2016 NBCA 17, 2016 NBCA 17

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK APPELLANT 63-15-CA PROVINCE DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK APPELANTE - and - - et - ENBRIDGE GAS NEW BRUNSWICK LIMITEDPARTNERSHIP, as represented by its generalpartner, ENBRIDGE GAS NEW BRUNSWICKINC., ENBRIDGE ENERGY DISTRIBUTION INC.and ENBRIDGE INC. RESPONDENTS ENBRIDGE GAS NEW BRUNSWICK LIMITEDPARTNERSHIP, représentée par sa commanditéeENBRIDGE GAZ NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK INC.,ENBRIDGE ENERGY DISTRIBUTION INC. etENBRIDGE INC. INTIMÉES Province of New Brunswick v.

Enbridge Gas NewBrunswick Limited Partnership et al., 2016 NBCA17 Province du Nouveau-Brunswick c.

Enbridge GasNew Brunswick Limited Partnership et autres, 2016NBCA 17 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird CORAM : l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’sBench: June 29, 2015 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de laReine : le 29 juin 2015 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2015 NBQB 136 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2015 NBQB 136 , 2015 NBBR 136 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: November 30, 2015 Judgment rendered: April 1, 2016 Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Green Appel entendu : le 30 novembre 2015 Jugement rendu : le 1 avril 2016 Motifs de jugement: l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Green Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Catherine A. Lahey, Q.C. For the respondents: David Duncan Young Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Catherine A. Lahey, c.r.

Pour les intimées : David Duncan Young THE COURT The appeal is allowed with costs of $5,000 payable to the Province. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli et des dépens de 5 000 $ sont accordés à la Province. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction and Background [ 1 ] This appeal arises as a result of a motion judge’s decision to order disclosure of approximately 800 documents

for which the appellant claimed either solicitor-client privilege or public interest immunity. As background, on April 12, 2012, the respondents (“Enbridge”) initiated legal proceedings against the Province of New Brunswick (the “Province”), alleging a breach of a General Franchise Agreement executed between them in 1999 for the distribution of natural gas in the Province of New Brunswick. [ 2 ] During pre-trial disclosure proceedings, the Province provided Enbridge with an Affidavit of Documents executed by Stephen A. Waycott, an agent of the Crown designated pursuant to the Proceedings Against the Crown Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-18.

Schedule “A” listed 9,686 documents, and

Schedule “B” listed 3,606 documents for which privilege was claimed. Enbridge filed a Notice of Motion seeking a court order requiring disclosure of the documents listed in

Schedule “B” on the basis the claims were improper. In answer, the Province filed an affidavit of Mr. Waycott, setting out additional detail of the basis for the privilege claims. The motion was heard on August 15, 2014, and December 17, 2014. Between those dates, the parties were able to reduce the number of documents in dispute, naming them the “Remaining Documents in Dispute”.

Approximately 800 documents remained in dispute at the time the hearing resumed. [ 3 ] Generically, the documents in question include: (1) “Internal Employee Documents” for which “solicitor- client privilege is claimed on the basis they transmit, comment upon or otherwise reveal the substance of legal advice”; (2) “Solicitor Copied Documents”, for which “solicitor-client privilege is claimed on the basis the solicitor, both in-house, as well as the out-sourced solicitor, is named as a direct addressee of the communication, and the document was created for the ‘direct purpose’ of ‘seeking or obtaining legal advice’”; (3) “Communications through Intermediaries” for which “solicitor-client privilege is asserted on the basis the documents involve communications involving ‘agents’ of the Province of New Brunswick in furtherance of the solicitor-client relationship”; and finally, (4) “Public Interest Immunity Documents”, for which privilege is claimed on the ground that disclosure would interfere with the public interest. [ 4 ] The motion judge concluded the privilege claims were unsupported, and ordered disclosure of the remaining 800 documents.

II. Issues on appeal [ 5 ] The Province of New Brunswick appeals the disclosure order on five grounds. They assert the motion judge committed reversible errors in law when she ordered disclosure of documents for which solicitor-client privilege and public interest immunity was claimed. The five grounds were condensed into four headings in the Province’s written submission. They allege the motion judge erred in concluding that: (

a) the Internal Employee Documents are not subject to privilege and must, therefore, be produced; (

b) the Solicitor-Copied Documents are not subject to privilege and must, therefore, be produced; (

c) the Communications through Intermediaries are not subject to privilege and must, therefore, be produced; and (

d) the Public Interest Immunity Documents are not subject to the public interest immunity and must, therefore, be produced. III. Standard of Review [ 6 ] In Chapelstone Developments Inc., Action Motors Ltd. and Hamilton v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada , 2004 NBCA 96 , 277 N.B.R. (2d) 350 , Robertson J.A., for the Court, finds the standard of review surrounding production or disclosure of documents constitutes pure questions of law, or questions of mixed law and fact. [ 7 ] Enbridge initially submitted the appropriate standard of review was that described in The Beaverbrook

Canadian Foundation v. The Beaverbrook Art Gallery, 2006 NBCA 75, 302 N.B.R. (2d) 161, where Drapeau C.J.N.B., for the Court,describes the standard of review for discretionary orders; however, at the appeal hearing, Enbridge conceded, because the enumeratedgrounds of appeal are pure questions of law, the standard of review is correctness. In my view, this was a wise concession. IV. Analysis A. Solicitor-Client Privilege [8] “Solicitor-client privilege is part of and fundamental to the Canadian legal system”. It is a “fundamental andsubstantive rule of law”: R. v.

McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at para. 17. In that case, Major J., for the Court, explainssolicitor-client communications fall into the category of “class privilege” for which there is “a prima facie presumption of inadmissibility(once it has been established that the relationship fits within the class) unless the party urging admission can show why thecommunications should not be privileged (i.e., why they should be admitted into evidence as an exception to the general rule)” (para. 27quoting from Lamer C.J. in R. v. Gruenke, (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, [1991] S.C.J. No. 80 (QL).

In that decision,Lamer C.J. explained that “[s]uch communications are excluded not because the evidence is not relevant, but rather because, there areoverriding policy reasons to exclude this relevant evidence” (para. 26). [9] In Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd, v.

Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd., 2002 NBCA 41, 251 N.B.R. (2d) 102,Drapeau J.A. (as he then was), for the Court, explains the nature, purpose and rationale for the privilege: The solicitor-client relationship, being fiduciary in nature, obligates solicitors to keep secret all confidential information about thebusiness and affairs of the client obtained in the course of their professional employment. That duty of confidentiality lies at the heart ofthe solicitor-client privilege, which is fundamental to the Canadian legal system (see R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445,at para. 17).

It gives rise, as well, to an ethical obligation, the breach of which may result in disciplinary action. See the ProfessionalConduct Handbook, at p. 9.

Chapter IV of the Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct, entitled "ConfidentialInformation", contains the following rule: The lawyer has a duty to hold in strict confidence all information concerning the business and affairs of the client acquired in the courseof the professional relationship, and should not divulge such information unless disclosure is expressly or impliedly authorized by theclient, required by law or otherwise permitted or required by the Code. [Footnotes omitted] The rationale for that Rule is well known.

Our system of justice functions most effectively when litigants are competently represented. Counsel's competence blossoms when he orshe has been provided a full account of all potentially pertinent facts. The principal inspiration for counsel's education as to the facts isinvariably none other than the client. Unless the client is secure in the knowledge that shared confidences will remain secret, he or she isunlikely to speak freely and candidly and to provide counsel with a complete picture of the dispute's factual background.

As aconsequence, the client's interests may not be represented as fully as they might otherwise be. When that unfortunate situationmaterializes, both the client and the system of justice suffer.

That view is expressed particularly ably by Jackett C.J. in Re Shell CanadaLtd., (FCA), [1975] F.C. 184 (C.A.), at p. 193: ... the protection, civil and criminal, afforded to the individual by our law is dependent upon his having the aid and guidance of thoseskilled in the law untrammelled by any apprehension that the full and frank disclosure by him of all his facts and thoughts to his legaladviser might somehow become available to third persons so as to be used against him. [Footnotes omitted] See, as well, Solosky v. The Queen, (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, per Dickson J. (as he then was), at p. 834, Smith v.

Jones, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, per Cory J., at para. 46, and R. v. McClure, at paras. 31-33. [paras. 43-44] [10] In Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp., 2006 SCC 36, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 189, Binnie J. states the

common law rule for solicitor-client privilege “is an umbrella that covers confidences of differing centrality and importance” and “[t]heprotection of solicitor-client confidences is a matter of high importance” (paras. 34 and 54). In McClure, the privilege was granted theprotection of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in criminal prosecutions. In Maranda v. Richer, 2003 SCC 67, [2003]3 S.C.R. 193, the Supreme Court finds the privilege applies equally to both civil and criminal litigation. The privilege was “elevated” asdiscussed by Dickson J. in Solosky v.

