Brampton (City) v. Robinson, 2017 ONCJ 567

CITATION: Brampton (City) v. Robinson , 2017 ONCJ 567 DATE: August 18, 2017 IN THE MATTER OF the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O 1990, c. H.8 Between The Corporation of the City of Brampton prosecutor and Michael E. Robinson defendant Ontario Court of Justice Brampton, Ontario Quon J. P. Reasons for Judgment Trial held: May 5, 2017 Judgment rendered: August 18, 2017 Charge: “disobey sign”, contrary to s. 182(2) HTA

Counsel: M. Baiocco, prosecutor for the City of Brampton Michael Robinson, unrepresented Cases Considered or Referred To: Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727 (S.C.C.). Blue Mountain Resorts Ltd. v. Bok, 2013 ONCA 75 , [2013] O.J. No. 520 (O.C.A.), per MacPherson, Armstrong, and BlairJJ.A. Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652 [320 P. 2d 500] (Supreme Ct. of Calif.). Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., (ON CA), [1926] O.J. No. 4 (O.C.A.), per Mulock C.J.O., Magee, Hodgins, and Smith JJ.A. Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.).

Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 283 (O.C.A.), per Weiler, Sharpe, andSimmons JJ.A. People v. McGuire, 80 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1 (1978), 145 Cal.Rptr. 514 (Ct. of Appeals of Calif.). R. v. Dockman, [1996] O.J. No. 4548 (O.C.A.), per Houlden, Labrosse, and Austin JJ.A. R. v. Hajivasilis, 2013 ONCA 27 , [2013] O.J. No. 253 (O.C.A.), per O'Connor A.C.J.O., Doherty, Sharpe, Epstein JJ.A., andCavarzan J. (ad hoc). R. v. Plummer, (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 4530 (O.C.A.), per Rosenberg, MacPherson, and Gillese JJ.A. R. (on the application of Alexander) v.

The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, [2014] E.W.H.C. 560 (H.C. of Engl. And Wales (Q.B. Div.(Admin. Ct.))), per Keyser J. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1SCR 27 (S.C.C.).

Statutes, Regulations, Bylaws, and Rules Cited: Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, ss. 1(1), 143 , and 182(2) . Signs Regulation ( Highway Traffic Act ), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615, s. 23 . California Vehicle Code, ss. 665.5, 22102, 22103, 22104, and 22105. Brampton Bylaw #93-93 ,

Schedule 11. Brampton Bylaw #181-2004 , s. 1. Legislation Act, 2006 , S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F. Road Traffic Act 1988 (U.K.) , 1988, c. 52. Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (U.K.) , 1984, c. 27. Authorities or Reference Material Referred to or Considered: Ontario.ca: The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook, online: Government of Ontario website , << https://www.ontario.ca/document/official-mto-drivers-handbook/changing-directions#section-11 >>, instructions and diagrams on methods of turning your vehicle around to travel back in the opposite direction (U-turns, three-point turns). Sullivan, R. Statutory

Interpretation (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law Inc., 1997). Exhibits entered:

Exhibit "1" - copy of Google Map showing aerial view of Sunforest Drive, north of Bovaird Drive, in the City of Brampton, in which the defendant had marked a driveway with a blue “X” that was located on the westside of Sunforest Drive to indicate which private driveway is #6 Sunforest Drive and the driveway he had made a left turn into to do his three-point turn maneuver. The defendant had also placed red lines on the aerial map to indicate the paths his vehicle had travelled in making that three-point turn. (1 page) 1.

BACKGROUND [ 1 ] To be a “U-Turn” or not to be a “U-Turn”, that is the question for this provincial offences trial. Specifically, it has to be decided whether a motorist who turns left into a private driveway and then reverses back out of the driveway to complete a three-point turn for the purpose of going in the opposite direction, has violated a posted “No U-Turn” traffic sign.

In other words, for the motorist to be in violation of that "No U-Turn" sign, it would have to be found that the motorist’s turns and driving maneuvers when taken together would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.

However, because Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act , does not specifically define what turns or driving maneuvers made by a motor vehicle, or in what circumstances, would or would not constitute a U-Turn, then an appropriate legal test has to be first adopted that can be used for determining whether a particular driving maneuver, or a combination of turns and driving maneuvers, made by a motor vehicle in particular circumstances would constitute a “U-Turn maneuver whenever such a maneuver is prohibited.

In finding a proper test for determining which turns or driving maneuvers and in which circumstances those turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act , the test must foster the purpose or aims underlying this public welfare legislation, which had been enacted to regulate motorists and the operation of motor vehicles on public roads, so as to ensure the safety of all who use public roads.

Moreover, this public safety purpose is reflected and facilitated by municipalities or other authorized bodies through the erection or posting of traffic signs, which prohibit motorists from doing certain turns, maneuvers, or actions on public roads. As well, traffic signs are also utilized for the purpose of reducing congestion on roadways and to ensure efficient traffic flow. [ 2 ] In the present case, Michael Robinson (“the defendant”) has been charged with disobeying a traffic sign, contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.

The defendant allegedly made a U-Turn maneuver which had been prohibited by three validly erected and clearly posted “No U-Turn” traffic signs located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive. This particular road is located in the City of Brampton, and as such, the erection of the three “No U-Turn” signs had been legally authorized by

Schedule 11 of Brampton Bylaw #93-93. That specific bylaw expressly prohibits motorists travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive between Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street from doing a “U-Turn” maneuver in order to change direction and proceed southbound on Sunforest Drive.

And, because there is a school on the eastside of Sunforest Drive just north of Bovaird Drive, then there would be throughout a school day many pedestrians in that area, as well as numerous vehicles dropping off students in that area where the “No U-Turn” signs are situated. [ 3 ] For the circumstances of the present case, the defendant, who was by himself, had been driving a 2004 Dodge Caravan SUV motor vehicle on September 13, 2015, at 1:45 p.m., and proceeding northbound on Sunforest Drive, just north of the intersection of Sunforest Drive and Bovaird Drive in the City of Brampton.

At this point, Officer Orgill of the Peel Regional Police, who had been there specifically to monitor traffic and to enforce the “No U-Turn” prohibition, had observed the Dodge Caravan SUV motor vehicle drive pass the first “No U-Turn” sign located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive.

He then observed the left turn signal light on the Dodge Caravan motor vehicle come on, after which he had observed the Dodge motor vehicle make a left turn to go west across the southbound lane of Sunforest Drive and drive into a private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive, which had been located on the westside of Sunforest Drive. He then observed the Dodge vehicle come to a stop partly on the driveway and then reverse backwards onto Sunforest Drive, and then proceed forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive towards the intersection of Sunforest Drive and Bovaird Drive.

Officer Orgill also testified that the Dodge Caravan vehicle had not completely left the roadway, nor had it been driven completely onto the private driveway because he had observed the front wheels of the vehicle stop on the westside sidewalk while its rear wheels were still on the roadway and its rear had been overhanging the private driveway over the public roadway, which contradicts the defendant’s testimony that the defendant’s motor vehicle had been completely on private property and wholly off the public roadway. [ 4 ] Moreover, Officer Orgill had been in a low-profile police cruiser facing southbound on the west side of Sunforest Drive.

The cruiser was parked a few houses north of the private driveway at #6 Sunforest Drive, from where Officer Orgill said he had a clear view of the event. [ 5 ] Officer Orgill also testified that Sunforest Drive is a highway with one lane northbound and one lane southbound in the area where the U-Turns are prohibited.

