 19 ] At this point, the judge turned to the evidentiary record to determine whether Mr. Bernard had proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the mouth of the St.

John River was traditional territory of the Mi’kmaq people pre-contact. He undertook an extensive review of the evidence adduced by both sides, and in particular, the testimonies of two expert witnesses. The judge noted some of the documentary evidence were but expressions of the opinion of the author, and that historians “can only work with what evidence they have and from such must at times take informed and logical leaps from the evidence” (para. 100). Nevertheless, he concluded there was “compelling evidence that there was a Mi’kmaq (Souriquois) presence in the mouth of the St.

John River, a coastal region and in all probability it existed at the time of contact” (para. 101). [ 20 ] The trial judge phrased the next question he would address as follows: […] As a member of the Mi’kmaq people recognized under the “ Indian Act ” does the Defendant have an aboriginal right to hunt for food in this territory? [para. 102] [ 21 ] In addressing that question, the judge examined a similar case from Nova Scotia. In R. v. Walker , 2005 NSPC 1 , [2005] N.S.J.

No. 30 (QL), the defendant, a status Indian and a member of the Eel Ground band in New Brunswick, was charged with hunting wildlife in Nova Scotia without a licence. He was a Mi’kmaq born in New Brunswick and lived in Nova Scotia most of his life. He had shot a deer in a traditional Mi’kmaq hunting area in Nova Scotia. Judge Curran convicted him of the offence charged. Though finding there was an Aboriginal right to hunt for food in the area where he had been hunting, Mr.

Walker was not part of the community entitled to exercise that Aboriginal right. [ 22 ] Returning to the facts of the present case, the trial judge repeated that Mr. Bernard was born in Saint John, is a lifelong resident of that city, and is a status Indian and a member of the Shubenacadie/Indian Brook band in Nova Scotia. The judge found “[t]here is no Mi’kmaq reserve in or near Saint John and no organized Mi’kmaq group here” (para. 109). He stated Mr. Bernard “identifies with a Mi’kmaq nation, not a particular band” and that Mr.

Bernard claims “the Mi’kmaq nation is the community as that term is referred to in Sappier : Gray et al. ” (para. 110). [ 23 ] Rather than accepting the conclusion in Walker , where this same argument had been rejected, the trial judge undertook his own analysis. Thus, the judge proceeded to answer the following question: “Can the Mi’kmaq nation qualify as the community” (para. 112)? [ 24 ] The trial judge recognized no direct evidence had been adduced on the question of what became of those Mi’kmaq who had hunted in the St. John River area in the pre-contact period.

The evidence established Mi’kmaq “were nomadic people to begin with, who underwent the significant impact of the coming of the Europeans and moved accordingly, who were involved in their own struggles and war alliances, and then subject to compulsory type territorial moves by colonial and government authorities” (para. 116). The judge notes the inherent difficulties of proving events such as this.

Nevertheless, there was “evidence to the effect that the Mi’kmaq people did retain some geographical limitations” (para. 121) and, accepting the testimony of the prosecution’s expert witness, the trial judge concluded as follows: […] I accept that the Mi’kmaq at least in the period post control, did identify and group themselves into bands, voluntarily maintaining those distinctions in their dealings with the authorities. The treaty evidence is a prime example thereof.

Notwithstanding what I consider to be the valid concerns of modern academic historians, namely the problem of applying European constructs and thinking in interpreting aboriginal matters, it appears that there were recognizable administrations by the Mi’kmaq of distinct hunting areas for members of bands. [para. 125] [ 25 ] In sum, the judge made the following critical findings: In essence I accept the evidence of Dr.

Marquis and find that on a balance of probabilities the Mi’kmaq occupied the locus in quo at the time of contact with the Europeans and at the time of first encounter with the French in Saint John area.

Further, I accept the evidence of Dr. Patterson and find that on a balance of probabilities the Mi’kmaq, for whatever reason, excluding treaty or extinguishment, left the locus in quo and surrounding hunting territory. There are opinions cited, based upon facts not specifically recorded, that they left for Nova Scotia (Webster). There are cases cited herein which refer to this movement ( Walker ). There is not compelling evidence to support the position that for 250-300 years thereafter that there was a community of Mi’kmaq in the area exercising the aboriginal right to hunt for food.

It may exist, but it is not before me. [para. 126-127] [ 26 ] The trial judge continued by pointing out there was no evidence adduced “with respect to any modern day community of Mi’kmaq in [the Saint John] area[, n]or is there any evidence that [Mr.

Bernard’s] father or grandfather had any connection to the land by substantially maintaining observance of the practice of hunting for food” (para. 132). [ 27 ] The judge then turned to the approach McLachlin C.J. took in Van der Peet , namely that “[a]n aboriginal right is not lost by abandonment or cessation of exercise if a traditional connection with the land has been substantially maintained by observance of the custom, tradition or practice including a link to the resource in question”, noting that it was obvious that the Chief Justice “was referring to a group or community of aboriginals” (para. 134).

The judge stated there is “a point in time where abandonment can cause the loss of an aboriginal right” but hastened to add that it was not for him to decide. He was prepared to accept that a community that left the area can resume the exercise of its Aboriginal right, but added: “in order to resume something one must have had exercised the right in the first place” (para. 137). In the case of Mr.

Bernard, he had “neither shown the existence of nor his belonging to that community of Mi’kmaq in whom the right to resume the practice still rests ” (para. 138). [ 28 ] In light of the above, the judge concluded as follows: The Defendant has satisfied me, on the balance of probabilities, that Mi’kmaq peoples inhabited the area of the locus in quo at the time of European contact and enjoyed the aboriginal right to hunt for food in that site for the years they inhabited such territory. However the Defendant has failed to satisfy me that he is a member of that original right-bearing Mi’kmaq community.

As such he has failed to establish that he had a right to hunt in the locus in quo on the date in question. In these circumstances a finding of guilty will have to be registered. [paras. 142-144] [ 29 ] Mr. Bernard’s appeal to the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court was not successful. The decision of that court covered subjects that were not raised in the arguments presented in the application for leave to appeal before our Court, such as freedom of association rights and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Be this as it may, the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge reviewed Supreme Court cases holding that hunting rights are site-specific and, in the end, stated he was not persuaded the trial judge had erred in finding Mr. Bernard guilty. III. Issues on appeal [ 30 ] As Mr. Bernard correctly points out, since there has been no cross-appeal, the following findings are not in issue: • there were Mi’kmaq in the area of Saint John pre-contact who hunted; • the practice of hunting was integral and distinctive to the Mi’kmaq; • Mi’kmaq continue to hunt to this day ; • Mr.

Bernard’s status as a registered Indian under the Indian Act is sufficient proof of his Aboriginality as a Mi’kmaq man, and he need not further prove the three-part test set out in R. v. Powley . [ 31 ] While Mr. Bernard’s application for leave to appeal sets out three grounds, his written submission succinctly states the issues to be argued as follows:

(1) Did the lower court judges err in requiring “community continuity” as part of the Aboriginal rights test?

(2) Does the Mi’kmaq right to hunt include the right to decide who can participate in the right to hunt? [32] Mr. Bernard attributes to the trial judge a motivation for the approach taken. He submits the judge was concerned aboutopening a floodgate if the Aboriginal right to hunt was not found to be site-specific. He says such concern was misguided, first becauseMr. Bernard is a New Brunswicker and second because it ignores the Mi’kmaq right to regulate their own hunting rights.

