Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2013 SKPC 168

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2013 SKPC 168 Date: November 5, 2013 Information: 44739578 Location: Regina _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Levi Blind Appearing: Mitchell Miller For the Crown Karolee Zawislak For the Accused JUDGMENT J.D. KALMAKOFF , J [ 1 ] On September 2, 2012, Levi Blind got into a fight with Joshua Pritchard-Acevedo at a house party in Regina. The two young men were friends at the time, and both had been drinking that evening. The fight took a very serious turn when Mr.

Blind went into the kitchen of the house and got a knife. He stabbed Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo twice, including once in the heart. Somehow, Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo survived. [ 2 ] Mr. Blind has pled guilty to a charge of aggravated assault, contrary to

section 268 of the Criminal Code , arising out of that incident. This is my decision on sentence.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [ 3 ] Mr. Blind committed this offence when he was just shy of his 20 th birthday. Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo was one year younger. The two of them had been friends since they were in elementary school. On the night of the offence, they were at the same house party. [ 4 ] Mr. Blind was extremely intoxicated, to the point that he now has little memory of the incident. However, witnesses said that Mr. Blind, who had been at the party for approximately three to four hours before the incident occurred, had been causing problems for much of the night.

He was trying to pick fights with a number of people at the party. He made several disrespectful comments to Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo, mainly focussed on Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo’s cultural heritage. [ 5 ] Eventually, Mr. Blind provoked Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo to the point that they engaged in a physical fight. Mr. Pritchard- Acevedo, who was wearing a ring on his hand, punched Mr. Blind in the face, causing a small injury. Mr. Blind then walked into the kitchen, retrieved a large knife from the drawer, and returned to the living room area. Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo said “I thought we were friends”, as Mr.

Blind walked towards him. Mr. Blind then lunged at Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo, and stabbed him twice in the chest. Other people intervened at this point, and one of the interveners suffered a cut to his hand that required stitches. Finally, after a brief struggle, another person was able to get the knife away from Mr. Blind. [ 6 ] Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo’s situation was critical, as the knife had pierced the right ventricle of his heart. He was rushed to Regina General Hospital, where doctors had to perform an emergency sternotomy and open-heart surgery to repair his wounds.

Before losing consciousness, he pleaded with the medical staff to not let him die. While on the operating table, Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo nearly died; his heart stopped beating for four minutes. In addition to the injury to his heart, he suffered a collapsed lung and a serious cut to his right arm that required five staples to close. Through a combination of good fortune and first-rate medical treatment, Mr. Pritchard- Acevedo survived, a fact which amazed even the doctors who treated him. He remained in hospital for more than a week, and has lasting damage from the injuries he suffered.

His ability to participate in sports and perform physical labour has been permanently affected. II. POSITION OF THE PARTIES [ 7 ] The Crown seeks a period of imprisonment of three years, along with the mandatory firearms prohibition and DNA sample orders required by the Criminal Code . [ 8 ] The defence asks the Court to consider a community-based sentence, involving a period of probation, with electronic monitoring, citing Mr.

Blind’s youth, lack of record, otherwise good character, early guilty plea, remorse, positive work history, positive Pre-Sentence Report, the efforts he has made at rehabilitation since the offence, and the important role he plays in the lives of his spouse and child. If incarceration is necessary, suggests the defence, it should be a much shorter period than what the Crown is seeking. III. THE OFFENDER [ 9 ] Mr. Blind is 21 years old. He has no previous criminal record. He is the father of a two year old girl. He has been involved in a relationship with Cheyenne Lavallee, the mother of his child, for four years.

When Ms. Lavallee became pregnant with their daughter, Mr. Blind quit school so that he could join the workforce and support his new family. He was in grade 11 at the time. [ 10 ] Mr. Blind obviously takes his role as a provider for his family seriously. Since he left school, he has a commendable record of employment. He has held a number of different jobs, most recently working as an apprentice carpenter. He encouraged his partner to go back to school so that she could finish her education. He is described as hard working, personable, mature, and a devoted father.

