2023 NBCA 52, 2023 NBCA 52

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 65-22-CA UNIFOR, LOCAL 907 APPELLANT UNIFOR,

SECTION LOCALE 907 APPELANT - and - - et - IRVING PAPER LTD. RESPONDENT LES PAPIERS IRVING LIMITÉE INTIMÉE Unifor, Local 907 v. Irving Paper Ltd., 2023 NBCA 52 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice LeBlond Unifor,

section locale 907 c. Les Papiers Irving Limitée, 2023 NBCA 52 CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: June 21, 2022 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 21 juin 2022 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2022 NBQB 217 Décision frappée d’appel : 2022 NBBR 217 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : Aucune Appeal heard: April 11, 2023 Appel entendu : le 11 avril 2023

Judgment rendered: June 29, 2023 Jugement rendu : le 29 juin 2023 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice LeBlond Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: David G. Gauthier For the respondent: Christopher D. Pigott and James B. Green Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge LeBlond Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : David G. Gauthier Pour l’intimée : Christopher D. Pigott et James B.

Green THE COURT The appeal is dismissed with costs of $3,000 payable to the respondent. LA COUR L’appel est rejeté et des dépens de 3 000 $ sont adjugés à l’intimée. The judgment of the Court was delivered by LEBLOND, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] Robert Gaudet was a unionized employee of the respondent, Irving Paper Ltd., working full time as a quality assurance tester in its laboratory. He was a member of the appellant trade union, Unifor, Local 907. On March 25, 2021, following an employer investigation, he was terminated from his employment for his repeated misuse of the company’s time and resources. [ 2 ] Mr.

Gaudet, through Unifor, grieved his dismissal. An arbitrator found Irving had cause to discipline Mr. Gaudet for time theft and breach of trust. Mr. Gaudet had been using a company vehicle at his disposal to make what the arbitrator found were repeated, unauthorized stops to attend to his personal business during his shifts. Despite finding Mr. Gaudet held a position of trust and had abused this trust, the arbitrator concluded the employment relationship could be restored on account of mitigating factors that he found could counterbalance the gravity of Mr. Gaudet’s misconduct and justify a lesser penalty.

In a decision released October 26, 2021, the arbitrator reinstated Mr. Gaudet into his former position without retroactive compensation. [ 3 ] Irving applied for judicial review of the arbitration decision. The application judge allowed the application and quashed the decision as unreasonable. The judge held the arbitrator’s decision was neither based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis, nor justified in relation to the facts and law that constrained him.

The judge held the arbitrator’s factual findings were inconsistent with his conclusion that there was potential to rehabilitate the employment relationship. Moreover, the judge found the arbitrator’s approach was at odds with the applicable jurisprudence and there was no compelling basis for taking a different

path. [ 4 ] Unifor, on behalf of Mr. Gaudet, appeals from the judicial review decision. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal. II. Context [ 5 ] Irving produces specialty grade paper at its Bayside Drive mill in Saint John, New Brunswick. Mr. Gaudet worked as a quality assurance tester in the mill’s laboratory. His responsibilities included environmental testing of water samples taken from a lagoon near Irving’s mill. The testing was conducted at a different location owned by Irving Pulp and Paper Ltd. Mr.

Gaudet was required to deliver the samples to the testing facility using an Irving-owned vehicle and then return to the mill to resume his other duties. On the return trip, he was only allowed to pick up coffee or a sandwich. Although he did not require approval to use the company vehicle for this purpose, he did require approval to use it to make other stops or for any other purpose during his shifts. The task of collecting a sample, delivering it to the testing facility and returning to the mill typically took between 60 and 70 minutes. A.

The employer investigation [ 6 ] In 2020, after becoming aware that some employees were taking more time than required to deliver samples, Irving conducted an investigation through its security service. This investigation revealed that, during his sample deliveries, Mr. Gaudet made frequent stops at various residential and commercial properties which were unrelated to Irving’s operations.

The record discloses he made at least 20 of these “visits” over the period of three and a half months from late 2020 to early 2021, with his absences from the mill ranging from one hour and a half to two hours each and totalling approximately 800 missed minutes of work. None of these visits were authorized by Irving. [ 7 ] On March 24, 2021, Irving personnel met with Mr. Gaudet and a Unifor representative to confront him with the results of the investigation and to give him an opportunity to explain his conduct.

In his decision, the arbitrator describes the evidence presented at the hearing about this meeting. [ 8 ] At the beginning of the meeting, when asked to explain why his delivery trips were taking so long, Mr. Gaudet replied he had no other explanation to give than, “I talk a lot more than the average [person] I guess. I don’t know what to tell you.” When specifically asked if he made any side trips during his sample deliveries, he replied: “I wouldn’t say there is no side trips.

I might have made the odd side trips.” He was asked about the nature of the side trips, to which he answered: “Drop off at Tim’s, that sort of thing.” [ 9 ] He was then asked about specific locations where he was seen to have made visits and whether he owned or managed properties at those locations. He only acknowledged owning some of them. He had no explanation as to why he visited these properties during work hours. When asked if he thought it was acceptable for him to make these visits during work, he replied: “I didn’t put a lot of thought into it.

I thought if I was getting all my work done here then…Yeah, I guess I don’t take breaks when I am here so… again, if I thought it was wrong, I wouldn’t do it.” He later qualified this answer by saying: “…if I thought it was wrong, I wouldn’t do it. If I am getting my job done, if I complete my tasks… I guess I don’t see where it was jeopardizing the job.” In a final attempt to justify his conduct, he said: “If I did something wrong, I apologize, I can’t turn back time but I am dedicated to my job.” [ 10 ] After the meeting, later that evening, Mr.

Gaudet called one of the Irving representatives who had attended the meeting and left him a voicemail message. It stated in part: […] I would first like to say I am embarrassed about what happened. It was definitely not my intention to do anything wrong. I was never told that I was doing something wrong. Apparently, I was followed for a couple of months and it seems I didn’t take the correct most direct route back to the mill. I always give my 100% and I would like to apologize if I did something wrong … but again I would like to apologize to you and to Mr.

Irving as well. […] Again, I would like to say that I am sorry and would like to reach out to Mr. Irving and tell him as well that if I had known that I was doing something wrong I would definitely not have… […] I’m embarrassed and again if I had been told that I was doing something wrong I would have corrected myself. Hope you will take that into consideration. [Emphasis added; arbitration decision, para. 38]

[ 11 ] On March 25, 2021, Mr. Gaudet was terminated from employment effective immediately. Irving’s grounds included the fact that, when confronted about his conduct, Mr. Gaudet’s explanations ranged initially from not having any to not thinking what he had done was wrong.

Irving advised that it considered his conduct to amount to theft of company time and that this conduct, together with the responses given during the March 24th meeting, amounted to a breach of the trust Irving had placed in him that he would carry out his duties with honesty and integrity. [ 12 ] On March 31, 2021, under the collective agreement in place, Mr. Gaudet filed a grievance alleging he had been terminated without “just cause.” The grievance was denied, and the matter proceeded to arbitration in August 2021. [ 13 ] Mr.

Gaudet’s evidence at arbitration, in certain important respects, stood in stark contrast with what he had said during the March 24th meeting. Before the arbitrator, he testified he was the sole director and majority owner of Gaudet Properties Ltd., the company that owned the residential properties where he made visits during his delivery trips at work. The company owned about 160 rental units. He admitted he did not disclose any of this at the March 24th meeting.

He acknowledged that he began making these trips in January 2020 and that, on at least 25 days between December 2020 and March 2021, he visited these properties during his shifts without Irving’s prior approval. He claimed that these side trips gave him more energy and focus and that this would benefit Irving. [ 14 ] Irving’s general manager, Steve Dowding, testified before the arbitrator. He explained the March 24th voicemail did not change Irving’s decision to terminate because that was the only viable outcome in response to a long-term breach of the trust which was essential to the employment relationship.

Moreover, Mr. Dowding testified Mr. Gaudet had shown neither any genuine remorse for his conduct nor any recognition of his wrongdoing. At best, all Mr. Gaudet said was a lot of, “If I had known this was wrong” or worse yet, “I did not think it was wrong,” which Mr. Dowding found shocking. He thought it should have been obvious to Mr. Gaudet what he had done was wrong, and for him to suggest he did not know meant he could not be trusted to distinguish between right and wrong when engaging in company business. B .

The arbitration decision [ 15 ] In his decision released October 26, 2021, the arbitrator structured his analysis around a familiar framework for the arbitration of disciplinary matters in asking (

a) whether the employer had cause to impose discipline; (

b) if so, whether the penalty imposed was reasonable under the circumstances; and (

c) finally, if that penalty was excessive, which alternate penalty would be reasonable under the circumstances.