He argues that,to date, the Mi’kmaq have been prevented from exercising this right by the Province’s unilateral policy determination of the issue. [33] I do not agree with this characterization of the trial judge’s decision. The trial judge simply applied the law as he understoodit in Van der Peet and other cases to the facts as established by the evidence and determined that, in this case, Mr. Bernard had notsatisfied the onus of proving he could exercise s. 35(1) constitutional rights at the location in question. [34] While Mr.

Bernard invites us to grant him leave to appeal and to consider broader questions, such as self-determination, thesequestions were not addressed by either the trial court or the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court and lack a proper evidentiaryfoundation. [35] In the end, I would grant leave to appeal but only in regard to the following question: Did the

Summary Conviction AppealCourt err in law in failing to overturn the trial judge’s decision, which held that, in order to benefit from an s. 35(1) Aboriginal right tohunt deer at the mouth of the St. John River, Mr. Bernard had to show there existed a community of Mi’kmaq who could exercise thatright and to which he belonged? IV. Analysis [36] Mr. Bernard never disputed he was hunting without a licence in contravention of the requirement set out in the Fish andWildlife Act. His defence was simple: the Act did not apply to him because he had an Aboriginal right to hunt at that location.

Section35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada arehereby recognized and affirmed”. [37] In R. v. Sparrow, (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 (QL), the Court made it clear the s.35(1) protection was not limited to Aboriginal rights recognized by treaties. The right asserted in the present case is one of those that wasnot claimed to be recognized in a treaty. [38] Mr. Bernard acknowledges the test for establishing an Aboriginal right, such as the one in question, involves a three-stageanalysis.

This was established in Van der Peet and more recently reaffirmed in Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (AttorneyGeneral), 2011 SCC 56, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535, at para. 46. [39] The first stage involves characterizing the right guided by the three-part test the trial judge applied in this case, that is toconsider: 1) the nature of the action which Mr. Bernard claimed was done pursuant to an Aboriginal right; 2) the nature of thegovernmental legislation or action alleged to infringe the right; and 3) the pre-contact practice, custom, or tradition being relied upon toestablish the right.

No issue is taken with that portion of the trial judge’s analysis. The right in question is the right to hunt for foodwithout government prohibition, a practice that existed pre-contact. [40] As for the second stage of the analysis, Lamer C.J., for the majority in Van der Peet, states “in order to be an aboriginal rightan activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming theright” (para. 46).

He sets out a number of factors to be considered in the application of that test and analyzes them under the followingheadings: • Courts must take into account the perspective of aboriginal peoples themselves;

• Courts must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made in determining whether an aboriginal claimant has demonstrated the existence of an aboriginal right; • In order to be integral a practice, custom or tradition must be of central significance to the aboriginal society in question; • The practices, customs and traditions which constitute aboriginal rights are those which have continuity with the practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact; • Courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims; • Claims to aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than general basis; • For a practice, custom or tradition to constitute an aboriginal right it must be of independent significance to the aboriginal culture in which it exists; • The integral to a distinctive culture test requires that a practice, custom or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that practice, custom or tradition be distinct; • The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the inquiry if it is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition is only integral because of that influence; and • Courts must take into account both the relationship of aboriginal peoples to the land and the distinctive societies and cultures of aboriginal peoples; [ 41 ] Mr.

Bernard states the trial judge had no difficulty in concluding this stage of the analysis was met in the present case. He is right. The trial judge stated “there appears to be no dispute but that for the Mi’kmaq, hunting was such a significant practice as to constitute a way of life”, adding that “[i]t was a traditional means of survival of an aboriginal community” and “was part of what made the pre-contact and post-contact Mi’kmaq community distinctive” (para. 36).

The judge also found, with respect to this part of the test, the site-specific requirement was met since he accepted there was a Mi’kmaq presence at the mouth of the St. John River at the time of contact. [ 42 ] Mr. Bernard submits the judge erred at the final stage of the Aboriginal rights analysis. This stage requires the judge to “determine whether the claimed modern right has a reasonable degree of continuity with the ‘integral’ pre-contact practice”: Lax Kw’alaams, at para. 46. Mr.

Bernard says the trial judge identified two separate continuity tests; one relating to the “continuity of the nature of the practice” (para 47) and the other relating to the need to “show continuity of the ‘contemporary community’ and its practices with the historic community and its practices” (para. 48). The trial judge found the first test was met but not the second. It is in this regard Mr. Bernard claims the trial judge erred. He submits this second test has no application to him. [ 43 ] Mr.

Bernard acknowledges the “community continuity” is part of the test for Aboriginal title and is part of the test developed for Métis rights, but argues it is not an accepted test for his Aboriginal rights. He argues the adoption of such a test by the courts would be highly problematic. According to him, the continuity test relates to practices not peoples. He also submits it was an error for the trial judge to hold that if a community had not remained in the vicinity of a site-specific right the community would be taken to have abandoned the right. Mr.

Bernard adds that a requirement of community continuity confuses Aboriginal rights and title. In his view, to impose a requirement of community continuity at the same site where the activity was practiced at the time of contact, converts the test for a site-specific Aboriginal right to the test for Aboriginal title. He argues to require community continuity at the site is the same thing as requiring regular use and occupation, which is one of the main requirements to prove Aboriginal title. Mr.

Bernard claims it was wrong for the trial judge to impose a “community continuity” requirement based on what the Supreme Court did in Powley . In his view, Powley involved proving the existence of modern Métis communities and nothing more. In Mr. Bernard’s view, there is no basis for taking a narrow approach to identifying the beneficiaries of the right in question. He submits an approach that would identify the tribe/nation as the rights holder would be more consistent with the purposes of giving constitutional protection to Aboriginal rights. Finally, Mr.

Bernard maintains the approach to interpreting treaty rights should not inform the one for Aboriginal rights because each

serve a different purpose. One is in the nature of a contract and engages the solemn promises made by the Crown while the other is broader and provides cultural security and continuity for the Aboriginal society claiming the right. [ 44 ] In

summary form, the Attorney General’s response to Mr. Bernard’s arguments is as follows: 1) There is no historical evidence of a transprovincial “Mi’kmaq Nation” as described by Mr. Bernard, through which present day Mi’kmaq could claim to exercise their Nation’s communal rights anywhere in New Brunswick; 2) While s. 35(1) constitutional rights are communal rights, the right to determine who may exercise those rights does not fall to what Mr.

Bernard describes as “the current day Mi’kmaq Nation”; 3) The laws of the province of New Brunswick, including the Fish and Wildlife Act , do not unjustifiably infringe any Mi’kmaq community’s authority to determine its membership, or the right to exercise communal rights by members. [ 45 ] Ultimately, as stated above, this appeal raises one question of law: whether the community claiming an Aboriginal right to hunt under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , can be broadly defined as a “tribe/nation”. [ 46 ] In Sparrow , the Supreme Court held that s. 35(1) should “be construed in a purposive way”, which makes it “clear that a generous, liberal

interpretation of the words in the constitutional provision is demanded” (p. 1106). The Court recognized though, “the importance of context and a case-by-case approach to s. 35(1) ” (p. 1111).

This approach was confirmed in Van der Peet , the majority holding the purpose underlying s. 35(1) is “the protection and reconciliation of the interests which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, customs and traditions” (para. 44). [ 47 ] In the present case, it is common ground that Aboriginal rights, protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , are communal rights.