[ 11 ] The initial Pre-Sentence Report was generally positive. In it, Mr. Blind was assessed as posing a medium risk to re-offend. However, an updated Pre-Sentence Report, dated October 31, 2013, paints a slightly different picture, suggesting inconsistent reporting to bail supervision, and minimal compliance with bail conditions. [ 12 ] It is clear that Mr. Blind’s over-consumption of alcohol played a major role in the offence. While the nature of the offence is something that can be described as very much out of character for Mr.

Blind, it appears that others who know him have been aware for some time that alcohol tends to bring out the worst in him. Since the offence, Mr. Blind has received counselling for addictions through his bail conditions, but his performance in that programming was less than encouraging. IV. ANALYSIS [ 13 ] In determining the appropriate sentence for this offence, I am guided by the provisions of sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . A sentence must be one that fits the particular offence and the individual offender before the Court, but I cannot focus entirely on Mr. Blind and his personal circumstances.

While Mr. Blind is central to the process, his circumstances cannot be the entire focus. [ 14 ] In order to achieve the fundamental purpose of sentencing outlined in

section 718 of the Criminal Code , namely contributing to respect for law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society, the sentence I impose must be a just sanction. It must pursue one or more of the following objectives: denunciation of unlawful conduct; deterring the offender and others from committing offences; separation of the offender from society if necessary; rehabilitation; providing reparation to the victim and community; and promoting a sense of responsibility and acknowledging the harm done.

The relative emphasis to be placed on each of these objectives must be appropriate for the circumstances of this offence and this offender. [ 15 ] Even though the emphasis given to the sentencing objectives listed in

section 718 may vary according to the circumstances of the case, the resulting sentence must respect the principle of proportionality.

Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code says that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: R. v. Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6 , [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206. [ 16 ] I must also have regard for the secondary sentencing principles listed in

section 718.2 of the Criminal Code , including consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, totality, parity, the need to consider all available reasonable sanctions other than imprisonment, and the need to consider the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

a) Proportionality -

section 718.1 [ 17 ] Proportionality is central to the sentencing process: R. v. Nasogaluak , supra ; R. v. Solowan , 2008 SCC 62 , [2008] 3 S.C.R. 309. It is the most important of the factors codified in sections 718 to 718.2 : R. v. Arcand , 2010 ABCA 63 . In R. v.

Ipeelee , 2012 SCC 13 , [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 at paragraph 37 , Justice LeBel described proportionality as the “ sine qua non ” of a just sanction, saying that a sentence which properly respects the principle of proportionality inevitably ensures that secondary goals such as denunciation, restraint, promoting justice for victims, and maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice, are met. [ 18 ] In R. v. Yuzicapi , 2011 SKCA 134 , Chief Justice Klebuc emphasized the importance of proportionality in sentencing, and provided guidance as to its application.

At paragraph 28, he wrote: The gravity of an offence and the moral culpability of the offender in committing the offence are the principal factors to be considered in sentencing. In D.S.K. this Court stated the gravity of an offence lies in three considerations: (

i) the nature and comparative seriousness of the offence, (ii) the circumstances of its commission, and (iii) the harm caused by it. [ 19 ] Aggravated assault is an indictable offence, which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. Committing aggravated assault involves wounding, maiming, disfiguring, or endangering the life of another person. It is a serious personal injury

offence as defined in

section 752 of the Criminal Code. It is excluded from eligibility for conditional sentences of imprisonment. Thenature and comparative seriousness define aggravated assault as an offence of significant gravity. [20] The circumstances surrounding the commission of aggravated assault can vary greatly. In this case, Mr. Blind had voluntarilyconsumed a significant amount of alcohol. He then spent much of the evening trying to goad Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo and others intosome sort of altercation. Eventually, Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo took the bait, and they fought. Then, once the fight appeared to be over,Mr.