(1) The findings of fact [ 16 ] In his assessment of the evidence, the arbitrator made salient findings of fact in concluding Mr. Gaudet repeatedly engaged in misconduct for months in the course of “premeditated, planned and deliberate” unauthorized absences from work. [ 17 ] The arbitrator found, with “no hesitation,” that Irving had cause to discipline Mr. Gaudet because of the seriousness of his offences. He wrote: […] Having reviewed the facts, I have no hesitation in concluding that the Employer had just cause to discipline the grievor.

There is no question that the misuse of work time and of company assets at the frequency and duration at which it occurred in this case deserves discipline. Such conduct constitutes a violation of the basic obligation to perform work in exchange for wages and is

an act of dishonesty that undermines the trust foundation of the employment relationship. […] [para. 83] [ 18 ] Specifically, the arbitrator rejected Mr. Gaudet’s testimony that he did not appreciate his conduct was wrong. He found this testimony “misleading” and “deceiving”: During the March 24, 2021, interview and again in his voicemail to Mr.

Dowding, the grievor claims that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong and he claims that these visits did not exceed the time he was allowed for his lunch and other breaks. [...] the grievor’s explanation leaves me with the impression that he is deliberately trying to downplay the effect of his misconduct . I do not accept his explanation that during these visits he was just “poking around”, “getting some fresh air” or “reenergizing himself” for the benefit of the Employer. Taking into consideration the grievor’s own business experience, I find it hard to believe that he did not

understand that what he was doing was wrong. I can only categorize his explanation of the reasons for his visit to these properties and the description of these visits as being misleading . […] […] During, the March 24, 2021, meeting, the answers the grievor gave to the questions put to him were very deceiving . If he truly believed, as he indicated during the meeting, that he was not doing anything wrong, then why didn’t he openly provide the information requested by the Employer?

It should have been obvious to the grievor that the visits he made to his personal properties on company time and using the company’s vehicle were wrong and he should have admitted it. The grievor’s explanation for these visits also seems to change as the interview progresses and as the facts of the surveillance were presented to him.

They go from “no, I don’t own those properties” to “I was just doing drive-bys” to “I was just running in and out” and, finally, to “I was just walking through them.” Unfortunately, as it was admitted by counsel for the Union, his reluctance to admit his wrongdoing during this meeting does not help him. He could have easily aided his case if he had admitted his misconduct. However, he took a defensive approach that ultimately did not serve him well. [Emphasis added; paras. 86 and 102] [ 19 ] The fact that Mr.

Gaudet held a position of trust that afforded him a high level of autonomy was seen by the arbitrator as an aggravating factor. He found Mr. Gaudet had repeatedly abused this trust and taken advantage of his autonomy to the point where the very foundation of his employment relationship was severely compromised. [ 20 ] It was in the face of these unequivocal findings of fact that the arbitrator determined Mr. Gaudet was deserving of discipline. At the hearing, counsel for Unifor and Mr.

Gaudet, in fact, “conceded that the grievor was guilty of ‘time theft’ and that he did deserve to be disciplined for his actions” (para. 88).

(2) The mitigating factors [ 21 ] The arbitrator then examined whether termination was reasonable under the circumstances. In assessing the fairness of this penalty, he considered whether any mitigating factors could counterbalance the gravity of Mr. Gaudet’s misconduct and support the continuation of the employment relationship. The arbitrator found the mitigating factors in Mr.

Gaudet’s favour were his seventeen years of good service without any evidence of prior discipline having been put forth at the hearing; Irving’s delay in informing him of his misconduct after first becoming aware of problems in the spring of 2020; and the “apologies” that he had offered in person and by voicemail. The arbitrator did not accept Mr. Gaudet was suffering special economic hardship from his termination as he owned “substantial assets in the form of residential properties” and acquired additional properties after termination.

The arbitrator concluded his assessment of the mitigating factors by stating that, despite the seriousness of Mr. Gaudet’s conduct, the employment relationship was “not irretrievably broken” and a lesser penalty should be substituted for termination.

(3) The disposition [ 22 ] Having found that termination was excessive, the arbitrator reviewed his remedial authority to substitute a lesser penalty under the collective agreement and s. 76(4) of the Industrial Relations Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-4 , which grants a grievance arbitrator under the Act the power to substitute “such other penalty for the discharge or discipline” as may seem “just and reasonable in all the circumstances” where the collective agreement does not specify a penalty.

He then observed: The fact that I consider the penalty imposed by the Employer in this case excessive does not in any way lessen the seriousness of the grievor’s misconduct. The grievor has committed a serious offence and he deserves to be firmly reprimanded for his conduct. I must also add that the fact that the grievor was not forthcoming with the Employer when confronted with the surveillance evidence really bothered me.

I was also disturbed by the explanations, or should I say the lack of explanation, he gave the Employer during the March 24, 2021, meeting and the fact that he did not seem to recognize that what he had done was wrong . Having taken into consideration all of these elements, I must admit that my decision could have easily gone in favour of the Employer. Counsel for the Employer submitted some very persuasive arguments in his closing remarks justifying the decision to terminate the grievor’s employment.

However, I have taken into consideration the fact that the grievor is a longstanding employee of Irving Paper and that he has a good, discipline free, work record. I also considered the fact that, although it was not perfectly worded, the grievor did apologize for his actions. Furthermore, there was no convincing arguments to establish that this working relationship was irretrievably broken. I believe that the grievor has a rehabilitative potential. It will be up to him to show to the Employer that he can be a trusted and

efficient employee. [paras. 110-111] [ 23 ] After revealing his internal struggle with the evidence, the arbitrator nevertheless reinstated Mr. Gaudet into his former position without compensation or any other benefits. In making this order, the arbitrator effectively replaced Mr. Gaudet’s dismissal with a seven-month suspension without pay or other benefits from the date of dismissal to the date of the arbitrator’s decision. C.

The judicial review decision [ 24 ] Before the application judge, Irving argued the arbitrator’s decision was unreasonable when reviewed within the framework set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 , [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 . Irving focused on two of the Vavilov principles: 1. The decision was internally incoherent and irrational in light of the unequivocal findings of fact. Irving argued there was no way to reconcile the findings that Mr. Gaudet apologized and had rehabilitative potential with the findings that he was persistently dishonest and lacked remorse; and 2.

The decision was also untenable given the arbitrator’s factual and legal constraints. Its effect was to diminish the unvarnished findings of dishonesty and lack of remorse and to instead prefer Mr. Gaudet’s length of service and good disciplinary record and give those factors inordinate weight. [ 25 ] The application judge agreed with Irving on both counts. On the internal incoherence and irrationality principles, the judge wrote: [Irving] contends that even if one accepts that it was possible for [Mr.

Gaudet] to apologize while, at the same time, continuing to be dishonest and lack remorse (which Irving does not), there is simply no explanation in the Decision as to how, in these circumstances, [Mr. Gaudet’s] “apology” overcomes his dishonesty and failure to admit wrongdoing and can repair the employment relationship. [Irving] maintains that in the absence of any explanation or supporting evidence, this leap in logic is unreasonable. […] I agree with [Irving’s] submission in that regard. In my view, there is no explanation in the Decision as to how, in these circumstances, [Mr.

Gaudet’s] “apology” overcomes his dishonesty and failure to admit wrongdoing and can restore the employment relationship. In my view, in the absence of any explanation or supporting evidence, this leap is illogical. [Irving] further maintains that, in a similar vein, [the arbitrator’s] broader findings to the effect that [Mr.

Gaudet] could be rehabilitated are similarly brief, vague, and internally incoherent. [Irving] correctly notes that, in fact, in the space of a single paragraph, the arbitrator acknowledged the strength of Irving’s case, stating that his decision could “have easily gone in favour of the Employer,” but then proceeds to comment, inexplicably, that “there was no convincing arguments to establish that this working relationship was irretrievably broken”. […] [paras. 41-42] [ 26 ] On the factual and legal constraints principles, the judge concluded: In my view, based on the applicable arbitral jurisprudence and findings of fact of [the arbitrator] and the submissions of [Irving] and [Unifor], I am at loss to understand how [the arbitrator] could have reasonably decided that a viable working relationship between Irving and [Mr.

Gaudet] could be restored. In my view, [the arbitrator] took an approach in the Decision that departed from applicable arbitral jurisprudence and did not satisfy the justificatory burden of explaining that departure in his reasons in the Decision. Accordingly, in my view, the Decision is unreasonable. The Decision to reinstate [Mr. Gaudet] is not justified in relation to the facts and laws that constrain [the arbitrator]. [para. 72] [ 27 ] The judge quashed the arbitration decision with costs and remitted the matter to a different arbitrator to be mutually agreed upon by the parties.