Orgill also said that the defendant’s Dodge Caravan motor vehicle had not completely left the roadway, as the motor vehicle’s front wheels had stopped on the sidewalk on the westside of Sunforest Drive while its rear wheels were still on the roadway, before the vehicle had reversed completely back onto the roadway. Officer Orgill also said the distance between the west curb and the westside sidewalk is about five feet. However, the defendant said there is a grass boulevard on the westside that is about 8 to 10 feet wide that is situated between the west curb of Sunforest Drive and that westside sidewalk.

The defendant also said that

the distance between the west curb and the sidewalk is longer than the length of his motor vehicle. However, no evidence had been adduced at trial indicating where the property line that would separate the west boundary of the public roadway from the private property located at #6 Sunforest Drive had been actually located or where it would be in relation to the west curb. [ 6 ] Now, in regards to the “disobey sign” charge, the defendant contends that he did not complete a “U-Turn” maneuver with his motor vehicle nor did he disobey the “No U-Turn” signs posted on Sunforest Drive.

Instead, the defendant admits that he had been driving northbound on Sunforest Drive, just north of Bovaird Drive, when he signaled to make a left turn and then made a left turn, when it had been safe to do so, into a private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive that is on the westside of the roadway. He then said he drove onto the private driveway past the sidewalk and the west curb of the roadway, about 15 feet past the curb.

He further contends that at the point on the private driveway, where he had stopped the forward movement of his motor vehicle just before he reversed it out of the private driveway back onto Sunforest Drive to complete his three-point turn, he had been wholly on private property and completely off the public roadway known as Sunforest Drive. However, the defendant never provided evidence of where the private property lines actually commenced or where the boundaries of the public property that would comprise the public roadway would end.

He also said he did not know who lived at #6 Sunforest Drive, nor did he provide any evidence that he had a specific purpose for being on that property, except for the purpose of making a three-point turn, so that he could go southbound on Sunforest Drive. Moreover, after stopping momentarily on the private driveway, the defendant then said he had reversed his motor vehicle back onto the public roadway when it had been safe to do so, in order to complete a three-point turn.

He then said he proceeded forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive so that he could pick up his wife, who works at the Walmart store situated in a shopping plaza, which is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Sunforest Drive and Bovaird Drive in the City of Brampton. [ 7 ] What’s more, the defendant submits that doing a left turn into a private driveway in order to do a three-point turn, so that he could change the direction he had been travelling from a northbound to southbound direction, had not been illegal or prohibited under the Highway Traffic Act .

Moreover, he submits that this driving maneuver, known as a “three-point turn”, is a legal driving maneuver that is illustrated, explained, and recognized in the Official Ministry of Transportation’s Driver’s Handbook , as a method for turning around a motor vehicle so as to go in the opposite direction (see how to do a three-point turn at “ The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook, online: Government of Ontario website , << https://www.ontario.ca/document/official-mto-drivers- handbook/changing-directions#section-11 >>”).

But more significant, the defendant suggests that if the municipality did not want him to turn left into the private driveway located on the westside of Sunforest Drive for the purpose of making a three-point turn, then the municipality should have erected “No Left-Turn” signs instead on Sunforest Drive to prohibit his particular turn or driving maneuvers. [ 8 ] The defendant also argues that there is no clearly defined definition contained in the Highway Traffic Act that sets out the type of driving maneuvers that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver when it is prohibited, which means that his left turn into a private driveway, as well as his three-point turn, viewed together or separately, do not constitute a U-Turn.

In addition, the defendant also argues that because his motor vehicle had actually left the public roadway and had been driven wholly onto private property, then his vehicle’s actions on the private property were no longer regulated by the Highway Traffic , and that when his vehicle had re-entered onto the public roadway his vehicle’s maneuver was now a new driving maneuver and no longer part of the original action or maneuver that had begun or commenced when his vehicle had turned left into the private driveway.

In other words, there had been an intervening event between his first maneuver, consisting of driving northbound on Sunforest Drive and then turning left turn into the private driveway from the public roadway, and his second maneuver, consisting of reversing his vehicle back out onto the public roadway from the private driveway and then proceeding forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive, such that his vehicle’s two maneuvers could no longer be considered to be one continuous movement commonly referred to as a “U-Turn”, but were in fact two separate and distinct driving maneuvers.

As such, the defendant contends that in regards to the turns or driving maneuvers comprising these two separate driving maneuvers, either viewed together, or separately, they could not in any way be considered to be one continuous movement made by his motor vehicle on a highway that would constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver. [ 9 ] Furthermore, the defendant submits that his left turn into a private driveway, as a driving maneuver, is no different or no less safe than when a motorist makes a left-turn maneuver from the parking lot of the school located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive in order for that motorist to go southbound on Sunforest Drive. [ 10 ] On the other hand, the prosecution argues that a U-Turn is committed when the motor vehicle does a turn or driving maneuver which results in it turning around to go in the opposite direction from the direction which it had been originally travelling.

And, that this outcome is what had ultimately occurred with the defendant’s motor vehicle, which had been travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive when it had gone pass the first “No U-Turn” sign, signalled to make a left turn, and then turned left across the southbound lane of Sunforest Drive and drove onto a private driveway where the rear wheels were still on the public roadway and the rear part of the vehicle was still overhanging the public roadway. The defendant’s motor vehicle then reversed back out of the private driveway right away and then proceeded forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive.

Consequently, submits the prosecution, those turns and driving maneuvers made in combination by the defendant’s motor vehicle would constitute a “U-Turn maneuver” that was in violation of the posted “No U-Turn” signs. [ 11 ] Moreover, since the Highway Traffic Act does not provide for a specific definition of what turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances would constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver when it is prohibited by a “No U-Turn” traffic sign, although it does provide for a general description of a “U-Turn” maneuver under s. 143 of Highway Traffic Act , as a “ turn … so as to proceed in the opposite

direction ”; and since a “three-point” turn is also not specifically defined or even mentioned in the Highway Traffic Act ; and since the driving maneuvers known commonly as a “U-Turn” and a “three-point” turn are both methods for turning a motor vehicle around to go in the opposite direction; and since provisions in public welfare legislation are to be interpreted broadly so as to promote its purpose or goals, then a broad and purposive

interpretation of what turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances would constitute a “U- Turn” maneuver had to be utilized.

As such, the turns and driving maneuvers of the defendant’s motor vehicle on September 13, 2015, on Sunforest Drive, which consist of making a left turn into a private driveway momentarily to complete a three-point turn for the purpose of turning around in order to proceed in the opposite direction from which he had been originally travelling, would constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act . [ 12 ] In addition, there is no requirement set out in the Highway Traffic Act that the U-Turn maneuver when prohibited has to be completed in one continuous forward movement or that a U-Turn maneuver when prohibited could not include a turn or driving maneuver in which a motor vehicle would turn left into a private driveway to momentarily make a three-point turn so that the motor vehicle could then proceed in the opposite direction from the direction it had been travelling.

Moreover, there is also no legal requirement that the U-Turn maneuver has to be completed wholly on the public roadway to constitute a U-Turn.

As such, a motor vehicle that drives off a public roadway and is completely and momentarily on private property or off a public roadway momentarily to complete a three-point turn, would still be considered to be a turn or driving maneuver that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver when it is prohibited, since the purpose of the motor vehicle’s turn and combination of driving maneuvers had been so that it could go in the opposite direction from the original direction it had been travelling, which is the very purpose for why a motor vehicle would make a U- Turn on a highway. [ 13 ] Accordingly, because the purpose of the defendant’s left turn into a private driveway momentarily at #6 Sunforest Drive had been to make a three-point turn in order to go in the opposite direction, then the defendant’s turns and driving maneuvers taken as a whole would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act , and as such, the defendant has contravened the posted “No U-Turn” sign and committed the offence beyond a reasonable doubt of “disobey sign” under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act . [ 14 ] The trial of this regulatory charge was held on May 5, 2017.