Blind retrieved a weapon, and attacked Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo, who was unarmed. He stabbed him in the chest. The knife piercedMr. Pritchard-Acevedo’s heart, causing injuries that came within a hair’s breadth of being fatal. Mr. Blind did not stop the attack untilsomeone was able to wrestle the knife away from him, and in the process, another innocent person suffered a serious injury. Thecircumstances of this case, including the harm caused to Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo, speak of a very grave offence and a significant degreeof responsibility on the part of Mr. Blind.

b) Purposes of Sentencing -

section 718 [21] Mr. Blind has no prior criminal record. His use of alcohol is an issue that needs to be addressed, but I am confident that, ifthat were the only thing I needed to consider in sentencing, it would not be necessary to incarcerate him. I am satisfied that he needs littlein the way of specific deterrence from the sentence that I impose.

I expect that the consequences of his conduct, namely being chargedwith and convicted of a criminal offence, the impact that may have on his ability to provide for his partner and daughter, and the guilt hefeels over very nearly killing a man who was once his friend are likely sufficient to deter him from committing further offences. His lackof past record suggests that public protection could be accomplished through less restrictive measures than separating him from society. [22] However, the sentence cannot focus entirely on Mr. Blind.

The offence he committed is one that requires a sentence whichadequately denounces his conduct, and must be sufficient to deter others from committing similar offences. The Court of Appeal inSaskatchewan has made it clear that unprovoked acts of serious violence must be met with serious sentences that focus on denunciationand deterrence, even where the offender is of good character and has no prior criminal record: R. v. Dufault, (Sask.C.A.); R. v. Sayazie, 2010 SKCA 14; R. v. C.G.S., 2005 SKCA 65, 269 Sask. R. 247.

c) Relevant aggravating and mitigating factors [23] The major aggravating factors in this case centre around the seriousness of the offence. Mr. Blind’s attack caused horrific,near-fatal injuries to Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo. The physical consequences of those injuries will be long-lasting. The emotional scarscaused to Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo and his family may never heal. I also consider the fact that Mr. Blind spent a good deal of timeprovoking the initial confrontation to be an aggravating factor. His resort to a weapon against an unarmed person is aggravating. I alsoconsider the fact that Mr.

Blind voluntarily became extremely intoxicated, knowing that he does not mix well with alcohol to be anaggravating factor. [24] There are also a number of mitigating factors. They include: • Mr. Blind’s otherwise good character; • The strong support from both his family and the community; • His lack of criminal record; • His strong work ethic and steady employment history; • His guilty plea, which occurred prior to trial or preliminary inquiry; • He is genuinely remorseful for the offence; and • He has made some efforts at rehabilitation since the offence occurred.

d) Parity: sentences in similar cases

[25] The principle of parity, embodied in

section 718.2(

b) of the Criminal Code, dictates that an offender’s sentence should besimilar to sentences imposed on similar offenders, for similar offences, committed in similar circumstances. Uniformity in sentencing isnot required, as the individual nature of sentencing and the need to respect the principle of proportionality mean that disparity can existwhere circumstances warrant. Such disparity, however, should not be egregious, or unjustified. [26] R. v.

Sayazie, supra, dealt with a Crown appeal from sentence, where the trial judge had imposed an 18 month term ofimprisonment, less remand time, for an offender convicted of aggravated assault. Increasing the sentence to three years, the Court ofAppeal noted, at paragraph 7, that: In cases of this kind, a custodial term of between two and four years is appropriate, even assuming an offender of previous goodcharacter with no criminal record: R. v.

Dufault. [27] While the comment noted from Sayazie is a guideline, and not a rule, it is trite to say that sentences of imprisonment arefrequently imposed for aggravated assault in Saskatchewan. [28] In considering the principle of parity, the following cases are of particular relevance: R. v. Dufault, supra: In this case, the offender intentionally shot a neighbour over an ongoing dispute related to farmland boundaries. At the time ofsentencing, the offender was 65 and had no criminal record. He turned himself in to the police after the offence, and pled guilty.

He wasnoted to be elderly, illiterate and in less than perfect health. As a result of the conviction, he had lost his farmland and his livelihood. Hehad been on strict bail for a long time, with no reported breaches. The trial judge imposed a one year less a day sentence on theaggravated assault charge, consecutive to a one year sentence on a related firearms charge.

