2021 NBCA 56, 2021 NBCA 56

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK S.H. APPELLANT 36-21-CA S.H. APPELANTE - and - - et - MINISTER OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT and C.H. RESPONDENTS MINISTRE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL et C.H. INTIMÉS S.H. v. Minister of Social Development and C.H., 2021 NBCA 56 S.H. c.

Ministre du Développement social et C.H., 2021 NBCA 56 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: March 16, 2021 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 16 mars 2021 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2021 NBQB 61 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2021 NBBR 61 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune

Appeal heard: November 30, 2021 Judgment rendered: December 2, 2021 Reasons delivered: February 3, 2022 Appel entendu : le 30 novembre 2021 Jugement rendu : le 2 décembre 2021 Motifs déposés : le 3 février 2022 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the Appellant: Ben Reentovich For the respondent the Minister of Social Development: Nancy Jane Martel C.H. did not appear Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Ben Reentovich Pour l’intimé le ministre du Développement social : Nancy Jane Martel C.H. n’a pas comparu THE COURT On December 2, 2021, the Court dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow.

These reasons are set out in the accompanying text. LA COUR Le 2 décembre 2021, la Cour a rejeté l’appel et a indiqué que les motifs suivraient. Ces motifs sont exposés dans le texte qui suit.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction and Background [ 1 ] S.H. appeals a 421-paragraph decision in which permanent guardianship of five young children was granted to the Minister of Social Development (the “Minister”), with a right of access reserved between the mother and the children. The biological father did not participate in the guardianship hearing, nor at the appeal hearing. The order issued pursuant to the Family Services Act , S.N.B. 1980, c. F.-2.2 (the “ Act ”).

The five children were nine, eight, seven, six and two years of age when the decision was rendered. [ 2 ] This appeal concerns two main complaints. One prompts the Court to consider whether, or not, a judge is required to dismiss or delay guardianship applications until the twenty-four-month limit prescribed in the Act has expired, when there is evidence the parents may make further progress as a result of the measures employed by the Minister.

The other prompts a discussion concerning the role of counsel or responsible spokespersons who are appointed to represent children in child protection hearings. [ 3 ] In October 2011, as a result of homelessness and neglect, a three-month custody order issued concerning the oldest child, who was then four months old. The child was returned to parental care when she was seven months old. A file with the Department of Social Development remained open until January 2013 when the Department could no longer locate the family. By then, there were three children.

Another child protection file was open from April 2013 to March 2016, because of concerns relating to homelessness and intimate partner violence. In March 2014, a protective care order issued with respect to the children who were three, two and under the age of one year. A six-month custody order extension issued in September 2014 until March 2015 when the children were returned to the care of S.H. and C.H. In September 2017, complaints of intimate partner violence were again raised, and a supervisory order issued in November for the four children, who were then six, five, four and two years of age.

By 2019, a fifth child had been born. On September 10, 2019, all five children were taken into protective care in New Brunswick following their return from British Columbia pursuant to an interprovincial agreement. They had been in the care of the Ministry of Child Services of British Columbia from September 2018 to September 2019. [ 4 ] On September 17, 2019, the application for guardianship was filed. By the time the application was heard, in November 2020, the children had been in the Minster's care for fifteen months, or twenty-seven months if one considers the time they were in care in British Columbia.

The Minister’s primary concerns at that time were that: 1. There had been long-standing child protection involvement with the family when they resided in New Brunswick; 2. The children suffered from academic, emotional and developmental problems; 3. Safety plans that had been put in place had been violated; 4. The children had been in care in the province of British Columbia from September 2018 to September 2019, and they had been in the care of the Minister in New Brunswick since September 2019; 5. The youngest child had been in the care of the Minister since birth; 6.

The mother did not have a stable living situation; and

7. The mother had left an abusive relationship and struggled to live on her own. [ 5 ] The following interim court orders issued following the filing of the Minister’s application: 1. Effective September 19, 2019, the children were subject to a protective care order, to which the mother had consented; 2. On October 22, 2019, the judge set a date for a hearing concerning the Minister’s request that affidavits filed in earlier proceedings would be considered under s. 9 of the Act , and that certain evidence would be heard by way of video conference; 3.

On November 20, 2019, a Procedural Order issued requiring both parties to provide their dates of availability for a one-hour hearing in December 2019, January 2020 and February 2020 to address procedural issues; 4. On January 13, 2020, an order issued concerning the testimony of certain witnesses by video conference and directing that seven affidavits taken from previous proceedings between the years 2014 and 2017 be considered under s. 9 of the Act ; and 5. On June 10, 2020, an order issued setting the case down for trial, starting November 23, 2020.

Instructions were given concerning whether, or not, a G -hearing (for the appointment of state funded counsel) might be required for the father. [ 6 ] In all, eighteen witnesses testified.

They included three psychologists, the children’s foster parents, a social worker who appeared from British Columbia by video conference, child protection social workers who were involved with this family, family support workers, a mental health counsellor and domestic violence outreach counsellors, a skills link coordinator with the John Howard Society, and finally, the mother. [ 7 ] Common concerns emerged from the evidence of the social workers and other professionals who were engaged with this family. They can be summarized as follows: a. Inconsistent parenting; b. Lack of discipline; c.

Intimate partner violence; d. Lack of adequate housing and homelessness; e. Safety issues; f. Poor nutrition; g. Lack of basic necessities for the children; and h. Disruptions in the children’s educations. [ 8 ] Some of the most disturbing testimony was provided by a social worker from British Columbia who had conducted a home visit in September 2018.

Despite having signed a plan that prohibited him from residing with the mother and the children, the father was still residing with them, and there was evidence of domestic abuse against both the mother and the children. [ 9 ] The social worker testified that, when she entered the residence, she saw dirty dishes everywhere, there were bugs crawling in the bathroom, the children were “filthy,” clothing was kept in garbage bags, minimal food was present, there was a “bong” on the kitchen counter, and the children were covered in lice and bed bug bites.

She testified the children were sleeping on mattresses on the floor, a couch and a love seat. When she shone a light on the couch, she observed a “wave” of bed bugs that moved in the opposite direction. The children had lice nests on the backs of their necks. They were immediately placed in care.

[ 10 ] The judge conducted a thorough review of the extensive evidence. It is apparent she was aware of the history of this case and she considered it. Her treatment of the facts is not in dispute. In granting the guardianship order, she applied the evidence and tied it to each of the criteria set out in s. 1 of the Act , as she was required to do. III. Grounds of Appeal [ 11 ] The appellant’s Supplementary Notice of Appeal sets out three grounds of appeal. The appellant contends:

a) the judge erred in principle when she granted guardianship to the Minister because a “lesser” order was available and there was a likelihood of parent-child reunification if the appellant were given “more time;”

b) the judge erred in not considering COVID restrictions as an exceptional circumstance when she calculated the total time the children had spent in the care of the Minister; and

c) the judge erred in principle when she did not address the divergence between the children’s views and preferences and the “position” taken by counsel for the children. IV. Standard of Review [ 12 ] Deference is the governing standard of review in cases where child custody is decided. The scope for appellate review is narrow. The appellate mandate is not to reweigh the evidence. The weighing of the evidence is in the purview of the trier of fact.

If it is concluded the trial judge’s decision “has no factual merit or was based on an error in principle, a failure to consider all relevant factors or the consideration of an irrelevant factor,” appellate intervention is warranted (see Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires) v. A.N. et Y.N. , 2003 NBCA 45 , 264 N.B.R. (2d) 80 , per Drapeau C.J.N.B., as he then was, at para. 11). The Court has since followed and applied this principle (see C.A. v. Minister of Families and Children , 2018 NBCA 67 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 246 (QL) , at paras. 10 to 13 ). V. Analysis A.

Did the judge err in not granting a “lesser order?” [ 13 ] On this first ground of appeal, the mother argues the judge erred in law by not granting a further custody order to permit her more time to make the changes deemed necessary in order for her to successfully parent the children. As stated, the children had been in the Minister’s care in New Brunswick for fifteen months. There was some evidence the mother was making progress and was fully participating in the various services being offered to her.

