2020 QCCQ 10685, 2020 QCCQ 10685

Protection de la jeunesse — 201416 2020 QCCQ 10685 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT […] LOCALITY […] « Youth Court Division » N°: 525-41-0 34577-189 Date: February 13, 2020 PRESIDED BY: THE HONOURABLE TAYA DI PIETRO, Q.C.J. In the case of: X Born on […], 2018 [SOCIAL WORKER 1] , duly authorized by the Director of Youth Protection of the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux A Applicant -and- A , the mother The parent JUDGMENT

Section 38 of the Youth Protection Act (L.R.Q., c. P-34.1 ) WARNING: The Youth Protection Act forbids the publishing or broadcasting of information allowing for a child or the child’s parents to be identified.

Any person who contravenes this provision commits an offence and is liable to a fine (sections 11.2, 11.2.1 and 135 Y.P.A.). [ 1 ] JD2620 The Director of Youth Protection of the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux A filed an Application to declare that the security or development of a child is in danger in the case of X , a fifteen month-old child, based on the serious risk of neglect to which he is exposed. [ 2 ] The facts alleged in support of the application dated October 15, 2018 are as follows: 3.1. there is a serious risk that a child’s mother is not providing for the child’s basic needs more particularly but not restrictively in that:

a) the mother has a history of substance abuse (alcohol, marijuana and cocaine);

b) the mother has five (5) other children who are currently not in her care;

c) the said children were followed by Children’s Aid Society for the same risk issues;

d) the mother mother (sic) has demonstrated that she needs support in caring for the child, given her history (reproduced with errors and/or omissions). [ 3 ] The Director first seized the Court on October 19, 2018 with an Application for provisional measures recommending that the child, who was only nine days old, remain entrusted to his mother’s care provided a number of protective measures were put in place. [ 4 ] The mother acknowledged her prior substance abuse and agreed to collaborate with the Director of Youth Protection and to participate in the SIPPE program and the Application was granted. [ 5 ] However, less than a month later, on November 8, 2018, the Court entrusted the child to a confidential foster family based on the mother’s failure to respect her undertakings to ensure the child’s safety. [ 6 ] The hearing on the merits began before the undersigned on December 13, 2018.

The child was then entrusted to his great-aunt, B, on an interim basis. [ 7 ] The continuation, scheduled for May 10, 2019, was postponed at the mother’s request, and postponed again on October 10, 2019, also at the mother’s request.

[ 8 ] The hearing was finally completed on January 29, 2020. [ 9 ] The Director then recommended that the child remain entrusted to the foster home of Ms. B, with aid, counsel and assistance, as well as additional corrective measures, until he reaches the age of majority, on October 10, 2036. [ 10 ] The mother, assisted by Me Tanguay, agreed to the child’s continued entrustment to the care of Ms. B. However, she opposed a placement order until the child’s age of majority. [ 11 ] The child's father is not declared on his birth certificate.

However, DNA testing on October 24, 2019 allegedly confirmed the putative father’s identity. In fact, at the beginning of the hearing on January 29, 2020, the mother requested a third postponement to allow the father to become a party to the hearing. However, in the absence of any evidence of the father’s intention to become involved in the child’s life, the tribunal refused to postpone the hearing. [ 12 ] Me Fafard, on behalf of the child, made no admissions but argued that the evidence did not establish any of the exceptions allowing the tribunal to disregard the total period the child spent in foster care.

However, he suggested that a permanent plan did not necessarily imply an order until the child’s age of majority. [ 13 ] The Director filed Exhibits D-1 to D-10 as evidence: D-1: Child’s birth certificate; D-2: Letter from Marie Mc Manus, dated November 7, 2018 (filed under

section 292 C.C.P.); D-3: Court Report, signed by Amy Kasner, dated December 7, 2018; D-4: Addendum, signed by [social worker 1], dated April 24, 2019; D-5: Parental capacity assessment, signed by Danyan Edwards and Marie-Josée Mercier and curriculum vitae, en liasse dated April 11, 2019 (filed under

section 293 C.C.P.); D-6: Psychiatric assessment, signed by Dr. Daniel Frank, dated February 14, 2019 (filed under

section 292 C.C.P.); D-7: Addendum, signed by [social worker 1], dated October 2, 2019; D-8: Addendum, signed by [social worker 1], dated January 7, 2020; D-9: Mother’s Psychological Evaluation, signed by Diane Pérusse, dated August 16, 2019 (filed under