After final submissions were made by the prosecution and the defendant, judgment was reserved and adjourned to August 17, 2017, for the judgment to be rendered. These therefore are the written reasons for judgment: 2. THE CHARGE [ 15 ] As stated in the Certificate of Offence numbered 31604168187B that was issued on September 13, 2015, the defendant, Michael Robinson, has been charged with a

Part I regulatory offence of disobeying a sign, contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.: Michael E. Robinson On the day of 2015 – 09 –13 1:45 P.M. At Sunforest Drive Brampton Did commit the offence of: Disobey sign Contrary to HTA, Sect. 182(2)

3. ISSUES [ 16 ] The following are the issues that have arisen in this proceeding that need to be resolved: (

a) To constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act , does the turn or driving maneuvers in question have to be completed in one continuous forward movement or can a U-Turn maneuver be comprised of several driving maneuvers of stops and reversals? (

b) Would a motor vehicle making a left turn into a private driveway for the purpose of executing a three-point turn so as to go in the opposite direction be a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act ? (

c) Would a turn or driving maneuver, which involves a motor vehicle turning left into a private driveway so as to completely leave the public roadway momentarily and then immediately returns back onto the public roadway in order to complete a three-point turn maneuver, so as to proceed in the opposite direction, constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act ? (

d) Does the turns or driving maneuvers that constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act require that they be completed wholly on a public roadway? (

e) Would a turn or driving maneuver in which a motor vehicle is driven wholly onto private property to complete a three-point turn in order to proceed in the opposite direction constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act ? (

f) Was the defendant’s motor vehicle wholly on private property or was it still partly between the lateral property lines or boundaries of the public roadway when it made a turn or driving maneuver to go in the opposite direction? 4. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [ 17 ] The defendant has been charged with the offence of “disobey sign” under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, by allegedly making a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive, which had been prohibited by three “No U-Turn” signs erected on the eastside of Sunforest Drive that are for northbound motorists. [ 18 ] The three “No U-Turn” signs had been legally authorized, erected and posted under the authority of

Schedule 11 of Bylaw #93- 93, which had been amended by Bylaw #181-2004 that had been enacted on June 28, 2004: The council of the Corporation of the City of Brampton hereby ENACTS as follows: 1. By-law 93-93, as amended, is hereby further amended as follows: (1) by deleting from

Schedule 11 thereto the following items: U-TURNS

COLUMN 1 HIGHWAY COLUMN 2 BETWEEN Heart Lake Road Sandalwood Parkway and a point 130 metres north of Sandalwood Parkway Nasmith Street Bovaird Drive and Newport Street/Nuffield Street Sandalwood Parkway East A point 15 metres west of Richvale Drive and a point 15 metres east of Richvale Drive Sunforest Drive Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street (2) by adding to

Schedule 11 thereto the following items: U-TURNS COLUMN 1 HIGHWAY COLUMN 2 BETWEEN Heart Lake Road Sandalwood Parkway East and a point 130 metres north of Sandalwood Parkway East Nasmith Street Bovaird Drive East and Newport Street/Nuffield Street Sandalwood Parkway East A point 15 metres west of Richvale Drive North/Richvale Drive South and a point 15 metres east of Richvale Drive North/Richvale Drive South Sunforest Drive Bovaird Drive East and Cashel Street … [ 19 ] Hence, the three erected signs on the eastside of Sunforest Drive prohibited the defendant from making a “U-Turn” maneuver while traveling northbound on Sunforest Drive to go southbound on Sunforest Drive between Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street in the City of Brampton. [ 20 ] Section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act provides that e very driver or operator of a vehicle shall obey the instructions or directions indicated on any sign so erected : 182(2) Every driver or operator of a vehicle or street car shall obey the instructions or directions indicated on any sign so erected.

[ 21 ] The actual look of the “No U-Turn” signs erected on Sunforest Drive, as well as its dimensions, layout, description, markings, and graphic illustrations are prescribed and illustrated by the Figure and provisions contained in s. 23 of the Signs Regulation ( Highway Traffic Act ), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615 : No U Turn Sign 23. A no U Turn sign shall, (

a) be rectangular in shape and shall be not less than 60 centimetres in height and not less than 60 centimetres in width; and (

b) bear the markings and have the dimensions as prescribed and illustrated in the following Figure: Text alternative: Illustration of a sign with a “No U-turn” symbol consisting of a curving u-shaped black arrow inside a red circle with an interdictory stroke, on white retro-reflective background with a black border. Indicated size (60 x 60 cm).

This text alternative is provided for convenience only and does not form part of the official law. [ 22 ] Therefore, in order to prove that the defendant has committed the offence set out in s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act of disobeying a traffic sign, the prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s motor vehicle had made a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive, which would have disobeyed the instructions and directions indicated on the three “No U-Turn” signs located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive. (

A) Did The Defendant Make A U-Turn Maneuver on Sunforest Drive? [ 23 ] T he defendant contends that that he did not make a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive, nor did his actions and maneuvers constitute a U-Turn, nor did he disobey the “No U-Turn” signs erected on the eastside of Sunforest Drive for the following grounds: (

a) The defendant’s turns or driving maneuvers on Sunforest Drive had not been comprised of one continuous movement, but had comprised of two distinct and separate turns or driving maneuvers which are both legally permitted; (

b) The first of the defendant’s two distinct turns or driving maneuvers had been to make a left turn while going northbound on

Sunforest Drive into a private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive to commence a three-point turn, which is permitted and is not a “U- Turn”; (

c) The second of the defendant’s two distinct turns or driving maneuvers had been to reverse out of the private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive and go back onto Sunforest Drive to complete the three-point turn, and then to drive forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive, which is permitted and is not a U-Turn; (

d) The defendant’s three-point turn is illustrated and explained in the Official Driver’s Manual issued by the Ministry of Transportation, which demonstrates that the three-point turn that the defendant had made using a private driveway was not illegal nor prohibited by the three “No U-turn” signs; (

e) The defendant’s motor vehicle had completely left the public roadway when it entered the private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive and had gone 15 feet pass the west curb and had been wholly on private property; (

f) And, because the defendant’s motor vehicle had been wholly on private property and because the Highway Traffic Act does not apply on private property, then the Highway Traffic Act does not apply to the actions or maneuvers of the defendant’s motor vehicle when it had been wholly on the private property located at #6 Sunforest Drive.

As such, the defendant’s driving maneuver of reversing back onto Sunforest Drive from the private driveway would be a new driving maneuver that is separate and distinct from any of the turns or driving maneuvers that had been made by the defendant’s motor vehicle before it had been wholly on private property. Therefore, there had been two separate and distinct turns or driving maneuvers made by the defendant’s motor vehicle, in which neither of them would be “U-Turns”; (

g) As a result, the defendant’s turns or driving maneuvers on Sunforest Drive do not constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver since they had not been completed in one continuous and single movement wholly on a public roadway; (

h) And, that if the municipality did not want him to make a left turn into a private driveway on the westside of Sunforest Drive for the purpose of making a three-point turn, which is not an illegal turn or driving maneuver, then the municipality should have erected and posted a “No Left-Turn” traffic sign; and (

i) The defendant’s left turn into a private driveway, as a turn or driving maneuver, is no different or no less safe than the left-turn maneuver that a motorist would make from the parking lot of the school located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive, just north of Bovaird Drive, in order for that motorist exiting from the school parking lot to go southbound on Sunforest Drive.