The judge acknowledged the mother had made some progress; however, she defaulted to the best interests of the children analysis in deciding the children needed permanency. On this issue, she wrote: “It is possible S.H. might be able to make some further progress over the course of another six to nine months. However, I do not believe it would be in the children’s best interests to prolong their time in the care of the Minister, under a further Custody Order, for an uncertain outcome” (para. 408).

She added: “I recognize the impact a guardianship order will likely have, especially on the three oldest children, who are aware of what is happening and have expressed their strong wish to live with their mother. However, it is outweighed by the children’s need for permanency at this point in time. The Minister’s plan will better provide the children with the stability and security they require and ensure their respective needs are met.

I find it is in the children’s best interests that guardianship be granted” (para. 410). [ 14 ] Robertson J.A. discussed s. 55(2) in The Minister of Family and Community Services v. S.B ., 2008 NBCA 16 , 327 N.B.R. (2d) 101 . The Act prescribes a period of twenty-four months during which a parent will be required to demonstrate that he or she can successfully parent a child while the child remains in the custody of the Minister. Further extensions of interim custody orders are prohibited past that time (paras. 6 and 16).

In this case, the mother argued, as noted, that she should have been granted the additional nine months. She argues that the judge’s use of the words, “uncertain outcome,” can be interpreted to mean there was a doubt as to whether, or not, she could make further progress in her parenting skills, and that she was entitled to the benefit of that doubt, because of the permanent nature of a guardianship order. She contends the judge was required, as a matter of law, to find that all other measures had failed before she granted the order.

[15] If we were to accept the mother’s submission, we would be reweighing the evidence on which the judge basedher decision that a guardianship order was then in the best interests of the children. We would be compelled to conclude the judge erredin her analysis. We would be adopting an

interpretation of the Act that would prohibit the Minister, in these cases, from proving its casefor a guardianship order until the twenty-four-month period has elapsed when there is evidence of some progress in parenting skills. Themother was unable to provide us with jurisprudence to support this argument and, with respect, it is rejected. In fact, in S.G. and E.S. v.Minister of Families and Children, 2019 NBCA 66, [2019] N.B.J. No. 240 (QL), Green J.A. specifically discussed this point.

In thatcase, the child had already been in the Minister’s care for twenty four months but, in upholding the judge’s decision to grant theguardianship order, Green J.A. observed, although the application judge acknowledged the mother’s progress with respect to findinghousing, maintaining a clean home, budgeting, spending, and meal planning, and the strong bond between the mother and the child, thejudge’s “preoccupation” was with the mother’s parenting skills and her ability to ensure the child’s safety (para. 18). [16] Section 55(2) of the Act reads: Custody order 55(2) The court may extend an order madeunder subsection (1) for additional periods ofup to six months each, up to a maximum oftwenty-four consecutive months including theperiod of the initial order and any periodduring which the child was in care under acustody agreement.

Ordonnance de garde 55(2) La cour peut proroger pour des périodessupplémentaires de six mois chacune aumaximum une ordonnance rendue enapplication du paragraphe (1), mais le totaldes périodes, y compris la période initiale ettoute période pendant laquelle l’enfant a étépris en charge en vertu d’une entente de gardene doit pas dépasser vingt-quatre moisconsécutifs. [17] The twenty-four-month rule is a maximum period within which to extend a custody order.

The judge wasaware the children had been in the care of the Minister of Child Services in British Columbia since September 2018, prior to beingreturned to New Brunswick and placed immediately in the Minister’s care on September 10, 2019. She observed the children had been inthe combined care of child protection authorities for over twenty-four consecutive months (para. 406). She went on to write: The principle at play in

section 55, as was expressed by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in The Minister of Family and CommunityServices v. S.B., 2008 NBCA 16 [327 N.B.R. (2d) 101], is that there is a time limit on the parent to demonstrate the ability to meet thechildren’s needs. This remains relevant in my view and cannot be ignored. [para. 407] I agree. [18] In this case, abundant historical evidence chronicled child neglect and domestic violence dating back to 2011.

Iagree with the mother’s submission that the Act requires the state to attempt family reunification before any other measures are taken topermanently remove children from parental care. In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. C. (G.C.), (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1073, [1988] S.C.J. No.48 (QL), L’Heureux-Dubé J. acknowledged the

preamble to the Act declaresthat children should only be removed from parental care either partly or entirely when all other measures are inappropriate (para. 13 citedto QL). This is the distinction. The mother submits that all other measures must have failed before the children can be permanentlyremoved from her care. This is not how I interpret the law.

The Act states that children should only be removed from parental supervisionin accordance with the provisions of the Act. [19] The mother cited some lower court decisions where the parents were granted additional time to make progressin their rehabilitation; however, there was no evidence in this case that there remained a prospect for reunification, as there was in thosecases. This opinion is supported by the testimony of witnesses called by the Minister. Here, I draw particular attention to the evidence ofsocial worker Ms. Scott and to Dr.

Campbell’s report, where, under the heading “Summary and Conclusion,” she opined: However, there continues to be sub-threshold personality dynamics that are rooted in her past victimization and personal negativechildhood experiences that can throw her off her course of progress should she not remain vigilant to them. These dynamics relate to her

attachment relations with significant others, her tendency to be over-confident and overly optimistic about solutions to problems orminimization of problems, and her capacity to assuming all the realistic responsibilities that come from being self-reliant. [20] The judge reviewed the mother’s living arrangements with an emphasis on the fact she re-partnered with a manwho had a criminal record and was observed by the social workers, yelling, screaming, and threatening the mother. The judge noted themother left the children in British Columbia for two months while she travelled across Canada to New Brunswick.

The judge referred toDr. Campbell’s report, which noted that, although the mother had made progress in the last two years, S.H. minimized the trauma thechildren experienced and her “role in it.” The judge acknowledged that, in Dr. Campbell’s opinion, the mother had a moderate likelihoodof a successful outcome (para. 166). [21] The judge observed the mother had been plagued with chronic and severe parenting issues since 2011 and hadnever parented all five children at the same time (paras. 396-397). She noted that, in Dr. Campbell’s opinion, the mother would needCognitive Behavioural Therapy.

She found there was no evidence the mother was able to meet the children’s mental, physical andemotional health needs or provide them with a secure and stable environment (para. 353). [22] Paragraph (

e) of the definition “best interests of the child” in s. 1 of the Act requires a judge to consider themerits of any plan proposed by the Minister. It is clear the judge carefully weighed the return of the children to the mother’s care againstthe merits of the plan proposed by the Minister for their long-term care. She decided it was in their best interests to provide them withthe stability they needed at that time, rather than waiting. I see no error in the judge’s decision not to grant an extension of the custodyorder. This decision was hers to make, and it is entitled to deference.

This ground of appeal has no merit. B. Did the judge err in not considering the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions imposed? [23] On this ground, the mother argues the judge erred in principle when she failed to consider the impact of theCOVID-19 restrictions on the access visits the children had with her, as well as her ability to locate suitable housing. Physical visitsbetween the mother and the children were terminated between March 2020 and May 2020; however, the mother continued to havetelephone access with the children. The regular

schedule resumed in June 2020. During this period, the mother continued to receivesupport services that had been previously arranged by the Minister. Notably, the mother did not locate suitable housing until two monthsbefore the hearing. The judge took note of the cumulative time the children had been out of their mother’s care (paras. 324, 328, 331, 334and 337). [24] When one considers the evidence of Dr. Campbell, in combination with the evidence of the lead social worker,Ms.

Scott, it is evident the interruption in regular visits between the months of March and May 2020, would not have altered the result(see paras. 12-16 of Ms. Scott’s affidavit sworn October 5, 2020). The judge took particular care to summarize Ms. Scott’s testimonystarting at para. 299 of her reasons. [25] The sole consideration in these cases is the best interests of the child. Section 53(2) of the Act makes it clearthat, when disposing of an application for guardianship, the court shall place the child’s best interests above all other considerations.

TheSupreme Court has instructed that the term “best interests” encompasses not only the physical and economic well-being of a child, butalso his or her emotional, psychological, intellectual and moral well-being and that the analysis is contextual (see Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, [1993] S.C.J.

No. 112 (QL), at paras. 70 and 80). [26] In light of the judge’s findings that to delay the guardianship order would not be in the best interests of thechildren (paras. 317-394), and that there was uncertainty whether the mother would be able to successfully parent the children, it is myopinion the interruption in the visits due to the COVID-19 restrictions did not affect the result. This ground of appeal is thereforedismissed. C.