section 293 C.C.P.); D-10: Addendum, signed by [social worker 2], dated January 20, 2020. [ 14 ] The mother filed Exhibits M-1 to M-3 as evidence. [ 15 ] In

summary, at the outset of the hearing in December 2018, the mother denied any serious risk of neglect to her baby. [ 16 ] As it appears from the first Court Report [1] , at age 30, the mother felt prepared to care for her sixth child and claimed that her life had changed significantly since she lost custody of each of her five other children shortly after their birth (with the exception of one of her daughters who remained in her care until the age of four). [ 17 ] She claimed to be sober, stable and willing to learn whatever was necessary to respond to her child’s needs. [ 18 ] She was also seen to be affectionate with her child and has demonstrated her unwavering motivation to remain involved in her child’s life by attending all scheduled visits with the child and regularly inquiring about him. [ 19 ] However, despite the mother’s evident love and attachment to her son, as well as her strong willingness to assume her parental responsibilities, the evidence regarding her limitations is overwhelming. [ 20 ] All the assessments are consistent and reach similar conclusions. [ 21 ] The Psychiatric expertise dated February 14, 2020 indicates that the mother suffers from a personality disorder and that supervision of her access to the child remains necessary: In my opinion, she suffers from a personality disorder with anti-social and narcissistic elements.

Her insight, judgement and comprehension with respect to her parental capacities and past behavioral and psychological history is markedly deficient. […] Evidently, she has made some minor progress and has good ambition to improve but she remains in need of supervision, monitoring and possible parental education. A parental capacity assessment with psychological testing would be helpful going forward in this case. It is clear that at this time, ongoing supervision and control over Ms.

A’[s] access and custody of her child is necessary on the part of the DYP. [2] [ 22 ] Similarly, the Parental capacity assessment dated April 24, 2019 concludes: Although Ms. A can present as a capable and verbal woman and was motivated to attend the sessions with the undersigned, the current

assessment clearly indicates that she has psychological difficulties that impact on personal functioning as well as her parenting capacity. This mother believes that she is the only individual capable of supporting her child, whether or not others are willing to help (even medical professionals). [3] […] Ms. A believes that her misfortunes are always caused by others. The rigidity and inflexible character of these defenses translate to the existence of a personality disorder with antisocial, narcissistic, and paranoid traits.

This personality prevents her from gaining insight when confronted about potential problems. [4] [ 23 ] As a result, the author does not recommend that the child be returned to his mother’s care and also suggests that visits remain supervised. [ 24 ] The mother’s more recent Psychological evaluation dated August 16, 2019 confirms that, despite her genuine motivation to care for her son, she suffers from psychological traits that clearly limit her parental capacity: Madame A présente certaines capacités parentales, lesquelles peuvent toutefois être clairement limitées par d’autres caractéristiques psychologiques ; […] la tolérance aux frustrations parait limitée, et madame peut devenir impulsive, irritable, prendre au fond des décisions pour la recherche du plaisir ou l’évitement des souffrances, sans suffisamment se poser la question des impacts à moyen et long terme, y compris pour un enfant ; de la labilité émotive et des sautes d’humeur pourront se manifester ; madame peut dramatiser ce qui lui arrive ; elle tend à demeurer centrée sur ses envies et perceptions, y compris lorsque celles-ci ne sont pas très réalistes ; lorsque centrée sur elle-même, madame peut mal comprendre les émotions et réactions d’autrui ; [5] […] l’identification des besoins d’un enfant, de son bien-être affectif et de ce qui le rend possible, de même que de ce qui favorise son développement, semble limitée ; la capacité à assumer des responsabilités n’a pas été optimale pendant plusieurs années ; madame arrive relativement peu à identifier des solutions concrètes et efficaces lors des complications interpersonnelles le tout avec une certaine récurrence ; [6] [ 25 ] The numerous educators, social workers and medical professionals involved with the mother report countless concrete examples of the mother’s mood swings, erratic, suspicious and aggressive behavior, as well as her difficulties in accurately identifying her baby’s needs and responding to his cues. [ 26 ] The SIPPE worker assigned to support the mother testified that she felt threatened by her.