The Supreme Court made this clear in Sparrow , recognizing that Aboriginal rights – such as fishing rights in that case – are “not traditional property rights. They are rights held by a collective and are in keeping with the culture and existence of that group” (p. 1078). In subsequent cases, this reality has been consistently affirmed. In Van der Peet , Lamer C.J., for the majority, frequently referred to Aboriginal societies or the Aboriginal group claiming the right and spoke of the Aboriginal community demonstrating that a practice, custom or tradition is an Aboriginal right.

Under the heading that claims to Aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than general basis, he explains: Courts considering a claim to the existence of an aboriginal right must focus specifically on the practices, customs and traditions of the particular aboriginal group claiming the right . In the case of Kruger , supra , this Court rejected the notion that claims to aboriginal rights could be determined on a general basis.

This position is correct; the existence of an aboriginal right will depend entirely on the practices, customs and traditions of the particular aboriginal community claiming the right . As has already been suggested, aboriginal rights are constitutional rights, but that does not negate the central fact that the interests aboriginal rights are intended to protect relate to the specific history of the group claiming the right . Aboriginal rights are not general and universal; their scope and content must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The fact that one group of aboriginal people has an aboriginal right to do a particular thing will not be, without something more, sufficient to demonstrate that another aboriginal community has the same aboriginal right. The existence of the right will be specific to each aboriginal community . [para. 69] [Emphasis added] [ 48 ] Mr. Bernard claims Powley is specific to the Métis people and has no application in the present case. With respect, this argument is untenable. There are statements in Powley that explain the extent of Aboriginal rights in general.

In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the basic elements of the Van der Peet test, modifying certain elements to account for the fact that Métis communities emerged after contact with the Europeans. More generally, however, the Court stated that “Aboriginal hunting rights, including Métis rights, are contextual and site-specific” (para. 19) and “Aboriginal rights are communal rights: They must be grounded in the existence of a historic and present community, and they may only be exercised by virtue of an individual’s ancestrally based membership in the present community” (para. 24).

The use of the broader term “Aboriginal rights” and the specification that these include Métis rights, makes it clear the Supreme Court was elaborating principles applicable to Aboriginal rights in general. [ 49 ] Similarly, Mr. Bernard claims treaty right and Aboriginal title cases have no value in assessing Aboriginal rights. On this basis, Marshall; Bernard could be distinguished because it was a case involving such rights. However, it must be noted the Supreme Court in Van der Peet held that “aboriginal rights and aboriginal title are related concepts; aboriginal title is a sub-category of aboriginal

rights” (para. 74). Thus, cases dealing with aboriginal title certainly are relevant in aboriginal rights cases. In addition, cases dealing withtreaty rights can also be relevant where the Court has made general propositions that apply to all rights asserted under s. 35(1) of theConstitution Act, 1982. [50] In Marshall; Bernard, McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority, spoke of Aboriginal societies who exercised “control overtheir village sites and larger areas of land which they exploited for agriculture, hunting, fishing and gathering” (para. 62).

While shestated this in the context of demonstrating that such possession would be equivalent to common law notions of title, the fact that Courtequated Aboriginal societies with protection of their village sites indicates the communal rights to which s. 35(1) refers are specific to thesmaller communities that exercised the rights at the site that is the subject of the proceeding.

McLachlin C.J. stated “[m]odern-dayclaimants must establish a connection with the pre-sovereignty group upon whose practices they rely to assert title or claim to a morerestricted aboriginal right” (para. 67), adding that “[c]ontinuity is required, in the sense of showing the group’s descent from the pre-sovereignty group whose practices are relied upon for the right” (para. 70). [51] According to Mr.

Bernard, the Supreme Court has yet to provide explicit guidance on who are the specific beneficiaries ofAboriginal rights, being either members of local aboriginal communities or the particular nation/tribe to which belongs the member whoasserts the right. He notes the Supreme Court has used a variety of terms to describe beneficiaries of Aboriginal rights, including “groupof aboriginal people” and “aboriginal community” (para. 69 of Van der Peet), “societies” and “people” (paras. 38 and 41 of R. v. Côté, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93 (QL)), and “aboriginal nation” (para. 115 of Delgamuukw v.

BritishColumbia, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (QL)). Mr. Bernard’s argument continues: Cases that have spoken in terms of “peoples”, “tribes” or “nations” included Van der Peet (re: “the Sto:lo which is a nation made up of acollection of bands: see paras. 2, 76, 80, 84-89 and 58 BCLR (2d) 392 at para. 8), R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672, (which treated two tribes of the Nuu-chah-nulth identically given there was no difference in their cultures,see para. 23 and 66), R. v.

Nikal, (re: “the We’suwet’en people” as opposed to the Moricetown band), Adams (re: the “Mohawk”, asopposed to Akwesasne band, see para. 37), Côté (re: the “Algonquin” as opposed to the Desert River band, see para. 6), Mitchell (re: “theMohawk nation” as opposed to the Akwesasne band, see para. 2), and Sappier;Polchies (which speaks in terms of the distinctive cultureand territories of “the Maliseet” and the “the Mi’kmaq” see para. 52-53). [52] As all agree, s. 35(1) rights are communal rights.

The approach of the courts has been to recognize that an Aboriginal personis a beneficiary of his/her community’s Aboriginal or treaty rights. These rights, whatever their specific content, are exercised throughthe community’s consent and authority. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. in discussing aboriginal title, which is a subset of aboriginal rights,stated as follows: A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginalpersons; it is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation.

Decisions with respect to that land are also made bythat community. This is another feature of aboriginal title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal property interests. [Emphasis in original.] [para. 115] [53] This approach is consistent with the one used where treaty rights are involved. In R. v. Marshall, (SCC),[1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, the Court made the following statement: “treaty rights do not belong to the individual, but areexercised by authority of the local community to which the accused belongs” (para. 17).

This statement was made after noting that theBritish had signed “a series of agreements with individual Mi’kmaq communities” on the basis that “local chiefs had no authority topromise peace and friendship on behalf of other local chiefs in other communities, or to secure treaty benefits on their behalf” (para. 17). [54] Mr.

Bernard’s argument is that an approach that identifies the tribe/nation as the rights holder is more consistent with thepurpose of Aboriginal rights emphasized in Sappier; Gray to give “protection [to] the distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples” (para.22) and “provide cultural security and continuity for the particular aboriginal society” (para. 33). [55] In some cases, it may well be that evidence will show an entire tribe/nation is entitled to exercise certain Aboriginal rights thatare distinctive to their culture in all of the territory the tribe/nation occupied pre-contact, but that is not what the Supreme Court has heldto date.

Section 35(1) constitutional rights have been determined to be communal rights, preserved for communities whose membersexercise the right within its traditional territory. Moreover, in Sparrow and in the cases that followed, the Supreme Court has specificallyrejected a general approach to the determination of such rights, preferring instead “to emphasize the importance of context and a case-by-

case approach to s. 35(1)”, adding what follows: Given the generality of the text of the constitutional provision, and especially in light of the complexities of aboriginal history, society and rights, the contours of a justificatory standard must be defined in the specific factual context of each case. [p. 1111] [ 56 ] In the present case, the evidence accepted by the trial judge, to whom deference is owed regarding his assessment of either fact or credibility, was that the Mi’kmaq historically organized themselves as separate bands each with their own traditional hunting territories.