The Queen, (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, [1979] S.C.J. No. 130 (QL), at p. 836, andexpanded by the Supreme Court in Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43(QL), per Lamer J. at p. 893; in Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2004 SCC 31, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809; and Blank v.Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319.

In Descôteaux, Lamer J. observes the privilege can arise even beforethe retainer is established. [11] In McClure, however, Major J. notes the privilege is not absolute; “it will […] yield in certain clearly definedcircumstances, and does not involve a balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis” (para. 35). Cory J. reiterates these principles inSmith v. Jones, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, [1999] S.C.J. No. 15 (QL), and agrees the privilege is not absolute.

Henotes that one such exception is in matters of public safety (paras. 51 and 57). [12] In Pritchard, the Supreme Court extends the privilege to any consultation for legal advice, whether litigation iscontemplated or not, and whether or not there is an expectation of litigation (paras. 28, 32-33). In recent years, the Supreme Court hasadopted an expansive, more purposeful, approach to the privilege (Blank, at para. 26; McClure, at para. 31; and Smith v. Jones, at paras.45-46). [13] In his book, Solicitor-Client Privilege, (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2014), at

Chapter 12, ProfessorAdam M. Dodek of the University of Ottawa observes the same privilege rules apply to government as to the private sector, butacknowledges the unique nature of the Crown as client. This relationship may raise questions, particularly between the substantive ruleof solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege in cases where the protection of the public interest is at stake. The growing tensionbetween the need to protect the public interest, while at the same time maintaining the protections offered by the rule, was also identifiedby Professor Allan C.

Hutchinson in his article, “‘In the Public Interest’ The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers”(2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 (QL).

It is his opinion government agencies should not be permitted to use the rule as a shield wherepublic interests are at stake; however, any erosion of the privilege has, to date, been carefully circumscribed by the Supreme Court.Deborah MacNair, legal counsel for the Department of Justice, Ottawa, in a paper entitled “Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Crown:When is a Privilege a Privilege?” (2003), 82 Can Bar Rev 213, offers an historical case study review of the evolving jurisprudence in thearea of solicitor-client privilege in the public sector.

In her opinion, “[t]he sanctity of the solicitor-client relationship is pitted againstwhat others refer to as the search for truth, but in the glare of the public interest” (p. 215). [14] In-house government counsel serves the public interest; however, his or her client is the executive branch ofgovernment. The solicitor-client relationship is complicated yet again, when independent private sector legal counsel is retained by thegovernment, as it was in this case, to work collaboratively with in-house counsel, to share and exchange documents, ideas, legal adviceand opinions.

Recent decisions concerning solicitor-client privilege in this context include R. v. Campbell, (SCC),[1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, [1999] S.C.J. No. 16 (QL); Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC 44,[2008] 2 S.C.R. 574; Pritchard; and more recently Blank, as previously noted. [15] In Campbell, the Supreme Court finds the scope and nature of the privilege is the same as in the private sector.In Blank, Fish J. concludes solicitor-client privilege protects “full and frank” communications between a lawyer and his or her client andis conceptually distinct from litigation privilege.

He acknowledges litigation privilege terminates when the litigation terminates.Litigation privilege is distinct from solicitor-client privilege, as it ensures the efficiency of the litigation process. Solicitor-clientprivilege, on the other hand, protects the professional relationship, and continues even after the litigation terminates. See Davis v.MacKenzie, 2008 NBCA 85, 338 N.B.R. (2d) 232, at paras. 27-28 per Drapeau C.J.N.B., for the Court. [16] Solicitor-client privilege may involve non-confidential communications between the lawyer, the litigant andthird parties, as stated by this Court. In Lamey v.

Rice (2000), (NB CA), 227 N.B.R. (2d) 295, [2000] N.B.J. No. 271(QL), Larlee J.A., for the Court, concluded solicitor-client privilege can arise when an agent is “working for the lawyer or the client”(para. 12). In McClure, Major J. states the privilege “must be as close to absolute as possible to ensure public confidence and retainrelevance” (para. 35). [17] The Supreme Court finds solicitor-client privilege can arise when in-house government lawyers provide legaladvice to a government agency (Campbell, at para. 49).

Binnie J. compares the function of public lawyers in government agencies withthat of corporate in-house counsel. He explains when government lawyers give legal advice to a "client department" the privilegeapplies; however, corporate lawyers who give advice in a non-legal capacity, such as policy advice outside the realm of their legalresponsibilities, are not protected by the privilege. Whether or not the privilege attaches is dependent “on the nature of the relationship,the subject matter of the advice and the circumstances in which it is sought and rendered” (Campbell, para. 50).

[18] The following communications have been found to be privileged:

i) Legal advice prepared by lawyers in the Department of Justice for the Minister of Justice, including confidential memorandumsprepared for a specific purpose. In Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, [1992] S.C.J.

No.97 (QL), the Supreme Court extended the privilege to memoranda drafted by government lawyers to a Minister; ii) Legal advice provided by the Department of Justice lawyers for other government departments or agencies. (Campbell andPritchard); In Pritchard, the legal advice was provided to a Human Rights Commission; iii) Legal advice provided by lawyers outside of government to government bodies. (Canada (Attorney General) v. Central Cartage Co.,[1987] F.C.J. No. 345 (QL), at 257; McEwen v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 517, [2013] B.C.J. No. 583 (QL); andTelus Communications Inc. v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 380, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1918 (QL); iv) Legal advice provided by private lawyers concerning the drafting of regulations (Robin Quinn v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008FC 376, [2008] F.C.J. No. 474 (QL). [19] Professor Dodek observes there is an “expansive” modern Canadian view that solicitor-client privilege attachesto all communications in the “continuum of communications” which applies to the normal functioning of government (CampDevelopment Corporation v. South Coast Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, 2011 BCSC 88, [2011] B.C.J.

No. 104 (QL), atparas. 63-65). [20] Solicitor-client privilege applies only to legal advice and not necessarily to policy advice. In Campbell (para.50), Binnie J. finds advice given by lawyers such as those who participate in government committees, is not protected if the advicerequested and given falls outside their legal training or expertise; however, he acknowledges the line can be blurry. The result isdependent on the nature of the professional relationship, the subject matter of the advice, and the circumstances in which it is “soughtand rendered” (see Solosky at pp. 756-757).

In such an event, a contextual analysis is required to determine whether the privilegeattaches. The exceptions above are described in Pritchard as circumstances where legal advice is neither sought nor offered, where it isclear the communications were not intended to be confidential or have been waived, and where the purposes are unlawful. It exists,however, when “in-house” government lawyers provide legal advice to a government agency (paras. 21 and 50). [21] As previously observed, in Blank, Fish J. identifies the distinctions between solicitor-client privilege andlitigation privilege.

See paras. 27, 33-39 where he refers to the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in General Accident Assurance Co. v.Chrusz, (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3291 (C.A.) (QL). In the case at bar, the motion judge relied, in part, on Chrusz asauthority to order disclosure of documents for which solicitor-client privilege was claimed. In my opinion, this was an error. Communications protected by a class privilege have a prima facie presumption of inadmissibility, unless the party seeking disclosurecan show why the communications should not be privileged (McClure).

The onus was, therefore, on Enbridge in this case to present acase for exception. [22] I turn now to the disputed documents and the motion judge’s analysis. B. Internal Employee Documents [23]

Schedule “B” to the Affidavit of Documents identifies the communications the Province deems non-discoverable on the basis of solicitor-client privilege. The disputed documents have descriptors which reveal the date the document wascreated, the names of the individuals who created and received the document, and the basis of the privilege claim.

The unchallengedevidence before the motion judge concerning these documents was: As to the documents marked B-1, the Defendant objects to producing same on the grounds that these documents are confidentialcommunications passing between the Defendant and its lawyers, including the Office of the Attorney General, for the purpose ofobtaining or providing legal advice, or documents which reflect and reveal the substance of advice provided to the Defendant by itslawyers, with respect to matters which are now in question or may be in question in this action; [Affidavit of Documents, February 25,

2014, para. 4(a)] The documents listed in the spreadsheet attached as Exhibit “J” are internal communications among employees of the Defendant whichreflect and reveal the substance of solicitor-client advice. [Affidavit of Documents, August 14, 2014, para. 15(j)] [24] The motion judge finds the Province did not provide sufficient details in the descriptors to bolster their claim ofsolicitor-client privilege; however, they did not have that onus.