She terminated her involvement after six home visits, citing the mother’s lack of cooperation, as well as her intimidating and argumentative attitude [7] . [ 27 ] In addition, the mother repeatedly fails to implement suggested changes: The observations of both Ms. D [educator] and the undersigned support this conclusion as Ms. A does not engage her child during visits or respond to his cues in order to meet his needs neither does she stimulate him. In addition, she refuses to implement any strategies proposed by workers (including Ms. D, a permanency planning educator), Ms.

B, medical staff, or even the staff at the parenting program to improve the quality of her parenting so that she can keep her son safe and well cared for. [8] [ 28 ] Her Parental capacity assessment suggests an inability rather than an unwillingness to learn: Data on the WAIS-IV shows significant impairments in her cognitive functioning. […] These results indicate that her overall cognitive abilities are extremely low, and they border the intellectual disability range (2 nd percentile). [9] [ 29 ] The evidence therefore clearly establishes that the child faces a serious risk of neglect due to the mother’s impulsive, erratic behavior as well as her inability to meet his basic needs and to identify and respond to his cues and provide him with appropriate stimulation. [ 30 ] On the last day of the hearing, on January 29, 2020, the mother’s attitude changed dramatically.

She acknowledged that she has issues that she needs to address and claimed that she intends to take responsibility for her difficulties instead of blaming others. She described herself as “a work in progress” and reported that she began group therapy three weeks ago to work on impulsive decision- making and problem-solving, among other things. She claimed that she wants to be “free of her demons”, “to be normal”, that she is tired of feeling that everyone is against her.

She feels that her job as a mother is to work on herself and do what is necessary to care for her son. [ 31 ] She explained that she was so tired, overwhelmed and angry that she could not learn from any of the professionals assigned to work with her, but that has begun to change. [ 32 ] Now that the mother has acknowledged and accepted her challenges, she feels she can begin to make progress. [ 33 ] The evidence supported the mother’s claims to some extent. In fact, her aunt, E, started supervising weekly six hour visits

between the mother and the child in her home. Ms. E is an experienced educator whose presence and influence is admittedly positive both for the mother and for the child. [ 34 ] She attested to the mother’s progress and increased initiative and independence in responding to her son’s needs. The mother allows her son more space to explore and express himself. She is very affectionate, sings to him and arrives prepared for each visit.

She added that the child is happy to see his mother, appears content in her company and has no difficulty at the end of the visits. [ 35 ] The mother does not claim to be in a position to immediately independently care for her son.

However, despite the many months that the child has not been in her care, she opposes a placement order until he reaches the age of majority and requests an additional unspecified delay in which to demonstrate that the child could be returned to her care. [ 36 ] The mother’s affection and exemplary consistency in her commitment to her son are undoubtedly commendable, as is her newfound willingness to admit her challenges and to work to overcome them. [ 37 ] However, her efforts are very recent and only time will tell whether she will persevere and whether her efforts will lead to concrete changes in her abilities to care for her son.

Thus far, she has only attended two group therapy sessions. [ 38 ] The professionals who have assessed the mother believe there is no “quick fix” and that many years of therapy are required. [ 39 ] Consequently, despite the mother’s stated intentions, there is no evidence to suggest that the child could reasonably be expected to return to her care in the short term. [ 40 ] As for the child’s putative father, F, DNA testing allegedly recently confirmed his paternity. [ 41 ] However, he has taken no steps to become involved in the child’s life despite repeated attempts to communicate with him: On October 15 th , 2018 this caseworker called Mr.

F and left a message asking him to contact this caseworker. He has not responded. [10] [ 42 ] The child’s paternal grandmother also declined to become involved and indicated that her son was aware of the child’s birth: Mrs. G stated that her son is aware that Ms. A gave birth, however he does not want to be involved with the child. [11] [ 43 ] In December 2018, the putative father reached out to the caseworker but never followed up: The undersigned explained to Mr. F that he cannot see his son until he meets with the undersigned and then puts his name on the birth certificate.

To date, this case worker has not heard back from Mr. F. [12] [ 44 ] In July 2019, the putative paternal grandmother communicated with the worker and reiterated her son’s reluctance to become involved: She further stated that although her son would eventually want to be involved in his son’s life, he has no intention of doing so at the present time, as he is in a relationship with someone else and does not want to be involved with Ms. A. [13] [ 45 ] In January 2020, he still showed no sign of wanting to become involved: […] Mr.