The Court of Appeal increased the sentenceon the aggravated assault charge to two years imprisonment, consecutive to the sentence for the firearms offence, noting the generalrange of 2-4 years, and pointing out that the gravity of the offence cannot be ignored in the name of considering the offender’s personalcircumstances. R. v. Sayazie, supra: In this case, the offender, who had no prior record, administered a serious beating to his common-law spouse. He dragged her outside in-39 degree temperatures, clad only in a hoodie and her underwear, and continued to beat her.

The beating and hypothermia caused significant lasting injuries to the victim. The offender was highly intoxicated at the time, and was on bail for another charge ofaggravated assault. He spent 133 days on remand before pleading guilty. The trial judge imposed an 18 month jail sentence, reduced bynine months when credit for remand time was factored in. The Court of Appeal increased the sentence to three years, less remand time,noting that the 18 month sentence was “...not proportionate to the gravity of the offence and did not give sufficient emphasis to theprinciples of denunciation and deterrence.” R. v.

Cook, 2013 SKCA (SentDig) 6: In this case, the offender was 31 years old, and had no prior record. He was on bail at the time he committed aggravated assault. Whileintoxicated, he stabbed the victim several times with a pair of scissors, causing a punctured lung, along with other less serious injuries. The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less a day, minus two months credit for pre-trial custody. The Court of Appeal upheldthe sentence. R. v. Naistus, 2004 SKCA 142, 254 Sask. R. 318: In this case, the offender was 20 years old, and had a two year old child.

He was employed, and had significant support in thecommunity and from his family. He had a minor criminal record. He committed aggravated assault by issuing a prolonged beating,which left the victim with serious injuries. The reason for the assault was that he found the victim in bed with his common-law spouse.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of three years, which the Court of Appeal reduced to two years less a day, largely because they feltsuch a reduction would be fair, in light of the fact that the Crown at trial may have misled the offender into thinking they were going totake a less serious position on sentence than they ultimately did. R. v. Gosselin, (Sask. C.A.): The 29 year old offender in this case stabbed the victim twice in the back. The injuries were not serious. The offender had a lengthyrecord, including convictions for assault, and robbery. The trial judge imposed a sentence of six months.

The Court of Appeal increasedthe sentence to 15 months, noting that:

...such an offence would normally attract a sentence in the range of 18 to 24 months, however we recognize the accused’s efforts to turnhis life around and the fact that after a lengthy record he had not been in the justice system for approximately five years. R. v. C.G.S., supra: In this case, the offender found his common-law spouse and a friend in a bedroom together at a party. He administered a severe beatingto the friend, causing severe fractures to his facial bones. The offender was 28, and had a lengthy youth record for violence, and also hada record as an adult.

The trial judge imposed a 12 month conditional sentence order. The Court of Appeal overturned the sentence,noting that a conditional sentence (1) failed to give proper consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, (2) was notproportionate to the gravity of the offence, (3) did not reflect the degree of the offender’s responsibility, and (4) did not comply with theparity principle.

The Court commented that the appropriate range of sentence was a jail term of 20 months to two years less a day, butgave the offender credit for the time spent subject to the conditional sentence before the appeal was heard, and imposed a jail term of 12months. R. v. Starblanket (1988), (SK CA), 67 Sask. R. 244 (C.A.): The offender in this case was 47 years old, with a dated criminal record that included two convictions for assault causing bodily harm. On two separate occasions, he committed aggravated assault against his wife.

One occasion involved a serious beating, and on thesecond occasion, he stabbed her seven times while intoxicated. The trial judge imposed a jail sentence of six months, which the Court ofAppeal increased to two years less a day. R. v. Bird, 1991 SKCA (SentDig) 117: This case involved a 24 year old offender who had a criminal record, but no previous convictions for violent offences. A fight with thevictim led to a stabbing, with serious injuries. The Court of Appeal upheld the 30 month jail sentence imposed by the trial judge. R. v.