(1) Is There A Definition In The Highway Traffic Act Of What A “U-Turn” Maneuver Entails? [ 24 ] Deciding whether the particular turns or driving maneuvers, which had been made by the defendant’s motor vehicle to facilitate going southbound on Sunforest Drive after it had been originally travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive, in the circumstances, would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act , is not a simple determination, since there is no definition of what a U-Turn maneuver entails that has been provided in the

definitions

section contained in s. 1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act or that has been provided in any other part of that Act. Moreover, the only provision that is contained in the Highway Traffic Act which actually provides a description of what a U-Turn is equated to is found in s. 143 . In s. 143, a "U-Turn" is described or equated to a driving maneuver upon a highway in which the driver or operator of a vehicle “ turn[s] the vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction ” [ emphasis is mine below ]: U-turns prohibited 143. No driver or operator of a vehicle upon a highway shall turn the vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction when, (

a) upon a curve where traffic approaching the vehicle from either direction cannot be seen by the driver of the vehicle within a distance

of 150 metres; (

b) on a railway crossing or within 30 metres of a railway crossing; (

c) upon an approach to or near the crest of a grade where the vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of another vehicle approaching from either direction within 150 metres; or (

d) within 150 metres of a bridge, viaduct or tunnel where the driver’s view is obstructed within such distance. R.S.O. 1990, c.

H.8, s. 143 . [ 25 ] But more importantly, nowhere in the Highway Traffic Act does it indicate that a U-Turn maneuver has to be completed in one continuous forward movement or whether it could be completed in several turns or maneuvers that includes stops and reversals of the motor vehicle, nor does it specify that the U-Turn maneuver has to be completed wholly on the travelled portion of public roadway or whether a turn or a set of driving maneuvers would still be considered to be a U-turn maneuver if it is completed partly using private property or the non-travelled portion of the public roadway. [ 26 ] Furthermore, the actual offence of making a “prohibited U-Turn” prescribed in s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act is limited in scope and application, since it only refers to four special situations where making a U-Turn on a highway is illegal.

Section 143, however, does not refer to the situation when a “U-Turn” maneuver is prohibited by a posted “No-U-Turn” traffic sign. [ 27 ] In any event, the defendant is not charged with committing the offence of making a prohibited U-Turn under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act , but is charged with disobeying a traffic sign under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act , which happens to be a “No U-Turn” sign. [ 28 ] Consequently, because the defendant is charged with committing the “disobey sign” offence under s. 182(2) , the situations in which making a turn or driving maneuver that would be in disobedience of the “No U-Turn” signs would encompass more circumstances than just the 4 special situations set out in s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act . (

a) Is there a definition for the expression “U-Turn” in the Regulations enacted under the Highway Traffic Act ? [ 29 ] Similarly, there is also no definition, list of circumstances, or list of criterion for the type of turns or driving maneuvers that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver contained or provided under s. 23 of the Signs Regulation ( Highway Traffic Act ), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615 , which is the statutory provision that sets out the dimensions, layout, description, markings, and the graphical illustration of the prohibited turn or maneuver for the “No U-Turn” traffic sign.

(2) Should The Types Of Turns Or Driving Maneuvers And The Types Of Circumstances That Would Constitute A “U-Turn” Be Interpreted Broadly So As To Include A Combination Of A Left Turn, A Three-Point Turn Which Comprise Of Stops And Reversal Maneuvers, And The Use Of A Driveway? [ 30 ] To determine if the defendant’s motor vehicle had made a U-Turn within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act in contravention of the three “No U-Turn” signs that prohibit U-Turn maneuvers on Sunforest Drive, an appropriate test has to be adopted for making such a determination, since the Highway Traffic Act does not specifically define or expressly provide for what types of turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances such turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a U-Turn maneuver.

Adopting the appropriate legal test for determining whether a particular turn or driving maneuver or set of circumstances in which particular turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a “U-Turn” maneuver is critical for deciding if the prosecution has proven that the defendant has committed the “disobey sign” offence under s. 182(2) , considering that the specific type of turns or driving maneuvers that the defendant’s motor vehicle had engaged in for the purpose of going in the opposite direction on Sunforest Drive were not in the circumstances accomplished in one continuous forward movement nor wholly on Sunforest Drive.

(

a) Public Welfare Legislation Is To Be Generously Interpreted In A Manner That Is In Keeping With The Purposes AndObjectives Of The Legislative Scheme. [31] In Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City) (2002), (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 37 (O.C.A.), at para. 16,Sharpe J.A. had not only reinforced the notion that narrow or technical

interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainmentof the legislature's public welfare objectives were to be avoided, but that he had also emphasized that the generous approach to be usedfor the

interpretation of public welfare statutes does not, however, call for a limitless

interpretation of their provisions [emphasis is minebelow]: The OHSA is a remedial public welfare statute intended to guarantee a minimum level of protection for the health and safety of workers.When interpreting legislation of this kind, it is important to bear in mind certain guiding principles. Protective legislation designed topromote public health and safety is to be generously interpreted in a manner that is in keeping with the purpose and objectives of thelegislative scheme. Narrow or technical

interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's publicwelfare objectives are to be avoided. [32] Similarly, in Blue Mountain Resorts Ltd. v. Bok, 2013 ONCA 75 , [2013] O.J. No. 520, the Court of Appeal forOntario, at paras. 24, 26, and 27, held that interpreting legislation broadly to accord with the purpose of the legislation does not on theother hand call for a limitless

interpretation of their provisions, which could extend the reach of the legislation far beyond what wasintended by the legislature [emphasis is mine below]: Public welfare legislation is often drafted in very broad, general terms, precisely because it is remedial and designed to promote publicsafety and to prevent harm in a wide variety of circumstances. For that reason, such legislation is to be interpreted liberally in a mannerthat will give effect to its broad purpose and objective: R. v. Timminco Ltd. (2001), (ON CA), 54 O.R. (3d) 21 (C.A.),at para. 22. … This generous approach to the

interpretation of public welfare statutes does not call for a limitless

interpretation of their provisions,however. One of the problems with what is otherwise an understandable approach to the

interpretation of public welfare legislation is that broadlanguage, taken at face value, can sometimes lead to the adoption of overly broad

definitions. This can extend the reach of thelegislation far beyond what was intended by the legislature and afford the regulating ministry a greatly expanded mandate far beyondwhat is needed to give effect to the purposes of the legislation. [33] Equally, the notion that legislation containing broad language may be given a restrictive

interpretation in order to avoid absurdityin particular circumstances has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as a principle of statutory

interpretation: Ontario v.Canadian Pacific Ltd., (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, at pp. 1081-82; and Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, at para. 109, per Iacobucci J. [34] But more importantly, interpreting a statutory provision for a precise meaning does not simply require looking at the plain orliteral meaning of each individual word within the statutory provision in isolation.