III. Grounds of Appeal [ 28 ] On behalf of Mr. Gaudet, Unifor raised three grounds of appeal. It asserts the application judge erred in finding: 1) that the analysis which led the arbitrator to decide to reinstate Mr.

Gaudet was inconsistent with his previous findings of fact; 2) that the arbitrator’s reasons lacked the hallmarks of justification, transparency and intelligibility and that his decision to reinstate fell outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes that were defensible in respect of the facts and law; and 3) that the arbitrator’s reasons were unreasonable. [ 29 ] The third ground is subsumed into the first two and was not argued separately. My analysis will proceed accordingly. IV. Standard of Review [ 30 ] There is no dispute the standard is reasonableness.

On appeal from an application judge’s decision on judicial review of an administrative decision, the appellate court must “step into the shoes” of the judge and focus on the reasonableness of the administrative decision ( Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 3515 v. Dieppe (City) , 2019 NBCA 11 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 21 (QL) , para. 5 ). The determination is then made, from that perspective, whether the judge properly applied the reasonableness standard of review. The reviewing judge and this Court must consider whether the underlying administrative decision is reasonable in terms of both rationale and outcome.

Vavilov directs us to be robust in our review: Reasonableness review is an approach meant to ensure that courts intervene in administrative matters only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process. It finds its starting point in the principle of judicial restraint and demonstrates respect for the distinct role of administrative decision makers. However, it is not a “rubber-stamping” process or a means of sheltering administrative decision makers from accountability.

It remains a robust form of review . [Emphasis added; para. 13] [ 31 ] It is not sufficient for a decision to fall within a range of reasonable outcomes; it must also be justified. It is at this level that robustness comes into play. [ 32 ] As noted, in order to be reasonable, a decision must first follow an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and, second, it must be justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker ( see Vavilov , para. 85 ; Eastland Realty Limited v. Southeast Regional Service Commission, as represented by Jeff Boudreau , 2021 NBCA 10 , [2021] N.B.J.

No. 47 (QL) , para. 58 ). [ 33 ] First, for a decision to be internally coherent and rational, the reviewing court must be able to trace the decision maker’s reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in its overarching logic. If the conclusion reached cannot flow from the decision maker’s analysis, the decision is unreasonable ( Vavilov , paras. 102-103 ). [ 34 ] Second, a decision must be justified in relation to the relevant facts and law. With respect to the facts, it must be justified in relation to the evidence before the decision maker.

A decision may be unreasonable if it diminishes, ignores or contradicts the evidentiary record ( Vavilov , para. 126 ). See also Ontario (Transportation) v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union , 2013 ONSC 7227 , [2013] O.J. No. 5704 (QL) , paras. 30-48 . Similarly, a key finding made in the absence of any evidence in the record can render a decision unreasonable (see Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney General) , 2017 FCA 128 , [2017] F.C.J. No. 601 (QL) , para. 72 ).

[ 35 ] With respect to the law, the reviewing court should consider whether the decision under review is consistent with long-standing institutional practices and past decisions. If a decision maker departs from consensus on a matter without explanation, the decision will be unreasonable ( Vavilov , para. 131 ). [ 36 ] The Manitoba Court of Appeal discussed the two characteristics of a reasonable decision in Manitoba Government and General Employees ’ Union v. The Minister of Finance for the Government of Manitoba, The Honourable Scott Fielding , 2021 MBCA 36 , [2021] M.J.

No. 99 (QL) : With respect to the first characteristic, the reasons should contain a line of analysis that could reasonably lead the decision-maker from the evidence to its decision with no fatal flaw in logic. The Supreme Court [in Vavilov ] explained (at para. 96 ): … Even if the outcome of the decision could be reasonable under different circumstances, it is not open to a reviewing court to disregard the flawed basis for a decision and substitute its own justification for the outcome: Delta Air Lines ( Delta Air Lines Inc v. Lukács , 2018 SCC 2 ), at paras. 26-28.

To allow a reviewing court to do so would be to allow an administrative decision maker to abdicate its responsibility to justify to the affected party, in a manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis on which it arrived at a particular conclusion.

This would also amount to adopting an approach to reasonableness review focused solely on the outcome of a decision, to the exclusion of the rationale for that decision. […] The majority also clarified that “the internal rationality of a decision may be called into question if the reasons exhibit clear logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise” (at para. 104). Ultimately, the decision-maker’s reasoning must “[add] up” ( ibid ). Conclusory or

summary statements are generally insufficient. […] With respect to the second characteristic, the decision should be justifiable in light of the legal and factual constraints that bear upon the decision. It is important to recognise that the context in which the decision is rendered constrains the decision-maker. The Supreme Court of Canada provides a non-comprehensive list of some of the legal and factual elements that are generally relevant in determining reasonableness, each of which will vary in significance depending on the context.

Thus, where applicable, the decision should: • respect the governing statutory scheme (See Vavilov at paras. 108-10 ); • accord with other relevant statutes and common law principles, or explain why they are not applicable (see paras. 111-13); • be consistent with the modern approach to statutory

interpretation – although the decision-maker’s particular insight into a statutory scheme may be relevant (see paras. 115-24); • reflect the evidentiary record and general factual matrix (see paras. 125-26); • meaningfully account for the key issues or central arguments raised (see paras. 127-28); • justify any departure from past practices or decisions (see paras. 129-32); and • reflect the impact of the decision (see paras. 133-35). [paras. 37, 38 and 42] [ 37 ] If a decision does not conform to the above principles, it is unreasonable.

[ 38 ] In my view, as will be seen in the analysis below, the application judge in this case properly applied these principles to conclude the arbitrator’s decision is unreasonable. V. Analysis A. Ground 1: Did the application judge err in finding that the analysis that led to the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate was inconsistent with his previous findings of fact? [ 39 ] Unifor relies heavily on University of Saskatchewan v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1975 , 2022 SKQB 49 , [2022] S.J.

No. 83 (QL) , for the proposition that reviewing courts should not second-guess findings of fact made by an arbitrator. However, unlike the decision under appeal, University of Saskatchewan did not address internal inconsistencies and contradictions in the arbitrator’s reasons and findings of fact. Rather, in that case, the employer disagreed with the arbitrator’s factual findings and sought judicial review on that basis. The employer effectively asked the court to overturn the arbitrator’s findings of fact.

As a result, University of Saskatchewan does not assist Unifor. [ 40 ] In this case, Irving did not ask the application judge to overturn the arbitrator’s factual findings, nor did it allege the arbitrator had failed to consider relevant evidence or to make necessary factual findings. [ 41 ] Rather, Irving’s position is that the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Mr. Gaudet and his reasons in support of that decision were internally incoherent and irrational given his central factual findings. Put simply, his decision included contradictory factual findings that could not co-exist.

In other words, the decision and rationale did not “add up.” [ 42 ] Specifically, the arbitrator made repeated findings concerning the seriousness of Mr. Gaudet’s misconduct and his persistent lack of remorse and dishonesty. This conduct began at the March 24th meeting, continued with his March 24th voicemail and permeated his testimony at arbitration. These central factual findings cannot be reconciled with the arbitrator’s unsupported conclusions that:

(1) Mr. Gaudet “apologized” to Irving; (2) the working relationship was “not irretrievably broken”; and

(3) Mr. Gaudet had rehabilitative potential. [ 43 ] In accordance with Vavilov , the application judge was required to determine whether the arbitrator’s conclusions were justified by a transparent and intelligible chain of analysis. He applied the Vavilov reasonableness review principles and found they were not. The arbitrator did not provide a clear line of analysis that reasonably led − from his central factual findings regarding the seriousness of Mr.

Gaudet’s misconduct, his lack of remorse, notwithstanding dubious apologies, and his dishonesty − to his decision to reinstate him. [ 44 ] In making his decision, the application judge did not overturn the arbitrator’s factual findings or substitute his own. Rather, he found the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Mr. Gaudet was not justified in relation to his key findings of fact relating to the seriousness of the misconduct, the lack of remorse, and the dishonesty.

The judge properly applied the reasonableness analysis and its core requirement that a decision be based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis ( Eastland Realty Limited , para. 58 ). [ 45 ] Vavilov has raised the bar for decision makers. Both the rationale and the outcome of a decision must be justified through written reasons. In this case, I am of the view that the application judge did not err in finding the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Mr. Gaudet was inconsistent with his previous findings of fact. B.