Pelletier, 1989 SKCA (SentDig) 44: In this case, the offender was 19, and had a minor criminal record. He stabbed his common-law spouse twice. Her injuries requiredsurgery to repair a perforated bowel, and she spent two weeks in hospital. The trial judge imposed a suspended sentence, which theCourt of Appeal overturned and replaced with a sentence of 18 months in jail, noting the gravity of the offence and the need for generaldeterrence. R. v. Fiddler, 2005 SKCA (SentDig) 21: The 19 year old offender in this case had a minor criminal record, and was diagnosed with FASD.

While riding in a taxi, the cab drivermade a racist comment, and the offender put a knife to the driver’s throat, causing superficial injuries. The trial judge imposed a oneyear jail term, followed by two years probation. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence. R. v. Belanger, 2004 SKCA (SentDig) 26: The offender in this case was 24. He got into a fight with the victim. Both were intoxicated at the time. The offender inflicted seriousinjuries on the victim by kicking the victim after he had fallen to the ground. The offender had a significant record, but no convictionsfor violence.

The original sentence of 18 months jail plus one year probation was upheld by the Court of Appeal. R. v. Laliberte, 2013 SKQB 25: In this case, the offender was 34, and had a prior record. The offence involved an unprovoked beating which left the victim with seriousinjuries. While Laliberte did not participate in the beating, he facilitated it. He had a previous record, including one prior conviction forassault with a weapon. The Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of 18 months, less 260 days credit for pre-sentence custody, followedby probation for one year. R. v.

Kim, 2011 SKCA 74: In this case, the offender got into a fight outside a bar. He struck the victim with a beer bottle, then used the broken glass to inflict otherinjuries on him. The victim suffered facial injuries, permanent scarring and nerve damage. The offender pled guilty after preliminaryinquiry, but before trial. The trial judge imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the offender’sappeal of conviction, and denied the Crown’s application for leave to appeal the sentence.

e) Restraint [29] Sections 718.2(

d) and (

e) require that an offender not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions are appropriate. It alsorequires that sentencing judges consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances, withparticular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

[30] Mr. Blind is a person of aboriginal descent. As such,

section 718.2(

e) requires that I give particular attention to hiscircumstances in determining the appropriate sentence. In the Pre-Sentence Report, and in the submissions of defence counsel, it isnoted that Mr. Blind does not feel that he has experienced the negative effects of racism, nor did he suffer poverty or abuse during hischildhood and youth. He has not suffered any effects relating to dislocation from his First Nation community. While Mr. Blind is amember of the Neekaneet First Nation, he has never lived there and has no strong connection to that community. He does not feel thathis ethnicity has played a

part in his criminal offending. [31] That does not mean, however, that I can disregard his status in determining the appropriate sentence. According to the Pre-Sentence Report, both of Mr. Blind’s parents attended residential schools. Substance abuse, transience and domestic violence existedwithin his immediate family when he was very young. As noted in R. v.

Ipeelee, supra, at paragraph 60: ...[C]ourts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how thathistory continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuseand suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify adifferent sentence for Aboriginal offenders.

Rather, they provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel. [32] The Supreme Court also made it clear in Ipeelee that proper consideration of

section 718.2(

e) does not require the offender toestablish a causal link between systemic or background factors and the commission of the offence in order to have those factorsconsidered by the sentencing judge. I must consider how those factors may bear on such things as Mr. Blind’s moral blameworthiness,as well as how they may bear on the effectiveness of deterrence and denunciation in sentencing. In Ipeelee, the Supreme Court alsopointed out that the remedial purpose of

section 718.2(

e) must not be negated through slavish adherence to parity in sentencing.Furthermore, the mere fact that the offender is convicted of a violent offence does not mean that

section 718.2(

e) can be ignored. [33] Having said all of that, I am of the view that

section 718.2(

e) does not require that I adopt a predominantly restorativeapproach in Mr. Blind’s case. He is not an active member of, nor does he have a strong connection to, a First Nations community. Hisoffence was committed in the City of Regina. As such, even taking

section 718.2(

e) into account, denunciation and deterrence are stillthe primary goals that I need to address in sentencing in this case. I consider the systemic and background factors mentioned in Ipeelee,supra and R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 as factors which impact on Mr. Blind’s moral blameworthiness,even if he is not consciously aware of or does not acknowledge those factors.