The role of counsel for the children [27] I start by quoting former Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, who wrote: “In order to find out what is in the bestinterests of the children, it seems logical to find out what children think. How can you assess a child’s best interests without hearing fromthe child?” (see “Children and the Legal Process: Changing the Rules of Evidence” (1992) 50 The Advocate 727).

[ 28 ] On December 12, 1991, Canada ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child , 20 November 1989, Can. T.S 1992 No.

Article 12 reads: 1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 1.

Les Etats parties garantissent à l’enfant qui est capable de discernement le droit d’exprimer librement son opinion sur toute question l’intéressant, les opinions de l’enfant étant dûment prises en considération eu égard à son âge et à son degré de maturité. 2.

A cette fin, on donnera notamment à l’enfant la possibilité d’être entendu dans toute procédure judiciaire ou administrative l’intéressant, soit directement, soit par l’intermédiaire d’un représentant ou d’une organisation approprié, de façon compatible avec les règles de procédure de la législation nationale. [ 29 ] Since that time, courts have attempted to give effect to the principles set out in the Convention.

Section 6 of the Act establishes the statutory authority for the consideration of the wishes of a child in New Brunswick. It reads:

Consideration of wishes of child 6

(1) In the exercise of any authority under this Act given to any person to make a decision that affects a child, the child’s wishes, where they can be expressed and where the child is capable of understanding the nature of any choices that may be available to him, shall be given consideration in determining his interests and concerns, and the interests and concerns of the child shall be given consideration as distinct interests and concerns, separate from those of any other person. 6

(2) Where the wishes of a child have not been or cannot be expressed or the child is incapable of understanding the nature of the choices that may be available to him, the Minister shall make every effort to identify the child’s interests and concerns and shall give consideration to them as distinct interests and concerns separate from those of any other person. 6

(3) A person who is authorized under this Act to make a decision that affects a child may, in order to comply with subsection (1), consult directly with the child, in which case he shall do so in camera unless he determines that to do so would not be in the best interests of the child; and in consulting with the child in camera the person may exclude any person, including any party to a proceeding and his counsel, from participating in or observing the consultation. 6

(4) In any matter or proceeding under this Act affecting a child, whether before a court or any person having authority to make a decision that affects a child, the child has the right to be heard either on his own behalf or through his parent or another responsible spokesman. 6

(5) In any proceeding under this Act the court may waive any requirement that the child appear before the court where it is of the opinion that it would be in the best interests of the child to do so and the court is satisfied that the interests and concerns of the child with respect to the matter before the court will not be thereby prejudiced. Prise en considération des vœux de l’enfant 6

(1) Lorsqu’une personne a reçu autorité en application de la présente loi pour prendre une décision qui touche un enfant et qu’elle exerce cette autorité, les vœux de l’enfant, s’ils peuvent être exprimés et si l’enfant est capable de comprendre la nature d’un choix qui s’offre à lui, doivent être pris en considération pour déterminer les intérêts et préoccupations de l’enfant et elle doit prendre en considération ces intérêts et préoccupations distinctement et séparément de ceux de toute autre personne. 6

(2) Lorsque les vœux d’un enfant n’ont pas été exprimés ou ne peuvent l’être ou que l’enfant est incapable de comprendre la nature d’un choix qui s’offre à lui, le ministre doit tout faire pour déterminer les intérêts et préoccupations de l’enfant et il doit les prendre en considération distinctement et séparément de ceux de toute autre personne. 6

(3) Une personne autorisée par la présente loi à prendre une décision qui touche un enfant peut, pour se conformer au paragraphe (1), consulter directement l’enfant et, sauf si elle juge que ce ne serait pas dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, elle le consulte alors à huis clos et peut interdire à toute personne,

partie ou non à une procédure, et à son avocat, de participer à la consultation ou d’observer celle-ci. 6

(4) Dans toute question ou procédure qui touche un enfant et dont une cour ou toute personne autorisée à prendre une décision qui touche un enfant est saisie en vertu de la présente loi, l’enfant a le droit d’être entendu personnellement ou par la voix de son parent ou d’un autre porte-parole responsable. 6

(5) Dans toute procédure intentée en application de la présente loi, la cour peut renoncer à exiger que l’enfant comparaisse devant elle, si elle estime que c’est dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant et si elle est convaincue que les intérêts et préoccupations de ce dernier à l’égard de la question portée devant elle n’en souffriront pas. [ 30 ]

Section 7 allows for the appointment of legal counsel or a responsible spokesperson for a child in proceedings when the Minister is a party. It reads, in part:

Role of Minister in custody proceedings 7 In any proceeding with respect to the custody of a child, whether under this or any other Act , the court shall, […] (

b) where the Minister is a party to the proceeding and the court is of the opinion that the interests and concerns of the child should be represented by counsel or by a responsible spokesman, advise the Attorney- General that in his opinion counsel or a responsible spokesman should be made available to assist in the representation of the child’s interests and concerns. Rôle du ministre dans les procédures de garde 7 Dans toute procédure relative à la garde d’un enfant en application de la présente ou de toute autre loi, […]

b) lorsque le ministre est

partie à la procédure et que la cour estime qu’un avocat ou porte- parole responsable devrait exposer les intérêts et préoccupations de l’enfant, la cour informe le procureur général qu’à son avis, un avocat ou porte-parole responsable devrait être disponible à cette fin. [ 31 ]

Section 7.1 sets out the criteria to be considered before making the appointment. They are:

Appointment of counsel 7.1

(1) The court shall consider the following in order to determine whether counsel should be made available under paragraph 7(b): (

a) whether the child is 12 years of age or older; (

b) whether the child’s wishes, where they can be expressed and where the child is capable of understanding the nature of any choices that may be available to him or her, have been given consideration in determining his or her interests and concerns; (

c) whether the Minister has been able to identify the child’s interests and concerns; (

d) whether the interests and concerns of the child and those of the Minister differ; (

e) whether counsel is better able to identify the child’s interests and concerns; and (

f) any other factors the court considers relevant. 7.1

(2) Upon advising the Attorney General that counsel should be made available under paragraph 7(b), the court shall provide the reasons justifying the decision. Nomination d’un avocat 7.1

(1) Afin de déterminer si un avocat devrait être disponible en vertu de l’alinéa 7b), la cour tient compte des facteurs suivants :

a) si l’enfant est âgé de 12 ans ou plus;

b) si les voeux de l’enfant, qui peut les exprimer et qui est capable de comprendre la nature des choix qui peuvent s’offrir à lui, ont été pris en considération pour déterminer ses intérêts et ses préoccupations;

c) si le ministre a pu déterminer les intérêts et les préoccupations de l’enfant;

d) si les intérêts et les préoccupations de l’enfant et ceux du ministre diffèrent;

e) si un avocat est mieux placé pour déterminer les intérêts et les préoccupations de l’enfant;

f) tous autres facteurs qu’elle estime pertinents. 7.1

(2) Lorsqu’elle informe le procureur général qu’un avocat devrait être disponible en vertu de l’alinéa 7b), la cour motive sa décision. [ 32 ] The social policy reason behind the appointment of counsel for children in child custody hearings is discussed in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) , 2009 SCC 30 , [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 . The Supreme Court acknowledged there is a compelling argument that children of sufficient maturity have a constitutional right to have their views put before the court, by reason of the fact their “liberty and security” of the person is affected.

The Act specifically refers to the views and preferences of children as one criterion to be considered in a child custody dispute; however, they are not determinative. [ 33 ] On August 5, 2020, counsel for the three older was appointed so their interests, not their views and preferences, could be represented during the proceedings. Their views and preferences were canvassed as the result of a court ordered Psychological Voice of the Child Report authored by psychologist Mr. Robert Doucet dated November 19, 2020. Mr.

Doucet testified and reiterated what he stated in his report that all three of the older children “expressed in no uncertain terms on both visits that they wish to return and live with their mother.” Mr. Doucet correctly did not offer an opinion whether their preferences were in their best interests. He was confident the children had the maturity to clearly express their views and they did so openly and without hesitation. [ 34 ] The mother complains that counsel for the children exceeded his role when he urged the judge to grant the guardianship order.