Ground 2: Did the application judge err in finding that the arbitrator’s reasons lacked the hallmarks of justification, transparency and intelligibility such that his decision fell outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes, defensible on the facts and the law? [ 46 ] Unifor argues the arbitrator’s decision is not at odds with past decisions concerning “time theft, dishonesty and lack of remorse.” It relies forcefully on Wm. Scott & Company Ltd. v. Canadian Food and Allied Workers Union, Local P-162 , [1977] 1 Can.

L.R.B.R. 1 (B.C.L.R.B.) , an authoritative labour law case which summarized the factors that can counterbalance an employee ’s wrongdoing and that an arbitrator can take into consideration to mitigate the disciplinary measure imposed on the employee. These factors are known in labour law jurisprudence as the “Scott factors.” They are:

1. The previous good record of the grievor. 2. The long service of the grievor. 3. Whether or not the offence was an isolated incident in the employment history of the grievor. 4. Provocation. 5. Whether the offence was committed on the spur of the moment as a result of a momentary aberration, due to strong emotional impulses, or whether the offence was premeditated. 6. Whether the penalty imposed has created a special economic hardship for the grievor in the light of his particular circumstances. 7.

Evidence that the company rules of conduct, either unwritten or posted, have not been uniformly enforced, thus constituting a form of discrimination. 8. Circumstances negating intent, e.g. the likelihood that the grievor misunderstood the nature or intent of an order given to him and, as a result, disobeyed it. 9. The seriousness of the offence in terms of company policy and company obligations. 10. Any other circumstances which the board should properly take into consideration, including: (

a) failure of the grievor to apologize and settle the matter after being given an opportunity to do so. (

b) where a grievor was discharged for improper driving of company equipment and the company, for the first time, issued rules governing the conduct of drivers after the discharge, this was held to be a mitigating circumstance. (

c) failure of the company to permit the grievor to explain or deny the alleged offence. [ 47 ] However, an arbitrator cannot pick one or more of these factors to conclude an employment relationship can be restored without providing a rational explanation. For instance, an attempted apology, or a long and clean employment record, without more, does not suffice in this case to withstand the robust analysis required by Vavilov . Again, this appeal does not concern whether a finding of fact made by the arbitrator can be overturned.

The reasonableness review requires an examination of the arbitrator’s reasons as a whole to determine if they are coherent and rational with respect to the factual findings and the law. They need to add up. [ 48 ] The arbitrator correctly identified the test when he stated that, in considering whether another, less harsh, disciplinary measure than dismissal would be appropriate would depend on whether the employment relationship could be salvaged. The main factors he invoked to order reinstatement were Mr. Gaudet’s length of service and clean record coupled with the semblance of an apology.

While these factors might be clearly relevant to justify reinstatement, to the extent they are completely at odds with the arbitrator’s previous findings of fact, they cannot support reinstatement without a rational and logical explanation of the dichotomy. It was not open to the arbitrator to elevate the employment history and clean record factors above all else given the applicable jurisprudence. In other words, the arbitrator’s findings, on the one hand, and his disposition, on the other, do not add up.

[ 49 ] The failure of a decision maker to justify a departure from past decisions, including their own, or from consensus on a specific issue, may signal unreasonableness. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bétournay , 2018 FCA 230 , [2018] F.C.J. No. 1277 (QL) , De Montigny J.A. writes: It is true that an administrative decision​maker is not required to conform or adhere to an arbitral consensus and is not bound by the decisions that colleagues may make.

While a certain degree of consistency is desirable, departure from an arbitral trend is permissible, provided that the reasons for doing so are convincingly explained. As the Supreme Court noted in Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. , 2013 SCC 34 , [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458 , the body of arbitral jurisprudence is a “valuable benchmark” against which to assess the reasonableness of an administrative decision (at para. 6 (Justice Abella)).

The demand of predictability requires that rules which are established in earlier cases generally be followed unless an explanation is provided as to why an adjudicator decided to depart from them. […] [para. 51] [ 50 ] The arbitrator failed to follow the relevant and leading case law on employee time theft, dishonesty and lack of remorse. Moreover, he did not justify this departure from the case law, nor did he distinguish those cases from the facts before him. [ 51 ] The decision in Yorkton Cooperative Association v. Retail, Wholesale Department Store Union , 2016 SKQB 296 , [2016] S.J.

No. 501 (QL) , is a leading case on time theft and employee dishonesty and lack of remorse. Moreover, the facts and issues in that case bear a striking similarity to those before the arbitrator. [ 52 ] In Yorkton , the employer accused an employee of committing time theft for closing her store early without permission and then submitting inaccurate timesheets. During the investigation, the employee denied any wrongdoing. The employer terminated her employment, and her union filed a grievance. An arbitration board found the employee guilty of time theft on two occasions.

The board also concluded the employee’s testimony at arbitration was untruthful. Ultimately, the board found that the employer had cause for discipline but that the employee should be reinstated to her employment. The employee’s discipline-free record was the main factor weighing in favour of reinstatement. [ 53 ] On judicial review, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench quashed the arbitration board’s decision.

In the court’s view, the seriousness of time theft, coupled with the employee’s dishonesty and lack of remorse during the employer’s investigation and at arbitration, compelled the board to uphold the employee’s termination for cause. [ 54 ] First, the court reviewed and summarized the arbitral consensus on the seriousness of time theft and the limited circumstances in which it is appropriate to substitute a lesser penalty for termination: A review of relevant arbitration jurisprudence leads me to conclude that there is a consensus that time theft, or falsification of hours for the purpose of receiving pay for time not worked, is a serious breach of the employment relationship.

It constitutes fraud and theft against the employer: [references omitted]. The presumptive penalty for theft by an employee is termination: [reference omitted]. Time theft, therefore, is generally cause for termination of employment: [references omitted]. However, termination is not automatic. If the time theft is of a de minimis nature, a lesser penalty may be appropriate, even if the employee is in a position of trust: [reference omitted].

An arbitrator may substitute a lesser penalty where there are significant mitigating circumstances: […] […] In certain instances, significant mitigating factors such as genuine remorse and honesty during the investigation stage, can overcome the presumption in favour of dismissal for serious misconduct such as time theft: [reference omitted] Continued dishonesty on the part of the employee, however, such as failure to admit wrongdoing, lying during the investigation, or lying during the hearing are significant negative factors which compel the conclusion that there is no hope of restoring the employment relationship, and weigh heavily in favour of upholding termination, especially where the employee held a position of trust [references omitted]. [paras. 48-50 and 52]

[55] Applying these principles to the facts, the court then concluded the arbitration board’s decision to reinstate theterminated employee was unreasonable: The Board found that Ms. Osbourne was not trustworthy in circumstances under which the Co-op had the right to expect her to betrustworthy. Having perpetrated a serious wrong by committing time theft, Ms. Osbourne compounded her wrongdoing by lying whenshe was confronted by her employer. […] Her actions were not spur-of-the-moment, nor were they isolated.

Her actions were intentionaland they were serious, especially given the position she occupied. […] The Board found that Ms. Osbourne did not suffer economichardship as a result of being terminated (para. 216). The Board also found that Ms. Osbourne continued to lie, both during theinvestigative stage, and during her testimony (para. 217), and that she took no ownership of her wrongdoing, leaving the Board with littleconfidence that her conduct would not be repeated (para. 218).

All of those findings are factors which, according to the common law and the applicable arbitral jurisprudence, weigh very heavily infavour of dismissal. [The governing legislation] gives the Board broad powers to substitute a penalty that it considers just andreasonable in the circumstances, but a just and reasonable penalty must take into account the applicable common law andarbitral jurisprudence. In this case, all of the facts found by the Board weigh in favour of termination. Apart from the fact that Ms.

Osbourne had no previousrecord for discipline and the fact that, in the past, incidents of time theft had not been enforced by the Co-op, there were no othermitigating circumstances. […] Once an employee has been found to have committed serious misconduct, reinstatement is appropriate only if the evidence demonstratesmitigating factors which support the continued viability of the employment relationship.

The absence of mitigating factors which supportthe viability of a continued employment relationship render a decision by a tribunal to reinstate an employee who has been dismissed aleap of faith, and thus unreasonable: Bhadauria [Toronto (City) Board of Education v. O.S.S.T.F., District 15, (SCC),[1997] 1 S.C.R. 487, [1997] S.C.J. No. 27 (QL)], at para. 78. In this case, none of the findings of fact made by the Board point to theviability of a continued employment relationship. Quite the contrary, in fact.