While there was a common culture and social bonds amongst these individual communities, each community had its own chief, and the communities governed themselves independently. [ 57 ] On this point, the critical findings of fact of the trial judge are based on the expert evidence he accepted. None of this has been challenged on appeal: According to the Crown expert, the Mi’kmaq were organized into specific bands or communities identified over time with distinct territory.

Acknowledging that these people formed a Grand Council pre-Confederation (circa 1760), but with no grand chief, he opines that such was a cultural entity, not one of polity, and not an indication of hunting territory. He also referenced to there being 7 identified hunting districts of the Mi’kmaq, another indication of the distinctiveness of separate communities of the Mi’kmaq. After considering the testimony of Dr.

Patterson on the divisions or bands of Mi’kmaq with whom the colonial authorities, namely the British, dealt, I accept that the Mi’kmaq at least in the period post control, did identify and group themselves into bands, voluntarily maintaining those distinctions in their dealings with the authorities. The treaty evidence is a prime example thereof.

Notwithstanding what I consider to be the valid concerns of modern academic historians, namely the problem of applying European constructs and thinking in interpreting aboriginal matters, it appears that there were recognizable administrations by the Mi’kmaq of distinct hunting areas for members of bands. [paras. 124-125] [ 58 ] I accept the Crown’s argument that the nature of communal rights mandates that the community regulate, or authorize, appropriate exercise of these rights by its individual members through ensuring equitable access to the resources.

This is so wherever the resources are located, provided there is a right to them. In Sappier ; Gray , Bastarache J. for the majority explains: The right to harvest wood for domestic uses is a communal one.

Section 35 recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights in order to assist in ensuring the continued existence of these particular aboriginal societies. The exercise of the aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses must be tied to this purpose. The right to harvest (which is distinct from the right to make personal use of the harvested product even though they are related) is not one to be exercised by any member of the aboriginal community independently of the aboriginal society it is meant to preserve.

It is a right that assists the society in maintaining its distinctive character. [para. 26] [ 59 ] I go back to the extract from Van der Peet reproduced in para. 47 above and repeat the words of Lamer C.J.: “The fact that one group of aboriginal people has an aboriginal right to do a particular thing will not be, without something more, sufficient to demonstrate that another aboriginal community has the same aboriginal right.

The existence of the right will be specific to each aboriginal community” (para. 69). [ 60 ] In the specifics of the present case, the trial judge found that pre-contact, there had been a community of Mi’kmaq that hunted at the mouth of the St. John River. However, the judge found, based on expert evidence, that the Mi’kmaq community which occupied that location left the area a long time ago for some unexplained reason, and he found no evidence of a contemporary community of Mi’kmaq in the area. [ 61 ] The judge found the following observation made by John Giokas & Paul L.A.H.

Chartrand, in Who Are Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples? , (2002) at 111, applied: Aboriginal rights are not inherited by individuals, like personal property; nor are they inherited as genetic traits according to racist notions. A community is a social and legal fiction maintained through generations by social institutions. A successful defence based upon an Aboriginal right requires proof of membership in the Aboriginal community in which the Aboriginal right is vested.

[para. 140] [ 62 ] Mr. Bernard’s argument, holding that the modern day Mi’kmaq Nation has the constitutional right to make decisions that concern its membership, is not consistent with the evidentiary record. No evidence was presented at trial that would allow one to conclude that a modern-day Nation has become the contemporary community entitled to exercise all rights that had historically been exercised by local communities. While it may be that, in some cases, the evidence might reveal that certain communal rights belong to a tribe or nation, it was simply not the case in the matter under appeal.

Considering the case-by-case approach the Supreme Court mandates for these cases, the role of the trial judge was to apply the law to the facts as he found them. [ 63 ] The law as set out in Van der Peet was applied in this case. For the most part, the trial judge made findings favourable to Mr. Bernard. However, Van der Peet has been interpreted by other cases, each of which expanded upon the various elements of the analysis.

As seen earlier in these reasons, in Powley the Court stated “[a]boriginal rights are communal rights: They must be grounded in the existence of a historic and present community, and they may only be exercised by virtue of an individual’s ancestrally based membership in the present community” (para. 24). While Mr. Bernard urges us to disregard this statement on the basis that Powley dealt with Métis rights, the fact is this statement was made in respect to aboriginal rights generally.

Aboriginal rights are a type of right recognized in s. 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , which Métis peoples also get to enjoy. There would seem to be no rational basis for the claim the Métis peoples only get to exercise aboriginal rights that are grounded in the existence of a historic and present community, whereas other aboriginal peoples get to exercise the right regardless of whether it is so grounded. If that is to be the law, that is for the Supreme Court to determine.

At present, Powley establishes that Aboriginal rights, as communal rights, may only be exercised by virtue of an individual’s ancestrally based membership in a present community that is linked to the historic community. [ 64 ] The judge applied the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada to the facts of the case and concluded it had not been shown that Mr. Bernard had any ancestrally based membership in a present community that could exercise hunting rights at the location in question. Having made those findings, the judge was duty bound to conclude as he did.

In my view, the judge correctly understood and applied the critical legal principles. That being the case, and since his factual findings have not been challenged, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed. V. Disposition [ 65 ] For these reasons, I would grant Mr. Bernard leave to appeal the decision of the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court but I would dismiss the appeal. Execution of the sentence having been stayed by the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court and that order not having been further appealed, it follows that Mr. Bernard will not have to serve the sentence the trial judge imposed. [ 66 ] I conclude by adding my voice to those of the trial judge and the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge who pointed to the words of LeBel J. in Marshall; Bernard , at para. 142, to the effect that there has to be a more appropriate way to litigate aboriginal treaty, right and title issues than through the prosecution of

summary conviction offences. In fact, this sentiment had been articulated in Sparrow where Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. also pointed out that “the trial for a violation of a penal prohibition may not be the most appropriate setting in which to determine the existence of an aboriginal right” (para. 30). Recently, in R. v. Reynolds , 2017 NBCA 36 , [2017] N.B.J. No. 214 (QL) , French J.A., for the Court, recognized the “obvious merit” to such observations (para. 35). I agree. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE RICHARD I.

Introduction [1] Le 10 août 2010, un juge de la Cour provinciale a déclaré Stephen Charles Bernard coupable d’avoir chassé le chevreuil sans permis valide : 2010 NBCP 30 , 365 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 207. Quelques mois plus tard, le juge a condamné M. Bernard à la peine minimale prévue par la loi : sept jours d’emprisonnement et une amende de 2 000 $. Cette même journée, la peine a été suspendue en attendant

que l’appel de M. Bernard devant le tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires soit entendu. Le 27 janvier 2016, un juge de ce tribunal a rejeté l’appel : 2016 NBBR 21 , 444 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 319. Cependant, exerçant ce qu’il a qualifié de [TRADUCTION] « compétence inhérente », le juge du tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires a ordonné la suspension définitive de l’exécution de cette peine. M. Bernard sollicite maintenant l’autorisation de porter en appel le rejet de son appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires. Personne ne conteste la décision du juge de surseoir à l’exécution de la peine. [2] Au procès, la seule question à trancher consistait à déterminer si M. Bernard, membre mi’kmaq de la Première Nation de Sipekne’katik, exerçait un droit ancestral protégé par le par. 35(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 lorsqu’il chassait sans permis dans la

partie nord de la ville de Saint John. Cette question dépend de l’application du critère que la Cour suprême du Canada a élaboré pour statuer sur de telles revendications. M. Bernard fait valoir que le juge du procès, et par extension le juge du tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires, pour l’essentiel, ont convenablement appliqué le cadre d’analyse qui s’impose. La plupart des conclusions du juge du procès, qui ont été confirmées en appel, favorisaient M. Bernard. Toutefois, M. Bernard prétend que le juge du procès a commis une erreur sur un élément déterminant. Le juge du procès a conclu que pour que M.