The privilege claim would be meaningless if the party who claimsprivilege with respect to a certain class of documents was required to provide details that would, in essence, reveal the contents of thedocument (Seely v. Corrier, 2009 NBCA 3, 340 N.B.R. (2d) 262, per Drapeau C.J.N.B., for the Court, at para. 35; CanadianBroadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. (1999), (NB KB), 222 N.B.R. (2d) 1, [1999] N.B.J. No. 539(Q.B.) (QL), at paras. 49-50; Doucet v. Spielo Manufacturing Inc., 2007 NBQB 245, 319 N.B.R. (2d) 14, affd Spielo Manufacturing andManship v.

Doucet and Dauphinee, 2007 NBCA 85, 327 N.B.R. (2d) 1). [25] In her reasons, the motion judge opines the descriptors in the documents listed under “Internal EmployeeDocuments” did not advise they were prepared for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice. I disagree. The Waycott Affidavitadvises the documents were prepared for the purpose of “obtaining or providing legal advice”. Enbridge had the onus to establish anexception to the privilege (McClure). The motion judge’s reasons do not inform on what basis an exception to the privilege was eveninvoked. C.

Solicitor-Copied Documents [26] Turning to the Solicitor-Copied documents, the motion judge finds the Province did not provide “sufficientevidence of the reason” to protect the documents from disclosure (Enbridge Gas New Brunswick Limited Partnership v. New Brunswick(Province), 2015 NBQB 136, [2015] N.B.J. No. 166 (QL)). She finds: […]there is absolutely no information as to why the documents were copied to counsel.

There is no indication that it was for the seekingor giving of legal advice. […] There is no description in regard to any of the 28 documents listed under tab 2 that indicates the purpose of obtaining legal advice or foruse in litigation. PNB did not provide sufficient evidence of the reason to protect the documents from disclosure. [para. 40] The motion judge cites Solosky, as authority to order disclosure. As previously observed, this is a misinterpretation of the ratio in thatdecision, in my opinion.

The Supreme Court states once solicitor-client privilege is claimed, the party claiming the privilege does nothave to identify the purpose for which the advice was sought (Solosky, p. 837). In applying a litigation privilege analysis, the motionjudge committed an error in law. She determined communications through intermediaries were exempt from solicitor-client privilege.The Waycott Affidavit of Documents confirms these documents consisted of communications through agents of the Province whorelayed legal advice to the Province.

As there was no cross-examination of the deponent, that evidence remains unchallenged. [27] The documents listed in Exhibit “K” were described as internal communications among employees of theProvince which were copied to legal counsel for the purpose of “soliciting and requesting input and legal advice” (Affidavit ofDocuments, para. 15(k)). [28] The motion judge erroneously concludes the Province needed to provide further explanation with respect towhy the legal advice was being sought. See Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co.; and 051766 N.B. Ltd. v.Wilbur, 2004 NBQB 122, [2004] N.B.J.

No. 125 (QL). The fact the solicitor was only copied on documents does not change the nature ofthe privilege, provided the purpose is connected to the retainer, which was identified in this case. The Affidavit of Documents clearlyprovides the basis for the privilege claim; i.e. the purpose of obtaining and seeking legal advice. D. Communications through Intermediaries

[29] With respect to Tabs 3 and 4, the motion judge found the descriptors concerning the retainers of KPMG andElenchus did not reveal they were employed as intermediaries or agents of the Province and she concluded they were “garnering”information and passing it on to the Province through legal counsel. She finds: With regard to both tabs 3 and 4, the defendant’s further and better description of the documents in regard to both tabs, does not provideinformation that either Elenchus or KPMG were conduits between a client and its counsel.

In reference back to paragraph 11 of thisdecision I accept the submission of counsel for the plaintiffs and I find that PNB has failed to show evidence that any of the informationbeing assembled by either Elenchus or KPMG and disseminated to the Province was anything more than garnering information fromsources and passing it on to the client or to the lawyer. [para. 44] [30] If a third party is gathering information and passing it on through legal counsel, as stated in Chrusz, theinformation will not fall under the umbrella protection of solicitor-client privilege; however, the report of legal counsel and the adviceoffered as a result will be privileged.

Enbridge relies on Solosky and Chrusz to support its submission privilege did not attach todocuments prepared at the request of outsourced legal counsel.

There was no analysis concerning the effect of the Supreme Court’sdecision in Blank. [31] Paragraph 4(e)(iii) of the Waycott Affidavit of Documents states: […]The services provided by Elenchus were provided in conjunction with and closely related to advice from legal counsel, such thatreports, communications and other documents passing between the Defendant, Elenchus and/or its lawyers reveal the substance of legaladvice obtained by the Defendant with respect to matters now in issue or which may become in issue in this litigation.

The workcompleted by Elenchus was necessary to assess, consider and evaluate the advice received by the Defendant from its lawyers. Elenchus,as an agent of the Defendant, carried out various analyses at the direction of the Defendant’s lawyers to assist them in advising theDefendant. [32] Mr. Waycott deposes that KPMG was retained in 2011 to assist the Province with the development andevaluation of various financial models for consideration by the Minister and Executive Council in the development of natural gaspolicies.

The services were related to the advice given by legal counsel, and reveal the “substance of legal advice obtained by theDefendant with respect to matters now in issue or which may become in issue in this litigation”. [33] In Melanson v.

Léger et al., 2005 NBCA 19, 279 N.B.R. (2d) 276, Larlee J.A., for the Court, citing Lamey,states: “[it] seems clear that a solicitor-client privilege arises if, as in the present case, an adjuster, as agent of the client, carries out aninvestigation at the direction of the client’s lawyer and as a result, produces documents to assist the latter in advising the client” (para.11). [34] The uncontradicted evidence reveals Elenchus and KPMG were intermediaries, providing advice and counselat the direction of legal counsel on seminal questions relating to the development of natural gas policies in the Province of NewBrunswick.

This expert opinion advice became part and parcel of the legal opinions generated by outsourced counsel to the Province onthe same issues under consideration by Cabinet.

Doherty J.A., in Chrusz, states: […] If the third party’s retainer extends to a function which is essential to the existence or operation of the client-solicitor relationship,then the privilege should cover any communications which are in furtherance of that function and which meet the criteria for client-solicitor privilege. [para. 120] [35] I conclude the motion judge erred when she found solicitor-client privilege did not attach to communicationsbetween Elenchus, KPMG and legal counsel.

There was clear evidence of the nature of the communications, and the finding Elenchusand KPMG were simply “garnering” information is not founded. E. Public Interest Immunity [36] The authoritative decision concerning public interest immunity is Carey v. Ontario, (SCC),

[1986] 2 S.C.R. 637 , [1986] S.C.J. No. 74 (QL) . The former owner of a tourist resort initiated legal action against the Province of Ontario claiming damages arising from their significant financial losses. During pre-trial examination for discovery procedures, the plaintiffs sought disclosure of documents over which the Province claimed privilege, including all documents that were forwarded to Cabinet and various related committees, or were sent as a result of Cabinet discussions to those committees. The privilege claim was based not on the contents of the documents, but on the class to which they belonged.

The Province submitted disclosure would breach Cabinet confidentiality and therefore inhibit candid discussions of policy during Cabinet meetings. It further submitted the overarching principle of public interest immunity of government permitted them to withhold the documents.

The matter proceeded to the Supreme Court on the issue whether the refusal to produce Cabinet documents, as a class, was valid, and whether the plaintiff had established the documents were relevant to the litigation. [ 37 ] La Forest J. concludes there is a basic rule which would require disclosure, unless it can be demonstrated disclosure would be against the public interest. He states, however: The fact that such documents concern the decision-making process at the highest level of government cannot, however, be ignored. Courts must proceed with caution in having them produced.

But the level of the decision-making process concerned is only one of many variables to be taken into account. The nature of the policy concerned and the particular contents of the documents are, I would have thought, even more important. [para. 79] The Supreme Court elevates the issues to those of significant import, such as national security or national defence. A policy concerning the development of tourism in the Province of Ontario did not meet the threshold ( Carey ). La Forest J. finds the protection must be balanced against the public interest in maintaining confidence in the judicial system.

He describes the process: The principal argument for withholding the documents described in the affidavit is that their disclosure would lead to a decrease in completeness, in candour and in frankness of such documents if it were known that they could be produced in litigation and this in turn would detrimentally affect government policy and the public interest. The familiar "candour argument" is combined with the need of completeness and the fear that the freedom of Cabinet members to discuss matters of significant public concern and policy might be diminished.