F had not reached out to the undersigned for any form of contact with X. [14] [ 46 ] In short, the putative father has been completely absent from the child’s life. [ 47 ] The child, who is fifteen months old, has been in foster care for over fourteen months. [ 48 ]

Article 91.1 of the Youth Protection Act provides that if a child is under two years of age, the total period of foster care may not exceed twelve months unless an imminent return to his family is possible or other exceptions apply: 91.1 Period of foster care. If the tribunal orders a foster care measure under subparagraph j of the first paragraph of

section 91 , the total period of the foster care may not exceed (a) 12 months if the child is under two years of age on the date the order is made, […] Continuity of care. If the security or development of the child is still in danger at the expiry of the periods specified in the first paragraph, the tribunal must make an order aimed at ensuring continuity of care, stable relationships and stable living conditions corresponding to the child’s needs and age on a permanent basis . Imminent return to family.

However, the tribunal may disregard the periods specified in the first paragraph if it is expected that the child will be returned to his family in the short term, if the interest of the child requires it or for serious reasons, such as failure to provide the services agreed upon (emphasis added). [ 49 ] Under the circumstances, the legal delays have clearly expired. [ 50 ] Given the mother’s serious, chronic difficulties, given the long-term therapy required to begin to address her issues and given that she has only very recently acknowledged some of the challenges she faces, and given the putative father’s complete absence, the child’s imminent return to his parents is impossible.

[ 51 ] The child has been in the care of his current foster parent since December 2018. For over a year, Ms. B has provided for his needs on a daily basis and he is thriving in her care. [ 52 ] The foster mother testified at the hearing and confirmed her long-term commitment towards the child.

She has made significant personal sacrifices to provide for him and there is no reason to doubt her willingness or ability to continue to do so. [ 53 ] It is clearly in the child’s interest to benefit from the “continuity of care, stable relationships and stable living conditions” to which he is entitled on a permanent basis. [ 54 ] The evidence has not established any serious reason to deprive the child of the right to remain in the only stable home he has known for almost all of his life. [ 55 ] Having been removed from his mother’s care in November 2018 and there being no possibility of return to his parents’ care in the short term, the child is entitled to a permanent plan. [ 56 ] It is impossible to predict whether and when the mother might become able to care her child, and equally impossible to predict how the child might then react. [ 57 ] An order until he reaches the age of majority will ensure that he continues to benefit from the stability and continuity of care required for his development. [ 58 ] The tribunal finds no basis upon which to consider an order that would not extend to the child’s age of majority.

THEREFORE, THE COURT: [ 59 ] GRANTS the application; [ 60 ] DECLARES that the security and the development of the child, X , are in danger under

section 38 (b) (2) of the Youth Protection Act ; AS FOR THE MEASURES, THE COURT DEEMS IT TO BE IN THE CHILD 'S INTEREST TO ORDER THE FOLLOWING MEASURES: [ 61 ] ORDERS that the child remain entrusted to the foster home of Ms.

B; [ 62 ] ORDERS that the frequency and modality of contacts between the child and his mother be determined by agreement between the mother and the Director of Youth Protection, and in the absence of an agreement, that they be determined by the Director of Youth Protection, including supervision for as long as deemed necessary, at a minimal frequency of once per week; [ 63 ] TAKES JUDICIAL NOTICE that weekly six-hour contacts are currently supervised in Ms.

E’s home and RECOMMENDS that they continue; [ 64 ] ORDERS that the frequency and modality of contacts between the child and his maternal grandmother be determined by the Director of Youth Protection, including supervision, and occur only with the mother’s consent; [ 65 ] STRONGLY RECOMMENDS that the mother participate in therapy to address her mental health issues; [ 66 ] AUTHORIZES the Director of Youth Protection to exchange information regarding participation and attendance with treating professionals; [ 67 ] ORDERS that a person working for the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux A provide aid, counsel and assistance to the child and his family; [ 68 ] ENTRUSTS the situation of the child, X , to the Director of Youth Protection of the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux A , who shall then see that the measures are carried out; [ 69 ] THE WHOLE until he reaches the age of majority, on […], 2036.

Signed on February 13, 2020 TAYA DI PIETRO, Q.C.J. Me Dominique Douglas

Attorney for the Director of Youth Protection Me Alec Fafard Attorney for the child Me Cassandra Tanguay Attorney for the mother Hearing dates: December 13, 2018 and January 29, 2020. TD/vl