Bernard puisse exercer un droit ancestral de chasser à l’endroit en question, il devait démontrer qu’il exerçait le droit collectif d’une collectivité (ou communauté) mi’kmaq contemporaine (dont il était membre) ayant des liens avec la collectivité historique qui utilisait autrefois la région comme territoire de chasse. La preuve ne révélait pas l’existence d’une telle collectivité contemporaine dont M. Bernard était membre. La question de droit en appel consiste à déterminer si ce critère fait

partie du cadre d’analyse. Selon moi, telle est la conclusion de la Cour suprême. II. Contexte factuel [3] Les faits pertinents sont tirés des motifs du juge du procès dont des extraits sont soit reproduits textuellement, soit paraphrasés. [4] Le grand-père de M. Bernard était un Indien inscrit au sens de la

Loi sur les Indiens , L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-5. Il a grandi dans la réserve d’Indian Brook située à Shubenacadie, en Nouvelle-Écosse. Toutefois, il était jeune lorsqu’il est venu s’établir à Saint John, au Nouveau-Brunswick. [5] Stephen Charles Bernard est né à Saint John où il a résidé toute sa vie. Indien mi’kmaq inscrit, il est membre de la collectivité de la Première nation de Sipekne’katik, anciennement connue sous le nom de bande d’Indian Brook. [6] En 1996, un agent de conservation du ministère des Ressources naturelles du Nouveau-Brunswick a rencontré M.

Bernard et deux autres personnes du côté ouest de la rivière Saint-Jean. M. Bernard a admis qu’il chassait. Il a présenté un [TRADUCTION] « certificat de bande » indiquant qu’il était un Indien mi’kmaq de la bande de Shubenacadie en Nouvelle-Écosse. L’agent a remis à M. Bernard un avertissement écrit après l’avoir informé qu’il ne pouvait pas chasser sans permis à cet endroit parce qu’il faisait

partie du territoire de chasse traditionnel des Malécites. [7] Peu après cette rencontre, M. Bernard a communiqué avec un agent de conservation pour savoir à quel endroit il pouvait chasser en tant que Mi’kmaq. On lui a dit qu’il pouvait chasser à l’est du « réseau hydrographique de la rivière Saint-Jean » sans plus de précision. M. Bernard ne partageait pas le point de vue de l’agent et il a par la suite chassé dans les limites du réseau hydrographique de la rivière Saint-Jean. [8] À plusieurs occasions entre 1997 et 2004, en divers endroits, des membres du ministère des Ressources naturelles ont rencontré M.

Bernard pendant qu’il chassait. Chaque fois, il a présenté son certificat d’appartenance à une bande et les choses en sont restées là. En 2000, M. Bernard a obtenu du ministère des Ressources naturelles un permis l’autorisant à transférer de la viande d’orignal à une autre personne sans que l’on s’oppose à son statut d’Indien mi’kmaq. [9] Le 16 novembre 2004, M. Bernard et une autre personne chassaient dans le secteur du chemin Highland dans la

partie nord de la ville de Saint John lorsqu’ils ont rencontré un agent de conservation. Lorsqu’on lui a demandé de présenter un permis de chasse, M. Bernard a montré à l’agent son certificat de statut d’Indien. Cette fois, M. Bernard a été accusé, en vertu de la

Loi sur le poisson et la faune , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-14.1 , d’avoir illégalement chassé sans être titulaire d’un permis. [10] L’accusation a été portée le 16 mars 2005 et le procès a commencé le 5 octobre suivant. Au cours des quelques années qui ont suivi, de nombreux ajournements se sont succédé. Le juge du procès les explique aux par. 11 et 12 de sa décision. Le 16 août 2010, M. Bernard a été déclaré coupable.

[11] Le juge du procès a conclu que le poursuivant avait prouvé – comme la défense l’a admis d’emblée – que M. Bernard chassaitsans permis comme il en était accusé. Initialement, le poursuivant avait formulé comme suit les questions en litige : (1) le groupeautochtone dont M. Bernard est membre jouit-il d’un droit de chasse à l’endroit où il a été appréhendé et

(2) M. Bernard est-il admis àplaider l’erreur provoquée par une personne en autorité? Cependant, M. Bernard a écarté toute prétention à l’erreur provoquée par unepersonne en autorité. Dans un mémoire ultérieur, le poursuivant a modifié sa formulation des questions en litige. Ainsi, dans sa décision,le juge du procès a voulu trancher les questions suivantes :

(1) M. Bernard est-il un Autochtone jouissant des droits prévus à l’art. 35 dela Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 et (2) si tel est le cas, lui est-il permis d’exercer des droits ancestraux dans la vallée de la rivière Saint-Jean? [12] Le juge du procès a commencé son analyse en traitant de la question du fardeau de la preuve. Suivant la décision rendue par le juge d’appel Robertson dans l’arrêt Sockabasin et al. c. R., 2003 NBCA 60, 261 R.N.-B. (2e) 177, le juge du procès a conclu qu’ilincombait à M.

Bernard d’établir l’existence du droit ancestral et de l’atteinte portée à ce droit. [13] Le juge a ensuite passé en revue le droit qui régit les droits ancestraux. Il a énoncé les étapes du cadre d’analyse à utiliserpour déterminer ces droits au moyen des titres suivants : 1. Caractérisation de la revendication 2. Critère de la

partie intégrante d’une culture distinctive 3. Continuité entre le droit revendiqué et la pratique antérieure au contact 4. Condition relative aux sites spécifiques [14] Sous le premier de ces titres, le juge du procès note que, pour établir son droit ancestral de chasse de subsistance, M. Bernardinvoque une pratique de chasse de subsistance antérieure au contact avec les Européens malgré l’interdiction de chasser sans permis querenferme la

Loi sur le poisson et la faune. Le juge a conclu qu’il demeurait hautement probable que la chasse au grand gibier, commel’orignal ou le chevreuil, pour se nourrir était reliée au mode de vie du peuple mi’kmaq avant le contact avec les Européens.

Il aégalement conclu, sous le deuxième titre, que la pratique que constitue la chasse de subsistance donnait à la collectivité mi’kmaq soncaractère distinctif. [15] En ce qui concerne la continuité entre le droit revendiqué et la pratique antérieure au contact, le juge s’est demandé[TRADUCTION] « s’il y a eu continuité dans la nature du droit, de la période antérieure au contact avec les Européens jusqu’à l’èremoderne, de sorte qu’il puisse être reconnu pour tel » (par. 42). Il est arrivé à la conclusion que [TRADUCTION] « la preuve estindicative de continuité dans la nature de la pratique.