This may simply mean that the setting in which confidential statements are made may make them different in kind from others. [para. 44] [ 38 ] Carey was followed in Leeds v. Alberta (Minister of the Environment ), [1990] A.J. No. 370 (Q.B.) (QL) , where the Court found policy documents concerning the development of transportation and utility corridors around the City of Edmonton were not of sufficient public interest to warrant the privilege (see also Pocklington Foods Inc. v. Alberta (Provincial Treasurer ), [1993] A.J.

No. 1024 (Q.B.) (QL) ; Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia , 2002 BCSC 1509 , [2002] B.C.J. No. 2464 (QL) ). In the latter decision, the Court accepted the criteria laid out in J. Sopinka, S. Lederman & A. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada , 2d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999). [ 39 ] In

summary, a claim of public interest immunity will generally be successful if there is evidence the communication was the result of “high-level” policy deliberations at the policy formation stage, including confidential advice and recommendations to Cabinet, memoranda, letters, agendas and documents regarding Cabinet deliberations.

The persuasive public policy argument against disclosure is the potential for a chilling effect on Cabinet deliberations, where clearly, candid and open dialogue concerning sensitive matters should not be tempered by the fear of later divulgation. [ 40 ] La Forest J. queries in Carey : […] are we really dealing with the formulation of policy on a broad basis, or are we simply concerned with a transaction made in the implementation of that policy? […] Policy and implementation may well be intertwined but a court is empowered to reveal only so much of the relevant documents as it feels it is necessary or expedient to do following an inspection. [para. 82] [ 41 ] The above question, in my opinion, is seminal.

As Richard J.A., for the Court, states in Bennett v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company , 2013 NBCA 4 , 398 N.B.R. (2d) 290 : I accept that there may be situations where a court has an obligation to scrutinize documents if the judge feels disclosure of these might be harmful to the “fabric of the state,” in that the disclosure might damage, for example, national security, international relations, or government decision-making or functioning, but this is not one of those cases. […] [para. 39]

[ 42 ] The motion judge ordered disclosure of the challenged documents. The documents relate to the development of natural gas policy in the Province of New Brunswick, and date from 1997 forward. The documents were submitted in bundles. The motion judge concludes if there had been a valid claim for public interest immunity, that “time has passed”. She distinguishes the development of natural gas policy from policies relating to national security on the same basis as La Forest J. in Carey .

Recall, the Province of New Brunswick entered into a Franchise Agreement for the distribution of natural gas in 1999 at a time when the Province was in the infancy stages of developing natural gas strategies and policies, working with legal counsel, stake holders, and experts as previously noted.

In my opinion the analysis should not have been that simplistic. [ 43 ] The Province submits the motion judge committed reversible error when she concludes the development of natural gas policy was not of sufficient public interest to warrant the protection from disclosure, and, she erred in concluding natural gas policy is historical, and not a current preoccupation of the Province. In support of its submission, the Province draws from the affidavit of Mr.

Waycott, where he states: Natural gas policy in the Province has a significant impact on several sectors which affect the collective well-being of the Province and its citizens, such as employment in the Province, competiveness of the market and of the Province as a whole, the viability of the manufacturing sector, the availability of affordable heating options for the Province and other consumers and the environment.

The development of governmental policy with respect to natural gas, including the availability, regulation and distribution thereof, is an on- going and evolutionary process which is being undertaken by Executive Council and the highest levels of Government with the assistance of departmental officials, industry stakeholders, experts and legal counsel. [Appeal Book, page 803] [ 44 ] Public interest immunity has been codified since 1952.

The Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides: In proceedings against the Crown, the rules of the court in which the proceedings are pending as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery, oral and written, apply in the same manner as if the Crown were an ordinary corporation, except that (

a) the Crown may refuse to produce a document or to make answer to a question on discovery on the ground that the production or the answer would be injurious to the public interest, and nothing in this

section affects the rights of the Crown or any officer or agent of the Crown in connection with such refusal[.] Dans des procédures contre la Couronne, les règles de la cour saisie, relatives à la communication et à l’examen de documents, ainsi qu’à l’interrogatoire préalable, oral et écrit, s’appliquent comme si la Couronne était une corporation ordinaire, sauf

a) que la Couronne peut refuser de produire un document ou de répondre à une question de l’interrogatoire préalable pour le motif que cette production ou cette réponse serait préjudiciable à l’intérêt public et qu’aucune disposition du présent

article ne porte atteinte aux droits de la Couronne ou de l’un de ses fonctionnaires ou représentants concernant un tel refus[.] [ 45 ] As previously observed, public interest immunity exists as well in the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 ( RTIPPA ). [ 46 ] In The Law of Evidence in Canada , Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant define public interest immunity: The public interest in the administration of justice is promoted through full access of litigants to information.

The public also has an interest in protecting the country from damage to national security and international relations that could be caused by the disclosure of state secrets. Also, damage to the process of government decision-making and functioning may be caused by disclosure of other government documents. In those areas where the public interest favours non-disclosure, the government may assert an immunity from disclosure. [ 47 ] When one distills the jurisprudence since Carey , the following important analytic criteria emerge when determining whether or not public interest immunity applies:

i) The nature of the policy; ii) The contents of the documents; iii) The level of the decision-making process and the need to protect the confidences of Cabinet; iv) The importance of producing the documents to the administration of justice;

v) The time that has elapsed; vi) Any allegation of improper conduct by the executive branch of government towards a citizen (Leeds, at para. 25); vii) Whether the document relates to policy formation or implementation; viii) Whether the document affects “present policy”. [48] The Court in Pocklington correctly observes the distinction between development and implementation ofpublic policy, and whether the disputed documents affect “present policy”. The nature of the policy and its significance to the properdisposal of the litigation are also relevant. McLaughlin J. (as she then was) in M.(A.) v.

Ryan, (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R.157, [1997] S.C.J. No. 13 (QL), sums it up as follows: For privilege to exist, it must be shown that the benefit that inures from privilege, however great it may seem, in fact outweighs theinterest in the correct disposal of the litigation. [para. 31] [49] In her reasons, the motion judge refers to The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,2014), “in regard to public interest immunity”. At page 1064, under the “Criteria for Grant of Immunity”, the authors identify sevenfactors which should be considered in weighing whether disclosure should occur.

The motion judge correctly observes the necessity tobalance the public interest against the preservation of immunity. She notes “a class claim has a greater chance of success if thegovernment identifies the documents that specifically relate to the formulation of government policy on important economic andfinancial matters demonstrating the sensitivity issue of disclosure in the particular case” (para. 18). This is simply a re-statement of thetext. [50] The Province submits they met the threshold through the descriptions of the documents listed in the scheduleto the Waycott Affidavit of Documents.

The unchallenged affidavit evidence states the documents reflected “confidentialcommunications that would reveal the substance of deliberations, discussions and planning by Executive Council, and that there is acontinuing evolution in the development of natural gas policy in the Province of New Brunswick”. A further submission focused on thefact some of the documents could arguably be covered by solicitor-client privilege as they contain advice received from legal counselboth within and outside of government.

The Province submits the analysis should not be restricted solely to the nature of the document,but should also include a consideration of the content of the document. Did the Province successfully elevate the status of this class ofdocuments to a level where disclosure would be injurious to the public interest, or the withholding of the documents would impedelitigation? The answer to this question is found in Carey and the jurisprudence which followed.

La Forest J. frames the answer in thefollowing paragraphs: The foregoing authorities, and particularly, the Smallwood case, are in my view, determinative of many of the issues in this case. Thatcase determines that Cabinet documents like other evidence must be disclosed unless such disclosure would interfere with the publicinterest. The fact that such documents concern the decision-making process at the highest level of government cannot, however, beignored. Courts must proceed with caution in having them produced.

But the level of the decision-making process concerned is only oneof many variables to be taken into account. The nature of the policy concerned and the particular contents of the documents are, I wouldhave thought, even more important. So far as the protection of the decision-making process is concerned, too, the time when a documentor information is to be revealed is an extremely important factor.

Revelations of Cabinet discussion and planning at the developmentalstage or other circumstances when there is keen public interest in the subject matter might seriously inhibit the proper functioning ofCabinet government, but this can scarcely be the case when low level policy that has long become of little public interest is involved. To these considerations, and they are not all, one must, of course, add the importance of producing the documents in the interests of theadministration of justice.

On the latter question, such issues as the importance of the case and the need or desirability of producing thedocuments; to ensure that it can be adequately and fairly presented are factors to be placed in the balance. In doing this, it is well toremember that only the particular facts relating to the case are revealed.