They are mitigating in that respect, however, they do notdiminish his moral blameworthiness to such a degree as to make a non-custodial sentence appropriate. [34] In this case, a community-based disposition, such as suspended sentence with electronic monitoring would impose a sanction,while allowing Mr. Blind to continue to work and support his family. Rehabilitation could be accomplished, and the impact on Mr.Blind’s family would be minimized. However, in my view, that would not be an adequate response to the crime Mr.

Blind committed, assuch a sentence would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offence or the degree of Mr. Blind`s responsibility: R. v. Pelletier, supra;R. v. C.G.S., supra. A suspended sentence with probation is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000]1 S.C.R. 61, and is not designed to punish, or to have denunciatory or general deterrent effects. A suspended sentence is generallyinadequate when the sentence calls for a focus on deterrence and denunciation: R. v. Rawn, supra; R. v. Dunn, 2011 NBCA 19; R. v.Taylor (1997), (SK CA), 163 Sask. R. 29 (C.A.).

The essence of general deterrence is punishment: R. v. Rawn, 2012ONCA 487, at para. 33; R. v. P.(B.W.), 2006 SCC 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941, and where a sentence is required to focus on deterrence anddenunciation, it is important that the sentence contain a significant punitive element. A suspended sentence in this case would alsoviolate the principle of parity. [35] While I have sympathy for Mr. Blind’s personal circumstances, it would be an error to allow emphasis on his personalcircumstances to outweigh proper consideration of the gravity of the offence. As noted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v.

K.(J.C.),2013 ABCA 50, at para 31: The unhappy duty of the Courts on occasion is to impose sentences that may seem harsh for the individual, but are driven by the need toreflect the degree of injury to our common values as well as to the victim of the offence. The imposition of condign punishment is a keyelement to the maintenance of confidence on the part of the public in the law and the justice system.

[ 36 ] Taking into account the serious nature of the injuries inflicted upon Mr. Pritchard-Acevedo and the degree of Mr. Blind’s culpability, I conclude that the gravity of the offence in this case is so significant, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence so strong, that no sanction short of imprisonment would be reasonable in the circumstances. [ 37 ] Consideration of the circumstances of the offence in this case, along with all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, Mr. Blind’s personal circumstances, and

section 718.2 (

e) of the Criminal Code leads me to the conclusion that the sentence in this case should be in line with the sentences imposed in R. v. Cook, supra; R. v. Belanger, supra; R. v. Naistus , supra; and R. v. Pelletier, supra . Those are the cases in which I find the most similarity, in terms of the facts, and the personal circumstances of the offenders. [ 38 ] I sentence Mr. Blind to a term of imprisonment of 21 months, to be served in a Provincial Correctional Centre. [ 39 ] Following that, he will be on probation for one year, with the following conditions: 1. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour; 2.

Appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court; 3. Notify the Court or probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the Court or probation officer of any change of employment or occupation; 4. Report to a probation officer at 2 nd Floor, 1942 Hamilton Street, Regina, Saskatchewan, ph. (306) 787-3808 (toll free 1-888-586- 6363), in person, within 7 calendar days of his release from jail, and after that as told to do so by his probation officer or designate; 5.

Live at a residence approved by his probation officer and not change that residence without the prior written permission of his probation officer or designate or the Court; 6. Participate in assessment and complete programming for addictions, which may include in-patient and out-patient treatment, as told to do so by his probation officer. [ 40 ] I also make an order, pursuant to

section 487.051 of the Criminal Code , authorizing the taking from Mr. Blind of a DNA sample for forensic analysis. [ 41 ] I also make an order pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code , prohibiting Mr. Blind from having in his possession the items listed in that

section for 10 years. [ 42 ] This offence occurred before October 24, 2013, and therefore the victim surcharge is not mandatory. In light of the sentence of imprisonment I have imposed, and Mr. Blind’s family circumstances, the surcharge is waived, as I am satisfied it would present a hardship. J.D. Kalmakoff, J