Given all of the negative findings of fact made by the Board, it was necessary for the Board to identify some significant mitigation factoror factors in order to justify a penalty less than dismissal. In its reasons, the Board referred to no significant mitigating factors, nor wereany significant mitigating factors identified in the Board’s findings of fact, or the evidence. In particular, all of the relevant factors thatthe Board identified in its reasons were factors which, according to the applicable jurisprudence – both judicial and arbitral – weigh infavour of dismissal.

The Board did not identify any factors in its reasons which were indicative of a viable employment relationshipgoing forward. In the absence of such reasons, the decision to reinstate Ms. Osbourne was a “leap of faith” of the kind described by theSupreme Court in Bhadauria. […] [Emphasis added; paras. 54-58] [56] On that basis, the court quashed the arbitration board’s decision, dismissed the union’s grievance and upheldthe termination of the employee’s employment. [57] On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the reviewing court’s decision: Retail,Wholesale Department Store Union v.

Yorkton Cooperative Association, 2017 SKCA 107, [2017] S.J. No. 540 (QL). Writing for theunanimous court, Richards C.J.S. stated he could hardly understand how the arbitration board could have reasonably decided theworking relationship was restorable: The root question in determining whether a termination of employment is warranted in the context of acts of dishonesty is whether thetrust crucial to the employment relationship can be restored. […] Most significantly, and as the Board itself found, the Grievor failed totake ownership of her wrongdoing and gave no comfort that she would not repeat it.

In light of those factual findings, I am at a loss tounderstand how the Board could have reasonably decided that a viable working relationship between the Grievor and the Co-op could berebuilt. […] […] the precise contours of any arbitral consensus in this area are ultimately of no consequence to the resolution of this appeal. That is sobecause the result is the same regardless of whether the analysis is based on a rebuttable-type presumption that dishonesty warrantstermination or whether it considers dishonesty in context with reference to the severity of the employee’s conduct and the sanction

imposed. If the proper analysis is seen as involving the notion that

an act of dishonesty will presumptively warrant dismissal, I see nothing in the facts here that could reasonably displace that presumption. As the Chambers judge noted, the only consideration that weighs in the Grievor’s favour on this front is the fact that, in her three-year employment history with the Co-op, she had accumulated no disciplinary record.

The relatively minor amount of time stolen by the Grievor might also be mentioned in this context but, as noted above, the seriousness of her original misconduct was compounded by her decisions to lie during the Co-op’s investigation and at the arbitration hearing. If the proper analysis is contextual […] the result is the same. […] Taking into account all of the relevant aspects of what happened here and considering the Grievor’s conduct in context, the termination of her employment was the appropriate and just disciplinary response for the Co-op to take. […] In

summary, given the factual findings of the Board and given the applicable arbitral jurisprudence, there is only one reasonable outcome in this case. The Grievor took no ownership of her wrongdoing and the Board found as a fact that there could be no comfort she would not repeat that wrongdoing. In other words, the trust necessary to sustain the employment relationship between the Grievor and the Co-op had been fractured in circumstances where the Co-op could have no confidence it would or could be repaired.

As a consequence, the termination of the Grievor’s employment was the only reasonable bottom line at which the Board could have arrived. It follows that the Chambers judge did not err by reinstating the Grievor’s termination. [paras. 26, 38-40 and 51] [ 58 ] The fact that the grievor in Yorkton had only three years of service with an unblemished disciplinary record does not distinguish that case from Mr. Gaudet ’ s situation. In Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2069 v. Canadian Blood Services (London Grievance) , [2017] N.B.L.A.A.

No. 15 (QL), the same arbitrator as in the case before us noted that a significant length of service and the absence of a prior disciplinary record are not, in themselves, sufficient mitigating factors to re-establish trust between an employer and an employee or to justify reinstatement. [ 59 ] The arbitrator adopted the Yorkton approach in Canadian Blood Services , another case involving an employee in a position of trust who was dishonest and lacked remorse. In that decision, the arbitrator concluded an employee’s “clean” disciplinary record and long service did not outweigh his dishonesty and lack of remorse.

He wrote: Having considered all of the evidence and applying the two-step framework analysis, I have come to the conclusion that the Employer has effectively established that the Grievor has been dishonest. […] His continued dishonesty, by failing to admit wrongdoing and trying to transfer the blame not only to other employees but also on the client and the fact that he was less than truthful at the hearing are significant negative factors that compel me to conclude that there is no hope of restoring the employment relationship in this case.

The relation of trust between the Employer and the Grievor has been irretrievably broken. Once an employee, as it is the case here, has been found to have committed serious misconduct, reinstatement is appropriate only if the evidence demonstrates mitigating factors that support the continued viability of the employment relationship ( Yorkton Cooperative Association, supra , para 41). In this case, the mitigating factors that might play in the Grievor’s favour are his ten years employment with CBS and the fact that he never received, in the past, any disciplinary measure.

Taking into consideration first of all, the absence of any prior disciplinary measures, I must conclude that this factor by itself is not sufficient to justify reinstatement. The grievor knew that his conduct was wrong. […] He continued during the investigation and at the hearing to deny any misconduct on his part and continued to blame others for his plight.

These facts outweigh any mitigation factors that might play in favor of the grievor. […] As to his ten years of service with the Employer, this in itself is not sufficient, for all the reasons given above, to reestablish the relation of trust required for the work that the grievor is called upon to do. I cannot but feel some empathy for the Grievor’s situation. However, he has but himself to blame for the predicament in which he finds himself. Had he been more cooperative during the Employer’s

investigation and more candid during the hearing, the situation might have been different. [paras. 129-131 and 133] [ 60 ] Once again, the facts and issues in Canadian Blood Services bear a striking similarity to Mr. Gaudet’s case. In fact, Mr. Gaudet’s theft was significantly more serious than the one at issue in Canadian Blood Services. Over the course of approximately three months, Mr. Gaudet’s time theft amounted to almost 800 stolen minutes. Further, these 800 minutes did not accurately reflect anywhere near the total time lost, as Mr.

Gaudet’s conduct admittedly started approximately 11 months prior to Irving’s investigation, a fact noted by the arbitrator. [ 61 ] Having found that Mr. Gaudet committed time theft and then persisted in denying wrongdoing and dishonesty, the arbitrator had to explain his departure from arbitral trends in failing to uphold Irving’s decision to terminate Mr. Gaudet’s employment in the absence of compelling evidence that the employment relationship could be rehabilitated. There was no such evidence in the record before the arbitrator and, in any event, he did not provide any reasons for his belief that Mr.

Gaudet had “rehabilitative potential” beyond noting his lengthy history and discipline-free record. Again, as noted in Yorkton and Canadian Blood Services , a discipline-free record is not a sufficient basis to reinstate an employee who has committed time theft and then failed to acknowledge wrongdoing.

The arbitrator did not explain how he squared findings of breach of trust, dishonesty and lack of remorse by an employee in a position of trust with reinstatement. [ 62 ] While neither Yorkton nor Canadian Blood Services bound the arbitrator to a particular conclusion, he was required to explain and justify any departure from the approach taken in those decisions ( Vavilov , para 131 ).

In particular, he was required to elaborate sufficient mitigating factors to justify his decision that the employment relationship was “not irretrievably broken.” With respect, he did not do so. [ 63 ] As a result, the arbitrator’s failure to explain and justify an approach that was directly at odds with arbitral trends rendered the decision unreasonable ( Vavilov , para. 131 ). Indeed, courts have indicated that labour arbitrators should follow relevant precedents absent a compelling reason not to do so ( see Bétournay , para. 51 ; IBEW Local 636 v. Orillia Power Generation Corp. , 2019 ONSC 6442 , [2019] O.J.

No. 5641 (QL) , para. 23 ; Canadian National v. Teamsters Canada , 2020 ONSC 7286 , [2020] O.J. No. 5216 (QL) , para. 26 ). [ 64 ] The arbitrator provided no reasons at all – let alone compelling reasons – to justify his departure from relevant precedents, including his own previous decision in Canadian Blood Services . [ 65 ] Ultimately, I am of the view that the application judge did not err in finding that the arbitrator’s reasons lacked the hallmarks of reasonableness such that his decision fell outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes, defensible on the facts and the law. VI.

Conclusion and Disposition [ 66 ] Applying the reasonableness analysis prescribed by Vavilov , the application judge properly concluded the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate was unreasonable as it was inconsistent with his findings of fact that indicated the employment relationship was beyond repair and it was not justified in relation to the facts and law that constrained him. [ 67 ] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs of $3,000 payable to the respondent. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE LEBLOND

I. Introduction [1] Robert Gaudet était un employé syndiqué de l’intimée, Les Papiers Irving Limitée, et exerçait à temps plein la fonction de contrôleur de la qualité dans le laboratoire de l’intimée. Il était membre de la

section locale 907 du syndicat appelant Unifor. Le 25 mars 2021, à la suite d’une enquête de l’employeur, il a été congédié pour avoir abusé à maintes reprises du temps et des ressources de l’entreprise. [2] M. Gaudet, par l’entremise d’Unifor, a déposé un grief pour contester son congédiement. Un arbitre a conclu qu’Irving était fondée à prendre des mesures disciplinaires contre M. Gaudet pour vol de temps et abus de confiance. M.