While not saying so specifically, the mother implies the children’s counsel overstepped his role and weighed into the merits of the Minister’s case when he proffered an opinion as to what would be in the children’s best interests, instead of advocating for

their views and preferences.

The mother contends the children were effectively unrepresented as a result, and the judge, once she realized from the pre-trial brief what position the children’s lawyer was taking, was required to ask him to justify why he was taking a position contrary to the children’s views, and to then determine that either his participation was not necessary, or, at a very minimum, the order of cross-examination “could” have been changed The mother submits because the Act does not particularize their role, the Court should offer guidance. [ 35 ] The mother’s complaint shines a spotlight on this area of the law and begs the question: what is the role of children’s counsel in these cases?

The Minister acknowledges the Act does not offer guidance on what their role should be. I agree. In Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires v. J.D. et E.S. , 2001 NBCA 43 , 238 N.B.R. (2d) 201 , when asked to provide direction concerning the role of children’s counsel in child protection hearings, this Court observed the Act did not offer guidance.

Following that decision, s. 7.1 of the Act was proclaimed, which, as noted, deals with the criteria for the appointment of children’s counsel, but does not define their actual role. [ 36 ] In 2013, Professor Nicholas Bala, Professor Rachel Birnbaum and Dr. Lorne Bertrand co-authored a paper entitled “ Controversy about the Role of Children’s Lawyers: Advocate or Best Interests Guardian? Comparing Practices in Two Canadian Jurisdictions with Different Policies for Lawyers ” (2013) 51:4 Fam. Ct. Rev. 681.

They start by observing the increasing number of court orders appointing legal representation for children in child custody disputes, and add: […] there is profound controversy over the role that lawyers for children should play in family proceedings.

Should they play the traditional role of lawyers, acting on the “instructions” of their child clients, or are they to be “friends of the court,” ensuring that all relevant evidence is available but not advocating for any position, or is the role to advocate for the best interests of the child based on the lawyer’s assessment of the proper position to advocate? [p. 681] [ 37 ] Children’s counsel should ensure the hearing judge has all relevant information concerning the children, so that a fulsome analysis of the best interests of the child can be undertaken.

It is now generally accepted the views and preferences of children are best obtained by means of a professional engaged for that purpose, whose voice of the child report can form part of the record and who can be subject to cross-examination, as occurred in this case.

What emerges from the jurisprudence is that child legal representation is best viewed as allowing the child’s voice to be heard, while protecting the child from the arbitrary decision-making of the court regarding his or her best interests. [ 38 ] Lawyers who are retained as instructional legal counsel for a child adopt a role distinct from that of amicus curiae (friend of the court) and guardian ad litem . They have a relationship with a child on the same ethical and professional responsibility principles as those that apply to adult clients (see Bala, Birnbaum and Bertrand, at p. 683).

However, in those cases where the child is too young, or not able to provide instructions, the role becomes one of ensuring a fair process and that the court has all relevant evidence concerning the child. [ 39 ] New Brunswick has yet to develop child representation policies and programs, especially for child protection cases, as have been developed elsewhere in Canada. In Ontario, as an example, the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 , S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 , sets out that, in child protection proceedings, the role of the children’s lawyer is that of a legal representative.

Section 78(2) states the court “shall” make the appointment “ as soon as practicable after the commencement of the proceeding ” but “may” make it “ at any later stage in the proceeding,” if it is determined legal representation is desirable.

The Family Law Rules of Ontario also permit the court to appoint a lawyer to represent a child who is not a party to a proceeding pursuant to Rule 4(7) , and this gives the child the rights of a party, to fully participate in the proceedings. [ 40 ] In Alberta, the Office of the Child and Youth Advocate has published the Legal Representation for Children and Youth Policy Manual , revised April 1,

Section 4.1 sets out the role of counsel and describes their representation as one of instructional advocacy. When instructional advocacy is not possible due to the age of the child or his or her mental capacity, the role becomes that of ensuring the interests and needs of the child are properly before the court.

The policy manual contains detailed instructions concerning how legal counsel for children is to discharge this role. [ 41 ] The Canadian Bar Association has published, under its Child Rights Toolkit , a guide on children’s legal representation in which it notes that representing a child’s interests should not be confused with best interests advocacy. It specifically states that a child’s interests are the individual child’s subjective “interests,” not interests determined by some other individual or counsel’s own opinion.

Similarly, the Government of Saskatchewan has prepared a document entitled Counsel for Children and Youth Program Manual , dated January 2016. Under s. 6.0, the role of counsel is set out and is described as that of instructional advocate. The manual states that, when acting as an instructional advocate, counsel is expected to consult with the child to obtain his or her views and

preferences, obtain the child’s consent before proceeding to advocate these interests on his or her behalf and report back to the child.Representing a child under the age of twelve does not necessarily justify a departure from the role of instructional advocate unless, as anexample, the child is a preverbal infant or has a mental impairment. [42] The Northwest Territories’ Office of the Children’s Lawyer offers another example. The Office’s Policy &Procedures Manual, adopted on February 12, 2021, provides guidance to counsel appointed to represent children. Under

section 5,“Expectations of Panel Lawyers,” the children’s lawyer is directed to represent the views and preferences of the child with the goal tohave decision makers consider them in reaching a decision regarding the best interests of the child. The

section also clearly sets out thelawyer’s need to remain neutral: “[Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”)] lawyers must at all times remain neutral and unbiased intheir dealings with other parties. Even if aspects of the OCL position align with that of another party, the OCL lawyer should not appearto be advancing the position of that party” (p. 17). [43] There have been fractional divides in Canada over the role of children’s counsel.

The Government of Canada,in its publication The Voice of the Child in Divorce, Custody and Access Proceedings (Department of Justice Canada, The Voice of theChild in Divorce, Custody and Access Proceedings, by Ronda Bessner (Background Paper), 2002), states: The judiciary in this country has offered little guidance on the subject of child representation in family law cases. The decisions renderedon this issue have been conflicting and, as a result, have exacerbated the confusion surrounding the circumstances in which a lawyershould be appointed for the child, as well as the precise function of child’s counsel.

As one observer writes: There have been fractional divides in Canada with respect to the proper role of counsel who represent a child in custody and accessproceedings. Moreover, wavering judicial

interpretations for the role of counsel has provided ambiguous and inconsistent precedence. [Ch. 2, p. 15] [44] The following decisions illustrate the above statement. In Strobridge v. Strobridge, (ON CA),[1994] O.J. No. 1247 (QL) (C.A.), Osborne J.A. concluded: Counsel retained [for the child] is entitled to file or call evidence and make submissions on all of the evidence. In my view, counsel is notentitled to express his or her personal opinion on any issue, including the children's best interests.

Nor is counsel entitled to become awitness and advise the court what the children’s access-related preferences are. If those preferences should be before the court, resortmust be had to the appropriate evidentiary means […]. [para. 36] [45] In M.F. c. J.L., [2002] J.Q. No. 480 (QL) (C.A.), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, [2002]C.S.C.R. No. 218 (QL), the court concluded that children’s counsel should adopt the advocate’s role, particularly when the child hasgiven clear direction, even if the lawyer disagrees.

In that case, a ten-year-old boy told his lawyer he did not want to see his father (paras.9 and 12). A psychologist concluded the child was being alienated by the mother (para. 13). The first lawyer appointed for the childplaced his views before the court, but declined to take a position (para. 14). A second lawyer was appointed and argued the best interestsof the child (paras. 15 and 33). On appeal, the court concluded that a lawyer representing a child must follow the child’s instructions,even in an alienation case.

Rothman J.A. wrote: […] if a child is sufficiently mature to express himself on a vital question such as custody or access by his parents, then he has the rightto be heard on that question and the right to have his wishes fairly put in evidence before the court. If the child has the capacity and thedesire to express his wishes, then that is a fundamental right that must be respected by counsel who represents him, whether or notcounsel may have a different personal opinion on the matter […] [para. 35] [46] In Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v. R.M., 2011 ABPC 244, [2011] A.J.

No.960 (QL), three young boys were apprehended by child protection authorities. The mother had a history of intimate partner violence andsubstance abuse and she had limited contact with the children following their apprehension. The judge in that case expressed concernsabout the role that legal counsel appointed for the children had adopted. The oldest child was just three-and-a-half-years of age.