As the Supreme Court held in Rizzo & Rizzo ShoesLtd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at pp. 40-41, courts should use the modern principled approach instead of theplain meaning approach, when they are required to interpret or construe the meaning of a particular statutory provision, which requiresthat the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the schemeof the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislators who enacted the statutory provision [emphasis is mine below]: Although much has been written about the

interpretation of legislation (see, e.g. Ruth Sullivan, Statutory

Interpretation (1997); RuthSullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter "Construction of Statutes"); Pierre-André Côté, TheInterpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates theapproach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory

interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation

alone. At p. 87 he states: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammaticaland ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. [35] Moreover, s. 64 of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, a statute that governs the

interpretation of statutes andregulations enacted by the Ontario Legislature, expressly states that a fair, large, and liberal

interpretation of Ontario statutes should bemade to best ensure the attainment of the object of a statute: Rule Of Liberal

Interpretation 64(1)

An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal

interpretation as best ensures theattainment of its objects. Same (2) Subsection (1) also applies to a regulation, in the context of the Act under which it is made and to the extent that the regulation isconsistent with that Act. [36] Furthermore, in her textbook, Statutory

Interpretation (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law Inc., 1997), at pp. 54, 134, and 137,Professor Ruth Sullivan emphasized that interpreters of legislative text must identify and take into account the purpose of legislation andby analyzing the words to be interpreted in context, and that modern legislation is also written in a form that lends itself to purposiveanalysis [emphasis is mine below]: The meaning of a legislative text is determined by analysing the words to be interpreted in context.

Words are analysed in theirimmediate context by focusing on the specific provision in which the words appear and attempting to understand the reasons why thelegislature has chosen this combination of words, this structure, this punctuation, and so on. Words are also analysed in larger contextsby comparing the wording of the provision to be interpreted with the wording of provisions elsewhere in the same or other Acts and byconsidering the role of the provision in the scheme to which it belongs. … To achieve a sound

interpretation of a legislative text, interpreters must identify and take into account the purpose of legislation.This includes the purpose of the provision to be interpreted as well as larger units - parts, divisions, and the Act as a whole. Onceidentified, the purpose is relied on to help establish the meaning of the text. It is used as a standard against which proposedinterpretations are tested: an

interpretation that promotes the purpose is preferred over one that does not, while

interpretations thatwould tend to defeat the purpose are avoided. [37] In addition, the principles to follow for adopting the proper

interpretation or construction of public welfare legislation have beenoutlined by Sharpe J.A. for the Court of Appeal in Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), (ON CA),[2002] O.J.

No. 283, at paras. 16 to 20, which include generously interpreting protective legislation designed to promote public healthand safety in a manner that is in keeping with the purposes and objectives of the legislative scheme; that narrow or technicalinterpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's public welfare objectives are to be avoided; tointerpret a legislative provision in its total context; to consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislativemeaning; that the

interpretation of the statutory provision should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflectthe legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and just meaning; and that penal legislation, even of the public welfare variety, mustalso be interpreted in a manner consistent with the procedural rights of the accused. Finally, Sharpe J.A. held that a balance must bestruck to arrive at an

interpretation that promotes the larger objects of the legislation and at the same time respects the procedural rightsof the accused [emphasis is mine below]: The OHSA is a remedial public welfare statute intended to guarantee a minimum level of protection for the health and safety of workers.

When interpreting legislation of this kind, it is important to bear in mind certain guiding principles. Protective legislation designed topromote public health and safety is to be generously interpreted in a manner that is in keeping with the purposes and objectives of thelegislative scheme. Narrow or technical

interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's publicwelfare objectives are to be avoided. This principle has been recognized and applied in several recent decisions of this court. In R. v. Timminco Ltd. (2001), (ON CA), 54 O.R. (3d) 21 (C.A.) at 27, Osborne A.C.J.O. stated: The Occupational Health and Safety Act is a public welfare statute. The broad purpose of the statute is to maintain and promote areasonable level of protection for the health and safety of workers in and about their workplace. It should be interpreted in a mannerconsistent with its broad purpose.

Laskin J.A. adopted the same principles when interpreting the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 84.1 dealing with the hazardof "flying truck wheels" in Ontario (Minister of Transport) v. Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd. (2000), (ON CA), 47O.R. (3d) 171 at 174: The modern approach to statutory

interpretation calls on the court to interpret a legislative provision in its total context. The courtshould consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. The court's

interpretation shouldcomply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflect the legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and justmeaning [Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994), at p. 131.] The Supreme Court hasrepeatedly affirmed this approach to statutory

interpretation, most recently in R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688at p. 704, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385, where Cory and Iacobucci JJ. wrote: As this Court has frequently stated, the proper construction of a statutory provision flows from reading the words of the provision intheir grammatical and ordinary sense and in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute as a whole, the purpose ofthe statute, and the intention of Parliament.

The purpose of the statute and the intention of Parliament, in particular, are to bedetermined on the basis of intrinsic and admissible extrinsic sources regarding the Act's legislative history and the context of itsenactment ... In Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board) v. Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. (2000), (ON CA), 51 O.R.(3d) 83 at p. 87, Rosenberg J.A. adopted a similar approach when interpreting the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O.1997, c. 16, Sched. A: The starting point for the

interpretation of the statutory provisions involved in this appeal is s. 10 of the

Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990,c. I.11. 10. Every Act shall be deemed to be remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything that the Legislaturedeems to be for the public good or to prevent or punish the doing of any thing that it deems to be contrary to the public good, and shallaccordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and

interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Actaccording to its true intent, meaning and spirit. (Emphasis added) By its terms, s. 10 applies to penal statutes. Iacobucci J. considered the application of s. 10 in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193. He held that s. 10 directs the court to not only consider the plain meaning of thespecific provisions in question, but the scheme of the Act as a whole, its object and the intention of the legislature.

It remains true, of course, that penal legislation, even of the public welfare variety, must also be interpreted in a manner consistent withthe procedural rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to have full and fair notice of the charges and to make full answer anddefense to those charges. In the end, a balance must be struck to arrive at an

interpretation that promotes the larger objects of thelegislation and at the same time respects the procedural rights of the accused. (

b) What Is The Legislative Goal Of The Highway Traffic Act?

[38] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has held at para. 38 in R. v. Plummer, (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 4530(O.C.A.), that the scheme of the Highway Traffic Act has many purposes, but that it is first and foremost a collection of duties andobligations imposed on drivers in relation to the operation of vehicles, especially motor vehicles, to ensure the safety of motorists andothers [emphasis is mine below]: The Act has many purposes.

It is first and foremost a collection of duties and obligations imposed on drivers in relation to operation ofvehicles, especially motor vehicles, to ensure the safety of motorists and others. See Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., (ONCA), [1926] 3 D.L.R. 254 (Ont. C.A.).

It also establishes a licensing scheme and gives to police officers (and other officers appointed forthe purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act) powers to enforce this bundle of regulations, including the licensing scheme.However, the Act is only quasi-criminal legislation and strict limits have been placed on the powers of police and others to enforce thelegislated duties and obligations by means more normally associated with criminal legislation. [39] In addition, in Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., (ON CA), [1926] O.J. No. 4 (Ont. Supreme Ct. (App.

Div.)), at para.9, Hodgins J.A. held that the Highway Traffic Act deals with the operation of motor and other vehicles on a highway when driving, aswell as protecting people from dangers to which they are exposed from the neglect of statutory provisions regarding motors and othervehicles when on the highway itself, and their equipment, and from the perils caused thereon by the operation of moving vehicles: The Act clearly deals with the operation of motor and other vehicles on a highway, as is evident from the frequent use of the expressions"on a highway," "when driving," as well as from the fact that the various sections are directed to protecting people from dangers towhich they are exposed from the neglect of statutory provisions regarding motors and other vehicles when on the highway itself, andtheir equipment, and from the perils caused thereon by the operation of moving vehicles. (

c) U-Turns Are Naturally Unsafe Driving Maneuvers [40] The Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Dockman, [1996] O.J. No. 4548, at para. 7, has recognized that a U-Turn maneuver, asa driving maneuver, is a naturally unsafe or imprudent turn, even though the actual unsafeness of the particular turn or maneuver inquestion is not an element of the offence that the prosecution is required to prove for a charge of making a prohibited U-Turn under s.143 of the Highway Traffic Act [emphasis is mine below]: It is conceded by the Crown that both the trial and appellate courts below misinterpreted s. 143(

c) of the Highway Traffic Act by restingliability on the unsafe nature of the turn.