Gaudet s’était servi d’un véhicule de l’entreprise mis à sa disposition pour faire, selon l’arbitre, des arrêts répétés et non autorisés en vue de s’occuper d’affaires personnelles pendant ses quarts de travail. M. Gaudet, selon l’arbitre, occupait un poste de confiance et avait abusé de cette confiance; néanmoins, l’arbitre a conclu qu’il était possible de restaurer la relation d’emploi en raison de facteurs atténuants qui, selon lui, pouvaient contrebalancer la gravité de l’inconduite de M. Gaudet et justifier une sanction moins sévère. Dans sa décision du 26 octobre 2021, l’arbitre a réintégré M.

Gaudet dans son ancien poste sans compensation rétroactive. [3] Irving a demandé une révision judiciaire de la décision arbitrale. Le juge saisi de la requête l’a accueillie et a annulé la décision, qu’il a jugée déraisonnable. Le juge a statué que la décision de l’arbitre n’était pas fondée sur une analyse intrinsèquement cohérente et rationnelle ni justifiée au regard des contraintes juridiques et factuelles auxquelles il était assujetti. Le juge a estimé que les conclusions de fait de l’arbitre étaient incompatibles avec sa conclusion voulant qu’il fût possible de restaurer la relation d’emploi.

De plus, selon le juge, la méthode retenue par l’arbitre ne cadrait pas avec la jurisprudence applicable et rien ne justifiait en l’occurrence qu’on s’y écartât. [4] Unifor, pour le compte de M. Gaudet, interjette appel de la décision issue de la révision judiciaire. Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel. II. Contexte [5] Irving produit du papier de spécialité à son usine de la promenade Bayside à Saint John, au Nouveau- Brunswick. M. Gaudet occupait un poste de contrôleur de la qualité au laboratoire de l’usine.

Il avait pour fonction, entre autres, de collaborer aux travaux d’essai environnemental d’échantillons d’eau prélevés dans une lagune située à côté de l’usine d’Irving. Les essais étaient réalisés dans un autre établissement appartenant aux Pâtes & Papier Irving, Limitée. M. Gaudet devait livrer les échantillons au centre des essais au moyen d’un véhicule appartenant à Irving, puis retourner à l’usine pour reprendre ses autres fonctions. Sur le chemin du retour, il n’avait le droit que de prendre un café ou un sandwich.

Il n’avait pas besoin d’une approbation pour ainsi utiliser le véhicule de la compagnie; cependant, une approbation lui était nécessaire pour s’en servir pour d’autres arrêts ou pour d’autres raisons pendant ses quarts de travail. La tâche de prélever un échantillon, de le livrer au centre des essais et de retourner à l’usine prenait habituellement entre 60 et 70 minutes. A. L’enquête de l’employeur [6] En 2020, apprenant que certains employés prenaient plus de temps que nécessaire pour livrer des échantillons, Irving a ouvert une enquête par l’entremise de son service de sécurité.

L’enquête a révélé que, durant ses livraisons d’échantillons, M. Gaudet se rendait fréquemment dans divers lieux résidentiels et commerciaux qui n’avaient rien à voir avec les activités d’Irving. Le dossier révèle qu’il a fait au moins 20 de ces [TRADUCTION] « visites » sur une période de trois mois et demi allant de la fin de 2020 au début de 2021, ses absences de l’usine variant d’une heure et demie à deux heures chacune, ce qui donne un total approximatif de 800 minutes de travail manquées.

Aucune de ces visites n’avait été autorisée par Irving. [7] Le 24 mars 2021, des membres du personnel d’Irving ont rencontré M. Gaudet en présence d’un représentant d’Unifor pour lui présenter les résultats de l’enquête et lui donner la chance d’expliquer sa conduite. Dans sa décision, l’arbitre décrit la preuve présentée à l’audience relativement à cette rencontre. [8] Au début de la rencontre, M. Gaudet, à qui on avait demandé d’expliquer pourquoi ses livraisons prenaient autant de temps, a répondu qu’il n’avait aucune explication, sinon : [TRADUCTION] « Je bavarde plus que la moyenne [des gens], j’imagine.

Je ne sais pas quoi vous dire. » Prié d’indiquer plus précisément s’il avait fait des détours durant ses livraisons d’échantillons,

il a répondu : [TRADUCTION] « Je ne peux affirmer n’avoir jamais fait de détours. J’ai pu m’écarter quelquefois de mon trajet. » Interrogé au sujet de la nature de ces détours, il a répondu : [TRADUCTION] « Aller au Tim’s, par exemple. » [9] Il a ensuite été interrogé à propos d’endroits précis où il a été vu et on lui a demandé s’il possédait ou gérait des propriétés à ces endroits. Il s’est contenté de reconnaître que certains de ces biens lui appartenaient. Il n’avait rien à dire sur les raisons pour lesquelles il avait visité ces propriétés durant ses heures de travail.

Lorsqu’on lui a demandé si de telles visites pendant ses heures de travail lui paraissaient acceptables, il a répondu : [TRADUCTION] « Je n’y ai pas beaucoup réfléchi. Je me suis dit que si je parvenais à faire tout mon travail ici, alors… Ouais, c’est que je ne prends pas de pauses pendant que je suis ici, donc… encore une fois, si je pensais que c’était mal de faire ça, je ne le ferais pas. » Plus tard, il a nuancé sa réponse ainsi : [TRADUCTION] « … si je pensais que c’était mal de faire ça, je ne le ferais pas.

Si j’effectue mon travail, si je remplis mes tâches… Je suppose que je ne vois pas en quoi ça mettait mon emploi en péril. » Dans un dernier effort pour justifier sa conduite, il a dit : [TRADUCTION] « Si j’ai fait quelque chose de mal, je m’en excuse, je ne peux revenir en arrière, mais je prends à cœur mon travail. » [10] Après la rencontre, plus tard en soirée, M. Gaudet a téléphoné à un des représentants d’Irving qui était à la rencontre et lui a laissé un message dans sa boîte vocale. Le message disait en

partie : [TRADUCTION] […] Je voudrais dire d’abord que ce qui s’est passé m’embarrasse. Je n’avais vraiment pas l’intention de mal agir. On ne m’a jamais dit que ce que je faisais était mal. Semble-t-il qu’on m’a suivi pendant quelques mois et que je n’ai pas pris la route la plus directe pour retourner à l’usine. Je donne toujours mon 100 % et je voudrais m’excuser si j’ai fait quelque chose de mal … Mais, encore une fois, je voudrais présenter mes excuses à vous-même ainsi qu’à M. Irving. […] Encore une fois, je voudrais exprimer mes regrets et je voudrais m’adresser à M.

Irving et lui dire également que si j’avais su que je faisais quelque chose de mal , je ne l’aurais certainement pas fait… […] J’suis embarrassé et, encore une fois, si on m’avait dit que j’agissais mal, j’aurais corrigé mon comportement. J’espère que vous prendrez cela en compte. [Gras ajouté; décision arbitrale, par. 38] [11] Le 25 mars 2021, M. Gaudet a été congédié sur-le-champ. Parmi les motifs d’Irving, il y a le fait que, pressé d’expliquer sa conduite, M. Gaudet a oscillé au départ entre ne pas avoir d’explications et estimer que ce qu’il avait fait n’était pas mauvais.

Selon Irving, sa conduite équivaut à du vol de temps de l’entreprise et, assortie aux réponses obtenues de lui à la rencontre du 24 mars, à un abus de la confiance qu’Irving lui avait faite de remplir ses fonctions avec honnêteté et intégrité. [12] Le 31 mars 2021, en vertu de la convention collective en vigueur, M. Gaudet a déposé un grief pour congédiement sans [TRADUCTION] « motif valable ». Le grief a été rejeté et l’affaire a été soumise à l’arbitrage en août 2021. [13] Le témoignage de M. Gaudet à l’arbitrage se distingue, à certains égards importants, de ce qu’il avait dit à la rencontre du 24 mars.