Thejudge concluded: It is the role of counsel to not only advocate for the child’s wishes but also, at a minimum, to present evidence regarding the [child’s]physical, intellectual and psychological maturity, the child’s understanding of the facts and issues before the Court, the voluntariness ofthe child’s stated desires and the strength of the child’s wishes so that the Court is able to determine what weight to place on the child’s

wishes. [para. 131] [47] In B.L.S. (Re), 2013 ABPC 132, [2013] A.J. No. 459 (QL), Cook-Stanhope J. argued that counsel for the childis to thoroughly assess whether: […] (

a) the child can communicate clearly with counsel (this would coincide with the ability to articulate a preference, opinion or position ascontemplated in the Guidelines); (

b) the child can comprehend all the information relative to any decisions the child must make (this requires an assessment of the child'smental capacity, especially when evidence calls that capacity into question); (

c) the child is aware of and capable of appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making necessary decisions or failing tomake these; and (

d) the child is aware of and capable of appreciating the nature, context and consequences of the legal proceedings that affect them andthe impact they may have on the child. [Emphasis in original; para. 279] [48] She went on to opine: When counsel undertakes to act on behalf of a child they must strive to achieve a balance which recognizes not only the ability of thechild to articulate their wishes but also appreciates the child’s developmental, social, or psychological immaturity or educational deficitsand recognizes the child's historical social context.

Whether or not counsel’s role shifts from one of instructional advocacy to bestinterests, the Court’s role will remain the same, that is adjudicating on all of the evidence to ensure the best interests of a child prevails.[para. 280] [49] In Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, [2019] O.J. No. 4437 (QL), the court was primarily concerned with theapplication of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (“Hague Convention”).There were four children (aged 15, 13, 12 and 9 years) who had been raised in Germany but moved to Ontario.

The father wanted toreturn to Germany with the children and the mother wanted to remain in Ontario with them (para. 5). Prior to the hearing, an order issuedrequiring the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”), giving them full power to act for the children, includingadvising the court of the children’s views and preferences (para. 10). [50] On appeal, one of the grounds was whether, or not, the application judge erred by permitting OCL counsel togive evidence and advance legal argument from the counsel table.

In rejecting this ground, Tulloch J.A. writes: I reject the appellant’s argument that the OCL counsel exceeded the parameters of her role. The appellant’s submission misunderstandsthe role of OCL counsel. OCL counsel is not a mere cypher for the children’s views or a passive participant in the proceedings. As thiscourt recently confirmed in Ontario (Children’s Lawyer) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 ONCA 559, 141O.R. (3d) 481 (“OCL v. IPC”), at paras. 69, 98-100, 114, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A.

No. 360, OCL counsel acts as thelegal representative of the OCL’s child clients and owes them fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and attention to their interests. Itfollows, as this court established in Strobridge v. Strobridge, that OCL counsel may call evidence and make submissions on behalf of thechildren: (1994), (ON CA), 18 O.R. (3d) 753 (C.A.), at p. 764. That is what occurred in this case. Grace J.’s order gave OCL counsel “full power to act for the [...] child(ren),” including the rights tocall evidence and make legal submissions.

Campbell J.’s subsequent endorsement did not purport to rescind Grace J.’s order. Instead,Campbell J. merely specified the mode of presentation of the children’s evidence, namely that OCL counsel would present this evidencefrom the counsel table on consent. This court approved of this mode of presentation of the evidence in Strobridge v. Strobridge at p. 764.

[paras. 69-70] [ 51 ] In Ludwig , the order permitted OCL counsel to express the children’s views directly. That issue is not before this Court; however, Tulloch J.A. did weigh in on the question of whether, or not, children’s counsel should offer an opinion concerning their best interests. Tulloch J.A. writes: The question is thus whether OCL counsel stayed within the bounds of assessing the consistency, clarity, and independence of the children’s views to determine what position to take and then make submissions to the court on those factors, or whether she stepped into the realm of giving opinion evidence.

As this court held in Strobridge , at p. 764, while OCL counsel “is entitled to [...] make submissions on all the evidence [...] counsel is not entitled to express his or her personal opinion on any issue.” [para. 76] [ 52 ] He concluded that even if counsel had overstepped their role, no prejudice resulted: In any case, even if I had concluded that OCL counsel crossed the line into giving opinion evidence, I am not convinced that any prejudice to the appellant would have flowed from this.

The application judge did not analyze the clarity, consistency, and independence of the children’s views in any detail, and there is no indication in her reasons that she improperly relied on the comments of OCL counsel as opinion evidence. [para. 82] [ 53 ] In my view, this is the fundamental question. It would constitute reversible error should a judge default to the opinion proffered by children’s counsel concerning their best interests. In my view, children’s counsel should not offer a personal opinion on the very issue the court is tasked to decide.

The best interests assessment is that of the application judge. [ 54 ] Professors Nicholas Bala and Rachel Birnbaum, in their paper entitled “ Rethinking the Role of Lawyers for Children: Child Representation in Canadian Family Relationship Cases ” (2018) 59: 4 C. de D. 787, opine there should be a presumption that counsel will be an “instructional advocate, but if a child lacks the capacity or willingness to instruct counsel, counsel should be an advocate for the rights and interests of the child” (pp. 787-788).

They observe that regardless of the role adopted, counsel for a child also has the responsibility to introduce relevant evidence that would not otherwise be before the Court. I agree. Their conclusion is that governments and Law Societies should develop more comprehensive, child-focused, contextual and cost-efficient programs to ensure children can participate in the family justice process, including recognition of the importance and limitations that lawyers for children have in family and child welfare proceedings. I agree. [ 55 ] In D.S. and A.C. v.

The Minister of Social Development , 2021 NBCA 25 , [2021] N.B.J. No. 128 (QL) , this Court observed that although the Act does not particularize the role of legal counsel for children (para. 32), counsel for children has the right to receive disclosure, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to fully participate in the proceedings and to make recommendations to the court (paras. 31 and 33). We concluded that the role of the children’s lawyer is to represent a child’s interests, not to be confused with best interests advocacy: Advocating on behalf of a client is the traditional role of children’s counsel.

The goal is to protect the child’s legal rights through the observance of proper procedures, the presentation of technical questions of law, the testing of the evidence, and, depending on the age of the child, to express his or her wishes (see J.E.S.D. v. Y.E.P. , 2018 BCCA 286 , [2018] B.C.J. No. 1373 (QL)). The answer to the appellants’ contention that a court must summarize best interests submissions made on behalf of a child, is found not only in the M.F. decision, but also in an

article authored by Professor Nicholas Bala, entitled: “ Child Representation in Alberta: Role and Responsibilities of Counsel for the Child in Family Proceedings ” (2006), 43: 4 Alta. L.R. 845 . He describes the role of children’s counsel in child protection hearings as that of representing a child’s “interests,” not to be confused with best interests advocacy. I agree. In my opinion, once legal counsel for the children have fully participated in a hearing, and they have had the opportunity to effectively represent the rights and interests of the children, they have fulfilled their role.

A judge should consider the submissions made on behalf of the children, but he or she is under no obligation to refer to, to recite, or to follow them. The judicial role is to review the evidence, to make findings of fact based on that evidence, to apply proper legal principles and render a decision that offers justification, intelligibility and transparency. The fact a judge has not referred to the submissions made by counsel for the children is not an error in law in my view. I would therefore dismiss this ground of appeal.

[paras. 34-36] [ 56 ] As noted, in this case, the children’s legal counsel was not asked to place the children’s views before the court because Mr. Doucet testified to his findings in that regard. Counsel’s role was to ensure there was a fair process, to fully participate at the hearing and to cross-examine the Minister’s witnesses to draw out evidence that would assist the court in determining the children’s long-term best interests.

I have reviewed the eight-volume transcript with a particular focus on the cross-examinations conducted by the children’s counsel as well as his submissions, and I have also read the pre-hearing briefs that were filed. [ 57 ] There is no doubt the children’s legal counsel crossed the line in his brief and submissions on behalf of the children when he rendered an opinion that supported the guardianship order. With respect, this fell outside the scope of his role, all good intentions aside. The judge acknowledged the fact the children’s counsel supported the guardianship order, and that was all (para. 311).