This is not a serious departure from the general regime ofsecrecy that surrounds high level government decisions. [paras. 79-80] [51] La Forest J. acknowledges the level of the decision-making process is but one consideration; however, he findsthe nature of the policy and the contents of the documents to be “more important”. If it is shown divulgation “might” inhibit the proper

functioning of Cabinet, or impede the development of government policy, public interest immunity applies. The scope is not narrowed to matters of national security as suggested by the motion judge and Enbridge. In Alberta v. Yellowhorn , 1998 ABCA 206 , [1998] A.J. No. 1467 (QL) , it was extended to issues pertaining to water management. In the same vein, the Waycott Affidavit of Documents highlights similar issues (see excerpt at paragraph 43, above). [ 52 ] The motion judge agrees Cabinet communications are privileged.

As she notes in para. 48 of the decision, if she failed to recognize a confidential Cabinet document that reveals the nature and substance of cabinet communications, the document “could possibly” be exempt from disclosure; however, she finds the descriptors were insufficient to enable her to discern which documents would fall into that category. She notes the issues do not fall into the category of matters of “national security”. She concludes that policy concerning the development of natural gas in the Province of New Brunswick is evolving; therefore, there is no compelling public interest immunity.

I pause here to note the types of communications for which the Province claims immunity. They are identified as documents which include formal memoranda to Executive Council as well as communications containing advice to Executive Council. [ 53 ] The respondents correctly draw our attention to what it terms “a general trend” towards disclosure of Cabinet documents. In support, it quotes from Karen Horsman and Gareth Morley , Government Liability Law and Practice , 4th ed (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 2007) at 114. Counsel for Enbridge presents a liberal

interpretation of Carey , and suggests the bulk of the jurisprudence favours a dilution of public interest immunity. Examples include Health Services and Support Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia ; Can Am Simulation Ltd. v. Newfoundland , [1994] N.J. No. 125 (S.C.) (QL) ; Johnston v. Prince Edward Island , [1988] P.E.I.J. No. 63 (S.C.) (QL) ; and Nova Scotia (Attorney General ) v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. of Canada , [2000] N.S.J. No. 404 (S.C.) (QL) . In Nunavut (Department of Community and Government Services) v.

Northern Transportation Co ., 2011 NUCJ 4 , [2011] Nu.J. No. 3 (QL) , Johnson J. ordered disclosure of 32 documents of 35, finding three were privileged as they related to policy development concerning the long term supply of fuel to citizens living in northern Canada. The 32 documents not covered by the privilege were created eight years prior to the motion. The Court found their production would have minimal impact on candid dialogue in Cabinet, where matters concerning the long-term fuel supply policies were concerned.

The Court notes: “[h]igh level policy documents are treated differently than lower level policy documents” (para. 24).

Johnson J. observes: The words "hardly world-shaking", used by La Forest J. in Carey to describe a tourist policy, were adopted by Miller J. in Leeds to describe the policy of developing the transportation and utility corridors around the cities of Edmonton and Calgary. [para. 44] The three privileged documents concerned the financial implications of proposals received for the bulk fuel re-supply to 27 communities; one was an Information Plan for Cabinet to develop strategies, and one was a Ministerial Briefing Note/Decision paper. All three documents were described as pertaining to “policy formation” by Cabinet.

From the above jurisprudence, and considering Carey , I conclude the distinction rests on whether the documents over which privilege is claimed pertain to policy formation, as opposed to policy implementation. Carey requires the plaintiff to describe the policy matters in sufficient detail so the trier of fact can decipher the purpose of the document. If it relates to the former, it is privileged; if the latter, it is discoverable. [ 54 ] The motion judge ordered disclosure on the basis the documents did not fall within the same category as national security or national defence. With respect, this is a mis

interpretation of Carey , as previously observed. I conclude too much weight was given by the motion judge to one or two criteria. The reasons did not demonstrate any other consideration. The Province characterized the challenged documents as relating to “policy” formulation. A review of the index and descriptors confirms they were prepared for the purpose of giving advice to the Minister and Executive Council to assist in the development of natural gas policy in the Province of New Brunswick.

The fact some of the documents date to 1997, does not change their purpose. [ 55 ] The Supreme Court in Carey , and the jurisprudence which follows, advises that a purposeful analysis should be undertaken, which did not occur in this case. The motion judge concludes the documents are dated and should be produced on that basis. I disagree. There is no pressing “keen public” interest for disclosure as stated in Nunavut. In fact, on the same basis as discussed in Carey , I am of the view disclosure would have no benefit to the public. Enbridge did not advance a case for “public interest” in the documents.

In Carey , the Cabinet discussions pre-dated the disclosure request by twelve years, and the issue in dispute was limited to a singular event. Here, Cabinet memoranda and discussions pre-dated the execution of the Gas Franchise Agreement by a few years only. The motion judge did not advise how she concludes the documents would be relevant in the prosecution of the Enbridge case. [ 56 ] I pause again to observe the motion judge did not scrutinize the documents. There was no cross-examination of the affidavit evidence proffered by the Province.

Richard J.A., for the Court, discusses the application of Rule 31.06 in a similar context in Bennett v. State Farm and Casualty Company (2013). Rule 31.06(

d) permits a court to “inspect any document for the purpose of determining the validity of a claim of privilege”, but only where the court is satisfied a claim of privilege may have been improperly made (para. 23). This matter was heard by way of affidavit evidence. In Seely v. Corrier , Drapeau C.J.N.B., for the Court, discusses the importance of “cogent” affidavit evidence. “The affidavits must make the factual case for the privilege claimed, lifting its foundation from the general to the particular” (para. 35).

Enbridge submits two of the documents over which solicitor-client privilege was claimed did not meet that standard in the descriptors. If that were all, perhaps they may have had a case; however, the importance of the Waycott

affidavit cannot be underestimated, as it clearly reveals the basis for the privilege claim. V. Disposition [ 57 ] In my respectful view, the motion judge erred when she ordered disclosure of the documents for which solicitor-client privilege was claimed. Similarly, for the reasons stated, I conclude she erred in ordering disclosure of the documents over which public interest immunity was claimed. In the former case, the judge reversed the onus in a situation where the privilege was otherwise properly claimed.

In the latter case, she failed to take into account the unchallenged Waycott affidavit that sufficiently set out the basis for the immunity. It follows that I would allow the appeal and set aside the motion judge’s decision. I would order Enbridge to pay costs in the amount of $5,000. ___________________________ BARBARA L. BAIRD, J.A. WE CONCUR: ___________________________ J.C. MARC RICHARD, J.A. ___________________________ BRADLEY V. GREEN, J.A. Version française de la décision rendue par La juge Baird I.

Introduction et contexte [1] Le présent appel est interjeté de la décision, rendue par une juge saisie d’une motion, d’ordonner la divulgation d’environ 800 documents pour lesquels l’appelante revendiquait soit le privilège du secret professionnel de l’avocat, soit une exception d’intérêt public. À

titre d’information contextuelle, mentionnons que le 12 avril 2012, les intimées (« Enbridge ») ont intenté une poursuite judiciaire à la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick (la « Province »), en reprochant à celle-ci d’avoir violé un accord de concession générale conclu entre elles en 1999 et visant la distribution de gaz naturel dans la province du Nouveau-Brunswick. [2] Au cours de l’enquête préalable, la Province a remis à Enbridge un affidavit des documents signé par Stephen A. Waycott, représentant de la Couronne nommé conformément à la

Loi sur les procédures contre la Couronne, L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. P-18. L’annexe A énumérait 9 686 documents; l’annexe B énumérait 3 606 documents pour lesquels le privilège était revendiqué. Enbridge a déposé un avis de motion sollicitant une ordonnance judiciaire prescrivant la divulgation des documents énumérés à l’annexe B en soutenant que les revendications de privilège étaient injustifiées. En réponse, la Province a déposé un affidavit souscrit par M. Waycott qui fournissait des renseignements additionnels sur les motifs des revendications de privilège.

La motion a été entendue le 15 août 2014 et le 17 décembre 2014. Dans l’intervalle, les parties ont réussi à réduire le nombre de documents en litige et

elles ont classé les documents qui restaient dans la catégorie « documents qui demeurent en litige ».