Section 143(

c) makes it an offence to make a U-turn near the crest of a grade without the driverbeing able to see oncoming vehicles for 150 metres. The unsafe or imprudent nature of the turn is not an element of the offence.Accordingly, the trial court failed to give proper effect to the contradicted evidence that the appellant had a sight line of more than 150metres when he made his turn. As result, the learned Justice of the Peace failed to appreciate correctly the nature of the offence.

Thelearned appeal judge was also in error in upholding the conviction. [41] Therefore, motorists who make U-turns on a public roadway or highway are making inherently unsafe turns or drivingmaneuvers, especially when there are other motor vehicles or pedestrians around because the motorist making that U-Turn maneuveraffects motor vehicles travelling in two opposite directions and can be especially dangerous to other motorists travelling in the oppositedirection who would not expect a motor vehicle to do such a maneuver across their path at an intersection or at mid-block, as well ascreating unsafe risk to pedestrians crossing the street at an intersection.

(3) In Promoting The Purposes And Goals Of The Highway Traffic Act And In Protecting The Procedural Rights Of AnAccused What Criteria Should Be Used To Decide What Type Of Turn Or Driving Maneuvers And In What CircumstancesSuch Turns Or Driving Maneuvers Would Constitute A “U-Turn” Maneuver Within The Meaning Of The Highway TrafficAct? [42] To promote the purposes or objectives of the Highway Traffic Act in reducing the risk of accidents, ensuring the safe use ofpublic roads, and to protect motorists and pedestrians on public roads, the type of turns or driving maneuvers and circumstances thatwould constitute a prohibited “U-Turn” within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act must be interpreted broadly, but at the same timethat

interpretation must be balanced with the procedural rights of the accused: Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 283 (O.C.A.). As such, motorists should have full and fair notice of what turns or driving

maneuvers and in what circumstances such turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a “U-Turn” within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act . (

a) Does A Prohibited U-Turn Maneuver Within The Meaning Of The Highway Traffic Act Have To Be Accomplished In One Continuous Movement Or Can It Be Accomplished By More Than One Turn Or Driving Maneuver? [ 43 ] In People v. McGuire (1978), 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 145 Cal.

Rptr. 514, the Court of Appeals for the State of California had to consider, on an appeal of a conviction, the question of whether a motorist who makes a turn or driving maneuver in order to complete a turn to go in the opposite direction on a public roadway, by driving into a driveway and then reversing back onto the roadway to complete that opposite-direction turn or driving maneuver, had made a U-Turn, which had been prohibited in that area of the highway. The convicted motorist at trial had been found guilty of making a prohibited U-Turn under

section 22102 of the California Vehicle Code , which had stated [ emphasis is mine below ]: 22102. No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with

Section 21651 .

This turning movement shall be made as close as practicable to the extreme left-hand edge of the lanes moving in the driver's direction of travel immediately prior to the initiation of the turning movement, when more than one lane in the direction of travel is present. [ 44 ] The California Vehicle Code , by virtue of sections 22103, 22104, and 22105 also made it illegal to make a U-Turn in specified situations, such as when any other vehicle is approaching from either direction within 200 feet, except at an intersection controlled by a traffic control device; when in front of the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station or not to use the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station for the purpose of turning a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction; and upon any highway where the driver does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon : 22103.

No person in a residence district shall make a U-turn when any other vehicle is approaching from either direction within 200 feet, except at an intersection when the approaching vehicle is controlled by an official traffic control device. 22104. No person shall make a U-turn in front of the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station. No person shall use the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station for the purpose of turning a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction. 22105.

No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon. [ 45 ] But more importantly, under s. 665.5 of the California Vehicle Code , a “U-Turn” had been defined as “the turning of a vehicle upon a highway so as to proceed in the opposite direction whether accomplished by one continuous movement or not": 665.5.

A U-turn is the turning of a vehicle upon a highway so as to proceed in the opposite direction whether accomplished by one continuous movement or not. [ 46 ] However, in arriving at their decision that a motor vehicle, which makes a turn into a driveway for the purpose of turning around to go in the opposite direction, was not a “U-Turn” or a driving maneuver specifically prohibited by the statutory provision under which the convicted motorist had been charged and convicted, the California Court Of Appeals in People v.

McGuire had taken a narrow and strict construction approach to interpreting what constitutes a U-Turn by relying precisely on the “plain meaning” or “literal meaning” of the wording in that statutory provision. The California Court Of Appeals had concluded that the turns and driving maneuvers used and made by the convicted motorist did not constitute a U-Turn maneuver because

section 22102 of the California Vehicle Code , which prohibited the making of a U-Turn in a business district unless at an intersection or on a divided highway at a properly designated opening, had not specifically and expressly prohibited the turn or driving maneuver in which a motor vehicle would use a driveway to accomplish turning around so as to proceed in the opposite direction on a highway, which the convicted motorist had done so by turning into a driveway and then reversing to complete a three-point turn (as that driving maneuver is commonly known). Moreover, the

California Court Of Appeals had also concluded that if the California Legislature had desired or intended to prohibit that particular type of turn or driving maneuver using a driveway, it could have easily done so, as it had done in the second sentence of

section 22104 of the California Vehicle Code , which had clearly stated that a motorist was prohibited from using “ the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station for the purpose of turning a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction” [ emphasis is mine below ]: … defendant made an illegal U-turn in violation of Vehicle Code

section 22102. Defendant, southbound within a business district, made a left turn, crossed northbound lanes, entered into a driveway on the easterly side of the street, backed up to head northward, then proceeded in a northerly direction and parked at the east curb. … We cannot fairly read

section 22102, involved here, to include the use of a driveway, since that section's reference to a "U-turn" was inserted at the same time and by the same 1970 statute (ch. 620, § 2). A myriad of cases instructs us that statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together and harmonized if possible (e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 437 , 442 [ 62 Cal. Rptr. 429 , 432 P.2d 31 ]). "Both Acts were passed upon the same day and relate to the same subject matter. They are, therefore, according to a well settled rule of

interpretation, to be read together, as if parts of the same Act...." (People v. Jackson (1866) 30 Cal. 427, 430.) [1b] In the light of these guidelines, we construe

section 22102 not to prohibit a turn accomplished by the use of a driveway, such as occurred here Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 652 , in stating that the use of a driveway did not constitute a "U-turn" said "Neither the making of a left turn into a private driveway nor the backing out of a driveway is in itself prohibited, and the [then]

section does not specify that the combination of the two, when the driver's real purpose is to proceed in the opposite direction, must be treated as a single, complete turn coming within the prohibition of the statute ." (Id., at p. 656.) The People urge that the language of

section 665.5 which defines a U-turn as the turning of a vehicle upon a highway so as to proceed in the opposite direction "whether accomplished by one continuous movement or not" was designed to meet the holding of Butigan. Clearly, as the People suggest, one turning a vehicle on a narrow street, so as to go in the other direction, and having to make a series of backings and fillings to accomplish that result, would have made a U-turn within the present definition.

But in urging, without citation of other authority, that the definition likewise extends to turns which involve the use of driveways, the People fail to take into account the statutory history which we have recited here. If the Legislature desires to prohibit the type of turn which defendant made in this case it can easily do so, without ambiguity, as it has done in the second sentence of

section 22104. [ 47 ] And, in Butigan v.