The mother argues the judge should have observed that he overstepped his role, and she should have case managed as a result, or, at the very least, she should have noted this in her reasons. She contends the children’s counsel undermined her case. [ 58 ] I cannot agree: first, the judge was alive to the children’s views and preferences and referred to Mr. Doucet’s Voice of the Child Report and evidence in her decision (paras. 368-372). However, as the Minister submits, those views and preferences were but one consideration under the best interests of the child analysis.

Second, as stated in D.S. and A.C. , a judge is not required to refer to, to recite, or to follow the submissions made by counsel for the children, and it is not an error in law to fail to refer to them. Third, children’s counsel does not usurp the fact-finding role of the hearing judge. Counsel must not be the one to make credibility findings or conduct a best interests of the child analysis. Children’s counsel advocates for the rights and interests of children and draws out evidence to further illuminate their state. The best interests analysis remains in the exclusive domain of the hearing judge.

Children’s counsel should not opine on the very issue the judge is required to decide. [ 59 ] For the above reasons, I agree the children’s counsel overstepped his role in this case, but I do not agree the judge committed reversible error in failing to address this issue in her reasons, nor should she have prevented their counsel from participating. As noted, I have read the cross-examinations conducted by counsel for the children. It is clear he probed the witnesses and drew out evidence that was not otherwise before the court, and I fail to see how this affected the result.

I do not agree the mother’s case was undermined or prejudiced because of it. I note further that this issue was never raised during opening remarks, nor in closing submissions. This ground of appeal is therefore dismissed. V. Disposition [ 60 ] It is for these reasons that, on December 2, 2021, I joined my colleagues in dismissing the appeal. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD I. Introduction et contexte [1] S.H. interjette appel d’une décision de 421 paragraphes ayant accordé à

titre permanent la tutelle de cinq jeunes enfants au ministre du Développement social (le Ministre) et réservé un droit de visite à la mère et aux enfants. Le père biologique n’a participé ni à l’audience de tutelle ni à l’audience d’appel. L’ordonnance de tutelle a été rendue en vertu de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F.-2.2 (la Loi ). Les cinq enfants avaient respectivement neuf, huit, sept, six et deux ans au moment où la décision a été rendue. [2] Deux griefs principaux de S.H. sont à l’origine de l’appel. L’un engage la Cour à examiner si un juge doit ou

non rejeter une demande de tutelle, ou en reporter l’audition, tant que la limite de vingt-quatre mois prescrite par la Loi n’est pas atteinte, s’il ressort de la preuve offerte que les parents pourraient progresser davantage grâce à des mesures mises en œuvre par le Ministre.

L’autre engage à discuter du rôle des avocats ou des porte-parole responsables nommés pour représenter les enfants aux audiences portant sur leur protection. [3] En octobre 2011, en conséquence d’itinérance familiale et de négligence, une ordonnance de garde de trois mois a été rendue à l’égard de l’aînée, qui était alors âgée de quatre mois. L’enfant a été renvoyée à la charge de ses parents à l’âge de sept mois. Un dossier est demeuré ouvert au ministère du Développement social jusqu’en janvier 2013 : le Ministère a alors constaté que la famille, qui comptait désormais trois enfants, était introuvable.

Un nouveau dossier de protection de l’enfance a été ouvert en avril 2013 et l’est demeuré jusqu’en mars 2016, du fait de craintes à propos d’itinérance familiale et de violence entre partenaires intimes. En mars 2014, une ordonnance de placement sous un régime de protection a été rendue à l’égard des enfants, qui étaient âgés de trois ans, de deux ans et de moins d’un an. Une prorogation de six mois de l’ordonnance de garde a été prononcée en septembre 2014. Les enfants ont été renvoyés à la charge de S.H. et de C.H. en mars 2015.

En septembre 2017, des plaintes de violence entre partenaires intimes ont émergé encore une fois, et une ordonnance de surveillance a été rendue en novembre à l’égard des quatre enfants, qui avaient alors six, cinq, quatre et deux ans. L’année 2019 venue, un cinquième enfant avait vu le jour. Le 10 septembre 2019, les cinq enfants, à leur retour de la Colombie-Britannique, ont été placés sous un régime de protection au Nouveau-Brunswick en exécution d’une entente interprovinciale.

Ils avaient été pris en charge par le Ministry of Child Services de la Colombie-Britannique de septembre 2018 à septembre 2019. [4] La demande de tutelle a été déposée le 17 septembre 2019. Au moment où la demande a été entendue, il y avait alors quinze mois que le Ministre avait la charge des enfants, ou vingt-sept mois s’il est tenu compte de leur prise en charge en Colombie-Britannique. Les principales préoccupations du Ministre, à ce moment-là, étaient les suivantes : 1.

À l’époque où la famille habitait au Nouveau-Brunswick, des interventions en protection de l’enfance avaient eu lieu auprès d’elle pendant des années. 2. Les enfants connaissaient des difficultés à la fois scolaires, émotionnelles et développementales. 3. On avait contrevenu aux plans de sécurité adoptés. 4. Les enfants avaient été pris en charge de septembre 2018 à septembre 2019 en Colombie-Britannique; depuis septembre 2019, ils étaient pris en charge par le Ministre au Nouveau-Brunswick. 5. Le benjamin était pris en charge par le Ministre depuis sa naissance. 6.

Les conditions de vie de la mère n’étaient pas stables. 7. La mère, sortie d’une relation de violence, peinait à vivre sans aide. [5] Les ordonnances provisoires suivantes ont été rendues après le dépôt de la demande de tutelle du Ministre : 1. Le 19 septembre 2019, une ordonnance plaçant les enfants sous un régime de protection, ordonnance à laquelle la mère a consenti, est entrée en vigueur. 2.

Le 22 octobre 2019, la juge a fixé la date d’audition d’une demande du Ministre : la Cour était priée de prendre en considération, en vertu de l’art. 9 de la Loi , des affidavits déposés lors de procédures antérieures, et d’entendre certains témoignages par vidéoconférence. 3. Le 20 novembre 2019, il a été enjoint aux deux parties, par ordonnance procédurale, de donner les dates auxquelles elles pourraient

participer à une audience d’une heure, en décembre 2019, janvier 2020 et février 2020, où seraient abordées des questions de procédure. 4. Le 13 janvier 2020, une ordonnance a été rendue au sujet de la présentation de certains témoignages par vidéoconférence. Elle prescrivait aussi que soient pris en considération, en vertu de l’art. 9 de la Loi , sept affidavits produits lors de procédures antérieures conduites entre 2014 et 2017. 5. Le 10 juin 2020, la mise au rôle de l’affaire a été ordonnée; l’audition de la cause devait débuter le 23 novembre 2020.

Des directives ont été données en vue de la tenue éventuelle, dans le cas du père, d’une audience du type visé dans l’arrêt « G » (visant la nomination d’un avocat rémunéré par l’État) . [6] En tout, dix-huit personnes ont témoigné.

Comptaient parmi les témoins trois psychologues, les parents nourriciers des enfants, une travailleuse sociale qui a comparu depuis la Colombie-Britannique par vidéoconférence, des travailleurs sociaux de la protection de l’enfance qui étaient intervenus auprès de la famille, des travailleurs de soutien familial, un conseiller en santé mentale, des conseillers d’ approche en matière de prévention de la violence conjugale , un coordonnateur du programme Connexion compétences de la John Howard Society, et enfin la mère. [7] Des préoccupations communes se sont dégagées de la preuve apportée par les travailleurs sociaux et par les autres professionnels qui avaient œuvré auprès de la famille.

Il est permis de les résumer ainsi :

a) soins parentaux inconstants;

b) discipline insuffisante;

c) violence entre partenaires intimes;

d) logement non convenable et itinérance familiale;

e) problèmes de sécurité;

f) piètre alimentation;

g) manque des nécessités essentielles pour les enfants;

h) perturbations dans l’éducation des enfants. [8] L’un des témoignages les plus consternants est venu d’une travailleuse sociale de la Colombie-Britannique qui avait visité le foyer familial en septembre 2018. Le père, bien qu’il avait signé un plan lui interdisant d’habiter avec la mère et les enfants, habitait toujours avec eux. Il y avait des signes de violence familiale faite à la fois à la mère et aux enfants. [9] La travailleuse sociale a témoigné que, entrée dans le logement, elle avait aperçu de la vaisselle sale partout. Des insectes se déplaçaient dans la salle de bain.