La pratique des Mi’kmaq de chasser ces animaux pour se nourrir s’est poursuivieaprès le contact avec les Européens. Demeurée collective, elle a évolué et elle se perpétue » (par. 47). Sous ce titre, le juge a examiné s’ilexistait une collectivité actuelle pour laquelle la protection du droit était demandée. Invoquant les arrêts R. c. Van der Peet, (SCC), [1996] 2 R.C.S. 507, [1996] A.C.S. no 77 (QL); R. c. Sappier; R. c. Gray, 2006 CSC 54, [2006] 2 R.C.S. 686; et R. c.Marshall; R. c.

Bernard, 2005 CSC 43, [2005] 2 R.C.S. 220, le juge a conclu qu’[TRADUCTION] « un droit ancestral n’est pas perdupar abandon ou par cessation de son exercice si des liens traditionnels avec le territoire, y compris un lien avec la ressource en question,sont maintenus de façon substantielle par l’observation de la coutume, de la tradition ou de la pratique » (par. 53). [16] Le juge s’est ensuite penché sur l’argument du ministère public voulant que rien dans la preuve n’attestât l’existence,[TRADUCTION] « dans le secteur visé, d’une communauté mi’kmaq qui serait historique ou actuelle, et à laquelle [M.

Bernard]pourrait s’identifier » (par. 54) et sur l’invitation que lui avait faite le ministère public de se reporter aux critères énoncés dans R. c.Powley, 2003 CSC 43, [2003] 2 R.C.S. 207, pour évaluer cette situation. Toutefois, le juge s’est dit d’avis [TRADUCTION] « qu’il estplus approprié de se pencher sur la question de l’existence d’une communauté historique du point de vue de la condition de rattachementà un site spécifique » et qu’il en allait de même de « la question de l’existence d’une communauté actuelle » (par. 55). En ce quiconcerne les critères de l’arrêt Powley, le juge a noté que M.

Bernard est un Indien inscrit et a conclu que [TRADUCTION]« l’appartenance à une bande en tant qu’Indien inscrit apporte une indication et une vérification substantielles de l’appartenance d’unrevendicateur de droit à la communauté autochtone » (par. 65).

Il a établi une distinction entre la présente affaire et plusieurs autres danslesquelles les critères de l’arrêt Powley avaient été utilisés dans l’évaluation de droits revendiqués par des Indiens non inscrits. [17] Le juge a alors reconnu qu’il devait examiner la condition relative aux sites spécifiques puisque [TRADUCTION] « le seulfait d’être Indien inscrit ne confère pas des droits universels, qui peuvent être exercés partout au pays » (par. 74).

Il a indiqué qu’il devaitse pencher sur [TRADUCTION] « la question du rattachement à une communauté et à un site spécifiques, de même que sur la questionde la disparition, de l’abandon ou de l’extinction de la pratique invoquée » (par. 75).

[18] L’analyse effectuée sous le

titre relatif`aux sites spécifiques a commencé par une revue des principes juridiques applicables.Le juge du procès a observé que, dans l’arrêt R. c. Sappier; R. c. Gray, la Cour suprême a reconnu qu’elle avait imposé une conditionrelative aux sites spécifiques sur les droits ancestraux de pêche et de chasse qu’elle avait reconnus dans d’autres causes. Il a ajouté ce quisuit : [TRADUCTION]Le juge en chef Lamer a expliqué ce qui suit, au paragraphe 30 de Adams [R. c. Adams, (SCC), [1996] 3 R.C.S. 101, [1996] A.C.S. no 87 (QL)] : [...] si un peuple autochtone établit que la chasse sur une parcelle de terrain spécifique faisait

partie intégrante de sa culture distinctive àl’époque, le droit de chasse ancestral – même s’il existe indépendamment du

titre sur cette parcelle de terrain – est néanmoins définicomme étant le droit de chasser sur cette parcelle spécifique, et il se limite à cela. Un droit de chasse ou de pêche spécifique à un site nedevient pas, du seul fait qu’il existe indépendamment du

titre aborigène sur le territoire où il a été exercé, un droit de chasse ou de pêcheabstrait, pouvant être exercé n’importe où; il demeure un droit de chasse ou de pêche sur la parcelle de terrain en question. Comme nous l’avons vu, la Cour, dans Van der Peet, a insisté sur la spécificité du droit revendiqué, c’est-à-dire que le tribunal doits’attacher spécifiquement à l’examen des coutumes, pratiques et traditions de la communauté autochtone revendiquant le droit, et àl’histoire spécifique de ce groupe. Elle a ajouté au par. 69 : Les droits ancestraux n’ont pas un caractère général et universel.

Leur portée et leur contenu doivent être déterminés au cas par cas. Lefait qu’un groupe autochtone possède le droit ancestral de faire une chose donnée ne permet pas, à lui seul, d’établir qu’une autrecollectivité autochtone a le même droit. L’existence du droit en question dépendra de la situation spécifique de chaque collectivitéautochtone. [par. 78 et 79] [19] À ce stade, le juge s’est intéressé au dossier de preuve afin de déterminer si M.

Bernard avait prouvé, selon la prépondérancedes probabilités, que l’embouchure de la rivière Saint-Jean était un territoire traditionnel du peuple mi’kmaq avant le contact avec lesEuropéens. Il a entrepris un examen approfondi de la preuve produite par les deux parties, et notamment des témoignages de deuxtémoins experts. Le juge a noté qu’une

partie de la preuve documentaire n’était que l’expression de l’opinion de l’auteur et que leshistoriens [TRADUCTION] « doivent composer avec la preuve dont ils disposent et doivent parfois extrapoler au juger, et logiquement,à partir de données connues » (par. 100). Il a néanmoins conclu qu’[TRADUCTION] « une preuve convaincante établit une présencemi’kmaq (souriquoise) à l’embouchure de la rivière, laquelle forme une région côtière.

Les Mi’kmaq y étaient présents, selon touteprobabilité, à l’époque du contact avec les Européens » (par. 101). [20] Le juge du procès a formulé comme suit la question suivante dont il allait traiter : [TRADUCTION][…] En tant que membre du peuple mi’kmaq, reconnu par la

Loi sur les Indiens, le défendeur jouit-il d’un droit ancestral de chasser poursa subsistance dans ce territoire? [par. 102] [21] Pour répondre à cette question, le juge a examiné une affaire analogue de la Nouvelle-Écosse. Dans R. c. Walker, 2005 NSPC1, [2005] N.S.J. No. 30 (QL), le défendeur, un Indien inscrit membre de la bande indienne d’Eel Ground au Nouveau-Brunswick, étaitaccusé d’avoir chassé les animaux sauvages en Nouvelle-Écosse sans permis. Il s’agissait d’un Mi’kmaq né au Nouveau-Brunswick quiavait passé l’essentiel de sa vie en Nouvelle-Écosse.

Il avait abattu un chevreuil dans une zone de chasse mi’kmaq traditionnelle, enNouvelle-Écosse. Le juge Curran l’a déclaré coupable de l’infraction dont il était accusé. En effet, bien qu’il ait conclu à l’existence d’undroit ancestral de chasse de subsistance dans la région où il chassait, M. Walker n’appartenait pas à la collectivité habilitée à exercer cedroit ancestral. [22] Revenant aux faits en cause, le juge du procès a répété que M. Bernard était né à Saint John, y avait résidé toute sa vie et étaitun Indien inscrit membre de la bande de Shubenacadie/Indian Brook en Nouvelle-Écosse.