Yellow Cab Co. (1958), 49 Cal. 2d 652, 656, 320 P.2d 500 , the Supreme Court of California had to also consider whether a motorist who commences to make a left turn into a driveway and then reverses back out for the purpose of making a “three-point turn” (as that driving maneuver is commonly known as), had contravened the “No U-Turn” prohibition of s. 541 of the California Vehicle Code (as it was then), which stated that “ No vehicle in a business district shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction, except at an intersection.” In interpreting whether the intended maneuver of the motorist had contravened the “No U-Turn” prohibition, the majority of the Supreme Court of California had interpreted s. 541 of the Vehicle Code using the “plain meaning” of its wording that it did not, since the provision itself did not specifically prohibit the turning movements which the motorist had been attempting to execute of making a left turn into a driveway and then the backing out of a driveway, nor did s. 541 specify that the combination of those two turning movements must be treated as a single, complete turn when the driver's real purpose for making those two turning movements had been for turning around to proceed in the opposite direction [ emphasis is mine below ]: The first question is whether the evidence shows as a matter of law that the collision was caused by the negligence of any of the defendants.

Plaintiff contends that the manner in which Bland turned violated sections 541 and 544 of the Vehicle Code. [1]

Section 541, insofar as applicable, reads: "(

a) No vehicle in a business district shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction, except at an intersection." This provision, which prohibits "U" turns, does not prohibit the movements which Bland testified he was attempting to execute. Neither the making of a left turn into a private driveway nor the backing out of a driveway is in itself prohibited, and the

section does not specify that the combination of the two, when the driver's real purpose is to proceed in the opposite direction, must be treated as a single, complete turn coming within the prohibition of the statute . [2]

Section 544 permits the making of a turn only when it can be made with reasonable safety and after giving an appropriate signal. This provision does not require the driver to know that a turn can be made with safety but only that he must exercise reasonable care, and whether such care has been exercised is normally a question of fact. (Washam v. Peerless Automatic etc. Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 174, 177 [ 113 P.2d 724 ]; Spear v.

Leuenberger, 44 Cal.App.2d 236, 247- 248 [ 112 P.2d 43 ].) [ 48 ] But, unlike the California Vehicle Code , Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act does not contain an actual definition for the driving maneuver commonly known as a “U-Turn”, while the California Vehicle Code did have a definition for the “U-Turn” maneuver. Furthermore, the definition of a “U-Turn” in the California Vehicle Code clearly stated that for a driving maneuver to constitute a U-Turn it did not have to be accomplished in one continuous movement while the Ontario Highway Traffic Act is silent in that respect.

Moreover, in reference to the prohibited U-Turn offence for the four special situations listed under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act , there was no expressed condition that the U-Turn maneuver had to be completed on a highway in one continuous movement or whether it could be comprised of more than one turn or driving maneuver. [ 49 ] On the other hand, the type of turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances that would constitute a ”U-Turn” maneuver when prohibited had been interpreted by the English courts much more purposively and broadly than the

interpretation that had been used by the California Court of Appeals. In a similar situation to the case at bar, where a motorist had been charged and convicted in London, England with contravening a posted “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign after completing a three-point turn to proceed in the opposite direction on a public roadway, Justice Keyser of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor , [2014] E.W.H.C. 560 (H.C. of Engl. And Wales (Q.B. Div. (Admin.

Ct.)) , had to also consider the same legal arguments as that which had been brought by the defendant, Michael Robinson, in the case at bar.

And, like Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act , the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (U.K.),1984, c. 27, the legislation governing the prohibited U- Turn in England, Scotland, and Wales, also did not specifically define the expression “U-Turn”, nor did it specify whether a prohibited U-Turn maneuver had to be made in one continuous movement or whether it could be made in several turns or driving maneuvers. [ 50 ] The convicted motorist in that English case of R. (on the application of Alexander) v.

The Parking Adjudicator & Anor had argued that to constitute a U-Turn the driving maneuver had to be accomplished in one continuous movement without stops or reversals; that the convicted motorist had not made a U-Turn but instead had made a three-point turn, which is not an illegal maneuver; and that the legislator’s intention that a U-Turn had to be accomplished in one single and continuous forward movement is demonstrated by the pictorial description of the prohibited turn shown on the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign, which depicts what a prohibited U- Turn would look like in form -- which would not include nor prohibit a three-point turn as the pictorial description had only depicted a continuous upside-down curved “U” shape for that prohibited turn. [ 51 ] After considering the convicted motorist’s arguments brought at the appeal, Justice Keyser at para. 49 in R. (on the application of Alexander) v.

The Parking Adjudicator & Anor , rejected all of the convicted motorist’s arguments.

First of all, Justice Keyser rejected the argument that making a right turn to do a legal three-point turn was not a U-Turn nor prohibited by the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign. (It is important to remember that motorists in England drive on the left side of a divided highway unlike in Canada where motorists drive on the right side of a divided highway, so that motorists in England would make a right turn into a driveway to make a three-point turn or a right turn to make a U-Turn.) In finding that the three-point turn made by the convicted motorist would constitute a U-Turn that is prohibited by the posted traffic sign, Justice Keyser had essentially used a purposive approach in making that determination, as well as applying the “mischief rule” of statutory

interpretation, which involves determining the mischief and defect that the statute is set out to remedy and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy [1] .

Second, Justice Keyser rejected the convicted motorist’s argument that a U-Turn had to be accomplished in one single and continuous forward movement, reasoning that there was no legitimate reason for finding that the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign had only prohibited U-Turn maneuvers that are brought about by one single and continuous forward movement, but not for finding that the traffic sign had prohibited three-point turns that are the result of a sequence of forward and backward movements.

In addition, Justice Keyser had concluded that the prohibition on the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign had been concerned with prohibiting a motor vehicle from making a turn or driving maneuver that would result in the motor vehicle changing its original direction of travel so as to go in the opposite direction, such that it would be practical and desirable to conclude that sign 614 (the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign) had been intended to apply to both paradigmatic U-Turns and to three-point turns.

And thirdly, Justice Keyser had rejected the convicted motorist’s argument that the U-shaped black directional line depicting the prohibited turn on the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign had been evidence of the legislators’ intent that a U-Turn had to be made in one single and continuous forward movement, since accepting that argument, Justice Keyser had reasoned, would have taken pictorial literalism to an absurd length [ emphasis is mine below ]: 49.

Second, it can hardly be supposed that, although traffic authorities might have reasons for prohibiting paradigmatic U-turns, they could have no reasons for prohibiting 3-point turns . On the contrary: the principal point of objection is the oppositional change of direction of the vehicle, and to the extent that it matters how that change is brought about it is likely to be preferable that it be achieved in a single forward movement rather than in a sequence of forward and backward movements . There is immediate attraction in the supposition that sign 614 is intended to apply to both kinds of manoeuvre .

The claimant’s reliance on the pictorial nature of traffic signs and on the single forward movement of the black directional line on sign 614 seems to me to take pictorial literalism to an absurd length . (

i) Can a “three-point turn” maneuver constitute a U-Turn within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act ? [ 52 ] The defendant argues that he did not make a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive because the turn or driving maneuver that he did make had been a “three-point turn”, which he submits is a legal driving maneuver that is recognized, illustrated, and explained in the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook. [ 53 ] However, like a U-Turn maneuver, a three-point turn maneuver is also not specifically defined in Ontario’s Highway Traffic

Act . And even though the expression “U-Turn” is used in the heading for s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act , “three-point turns” are not even mentioned or appear as a term or name for a driving maneuver in the Highway Traffic Act .