Environ 800 documents demeuraient en litige au moment de la reprise de l’instruction de l’affaire. [3] Les documents en cause portent les titres génériques suivants : 1) « Documents d’employés internes », pour lesquels « le secret professionnel de l’avocat est revendiqué parce que ces documents renferment des observations sur la substance d’un avis juridique, transmettent cet avis ou autrement le révèlent »; 2) « Documents dont copie est envoyée à l’avocat », pour lesquels « le secret professionnel de l’avocat est revendiqué pour le motif que l’avocat, tant l’avocat interne que l’avocat du secteur privé, est nommé directement comme destinataire de la communication et que le document a été créé dans le “but direct” de “solliciter ou d’obtenir un avis juridique” »; 3) « Communications par voie d’intermédiaires », pour lesquelles « le secret professionnel de l’avocat est revendiqué du fait que les documents portent sur des communications entre des “représentants” de la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick et donnent suite à la relation entre avocat et client »; et enfin 4) « Documents visés par une exception d’intérêt public », pour lesquels un privilège est revendiqué du fait que la divulgation de ceux-ci porterait atteinte à l’intérêt public. [4] La juge saisie de la motion a conclu que les revendications de privilège n’étaient pas fondées et elle a ordonné la divulgation des 800 documents qui demeuraient en litige.

II. Questions soulevées en appel [5] La Province du Nouveau-Brunswick porte en appel l’ordonnance de divulgation en invoquant cinq moyens d’appel. Elle soutient que la juge saisie de la motion a commis des erreurs de droit justifiant l’infirmation de sa décision lorsqu’elle a ordonné la divulgation de documents pour lesquels le secret professionnel de l’avocat et l’exception d’intérêt public étaient revendiqués. Dans le mémoire de la Province, les cinq moyens d’appel ont été consolidés dans quatre rubriques.

Ils font valoir que la juge saisie de la motion a commis des erreurs en tirant les conclusions suivantes : a. les « Documents d’employés internes » ne sont pas assujettis au privilège et, par conséquent, ils doivent être produits; b. les « Documents dont copie est envoyée à l’avocat » ne sont pas assujettis au privilège et, par conséquent, ils doivent être produits; c. les « Communications par voie d’intermédiaires » ne sont pas assujetties au privilège et, par conséquent, elles doivent être produites; d. les « Documents visés par une exception d’intérêt public » ne s’inscrivent pas dans cette catégorie d’exception et, par conséquent, ils doivent être produits.

III. Norme de contrôle [6] Dans l’arrêt Chapelstone Developments Inc., Action Motors Ltd. et Hamilton c. Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada , 2004 NBCA 96 , 277 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 350 , le juge d’appel Robertson, qui rendait jugement au nom de notre Cour, a conclu que la norme de contrôle relative à la production ou à la divulgation de documents constitue une pure question de droit ou une question mixte de droit et de fait. [7] Au départ, Enbridge a prétendu que la norme de contrôle appropriée était celle décrite dans l’arrêt La Beaverbrook Canadian Foundation c.

La Galerie d’art Beaverbrook , 2006 NBCA 75 , 302 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 161 , où le juge Drapeau, J.C.N.-B., a décrit, au nom de la Cour, la norme de contrôle applicable aux ordonnances discrétionnaires. Toutefois, à l’audition de l’appel, Enbridge a reconnu, étant donné que les moyens d’appels énumérés constituent de pures questions de droit, que la norme de contrôle était celle de la décision correcte. À mon avis, cette concession de la part d’Enbridge était sage. IV. Analyse

A. Secret professionnel de l’avocat [8] « Le secret professionnel de l’avocat est un aspect fondamental du système juridiquecanadien. » Il constitue une « règle de droit fondamentale et substantielle » : voir R. c. McClure, 2001 CSC 14, [2001] 1 R.C.S. 445, aupar. 17. Dans cette affaire, le juge Major, qui rendait décision au nom de la Cour, a expliqué que les communications entre un avocat etson client s’inscrivent dans la catégorie du « privilège générique » pour lequel « il existe une présomption à première vued’inadmissibilité (lorsqu’il a été établi que les rapports s’inscrivent dans la catégorie) à moins que la

partie qui demande l’admission nepuisse démontrer pour quelles raisons les communications ne devraient pas être privilégiées (c.-à-d., pour quelles raisons elles devraientêtre admises en preuve à

titre d’exception à la règle générale) » (par. 27, où il cite le juge en chef Lamer dans R. c. Gruenke, (SCC), [1991] 3 R.C.S. 263, [1991] A.C.S. no 80 (QL)). Dans cette décision, le juge en chef Lamer a expliqué que « [d]etelles communications sont exclues non pas parce que l’élément de preuve n’est pas pertinent, mais plutôt parce qu’il existe des raisonsde principe prépondérantes d’exclure cet élément de preuve pertinent » (par. 26). [9] Dans l’arrêt Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. c.

Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. et al., 2002 NBCA 41, 251 R.N.-B. (2e) 102, le juge d’appel Drapeau (tel était alors son titre) a expliqué, au nom de la Cour, la nature, l’objet et laraison d’être du privilège : [TRADUCTION]La relation d’avocat à client étant d’ordre fiducial, elle impose aux avocats de garder le secret sur tous les renseignements confidentielsqu’ils obtiennent, dans l’exercice de leur profession, sur les affaires et les occupations d’un client.

Cette obligation de confidentialité estle pendant immédiat du secret professionnel de l’avocat, qui est un aspect fondamental du système juridique canadien (voir R. c.McClure, 2001 CSC 14, [2001] 1 R.C.S. 445, au par. 17). L’avocat qui manque à la confidentialité à laquelle il est obligé encourt uneinstance disciplinaire (Code de déontologie professionnelle du Barreau du Nouveau-Brunswick, p. 9). Le

chapitre IV du Code dedéontologie professionnelle de l’Association du Barreau canadien, intitulé « Le secret professionnel », formule la règle suivante : L’avocat est tenu de garder le secret le plus absolu sur ce qu’il a appris des affaires et des occupations de son client au cours de leursrelations professionnelles. Il ne peut être relevé de ce devoir qu’avec l’autorisation soit expresse soit tacite de son client, lorsque la loile lui ordonne, ou encore lorsque ce Code le lui permet ou lui en impose l’obligation. [Renvois en bas de page omis.] La raison d’être de la règle est bien connue.

Notre système judiciaire fonctionne le plus efficacement lorsque les plaideurs sont représentés avec compétence. L’avocat est d’autantplus compétent si le client rend compte sans détour de tous les faits qui peuvent être pertinents. L’inspiration première de l’avocat às’instruire des faits est, inévitablement, le client et nul autre. Il est peu probable que le client, s’il n’est pas convaincu que sesconfidences demeureront secrètes, s’exprime librement et franchement et dresse un tableau complet des faits du litige.

Il apparaît doncpossible que les intérêts du client ne soient pas représentés tout aussi parfaitement qu’ils pourraient l’être. Dans ce cas malheureux, leclient et le système judiciaire sont tous deux perdants.

Le juge en chef Jackett, à la page 193 de Shell Canada Ltd., Re, (FCA), [1975] C.F. 184 (C.A.), traduit particulièrement bien ce point de vue : […] La protection civile et criminelle, que nos principes de droit accordent à l’individu est subordonnée à l’assistance et aux conseilsque l’individu reçoit d’hommes de loi sans aucune crainte que la divulgation pleine et entière de tous ses actes et pensées à son conseillerjuridique puisse de quelque façon être connue des tiers de manière à être utilisée contre lui. [Renvois en bas de page omis.] On pourra se reporter également à la page 834 de Solosky c.

Canada, (SCC), [1980] 1 R.C.S. 821, motifs du jugeDickson (tel était alors son titre), au paragraphe 46 de Jones c. Smith, (SCC), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 455, motifs du juge Cory,et aux paragraphes 31 à 33 de R. c. McClure. [par. 43 et 44] [10] Dans l’arrêt Celanese Canada Inc. c.

Murray Demolition Corp., 2006 CSC 36, [2006] 2 R.C.S.189, le juge Binnie affirme que la règle de common law applicable au secret professionnel de l’avocat couvre des renseignementsconfidentiels protégés qui « n’ont pas tous la même importance et le même caractère crucial » et que « [l]a protection descommunications avocat-client confidentielles revêt une grande importance » (par. 34 et 54). Dans l’arrêt McClure, le privilègebénéficiait de la protection accordée par l’art. 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés dans le cas de poursuites criminelles. Dans

l’arrêt Maranda c. Richer, 2003 CSC 67, [2003] 3 R.C.S. 193, la Cour suprême a conclu que le privilège du secret professionnels’appliquait en matière civile comme en matière criminelle. Le privilège a été placé « sur un plan nouveau », ainsi que l’a affirmé le juge Dickson dans Solosky c. La Reine, (SCC), [1980] 1 R.C.S. 821, [1979] A.C.S. no 130 (QL), à la p. 836, et élargi par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Descôteaux et autre c. Mierzwinski, (SCC), [1982] 1 R.C.S. 860, [1982] A.C.S. no 43 (QL),par le juge Lamer, à la p. 893, ainsi que dans l’arrêt Pritchard c.