Devant l’arbitre, il a témoigné qu’il était l’administrateur unique et l’actionnaire majoritaire de Gaudet Properties Ltd., l’entreprise à qui appartenaient les biens résidentiels qu’il avait visités pendant ses livraisons au travail. L’entreprise était propriétaire d’environ 160 unités locatives. Il a admis ne pas avoir révélé ces faits à la rencontre du 24 mars. Il a reconnu avoir commencé à faire ces détours en janvier 2020 et que, à au moins 25 reprises entre décembre 2020 et mars 2021, il avait visité ces propriétés pendant ses quarts de travail sans l’approbation préalable d’Irving.

Selon lui, ces détours lui donnaient plus d’énergie et de concentration, ce qui était à l’avantage d’Irving. [14]

Le directeur général d’Irving, Steve Dowding, a témoigné devant l’arbitre. Il a expliqué que le message vocal du 24 mars n’avait pas changé la décision d’Irving de procéder au congédiement, lequel était la seule solution viable au problème d’un abus à long terme de la confiance qui constituait un élément essentiel à la relation d’emploi. De plus, M. Dowding a témoigné que M. Gaudet n’avait pas fait preuve de remords sincères pour sa conduite ni reconnu avoir mal agi. M.

Gaudet n’a pu faire mieux que de répéter des [TRADUCTION] « Si j’avais su que c’était mal » et, pire encore, [TRADUCTION] « Je ne pensais pas que c’était mal », énoncés choquants, selon M. Dowding. Selon lui, il aurait dû être évident pour M. Gaudet que ce qu’il avait fait était mal, et le fait pour lui de prétendre le contraire voulait dire qu’on ne pouvait se fier à lui pour distinguer le bien du mal dans l’accomplissement de ses fonctions auprès de l’entreprise. B.

La décision arbitrale [15] Dans sa décision publiée le 26 octobre 2021, l’arbitre a structuré son analyse suivant le cadre usuel pour l’arbitrage d’affaires disciplinaires, en se posant les questions suivantes :

a) L’employeur était-il fondé à appliquer des mesures disciplinaires?

b) Si oui, la sanction imposée était-elle raisonnable dans les circonstances?

c) Enfin, si la sanction était trop sévère, quelle

autre sanction serait raisonnable dans les circonstances?

(1) Conclusions de fait [16] Dans son appréciation de la preuve, l’arbitre a tiré des conclusions de fait saillantes en concluant que M. Gaudet s’était livré à maintes reprises, durant plusieurs mois, à des actes d’inconduite au cours d’absences [TRADUCTION] « préméditées, planifiées et délibérées » non autorisées de son travail. [17] L’arbitre a conclu, sans [TRADUCTION] « aucune hésitation », qu’Irving était fondée à sanctionner M. Gaudet en raison de la gravité de ses délits.

Il s’est exprimé ainsi : [TRADUCTION] […] Après examen des faits, je n’ai aucune hésitation à conclure que l’employeur avait des motifs valables de sanctionner le plaignant. Il ne fait aucun doute que l’abus de son temps de travail ainsi que des ressources de l’entreprise à la fréquence et pour la durée qui se présentent en l’espèce justifie une sanction.

Pareille conduite constitue une violation de l’obligation fondamentale d’accomplir un travail contre rémunération et un acte malhonnête qui compromet la confiance sur laquelle se fonde la relation d’emploi. […] [par. 83] [18] Plus précisément, l’arbitre a rejeté le témoignage de M. Gaudet voulant qu’il n’ait pas été conscient que ce qu’il faisait était mal. Selon lui, ce témoignage était [TRADUCTION] « fallacieux » et [TRADUCTION] « trompeur » : [TRADUCTION] Pendant l’entretien du 24 mars 2021 et de nouveau dans son message vocal à M.

Dowding, le plaignant prétend qu’il ne savait pas que ce qu’il faisait était mal et soutient que ces visites ne dépassaient pas le temps qui lui était alloué pour son repas du midi et d’autres pauses. […] l’explication du plaignant me donne l’impression qu’il tente délibérément de minimiser la portée de son inconduite . Je ne retiens pas son explication voulant que, pendant ces visites, il ne faisait que [TRADUCTION] « farfouiller », [TRADUCTION] « prendre de l’air » ou [TRADUCTION] « se redynamiser » pour le bien de l’employeur.

Compte tenu de l’expérience commerciale personnelle du plaignant, j’ai peine à croire qu’il ne comprenait pas que ce qu’il faisait était mal. Je ne peux faire autrement que de qualifier de fallacieuses son explication pour ses visites à ces propriétés et la description de ces visites . […] […] Au cours de l’entretien du 24 mars 2021, les réponses que le plaignant a données aux questions qui lui ont été posées étaient très trompeuses . S’il croyait vraiment, comme il l’a indiqué à la rencontre, qu’il ne faisait rien de mal, pourquoi donc n’a-t-il pas fourni ouvertement les renseignements demandés par l’employeur?

Il aurait dû être évident au plaignant que les visites qu’il a faites à ses propriétés personnelles sur le temps de l’entreprise et au moyen du véhicule de l’entreprise étaient illicites, et il aurait dû l’admettre. Son explication pour ces visites semble aussi évoluer au fur et à mesure que l’entretien progresse et que les faits constatés lors de la surveillance lui sont présentés.

C’est d’abord [TRADUCTION] « Non, ces propriétés ne m’appartiennent pas », puis [TRADUCTION] « Je ne faisais que passer devant » et [TRADUCTION] « Je ne faisais qu’entrer et sortir rapidement », et enfin [TRADUCTION] « Je ne faisais que les traverser ». Malheureusement, comme l’a reconnu l’avocat du syndicat, son hésitation à admettre ses transgressions pendant la rencontre joue en sa défaveur. Il aurait pu faire avancer sa cause facilement en admettant son inconduite.

Cependant, il a choisi une attitude défensive qui, en fin de compte, ne l’a pas bien servi. [Gras et soulignement ajoutés; par. 86 et 102] [19] Le fait que M. Gaudet occupait un poste de confiance qui lui accordait beaucoup d’autonomie était, aux yeux de l’arbitre, un facteur aggravant. Il a conclu que M. Gaudet avait abusé à maintes reprises de cette confiance et tiré avantage de son autonomie jusqu’au point de compromettre gravement le fondement même de sa relation d’emploi. [20] C’est en raison de ces conclusions de fait sans équivoque que l’arbitre a décidé que M. Gaudet méritait d’être sanctionné.

En fait, à l’audience, l’avocat de Unifor et de M. Gaudet [TRADUCTION] « a concédé que le plaignant était coupable de [TRADUCTION] “vol de temps” et qu’il méritait bien d’être sanctionné pour ses agissements » (par. 88).

(2) Facteurs atténuants

[21] L’arbitre a examiné ensuite si le congédiement était raisonnable dans les circonstances. Dans son évaluation de la justesse de cette sanction, il s’est demandé s’il y avait des facteurs atténuants qui pouvaient contrebalancer la gravité de l’inconduite de M. Gaudet et appuyer le maintien de la relation d’emploi. Selon l’arbitre, les facteurs atténuants en faveur de M.

Gaudet étaient ses dix- sept années de loyaux services sans qu’aucune preuve de sanctions antérieures n’ait été produite à l’audience; le retard d’Irving pour l’informer de son inconduite après avoir découvert le problème au printemps de 2020; et les [TRADUCTION] « excuses » qu’il avait présentées en personne et par messagerie vocale. L’arbitre n’a pas accepté la thèse voulant que M.

Gaudet subît des difficultés financières particulières par suite de son congédiement, puisqu’il possédait [TRADUCTION] « des actifs considérables sous forme de biens résidentiels » et en avait même acquis d’autres depuis son congédiement. L’arbitre a conclu son évaluation des facteurs atténuants en déclarant que, malgré la gravité de la conduite de M. Gaudet, la relation d’emploi n’était [TRADUCTION] « pas irrémédiablement rompue » et que le congédiement devrait être remplacé par une sanction moins sévère.

(3) Le dispositif [22] Ayant conclu au caractère excessif du congédiement, l’arbitre a passé en revue son pouvoir réparatoire d’appliquer, par substitution, une sanction plus faible sous le régime de la convention collective ainsi que du par. 76(4) de la

Loi sur les relations industrielles , L.R.N.-B. 1973, c. I-4, lequel confère à l’arbitre d’un grief agissant en vertu de la Loi le pouvoir de substituer « au congédiement ou à la peine imposée, toute autre peine qu’il estime juste et raisonnable, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances », si la convention collective ne précise pas la sanction. Il a ajouté l’observation suivante : [TRADUCTION] Le fait que je considère comme excessive en l’espèce la sanction imposée par l’employeur ne diminue en rien la gravité de l’inconduite du plaignant.