Le juge a conclu que [TRADUCTION]« Saint John et ses environs n’ont pas de réserve mi’kmaq; aucun groupe mi’kmaq organisé ne se trouve ici » (par. 109). Il a déclaré queM. Bernard [TRADUCTION] « s’identifie à la nation mi’kmaq, et non à une bande donnée. Il soutient que la nation mi’kmaq estconstitutive de la collectivité, ici, au sens donné à ce terme dans R. c. Sappier; R. c. Gray » (par. 110).

[23] Au lieu d’accepter la conclusion tirée dans l’arrêt Walker , dans lequel ce même argument avait été rejeté, le juge du procès a effectué sa propre analyse. Le juge a donc répondu à la question suivante : [TRADUCTION] « La nation mi’kmaq peut-elle être la communauté » (par. 112)? [24] Le juge du procès a admis qu’aucune preuve directe n’avait été produite relativement à la question de savoir ce qu’il était advenu de ces Mi’kmaq qui avaient chassé dans la région de la rivière Saint-Jean au cours de la période antérieure au contact avec les Européens.

La preuve avait établi que [TRADUCTION] « [o]utre que les Mi’kmaq étaient un peuple nomade, ils ont subi le lourd contrecoup de l’arrivée des Européens et dû se déplacer en conséquence; ils étaient occupés à leurs propres luttes et à leurs propres alliances guerrières et, enfin, ils ont été contraints par les autorités coloniales et gouvernementales à des mouvements territoriaux » (par. 116). Le juge a noté combien il est difficile de prouver ce genre d’événement.

Néanmoins, [TRADUCTION] « [d]es éléments de preuve indiquent que des limites géographiques subsistaient bel et bien chez les Mi’kmaq » (par. 121) et, acceptant le témoignage de l’expert du poursuivant, le juge du procès a tiré la conclusion suivante : [TRADUCTION] […] je conviens que, pendant la période postérieure à la mainmise européenne tout au moins, les Mi’kmaq formaient des bandes auxquelles ils s’identifiaient et maintenaient sciemment ces distinctions dans leurs rapports avec les autorités. La preuve liée aux traités en apporte un parfait exemple.

Quoi qu’il en soit des sujets de crainte, que je crois légitimes par ailleurs, des historiens modernes, dont le problème de l’application d’une pensée et de concepts européens à l’interprétation de la réalité autochtone, il semble qu’aient existé des administrations mi’kmaq reconnaissables de secteurs de chasse distincts attribués aux membres de bandes. [par. 125] [25] En résumé, le juge a tiré les conclusions importantes suivantes : [TRADUCTION] Pour l’essentiel, j’accueille la preuve de M.

Marquis et je conclus que, par prépondérance des probabilités, les Mi’kmaq occupaient le secteur correspondant au lieu de l’infraction à l’époque du contact avec les Européens et à l’époque de la rencontre initiale des autochtones avec les Français dans la région de Saint John. J’accueille également la preuve de M. Patterson et je conclus que, par prépondérance des probabilités, les Mi’kmaq, quel que soit le motif de leur départ – à l’exclusion des motifs de traité et d’extinction – ont quitté le secteur correspondant au lieu de l’infraction et le territoire de chasse environnant.

Des opinions sont citées, sur le fondement de faits qui ne sont pas proprement attestés, selon lesquelles ils seraient partis à destination de la Nouvelle-Écosse (Webster). Des causes sont citées, en l’instance, qui font mention de ce mouvement ( Walker ). Je ne dispose pas d’une preuve convaincante de la présence dans la région, au cours des deux cent cinquante à trois cents ans qui ont suivi, d’une communauté de Mi’kmaq qui aurait exercé le droit ancestral de chasse de subsistance.

Il se peut que cette preuve existe, mais elle ne m’a pas été présentée. [par. 126 et 127] [26] Le juge du procès a poursuivi en soulignant qu’il ne disposait d’aucune preuve [TRADUCTION] « de l’existence d’une communauté mi’kmaq contemporaine, dans la région [de Saint John] [et que rien] dans la preuve n’indiqu[ait], non plus, que [le] père ou [le] grand-père [de M.

Bernard] aient entretenu un lien avec le territoire par le maintien substantiel de la pratique d’une chasse de subsistance » (par. 132). [27] Le juge s’est alors intéressé à l’analyse que la juge en chef McLachlin avait proposée dans l’arrêt Van der Peet , à savoir qu’[TRADUCTION] « un droit ancestral n’est pas perdu par abandon ou par cessation de son exercice si des liens traditionnels avec le territoire, y compris un lien avec la ressource en question, sont maintenus de façon substantielle par l’observation de la coutume, de la tradition ou de la pratique », en notant qu’il était évident que la juge en chef [TRADUCTION] « songeait à un groupe ou à une communauté autochtones » (par. 134).

Le juge a déclaré que [TRADUCTION] « l’abandon peut […] amener, à un certain moment, la perte d’un droit ancestral », mais il s’est empressé d’ajouter qu’il ne lui appartenait pas d’en décider. Il était disposé à accepter qu’une collectivité qui a quitté la région puisse reprendre l’exercice de son droit ancestral, mais il a ajouté que : « [p]our qu’il puisse y avoir reprise, toutefois, le droit doit d’abord avoir été exercé » (par. 137). Dans le cas de M.

Bernard, il n’avait « montré, ni l’existence d’une communauté mi’kmaq qui serait investie du droit de reprendre la pratique, ni son appartenance à cette communauté » (par. 138). [28] Compte tenu de tout ce qui précède, le juge est arrivé à la conclusion suivante : [TRADUCTION] Le défendeur m’a convaincu, par prépondérance des probabilités, que des Mi’kmaq habitaient le secteur correspondant au lieu de l’infraction à l’époque du contact avec les Européens et qu’ils jouissaient d’un droit ancestral de chasser pour se nourrir, dans ce territoire, au cours des années où ils l’ont habité.

Il ne m’a toutefois pas convaincu qu’il était membre de la communauté mi’kmaq originale titulaire du droit. De ce fait, il n’a pas établi qu’il jouissait du droit de chasser au lieu de l’infraction à la date en question. Dans les circonstances, il y aura lieu d’inscrire une déclaration de culpabilité. [par. 142 à 144] [29] L’appel que M. Bernard a interjeté devant le tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires a été rejeté. La décision de ce tribunal portait sur des sujets qui n’ont pas été abordés dans les arguments présentés dans la demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel devant notre Cour, comme la liberté d’association et les droits à l’égalité prévus par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés . Quoi qu’il en soit, le juge du tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires a passé en revue la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême dans laquelle il avait été établi que les droits de chasse sont rattachés à un lieu précis et il a finalement indiqué qu’il n’était pas persuadé que le juge du procès avait commis une erreur en déclarant M. Bernard coupable. III. Questions en litige en appel [30] Comme M. Bernard le souligne à bon droit, étant donné qu’il n’y a pas d’appel reconventionnel, les conclusions suivantes ne sont pas en cause : • Il y avait des Mi’kmaq dans la région de Saint John avant le contact avec les Européens et ils chassaient; • La pratique de la chasse faisait

partie intégrante de la culture des Mi’kmaq et les différenciait; • Les Mi’kmaq chassent encore aujourd’hui; • Le statut d’Indien inscrit, au sens de la