Ontario (Commission des droits de la personne), 2004 CSC 31, [2004] 1R.C.S. 809, et dans l’arrêt Blank c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), 2006 CSC 39, [2006] 2 R.C.S. 319. Dans l’arrêt Descôteaux, le jugeLamer a fait remarquer que le privilège de la relation client-avocat peut prendre naissance avant même la formation du mandat formel. [11] Toutefois, dans l’arrêt McClure, le juge Major fait remarquer que le secret professionnel del’avocat n’est pas absolu et qu’il « cède le pas […] dans certaines circonstances bien définies et ne nécessite pas une évaluation desintérêts dans chaque cas » (par. 35).

Le juge Cory réitère ces principes dans l’arrêt Smith c. Jones, [1999] 1 R.S.C. 455, [1999] A.C.S. no 15 (QL), et convient que le secret professionnel de l’avocat n’est pas absolu. Il souligne une exception au secret professionnel del’avocat lorsqu’il s’agit de sécurité publique (par. 51 et 57). [12] Dans l’arrêt Pritchard, la Cour suprême du Canada a étendu le privilège avocat-client à touteconsultation en vue d’obtenir un avis juridique, peu importe qu’un litige soit envisagé ou prévu (par. 28, 32 et 33).

Au cours desdernières années, la Cour suprême a adopté une solution plus large et davantage téléologique concernant le secret professionnel del’avocat (Blank, par. 26; McClure, par. 31; Smith c. Jones, par. 45 et 46). [13] Dans son ouvrage intitulé Solicitor-Client Privilege, (Markham : LexisNexis Canada Inc.,2014), le professeur Adam M. Dodek, de l’Université d’Ottawa, souligne, au

chapitre 12, que les mêmes règles en matière de secretprofessionnel de l’avocat s’appliquent au gouvernement et au secteur privé, mais il reconnaît que la Couronne est un client unique. Cetterelation peut soulever des questions, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la règle de droit substantielle du secret professionnel de l’avocatet le privilège relatif au litige dans les affaires où la protection de l’intérêt public entre en jeu. Le conflit accru entre le besoin de protégerl’intérêt public tout en préservant en même temps les protections offertes par la règle a aussi été abordé par le professeur Allan C.Hutchinson dans son

article intitulé « “In the Public Interest” The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers », (2008) 46Osgoode Hall LJ 105 (QL). De l’avis de l’auteur, il ne devrait pas être permis aux organismes gouvernementaux d’invoquer cette règlecomme bouclier lorsque des intérêts publics sont en jeu; toutefois, jusqu’à présent, toute érosion du secret professionnel de l’avocat a étésoigneusement circonscrite par la Cour suprême.

Deborah MacNair, conseillère juridique au ministère de la Justice, à Ottawa, dans unarticle intitulé « Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Crown: When is a Privilege a Privilege? », (2003), 82 R. du Bar. Can. 213, passe enrevue l’évolution de la jurisprudence qui porte sur le secret professionnel de l’avocat dans le secteur public.

À son avis,[TRADUCTION] « [l]e caractère sacré de la relation avocat-client se trouve à concurrencer avec ce que d’autres appellent la recherchede la vérité, mais sous les projecteurs de l’intérêt public » (p. 215). [14] Les conseillers juridiques internes du gouvernement servent l’intérêt public; toutefois, leurclient est la branche exécutive du gouvernement.

La relation avocat-client se trouve davantage compliquée lorsque le gouvernementretient les services d’un avocat indépendant du secteur privé, comme c’était le cas en l’espèce, pour que ce dernier travaille de concertavec un avocat interne afin de partager et d’échanger des documents, des idées, des avis et des conseils juridiques. Parmi les décisionsrécentes qui portent sur le secret professionnel de l’avocat dans ce contexte, mentionnons les décisions R. c. Campbell, (SCC), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 565, [1999] A.C.S. no 16 (QL), Canada (Commissaire à la protection de la vie privé

e) c. Blood TribeDepartment of Health, 2008 CSC 44, [2008] 2 R.C.S. 574, l’affaire Pritchard et, plus récemment, l’affaire Blank, comme nous l’avonsmentionné précédemment. [15] Dans l’arrêt Campbell, la Cour suprême a conclu que la portée et la nature du privilège sont lesmêmes que celles qui existent dans le secteur privé. Dans l’arrêt Blank, le juge Fish a conclu que le secret professionnel de l’avocatprotège la communication « complète […] et franche » entre un avocat et son client et qu’il se distingue du privilège relatif au litige.

Ilreconnaît que le privilège relatif au litige prend fin lorsque se termine le litige. Le privilège relatif au litige se distingue du secretprofessionnel de l’avocat en ce sens qu’il vise à assurer l’efficacité du processus afférent au litige. En revanche, le secret professionnel del’avocat protège la relation professionnelle et continue de s’appliquer même une fois que le litige a pris fin. Voir l’arrêt Davis c.

MacKenzie, 2008 NBCA 85, 338 R.N.-B. (2e) 232, aux par. 27 et 28, rendu au nom de la Cour par le juge Drapeau, J.C.N.-B. [16] Le secret professionnel de l’avocat peut s’appliquer à des communications non confidentiellesentre l’avocat, la

partie au litige et des tiers, comme l’a affirmé notre Cour. Dans l’arrêt Lamey c. Rice (2000), (NB CA), 227 R.N.-B. (2e) 295, [2000] A.N.-B. no 271 (QL), la juge d’appel Larlee, rendant jugement au nom de la Cour, a conclu que lesecret professionnel de l’avocat peut s’appliquer lorsqu’un mandataire [TRADUCTION] « travaille pour l’avocat ou le client » (par. 12).Dans l’arrêt McClure, le juge Major a affirmé que le secret professionnel de l’avocat « doit être aussi absolu que possible pour assurer laconfiance du public et demeurer pertinent » (par. 35).

[17] La Cour suprême a conclu que le secret professionnel de l’avocat peut s’appliquer lorsque desavocats d’un service juridique gouvernemental interne fournissent des conseils juridiques à un organisme gouvernemental (Campbell, aupar. 49). Le juge Binnie compare la fonction des avocats d’un organisme gouvernemental à celle des avocats internes de sociétés.

Ilexplique que lorsque les avocats gouvernementaux fournissent des conseils juridiques à des « ministères clients », le secret professionnelde l’avocat s’applique; toutefois, les conseils n’ayant rien à voir avec leur formation juridique que donnent les avocats internes desociétés, comme les conseils en matière de politique non liés à leurs responsabilités juridiques, ne sont pas protégés par le secretprofessionnel de l’avocat.

La question de savoir si le secret professionnel de l’avocat s’appliquera ou non dépend de « la nature de larelation, l’objet de l’avis et les circonstances dans lesquelles il est demandé et fourni » (Campbell, par. 50). [18] Les communications suivantes ont été jugées protégées :

i) Les avis juridiques rédigés par des avocats du ministère de la Justice pour le ministre de la Justice, notamment les notesconfidentielles rédigées dans un but précis. Dans l’arrêt Idziak c. Canada (ministre de la Justice), (SCC), [1992] 3 R.C.S. 631, [1992] A.C.S. no 97 (QL), la Cour suprême a étendu le privilège aux notes rédigées par des avocats du gouvernement àl’intention d’un ministre. ii) Les avis juridiques fournis par les avocats du ministère de la Justice à l’intention d’autres ministères ou organismesgouvernementaux (Campbell et Pritchard).

Dans l’arrêt Pritchard, l’avis juridique avait été fourni à la Commission des droits de lapersonne. iii) Les avis juridiques fournis à des organismes gouvernementaux par des avocats du secteur privé (Canada (Attorney General) c.Central Cartage Co., [1987] F.C.J. No. 345 (QL), à 257; McEwen c. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 517, [2013]B.C.J. No. 583 (QL); et Telus Communications Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 380, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1918 (QL)). iv) Les avis juridiques fournis par des avocats du secteur privé concernant la rédaction de règlements (Quinn c.

Canada (Ministre de la Justice), 2008 CF 376, [2008] A.C.F. no 474 (QL). [19] Selon le professeur Dodek, il existe au Canada une opinion contemporaine [TRADUCTION]« expansive » voulant que le secret professionnel de l’avocat s’applique à toutes les communications, dans le [TRADUCTION]« continuum des communications » qui relève du fonctionnement normal du gouvernement (Camp Development Corporation c. SouthCoast Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, 2011 BCSC 88, [2011] B.C.J.