Furthermore, even though the terms “U-Turn” and “three-point turn”, as driving maneuvers, have a common meaning to motorists, the driving maneuver commonly known as a “three-point turn” does not in fact have any legal meaning within the Highway Traffic Act . [ 54 ] But more important, the Ministry of Transportation states that the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook is only a guide and that legal obligations of motorists are to be found in the Highway Traffic Act or in its Regulations (see Ontario Ontario.ca: The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook, online: Government of Ontario website << https://www.ontario.ca/document/official-mto-drivers-handbook >>) [ emphasis is mine below ]: This handbook gives new drivers the basic information they need about learning to drive in Ontario: the rules of the road, safe driving practices and how to get a licence to drive a car, van or small truck.

The ministry recommends that all drivers would benefit from taking an advanced course in driver training. As you read, remember that this handbook is only a guide . For official descriptions of the laws, look in the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario and its Regulations . Information on how to get licences to drive other types of vehicles is available in Part Two of this handbook, the Official MTO Motorcycle Handbook, the Official MTO Truck Handbook, the Official MTO Bus Handbook and the Official MTO Air Brake Handbook. [ 55 ] Also, in the English case of R. (on the application of Alexander) v.

The Parking Adjudicator & Anor , Justice Keyser had to decide whether both the municipal order that had prohibited motorists from making a turning movement to go in the opposite direction, commonly known as a U-Turn”, on a specific public roadway in the City of London and the “No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic” sign that had been posted, had made it unlawful for a motorist to make a three-point turn in that area where U-Turn maneuvers are prohibited.

At paras. 4, 21, and 37, Justice Keyser noted that neither the municipal order governing the prohibition of U-Turn maneuvers being made at that particular location of the public roadway, which had been passed by the municipal council under the power granted to them under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, nor the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 itself, had actually used the expression “U-Turn” to describe the prohibited turn or driving maneuver and had only described it as “ vehicles turning so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which they were proceeding ”.

Justice Keyser also noted that the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 had not differentiated between the various turns or driving maneuvers that could be used to facilitate a motor vehicle going in the opposite direction on a public roadway or between ones involving reversing movements [ emphasis is mine below ]: 4. The issue in the case is a point of law: whether the combination of

Article 3 of the Hammersmith and Fulham (Gliddon Road) (Banned U Turn) Order 2011 ("the Order") and the familiar "No U-turn" traffic sign made unlawful the manoeuvre performed by the claimant, which was what is generally known as a 3-point turn . … 6. The Order was made on 3 August 2011 under powers conferred by the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 ("the 1984 Act") and came into effect on 15 August 2011.

Article 3 of the Order reads as follows: "No person causing or permitting any vehicle to proceed in those lengths of Edith Road or Gliddon Road that lie between the common boundary of Nos. 21 and 23 Edith Road and the northern kerb-line of Talgarth Road shall cause or permit that vehicle to turn at any point in those lengths of roads so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which it was proceeding." 8. Article 2 (2) of the Order provided: "The reference in

Article 3 of this Order to lengths of Edith Road or Gliddon Road shall be construed as a reference to the whole width of those lengths of roads, including the carriageway, the footway and the footway crossovers leading to or from premises adjacent to those lengths of road." …

21. As the traffic authority for a road in Greater London, the Council has power under section 6(1) of the 1984 Act to make an order for controlling or regulating vehicular and other traffic. The purposes for which such orders may be made are set out in

Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act; paragraph 4 specifies the following such purpose: "For prescribing the places where vehicles, or vehicles of any class, may not turn so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which they were proceeding, or where they may only so turn under conditions prescribed by the order ." The Order in the present case was made pursuant to these powers and reflects the terms of paragraph 4.

Schedule 1 does not distinguish between different versions of the turn mentioned in paragraph 4; the paragraph relates to all such turns, both those that do and those that do not involve a reversing movement, and no other paragraph makes provision in that regard . … 37.

The 1984 Act does not use the expression “U-turn” but instead refers to vehicles turning so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which they were proceeding ; see paragraph 21 above. [ 56 ] Justice Keyser also noted at para. 38 that the 2002 Regulations and the 2002 Directions governing the use of the “No U-turns For Vehicular Traffic” sign, designated as sign 614, also did not provide for a definition for a “U-Turn” nor did they specify the kind of turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances that would be prohibited by that particular traffic sign: 38.

The 2002 Regulations and the 2002 Directions provide for the use of sign 614, “No U-turns for vehicular traffic”, but they neither specify the prohibitions that can be shown by its use nor contain a definition of “U-turns”; see paragraphs 31 to 35 above. (

A) the purpose of a “three-point turn” is for a motor vehicle to turn around to go back in the opposite direction [ 57 ] Although the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook is only a guide and has no legal status, it is noteworthy that the Driver’s Handbook, which the defendant relies on for arguing that three-point turns are legal driving maneuvers recognized by the Ministry of Transportation, does nevertheless expressly state that “U-Turns” and “Three-Point Turns” are different methods of turning a motor vehicle around to travel back in the opposite direction.

The Driver’s Handbook also advises a motorist not to make the three-point turns, like it does for a U-Turn maneuver, in such situations as in curves or on hills on a highway where visibility in those areas may not be ideal for other motorists to see those dangerous turns or driving maneuvers being made (see Ontario.ca: The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook, online: Government of Ontario website << https://www.ontario.ca/document/official-mto-drivers-handbook/changing-directions#section-11 >> [ emphasis is mine below ]: • Methods of turning your vehicle around to travel back in the opposite direction ( U-turns, three-point turns ) U-turn Before you make a U-turn, check to make sure there is no sign saying not to .

To make a U-turn safely, you must be able to see well in both directions. It is illegal to make a U-turn on a curve in the road, on or near

a railway crossing or hilltop, or near a bridge or tunnel that blocks your view. Never make a U-turn unless you can see at least 150 metres in both directions . To make a U-turn, signal for a right turn, check your mirror and over your shoulder and pull over to the right side of the road. Stop. Signal a left turn and when traffic is clear in both directions, move forward and turn quickly and sharply into the opposite lane.

Check for traffic as you turn. … A three-point turn is a method of turning a vehicle around in a narrow space by moving forward, backward, and forward again in a sequence of arcs. … Three-point Turn On narrow roads you need to make a three-point turn to change directions . As shown in Diagram 2-44, a three-point turn starts from the far right side of the road. Make sure you do not make a three-point turn on a curve in the road, on or near a railway crossing or hilltop, or near a bridge or tunnel that blocks your view . Signal for a left turn.

When the way is clear in both directions, move forward, turning the steering wheel sharply left towards the curb on the far side of the road. When you have reached the left side of the road, stop. Shift the vehicle into reverse. Signal a right turn. After checking that the way is still clear, turn the steering wheel sharply to the right, while backing up slowly to the other side of the road. Stop. Shift to forward gear and check traffic. When the way is clear, drive forward.

Diagram 2-44 [ 58 ] Furthermore, in the situation of a narrow roadway, a motorist attempting a turn or driving maneuver in order to go in the opposite direction, may only be able to accomplish this turn around by making stops and reversals on the roadway or to use a driveway to complete a three-point turn, since it may be difficult to complete the driving maneuver for turning a motor vehicle around to go in the opposite direction in one continuous forward movement wholly on that narrow roadway.

Moreover, using a three-point turn to accomplish the purpose of going in the opposite direction on a narrow roadway would have the same outcome as a motor vehicle on a wider roadway making one continuous forward movement wholly on that roadway t

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