Les enfants, en plus d’être [TRADUCTION] « crasseux », étaient couverts de piqûres de poux et de punaises. Il y avait très peu de nourriture. Les vêtements étaient empilés dans des sacs à ordures et un « bong » traînait sur le comptoir de cuisine. Elle a indiqué que les lits des enfants étaient constitués de matelas déposés à même le sol, d’un canapé et d’une causeuse. Le faisceau de la lampe qu’elle avait pointé sur le canapé avait provoqué un [TRADUCTION] « ressac » de punaises. Les enfants avaient des nids de poux sur la nuque.

Ils ont été immédiatement pris en charge. [10] La juge a examiné minutieusement la preuve considérable présentée. Il est évident que l’historique de l’affaire était connu de la juge, et elle l’a pris en compte. Son analyse des faits n’est pas contestée. Elle a prononcé l’ordonnance de tutelle après avoir appliqué la preuve et l’avoir rapportée à chacun des critères énoncés à l’art. 1 de la Loi , ainsi qu’elle y était tenue. III. Moyens d’appel [11] Trois moyens sont avancés dans l’avis d’appel additionnel :

a) La juge a commis une erreur de principe en accordant la tutelle au Ministre, parce qu’une ordonnance [TRADUCTION] « moins rigoureuse » pouvait être rendue et qu’il y avait des chances que donner [TRADUCTION] « plus de temps » à l’appelante aurait abouti à une réunification avec les enfants.

b) La juge a commis une erreur, dans le calcul du temps de prise en charge des enfants par le Ministre, en ne considérant pas les restrictions amenées par la COVID comme une circonstance exceptionnelle.

c) La juge a commis une erreur de principe en ne prenant pas de dispositions devant la divergence qui opposait les points de vue et les préférences des enfants à la [TRADUCTION] « thèse » soutenue par leur avocat. IV. Norme de contrôle [12] La déférence est la norme de contrôle applicable dans les causes où il est statué sur la garde d’un enfant. La portée du contrôle en appel est restreinte. Le mandat du tribunal d’appel n’est pas d’apprécier de nouveau la preuve. L’appréciation de la preuve est du ressort du juge des faits.

S’il est conclu que la solution prescrite par le juge du procès « est dénuée de fondement dans les faits ou si cette solution est fondée sur une erreur de principe, le défaut de prendre en considération tous les facteurs d’influence pertinents ou la considération d’un facteur dénué de pertinence », l’intervention en appel est justifiée ( Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires) c. A.N. et Y.N. , 2003 NBCA 45 , 264 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 80 , le juge en chef Drapeau, tel était alors son titre, par. 11). Depuis, la Cour suit et applique ce principe ( C.A. c.

Ministre des Familles et des Enfants , 2018 NBCA 67 , [2018] A.N.-B. n o 246 (QL) , par. 10 à 13 ). V. Analyse A. La juge a-t-elle commis une erreur en ne prononçant pas une « ordonnance moins rigoureuse »? [13] Par ce premier moyen d’appel, la mère avance que la juge a commis une erreur de droit en ne prononçant pas une nouvelle ordonnance de garde qui lui aurait accordé plus de temps pour accomplir les changements estimés nécessaires à l’exercice réussi de son rôle de parent. Nous avons vu que les enfants avaient été pris en charge au Nouveau-Brunswick pendant quinze mois.

Il se dégageait de la preuve, dans une certaine mesure, que la mère progressait et tirait le meilleur parti des divers services qui lui étaient offerts. La juge a reconnu que la mère avait accompli des progrès; elle s’en est remise, cependant, à une analyse de l’intérêt supérieur des enfants pour conclure que la permanence leur était nécessaire. Sur ce point, elle a écrit : [TRADUCTION] « Il est possible que S.H. soit en mesure de progresser davantage si elle dispose encore de six à neuf mois.

Cependant, je n’estime pas qu’il soit dans l’intérêt supérieur des enfants de prolonger leur prise en charge par le Ministre en prononçant une nouvelle ordonnance de garde pour une issue incertaine » (par. 408). Elle a ajouté : [TRADUCTION] « Je reconnais l’incidence qu’une ordonnance de tutelle aura vraisemblablement, en particulier sur les trois enfants les plus âgés, qui ont conscience de ce qui se produit et qui ont exprimé le vœu ardent de vivre avec leur mère. Mais, à ce stade, le besoin de permanence des enfants l’emporte.

Le plan proposé par le Ministre saura mieux apporter aux enfants la stabilité et la sécurité dont ils éprouvent le besoin et garantira que leurs besoins respectifs seront comblés. Je conclus qu’il est dans l’intérêt supérieur des enfants d’ordonner la tutelle » (par. 410). [14] Le juge d’appel Robertson s’est penché sur le par. 55(2) dans Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires c. S.B. , 2008 NBCA 16 , 327 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 101 .

Au cours de la période de vingt-quatre mois que prévoit la Loi , le parent doit démontrer, tandis que la garde de son enfant est confiée au Ministre, qu’il peut exercer correctement son rôle de parent. Il est interdit de proroger les ordonnances de garde provisoires au-delà de cette période (par. 6 et 16). En l’espèce, la mère avance, comme je l’ai indiqué, qu’il aurait fallu lui accorder les neuf mois additionnels.

Elle affirme que l’emploi par la juge des mots [TRADUCTION] « issue incertaine » peut s’interpréter comme signifiant qu’un doute subsistait sur ce que pourraient être les progrès de ses habiletés de parentage, et qu’elle avait droit au bénéfice de ce doute vu la permanence d’une ordonnance de tutelle.

Elle soutient que, pour pouvoir prononcer cette ordonnance, la juge devait, en droit, avoir conclu que toutes les autres mesures avaient échoué. [15] Si nous nous rendions à l’argumentation de la mère, nous nous trouverions à apprécier de nouveau la preuve sur laquelle la juge s’est fondée pour décider qu’une ordonnance de tutelle servait l’intérêt supérieur des enfants à ce moment-là. Nous serions contraints de conclure que la juge a fait erreur dans son analyse.

Nous nous trouverions à adopter une interprétation de la Loi qui interdirait au Ministre, dans les affaires de ce genre, de démontrer le bien-fondé de sa demande de tutelle avant la fin de la période de vingt-quatre mois lorsqu’il ressort de la preuve que des progrès sont accomplis dans les habiletés de parentage. La mère n’a pu citer aucun texte de droit à l’appui de sa prétention et, avec égards, nous devons rejeter cette argumentation. Le juge Green a d’ailleurs abordé ce point précis dans S.G. et E.S. c. Ministre des Familles et des Enfants , 2019 NBCA 66 , [2019] A.N.-B. n o 240 (QL) . Dans cette affaire,

il y avait déjà vingt-quatre mois que l’enfant était prise en charge.

Néanmoins, le juge Green, qui a confirmé l’ordonnance de tutelle, afait observer que la juge saisie de la requête, quoiqu’elle ait admis les progrès accomplis par la mère pour ce qui est de l’emménagementdans un logement convenable, des tâches ménagères, des dépenses, du budget et de la planification des repas, et qu’elle ait reconnul’attachement profond et l’amour unissant la mère et son enfant, demeurait « préoccupée » des habiletés de parentage de la mère et de sacapacité de voir à la sécurité de l’enfant (par. 18). [16] Texte du par. 55(2) de la Loi : Custody order 55(2) The court may extend an order madeunder subsection (1) for additional periods ofup to six months each, up to a maximum oftwenty-four consecutive months including theperiod of the initial order and any periodduring which the child was in care under acustody agreement.

Ordonnance de garde 55(2) La cour peut proroger pour des périodessupplémentaires de six mois chacune aumaximum une ordonnance rendue enapplication du paragraphe (1), mais le totaldes périodes, y compris la période initiale ettoute période pendant laquelle l’enfant a étépris en charge en vertu d’une entente de gardene doit pas dépasser vingt-quatre moisconsécutifs. [17] La règle des vingt-quatre mois prescrit la période maximale pour laquelle peut être prorogée une ordonnancede garde.