Loi sur les Indiens , de M. Bernard constitue une preuve suffisante de son aboriginalité en tant qu’homme mi’kmaq, et il n’a pas besoin de prouver en plus qu’il satisfait au critère à trois volets qui est énoncé dans l’arrêt R. c. Powley . [31] Bien que la demande en autorisation d’appel de M. Bernard énonce trois moyens, son mémoire formule succinctement les questions à débattre en ces termes : a. Les juges des instances inférieures ont-ils commis une erreur en exigeant que la « continuité entre les communautés historique et actuelle » fasse

partie du critère en matière de droits ancestraux? b. Le droit de chasse des Mi’kmaq comprend-il le droit de décider qui peut en jouir? [32] M. Bernard attribue au juge du procès une motivation qui explique la démarche qu’il a adoptée. Il affirme que le juge craignait d’ouvrir une brèche s’il concluait que le droit ancestral de chasse n’était pas rattaché à un site spécifique. Il soutient que cette préoccupation était malavisée, d’abord parce que M. Bernard est un Néo-Brunswickois et ensuite parce qu’elle n’accorde aucune considération au droit des Mi’kmaq de régir leurs propres droits de chasse.

Il prétend que, jusqu’à maintenant, la décision de principe unilatérale que la Province a prise sur cette question a empêché les Mi’kmaq d’exercer ce droit. [33] Je ne souscris pas à cette façon de caractériser la décision du juge du procès. Il a simplement appliqué le droit, tel qu’il se dégageait selon son interprétation de l’arrêt Van der Peet et d’autres causes, aux faits établis par la preuve avant de conclure qu’en l’espèce, M. Bernard ne s’était pas acquitté du fardeau d’établir qu’il pouvait exercer, à l’endroit en question, les droits constitutionnels que lui confère le par. 35(1). [34] M.

Bernard nous invite à lui accorder l’autorisation d’interjeter appel et à examiner des questions plus larges, comme l’autodétermination, mais ces questions n’ont été traitées ni par le juge du procès, ni par le tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires, et nous ne disposons pas d’une preuve suffisante pour les trancher.

[35] En fin de compte, je serais d’avis d’accueillir la demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel, mais seulement en ce qui concernela question suivante : le tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites

sommaires a-t-il commis une erreur de droit en omettant d’infirmer ladécision du juge du procès selon laquelle M. Bernard, pour pouvoir jouir, en vertu du par. 35(1), d’un droit ancestral de chasser lechevreuil à l’embouchure de la rivière Saint-Jean, devait démontrer l’existence d’une collectivité mi’kmaq qui pouvait exercer ce droit etson appartenance à cette collectivité? IV. Analyse [36] M. Bernard n’a jamais contesté le fait qu’il chassait sans permis en violation de l’exigence énoncée dans la

Loi sur le poissonet la faune. So moyen de défense était simple : la Loi ne s’appliquait pas à lui, car il jouissait d’un droit ancestral de chasser à cet endroit.En effet, le paragraphe 35(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 prévoit que « [l]es droits existants – ancestraux ou issus de traités – despeuples autochtones du Canada sont reconnus et confirmés ». [37] Dans l’arrêt R. c. Sparrow, (SCC), [1990] 1 R.C.S. 1075, [1990] A.C.S. no 49 (QL), la Cour a clairementdéclaré que la protection que confère le par. 35(1) ne se limitait pas aux droits ancestraux reconnus par des traités.

Le droit invoqué enl’espèce est au nombre de ceux dont on n’a pas prétendu qu’ils étaient reconnus dans un traité. [38] M. Bernard admet que le critère permettant d’établir l’existence d’un droit ancestral comme celui qui est en litige en l’espècenécessite une analyse en trois étapes. Cela a été établi dans l’arrêt Van der Peet et réaffirmé plus récemment dans l’arrêt Bande indiennedes Lax Kw’alaams c.

Canada (Procureur général), 2011 CSC 56, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 535, au par. 46. [39] La première étape consiste à caractériser le droit en se laissant guider par le critère en trois volets que le juge du procès aappliqué en l’espèce, soit prendre en considération : 1) la nature de l’acte qui, selon M. Bernard, a été accompli en vertu d’un droitancestral, 2) la nature de la législation ou de la mesure gouvernementale qui porterait atteinte à ce droit, et 3) la pratique, la coutume oula tradition antérieure au contact avec les Européens qui est invoquée pour établir l’existence du droit. Cette

partie de l’analyse du jugedu procès n’est aucunement contestée. Le droit en cause est un droit de chasse de subsistance sans interdiction gouvernementale, unepratique qui existait avant le contact avec les Européens. [40] Pour ce qui est de la deuxième étape de l’analyse, le juge en chef Lamer, au nom de la majorité dans l’arrêt Van der Peet,déclare que « pour constituer un droit ancestral, une activité doit être un élément d’une coutume, pratique ou tradition faisant partieintégrante de la culture distinctive du groupe autochtone qui revendique le droit en question » (par. 46).

Il énumère un certain nombre defacteurs à prendre en considération dans l’application de ce critère et les analyse sous les rubriques suivantes : • Les tribunaux doivent tenir compte du point de vue des autochtones eux-mêmes; • Les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec précision la nature de la revendication en cause lorsqu’ils décident si le requérantautochtone a établi l’existence d’un droit ancestral; • Pour faire

partie intégrante d’une culture distinctive, une coutume, pratique ou tradition doit avoir une importance fondamentalepour la société autochtone concernée; • Constituent des droits ancestraux les coutumes, pratiques et traditions qui marquent la continuité avec les coutumes, pratiqueset traditions qui existaient avant le contact avec les Européens; • Dans l’application des règles de preuve, les tribunaux doivent tenir compte des difficultés inhérentes à l’examen des affairesconcernant des revendications autochtones; • Les revendications de droits ancestraux doivent être tranchées de manière spécifique et non générale;

• Pour qu’une coutume, une pratique ou une tradition constitue un droit ancestral, elle doit avoir une importance particulière pour la culture autochtone où elle existe; • Le critère de la

partie intégrante d’une culture distinctive exige qu’une coutume, pratique ou tradition soit distinctive, non pas qu’elle soit distincte; • L’influence de la culture européenne n’est pertinente, dans le cadre de l’examen, que s’il est démontré que la coutume, la pratique ou la tradition ne fait

partie intégrante de la culture qu’en raison de cette influence; • Les tribunaux doivent tenir compte à la fois des rapports qu’entretiennent les peuples autochtones avec le territoire et des cultures et sociétés distinctives de ces peuples. [41] M. Bernard affirme que le juge du procès n’a eu aucune difficulté à conclure que cette étape de l’analyse était franchie en l’espèce. Il a raison.

Le juge du procès a en effet déclaré qu’[TRADUCTION] « [i]l ne semble pas contesté en l’espèce que, pour les Mi’kmaq, la chasse était une activité d’une telle importance qu’elle constituait un mode de vie », ajoutant que, [TRADUCTION] « [m]oyen traditionnel de subsistance d’une collectivité autochtone, elle figurait au nombre des caractéristiques qui, avant comme après le contact avec les Européens, donnaient à la collectivité Mi’kmaq son caractère distinctif » (par. 36). Le juge a également conclu, relativement à cette

partie du critère, que la condition relative aux sites spécifiques était remplie puisqu’il acceptait l’existence d’une p

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