Celui-ci a commis un délit grave et mérite d’être réprimandé fermement pour sa conduite. Je dois aussi ajouter que le fait que le plaignant a manqué d’ouverture envers l’employeur lorsqu’on lui a présenté les faits révélés par la surveillance m’a vraiment dérangé. J’ai aussi été dérangé par les explications, ou devrais-je dire le manque d’explication, qu’il a fournies à l’employeur pendant la rencontre du 24 mars 2021 et par le fait qu’il ne semblait pas reconnaître que ce qu’il avait fait était mal.

Ayant pris en considération tous ces éléments, je dois avouer que ma décision aurait pu facilement jouer en faveur de l’employeur. L’avocat de l’employeur a présenté des arguments très convaincants dans sa plaidoirie de clôture en vue de justifier la décision de mettre fin à l’emploi du plaignant. Néanmoins, j’ai tenu compte du fait que le plaignant est un employé de longue date des Papiers Irving et que son dossier d’emploi est bon et libre de sanctions. J’ai aussi tenu compte du fait que, malgré la formulation boiteuse de son message, le plaignant s’est excusé pour ses agissements.

De plus, aucun argument convaincant n’a établi que la relation de travail avait été rompue irrémédiablement. J’estime que le plaignant possède un potentiel de réhabilitation. Ce sera à lui de montrer à l’employeur qu’il peut être un employé fiable et efficace. [par. 110 et 111] [23] Après avoir fait connaître ses hésitations face à la preuve, l’arbitre a quand même fini par réintégrer M. Gaudet dans son ancien poste, sans compensation ou autres avantages. En ordonnant ainsi, l’arbitre s’est trouvé en fait à remplacer le renvoi de M.

Gaudet par une suspension de sept mois sans rémunération ou autres avantages de la date du renvoi jusqu’à la date de la décision arbitrale. C. La décision révisée [24] Devant le juge saisi de la requête, Irving a affirmé que la décision de l’arbitre était déraisonnable à la lumière du cadre établi dans Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration) c. Vavilov , 2019 CSC 65 , [2019] 4 R.C.S. 653 . Irving s’est concentrée sur deux des principes issus de Vavilov : 1. La décision était intrinsèquement incohérente et irrationnelle au regard des conclusions de fait sans équivoque.

Irving a soutenu qu’il était impossible de concilier la conclusion voulant que M. Gaudet se soit excusé et eût un potentiel de réhabilitation avec celle voulant qu’il fût d’une malhonnêteté persistante et n’eût pas de remords; 2. La décision était également insoutenable compte tenu des contraintes factuelles et juridiques de l’arbitre. Elle avait pour effet de minimiser les conclusions brutes de malhonnêteté et d’absence de remords au profit du grand nombre d’années de service de M. Gaudet et de son bon dossier disciplinaire, et de donner à ces derniers facteurs un poids démesuré.

[25] Le juge saisi de la requête était d’accord avec Irving sur les deux points. Au sujet des principes de l’incohérence interne et de l’irrationalité, le juge a écrit : [TRADUCTION] [Irving] soutient que, même dans l’hypothèse qu’il fût possible pour [M.

Gaudet] de s’excuser tout en continuant d’être malhonnête et de ne pas avoir de remords (hypothèse qu’Irving rejette), la décision ne fournit absolument aucune explication montrant comment, dans ces circonstances, les [TRADUCTION] « excuses » parviennent à surmonter sa malhonnêteté et son omission d’admettre d’avoir mal agi et à rétablir la relation d’emploi. [Irving] soutient que, faute d’une explication ou de preuves à l’appui, pareil saut inférentiel est déraisonnable. […] Je souscris à la prétention [d’Irving] à cet égard.

À mon avis, la décision omet d’expliquer comment, dans ces circonstances, les [TRADUCTION] « excuses » de [M. Gaudet] parviennent à surmonter sa malhonnêteté et son omission d’admettre sa transgression et à rétablir la relation d’emploi. À mon avis, faute de quelque explication ou preuve à l’appui, ce saut est illogique. [Irving] soutient en outre que, dans la même veine, les conclusions plus larges [de l’arbitre] voulant que [M.

Gaudet] puisse être réhabilité sont semblablement brèves, vagues et dépourvues de cohérence interne. [Irving] fait remarquer avec justesse que, en fait, dans un même paragraphe, l’arbitre a reconnu la solidité de la cause d’Irving, disant que sa décision aurait [TRADUCTION] « pu facilement jouer en faveur de l’employeur », alors qu’il poursuit en disant qu’[TRADUCTION] « aucun argument convaincant n’a établi que la relation de travail avait été rompue irrémédiablement ». […] [par. 41 et 42] [26] Concernant les principes des contraintes factuelles et juridiques, le juge a conclu : [TRADUCTION] À mon avis, compte tenu de la jurisprudence arbitrale applicable et des conclusions de fait de [l’arbitre] ainsi que des observations d’[Irving] et d’[Unifor], je n’arrive pas à comprendre comment [l’arbitre] a pu raisonnablement statuer qu’une relation de travail viable pouvait être rétablie entre Irving et [M.

Gaudet]. À mon avis, [l’arbitre] a, dans la décision, emprunté une voie qui s’écartait de la jurisprudence arbitrale applicable, sans se décharger, dans ses motifs, du fardeau justificatif d’expliquer cet écart. En conséquence, à mon avis, la décision est déraisonnable. La décision de réintégrer [M. Gaudet] n’est pas justifiée au regard des contraintes factuelles et juridiques auxquelles [l’arbitre] est assujetti. [par. 72] [27] Le juge a annulé la décision arbitrale avec dépens et a renvoyé l’affaire à un autre arbitre convenu entre les parties. III. Moyens d’appel [28] Pour le compte de M.

Gaudet, Unifor a soulevé trois moyens d’appel. Le syndicat affirme que le juge saisi de la requête a commis des erreurs en concluant : 1) que l’analyse qui a mené l’arbitre à décider de réintégrer M. Gaudet était incompatible avec ses conclusions de fait antérieures; 2) que les motifs de l’arbitre étaient dépourvus des caractéristiques de justification, de transparence et d’intelligibilité et que sa décision de réintégrer [M.

Gaudet] n’appartient pas aux issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit; 3) que les motifs de l’arbitre étaient déraisonnables. [29] Le troisième moyen d’appel est subsumé sous les deux premiers et n’a pas été plaidé séparément. Mon analyse procédera en conséquence. IV. Norme de contrôle

[30] Que la norme qui s’applique est celle de la décision raisonnable n’est pas en cause. Dans le cadre d’un appel d’une décision du juge saisi d’une requête en révision judiciaire d’une décision administrative, nous devons « nous mettre à la place » du juge et faire porter le faisceau de notre analyse sur la raisonnabilité de la décision administrative ( Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique,

section locale 3515 c. Ville de Dieppe , 2019 NBCA 11 , [2019] A.N.-B. n o 21 (QL) , par. 5 ) . Il s’agit alors de décider, dans ce contexte, si le juge a appliqué comme il devait la norme de contrôle de la décision raisonnable. Le juge chargé de la révision et notre Cour doivent examiner si la décision administrative sous-jacente est raisonnable tant du point de vue du raisonnement que du résultat.

L’arrêt Vavilov nous engage à être rigoureux dans notre exercice de contrôle : Le contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable est une approche visant à faire en sorte que les cours de justice interviennent dans les affaires administratives uniquement lorsque cela est vraiment nécessaire pour préserver la légitimité, la rationalité et l’équité du processus administratif. Il tire son origine du principe de la retenue judiciaire et témoigne d’un respect envers le rôle distinct des décideurs administratifs.

Toutefois, il ne s’agit pas d’une « simple formalité » ni d’un moyen visant à soustraire les décideurs administratifs à leur obligation de rendre des comptes. Ce type de contrôle demeure rigoureux. [C’est moi qui souligne; par. 13] [31] Il ne suffit pas qu’une décision appartienne aux issues raisonnables; elle doit aussi être justifiée.

C’est à ce niveau que la rigueur entre en jeu. [32] Comme il a été dit, pour qu’une décision soit raisonnable, elle doit, premièrement, être fondée sur une analyse intrinsèquement cohérente et rationnelle et, deuxièmement, être justifiée au regard des contraintes juridiques et factuelles auxquelles le décideur est assujetti (voir Vavilov , par. 85 ; Eastland Realty Limited c. Commission de services régionaux du Sud-Est , représentée par Jeff Boudreau , 2021 NBCA 10 , [2021] A.N.-B. n o 47 (QL) , par. 58 ). [33] Premièrement, pour qu’une décision s

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