La juge savait que les enfants, avant leur retour au Nouveau-Brunswick et leur prise en charge immédiate par le Ministre le10 septembre 2019, avaient été pris en charge par le Ministry of Child Services de la Colombie-Britannique depuis septembre 2018. Ellea constaté que les autorités de protection de l’enfance avaient eu la charge successive des enfants pendant plus de vingt-quatre moisconsécutifs (par. 406). Elle a ensuite écrit : [TRADUCTION]Le principe qui entre en jeu à l’art. 55 de la Loi, ainsi que la Cour d’appel du Nouveau-Brunswick l’a exprimé dans Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires c.

S.B., 2008 NBCA 16 [327 R.N.-B. (2e) 101], impose une limite de temps au parent pourdémontrer sa capacité de répondre aux besoins des enfants. Le principe demeure pertinent, à mon sens, et la cour ne peut passer outre.[par. 407] Je suis du même avis. [18] En l’espèce, une preuve abondante de faits passés relatait une négligence des enfants et une violence familialeremontant à 2011. Je conviens avec la mère que la Loi exige de l’État qu’il tente une réunification de la famille avant de prendre quelquemesure que ce soit en vue de soustraire les enfants, à

titre permanent, à la charge de leurs parents. Dans l’arrêt Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires) c. C. (G.C.), (SCC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 1073, [1988] A.C.S. no 48(QL), la juge L’Heureux-Dubé constate que le préambule de la Loi porte qu’on ne devrait soustraire les enfants à la charge de leursparents, partiellement ou complètement, que lorsqu’aucune autre mesure ne convient (par. 13, avec renvoi à QL). La distinction à faireest là. La mère avance que les enfants ne peuvent être soustraits à sa charge à

titre permanent que si toutes les autres mesures ont échoué.Je n’interprète pas le droit ainsi. La Loi indique qu’on ne devrait soustraire les enfants à la surveillance parentale que conformément à sesdispositions. [19] La mère a invoqué des décisions de juridictions inférieures où plus de temps a été accordé aux parents pourprogresser dans le rétablissement de leur situation; toutefois, rien dans la preuve n’indiquait en l’espèce qu’une réunification demeuraitenvisageable, alors que la preuve présentée l’indiquait dans ces autres causes.

Cette opinion trouve un appui dans la preuve apportée par des témoins du Ministre. Je signale notamment, ici, le témoignage d’une travailleuse sociale, Mme Scott, ainsi que le rapport de Mme Campbell qui, sous la rubrique [TRADUCTION] « Résumé et conclusion », a exprimé cet avis : [TRADUCTION]Cependant, il persiste une dynamique de la personnalité infraliminaire émanant de sa victimisation passée et d’expériences négativespersonnelles de son enfance qui pourra la détourner de la voie du progrès si elle n’y demeure pas attentive.

Sont fonction de cettedynamique ses relations d’attachement à des proches, sa tendance à la minimisation des problèmes ou à des excès de confiance oud’optimisme quant aux solutions aux problèmes, ainsi que sa capacité d’assumer toutes les responsabilités concrètes qui sont la

contrepartie de l’autonomie. [20] La juge a examiné les conditions de logement de la mère. Elle a souligné que la mère s’était mise en coupleavec un homme qui avait des antécédents judiciaires et que les travailleurs sociaux avaient vu hurler, crier, et la menacer. Elle a indiquéque la mère avait laissé les enfants deux mois en Colombie-Britannique tandis qu’elle traversait le Canada à destination du Nouveau-Brunswick.

Elle a fait mention du rapport de Mme Campbell, qui constatait que la mère, si elle avait accompli des progrès aucours des deux années précédentes, minimisait néanmoins le traumatisme des enfants et [TRADUCTION] « la part qu’elle y avait eue ». La juge a reconnu que, de l’avis de Mme Campbell, une issue favorable était modérément probable dans le cas de la mère (par. 166). [21] La juge a fait observer que la mère était accablée de difficultés profondes et chroniques à s’acquitter de son rôle de parent depuis 2011 et ne s’était jamais chargée des cinq enfants à la fois (par. 396 et 397).

Elle a noté que Mme Campbell étaitd’avis qu’il faudrait à la mère une thérapie cognitive du comportement. La juge a conclu que rien dans la preuve n’indiquait que la mèreétait en mesure de répondre aux besoins des enfants sur le plan de la santé mentale, physique et affective, ou de leur procurer un milieustable où ils seraient en sécurité (par. 353). [22] L’alinéa e) de la définition du terme « intérêt supérieur de l’enfant » à l’art. 1 de la Loi exige des juges qu’ilsprennent en compte les avantages de tout projet présenté par le Ministre.

Il est évident que la juge a soigneusement mis en balance lerenvoi des enfants à la charge de leur mère et les avantages du projet du Ministre proposant leur prise en charge pour l’avenir. Elle aconclu qu’il servait l’intérêt supérieur des enfants de leur procurer la stabilité qu’il leur fallait à ce moment-là, au lieu d’attendre. Je nerelève aucune erreur dans la décision de la juge de ne pas accorder de prorogation de l’ordonnance de garde. Il lui appartenait de prendrecette décision, qui appelle la déférence. Ce moyen d’appel est sans fondement. B.

La juge a-t-elle commis une erreur en ne prenant pas en considération les effets de la pandémie de la COVID-19 et desrestrictions imposées? [23] Par ce moyen d’appel, la mère soutient que la juge a commis une erreur de principe en ne prenant pas enconsidération l’effet des restrictions liées à la COVID-19 sur ses visites auprès de ses enfants, de même que sur sa capacité de trouver unlogement convenable. Les visites qui réunissaient la mère et les enfants ont cessé de mars 2020 à mai 2020; l’exercice du droit de visites’est toutefois poursuivi au téléphone. Le calendrier de visites régulier a repris en juin 2020.

Pendant cette période, la mère a continué derecevoir les services de soutien que le Ministre avait ménagés. Il est significatif que la mère n’a trouvé de logement convenable que deuxmois avant l’audience.

La juge a pris acte des périodes cumulatives où la mère n’avait pas eu la charge de ses enfants (par. 324, 328,331, 334 et 337). [24] À considérer la preuve apportée par Mme Campbell et le témoignage de la travailleuse sociale principale, Mme Scott, il est manifeste que l’interruption des visites régulières, de mars à mai 2020, n’aurait rien changé à l’issue de l’instance (par. 12 à 16, affidavit de Mme Scott souscrit le 5 octobre 2020).

La juge a mis un soin particulier à résumer le témoignage de Mme Scottdans ses motifs (par. 299 et suiv.). [25] L’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant est la seule considération qui importe dans une cause comme celle-ci. Leparagraphe 53(2) de la Loi indique clairement que la cour, lorsqu’elle statue sur une demande de tutelle, doit placer l’intérêt supérieur del’enfant au-dessus de toute autre considération.

La Cour suprême a précisé que le terme « intérêt de l’enfant » englobe non seulement sonbien-être physique et économique, mais également son bien-être affectif, psychologique, intellectuel et moral, et que l’analyse est contextuelle (Young c.

Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 R.C.S. 3, [1993] A.C.S. no 112 (QL), par. 70 et 80). [26] Étant donné les conclusions de la juge, qui a constaté qu’il n’était pas dans l’intérêt supérieur des enfants dereporter l’ordonnance de tutelle (par. 317 à 394) et qu’il n’était pas certain que la mère pourrait exercer correctement son rôle de parent,je suis d’avis que l’interruption des visites imputable aux restrictions amenées par la COVID-19 n’a pas agi sur l’issue de l’instance. Cemoyen d’appel est donc rejeté. C.

Le rôle de l’avocat des enfants [27] Je commencerai par citer l’ex-juge en chef Beverly McLachlin, qui a écrit ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]« Pour déterminer ce qui sert l’intérêt des enfants, il paraît logique de s’enquérir de ce que pensent les enfants. Comment peut-on évaluer

l’intérêt d’un enfant sans qu’il ait été entendu? » (« Children and the Legal Process: Changing the Rules of Evidence » (1992) 50 The Advocate 727). [28] Le 12 décembre 1991, le Canada a ratifié la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant des Nations Unies (20 novembre 1989, R.T. Can. 1992 n o 3). L’article 12 de la Convention prévoit ce qui suit : 1.

States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules

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