No. 104 (QL), aux par. 63 à 65). [20] Le secret professionnel de l’avocat s’applique uniquement aux conseils juridiques et non pasnécessairement aux conseils en matière de politique. Dans l’arrêt Campbell (par. 50), le juge Binnie a conclu que les conseils fournis pardes avocats qui participent, par exemple, à des comités gouvernementaux, ne sont pas protégés si les conseils demandés et fournis n’ontrien à voir avec leur formation ou expertise juridiques, mais il reconnaît que la distinction est parfois floue.

Le résultat est fonction de lanature de la relation professionnelle, de l’objet de l’avis juridique et des circonstances dans lesquelles cet avis est « demandé et fourni »(voir Solosky, aux p. 756 et 757). Dans ce cas, une analyse contextuelle est nécessaire afin de déterminer si le secret professionnel del’avocat s’applique.

Les exceptions mentionnées ci-dessus sont décrites dans l’arrêt Pritchard comme des circonstances où un avisjuridique n’est ni demandé ni offert, des circonstances où il est clair que les communications n’étaient pas censées être confidentielles ouont fait l’objet d’une renonciation, et des circonstances où les objectifs sont illicites.

Le privilège s’applique, toutefois, lorsque desavocats gouvernementaux « internes » fournissent des avis juridiques à un organisme gouvernemental (par. 21 et 50). [21] Comme il a déjà été mentionné, dans l’arrêt Blank, le juge Fish établit une distinction entre lesecret professionnel de l’avocat et le privilège relatif au litige. Voir les paragraphes 27, 33 à 39, où il renvoie à la décision rendue par laCour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’affaire General Accident Assurance Co. c. Chrusz, (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3291(C.A.) (QL).

Dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, la juge saisie de la motion s’est fondée, en partie, sur l’arrêt Chrusz afin d’ordonner ladivulgation des documents pour lesquels le secret professionnel de l’avocat était revendiqué. À mon avis, cette décision était une erreur. Il existe une présomption à première vue d’inadmissibilité dans le cas des communications qui font l’objet d’un privilège générique, àmoins que la

partie qui demande la divulgation puisse démontrer pour quelles raisons les communications ne devraient pas être protégées(McClure). En l’espèce, donc, le fardeau incombait à Enbridge de démontrer l’applicabilité de l’exception. [22] Je passe maintenant aux documents contestés et à l’analyse faite par la juge saisie de la motion.

B. Documents d’employés internes [23] L’annexe B de l’affidavit des documents énumère les communications que la Province juge nonassujetties à la divulgation en raison du secret professionnel de l’avocat. Les documents contestés contiennent des éléments descriptifsqui révèlent la date à laquelle le document a été créé, le nom des personnes qui l’ont créé et qui l’ont reçu ainsi que la raison pourlaquelle le privilège est revendiqué.

La preuve non contestée dont disposait la juge saisie de la motion concernant ces documents est lasuivante : [TRADUCTION]S’agissant des documents cotés B-1, la défenderesse s’oppose à la production de ceux-ci pour le motif qu’ils sont des communicationsconfidentielles échangées entre la défenderesse et ses avocats, notamment le bureau du Procureur général, afin d’obtenir ou de fournirdes avis juridiques, ou des documents qui reflètent ou révèlent la substance d’avis juridiques fournis à la défenderesse par ses avocats ausujet de questions qui sont maintenant en litige ou qui pourraient l’être dans la présente action. [Affidavit des documents, le25 février 2014, 4a)].

Les documents énumérés dans le tableau annexé comme pièce J sont des communications internes entre des employés de la défenderessequi reflètent et révèlent la substance d’avis juridiques d’un avocat à son client. [Affidavit des documents, le 14 août 2014, 15j)] [24] La juge saisie de la motion a conclu que la Province n’avait pas fourni suffisamment de détailsdans les éléments descriptifs pour étayer sa revendication de privilège du secret professionnel de l’avocat; toutefois, la Province n’avaitpas cette charge. La revendication d’un privilège n’aurait aucun sens si la

partie qui le revendique au sujet de certaines catégories dedocuments était tenue de fournir des détails qui, essentiellement, révéleraient le contenu des documents (Seely c. Corrier, 2009 NBCA 3, 340 R.N.-B. (2e) 262, décision rendue au nom de la Cour par le juge Drapeau, J.C.N.-B., au par. 35; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. c. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. (1999), (NB KB), 222 R.N.-B. (2e) 1, [1999] A.N.-B. no 539 (C.B.R.) (QL), aux par. 49 et 50; Doucet et al. c. Spielo Manufacturing Inc. et al., 2007 NBQB 245 , 2007 NBBR 245, 319 R.N.-B. (2e) 14, conf. à Spielo Manufacturing et Manship c.

Doucet et Dauphinee, 2007 NBCA 85, 327 R.N.-B. (2e) 1). [25] Dans ses motifs, la juge saisie de la motion exprime l’avis que les éléments descriptifs contenusdans les documents de la liste intitulée [TRADUCTION] « Documents d’employés internes » n’indiquent pas que ces documents ont étérédigés afin de solliciter ou de fournir un avis juridique. Je ne suis pas d’accord. L’affidavit de M. Waycott indique que les documentsont été rédigés afin [TRADUCTION] « d’obtenir ou de fournir un avis juridique ». Enbridge avait la charge d’établir l’existence d’uneexception au privilège (McClure).

Les motifs de la juge saisie de la motion n’indiquent pas sur quel fondement une exception au secretprofessionnel de l’avocat était même invoquée. C. Documents dont copie est envoyée à l’avocat [26] S’agissant de ces documents, la juge saisie de la motion a conclu que la Province n’avait pasfourni [TRADUCTION] « une preuve suffisante de la raison pour laquelle » ces documents devaient être protégés (Enbridge Gas New Brunswick c. PNB, 2015 NBQB 136 , 2015 NBBR 136, [2015] A.N.-B. no 166 (QL)).

Elle a tiré la conclusion suivante : [TRADUCTION][…] [I]l n’y a absolument aucune information sur la raison pour laquelle une copie des documents a été transmise à l’avocat. Rienn’indique qu’ils ont été transmis afin d’obtenir ou de fournir un avis juridique. […] Il n’existe aucune description concernant n’importe lequel des 28 documents énumérés à l’onglet 2 qui soit susceptible d’indiquer qu’ils’agissait d’obtenir un avis juridique ou d’utiliser ces documents dans un litige.

La Province n’a pas fourni une preuve suffisante de laraison pour laquelle ces documents ne devraient pas être divulgués[.] [par. 40] La juge saisie de la motion a cité l’arrêt Solosky comme source justifiant d’ordonner la divulgation des documents. Comme il a étémentionné précédemment, à mon avis, il s’agit là d’une mauvaise interprétation des motifs de cette décision. La Cour suprême affirme

qu’une fois le privilège du secret professionnel de l’avocat revendiqué, la

partie qui le revendique n’a pas à fournir la raison pour laquellel’avis juridique a été sollicité (Solosky, p. 837). En ayant recours à l’analyse fondée sur le privilège relatif au litige, la juge saisie de lamotion a commis une erreur de droit. Elle a jugé que les communications par voie d’intermédiaires étaient exclues du secretprofessionnel de l’avocat. L’affidavit des documents de M. Waycott confirme que ces documents étaient des communications transmisespar des mandataires de la Province qui transmettaient un avis juridique à la Province.

Puisque le déposant n’a pas été contre-interrogé, lapreuve demeure non contestée. [27] Les documents énumérés dans la pièce K sont décrits comme des communications internesentre des employés de la Province, dont des copies ont été transmises au conseiller juridique dans le but [TRADUCTION] « de solliciteret de demander son opinion et son avis juridique » (Affidavit des documents, par. 15k). [28] La juge saisie de la motion a conclu par erreur que la Province devait fournir une explicationsupplémentaire sur la raison pour laquelle elle avait sollicité l’avis juridique. Voir Canadian Broadcasting Corp. c.

New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. et 051766 N.B. Ltd. c. Wilbur, 2004 NBBR 122, 2004 NBQB 122 , [2004] A.N.-B. no 125 (QL). Le fait quedes copies seulement de ces documents sont transmises à l’avocat ne change en rien la nature du privilège, pourvu que l’objet soit lié aumandat, lequel a été établi en l’espèce. L’affidavit des documents indique clairement le fondement du privilège revendiqué, c’est-à-direqu’il s’agissait de demander et d’obtenir un avis juridique. D.

Communications par voie d’intermédiaires [29] S’agissant des onglets 3 et 4, la juge saisie de la motion a conclu que les éléments descriptifsdes mandats de

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